The living temple, or, A designed improvement of that notion that a good man is the temple of God by John Howe ...

CHAP. II.

The two more principal grounds which a Temple supposes. 1. The existence of God. 2. His Conversableness with men: Both argued from common consent. The former doubtful if ever wholly deny'd in former days. The latter al∣so implied in the known general practice of some or other Religion. Evidenc'd, in that some, no strangers to the world, have thought it the difference of man. The immodesty and rashness of the persons from whom any oppo∣sition can be expected. These two grounds pro∣posed to be more strictly considered apart. And first the existence of God. Where first the no∣tion of God is assigned. The parts whereof are proposed to be evinc'd severally of some exi∣stent Being. 1. Eternity. 2. Self-origina∣tion. 3. Independency. 4. Necessity of exi∣stence. 5. Self-activity. The impossibility this world should be this necessary self-active Being. The inconsistency of necessary alter∣able matter, more largely deduced in a mar∣ginal digression. 6. Life. 7. Vast and migh∣ty power. A Corollary.

NOW the grounds more necessary to be laid down, and which are suppo∣sed in the most general notion of a Temple, are especially these two;

• ...

• The existence of God, and
• His conversableness with men,

For no notion of a Temple can more easily occur to any ones thoughts, or is more agree∣able to common acceptation; than that it is an habitation wherein God is pleased to dwell among men.

Therefore to the designation and use of it, or (which is all one) to the intention and ex∣ercise of Religion, the belief or perswasion is necessary of those two things (the same which we find made necessary on the same account) That God is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him; as will appear when the manner and design of that his abode with men shall be considered.

These are the grounds upon which the sa∣cred frame of a Temple ought to stand, and without which it must be acknowledged an unsupported, airy fabrick. And since it were vain to discourse what a Temple is, or where∣to the notion of it may be applied; unless it be well resolved that there is, or ought to be any such thing. The strength and firmness of this its double ground should be tried and searcht, and of its pretensions thereto.

And though it be not necessary in a matter that is so plain, and wherein so much is to be said otherwise; yet it will not be impertinent to consider, First, what Prescription (which in clearing of titles is not wont to signifie no∣thing) will signifie in the present case. And,

First, For the existence of God, we need

not labour much to shew how constantly and generally it hath been acknowledg'd through the whole world; it being so difficult to pro∣duce an uncontroverted instance of any that ever deny'd it in more ancient times. For as for them whose names have been infamous amongst men heretofore upon that account, there hath been that said that, at least, wants not pro∣bability for the clearing them of so foul an im∣putation: That is, that they were maliciously represented as having deny'd the existence of a Deity, because they impugned and derided the vulgar conceits, and poetical fictions of those days concerning the multitude, and the ridi∣culous attributes of their imaginary Deities. Of which sort Cicero mentions not a few; Their being inflam'd with Anger, and mad with Lust, their Wars, Fights, Wounds, their Ha∣treds, Discords, their Births and Deaths, &c. Who though he speak less favourably of some of these men, and mentions one as doubting whether there were any Gods or no; (for which cause his Book in the beginning whereof he had intimated that doubt, (as Cotta is brought in, informing us) was publickly burnt at Athens, and himself banisht his Country) and two others as expresly denying them; yet the more generally decried † Patron of Atheism (as he hath been accounted) he

makes Velleius highly vindicate from this im∣putation, and say of him that he was the first that took notice that even nature it self had impressed the notion of God upon the minds of all men: who also gives us these as his words,

What Nation is there or sort of men that hath not without teaching, a certain anticipation of the Gods, which he calls a prolepsis, a certain preventive, or fore-con∣ceived information of a thing in the mind, without which nothing can be understood, or sought, or disputed of.

Unto which pur∣pose the same Author (as is commonly obser∣ved) elsewhere speaks; That there is no Na∣tion so barbarous, no one of all men so savage, as that some apprehension of the Gods hath not tinctured his mind. That many do think in∣deed corruptly of them, which is (saith he) the effect of vicious custom. But all do believe there is a Divine Power and Nature. Nor (as he there proceeds) hath mens talking and agreeing together effected this. It is not an opi∣nion setled in mens minds by publick constitu∣tions and sanctions. But in every matter the consent of all Nations is to be reckoned a law of Nature.

