De corpore politico, or, The elements of law, moral and politick with discourses upon severall heads, as of [brace] the law of nature, oathes and covenants, several kinds of government : with the changes and revolutions of them / by Tho. Hobbs of Malmsbury.

CHAP. II. 1. Democracy precedeth all other, &c. 2. The Soveraign people covenanteth not with the Subiects. 3. The Soveraign, &c. cannot, &c. do iniury, &c. 4. The faults of the Sove∣raigne People, &c. 5 Democracy, &c. an Aristocracy of Orators. 6. Aristocracy how made. 7. The Body of the Optimates not properly said to iniure the Subiects. 8. The Election of the Optimates, &c. 9. An Ele∣ctive King, &c. 10. A Conditional King, &c. 11. The word People Equivocal. 12. Obe∣dience discharged by Release. 13. How such Releases are to be understood. 14. Obedience discharged by Exile. 15. By Conquest. 16. By ignorance of the Right of Succession.

HAving spoken in generall concerning instituted Policy in the former Chap∣ter, I come in this, to speak of the sorts there∣of in special, how every of them is instituted. The first in order of time of these three sorts, is Democracy; and it must be so of necessi∣ty, because an Aristocracy and a Monarchy,

require nomination of persons agreed upon, which agreement in a great multitude of men must consist in the consent of the major part; and where the Votes of the maior part involve the votes of the rest, there is actual∣ly a democracie.

2. In the making of a Democracie, there passeth no Covenant between the Soveraign and any Subiect. For while the Democracy is a making, there is no Soveraign with whom to contract. For it cannot be imagin∣ed, that the Multitude should contract with it seif, or with any one man, or number of men parcell of it self, to make it self Sove∣raign nor that a mulritude considered as One Aggregate, can give it self any thing which before it had not. Seeing then that Soveraignty Democraticall is nat conferred by the Covenant of any multitude, which supposeth Union and Soveraignty already made; it resteth that the same be conferred by the particular Covenants of evry several man, that is to say, every man with every man, for and in consideration of the Benefit of his own Peace and Defence, covenanteth to stand to and obey whatsoever the maior part of their whole number, or the Maior part of such a number of them, as shall be pleased to assemble at a certain time and place, shall determine and command. And this is that which giveth being to a Demo∣cracy, wherein the soveraign Assembly was

called of the Greeks, by the name of Demus, (that is, the People) from whence cometh Democracy. So that, where to the supreame and Independent Court, every man may come that will and give his vote, there the Soveraign is called the People.

3. Out of this that hath been sayd, may readily be drawn, that whatsoever the Peo∣ple doth to any one particular Member or Subject of the Common Wealth, the same by him ought not to be stiled Iniury. For first Iniury (by the Definition, Part 1. Chap. 3. Sect. 2.) is Breach of Covenant; but Covenants (as hath been said in the prece∣dent Section) there passed none from the People to any private man; and consequent∣ly (to wit the People) can do him no In∣iury. Secondly, how uniust soever the acti∣on be, that this Soveraigne D••mus shall do, is done by the will of every particular man subiect to him, who are therefore guil∣ty of the same. If therefore they stile it In∣iury, they but accuse themselves. And it is against Reason for the same man, both to do and complain, implying this Contradiction, that wheras he first ratified the Peoples Acts in general, he now disalloweth the same of them in particular. It is therefore said tru∣ly, Volenti non fit Injuria. Nevertheless no∣thing doth hinder but that divers Actions done by the people may be uniust before God Almighty, as Breaches of the Law of Nature.

4. And when it hapneth, that the Peo∣ple by plurality of voices, that decree or command any thing contrary to the Law of God or Nature, though the Decree and Command be the act of every man, not only present in the assembly, but also absent from it, yet is not the Iniustice of the Decree, the Iniustice of every particular man, but only of those men, by whose express-sufferag••s the Decree or Command was passed. For a Body politick, as it is a Fictious Body, so are the Faculties and will thereof Fictious also. But to make a particular man uniust which consisteth of a Body and Soul natu∣ral, there is required a Naturall and very Will.

5. In all Democracies, though the Right of Soveraignty be in the Assembly which is virtually the whole Body, yet the use ther∣of is alwaies in one, or a few particular men. For in such great Assemblies, as those must be, whereinto every man may enter at his pleasure, there is no means any waies to deliberate and give Councel what to do but by long and set Orations, whereby to every man there is more or less hope given to incline & sway the Assembly to their own Ends. In a multitude of speakers therefore where alwaies either one is eminent alone, or a few being equal amongst themselvs are eminent above the rest, that one or few must of necessity sway the whole. Inso∣much

that a Democracy, in effect is no more then an Aristocracy of Orators, interrupted sometimes with the temporary Monarchy of one Orator

6. And seeing a Democracy is by Institu∣tion, the beginning both of Aristocracy and Monarchy, we are to consider next, how Aristocracy is derived from it. When the particular Members of the Common Wealth growing weary of attendance at publick Courts, as dwelling far off, or being atten∣tive to their private Businesses, and with∣all, displeased with the Government of the People, assemble themselves to make an Aristocracy, there is no more required to the making thereof, but putting to the Questi∣on one by one, the Names of such men as it shall consist of, and assenting to their Election; and by plurality of Vote to trans∣fer that power, which before the People had, to the number of men so named and cho∣sen.

