The stumbling-block of disobedience & rebellion cunningly imputed by P.H. unto Calvin, removed in a letter to the said P.H. from I.H.

THE STUMBLING-BLOCK OF DISOBEDIENCE & REBELLION Cunningly imputed by P. H. unto CALVIN, removed in a Letter to the said P. H. from I. H.

Let no man put a Stumbling-block in his bro∣thers way,

Rom. 14. 13.

Sir,

I Gave my judgment upon your late book (that I mean against Calvin) in such man∣ner among some Gentlemen, that they de∣sired me to write something in Answer to it, which if there happen to be need I may; In the mean time it will, perhaps, be enough if I acquaint you with as much as I have acquainted them. In this

book of yours you speak some things as a Polititian only, others as a Polititian and a Divine too. Now to repeat a few, and yet as many I think as are needful of each kind, I shall begin with the former.

The Rise, Progress, and Period of the Common-wealth of Lacedemon is observable in Authors by these steps,

1. The Insufficiency of the Monarchy.

2. The Form of the Commonwealth.

3. An Infirmity in the Form, and a cure of it.

4. The Corruption aud Dissolution of the whole.

All which happened within the compasse of eight hun∣dred years.

To the first you say, That the Spartan Kings were as absolute Monarchs as any in those times, till Eurytion, or Eurypon, to procure the favour and good will of the Ras∣call-rabble (so you commonly call the people) purchased nothing but the losse of Royalty, beside an empty name unto his Family, thence called the Eurypontidae.

It is true that Plutarch in the Life of Lycurgus sayes, That Eurypon was the first, who to obtain favour with the people, let loose the reins of Government, and this he saith there without shewing any necessity that lay upon the King so to do; nevertheless that such necessity there was is apparent in Agis, where he affirmeth, That a King of Lacedemon could never come to be equal unto any other King, but only by introducing Equality among the people; forasmuch as a servant or Lieutenant of Se∣leucus, or Ptolomy, was worth more then ever were all the Kings of Sparta put together. Which latter speech if a man consider the narrowness of the Laconick Territory, being but a part of Peloponnesus, must needs evince the former action to have been not so voluntary in Eurypon, as in prudence unavoidable. But Eurypon having by this means rather confessed the infirmity of the Monarchy, then introduced any cure of the Government, it remain∣ed

that the people not yet brought under fit Orders must needs remain in disorderrs as they did till the institution of the Commonwealth.

The Monarchy that is or can be absolute, must be founded upon an Army planted by Military Colonys upon the overballance of Land being in dominion of the Prince; and in this case there can neither be a Nobility, nor a People to gratifie, at least without shaking the foundation, or disobliging the Army. Wherefore the Spartan Kings having a Nobility or People to gratifie, were not absolute. It is true, you call the Kings of France absolute, so do others, but it is known that in the whole world there is not a Nobility nor a People so frequently flying out or taking Armes against their Prin∣ces as the Nobility and People of France.

The Monarch that is founded upon a Nobility, or a Nobility and the people (as by the rise and progresse of the Norman line in our story is apparently necessary) must gratifie the Nobility or the Nobility and the people with such Laws and liberties as are fit for them, or the government (as we have known by Experience, is found in France, and no doubt was seen by Eurypon) becom∣eth Tyrannical, be the Prince otherwise never so good a Man.

Thus Carilaus in whose Reigne the Commonwealth was instituted by Lycurgus, is generally affirmed to have been a good man, and yet said by Aristotle to have been a Tyrant; it remaineth therefore with you to shew how a good man can otherwise be a Tyrant then by holding Mo∣narchical government without a sufficient balance, or if you please, how he that shall undertake the like, (be he ne∣ver so good or well deserving a man) can be any other; Or confesse that not the favour of Princes (by which if they be well balanced they lose nothing) nor the usurpa∣tion of the people (by which without a popular balance they get nothing) but the infirmity of the Monarchy

caused the Common wealth of Lacedemon, And what less is said by Plutarch, or thus rendred by your self; Not the people only sent messages to Lycurgus for his coun∣sel, but the Kings were as desirous he should return from his travels, in hope that his presence would bridle and re∣strain the people; but Lycurgus applyed not himself unto either, being resolv'd to frame both into one Common-Wealth.

