A second part of The mixture of scholasticall divinity, with practical, in several tractates: wherein some of the most difficult knots in divinity are untyed, many dark places of Scripture cleared, sundry heresies and errors refuted ... Whereunto are annexed, several letters of the same author, and Dr. Jeremy Taylor, concerning Original Sin. Together with a reply unto Dr. Hammonds vindication of his grounds of uniformity from 1 Cor. 14.40. By Henry Jeanes, minister of Gods Word at Chedzoy in Somersetshire.

Sir,

I understand by my very good friend Mr T. C that you are very much troubled at a passage in my [further explication of originall sin] pag: 496: The words are these [that every man is inclined to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 some more, some lesse, but all in some instances, is very true, and it is an effect, or condition of nature; but no sinne properly.] The 〈◊〉〈◊〉 you conceive is because, one of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 I bring to prove it is, because it is accidentall to nature, not intrinsecall and essentiall.]

〈◊〉〈◊〉 this you 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that I 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that all sinne is intrinsecall and essentiall to nature: which indeed is I had said, I had been as very a fool as you conceive me, and worse; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 besides the reasons you are pleas'd to object, which I am no way by this 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉〈◊〉, I had destroyed my maine intention, nay, that which I was proving in that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 place; for my worke there was to prove that no sinne is, or can be naturall.

Now 〈◊〉〈◊〉 although I 〈◊〉〈◊〉 you could easily have understood what I did and must meane there; yet because you are pleased not to doe it; I will point in out to you. To 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to evill is an effect or condition of nature; but no sinne properly, 〈◊〉〈◊〉: of 〈◊〉〈◊〉; for that is the subject of the Question: whether inclination to evill be an 〈◊〉〈◊〉 os nature, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 principle of evill; a sinne naturall and necessary. Now that it is not this; I doc suppose that reason, which you so misconstrued compe∣tent: 〈◊〉〈◊〉: It is not a naturall or necessary sinne, not a sinne of our nature, because it is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to nature, not intrins. call, not essentiall; If it be in our nature, it must be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, it 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be at first, it must be in all persons, that have our 〈◊〉〈◊〉. And this is my meaning; and that you may not be troubled at the word essential; I 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it not in the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 physicall, but in the morall sense; that which is not after our nature, but together with it in reall being: and I explicate it, by intrinsecall; I oppose it to accidentall; (in this 〈◊〉〈◊〉) 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to [superinduc'd] in the next, Sir I did give an account to Mr C. in a letter to him, which I know was sufficient, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; for cujus est loqui, ejus est 〈◊〉〈◊〉; I told you perfectly what is my meaning, it is very plaine by the whole 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of that, that it must be my meaning; it is also 〈◊〉〈◊〉 enough and very easy in the expression, and therefore I now appeale to your 〈◊〉〈◊〉, whether you ought to have made such tragedios with that which common 〈◊〉〈◊〉 would have made plaine to you, unlesse you had received a prejudice.

And now 〈◊〉〈◊〉, to your two 〈◊〉〈◊〉, be pleased to the subject of the two majors, to adde but this qualification; [naturall] and try if those horrid consequents will fol∣low which you assixed to your own 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

But I shall for this once consider the particulars.

1. You charge it with nonsense; but with your favour you prove it most pitifully, your 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is, that to say [essentiall] is predicated of (sin) in either os the two wayes, di∣cendi per se, is such pitifull and prodigious nonsense, that you 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it not worthy of any se∣rious resutation: so that this is your argument [to say that sin is essentiall is prodigious and pitifull nonsense; g. it is prodigious and pitiful nonsense] surely a good argument; or thus, that which is such nonsense that you think' not worthy of resutation, is certainly nonsense: but to say that sinne is essentiall is such nonsense that you thinke not worthy of resute: therefore it is 〈◊〉〈◊〉. I doe not say your argument is 〈◊〉〈◊〉, but I am sure it is no argument, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 affirmative be a sufficient proofe in your Logicke. But to the thing that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is essentiall, is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 false to say, but to say so, is not 〈◊〉〈◊〉. And whereas you will suppose me to say so, you are uncharitable, and something unreasona∣ble in it: for I was to prove that inclination to sinne, was not a sinne of our nature (as was pretended,) because what was 〈◊〉〈◊〉, is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and essentiall, as docibi∣lity to man; which because to be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to sinne is not, g. it is not a sin, viz: of nature.