And whatever the apprehensions of those few (and some others that are wont to be men∣tion'd under the same vile character) were in this matter, yet so inconsiderable hath the dis∣sent been; that, as another most ingenious Pa∣gan Author writes,

In so great a contenti∣on and variety of opinions (that is concern∣ing

what God is) herein you shall see the law and reason of every Country to be har∣monious and one. That there is one God the King and Father of all—That the many are but the servants and co-rulers unto God. That herein the Greek and the Barbarian says the same thing, The Islander and the Inhabitant of the Continent, The Wise and the foolish: Go to the utmost bounds of the Ocean, and you find God there. But if (says he) in all time there have been two or three, an atheistical, vile, sensless sort of per∣sons, whose own eyes and ears deceive them, and who are maimed in their very soul, an irrational and sterile sort, as monstrous crea∣tures, as a Lion without courage, an Ox without horns, or a bird without wings. Yet out of those you shall understand some∣what of God. For they know and confess him whether they will or no.

3. Yea, and the use of a Temple, and the exercise of Re∣ligion (which suppose the second ground also as well as the first) have been so very common (though not altogether equally common with the former, that it is the observation of that famed moralist,

That if one travel the world, 'tis possible to find Cities without Walls, without Letters, without Kings, without Wealth, without Coin, without Schools and Theatres. But a City without a Temple, or that useth no Worship, Prayers, &c. no one ever saw. And he believes a City may more easily be built without a foundation (or

ground to set it on) than any community of men have or keep a consistency

without Re∣ligion.

4. And it is no mean argument of the commonness of Religion, that there have been some in the world (and those no Idiots nei∣ther) that have accounted it the most consti∣tuent and distinguishing thing in humane na∣ture.

So that Platonick Jew judgeth in vocation of God with hope towards him to be, if we will speak the truth, the only genuine pro∣perty of Man, and saith that only he who is acted by such an hope is a man, and he that is destitute of this hope is no man, preferring this account to the common definition

(which he says is only of the concrete of man) that he is a reasonable and mortal living creature. And yet he extends not reason further, that is, to the inferior creatures, for he had expresly said above

That they who have no hope towards God, have no part or share in the rational nature.

And a noble person of our own says,

That upon accurate search, Religion and Faith ap∣pear the only ultimate differences of man; whereof neither Divine perfection is capa∣ble, nor brutal imperfection.

Reason in his account descending low among the inferiour creatures. But these agreeing more peculiarly to man, and so universally that he affirms,

There is no man well, and entirely in his wits that doth not worship some Deity.

Who therefore accounted it a less absurdity to admit such a thing as a rational Beast, than

an irreligious man. Now if these have taken notice of any instances that seem'd to claim an exemption from this notion of Man; they have rather thought fit to let them pass as an anomalous sort of creatures, reducible to no certain rank or order in the Creation; than that any should be admitted into the ac∣count, or be acknowledged of the Society of Men, that were found destitute of an inclina∣tion to worship the common Author of our beings. And according to this opinion; By whatsoever steps any should advance in the de∣nial of a Deity; they should proceed by the same, to the abandoning their own humani∣ty; and by saying there is no God, should pro∣claim themselves no men.

However it discovers (which is all that is at present intended by it) the commonness, not to say absolute universality, of Religion, in the observation of these Persons, whom we must suppose no strangers to the world in their own and former times. And if it afford any less ground for such an observation in our present time, we only see as the world grows older it grows worse, and sinks into a deeper obli∣vion of its original, as it recedes further from it.

And (notwithstanding) this so common a consent is yet not without its weight and signi∣cancy to our present purpose. If we consider

How impossible it is to give or imagine any tolerable account of its original, if we do not confess it natural, and refer it to that common

Author of all nature whom we are enquiring about: (of which so much is said by divers others, that nothing more needs here to be said about it. 5. And at least so much is gained by it to a Temple, that unless some very plain and ungainsayable demonstration be brought against the grounds of it (which will be time enough to consider when we see it pretended to) no opposition, fit to be regarded, can ever be made to it. That is, none at all can possibly be made; but what shall proceed from the most immodest and rash confidence, animated and born up only by a design of being most licen∣tiously wicked, and of making the world be∣come so. Immodest confidence it must be, for it is not a Man, or a Nation, or an Age that such have to oppose, but Mankind; upon which they shall cast, not some lighter reflecti∣on, but the vilest and most opprobrious con∣tumely, and scorn that can be imagined. That is the imputation of so egregious folly and doa∣tage, as all this while to have worshipped a shadow as the Author of their being; and a figment for their common parent. And this not the ruder only, and uninquisitive vulgar, but the wisest and most considering persons in all times. Surely less than clear and pregnant demonstration (at least not wild incoherent self-confounding suppositions and surmises, of which more hereafter) will ever be thought sufficient to justifie the boldness of an attempt that shall carry this signification with it. And it will be a confidence equally rash as immo∣dest.