To the form of this Common Wealth, you say, That whatever the Kings lost, the people got little by this altera∣tion, being left out of all imployment in affairs of state, and forced to yeild obedience unto Thirty Masters, whereas before they had but two.

A strange affirmation seeing the Oracle conteyning the model of Lacedemon is thus recorded by your Au∣thor, When thou hast divided the people into Tribes and linages, thou shalt establish the Senate, consisting with the two Kings of thirty Senators, and assemble the people as there shall be occasion, where the Senate shall propose and dismiss the people without suffering them to debate. Now who seeth not that the people having no right to debate, must therefore have had the right to resolve, or else were to be assembled for nothing? but the Ultimate re∣sult is the soveraign power in every government. It is true the Greek of the Oracle is obsolete, and abstruse, but then it is not only interpreted by Plutarch in the sense I have given, but by the Verses of the Poet Tyr∣teus, which the Kings themselves, though they would have made other use of, acknowledged unto the people to be Authentick▪

They having of Apollo sought, This Oracle from Delphos brought; Vnto the Spartan Kings, among The Senators, it doth belong

To moderate in Royal Chairs, And give their Votes in all Affairs; And when they have proposed these, The People chose what ere they please.

Of many other Testimonies, I shall add no more then one out of the Isocrates; I am not ignorant (saith he, to the Areopagites) that the Lacedemonians flourish for this cause especially, that their government is popu∣lar.

To the infirmity of this form, and the cure of it you say; That the Royalty and power of the Kings being thus impaired, the people absolutely discharged from hav∣ing any hand at all in publick government, and the Autho∣rity of the Senate growing every day more insolent and pre∣dominant by reason that (albeit the Senators were elected by the people) they had their places for term of life, the Kings resolved upon a course of putting the people into such a condition as might inable them to curb and controle the Senators, to which end they ordained the Ephori, Magi∣strates to be annually chosen out of the body of the peo∣ple.

In which first you make that to be a practise of the Kings against the Senate, which by your Author is plain to have been a combination of the Kings, and the Se∣nate against the people; for the people upon the inso∣lency and predominancy of the Kings, and the Senate, fell, as is in that case, the inevitable nature of them, upon counsel how to defend themselves, and so assumed the power of debate. Hereupon the Kings Theopompus and Polidore would have added unto the tenor of the Oracle, that if the people went about by debate to change the propositions of the Senate, it should be law∣ful for the Kings and the Senate to null the result of the people; which practise if it had past, must have made the

Kings and the Senate altogether uncontrollable; where∣fore the people incensed at it, put a bitt into the mouth of the Senate, by the institution of the Ephori: This is the clear sense of Plutarch, which he taketh out of Pla∣to, who affirmeth the Ephorate to have been set up a∣gainst the hereditary power of the Kings; with whom agree both Aristotle and Cicero; the former affirming this Magistracy to contain the whole Common Wealth, inasmuch as the people having obtained it, were quiet; and the later that the Ephori in Lacedemon were so op∣posed to the Kings, as the Tribunes in Rome to the Con∣suls. Now if other Authors attribute the institution of the Ephori unto the Kings, and there be a story affirm∣ed as well by Plutarch as others, that Theopompus hav∣ing thus created the Ephori, and being told by his Queen he had done that which would leave narrower power to his children, answer'd well, that it would leave that which would be narrower, but longer: This is nei∣ther any Riddle nor kind of contradiction to the for∣mer sense: Seeing, when we say that Henry the Third instituted the Parliament to be assistant to him in his go∣vernment, we no more doubt of that, then how it is to be understood. Nor if his Queen had said as shee of Lacedemon, and our King had made the like answer, would that have alter'd any thing, or proved the wo∣man to have been, (as you will have it) the better Pro∣phet, seeing either Government lasted longer for either reformation, nor came to alter, but through the altera∣tion of the ballance, which was nothing to the womans prophecy.

The ruine of this Ballance, and corruption of the Common wealth, you wholly omit to the end, that picking up your objections against the Government in vigour, out of the rubbish and dissolution of it, you may cast dust in mens eyes, or perswade them that the Ephori trusting to the power and interest, they had in the

Communalty, came to usurp upon the Kings, and to be Ty∣rants as they are called by Plato and Aristotle, so you af∣firm.