In the next place you charge this with blasphemy. If I had 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or meant what you pre∣tend; you had reason. But then pray consider how your charge will returne really upon your selfe. For is it be blasphemy to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to be the Authour of sinne; then what I deriv'd from 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is no sinne, for that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sinne should descend upon me, I de∣mand, who was the Author of that? If you please you may take time to consider it; but in the interim, if you be pleased to read a little 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of mine called Deus justifica∣tus,

you shall find my Question not to be answered by you, if you have any regard to the authority, or to the reason of Mr Calvin, Dr Twisse, and some other Bigots of your par∣ty. Your second charge of Blespemy, is that my reason does by implication involve Christ in the guilt of sinne; because whatsoever is essentiall he had. But then if you remember, that I say not, that sinne is essentiall; and that I bring the reverse of this very argument against your party and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in some of my late discourses, you have reason to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 out of your owne bosome, not to tell me, that I 〈◊〉〈◊〉. For if inclination to sinne be a sinne naturally, and derived from our Parents, I de∣mand whether or no had not Christ all naturall 〈◊〉〈◊〉? If he had not, he was not a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 man. If he had then all naturall desire: are not natural sins, for if you say they be you are the blasphemer by the consequence of your affirmative; not I: But God sorbid that either of us should. Your 〈◊〉〈◊〉 reason also is as pretty. For first; I demand whether a possibility to sinne be not of the nature of man (for that is all I mean by essentiall.) If it be not; how came Adam to sinne his first sine? if it be; I ask: whether shall the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the resurrection be raised up with it or no? If yea, then you 〈◊〉〈◊〉 God's full glorification of the Saints in the resurrection, for 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is certainly a part of their full glorification; If nay, then it is no blasphemy to say that in the resurrect on the Saints shall be raised up will out something that is es∣sentiall to them, or of their nature. But Sir, what 〈◊〉〈◊〉 you of mortality? is that 〈◊〉〈◊〉, or os the nature of man? I suppose you will not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it. But yet I also believe you will confesse that though we are 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a corruptible 〈◊〉〈◊〉, yet we shall be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 an incorruptible; and the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 shall put on immortality. Once more, is it naturall to be naturall? that will not be denyed; but then remember that although to be naturall is essen∣tiall, that is, of the essence of the body, yet the natural body shall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 without it's 〈◊〉〈◊〉, it is sowne a naurall body, it is raised a spirituall. So that you see if I had said this which you charge upon me, which is so contrary to my thoughts, and so against my purpose, yet your arguments could not have overthrowns it. It is good advice, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. If you had been pleased to have learn'd my meaning, before you had published your dislike, I should have 〈◊〉〈◊〉 my selfe oblig'd to you in a great acknowledgment: now you have said very much evill of me, though I de∣serv'd it not. For suppose I had not prosperously enough express'd my meaning; yet you who are a man of wit and parts could easily have 〈◊〉〈◊〉 my purpose and my designe, you could not but know and consider too, that my great 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was to say, that sinne could not be natural; that it is so sar from being 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is not so much as subjected in our common nature, but in our persons only. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 beside 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Sir, I am a little to complaine of you, that when you had two 〈◊〉〈◊〉 at your choice to explicate each other, (intrinsecall and 〈◊〉〈◊〉) you would take the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and the worst sease, not the easiest and most ready: for you cannot but know that (〈◊〉〈◊〉) is not alwayes to be taken in the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sense os Philosophy 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that which is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 os a nature; but largely and for all sorts of proprieties, and the universall accidents of 〈◊〉〈◊〉; as it is essentiall to man to laugh, to be capable 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, to be mortall, to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a body of con∣trary qualities, and consequently by nature corruptible; and in a morall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 metaphysicall significations, and not to be content with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from an 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to quarrel, but not from that ingenuity which will be your and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