For what can be the undertakers hope, either of success or reward? Do they think it an easie enterprize? and that a few quirks of malapert wit will serve the turn to baffle the Deity into nothing? and unteach the world Religion? and raze out impressions renew'd and transmitted through so many ages? and perswade the race of men to descend a peg lower, and believe they ought to live and shall die like the perishing beast. Or do they expect to find men indifferent in a matter that con∣cerns their common Practice and Hope? and wherein their zeal hath been wont to be such as that it hath obtained to be proverbial, to strive as for the very Altars. And what should their reward be, when the natural tendency of their undertaking is to exclude themselves from the expectation of any in another world? And what will they expect in this from them whose Temples and Altars they go about to subvert? Besides, that if they be not hurried by a blind impetuous rashness, they would consider their danger, and apprehend them∣selves concern'd to strike very sure: For if there remain but the least possibility that the matter is otherwise, and that the being doth exist whose honour and worship they contend against, they must understand his favour to be of some concernment to them; which they take but an ill course to entitle themselves un∣to. Much more have they reason to be solici∣tous, when their horrid cause not only wants evidence; nor hath hitherto pretended to more

than a bare possibility of truth on their side; but hath so clear (and as yet altogether unrefu∣ted) evidence lying against it; that quite takes away that very possibility, and all ground for that miserable languishing hope, that it could ever have afforded them. Therefore is it left also wholly unimaginable, what principle can animate their design, other than a sensual hu∣mour, impatient of restraints, or of any obli∣gation to be sober, just and honest, beyond what their own inclination, and (much mista∣ken) interest, or conveniency would lead them to.

By all which we have a sufficient measure of the persons from whom any opposition un∣to Religion can be expected, and how much their authority, their example or their scorn ought to signifie with us. And that a more valuable opposition can never be made; our experience, both that hitherto it hath not been, and that it would have been if it could, might render us tolerably secure. For surely it may well be supposed, that in a world so many ages lost in wickedness, all imaginable trials would have been made to disburthen it of Re∣ligion; and somewhat that had been specious, at least, to that purpose, had been hit upon; if the matter had been any way possible. And the more wicked the world hath been, a so di∣rectly contrary, and so continually assaulted principle, not yet vanquished, appears the more plainly invincible: And that the assaults have been from the lusts of men, rather than

their reason, shews the more evidently, that their reason hath only wanted a ground to work upon; which if it could have been found, their lusts had certainly prest it to their service in this warfare; and not have endured rather, the molestation of continual checks and rebukes from it.

Nor need we yet to let our minds hang in suspence, or be in a dubious expectation, that possibly some or other great Wit may arise that shall perform some great thing in this matter, and discover the groundlesness and folly of Re∣ligion by plain and undeniable reasons, that have not as yet been thought on: But betake our selves to a stricter and closer consideration of our own grounds, which if we can once find to be certainly true, we may be sure they are of eternal truth, and no possible contrivance or device can ever make them false.

Having therefore seen what common con∣sent may contribute to the establishing of them joyntly; we may now apply our selves to con∣sider and search into each of them (so far as they are capable of a distinct consideration) se∣verally and apart. Having still this mark in our eye, our own confirmation and excitation in reference to what is the proper work and business of a Temple, Religion and conversa∣tion with God: How little soever any endea∣vour in this kind may be apt to signifie with the otherwise minded.

And, first for the existence of God; that we may regularly and with evidence make it

out to our selves, that he is, or doth exist, and may withal see what the belief of his exist∣ence will contribute towards the evincing of the reasonableness of erecting a Temple to him. It is requisite that we first settle a true notion of him in our minds; or be at an agreement with our selves, what is that we mean, or would have to be signified by the name of God: otherwise we know not what we seek, nor when we have found him,

And though we must beforehand professed∣ly avow that we take him to be such a one as we can never comprehend in our thoughts. That this knowledge is too excellent for us, or he is more excellent than that we can per∣fectly know him; yet it will be sufficient to guide us in our search after his existence, if we can give such a description, or assign such cer∣tain characters of his being as will severally or together distinguish him from all things else. For then we shall be able to call him by his own name, and say this is God. Whatever his being may contain more; or whatsoever other pro∣perties may belong to it beyond what we can as yet compass in our present thoughts of him.