But the truth is thus recorded by Plutarch in the life of Agis. So soon as the Lacedemmoans having ruin'd Athens, became full of gold and silver, the Common wealth began to break; Nevertheless, the lots or divi∣sion of lands made by Lycurgus yet remaining, the E∣quality of the foundation held good, till Epitadeus an ill-natur'd fellow became Ephore, and having a mind to dis-inherit his son, got a Law to pass whereby any man might dispose of his lot as he pleased: This by him pur∣sued of meet malice to his son, was hurri'd on by the a∣varice of others, whose riches came thus to eate the people so cleerly out of their lands, that in a short time there remained not above an hundred Freeholders in all Sparta. This he shews to have been the rise of the O∣ligarchy: The Oligarchy thus balanced totally exclu∣ded the people, and murther'd Agis, the first King that was ever put to death by the Ephori; and to these times (about which Plato and Aristotle lived) relateth that Tyranny, which they who (as was shewn) commended the Ephorate in the Common wealth, now laid unto it in Oligarchy: Thus have you fetcht arguments against a Common wealth, that are nothing to it. Again, whereas Agis and Cleomenes, by the restitution of the lots of Lycurgus were assertors of popular power, you insinuate them to have been assertors of Monarchy; such is your play with humane Authors, or as a poli∣titian. Now let us see, whether you have dealt any thing better with Scripture, or been more careful as a Divine. In order to this Discovery, I shall repeate that peice of Calvin, which you call the stumbing block of disobedi∣ence. Calvin having preached obedience to your good approbation comes at length to this expression. But still I must be understood of private persons; for if there be

now any popular officers ordained to moderate the licentious∣ness of Kings (such as were the Ephori, set up of old a∣gainst the Kings of Sparta, the Tribunes of the people a∣gainst the Roman Consuls, and the Demarches against the Athenian Senate, of which power perhaps as the world now goes, the three estates are seized in each several Kingdom when solemnly assembled) so far am I from hindring them to put restraints upon the exorbitant power of Kings, as their office binds them, that I conceive them rather to be guilty of perfidious dissimulation, if they connive at Kings when they play the Tyrants, or wantonly insult on the people; in that so doing they betray the liberty of the sub∣ject, of which they know themselves to be made Guardians by Gods own ordinance.

What Calvin sayes of the Athenian Demarches, they having been Magistrates of another nature, is a mistake, but such an one, as destroyes no other part of his as∣sertion, the rest of the Parenthesis, or that which he saith of the Ephori, and the Tribunes being confirmed as hath been already shewn by Plato and Aristotle, by Cicero and Plutarch. Wherefore of the Ephori and the Tri∣bunes enough; now why the estates in a Gothick Mo∣del should be of less power, no Polititian in the world shall ever shew a reason; the estates are such by virtue of their estates, that is of their over-ballance in domi∣nion, you are then either speculatively to shew how the over-ballance of dominion should not amount unto Em∣pire, or practically that the over-ballance of dominion hath not amounted unto Empire, and that in a quiet Government, or it can be no otherwise in a quiet Go∣vernment, then that the over-ballance of dominion must amount unto Empire. This principle being now sufficiently known, is the cause it may be why you chuse in this place to speak rather like a Divine, as you suppose, then a Polititian. For you would fain learn, you say, of Calvin, in what part of the Word of God we shall find any

such Authority given to such popular Magistrates, as he tels us of.

To which by the way I answer, That God founded the Israelitish Government upon a popular balance, that we find the people of Israel judging the tribe of Benjamin, and by the Oracle of God, levying War a∣gainst them, which are acts of Soveraign power, there∣fore a popular ballance, even by the ordinance of God himself expressed in Scripture, amounted unto Em∣pire.

But you, when you have asked in what part of the Word of God we shall find any such Authority given to popu∣lar Magistrates; answer, Not in the Old Testament you are sure. For when Moses first ordained the Seventy Elders, it was not to diminish any part of that power which was in∣vested in him, but to ease himself of some part of the burthen lying upon him, as you will have to appear plainly by the 18^th of Exodus, where Moses upon the advice of Jethro chose able men out of all Israel, and made them Rulers of Thousands, Rulers of Hundreds, Rulers of Fifties, and Rulers of Tens. Now I am sure that about this time the number of the men of Israel was above six hundred thou∣sand, and so any man may be sure that the elders thus chosen (should we count but the Rulers of the thousands only) must have come at the least to six hundred, where∣fore, you cannot be sure that this makes any thing to the election of the seventy elders.

