A second part of The mixture of scholasticall divinity, with practical, in several tractates: wherein some of the most difficult knots in divinity are untyed, many dark places of Scripture cleared, sundry heresies and errors refuted ... Whereunto are annexed, several letters of the same author, and Dr. Jeremy Taylor, concerning Original Sin. Together with a reply unto Dr. Hammonds vindication of his grounds of uniformity from 1 Cor. 14.40. By Henry Jeanes, minister of Gods Word at Chedzoy in Somersetshire.

To the Reverend and Learned, Dr. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Taylor.

SIR.

WHat you mean, by my being very much troubled at a passage in your fur∣ther Explication of Original Sin, I know not; Indeed I expressed unto Mr. T. C. my dislike of it, and charged it with nonsense and Blasphemy: And this charge I have proved; and now shall briefly vindicate the proof of it, from your Reply in this my Rejoynder. You tell me, that your work in that very place, is to prove, That no sin is, or can be natural: Now I cannot finde any thing sound∣ing that way within forty lines of these words; and that it was my duty to look fur∣ther for the Coherence of them, I confess, I knew not. Another great mistake al∣so, it seems I have committed; in that I have not so high thoughts of you, as to think it impossible, or very unlikely, that you should be so uncautelous as to drop any contradiction unto your main intention: And this is an error that I can hardly shake off as yet; but I do assure you, that I shall endeavour to have as reverend an opinion of you as I possibly can; onely, I shall never exempt you from a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉〈◊〉: never think that you sit upon a Chair made of Irish Timber, that can∣not endure a venomous Spider to hang his web thereon. I shall, for that which followeth, insert the words of your Letter verbatim, that the Reader may the better compare them and my answer together.

Dr. Taylor.

Now although I know you could easily have understood what I did, and must 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉; yet, because you are pleased not to do it, I shall point it to you.

〈◊〉〈◊〉.

I wonder why you should think it so easie a matter to understand your meaning, seeing you, who are the Author, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from your self in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 what it is; for in your Letter unto Mr. C. you apportion'd this second Reason soley unto the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Clause; That every man is inclined to evil, some more, some less, but all, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 some 〈◊〉〈◊〉∣stances is very true: And here in your Letter to me, you apply it unto the second Clause: It is an effect or condition of nature, but no sin 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Suppose I were at a loss, yet you have no reason to blame me, until you agree with your 〈◊〉〈◊〉: I have no Spectacles to look into your meaning, but your words, and that they 〈◊〉〈◊〉 rela∣ted onely unto one Proposition, as a reason thereof; and yet related to two Propo∣sitions, as a proof of each, was a thing that I could never 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉

cannot yet understand; and herein, I am afraid, you are as unable to teach me 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 can be, as I am uncapable of learning; but if you can teach any such thing unto me, you shall finde me, though perhaps not an apt, yet a willing and thankful Scholar: But to deal plainly with you, I am very confident that your words in themselves hold forth neither of those senses that you propound; and if by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of argument you can prove either of them from your words, you shall have my most 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and subm ssive 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of my mistake, and shall have full leave to prescribe me as publick and shameful a satisfaction, as you can think on; unto which, I do 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to conform my 〈◊〉〈◊〉. But let us hear how you point out your meaning to me.

Dr. Taylor.

Yet because you are 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to understand what I did, and must mean 〈◊〉〈◊〉, I will point it out to you: To be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to evil, is an effect or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of nature, but no 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, viz. of nature; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that is the subject of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, whether 〈◊〉〈◊〉 unto evil be an effect of nature, or an 〈◊〉〈◊〉 principle of evil; a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 natural and 〈◊〉〈◊〉? Now that it is not this, I do suppose that reason, which you so 〈◊〉〈◊〉, competent, 〈◊〉〈◊〉. it is not a natural, or necessary 〈◊〉〈◊〉, not a sin of our nature, because it is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to nature, not 〈◊〉〈◊〉, not essential.

Jeanes.

To rescue your second reason from that which I charge it with, you are 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to make an additional supply unto the Proposition; unto which, you 〈◊〉〈◊〉 your second reason is competent. To be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to evil, &c. is no sin properly, no natural and necessary sin, no inherent Principle of evil. Now unto this addition I shall apply your words that you have 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the like case; whe∣ther it may be allowed you by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cense, less then 〈◊〉〈◊〉, let 〈◊〉〈◊〉 iudge: Surely, Sir, if the most of your Writings be thus 〈◊〉〈◊〉, they will be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 un∣to me without a Commentary, and if you must be indulged the liberty of making such 〈◊〉〈◊〉, all the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in Christendom are no match to dispute with you.

But to insist a little upon the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of this Interpolation.

1. You seem to make equivalent these two 〈◊〉〈◊〉; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉〈◊〉, is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 principle of evil, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to evil, is a sin 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉〈◊〉: But I am utterly unsatisfied touching this their 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and shall desire you to clear it up unto me.

Nay further, I very much question the truth of the first Proposition; this 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to evil, is not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 principle of evil; and shall intreat you to inform me, whether you deny it to be a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of evil, or an 〈◊〉〈◊〉 principle, and think it onely adherent, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, or the 〈◊〉〈◊〉: but I believe you will tell me of some 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in your words, that I ought to understand, and supply something to make out your 〈◊〉〈◊〉: What it is, I will not adventure to guess at, but leave it to you to express it your self.

Secondly, The conclusion that is confirmed by your second Reason, is the same with that which is proved by your first Reason; and that was, that inclination to e∣vil was no sin, without the additional Epithets of natural and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 It is no sin, say you, properly; because, that which is 〈◊〉〈◊〉, is no sin: and indeed, the un∣avoidableness of our 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to evil, may be a probable argument that it is no

sin, and require an answer; but no competent reason at all to prove it not to be natural and necessary: But seeing you say, it must be your meaning that these 〈◊〉〈◊〉 should be interposed, we will for once 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it, for Disputation sake, and see whether we can understand by any means what you would have.

• 1. You say, your meaning in your conclusion is, that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to evil is no sin, 〈◊〉〈◊〉. of nature, which I shall consider 〈◊〉〈◊〉, when I shall come to examine that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of yours, That sin is not so much as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in our common nature.
• 2. Let us inquire what you mean by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

1. What you mean by natural: There be divers significations of the word natu∣ral, which are impertinent to our present Discourse, and therefore I shall omit them. I suppose that you take natural, either for that, which is so termed, in regard of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with our nature; or else in respect of Physical, and necessary 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nature.

If you take it for that, which is so termed, in regard of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with our nature, which is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with our nature, derived unto us in the Nativity and Concept on of our nature, then your second Reason is Tautological, a most pitifull and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 begging of the question; for you tell us afterward, that by essential, you mean that which is not after our nature, but together with it in real being; and then, there will be no more difference betwixt essential and natural, in this acception of it, then there is betwixt 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and gladius, and so your Argument explained will stand thus.

〈◊〉〈◊〉 to evil is not connexed with our nature; because it is not connexed with our nature: it is not coeval with our nature, derived unto us in the Conception and Nativity of our nature; because it is after our nature, and not together with it in real being.

2. If you take natural, in regard of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from our 〈◊〉〈◊〉; then your Argument is impertinent, and concerns not those whom you oppose; for they deny, as well as you, that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 unto evil is natural in such a 〈◊〉〈◊〉: Let two speak for all.

First, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in his 〈◊〉〈◊〉, where his determination of the sixteenth Question, is, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ex 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

The second is Dr. Baro in his Metaphysicks, pag. 256. Theologi 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉

But perhaps you may pitch upon some other acception of natural; if you 〈◊〉〈◊〉, I 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 you not to chide me, but to certifie my mistake by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of your meaning; for I have done my 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to bolt it out, and must needs 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that I can∣not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 at any other signification of natural, which you can here in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 place with any 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pretend unto: But if you can 〈◊〉〈◊〉 me with any other, when I know it, I shall be ready to examine it.

But to proceed unto the next 〈◊〉〈◊〉 necessary: When you said, that an incli∣nation to evil was not properly a sin, your meaning was (you say) that it was not a necessary sin.

But then I desire to know how your first Reason will be suited unto this conclusion, for your first Reason stands thus, because that which is 〈◊〉〈◊〉, is not sin; and I would intreat you also to inform us, what is the difference here 〈◊〉〈◊〉 necessary and unavoidable; for if there be no difference, I shall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 suspect your argu∣ments sick of that infirmity, called 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

But perhaps we must here make the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 supply, and understand you thus, because that which is unavoidable is not a necessary sin; if so, your Argument reduced un∣to form, will run thus.

Nothing that is unavoidable can be a necessary sin: But an inclination to evil is unavoidable: Therefore it is not a necessary sin.

Vnto your 〈◊〉〈◊〉 I say, that though unavoidableness, in one sense, may carry a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 unto sin, yet not to necessary; it may prove a thing not to be a sin, but it makes 〈◊〉〈◊〉 against its being necessary; for that which is 〈◊〉〈◊〉, may be, and is necessary; it is probable therefore, that necessary was never in your 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thoughts, but put in, to secure your second Reason from 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Objections a∣gainst it.

However, yet I shall here propound and apply a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of necessary, usuall among your Antagonists: A thing, say they, may be said to be necessary, in re∣gard of either 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and created, or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and contracted 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

If you speak of that, which is necessary with that necessity, which is primitive and created, then indeed I grant your conclusion true, and your second reason compe∣tent unto it: Inclination unto evil is not a necessary sin, in regard of a Primitive and Created necessity.

But now this were utterly besides the main of your intention, for here you would sight with nothing but your own shadow, because your adversaries do not avouch such a necessity in our inclination to evil, but desie and abhor it more then your self; and you cannot 〈◊〉〈◊〉 any such thing unto them, unless you 〈◊〉〈◊〉 calumni∣ate them.

If you speak of that which is necessary, with a consequent and contracted necessi∣ty; then your conclusion is false, and your second reason no confirmation thereof; if it be put into form, it will make up two Syllogisms.

The first Syllogism.

Nothing that is accidental, can be a sin necessary, with a consequent and contra∣cted necessity.

But our inclination to evil is accidental.

Therefore it is not a necessary sin in respect of a consequent and contracted ne∣cessity.

The second Syllogism.

Every thing that is necessary in respect of a consequent and contracted necessity, is intrinsecal and essential.