And such an account we shall have of what we are enquiring after; if we have the conception in our minds of an eternal uncaused, independent, necessary Being that hath active power, life, wisdom, goodness, and whatso∣ever other supposable excellency, in the highest perfection originally, in and of it self.

Such a Being we would with common con∣sent

express by the name of God. Even they that would profess to deny or doubt of his ex∣istence, yet must acknowledge this to be the notion of that which they deny or doubt of. Or if they should say this is not it, or (which is all one) that they do not deny or doubt of the existence of such a Being as this; they on the other hand that would argue for his exist∣ence, may conclude the cause is yielded them. This being that which they designed to con∣tend for.

It must indeed be acknowledg'd, that some things belonging to the notion of God might have been more expresly named: But it was not necessary they should, being sufficiently included here, as will afterwards appear. Nor perhaps so convenient; some things, the ex∣press mention wherof is omitted, being such as more captious persons might be apt at first to startle at; which yet may, possibly as they are insinuated under other expressions be∣come by degrees more inclinable to receive them afterwards. And however if this be not a full and adequate notion (as who can ever tell when we have an express, distinct particular notion of God, which we are sure is adequate and full?) it may however suffice, that it is a true one, as far as it goes, and such as cannot be mistaken for the notion of any thing else. And it will be more especially sufficient to our present purpose; if enough be comprehended in it to recommend him to us as a fit and wor∣thy object of Religion; and whereto a Tem∣plea

ought to be designed. As it will appear there is, when also we shall have added what is intended concerning his conversableness with men. The ground whereof is also in great part included in this account of him; so that the consideration of it cannot be wholly severed from that of his existence: as hath been inti∣mated above. That is, that if such a Being ex∣ist, unto which this notion belongs; it will sufficiently appear, he is such as that he can converse with men; though it doth not thence certainly follow that he will. For it were a rash and bold adventure to say he could not be God, if he did not condescend to such terms of re∣conciliation and converse with apostate crea∣tures. Whereof therefore more is to be said than the meer manifesting his existence in its own place.

And as to this, that we may proceed gradu∣ally, and in the most familiar and intelligible way that we can; we may

1. Be most assured, that there hath been somewhat or other from all eternity, or that looking backward, somewhat of real being must be confessed eternal. Let such, as have not been used to think of any thing more than what they could see with their eyes; and to whom reasoning only seems difficult, because they have not tried what they can do in it; but use their thoughts a little, and by moving them a few easie steps, they will soon find themselves as sure of this, as that they see or hear, or understand, or are any thing.

For being sure that something now is (that you see, for instance, or are something.) You must then acknowledge that certainly either something always was, and hath ever been, or been from all eternity; or else you must say, that sometime nothing was; or that all being once was not. And so, since you find that some∣thing now is, that there was a time when any thing of being did begin to be, that is, that till that time there was nothing; But now at that time somewhat first began to be. For what can be plainer than that, if all being sometime was not, and now some being is, every thing of being had a beginning? And thence it would follow that some being, that is, the first that ever began to be, did of it self start up out of nothing, or made it self to be, when before, nothing was.

But now do you not plainly see that it is altogether impossible any thing should do so; that is, when it was as yet nothing, and when nothing at all as yet was, that it should make it self, or come into being of it self? For sure, making it self is doing something. But can that which is nothing do any thing? unto all doing there must be some doer. Where∣fore a thing must be before it can do any thing; and therefore it would follow that it was be∣fore it was; or was and was not, was some thing and nothing at the same time. Yea, and it was divers from it self. For a cause must be a distinct thing from that which is cau∣sed by it. Wherefore it is most apparent that

some being hath ever been, or did never begin to be. Whence further,

2. It is also evident, that some being was uncaused, or was ever of it self, without any cause. For what never was from another had never any cause, since nothing could be its own cause. And somewhat, as appears from what hath been said, never was from another. Or it may be plainly argued thus; That either some being was uncaused, or all being was cau∣sed. But if all being were caused, then some one at least was the cause of it self: which hath been already shown impossible. Therefore the ex∣pression commonly used concerning the first Be∣ing that it was of it self, is only to be taken ne∣gatively, that is, that it was not of another, not positively, as if it did sometime make it self. Or, what there is positive, signified by that form of speech, is only to be taken thus, that it was a being of that nature, as that it was impossible it should ever not have been. Not that it did ever of it self step out of not being into Being: Of which more hereafter.