Although I have not much to doe with it, yet because you are so 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and so great an admirer of that, which everyone of your 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 I 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 de∣sinition of an accident: I care not if I tell you, that the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 on is imperfect and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it is not convertible with the 〈◊〉〈◊〉. For even 〈◊〉〈◊〉 things 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, sine interitu subjecti. I instance: to be 〈◊〉〈◊〉, is essentiall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a ledy, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉

have successio•• of duration; but yet in the resurrection, when bodies shall be spiritual and eternal, those other which are now Essential predicates shall be taken away, and yet the subject remain, and be improv'd to higher and more noble predicates. This I have here set down, not that I at all value the probleme whether it be so or no; but that you may not think me a Socinian particularly in this Article, or that I think the bodies in the resurrection shal be specifically distinct from what they are: I believe them the same bodies, but enobled in their very beings: For to a specifical and substantial change, is required that there be an introduction of new forms; but yet the improving of Essential predi∣cates, is no specification of subjects, but melioration of the first: But the consequent is, that abesse, & adesse,&c is not an excellent definition of an accident. And yet further, it follows, That if sin were as essential to a man, as mortality is, or to be quantitative, yet there is no more need that a man should rise with sin, then with mor∣tality: But Aristotles, Philosophy, and Porphyri••s Commentary, are but all measures in Theology; and you should do well to scoure bright the armor in which you trust, which unless it be prudently conducted, it will 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a man a Sophister, rather then a Theo∣logue; but you are wiser. I have onely this one thing to adde, That the common dis∣courses of Original sin, make sin to be natural, necessary and unavoidable; and then may not I use your own words? This Tenet is chargeable with Libertinism: It is a licentious Doctrine, and opens a gap to the greatest prophaneness: For it takes a∣way all conscience of sin, all repentance of it for the time past. If sin be natural, necessary, and unavoidable, as it is to us, if we derive it from Adam, &c. What reason hath he to be humbled for it, and to ask God pardon for it? So that you have done well against your own Opinion; and if I had not used the argument before, I should have had reason to thank you for it: Now as it is, you are further to consider it, not I. Sir, Though I have reason to give you the priority to every thing else, yet in civility I have far out-done you: You were offended at a passage, which you might easily, but wou'd not understand: You have urged arguments against me, which return upon your own head: The Proposition you charge me withal, I own not in any of your senses, nor (as you set it down) in any at all; and yet your Arguments do not substantially or rationally confute it, if I had said so: Besides all this, you have used your pleasure upon me, you have revil'd me, slighted me, scorn'd me, untempted, unprovoked: you never seat to me civilly to give you satisfaction in your objections but t••k'd it in my absence, and to my prejudice; yet I have sent you an answer, I hope satisfactory, and together with it a long Letter, which in the midst of my many affairs, and straitned condition, is more then I can again afford: And after all this, I assure you that I will pray for you, and speak such good things of you, as I can ••••••de, or hear to be in you, and profess myself, and really be,

Sir,

Your affectionate Friend and Servant in our blessed Lord and Saviour Iesus. Jer〈…〉〈…〉 Taylor.

August 15. 1657.

Postscript.

Sir, I received yours late last night, and I have returned you this, early this 〈◊〉〈◊〉. that I might in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thing be respective of you; but I desire not to be troubled with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thing that is not very 〈◊〉〈◊〉, for I have business of much greater concernment; 〈◊〉〈◊〉∣ther can I draw the saw of contention with any man about things less 〈◊〉〈◊〉. I 〈◊〉〈◊〉 no 〈◊〉〈◊〉, I need none, I desire none; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 expect that you will imploy 〈◊〉〈◊〉 good parts in any thing rather, then in being 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in alieno libro: Your 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 (if you 〈◊〉〈◊〉) serve God, then by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with, or without reason.