But 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to evil is not intrinsecal and essential.

Therefore it is not necessary, in regard of a consequent and contracted ne∣cessity.

The major in both Syllogisms is evidently false, as will appear, when you attempt the proof of them: and I am very 〈◊〉〈◊〉, you never will own them, if you can any other way shift off my objections.

In the next place, we have a strange Paradox of yours, which I understand not, I shall propound it, and briefly consider it.

Dr. Taylor.

Is it 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in our nature, it must be naturally inseparable, it must be at first, it must be is all 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that have our nature.

Jeanes.

I shall not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 charge this Proposition with falshood, until I know how you 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it, and yet I will tell you what reason I have to suspect it to be very false; divers accidents are in our nature, properly and strictly inherent in our na∣ture, which yet are naturally separable from our nature, which were not at 〈◊〉〈◊〉, which are not now in all persons that have our nature: I might instance in several acquired habits, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 acts of the rational soul, which are neither ade∣quate unto, nor coeval with, nor naturally inseparable from it.

But I look for some strange Ellipsis; a Rhetorical Scheme it seems you are much delighted with; but if you use it 〈◊〉〈◊〉 often, it will prove rather a Weed, then a Flower in your Rhetorick; you expect, it seems, I should pay such reverence unto your Writings, as great Criticks do unto the Ancients, in whose words, when they cannot make sense, they suppose some Chasma to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 up, with which they torture 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉; but I have something else to do, then to trouble my self with Divinations at your meaning: when you vouchsafe to acquaint us what it is, I shall then examine it.

But having seen how ill you have sped in new shaping your conclusion, let us 〈◊〉〈◊〉 next whether your success be better in the qualification of your second reason 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

Dr. Taylor.

And this is my meaning, and that you may not be troubled at the word Essential; I mean it not in the strict Physical, but 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the moral sense, that which is not after our na∣ture, but together with it in real being, and explicate it by 〈◊〉〈◊〉; and I oppose it to accidental in this reason, and to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the next.

Jeanes.

But first, pray who could tell that you thus meant it, until you now tell me: Is this a usual and received sense of the word? and if it be, direct me unto those mo∣ral Philosophers and Divines, that thus take it; if it be not, my ignorance of it is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 negationis, not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dispositionis, not privative and blameable: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 se positum slat pro 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Analogato; and therefore I appeal unto your own inge∣nuity, whether I have injured you, by supposing that you took Essential in the ac∣customed accept on thereof.

2. I shall beseech you to set down the difference that you make betwixt natural in your conclusion, and essential in your second reason for it; and when you have done this, I am very confident to make it appear, that your Argument is either a meer tautology, or an utter impertinency; but of this before.

Next you refer me unto your former Letter unto Mr. C.

Dr. Taylor.

Sir, I did give an account unto Mr. C. in a Letter to him, which I know was suf∣ficient, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Jeanes.

The vanity of this brag you will soon acknowledge, when you shall compare that Letter with this unto me; for in this you apply the second reason unto the latter

as a congruent proof; it it is an effect, or condition of nature, but no sin 〈◊〉〈◊〉: And this you point out to be your meaning, and say, That I could easily have un∣derstood it: But in your Letter to Mr. C. you aver, that this second reason is ap∣pliable onely unto the first clause; That every man is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to evil, some more, some less, &c. and not at all unto the second; nay, that it is not appliable unto it, with∣out a mistake of not onely the second, but the four other reasons also; and of this too, you say that it must be your meaning, and that 'tis clear enough, and easie in the 〈◊〉〈◊〉; and you wonder that Mr Jeanes, if he be the man, that he would be thought could mistake it: Here you propound inconsistent and contrary meanings, and it seems you intend to tie me unto such hard meat, as that I must finde out each to be your 〈◊〉〈◊〉; but this is a task, that my understanding cannot perform, and therefore I 〈◊〉〈◊〉 beg assistance from the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and learning of yours: and until you afford this, I shall offer unto your consideration this common rule in 〈◊〉〈◊〉, That contrary 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cannot be both true, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 one of them must needs be false: But these 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, this second 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is referred unto the second clause, as a competent proof, and this second reason is not referred unto the second clause, are contrary propositions; the opposition betwixt singular propositions, being, as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 well sheweth, de prop: cap. 11. num. 18. most aptly reducible unto contrariety; an i yet both these propositions are yours, the first in this letter, the latter in your former letter, and therefore one of them must needs be false; you are not then so much 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, extra 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, out of Gun-shot, but that my poor 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Logick is able to reach you: if you should deny the matter of Fact, that both these propositions are yours, your letters will convince you of untruth, and I shall need no more then to transcribe your own words: The first Proposition you have in these words of this Letter, To be inclined to evil, is an effect, or condition of nature, but no sin properly, viz. of nature, &c. a sin natural and necessary; now that it is not this, I do suppose that reason, which you so misconstrued, is competent, &c. The second, in several passages of your former Letter; as for the other clause, it is an effect, or condition of nature, but no sin properly, that was the less principal part of the Proposition, and to it one∣ly the first reason was apportioned; and again afterward, none of the other reasons, the first onely excepted, relate to the latter part of the Proposition: But let us hear your reason for the sufficiency of your Letter unto Mr. C.

Dr. Taylor.

For cujus est loqui, ejus est interpretari.

Jeanes.

I shall willingly grant you all fair liberty of interpreting your self, so you do it lo∣gically and rationally; but that which you expect, is rather a licentiousness, then a true liberty of interpretation.

First, You would have a license of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, to carry your words where you please; you would have the second reason placed betwixt the two Propositions, and before the first Reason; thus in your Letter to Mr. C.

〈◊〉〈◊〉, You usurp the license of interposition, to put in what you please; as when in this Letter you adde the Epithets of natural and necessary to sin.

And thirdly, You take up a strange license in exposition of your Terms; for if you cannot justifie what you say, if such a term in your words be taken in the common

and usual sense: Then you impose upon me an unusual, that I say not a new and un∣heard of signification thereof. Thus you deal with the word Essential.

And lastly, You assume a license of contradiction, to contradict your self, to say and unsay; one while to make this your meaning, and another time to make that which is contrary your meaning; and you think that I am obliged to take these con∣trary meanings to be both your meanings.

Surely Sir, if you can get a Patent for these four Licenses, you will, for matter of Disputation, be shot-free and invulnerable; your Opponents may 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their caps at you, but not an Argument of theirs can touch you.

Dr. Taylor.

I told you perfectly what is my meaning, it is very 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by the whole design of that, that it must be my meaning, it is also clear enough, and very plain, and very 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the expression; and therefore I now appeal to your 〈◊〉〈◊〉, whether you ought to have made such Tragedies with that, which common sense would have made plain unto you, un∣less you had received a prejudice.

Jeanes.

As for this triumphant appeal which you make in the close here to my ingenuity, I need say nothing, but refer unto the premises; onely I cannot but 〈◊〉〈◊〉 one Ad∣vertisement unto your Disciples, that you sometimes triumph when you have not con∣quered.

Dr. Taylor.

And now Sir, to your two Syllogisins, be pleased to the subject of the two Majors, adde but this qualification [natural] and try if 〈◊〉〈◊〉 horrid 〈◊〉〈◊〉 will follow, which you affixed to your own 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Jeanes.

I have already considered with how little sobriety you have added this Qualifica∣tion of natural, and, I believe, the impartial Reader will conclude with me, that you have foisted it in upon second thoughts, onely to avoid those horrid 〈◊〉〈◊〉, unto which your words in themselves are liable.

Dr. Taylor.

But I shall for this once consider the particulars. 1. You charge it with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sease; but with your 〈◊〉〈◊〉 you prove it most pitisully: Your reason is, that to say [〈◊〉〈◊〉] is predicated of [sin] in either of the two ways dicendi per se, is such 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 non-sense, that you think it not worthy of any serious 〈◊〉〈◊〉: So that this is your Argument, To say that sin is Essential, is prodigious and pitiful non-sense, therefore it is prodigious and pitiful non-sense.

Surely a good 〈◊〉〈◊〉; or thus, that which is such non-sense that you think not wor∣thy of refutation, is certainly non-sense: But to say that sin is Essential, is such non-sense, that you think not worthy of refutation, therefore it is non-sense. I do not say your Ar∣gument is non-sense, but I am sure it is no Argument, unless a bold 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 proof in your Logick. But to the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, That sin is Essential, is indeed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to say, but to say so is not non-sense. And whereas you will suppose me to say so, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉

uncharitable, and something unreasonable in it; for I was to prove, That inclination to sin was not a sin of our nature (as was pretended) because what was natural is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 essential, as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to a man: which because to be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to sin is not, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it is not a sin, viz, of nature.

Jeanes.

First, Here is a gross and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 falsification of my 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and that without any advantage to your cause: Your reason is, say you, That to say Essential is pre∣dicated of sin in either of the two ways, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 se, is such pitiful and prodigi∣ous nonsense, that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 think it not worthy of any serious refutation: Whether these words be justifiable, or no, I need not inquire; for there are no such words in my Paper, neither can you, with all your wit and learning, infer any such matter therefrom.

Secondly, To make 〈◊〉〈◊〉 for your followers, you 〈◊〉〈◊〉-〈◊〉〈◊〉 my Argument; and first, clap it into a single Enthymeme, and then into one 〈◊〉〈◊〉, both of your own 〈◊〉〈◊〉; in both which you leave out two mediums, that are in my Ar∣gument, which reduced unto form, will make up two 〈◊〉〈◊〉: To convince you of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 unfair, injurious, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉-ingenuous dealing, I shall insert my words at large. To say (as the Doctor doth by consequence) that sin is essential to the nature of man, is an assertion guilty of nonsense; a thing may be said to be essential to another, à priori, and then it is predicated of it in primo modo dicendi per se; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 else à 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and then it is predicated of it in secundo modo dicendi per se. And to say that sin is either of these ways essential to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nature of man, is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pitisul and prodigious non∣sense, as that I cannot think 〈◊〉〈◊〉 worthy of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 serious resutation.

The learned Reader will soon perceive how 〈◊〉〈◊〉 alliance your Enthymeme and Syllog 〈◊〉〈◊〉 have with my Argument; and to him I appeal, to judge of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 unwor∣thy and unscholarly injury that you have herein done me; but yet, for the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 stopping of your mouth, I shall Analyze this my Argument. My conclusion 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that to say (as you do by consequence) that sin is essential unto the nature of man, is an assertion guilty of nonsense; this I prove from a distribution of essential; whatsoever is essential is such, either à priori, or à 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

But to say that sinne is essential, either à priori, or à posteriori, is non∣sense.