3. And now it is hence further evident that some being is independent upon any other, that is, whereas it already appears that some being did never depend on any other, as a pro∣ductive cause. Or was not beholden to any other, that it might come into Being. It is thereupon equally evident that 'tis simply in∣dependent, or cannot be beholden to any for for its continued being. For what did never need a productive cause, doth as little need a

sustaining or conserving cause. And, to make this more plain, either some being is indepen∣dent, or all being is dependent. But there is nothing without the compass of all being, whereon it may depend. Wherefore to say, that all being doth depend, is to say it depends on nothing, that is, that it depends not. For to depend on nothing is not to depend.

It is therefore a manifest contradiction to say that all being doth depend: against which it is no relief to say, that all beings do circu∣larly depend on one another. For so, however the whole circle or sphere of being, should de∣pend on nothing, or one at last depend on it self; which negatively taken, as before, is truc, and the thing we contend for; that one, the common support of all the rest depends not on any thing without it self. Whence also it is plainly consequent.

That 4. Such a Being is necessary, or doth necessarily exist: that is, that it is of such a nature as that it could not, or cannot but be. For what is in being neither by its own choice, or any others, is necessarily. But what was not made by it self (which hath been shewn im∣possible that any thing should) nor by any other (as it hath been proved, something was not.) It is manifest it neither depended on its own choice, nor any others that it is. And therefore its existence is not owing to choice at all, but to the necessity of its own nature. Wherefore it is always by a simple, absolute, natural ne∣cessity;

being of such a nature, to which it is altogether repugnant, and impossible ever not to have been, or ever to cease from being. And now having gone thus far, and being as∣sured that hitherto we feel the ground firm un∣der us; that is, having gained a full certainty that there is an eternal, uncaused, independent necessary Being, and therefore actually, and everlastingly existing; we may advance one step further, and with equal assurance, add,

5. That this eternal, independent uncaused Being, is self-active, that is, (which is at pre∣sent meant) not such as acts upon it self, but that hath the power of acting upon other things in and of it self, without deriving it from any other. Or at least that there is such a Being as is eternal, uncaused, &c. having the power of action in and of it self.

For either such a Being as hath been already evinced is of it self active or unactive, or ei∣ther hath the power of action of it self or not. If we will say the latter, let it be considered what we say, and to what purpose we say it. First, we are to weigh what it is we affirm, when we speak of an eternal, uncaused, inde∣pendent, necessary Being, that is of it self to∣tally unactive, or destitute of any active power. If we will say there is some such thing, we will confess when we have called it something, it is a very silly, despicable, idle something, and a something, (if we look upon it alone) as good as nothing. For there is but little odds be∣tween

being nothing, and being able to do nothing. We will again confess, eternity, self-origination, independency, necessity of existence, to be very great and highly dignify∣ing attributes; and that import a most uncon∣ceivable excellency. For what higher glory can we ascribe to any being, than to acknowledge it to have been from eternity of it self; with∣out being beholden to any other, and to be such as that it can be, and cannot but be in the same state, self-subsisting, and self-sufficient to all eternity? And what unconceivable myriads of little sensless Deities must we upon that sup∣position admit (as would appear if it were fit to trouble the Reader with an explication of the nature and true notion of matter, which the being now supposed, must be found to be!) But what can our reason either direct, or en∣dure, that we should so uncongruously misplace so magnificent attributes as these? and ascribe

the prime glory of the most excellent Being, unto that which is next to nothing? What might further be said to demonstrate the im∣possibility of a self-subsisting, and self-original, unactive being, will be here unseasonable, and pre-occupying. But if any in the mean time will be so sullen as to say such a thing,