7. And from this manner of erecting an Aristocracy, it is manifest, that the Few, or Optimates, have entred into no Covenant with any of the particular Members of the Common VVealth, wherof they are Sove∣raign; and consequently cannot do any thing to any private man, that can be called Injury to him, howsoever their act be wicked before Almighty God, according to that which hath been sayd before Sect ••. Farther

it is impossible, that the People, as one Body Politick, should covenant with the Aristo∣cracy or Optimates, on whom they intend to transfer their Soveraignty. For no soon∣er is the Aristocracy erected, but the Demo∣cracy is annihilated, and the Covenants made unto them void.

8. In all Aristocracies the Admission of such as are from time to time to have Vote in the soveraign assembly, dependeth on the Will and Decree of the present Optimates. For they being the Soveraign, have the no∣mination (by the 11. Section of the former Chapter) of all Magistrates, Ministers, and Counsellors of State whatsoever, and may therefore chuse either to make them elective, or hereditary, at their pleasure.

9. Out of the same Democracy, the In∣stitution of a Political Monarch proceedeth in the same manner, as did the Institutio•• of the Aristocracy, to wit, by a Decree of the Soveraign People, to passe the Soveraignty to One Man named and approved by Plura∣lity of Suffrage. And if this Soveraignty be truly and indeed transferred, the Estate or Common-Wealth is an absolute Monarchy wherein the Monarch is at liberty, to dispos•• as well of the Succession, as of the Possession and not an Elective Kingdome. For suppos•• a Decree be made first in this manner, Tha•• such a One shal have the Soveraignty for hi•• life, and that afterward they will chuse a new▪

In this Case, the Power of the People is dis∣solved, or not; if dissolved, then after the Death of him that is chosen, there is no man bound to stand to the Decrees of them that shall, as Private men, run together to make a new Election; and consequently, if there be any man, who by the advantage of the Raign of Him that is dead, have strength e∣nough to hold the multitude in Peace and Obedience, he may lawfully, or rather is by the Law of Nature obliged so to do; if this power of the people were not dissolved at the chusing of their King for life, then is the peo∣ple Soveraign still, and the King a Minister thereof only, but so, as to put the whole So∣veraignty in Execution, A Great Minister, but no otherwise for his time, then a Dicta∣tor was in Rome. In this case at the death of him that was chosen, they that meet for a new Election, have no new, but their old Authority for the same. For they were the Soveraign all the time, as appeareth by the Acts of those Elective Kings, that have pro∣cured from the People, that their children might succeed them. For it is to be under∣stood, when a man receiveth any thing from the Authority of the people, he receiveth it not from the People his Subiects, but from the people his Soveraign. And farther though in the Election of a King for his life, the People grant him the Exercise of their So∣veraignty

for that time; Yet if they see cause, they may recall the same before the Time. As a Prince that conferreth an Office for life, may nevertheless upon suspition of Abuse thereof, recall it at his pleasure; in as much as Offices that require lobour and care, are understood to passe from him that giveth them, as Onera, Burthens, to them that have them; the recalling whereof are therefore not Injury, but Favour. Nevertheless if in making an Elective King, with Intention to reserve the Soveraignty, they reserve not a Power at certaine known and determined times and places to assemble themselves, the reservation of their Soveraignty is of no ef∣fect, in as much as no man is bound to stand to the Decrees and Determinations of those that assemble themselves without the Sove∣raign Authortiy.

10. In the former Section is shewed, that elective Kings that exercise their Soveraign∣ty for a Time, which determines with their Life, either are Subjects, or not Soveraigns; And that it is, when the people in Election of them, reserve unto themselves the right of Assembling at certaine times and places limited and made known; Or else Absolute Soveraigns to dispose of the Succession at their Pleasure, and that is, when the people in their Election have declared no time nor place of their meeting, or have left it to the