Therefore to say that sin is essential to man, is nonsense.

〈◊〉〈◊〉 Syllogism is grounded upon a known and received Maxime [Negatis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 subjectis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 de aliquo subjecto 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ipsum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 universale, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cunctis membris 〈◊〉〈◊〉, negatur ipsum divisum]

The major I presumed none would deny, and as for the minor, that I proved from a description of both ways of being essential.

That which is essential to a thing, à priori, is predicated of it in primo modo di∣cendi per se; that which is essential to a thing, à posteriori, is predicated of it in se∣cundo modo dicendi per se.

Now to say that sin is predicated of man, in either primo, or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 modo dicen∣di 〈◊〉〈◊〉 se, is nonsense: Therefore to say that sin is essential to man, either à priori, or à posteriori, is nonsense.

The major I thought undenyable, and as for the minor, here indeed I stopped too in the proof thereof, as thinking all further proof of it needless; because I took it, and still do take it to be, propositio per se nota, which needs no proof, but a bare expli∣cation

of its terms; propositio per se nota dicitur; quae non est nota per 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as Ly∣chetus; quae suis tantum terminis cognoscibilis, as Collegium 〈◊〉〈◊〉 gather out of Aristotle; quae tales terminos habet, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ii 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 notitiam totius propositionis fine addito; omnis propositio 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est per se 〈◊〉〈◊〉, ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 aliquod medium, sed solum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 contentus est, so Scheibl r.

Now, for the terms of the minor 〈◊〉〈◊〉: I presumed, that all explication of them was needless unto a Scholar of so great a repute as Dr. Taylor: And therefore, without more adoe, I inferred, that to say that sin is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of these ways essential, either à priori, or à posteriori, is such 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and prodigious nonsense, as that I could not think it worthy of any serious refutation. And now Sir, I shall entreat you to review my Argument, being thus truly Analyzed, and I shall appeal unto 〈◊〉〈◊〉 con∣science, when you are next upon your knees before God, whether you have not deeply wronged me, to represent my Argument thus defectively (that I say not 〈◊〉〈◊〉) on purpose, I am afraid, to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it and me ridiculous. Suppose any 〈◊〉〈◊〉 should be so absurd, as to say, That a Stone is animal; and I to refute 〈◊〉〈◊〉 should thus argue, Omne animal est 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, who is endued with reason, as well as sense; or Brutum, which is endued with sense, but not with reason; but to say that a stone is either homo, or brutum, is such 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as that I cannot think it 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of any serious refutation. Now he that shall say 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is no Argu∣ment, but onely a bold affirmative, will goe a degree beyond 〈◊〉〈◊〉; for 〈◊〉〈◊〉 plain, that here are couched and implyed two 〈◊〉〈◊〉. First, a distribution of animal in hominem & brutum: Next, a description of each member of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and my Argument is exactly paralell'd unto 〈◊〉〈◊〉. But Sir, though I thought, that, before you, I might have spared my labor to prove that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nonsense, to say that sin is essential unto man, either à priori, or à posteriori; that its predicated of man, either in primo, or secundo modo dicendi per se; yet, because you 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to blame mine omission of such proof, I shall now give you herein, I hope, sufficient 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

First, To say that that which is 〈◊〉〈◊〉, is positive, is nonsense: Put to say that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is essential unto man, either à priori, or à 〈◊〉〈◊〉, is to say, that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which is privative is positive (for the essentials of man are positive, and the sormality of sin is a privation.)

Therefore to say that sin is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 unto man, either à 〈◊〉〈◊〉, or à posteriori, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nonsense.

Secondly, To say that that which is predicated of man 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ac 〈◊〉〈◊〉, is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of man in primo, or secundo modo dicendi per se, is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 (〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 per se & per accidens, are opposite ways of predication.)

But to say that sin is predicated of man in primo, or secundo modo 〈◊〉〈◊〉 per se, is to say, That that which is predicated of man per accidens, is predicated of man per se (sor that sin is predicated of man, per 〈◊〉〈◊〉, will be questioned by none, who know what primus modus dicendi per accidens is)

Therefore to say that sin is predicated of man in primo, or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 per se, is nonsense.

Thirdly, To say that that which is predicated contingently of man, is predicated 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of him, is nonsense.

But to say that sin is predicated of man in primo, or secundo modo 〈◊〉〈◊〉 per se, is to say, That that which is predicated of man 〈◊〉〈◊〉, is predicated of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 necessarily, (for sin is predicated of man contingently, because man and sin cohere

〈◊〉〈◊〉; man might not have been a sinner, and when he shall not be a sinner, he will still be a man; and then 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, per se est gradus necessitatis.

Therefore to say that sinne is predicated of man in 〈◊〉〈◊〉, or secundo modo dicen∣di per 〈◊〉〈◊〉, is nonsense.

If these arguments satisfy you not, you may command more of me when you please, as also any further enlargement of these.

Yea but you say, that sinne is essentiall is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to say, but to say so is not non∣sense.

To this I answer, that however it may be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in Grammar, yet 'tis nonsense in Logick; because 'tis a 〈◊〉〈◊〉; for in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 every contradiction not only expresse, but that also 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and implyed is nonsense, a 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as we usual∣ly speake: thus 'tis nonsense to say that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉; that a spirit is corpo∣reall; that a body is 〈◊〉〈◊〉, without quantity or extension; that an 〈◊〉〈◊〉 subsists; or that a substance properly inhereth.

Now my three arguments above irrefragably prove that, to say that sinne is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to man is a contradiction; for 'tis in effect as much as to say, that that which is privative is positive; that that which is predicated of man per accidens, is predicated of him per se; that that which is predicated of man 〈◊〉〈◊〉, is predicated of man necessarily; and these are grosse and palpable contradictions; and therefore not only false, but most pitifull and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nonsense.

You accuse me of uncharitablenesse, and unreasonablenesse, in supposing that you say that sinne is essentiall unto man; but from this accusation I have 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vindicated my selfe by beating you from all your miserable shifts; And unto what I have said herein, I shall referre both your selfe and the Reader.

Dr Taylor.

In the next place you charge me this with blasphemy: if I 〈◊〉〈◊〉 said or meant what you 〈◊〉〈◊〉, you had reason; but then I pray consider how your charge will 〈◊〉〈◊〉 real∣ly 〈◊〉〈◊〉 your selfe; for if it be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 God to be the Author of sinne, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 what I derived from Adam is no sinne; for that Adam's sinne should 〈◊〉〈◊〉 upon me, I demand who was the Author of that? If you please you may take time to consider it; but in the interim if you be pleased to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 discourse of 〈◊〉〈◊〉; cal∣led Deus justificatus, you shall find my question not to be answered by you; if you 〈◊〉〈◊〉 any regard to the authority or to the reason of Mr Calvin, Dr Twisse, and some other of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of your party.

Jeanes.

1. Here you tempt me to a digression; and you may with as good reason call upon me to answer all the reproaches that Bellarmine in this particular, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 upon the Protestant Churches, and some of the most eminent members thereof, as propound this question unto me.

2. However yet I briefly answer to it, that Adam was the author of the de∣scent of his sinne upon me, not God; for to be the Author of sinne is to be a desi∣cient, culpable cause thereof; and it is impossible that God should be defective in a culpable manner; and that our doctrine of originall sinne maketh him to be such, you may boldly affirme, but can never prove.

3. Bishop 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the doctrine of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sinne is one of our party; and he speaks that which will abundantly 〈◊〉〈◊〉 your demands, in his animadversions upon Hord pag. 323. 224. It was not (sayes he) God's absolute decree of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, but Adam's voluntary act of rebellion, which brought sinne, and the guilt of sinne upon himselfe, and all his posterity, God having justly 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that Adam's chil∣dren should participate with him 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his state of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, did as justly 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that they should also participate in the state of sinne.

If this Author deny the propagation of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from Adam, he must acknowledge 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉〈◊〉, &c. His whole discourse concerning originall sinne and the propa∣gating 〈◊〉〈◊〉 unto all mankind is 〈◊〉〈◊〉, in that he 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that the di∣vine 〈◊〉〈◊〉 must needs be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or causative of all the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉; whereas if the events be actions sinfull, God's decrees are 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and ordinative, not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of causing, much, esse necessitating such evill 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as hath been often told him.

4. I have seene your little 〈◊〉〈◊〉 called 〈◊〉〈◊〉 justisicatus; and must say of it as Florus did of the Ligurians: lib. 2. cap. 3. Major 〈◊〉〈◊〉 labor 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vincere; The Rhetorick of it is so rank, as that it will be a very hard matter to find out the Logick and reason that is in it.

If you please to put your arguments into forme, you then may command me to consider them; but otherwise, I shall be very loath to adventure upon any thing of yours; for I find by this present debate about two or three lines, that I shall not without great difficulty search out what is your meaning.

5. I wonder why you say, that by this discourse I shall find your question not to be answered by me; why (pray Sr) could I answer it before you propounded it? but your meaning is, I suppose, that I shall find, that your question cannot be answr'd by me: but the event will 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that.

6. That which you meane in Mr Calvin, and Dr Twisse, are I 〈◊〉〈◊〉 those places which you quote, pag. 32: of that your 〈◊〉〈◊〉; and then unto the place in Calvin you have an answer in Dr Twisse (〈◊〉〈◊〉: gra: lib. 2. dig: 2. cap. 3. pag. 42.) where he cleares it from the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉〈◊〉: And then for the place in Dr Twisse you may gather an answer from that he saith unto Mr Hord, (〈◊〉〈◊〉. 149. 150.) who makes the like objections against him from another place.

7. You are the unmeerest man in the world to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 me with the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of my party; sor the rigid Zelots of your party, in your doctrine of originall sin, are such whom you may be ashamed to name. Indeed in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 point there are ve∣ry few of your party, save the Pelagians of old, and now the worthy 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Racovian denne, and their followers; unto whom the best and the most learned of Protestants will hardly vouchsafe the name of Christians. The Arch∣Bishop of Armagh 〈◊〉〈◊〉 them, in a sermon of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 (that I heard) a company of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Turkes; and indeed Turkes, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 can hardly be greater enemies unto the divine person, and nature of Christ, unto his offices, and unto his great and glorious worke of redemption, and satisfaction, than these wretched mis∣creants are.