Let it 2. be considered to what purpose they say it. Is it to exclude a necessary self-active being? But it can signifie nothing to that purpose. For such a Being they will be forced to acknowledge, let them do what they can (besides putting out their own eyes) notwith∣standing. For why will they acknowledge any necessary Being at all, that was ever of it self? Is it not because they cannot otherwise for their hearts tell how it was ever possible that any thing at all could come into being? But find∣ing that something is, they are compell'd to ac∣knowledge that something hath ever been, ne∣cessarily, and of it self. No other account could be given how other things came to be. But what? doth it signifie any thing towards the giving an account of the original of all other things, to suppose only an eternal, self-subsist∣ing, unactive Being? Did that cause other things to be? Will not their own breath choak them if they attempt to utter the self-contra∣dicting words, an unactive cause, (i. e. Effi∣cient or Author) of any thing. And do they not see they are as far from their mark, or do no more towards the assigning the original of

all other things, by supposing an eternal, un∣active Being only, than if they supposed none at all. That what can do nothing, can no more be the productive cause of another, than that which is nothing? Wherefore by the same Rea∣son that hath constrained us to acknowledge an eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary Be∣ing, we are also unavoidably led to acknow∣ledge this Being to be self-active, or such as hath the power of action in and of it self. Or that there is certainly such a Being, that is the cause of all the things which our sense tells us are besides existent in the world.

For what else is left us to say or think? will we think fit to say that all things we behold were as they are necessarily existent from all eternity? That were to speak against our own eyes, which continually behold the rise and fall of living things, of whatsoever sort or kind, that can come under their notice. And it were to speak against the thing it self that we say, and to say and unsay the same thing in the same breath. For all the things we behold are in some respect or other (internal, or external) continually changing, and therefore could ne∣ver long be beheld as they are. And to say then, they have been continually changing from eternity, and yet have been necessarily, is unintelligible, and flat non-sense. For what is necessarily, is always the same; and what is in this or that posture necessarily (that is by an intrinsick simple and absolute necessity, which must be here meant) must be ever so. Where∣fore

to suppose the world in this or that state necessarily; and yet that such a state is change∣able, is an impossible, and self-contradicting supposition. †

And to say any thing is changing from eter∣nity, signifies it is always undergoing a change which is never past over, that is, that it is eter∣nally unchang'd, and is ever the same. For the least imaginable degree of change, is some change. What is in any the least respect chan∣ged, is not in every respect the same, suppose

then any thing in this present state or posture, and that it is eternally changing in it; either a new state and posture is acquired, or not. If it be, the former was temporary, and hath an end; and therefore the just and adequate mea∣sure of it was not eternity, which hath no end; much less of the change of it, or the transition from the one state to the other. But if no new state or posture be acquired (which any the least gradual alteration would make) then it is eternally unchanged in any the least degree. Therefore eternal changing is a manifest con∣tradiction.

But if it be said though eternity be not the measure of one change; it may be of infinite changes endlesly succeeding one another. Even this also will be found contradictions and im∣possible. For (not to trouble the Reader with the more intricate controversie of the possibili∣ty or impossibility of infinite or eternal succes∣sion, about which they who have a mind may consult others.

If this signifie any thing to the present pur∣pose, it must mean the infinite or eternal changes of a necessary being. And how these very terms do clash with one another, me∣thinks any sound mind might apprehend at the first mention of them; And how manifestly re∣pugnant the things are, may be collected from what hath been said; and especially from what was thought more fit to be annexed in the Margin.

But now since we find that the present state

of things is changeable, and actually chan∣ging, and that what is changable is not neces∣sarily, and of it self.

And since it is evident that there is some necessary Being, otherwise nothing could ever have been, and that without action nothing could be from it. Since also all change imports somewhat of passion, and all passion supposes action, and all action, active power, and active power an original seat or subject, that is self∣active, or that hath the power of action in and of it self. For there could be no derivation of it from that which hath it not, and no first∣derivation, but from that which hath it origi∣nally of it self. And a first derivation there must be, since all things that are or ever have been furnisht with it, and not of themselves must either mediately or immediately have de∣rived it from that which had it of it self. It is therefore manifest, that there is a necessary self∣active Being, The cause and Author of this per∣petually variable state and frame of things. And hence,

6. Since we can frame no notion of life which self-active power doth not, at least, com∣prehend (as upon trial we shall find that we cannot) it is consequent that this Being is also originally vital, and the root of all vitality, such as hath life in or of it self, and from whence it is propagated to every other living thing. †