Well, but out of these (say you) God afterwards in the Eleventh of Numbers, willed Moses to chuse the seventy Elders.

You may do me a greater favour then you can sudden∣ly imagine, to tell me really for what cause, or upon what authority your speech is so positive, that God wil∣led Moses to choose the seventy Elders out of those that were chosen in the Eighteenth of Exodus; For whereas Moses is willed to choose them out of such as he knew to

be elders, such there were in honour among the people, though not in power before the election of those ad∣vised by Jethro, as appears. Ex. 3••. 16. & 4. 29. But had this been as you would have it, what is the necessity, that because there lay an appeal unto Moses from those in Exodus (that is from the Jethronian Elders, or Courts which sat afterwards in the gates of the Temple, and of every City,) therefore there must needs lye an ap∣peale from the seventy Elders, or the Sanhedrim unto Moses, especially while the whole stream of Jewish writers or Talmudists, (who should have had some knowledg in their own Common-Wealth) unanimously affirms that there was no such thing? Whereupon to the election of the former Elders, saith Grotius, in the place of these came the Judges in the gates, and in the place of Moses the Sanhedrim. Nor need we go farther than the Scripture, for the certainty of this assertion, where the seventy are chosen not to stand under Moses, but with him, not to diminish his burthen, or bear it under him, with an appeal in difficult cases to him, as is expressed in the election of the Jethroinan Elders, but to bear the burden with him, and without any mention of such appeal. Moses before the election of the Je∣thronian Judges had the whole burthen of Judicature lying upon him, after their election, the burden of the ap∣peals only, wherefore if the seventy Elders were indeed instituted to bear the burthen with Moses, there thence∣forth lay no appeal unto Moses, which is yet clearer in this precept, If there arise a matter of controversie within thy gates, (which plainly is addrest to the Jethronian Courts) too hard for thee in judgment, then shalt thou come unto the Priest and the Levite (by which in the sense of all Authors Jewish and Christian is understood the San∣hedrim), or to the Judg that shall be in those dayes (the Suffes or Dictator) and they shall shew thee the sentence of Judgment; whence by the clear sense of Scripture,

all matter of appeal in Israel, lay unto the Sanhedrim. Your next Argument, that there must be nothing in all this but easing the supreme Magistrate of some part of the burthen, which was before too heavy for him, without any diminution, in the least respect of his power; is, that when God had taken of the Spirit which was upon Moses, and put it upon the seventy Elders, the Spirit yet rested upon Moses in as full a measure as it did at first: I grant in a fuller, for I believe his wisdom was the greater for this diminution of his power, it being through the nature of the ballance, apparently impossible that he could be any more then a Prince in a Common-wealth; but your argument can be of no force at all, unless you will have him to have been less wise, for not assuming soveraign power, where without confusion, it was alto∣gether impossible he should have held it: A Pince in a Common-wealth subsisteth by making himself, or be∣ing made of use unto the free course of popular orders; but a soveraign Lord can have no other subsistance or se∣curity, then by cutting off or tearing up all roots, that do naturally shoot or spring up into such branches. To conclude, if the Congregation of the people, in law to be made, had such power as was shewn, and in law, so made, the ultimate appeal lay unto the Sanhedrim; why, are not here two estates in this Common-wealth, each by Gods own ordinance, and both plain in Scripture? well, but when they came (you will say) to make unto themselves Kings, what ever power they had formerly, was now loft. This at best were but to dispute from the folly of a people against an ordinance of God, for what less is testified by himself in those words to Samuel, They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me that I should not raign over them. The Government of the Senate and the people, is that only which is or can be the government of lawes and not of men, and the government of lawes▪ and not of men, is the govern∣ment