Dr Taylor.

Your second charge of blaspemy is, that my reason does by implication involve Christ in the guilt of sinne; because whatsoever is essentiall he had; but 〈◊〉〈◊〉, If you remem∣ber that I say not, that sinne is 〈◊〉〈◊〉; and that I bring the reverse of this very

argument against your party and opinion in some of my late discourses, you have reason to shake the fire out of your own 〈◊〉〈◊〉, not to tell me, that I burne; for is inclination to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 naturally and derived from our Parents; I 〈◊〉〈◊〉 whether or no 〈◊〉〈◊〉 not Christ all naturall desires? if he had not, he was not a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 man; If he had 〈◊〉〈◊〉 all 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 are not naturall 〈◊〉〈◊〉; sor is you say they be, you are the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by the consequence of your 〈◊〉〈◊〉, not I; but God sorbid that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of us should.

〈◊〉〈◊〉.

First, here is no 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of my argument; for none of my party or opinion hold, that inclination unto 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is essentiall unto man: Flaccius 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sinne was the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, or substance of the soule; but I ne∣ver heard that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sollowers were considerable; he hath (I am sure) both Pa∣pists and Protestants; 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and Lutherans for 〈◊〉〈◊〉 opponents: but, perhaps you confound naturall with 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and make them all one; if you doe, your reason will be 〈◊〉〈◊〉, but 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

2. I believe, you here play with the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the word naturall, a thing (though it may be tollerated in a Sophister,) altogether unworthy of a 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

Inclination to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 may be said to be naturall, either 〈◊〉〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

That inclination to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is naturall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 (that it flowes, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Physically, and necessarily from our nature,) I slatly deny: and if you can direct me unto any place in your bookes, where you prove it to be naturall in this sense, I shall take it into 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Indeed to say, that it is in this sense naturall, is to throw a reproach upon God the Author of nature.

But it is naturall 〈◊〉〈◊〉; together with our nature derived unto us from our first Parents; and yet not in Christ, who had not his nature from Adam in an ordinary way of Generation, but was miraculously conceived by the holy Ghost, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the wombe of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Mary.

This inclination unto evill is a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 blemish of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nature; because it is a cause of sinne, & qualis causa 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est effectus. A good tree, saith our Saviour, cannot bring forth evill fruit, Matth. 7. 18. This inclination to evill bringeth forth much 〈◊〉〈◊〉 fruit, and therefore it cannot be good; and consequently it is bad, and sinfull; and therefore could not be in Christ; (who even as man) was the most holy one of God. Indeed if Christ had wanted any propriety of man's nature, he had not then been a perfect man, but, that inclination to evill is a propriety of our nature, sc: proprium 4 to modo you are never able to make good.

But, Sir, in good earnest, doe you thinke that Christ was inclined unto evill? if you doe not, your 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Christ is impertinent; if you doe, I shall con∣clude your opinion to be blasphemous; and unto it shall oppose this following ar∣gument.

He in whom dwelled an all-fullnesse of the Godhead bodily; he in whom dwelled an all-fullnesse of habituall grace; he who enjoyed the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vision, was not, could not be inclined unto evill.

But, in Christ dwelled an all-〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Godhead 〈◊〉〈◊〉; in him also dwel∣led an all-〈◊〉〈◊〉 of habituall, and sanctifying grace; he enjoyed the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vision

Therefore he was not, could not be inclined unto evill.

The Minor will not be denied by any Orthodox Divine, and we may say the same of the Major, for, he that shall thinke that the grace of personall union, the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of habituall grace, and the beatificall vision are not sufficient to exclude from Christ all inclination untoevil wil render both 〈◊〉〈◊〉 learning & religion too suspected.

But, to put the matter out of doubt, take this following argument for confirmation of the Major: there could not be the least inclination unto evill in that person, in whom there was an utter aversenesse from evil in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉; (for of contraries, that which is in a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 degree is not consistent with the other in the highest and most intense degree) but, in that person, in whom there was an 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Godhead, on all-fullnesse of habituall grace, and the beatificall vision, there was an utter aversnesse from evill, and that in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉; and therefore impossible that there should be in him an inclination to evill in the least degree.

The Papists extenuate the malignancy of concupiscence as much as may be, af∣firming that in the regenerate it is no sinne, and that it had been 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Adam if he had been created in his pure naturalls; yet, they thinke not so well of it, as to as∣cribe it unto Christ.

Indeed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is accused for speaking somewhat suspiciously this way; but he is contradicted by the generality of the Schoolemen; who hold that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, concupiscence was neither 〈◊〉〈◊〉 primo, nor 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in Christ.

1. Not in actu primo, and for this they alledge three reasons.

• 1. The absolute perfection of his virtues, and all-fullnesse of grace.
• 2. The perpetuall vigilancy, and advertency of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 reason.
• 3. The government of his humane nature, and actions, by his divine and infinite person.

2. Not in actu secundo, because in him, the very first motions unto sinne would have been voluntary, and consequently sinfull.

Unto this purpose 〈◊〉〈◊〉, (〈◊〉〈◊〉: 〈◊〉〈◊〉: Scholast: Tom: 5. cap. 12. 〈◊〉〈◊〉: 5. pag: 200.) observeth; that the first motions of concupiscence may be said to be voluntary two manner of wayes.

• 1. Antecedently; when one willingly admits them when he may avoid them.
• 2. Consequently; when one yeelds consent unto them after they are crept in, in the former way or manner they had been voluntary in Christ; because Christ could have avoided them, by reason of the government of the person of the word; if he had not therefore avoided them, but willingly admitted them, they had in him been blameworthy.

Dr Taylor.

〈◊〉〈◊〉 third reason also is as pretty; for, first; I demand whether a possibility to sinne be not of the nature of man; (sor that is all I meane by essentiall) if it be not; how came Adam to sinne his first sinne? if it be, I aske whether shall the Saints in the resurrection be raised up with it or no? If yea; then you blaspheme God's full glorifica∣tion of the Saints in the resurrection; for impeccability is certainly a part of their full glorisication. If nay; then it is no blasphemy to say that in the resurrection the Saints shall be raised up without something that is essentiall to them, or to their nature.

Jeanes.

That possibility to sinne is essentiall unto every rationall creature I grant; and hereupon 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that 'tis not separated from the Saints in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 full 〈◊〉〈◊〉; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 shall I 〈◊〉〈◊〉 your charge of blasphemy herein, having the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Schoolemen, (both Thomists, and Scotists) and reason too on my side. Indeed, the Saints of Heaven do constantly, and interruptedly shun, and decline sinne; yet, 'tis an 〈◊〉〈◊〉 possible unto their nature, considered in it selfe; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 they are 〈◊〉〈◊〉 therefrom by their glorisied state and 〈◊〉〈◊〉: for though sinne, and a fullnesse of glory 〈◊〉〈◊〉 inconsistent; yet '〈◊〉〈◊〉 no 〈◊〉〈◊〉, or repugnancy, that their natures abstractly considered, secluding the consideration of their glory, should be sinfull. Yea, but you say, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is certainely a part of the full glo∣rification of the Saints; and what is impeccability but an impossibility of sinning; if God then make the Saints impeccable, he 〈◊〉〈◊〉 away from them all 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of sinning.

For answer.

1. There is a twosold impeccability.

1. By nature. 2. By the grace and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of God.

〈◊〉〈◊〉 by nature takes away all possibility of sinning; but it is received ge∣nerally as a rule among the School-men, that a creature cannot be made 〈◊〉〈◊〉 per 〈◊〉〈◊〉, (that is) such a one, as cannot by nature sinne. And, if you please, you may view the proofes thereof in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 lib: 2. Dist: 22. quaest. 1.

〈◊〉〈◊〉 by the gift and grace of God doth not eradicate the remote pow∣er of sinning; but only keeps it from being actuated; and 'tis this impeccability on∣ly, that is part of the Saints glorification.

2. A thing may be said to be impossible, sensu diviso, or sensu 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

In sensu diviso 'tis not impossible, but possible, for the Saints in Heaven to sin; for that (considered in themselves without the custodient grace of God alwayes un∣derpropping them) they are liable unto sin, the lamentable fall of the Angels of darkenesse is an evident proofe.

But now, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 composito, 'tis indeed impossible for glorified Saints to sinne; that is; 'tis impossible for them to sinne considered under this reduplication, as fully glorified; because fullnesse of glory and sinne cannot stand together. This answer is in Scotus (lib. 4. dist: 49. quaest: 6.) whose words I shall insert for the sake of some Readers who may not have him in their 〈◊〉〈◊〉:) 〈◊〉〈◊〉; patet, quod bea∣tus est impeccabilis in sensu compositionis, hoc est, non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 beatus, & peccare: sed in sensu divisionis, quod manens beatus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 habeat potentiam & possibilitatem ad pec∣candum potest 〈◊〉〈◊〉 duplicitèr: vel per aliquid sibi 〈◊〉〈◊〉, quod excludit po∣tentian talem; vel per causam 〈◊〉〈◊〉, quod 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 propinquam ab il∣lo, &c: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est causa intrinseca in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Michaelis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 beati, per quam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 potentia ad peccandum pro alias, in sensu divisionis, non est autem causa intrinseca 〈◊〉〈◊〉 istam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 omnino reduci ad actam: sed per causam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 illa propinqua ad peccandum, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 per 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 semper 〈◊〉〈◊〉 actum fruendi, & it a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 possit 〈◊〉〈◊〉 suam remolam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ad actum: siqui∣dem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 causa secunda praeventa à causâ superiori agente ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉 oppositum po∣test 〈◊〉〈◊〉 propinqua exire in aliud oppositum. Concedo ergo, quod infert, quod 〈◊〉〈◊〉

beatus, & sit peccabilis in sensu divisionis loquendo de 〈◊〉〈◊〉 re∣motâ.

Dr. Taylor.

But Sir, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 think you of Mortality? is that essential, or of the nature of man? I suppose you will not deny it. But yet I also believe you will 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 we are sown a corruptible body, yet we shall be raised an incorruptible, and the mortal shall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 on immortality.

Ieanes.