And so as we plainly see that this sensible world did sometime begin to be, 'tis also evi∣dent it took its beginning from a Being essen∣tially vital, and active, that had it self no be∣ginning. Nor can we make a difficulty to con∣clude that this Being, (which now we have shewn, is active, and all action implies some power) is

7. Of vast and mighty Power (we will not say infinite, lest we should step too far at once; not minding now to discuss whether creation require infinite power) when we consider and contemplate the vastness of the work perfor∣med by it. Unto which (if we were to make our estimate by nothing else) we must, at least, judge this power to be proportionable. For when our eyes behold an effect exceeding the power of any cause which they can behold, our mind must step in and supply the defect of our feebler sense; so as to make a judgment there is a cause we see not, equal to this effect. As when we behold a great and magnificent fa∣brick, and entring in we see not the master or

any living thing (which was Cicero's Observa∣tion in reference to this present purpose) be∣sides Mice or Weasles, we will not think that Mice or Weasels built it. Nor need we, in a matter so obvious, insist further. But only when our severer Reason hath made us confess, our further contemplation should make us ad∣mire a power which is at once both so appa∣rent, and so stupendous.

Corollary. And now from what hath been hitherto discoursed, it seems a plain and necessary consectary, That this world had a cause divers from the matter whereof it is composed.

For otherwise matter that hath been more generally taken to be of it self al∣together unactive, must be stated the on∣ly cause and fountain of all the action and motion that is now to be found in the whole Universe. Which is a conceit wild and absurd enough; not only as it oppo∣ses the common judgment of such as have with the greatest diligence enquired into things of this nature, But as being in it self manifestly impossible to be true.

As would easily appear if it were need∣ful to press farther Dr. More's reasonings to this purpose; which he hath done suf∣ficiently for himself.

And also that otherwise all the great and undeniable changes which continual∣ly happen in it must proceed from its

own constant and eternal action upon it self, while it is yet feigned to be a neces∣sary being; with the notion whereof they are notoriously inconsistent. Which therefore we taking to be most clear, may now the more securely proceed to what follows.

Notes

• 1.
• Heb. 11. 6.
• II.
• Parker Tentam.
• De natura Deorum, lib. 1.
• Protag. Abderites.
• Diagoras and Theo∣doras Cyre∣naicus (who as Diogenes Laertius in Aristip. reports) was surnamed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, afterwards 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• †

  Epicurus, whom also his own Epistle to Me∣naceus in Diogen s Laertius acquits of Atheism, but not of Irreli∣gion; as hereafter may be observed.
• Cicero Tuscul. Quest. l.
• Maxim. Tyr. diss. 1.
• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c.
• III.
• Plutarch. adversus Colotem.
• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• IV.
• Philo. libr. de eo quod Deterius potiori in∣sid. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, p. 180.
• Herbert de verit.
• See Ci∣cero in sundry places. Grotius de veritate Christianae Relig. D•• Pless. same sub∣ject and title Calvin. In∣stit. Episcopius his Instu. Theol. who hath writ∣ten ner∣vously on this sub∣ject, with many more. But espe∣cially Dr. Stilling∣fleet in his Orig. Sac.
• VI.
• VII.
• VIII.
• IX.
• X.
• XI.
• XII.
• XIII.
• We will acknow∣ledge an Impropri∣ety in this word, & its conju∣gate Self-Originate, some∣times hereafter used, which yet is recom∣penced by their con∣veniency; as they may per∣haps find who shall make trial how to express the sense intended by them in other words. And they are used without suspicion, that it can be thought they are meant to signifie as if ever God gave original to himself; but in the negative sense that he never received it from any other; yea, and that he is, what is more than equiva∣lent to his Being, self-caused, viz. a Being of himself so excellent as not to need or be capable to admit any cause. Vid. c. 4. Sect. 3. And with the expectation of the same allowance which hath been given to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or other like words. We also take it for gran∣ted (which it may suffice to hint here once for all) that when we use here the word Self-subsistent, it will be understood we intend by it (without Logical or Metaphysical nicety) not the meer ex∣clusion of dependence on a subject, but on a cause.
• XIV.
• †