of God and not of men: He that is for the go∣vernment of lawes, is for the government of God, and he that is for the government of a man, is for the government of a beast. Kings, no question, where the ballance is monarchical, are of divine right, and if they be good the greatest blessings that the go∣vernment so standing can be capable of; but the ballance being popular, as in Israel, in the Grecian, in the Sici∣lian Tyrannies, they are the direst curse that can befal a nation. Nor are divines, who will alwayes have them to be of divine right, to be hearkened to, seeing they affirm that which is clean contrary to Scripture, for in this case saith Hosea, They have set up Kings and not by me, they have made Princes and I knew it not. Pha∣raoh may impose the making of brick without the al∣lowance of straw, but God never required of any man or of any government, that they should live otherwise, then according to their estates. It is true if a mans want make him a servant; there are rules in Scripture that injoyn him the duty of a servant: But shew me the rule in Scripture that obligeth a man who can live of himself unto the duty of a servant. Hath God less regard unto a nation then to a man? Yet the peo∣ple of Israel, continuing upon a popular Agrarian, though God forwarned them, that by this means they would make themselves servants, would needs have a King; whence saith the same Proph••t. O Israel, thou hast destroyed thy self, but in me is thine help, I will be thy King (which foretels the restitution of the Com∣mon-wealth, for) where is any other that may save thee in all thy cities? and thy Judges of whom thou saidst give me a King and Princes. I gave thee a King in mine anger (that is in Saul) and I took him away in my wrath (that is in the captivity, so at least saith Rabbi B••chai, with whom agree Nachmoni, Gerschome, and others. Kimchi, it is true, and Maimonides are of op••n••on, that the people making a King, displeased God not in the matter, but in the

form only, as if the root of a tree, the ballance of a government, were form only and not matter: nor do our divines yet, who are divided into like partys, see more then the Rabbys. Both the Royalists and the Common-wealthsmen of each sort, that is whether divines or Talmudists appeal unto the letter of the law, which the Royalists (as the Translators of our Bible) ren∣der thus; When thou shalt say (the Common-wealths∣men, as Diodati thus, If thou come to say) I will set a King over me, like all the nations that are about me, thou shalt in any wise set him King over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose. The one party will have the law to be positive, the other contingent, and with a mark of detestation upon it, for so where God speaketh of his peoples doing any thing like the nations that were a∣bout them it is every where else understood. But let these (which are no nicities) be as you will; who seeth not that to argue from this place, for the necessity of the King, is as if one from that foregoing should argue for the necessity of the Judges. The words are these, Thou shalt come unto the Priest and to the Levitè (which, as was said, is to the Sanhedrim) and (that is or) to the Judg that shall be in those dayes. Yet that the Judg not by a∣ny necessity implyed in these words, but through the meer folly of the people came to be set up in Israel, is plain by Josephus, where he shews that the Israelites lay∣ing by their Armes. And betaking themselves unto their pleasures, while they did uot as God had commanded, root out the Canaanites from among them, but suffered them to dwell with them, suffered also the form of their Com∣mon-wealth to be corrupted, and the Senate to be bro∣ken; the Senators nor other solemn Magistrates being elected as formerly; which both in word and fact is con∣firmed also by the Scripture. In words, as where it is thus written. When Josua had let the people go (that is, had dismissed the Army, & planted them upon their popular

ballance) the children of Israel went every man unto his inheritance to possess the land, and the people served the Lord all the dayes of Josua, and all the dayes of the Elders that out-lived Josua (that is, while the Sanhedrim con∣tinued after him, but when the Elders hereof came to dye, and the people elected them no successors) they did evil in the sight of the Lord (and having broken their civil orders, forsook also their religion, the government whereof depended upon the Sanhedrim) and served Ba∣lim. And for the matter of fact included in these words, it farther appears, where Judah said unto Sime∣on his brother come up with me into my Lot, that we may fight against the Cananites, and I likewise will go with thee into thy lot; so Simeon went with him. By which the tribes leaguing at their pleasure one with ano∣ther, it is plain, that the Sanhedrim their common Liga∣ment was broken: Now except a man shall say that this neglect of Gods ordinance was according unto the law of God, there is no disputing from that law to the necessi∣ty of the judg, which happened through no other then this exigence (quippe aut rex, quod abominandum, aut quod unuus liberae civitatis consilium est, senatus habendus est) wherefore the judg of Israel was not necessitated by the will of God, but foreseen only by his Providence, not imposed by the law, but provided by it as an expedient in case of necessi¦ty, and if no more can be pleaded from the law, for the judg against whom God never declared, much less is there to be pleaded from the same for the King, against whom he declared so often. There is nothing more clear nor certain in Scripture, then that the Commonwealth of Isra∣el was instituted by God, the judges and the Kings no o∣therwise then through the imprudence and importunity of the people. But you who have no better name for the peo∣ple in a common-wealth, then the rascal rabble will have Kings at a venture to be of divine right, and to be absolute; whereas in truth if divine right be derived