For answer, I shall propound a distinction of mortality, that is very obvious and ordinary. A thing may be said to be mortal, either respectu 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 propinquae.

1. In respect of a remote power of dying, which hath in it the remote cause of dissolution, an elementary matter.

2. In regard of a near power of dying, arising from the actual conflict, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 influence of the Elements, and their contrary qualities.

The latter Mortality is separable, but then it is not essential.

As for the former Mortality, which alone is essential, I think very few doubt, but that 'tis also inseparable from the nature of a man, body: for, the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and incorruption of the bodies of the Saints in the resurrection, will not be by taking a∣way out of their bodies the remote causes of corruption, the Elements, and their contrary qualities. (for, then their bodies would not be mixt; and so not for sub∣stance the same that they were) but by an hinderance or prevention of the corrup∣tive influence of the Elements, and their contrary qualities.

That I am not singular in this, I shall manifest, by transcribing the Testimonies of some few School-men, who though they differ one from another in assigning the cause and reason of the impassibility and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of glorified Bodies; yet they all agree with Durand in this, That glorified Bodies are not impassible, per privationem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 passivae, sed per aliquod 〈◊〉〈◊〉 impedimentum actualis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nè siat.

The first shall be of Scotus, (lib 4. dist. 49. quaest. 13.) Dico ergo quod causa im∣passibilitatis est voluntas divina non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 causae secundae corruptivae, & per hoc, est illud impassibile, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 potentia remota, sed propinqua, non à causâ 〈◊〉〈◊〉, sed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 impediente, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est de 〈◊〉〈◊〉 supra, &c. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 de 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in camino, qui non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉 trium puerorum, non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 per aliquam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pueris, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ex carentiâ potentiae 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ex contrario 〈◊〉〈◊〉 impediente, sed quia Deus ex voluntate suâ non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

The second is of Durand (lib. 4. dist. 44. quaest. 4.) Restat ergò quod 〈◊〉〈◊〉 gloriosa non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 impassibilia simplicitèr, & absolutè per privationem principii 〈◊〉〈◊〉, cùm natura corporum gloriosorum, sit 〈◊〉〈◊〉 eadem quae prius, sed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 aliquid praestans impedimentum actualis passionis nè siat.

Quid autem sit illud, utrum sit aliqua forma 〈◊〉〈◊〉, an solum virtus divina 〈◊〉〈◊〉, duplex 〈◊〉〈◊〉 opinio: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 enim quidam quod talis impassibilitas 〈◊〉〈◊〉 per aliquam forman inexistentem, &c.

Alius modus est, quod impassibilitas corporum gloriosorum non crit per aliquam 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

〈◊〉〈◊〉, sed solum per virtutem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 beatis ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & pro∣hibentem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 extriaseci inserentis passionem.

This latter way Darand takes himself, and endeavoreth to confirm it by three Reasons.

The third shall be of Suarez, (in tertiam part: Thom: 〈◊〉〈◊〉: 48. p. 531.) nam li∣cet in corpore glorioso maneat eadem 〈◊〉〈◊〉, idemque temperamentum ex 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, inde solum sit, corpus illud in nudâ naturá suá consideratum, esse corruptibile, & in beatitudine 〈◊〉〈◊〉 quasi 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, seu naturalem radicem 〈◊〉〈◊〉: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 intrinsecam esse 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & impassibile: quia 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est aliâ quadam persectione quae ex se potest impedire, nè illa maturalis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 reducalur.

Dr. Taylor.

Once more, Is it natural to be a natural? that will not be denyed: But then remem∣ber, that although to be natural is essential, that is, of the essence of the body, yet the natural shall arise without its naturality; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spi∣ritual.

Jeanes.

1. That that which is natural, is natural, will not be denyed, as you say; but 'tis propositio identica 〈◊〉〈◊〉, a most 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Tautology: and unto what purpose you propound a question concerning it, I know not.

2. Of things natural unto man, some are natural powers, some are naturall acts: Natural (〈◊〉〈◊〉) powers may be and are essential unto the body; and so they are in∣separable too; our Bodies, when they shall be raised, shall not want so much as one such natural power: But natural acts are accidental, and in the resurrection there may be no place for the exercise of, at least, some of them, viz: Generation, Nutrition, and the like; as touching such things, we shall be like the angels in Hea∣ven, as it were spiritual.

3. In the Apostle, 1 Cor. 15. 44. it is not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a natural body, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an animal or souly body, that is, actuated and animated by the soul after a natural way and manner, by the intervention of bodily helps, such as eating, drinking, sleeping, and the like. And in all congruence of opposition hereunto, a glorious body is said to be a spiritual, in regard of an immediate supportance by the spirit, without any corporeal means, and without any use of the generative and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 faculties.

Dr. Taylor.

So that you see, is I had said this which you charge upon me, which is contrary to my thoughts, and so against my purpose, yet your Arguments could not have 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it.

Jeanes.

Whether you do not here boast, and triumph without a victory, I am very well contented to refer it unto the learned Reader.

Since my penning of my exceptions, sent unto Mr. C. I have read the Metaphy∣sicks of Dr. Robert Baro, that learned Scot; and in them I finde the like of these

three last Arguments of mine, urged against the error of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉; that O∣riginal Sin is of the substance of man, and essential to him after the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 subalternate unto that which I charge you with; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 words are as followeth, Prima opinio demnanda & à postris 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 de 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est absurdissima haeresis 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 peccatum originale 〈◊〉〈◊〉 de 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 esse quid 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, contra quam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 disputans; varias assert rationes: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hae 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Primò, si 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pars 〈◊〉〈◊〉 humanae, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Deus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 author 〈◊〉〈◊〉, quippe qui 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 si 〈◊〉〈◊〉 neget 〈◊〉〈◊〉 substantiam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 à 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 esse à 〈◊〉〈◊〉, qui est author peccati; necessarium 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 habeat aliquam causam; at 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 absurdum, ergò & 〈◊〉〈◊〉: 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Christus non assumpsit naturam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 integram, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 peccato non 〈◊〉〈◊〉, quorum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est absurdum: 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 diem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 resurget, & aeternam vitam possidebit, saltem quoad 〈◊〉〈◊〉: Peccatum verò tum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 erit in glorificatis, ergò peccatum non est quid 〈◊〉〈◊〉, sed quid separabile est ab 〈◊〉〈◊〉 natura, pag. 248, 249. These reasons differ so little from mine, as that you may think perhaps that I have 〈◊〉〈◊〉 mine from either Bellarmine or 〈◊〉〈◊〉, which yet I assure you I did not: The reason why now I recite these Reasons, is to shew, that my arguments are not such 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and pi∣tifull things, but that very Learned Men have made use of the like, to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 proposition subordinate unto that which I goe about to refute.

Dr. Taylor.

It is good advice 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, if you had 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pleased to have learned my meaning before you had published your 〈◊〉〈◊〉, I should have esteemed myself 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to you in a great acknowledgement.

Jeanes.

Your advice out of Aristophanes, I like very well; I am not conscious unto my self that I have towards you transgressed against it: for before I uttered a syllable of dislike, I used my best endeavor to finde out what was your meaning, and to that purpose, made use of that little Logick and Reason which I had; and as for that meaning which I affix unto your words, let the Reader determine, whether I have violated any rule of Logick or Reason, in imputing it unto you: What I took to be your sense, together with my Objections against it, I sent unto Mr. C. to be transmitted speedily unto you, exposing all unto the utmost severity of your 〈◊〉〈◊〉; and wherein I have here trespassed against charity or justice, I would fain know.

Besides, my dislike I expressed onely in a private place, before very few, in private discourse, and I have not hitherto published it, from either Press or Pulpit.

Dr. Taylor.

Now you have said very much evil of me, though I deserve it not.

〈◊〉〈◊〉.

This I deny, and slatly challenge you to prove what you aver.

Dr. Taylor.

For suppose I had not prosperously enough expressed my meaning, yet you, who are a man of wit and parts, could easily have discerned my purpose and my design: You could not but know, and consider too, that my great design was to say, That sin could not be natural, that it is so sar from being essential, that it is not so much as subjected in our common natures, but in our persons onely.

Ieanes.

1. Whether what you say of my wit and parts, be not a 〈◊〉〈◊〉, I shall not trou∣ble my self to inquire, but leave it unto your conscience: However, I suppose, you think your self far superior unto my poor self in wit and parts, and I also readily acknowledge as much: Now I wonder why you should think that I should so easily finde out what is your meaning, seeing you (whose abilities so far transcend mine) be so unprosperous, not onely in the expression, but in the after interpretation of your meaning, as that you dissent in a latter Letter, from your self in a former Letter: How can you reasonably expect that I, who am not (as one of your Proselites late∣ly said) worthy to be named the same day with you, (I shall not deny the truth of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, nor envy you the honor thereof) should (as the Proverb is) see further into a Mill-stone then you, who are so Eagle and quick sighted.

Secondly, Whereas you say, That sia is not so much as subjected in our common na∣ture, but in our persons onely; I doubt that I understand you not, for to me it seems very evident, that sin, (so far as a privation can be inherent) is truly inherent in our natures; for it hath all the Requisites of inherence, that Aristotle layeth down (Ca∣tegor: cap. 2.)

• 1. It is in our nature.
• 2. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 as a part of our nature.
• 3. Neither can it exist sever'd and apart from our natures: Sin is seated in all in∣dividuals of our nature, whilest living here upon earth, Christ his humanity alone excepted; and therefore why may not we say, that 'tis subjected in our common nature? Seeing those accidents are seated secundarily, and mediately in second sub∣stances, which are primarily and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 placed in their respective first substances; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 secundae substant accidentibus gratiâ primarum.

Yea, but you will (perhaps) say, it is subjected in our persons onely, therefore not in our nature: But this is a very sorry Objection: For who knows not the di∣stinction of subjectum, in subjectum quo, & quod; our persons onely are subjectum quod of sin, our natures notwithstanding may be subjectum quo of it; and we may say the same of other accidents. I finde you (pag. 494.) quoting that usual Axi∣ome, actiones 〈◊〉〈◊〉 suppositorum; but, if you had considered the limitations that are usually given thereof, you would have spared the urging of it: actio est suppositi (saith Scotus) ultimate denominati ab actione, sed non ut solius denominati ab ipsa: But you may have some deep meaning, which I fathome not; fair leave may you take to explain your self.

Dr. Taylor.