  And whether by the way this will not afford us (though that be none of our present business) plain evidence that there can be no such thing as necessary alterable matter, may be examined by such as think fit to give themselves the diversion. For let it be considered, if every part and particle that makes up the matter of this universe, were it self a necessary being, and of it self from all eternity, it must have not only its simple being, but its being such or such, of it self necessarily, or rather every thing of it, or any way belonging to it, must be its very simple being it self. For whence should it receive any accession to it self when it is supposed equally independent upon its fellows, as any of them upon it? Suppose then only their various intercur∣rent motion among themselves, requisite to prepare them to, and unite them in the composition of particular bodies, and no other change of any other individual particle needful thereto, but only of their figure, place, and scituation, till they shall come aptly to be disposed in the now attempted composition. How is even this change possible) For suppose one of these particles from eterni∣ty of such or such a figure, as triangular, hooked, &c. How can it lose any thing from it self, or suffer any alteration of its figure which essentially and necessarily belonged to it from eternity? That to which 'tis necessary to be such, 'tis impossible to it not to be such. Or suppose no alteration of figure (which Epicurus admits not) were necessary; but of situation and motion till it become conveniently situate. Even this change also will be simply im∣possible. Because you can frame no imagination of the existence of this or that particle, but you must suppose it in some or other ubi, or point of space, and if it be necessarily, it is here necessarily; for what is simply no where is nothing. But if it be here necessarily (that is in this or that point of space, for in some or other it must be, and it cannot be here and there at once) it must be here eternally, and can never not be here. Therefore we can have no notion of necessary alterable or movable matter, which is not in∣consistent and repugnant to it self. Therefore also motion must proceed from an immovable mover, as hath been (though upon another ground) concluded of old. But how action ad extra stands with the immutability of the Deity must be fetcht from the consi∣deration of other perfections belonging thereto. Of which Meta∣physicians and Schoolmen may be consulted, discoursing at large: See Suarez: Ledesma de divina perfectione, with many more at lea∣sure. Whatsoever difficulty we may apprehend in this case. Or if we cannot so easily conceive how an eternal mind, foreseeing perfectly all futurity, together with an eternal efficacious determi∣tion of will concerning the existence of such and such things to such an instant or point of time, can suffice to their production without a super-added efflux of power at that instant: which would seem to infer somewhat of mutation; yet as the former of these cannot be demonstrated insufficient (nor shall we ever rec∣kon our selves pincht in this matter till we see that plainly and fully done.) So they are very obstinately blind that cannot see upon the addition of the latter the vast difference of these two cases, viz. the facile silent egress of a sufficient power in pursuance to a calm, complacential, eternal purpose; for the production of this creation, by which the Agent acts not upon it self, but upon its own creature made by its own action; and the eternal blind ungovern'd action of matter upon it self, by which it is perpetu∣ally changing it self, while yet it is supposed necessarily what it was before: And how much more easily conceivable that is than this. How also liberty of action consists with necessity of existence, divers have shewn: to which purpose somewhat not inconside∣rable may be seen, Fioin. lib. 2. cap. 12. de immortal &c. But in this there can be little pretence to imagine a difficulty. For our own being, though not simply, yet as to us is necessary, i. e. it is impos'd upon us; for we come not into being by our own choice; and yet are conscious to our selves of no prejudice hereby to our liberty of acting. Yea and not only doth the former consist with this latter, but is inferr'd by it. Of which see Gibbeuf de libert. Dei, & creat.
• Parker Tentam. Physico. Theolog. Derodon. Philos. cont. Dr. More's Enchirid. Metaphys.
• XV.
• †

  Which will also prove it to be a Spi∣rit; unto which or∣der of Be∣ings essen∣tial vitality, or that life be essential to them, seems as distinguishing a property between it and a body, as any other we can fasten up∣on, that is, that though a body may be truly said to live; yet it

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  lives by a life that is accidental, and separable from it. So as that it may cease to live, and yet be a body still; whereas a Spirit lives by its own essence; so that it can no more cease to live than to be. And as, where that essence is borrowed and derived only, as 'tis with all created Spirits, so its life must needs be therewithal. So the eternal self-subsisting Spirit, lives necessarily, and of it self, according as, necessarily and of it self, it is, or hath its being.

  Which is only annoted, with a design not to trouble this dis∣course with any disquisition concerning the nature and other pro∣perties of a spiritual Being. Of which enough hath been, with great evidence, said, by the incomparable Dr. More.
• XVI.
• De natura Deorum.
• Both in his Immor∣tality of the Soul: and En∣chirid. Me∣taphys.