unto Kings from these of the Hebrews only, it is most apparent that no absolute King can be of divine right: for these Kings if they were such by the law alledged, then by the same law they could neither multiply horses nor wives, nor silver, nor gold, without which no King can be absolute; but were to keep all the words of this law and these statutes, and so by consequence were regulated Monarchs; Nay, could of right enact no law, but as those by David for the reduction of the Ark, for the regulation of the Priests, for the election of Solomon, which were made by the suffrage of the peo∣ple, no otherwise then those under the Kings of Rome, and ours under the late Monarchy. What then is at∣tributed by Calvin unto popular Migistrates, that is not confirmed by Scripture and reason? yet nothing will serve your turn but to know what power there was in the Sanhedrim, to control their Kings: to which I answer, that both Skickardus and Grotius with the full consent of the Talmudists have assured you, that in case the King came to violate those lawes and statutes it was in the power of the Sanhedrim, to bring him unto cor∣poral punishment. Moreover it is shewn by the later out of Josephus, that Hircanus, when he could not deliver He∣rod from the Sanhedrim by power, did it by art: Nor is your evasion so good as that of Hircanus, while you hav∣ing nothing to say to the contrary, but that Herod when he was questioned, was no King, shufle over the business without taking any notice as to the point in controversy, that Hireanus who could not save Herod from the questi∣on was King.

The manner of the restitution of the Sanhedrim made by Jehoshaphat plainly shews, that even under the Monar∣chy the power of the Sanhedrim was coordinate with that of the King, at least, such is the Judgment of the Jewish writers, for saith Grotius, the King (as is rightly noted by the Talmudists,) was not to judg in some cases, and

to this the words of Zedekia seem to relate, where to the Sanhedrim demanding the Prophet Jeremiah, he said behold he is in your hands, for the King is not he that can do any thing without you. Nor (except David) had ever any King ••••ssion or vote in this councel: to which soon after he adds, that this court continued till Herod the great, whose insolencie, when exalting it self more and more against the law, the Senators had not in time as they ought, suppressed by their power; God punish∣ed them in such manner for the neglect of their duty, that they came all to be put to death by Herod, except Sameas only, whose foresight and frequent warning of this or the like calamity they h••d as frequently con••em∣ned. In which words Gr••tius following the unanimous consent of the Talmudists (if they knew anything of their own orders) expresly attributes the same power unto the Sanhedrim, and chargeth them with the same duty in Israel, that is attributed unto the three estates in a Go∣thick Model, and charged upon these by Calvin.

Thus that there never lay any appeal from the Sanhe∣drim, unto Moses nor (except when the Jews were in cap∣tivity, or under provincial government) to any other Magistrate, as also that they had power upon their Kings, being that your self say, Is the objection Paramount, and which not answered, you confess that the three estates cox∣vened in Parliament, or any other popular Magistrate Calvin dreames of, notwithstanding 〈◊〉〈◊〉 discontinuance; or non usage on their parts, or any prescription alledged by Kings to the contrary, may resume and exercise that Au∣thority which God hath given them when ever they shall find a fit time for it: And this letter sh••wing plainly that you have in no wise answered this objection; it re∣mains that your whole book (even according to your own acknowledgment,) is confuted by this Let∣ter. Or if you be of another mind, I shall hope to hear farther from you.

Notes

• p. 39, 40, 41
• P. 41.
• P. 43.
• P. 45.
• De Leg. 3.
• Pol. lib. 2.
• De Leg 3••
• P. 55.
• Calv. Inst. lib. c. 20. §. 31.
• P. 290.
• Judg. 20▪
• P. 290,
• Num. 1. 46.
• Grotius ad Ex. 18. 21.
• Num. 11.
• Deut. 17. 8.
• P. 292.
• 1 Sam. 8. 7.
• Arist pol. 3. c.
• Hos. 8. 4.
• Hos. 13.
• Deut. 17. 14.
• Verse 9.
• Book 5. c. 2▪
• Judg. 26.
• Indg. 1. 3.
• Pacuvious apud Livium. lib. 23
• Dan. 17.
• De jure B. ac. p. Lib. 1. Cap. 1••
• 2 Chr. 19.
• Ad Mat. 5.
• Ier. 38. 5.
• ••. 289.