But besides this, Sir, I am a little to complain of you, that when you had two words at your choice to explicate each other (intrinsecal, and essential) you would take the hard∣est and the worst sense, not the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and most ready.

Ieanes.

I have here given you, not onely no cause, but not so much as any shadow or colour for complaint.

1. I gave a reason why I insisted on the word essential onely, and passed by the term intrinsecal; because you use intrinsecal as equivalent unto essential, as is ap∣parent, by your opposing it unto accidental: And have you said, can you say any thing to the contrary.

2. I would fain know why you should say that essential is a harder word then in∣trinsecal; there is, I am sure, that equivocation in the word intrinsecal, which is not in the word essential; for, that which is accidental, may be intrinsecal; there being intrinsecal, as well as extrinsecal accidents; interaum & externum (say Phi∣losophers) sumuntur, vel ratione essentiae, vel ratione loci, & subjecti.

Dr. Taylor.

For you cannot but know, that essential is not always to be taken in the strictest sense of Philosophy, for that which is constitutive of a nature; but largely, and for all sorts of properties, and the universal accidents of nature.

Ieanes.

The distinction of essential, into that which is such constitutivè, as constituting the essence, or that which is such, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as necessarily resulting from the essence, I very well know: and I grant the proprieties which are such, quarto mo∣do, which agree omni, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, semper, are in this latter sense said to be essential; but that essential is ever taken, as you say, for all sorts of proprieties, those which are such, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, secundo, or tertio modo, is notoriously false, for then essential would be taken for that which is most accidental; but let us examine your instances.

Dr. Taylor.

As it is essential to a man to laugh, to be capable of learning, to be mortal, to have a body of contrary qualities, and consequently by nature corruptible.

Ieanes.

If you should affirm in the publick Schools of either of the Universities, that to laugh is essential to man, you would not onely be laughed, but 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and houted at: the gross and palpable absurdity of this your Assertion, I thus prove.

Nothing that is accidental to man, can be said to be essential to him.

But to laugh is accidental to man.

Therefore it is not essentiall.

The Major is apparent from the opposition, that you your selfe make 〈◊〉〈◊〉 es∣sentiall, and accidentall.

The 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is thus confirmed.

That which is predicated of man contingently, is accidentall to man.

But to laugh is predicated of man contingently.

Therefore it is accidental to man.

The Major is plain, because contingency of predication is one of the chief things which distinguisheth 〈◊〉〈◊〉 praedicabile, from all other predicables, and it is a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 character thereof.

And for the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that is no lesse evident: indeed risibile is essential unto man, and predicated of him in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 modo dicendi per se; but ridere to laugh is acci∣dental; because it is predicated of man contingently; for a man and actuall laughter cohere contingently: the lowest degree of necessity in assirmative and essential pre∣dications, is de omni; and de omni 〈◊〉〈◊〉, requireth universitatem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 as well as subjecti; that is, propositio 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 debet esse semper vera; now all men do not alwayes laugh, and therefore laughter is predicated of man contin∣gently, and consequently accidental to him.

You see, Sir, I am bold to trouble you, ever and anon, with my 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Logick, and you can expect no other, as long as you thus trespasse against what is most tri∣vial and obvious in Logick, the very A. B. C. thereof.

2. As for the second instance, you bring capacity of learning: that is taken for potentia prima, or secunda.

1. If it be taken for potentia prima, then it immediately flowes from the soule, and is essential to man, consequutivè, as à proprium 4 to modo of man, and so 'tis in∣separable from him; but, if taken for potentia secunda, so it ariseth from the dispo∣sition of the temper and organs of the body, and is not essential, but accidental, and separable from man.

As for the third, to be mortal, I have already spoken of that sufficiently.

As for the 4th instance; to have a body of contrary qualities is essential consequutivè. and à posteriori unto an essential predicate of man; viz: a mixt body; and so is es∣sential unto man, and predicated of him in secundo modo dicendi per se, as a mixt body is predicated of him primo modo dicendi per se. For, as Scheibler [de prop: cap: 4. n: 41.] sheweth, ad praedicationes per se secundi modi pertinent non solum praedi∣cationes illae, in quibus proprium praedicatur de subjecto suo primo, veluti corpus est quan∣tum, sed etiam ille praedicationes in quibus proprium praedicatur de speciebus sui primi 〈◊〉〈◊〉, veluti homo est 〈◊〉〈◊〉: but this hath no alliance with laughing, for it agre∣eth alwayes unto all men.

Dr. Taylor.

And in a morall discourse to call for Metaphysicall significations, and not to be con∣tent with morall and generall, may proceed from an itch to quarrell, but not srom that ingenuity, which will be your and my best ornament.

Ieanes.

It hath hitherto been a receiv'd 〈◊〉〈◊〉 amongst all Logicians; that in mixt que∣stions, the termes of which belong unto severall disciplines, we must for the ex∣plication of each terme, have recourse unto the discipline, unto which it 〈◊〉〈◊〉; and you can say nothing to disprove this rule: whether inclination to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be essentiall to man? is a mixt question; for inclination to evill or 〈◊〉〈◊〉, is a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 terme, and essentiall, is a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 terme, and therefore, in taking it in a Metaphysicall sense, I have done nothing, but what Logick, and reason have prescribed me; and therefore I shall not feare your passionate, and irrationall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of me for it. To cleare this yet further by instancing in mixt 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the like nature; an formale 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in genere sit 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ali creaturae? an formale 〈◊〉〈◊〉 originalis sit 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 originalis 〈◊〉〈◊〉? 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ad malum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ex principiis naturae integrae? an Sacramentum sit 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉? an 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sint 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Physicae gratiae?

Now if here you should be pleased to say, that in these questions to call for Me∣taphysicall significations, of privatio, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 respectivum, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, may proceed from an itch to quarrell, but not from that ingenuity, which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be our best ornament, you will bewray but little judgment, and lesse 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

2. If that, which you call essentiall in a morall, and large 〈◊〉〈◊〉, doe not ei∣ther constitute the essence, or necessarily flow therefrom, it will in the upshot prove to be but accidentall; and how then comes it that you oppose it unto accidentall? But you will, perhaps,, tell me, that I must take accidentall in a morall, and large sense, as well as essentiall; But, Sir, what is there in your words to guide me unto this sense of accidentall? I took accidentall for the concrete of accidens 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and so I believe have most Schollars that have read you; and why it should not be thus understood I thinke you can alledge no reason, but that, you know not otherwise to make any tolerable sense of your words: your discourse is Polemicall, and if therein you use Philosophicall termes, and I call for a Philosophicall signifi∣cation of the termes, with what forehead can you accuse me for being 〈◊〉〈◊〉 some, and disingenuous? if when you cannot defend what you say, according unto the pro∣per, and usuall signification of the words you use, you must have liberty to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 un∣to large and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 senses of them, you may say even what you please; for no man will be able to understand what you say, unlesse he hath a peculiar key unto your writings,

But let us inquire what can be here meant by accidentall in a morall and large sense: essentiall, you say, in a morall sense, is that which is not after our nature, but together with it; and, in conformity hereunto, accidentall in a morall sense must be that which is after our nature, and not together with it, and then I shall desire you to awake, and consider, whether your second reason be not coincident with your third; for your second reason, as you expound it, stands thus; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to evill is after our nature, and not together with it in reall being: And your third 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is this, inclination to evill is superinduc'd unto nature, and is after it, &c.

Dr Taylor.

Although I have not much to doe with it, yet because you are so great a Logician, and so great an admirer of that which every one of your Pupils knowes, I mean Porphyrics 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of an accident, I care not if I tell you that the definition is imperfect and false.

Jeanes.

1. You have ever and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 an uncivil fling at my poor Logick; But, Sir, let me be so bold as to tell you, that as my Logick is the object of your contempt, so that my Pupils cannot find in that 〈◊〉〈◊〉, which you manifest in these your papers, matter for either their envy or emulation.

2. Why, pray Sir, doe you say, that I am so great an admirer of Porphyrics de∣finition of an accident? indeed I say, that 'tis a celebrated definition of an acci∣dent; but thereby I signify only that 'tis frequently and much used, commonly known, and in every man's mouth; and this acception of the word is usuall in Ci∣cero, as these instances following evidence: Celebratur omnium sermone 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉: hoc delatum est tum ad vos pontifices, post omnium sermone celebratum, quemadmodum iste 〈◊〉〈◊〉 fecit: quod it a esse constanti fama atque omnium sermone cele∣bratum est: quid porro in graeco sermone tum tritum atque celebratum est quam, &c.

3. Though you care not to tell me, that Porphyries definition of an accident is false, and imperfect; yet you should have been carefull to have brought stronger objections against it, than those you have urged, for they containe such grosse, and absurd untruths, as that every one that understands them, will think you a very in∣competent judge of the definitions of Porphyrie and Aristotle. Indeed how farre you are to seek in the nature of accidents, appeares by your talking of accidents constitu∣tive of a substance, in your discourse of the Real-presence, &c: (Sect: 11. num: 12: pag: 209.) but let us heare your objections.

Dr Taylor.

It is not convertible with the defiaitum; for even, essential things may be taken away sine interit u subjecti.

Jeanes.

For an answer unto this, I shall referre you to your selfe, in your book, but now mentioned of the Real-presence of Christ in the holy Sacrament. (Sect. 11. num. 30. p. 244. & 245.) God can doe what he pleaseth, and he can reverse the lawes of his whole creation, because he can change or annihilate every creature, or al∣ter the manners and essences; but the question now is, what lawes God hath already esta∣blished, and whether or no essentials can be changed, the things remaining the same? that is, whether they can be the same, when they are not the same? he that sayes God can give to a body all the essentiall properties of a spirit, saies true, and confesses God's Omnipotency; but he sayes also that God can change a body, from being a body to be∣come a spirit; but if he saves, that remaining a body it can receive, the essentials of a spirit, he does not confesse God's 〈◊〉〈◊〉, but makes the Article dissicult to be believed, by making it not to work wisely and possibly: God can doe althings, but are they undone, when they are done? that is, are the things changed in their essentials

and yet remaine the same? then how are they chang'd, and then what hath God done to them?

But to come unto your instances.

Dr. Taylor.

I instance to be quant tative is essential to a body, and to have succession of duration; but yet in the resurrection when bodyes shall be spiritual, and eternal, those other which are now essential predicates shall be taken away, & yet the subject remain, & be improved to higher, and more noble predicates.

