Sect. 3. Against Reason. [ D]
IN very Reason, where all is of mere Duty, there can be no Merit; for how can we deserve reward by doing that, which if we did not we should of∣fend? It is enough for him that is obliged to his task, that his work is well taken. Now all that we can possibly doe, and more, is most justly due unto God by the bond of our Creation, of our Redemption, by the charge of his Royal Law, and that sweet Law of his Gospel: Nay, alas! we are far from being able to compass so much as our duty; In many things we sin all. It is enough that in our Glory we cannot sin: though their Fa∣ber Stapulensis would not yield so much, and taxeth Thomas for saying so: [ E] with the same presumption that Origen held the very good Angels might offend. Then is our Grace consummate: till then our best abilities are full of Imperfection. Therefore that conceit of Merit is not more arrogant then absurd.
We cannot merit of him whom we gratifie not: we cannot gratifie a man with his own. All our good is God's already, his gift, his propriety: What have we that we have not received? Not our talent onely, but the improvement also is his mere bounty. There can be therefore no place for Merit.
In all just Merit there must needs be a due proportion betwixt the act [ F] and the recompence. It is our favour if the gift exceed the worth of the service. Now what proportion can be betwixt a finite, weak, imperfect Obedience, (such is ours at the best) and an infinite, full and most perfect Glory? The old Schools dare say, that the natural and entitative value of the Works of Christ himself was finite, though the moral value was infinite. What then shall