power of the Elected King, to assemble and dissolve them at such times as he himselfe shall think good. There is another kind of Limitation of time to him that shal be elect∣ed to use the Soveraign Power, (which whe∣ther it hath been practised any where, or not I know not, but it may be imagined, and hath been obiected against the Rigor of Sove∣raign Power) and it is this, that the People transfer their Soveraignty upon Conditions. As for Example, for so long as he shall ob∣serve such and such Lawes, as they then pre∣scribe him. And here as before in elected Kings, the Question is to be made, whether in the Electing of such a Soveraign, they re∣served to themselves a right of Assembling at times and places limited and known, or not; if not, then is the Soveraignty of the People dissolved, and have neither power to iudge of the Breach of the Conditions given him, nor to command any Forces for the Deposing of him, whom on that Condition they had set up, but are in the Estate of war amongst themselves, as they were before they made themselves a Democracy; and con∣sequently, if he that is elected by the advan∣tage of the possession he hath of the publick meanes, be able to compel them to Unity and Obedience, he hath not only of the right of Nature to warrant him, but of the Law of Nature to Oblige him thereunto. But if in Electing him, they reserved to themselves

a right of Assembling, and appointed cer∣tain times and places to that purpose, then are they Soveraign still, and may call their conditional King to account at their plea∣sure, and deprive him of his Government, if they judge he deserve it, either by breach of the condition set him, or otherwise. For the Soveraign power can by no Covenant with a subiect be bound to continue him in the charge he undergoeth by their Com∣mand, as a Burden imposed not particularly for his good, but for the good of the Sove∣raign People.

11. The Controversies that arise concern∣ing the Right of the People, proceed from the Equivocation of the Word. For the word People hath a double signification. In one sense it signifieth onely a Number of Men, distinguished by the place of their ha∣bitation; as the People of England, or the People of France, which is no more, but the Multitude of those particular persons that inhabit those Regions, without considerati∣on of any Contracts or Covenants amongst them, by which any one of them is obliged to the rest. In another sense, it signifieth a Person civill, that is to say, either one Man or one Councel, in the Will whereof is in∣cluded and involved, the Will of every one in particular. As for example; in this later sence, the lower House of Parliament is all the Commons as long as they sit there

with authority and right thereto; but after they be dissolved, though they remain, they be no more the People nor the Commons, but only the Aggregate, or Multitude of the particular men there sitting, how well soe∣ver they agree, or concur, in Opinions a¦mongst themselves; whereupon they that do not distinguish between these two signifi∣cations, do usually attribute such rights to a dissolved Multitude, as belong only to the People virtually contained in the Body of the Common Wealth or Soveraignty. And when a great number of their own authori∣ty flock together in any nation, they usually give them the name of the whole Nation. In which sense they say the People rebel∣leth, or the People demandeth, when it is no more then a dissolved multitude, of which though any one man may be said to demand or have right to something, yet the heap, or multitude, cannot be said to demand or have right to any thing. For where every man hath his right distinct, there is nothing left for the multitude to have right unto: and when the particulars say, this is mine, this is thine, and this is his, and have shared all amongst them, there can be nothing where∣of the Multitude can say, this is mine; nor are they one Body as behoveth them to be, that demand any thing under the name o Mine, or His: and when they say Ours every man is understood to pretend in seve∣rall,

and not the multitude: On the other, side, when the Multitude is united into a Body politick, and thereby are a People in the other signification, and their wills vir∣tually in the Soveraign, there the rights and Demands of the particulars do cease; and he or they that have the Soveraign Power, doth for them all demand and vindicate un∣der the name of his, that which before they called in the plural, Theirs.

12. VVe have seen how particular men enter into subiection by transferring their Rights; It followeth to consider, how such subiection may be discharged. And first, if He or they that have the Soveraign Power, shall relinquish the same voluntarily, there is no doubt, but every man is again at Liber∣ty to obey or not. Likewise, if he or they retaining the Soveraignty over the rest, do neverthless exempt some one or more, from their subiection, every man so exempted, is discharged, for he or they to whom any man is obliged, hath the power to release him.

13. And here it is to be understood, that when he or they that have the Soveraign power, give such exemption, or Priviledge, to a Subiect, as is not seperable from the So∣veraignty, and nevertheless directly retain∣eth the Soveraign Power, not knowing the consequence of the priviledg they grant, the Person or persons exempted or priviledged,

are not thereby released. For in contra∣dictory significations of the will, Part 1. Chap. 13. Sect. 9. That which is directly sig∣nified, is to be understood for the will, be∣fore that which is drawn from it by Conse∣quence.

14. Also Exile perpetual, is a Release of Subiection, forasmuch, as being out of the protection, of the Soveraignty that expelled him, he hath no meanes of subsisting but from himself. Now every man may lawful∣ly defend himself, that hath no other De∣fence; else there had been no necessity, that any man should enter into volun∣tary subiection, as they do in Common Wealths.

15. Likewise a man is released of his sub∣iection by conquest. For when it cometh to pass, that the Power of a Common wealth is overthrown, and any particular man thereby lying under the sword of his Ene∣my, yeildeth himself Captive, he is there∣by bound to serve him that taketh him, and consequently discharged of his Obligation to the former. For no man can serve two Masters.

16. Lastly, Ignorance of the Succession dischargeth Obedience. For no man can be understood to be obliged to obey he know∣eth not whom.