Jeanes.

1. As for the 1. of these instances it is without doubt, that to be quantitative is essentiall unto a body à posteriori, and consecutive as a probrium thereof 4 to modo. but.

• 1. That quantity is separable from a body was never affirmed by any besides the Patrons of either transubstantiation or consubstantiation.
• 2. If a body were without quantity, it would be without extension, and so would exist in an undivisible point without distinction of parts, and so it would be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a bodilesse body, which is a flat contradiction.

But for refutation of this, I shall referre you to your own selfe in your discourse of the Real-presence, &c. (Sect. 11. 13 pag. 211.) But I demand, when we 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of a body what we mean by it? for in all discourses and entercourses of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by words, we must agree concerning each others meaning: when we speak of a body, of a substance, of an accident, what does man-kind agree to mean by these words? all the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and all the wise men in the world, when they speak os a body, and separate it from a spirit, they mean, that a spirit is that which hath no material divisible parts Physi∣cally that which hath nothing of that which makes a body that is extension & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by sines and superficies. And, (Pag. 212.) when we speak os a body all the world meanes that, which hath a finite quantity. Pag. 219. 220: that which I now insist upon is, that in a body there cannot be indistinction of parts, but each must possesse his own portion, or place, and if it does not, a body cannot be a body. Sect. 11. num. 18. Again, (Pag 221. num. 20: ejusd: Sect:) If Christ's body be in the Sacrament ac∣cording to the manner of a substance not of a body; I demand according to the nature of what substance whether of a material or an immaterial? if according to the nature of a material substance, then it is commensurate by the dimensions of quantity, which he is now endeavouring to avoid. If according to the nature of an immateriall substance, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it is not a body, but a spirit, or else the body may have the being of a spirit, whil'st it remains a body, that is, be a body, and not a body at the same time.

Here every material substance, by your opinion is commensurate by the division of quantity, and therefore no material substance can be without the dimensions of of quantity; afterwards in (pag. 241. &. 242. num: 29. ejusd: Sect:) you bring in a shift of Bellarmines unto which you returne a very good answer, both which I shall transcribe. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sayes that to be coextended to a place is separable from a ma∣gnitude or body, because it is a thing that is extrinsecal and consequent to the intrinse∣cal extension of parts, and being later than it, is by divine power separable: but this

is as very a sophism as all the rest; for if whatever in nature is later than the substance, be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from it, than fire may be without heat, or water without moisture; a man can be without time, for that also is in nature after his essence, and he may be without a fa∣culty of will, or understanding, or of affections, or of growing to his state, or being nourished, and then he will be a strange man, who will neither have the power of will, or understanding, of desiring, or avoiding, of nourishment or growth, or any thing, that can distinguish him from a beast, or a tree, or a stone; for these are all later than the essence, for they are all essential 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from it, thus also quantity can be separated from a substantial body if every thing that is later than the forme can be separated from it.

When you wrote this, you thought it a grosse absurdity to averre that quantity could be separated from a substantial body; when you have answered your selfe, I shall then take up the Cudgels, and reply unto your answer in the mean while, I shall consider your argument by which you endeavour to prove quantity separable from a body.

It stands thus; in the resurrection bodies shall be spiritual; therefore to be quan∣titative, which is now an essential predicate, shall be then taken away.

For answer.

1. If the bodies of the Saints shall be raised without quantity, then without extension, without integral parts, without heads, eyes, armes, legs, feet, and this would be a very pretty, and proper resurrection; it would indeed be an invisible resurrection; this is a very strange, and false assertion, contrary as to the constant tenet of both ancient, and moderne Divinity, so also unto expresse scripture; In my flesh, saies Job, shall I see God, whom I shall see for my-selfe, and my eyes shall be∣hold, and not another, Job. 19. 26, 27: the bodies of the Saints shall in the resur∣rection be conformed unto Christ's glorious body in his: Philip. 3. 21: and that was a visible and palpable body, it might be seen and selt, it had flesh and bones, and hands, feet and sides, Luk. 24. 39, 40: John. 20. 27: see Aquin: sup: ad 3 am part. sum: &c: quaest. 80. Art. 1. Tertullian upon these words of the Apostles [this corruptible shall put on incorruption] hath this glosse, quantitativam & eandem numero essentiam di∣gito demonstrat, magis enim expressè loqui non poterat, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cutem suam manibus 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

2. As for the spirituality of our bodies in the resurrection, that shall not be de∣structive of their quantity; for they shall be spiritual, not in regard of substance; but in respect of either immediate supportance by the spirit, or else resemblance unto a spi∣rit.

1. In respect of immediate supportance by the spirit without the help of bodily meanes, meates, drinks, sleep, medicaments, &c: he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that dwelleth in you, Rom. 8. 11: or else

2. (As others conjecture) in regard of resemblance unto a spirit as touching some particulars in the resurrection; they neither marry, nor are given in marriage; but are as the Angels of God in Heaven, Matth. 22. 30.

But that spirituality of the body in `Paul's sense of the word is no impeachment unto the quantity of it is evident enough from what you say in your treatise of the Real-presence, &c: for therein you rightly averre, that Christ's body is now a spi∣ritual body, and yet maintain against the Papists that 'tis endued with quantity, and hath partem extra partem, one part without the other answering to the parts of his place.

Your second instance is, to have succession of duration, this is essential to a bo∣dy think you; yet in the resurrection, when our bodies shall be eternal, it shall be taken away.

But here Sir, my poor Pupils, because you are so great a Metaphysitian, care not much if they tell you, That succession in duration is so far from being essential to a body, as that it doth not at all agree thereunto; and they have learnt it out of Scheibler, Metap. lib. 1. cap. 16. n. 48. 53. 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, cap. 19. n. 9, 10, 11, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35. And 〈◊〉〈◊〉, disp: 50. Sect. 5. and 7. Metaphysitians no 〈◊〉〈◊〉 inferior unto your great self.

Out of them they thus argue, whatsoever hath a successive duration, hath also a successive essence or being; but now no body hath a successive essence or being, therefore no body hath a successive duration.

The Major is evident, because as Suarez and Scheibler well prove, the duration of a thing is not distinguished from the actual existence thereof, really, but onely ratione ratiocinata.

And then for the Minor, it may be thus confirmed, Whatsoever hath a succes∣sive essence or being, hath the parts of its essence in fluxu, so that 'tis partly past, partly present, and in part to come; but no such thing can be affirm'd of any body, and therefore no body hath a successive essence or being.

Or thus, No permanent being hath a successive being or essence; but every body is a permanent being, therefore no body hath a successive being or essence.

The Minor, that alone askes proof, may be thus confirmed: Whatsoever hath all the parts of its essence or being together (so that in no moment of time there is wanting unto it any thing requisite unto its essential integrity) that is a permanent being; but every body hath all the parts of its essence or being together (so 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in no moment of time there is wanting unto it any thing requisite unto its essential integrity.)

Therefore every body is a permanent being.

If you should say, That God onely hath permanency of being, according to that of the Psalmist, Psal. 102. 26, 27. The Heavens shall perish, but thou sha't en∣dure; yea all of them shall wax old, like a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed, but thou art the same.

Unto this they will answer, That you do but triste with the equivocation of the word permanency, it is (they will say) opposed unto either mutability or succession; if it be opposed unto mutability and defectibility of being, then God alone hath permanency of being; but if it be opposed unto succession of being, then every created being, besides motion, hath permanency of being; and this Scheibler hath taught them, Met: lib. 1. cap. 19. n. 35. Nullae rei (inquit) convenit fluxus vel suc∣cessio partium essentialium praeterquam motui (〈◊〉〈◊〉 loquendo) unde non est tempus successivum, nisi tempus quo durat ipse motus: nempe sicut essentia motus consistit in successione partium: ita etiam duratio motûs consistit in successione partium, & pro∣inde utrumque est ens successivum, si tamen a parte rei loquamur, tum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 eas est successivum, nempe motus, duratio enim motus à parte rei cadem est cum essentià ipsà. If you should say with Bonaventure, and others, That succession of dura∣tion distinguisheth the creature from the Creator, and therefore every creature hath succession of duration: They will again (out of the forementioned Authors) di∣stinguish of a two-fold succession, privative and positive.

1. A privative or negative succession, and that is, either betwixt not being, and being, or betwixt being, and not being; thus when a man is begotten, his being succeeds his not being, and when he dies, his not being succeeds his being; and this privative succession doth distinguish the creature from the Creator, and there∣fore doth or may agree to every creature: for even the Angels had a beginning,

and so there was a succession of their being unto their not being; and they might have an end, by Gods omnipotency, if he had not decreed otherwise: nay, God could 〈◊〉〈◊〉 them meerly by the withdrawing of his preservative influence, and so there might have been a succession of their not being unto their being: this succession is opposed unto an intrinsecal necessity of existence, or unto an immuta∣ble permanency, seu stabilitati permanentiae, as Suarez phraseth it, Disp: 50 Sect. 5. n. 26. and not unto 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of being as such: This succession, if we speak of the power and capacity of it, is essential to our bodies, and withal, 'tis insepara∣ble from them; for even after the resurrection, God could (if he had not deter∣mined the contrary) reduce them unto their first nothing.

A positive succession hath for both its extreams a positive being, and this is again (they will say) either discrete, or continuous.

1. Discrete between beings totally perfect; as the knowledge of one Plant suc∣ceeds the knowledge of another Plant: But this succession doth not constitute a successive being

There is another succession, which they call continuous, and that is not betwixt total beings, but betwixt parts of the same being; when they do not exist together, but one after another, in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 (as they say) and this succession is proper and pe∣culiar unto motion, though not unto every motion. Thus far my Pupils.

Dr. Taylor.

This I have here set down, not that I at all value the problem whether it be so or no, but that you may not think me a Socinian particularly in this Article, or that I think the bodies in the resurrection shall be specifically distinct from what they are here; I believe them the same bodies, but enobled in their very beings, for to a specifical and substantial change, is required, that there be introduction of new forms.

〈◊〉〈◊〉.

1. You will not be throughly and sufficiently distinguished from the Socinians in this Article, if you think the bodies in the resurrection shall be numerically di∣stinct from what they are here; and therefore I shall intreat you to tell us in your next, how far you accord with or dissent from them in this particular.

2. You here say, that to be quantitative, shall be taken away from our bodies in the resurrection; and the sequel of this is, that bodies in the resurrection shall be specifically distinct from what they are here; for a quantitative substance, and a substance without quantity, are specifically distinct; because the one is material, a body, and the other immaterial, a spirit, and not a body at all, unlesse nomine tenns.

Dr. Taylor.

But yet the improving of essential predicates, is no specification of subjects, but a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the first.

Jeanes.

The ordinary Reader may perhaps think, that there is some great mystery wrapt up under these hard words; but the plain meaning of them, is (as I suppose) that

the improving of essential predicates, doth not make a specifical change of subjects, but onely advance a subject unto a better being. Essential predicates may be said to be improved three manner of ways. 1. By abolition of them. 2. By 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of them. 3. By addition unto them.

The two latter are impertinent to this business in hand; for suppose (though not grant) that the essential predicates of substances might be improved by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of them, or by addition unto them; yet what will this make to the separability of es∣sentials from a subject: The improving of essential predicates, that belongs unto our present purpose, is by abolition of them, and by substituting new and more no∣ble essentials in their room; and that essentials may be abolished, and new essen∣tials substituted in their rooms (the things remaining the same) is a thing you may magisterially and imperiously dictate, but can never Scholastically prove.

But (perhaps) you will say, that you take essential in a Moral and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉: But Sir, you must remember, that you are not to take essential here, in such a latitude, as to include accidental and contingent predicates; for if you should, Porphyry's definition of Accidens will remain unshaken by what you say: Would not this be a ridiculous Argument? accidental and contingent predicates may be taken away, sine subjecti interitu, therefore adesse & abesse sine subjecti 〈◊〉〈◊〉, is no excellent definition of an accident; and yet this will be your very argument, if by essential predicates you mean any thing besides the four first predicables, unto which all essential predicates are reducible.

Dr. Taylor.

But the consequent is, that abesse & adesse sine subjecti interitu, is not an excellent definition of an accident.

Jeanes.

The arguments from which you infer this consequent, are overthrown, and there∣fore this consequent falleth to the ground of it self, without you support it by some fresh arguments.

Dr. Taylor.

And 〈◊〉〈◊〉 further, it follows; That if 〈◊〉〈◊〉 were 〈◊〉〈◊〉 essential to a man, as mortality is, or to be 〈◊〉〈◊〉, yet there is no more need that man should rise with sin, then with mortality.

Ieanes.

And, pray Sir, why do not you adde, and with quantity? Do you begin to startle at this Proposition? that men shall rise without quantity: But as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the se∣parability of both mortality and quantity from bodies in the resurrection, I have spoken already so fully, as that I may spare to say any thing anew of it.

Dr. Taylor.

But Aristotles Philosophy, and Porphyry's Commentary, are but ill measures in 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and you should do well to scour bright that armor in which you trust, which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it be prudently conducted, will make a man a Sophister rather than a 〈◊〉〈◊〉: but 〈◊〉〈◊〉 are wiser.

Ieanes.

Aristotle and Porphiry are no contemptible Authors in Philosophy; but who ever thought them 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in Philosophy, or their Books measures in Theology? Phi∣losophy is a very usefull Hand-maid unto Divinity, and none will decry it, but such whose sayings and writings cannot endure the test thereof; nothing that is true in Philosophy, can be false in Divinity; for verum vero non opponitur, one truth doth not, cannot clash with another: As for my Philosophy, I hope God will preserve me from trusting in it, or in any other arm of flesh: If you can detect any error therein, I shall be ready to retract it, and be very thankful to you for your pains; as for the dirt you have hitherto thrown thereon, it will not stick, but recoil∣eth on your own face.

Dr Taylor.

I have onely this one thing to adde, That the common Discourses of Original Sin, makes sin to be natural, necessary, and unavoidable, and then may I not use your own words, this Tenet is chargeable with Libeatinism, it is a liceatious Doctrine, and opens a gap to the greatest prophaneness, for it takes away all conscience of sin, all 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of it for the time past; if sin be natural, necessary, and unavoidable, as it is to us, if we derive it from Adam, &c. what reason hath he to be humbled for it, and to ask God pardon for it? so that you have done well against your own opinion; and if I had not used the argument before, I should have had reason to thank you for it: now as it is, you are further to consider of it, not I.

Jeanes.

If you understand by natural, that which naturally results from nature, and by necessary and unavoidable, that which is denominated such from a primitive and crea∣ted necessity, that which you say is a foul slander against the common discourses of Protestants against Original sin: But if you mean by natural that which is con∣nexed with, and cocval unto our nature, and by necessary and unavoidable, that which is such in regard of a consequent and contracted necessity, it will be nothing to the purpose: for you (and you may take in to boot your good friends of Racovia) are never able to prove, that the assertion of such a naturality and necessity of Origi∣nal sin, is any bar to humiliation or repentance for it, unto Prayer for the pardon of it.

Dr Taylor.

Sir, Though I have reason to give you the priority in every thing else, yet in civility I have far out-done you.

Ieanes.

First, You have written a Letter to me without a Superscription, and I have re∣turned one unto you with a Superscription; and this I take, to be of the two, the greater civility.

If I may believe the eccho of the neighborhood, you have written several Let∣ters unto Mr. T. C. concerning me, that cannot pretend to any great civility, for they are said to be stuffed with insulting reproaches: unto which I shall return no∣thing, but my Prayers for the increase of your charity and humility.

Dr. Taylor.

You were offended at a passage, which you might easily, but would not understand; you have urg'd arguments against me, which return upon your own head: The Propositi∣on you charge me withall, I own not in any of your 〈◊〉〈◊〉, nor (as you set it down) in any at all, and yet your arguments do not substantially, or rationally confute it, if I had said so.

Ieanes.

Here you sum up your Conquests, but whether you do not reckon without your Host, let the Reader judge.

Dr. Taylor.

〈◊〉〈◊〉 all this, you have used your pleasure upon me; you have reviled me, slighted me, scorned me, untempted, unprovoked; you never sent to me civilly to give you satis∣faction in your Objections, but talked it my absence, and to my prejudice.

Ieanes.

Unto all this, a general negative is a sufficient answer, until I know the Parti∣culars that your Delator hath informed you with; but perhaps, you may think that for such an obscure person as my self, to dare to except against what you write, is to revile, slight, and scorn you; if you be so impatient of contradiction, I shall leave it unto your own bosom to judge from what spirit it proceeds: When you published your Book, you exposed it to every mans censure that would read it; and will you accuse every man of uncivility that passeth his censure upon any passage in it, in a private discourse with friends? But Sir, upon Mr. C. his entreaty, I sent him in writing the reasons that I had for my censure, and these reasons were by my con∣sent to be conveyed to you, and therefore I sent unto you mediately by another to give satisfaction to my objections: If you shall say that 'twas uncivil for me not to make my address immediately unto your self, it is a charge will easily be wiped off; I was, as I thought, an utter stranger unto you, and Mr. C. professed a greet ac∣quaintance with, and interest in you, and assured me that my Exceptions should be received with all possible candor, and promised his diligence and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in con∣veying of them unto 〈◊〉〈◊〉 my objections therefore were sent civilly unto you, though sent by him; but however you are thus 〈◊〉〈◊〉, the Reader, I hope, will have a more charitable opinion of my procedure herein, and think, that you have no reason to make such 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Out-crys against me for abusive uncivilities towards you.

Dr. Taylor.

Yet I have sent you an answer, I hope, satisfactory, and together with it a long Let∣ter, which in the midst of my many affairs and straitned condition, is more then I can a∣gain afford.

Jeanes.

Unto your long Letter I have returned a longer answer; and whether yours or mine be satisfactory, I am contented to refer it unto the indifferent Reader: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 your condition be straitned, I wish it were more plentiful: But my affairs are, I 〈◊〉〈◊〉, neither for number nor importance inferior unto yours; and from them I have borrowed so much time, as to answer you, and shall be ready to do so a∣gain to perform unto you the like office.

Dr Taylor.

And after all this, I assure you that I will pray for you, and speak such good things of you, as I can finde, or hear to be in you; and prosess my self, and really be, Sir, Your affectionate friend and servant, in our blessed Lord and Saviour Jesus. Jer: Taylor.

Ieanes.

For this your promise I give you hearty thanks, and shall endeavor to make you as grateful a return as I can, in the like Christian offices of love, and so shall rest,

In Christ Jesus your humble servant, Henry Jeanes.

POSTSCRIPT.

Dr Taylor.

Sir, I received yours late last night; and I have returned you this early in the morn∣ing, that I might in every thing be respective of you.

Jeanes.

This I easily believe, and am confident, that upon review of your Letter you will acknowledge, that according to the proverb, you have made more haste then good speed.

Dr. Taylor.

But I desire not to be troubled with any thing that is not very material, for I have bu∣siness of much greater concernment; neither can I draw the saw of contention with any man about things less pertinent. I expect no answer, I need none, I desire none, but ex∣pect that you will imploy your good parts in any thing, rather 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in being ingeniosus in alieno libro. Your talents can better (if you please) serve God, then by cavilling with or without reason.

Ieanes.

Whether or no the controversie between us be not material, but less pertinent; whether your Letter be so satisfactory, as that it needs no answer? as also, whether I cavill without reason (to cavil with reason, is a Catachresis as harsh as ratione 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and as hardly justifiable, but by a licentiâ pocticâ) are things in which I re∣fuse you for my Judge, and appeal unto the learned and unprejudic'd Reader.

Secondly, That you neither expect nor desire an answer from me may be very pro∣bable, but that I was obliged to return you one, I have 3 Reasons that convince me.

First, By my silence, the truth which you have wronged would suffer.

Secondly, your Papers have been with a great deal of diligence published, and if I should not give them an answer, I should be accessary to the Funeral of my own good name. And

Thirdly, A friend of yours, when he gave me this your Letter, told me, That I could not answer it, and that you were, as he thought, infallible: now I thought it my duty to undeceive him, who having your person in too great an admiration, greedily swalloweth whatsoever falls from your pen, though never so 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and erro∣neous.

Notes

• Dr. 〈◊〉〈◊〉: Reynolds 3 Treatises, pag: 209.
• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in 3 am 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Thom: disp. 34. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 2. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Valentia. Tom. 4. dist. 1 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 3.