The interest of reason in religion with the import & use of scripture-metaphors, and the nature of the union betwixt Christ & believers : (with reflections on several late writings, especially Mr. Sherlocks Discourse concerning the knowledg of Jesus Christ, &c.) modestly enquired into and stated / by Robert Ferguson.

CHAP. I. Of the Interest and Use of Reason in RELIGION:

Sect. I.

THe Interest which all Chri∣stians have in the Truths of the Gospel, doth suffi∣ciently Authorize a Con∣cernedness in every Be∣liever; that they be neither directly Invaded, nor se∣cretly Supplanted. And the more Impor∣tant the Doctrines are either in them∣selves, or with Respect to their Influence on the Hopes and Comforts of such as Be∣lieve and Profess Christianity the less

chargeable as Importune is he, who En∣gageth either in the Explication or De∣fence of them. Besides the Name of William Sherlock, and the Quality of Rector of St. George Buttolph••Lane, Lon∣don, which the Author Characters him∣self by: I understand nothing of the Person whose Writings I am now to In∣counter; and I wish for his own sake, as well as the Truths, that I had no further Occasion of knowing him than as his In∣terest lies in the Church of England. But having vouchsafed the World a further Discovery and Manifestation of himself, by a Stated Opposition of the Immediate Union of Believers to Christ, and their be∣ing justified by the Imputation of his Righ∣teousness; Truths wherein the whole of our Concernment and Expectation con∣sists: He must not Resent it Amiss, if while we are Examining what he would Obtrude upon us in these and some other things; we Regulate our Conceptions of him, in relation to what he Inti∣mates to us of his Principles in those Mat∣ters.

The Prefixed Imprimatur of Doctor Parker, would tempt one to Suspect, that all this is done, not only under the Con∣nivance,

but with the Approbation of more than we are aware of. I confess Men are filled with Surprizal and Amaze∣ment, that it should be so; considering the Manifest Repugnance of our Authors Principles, not only to the Opinions of private Doctors of the Church of Eng∣land, but the Declared Articles of the ••aid Church. Though it be Unjust to Ascribe the Sentiments of every private Writer to the Society whereof he is a Member; yet when Errors are Vented under Allowance, others besides the Au∣thors become Accountable for them. The Quality of the Licenser, and the Relation he stands in to a greater Person, in whose Behalf in all these things he is Reputed to Act, would seem to Plead that the Fame and Dignity of the Church of England, as well as the Interest of Truth, bespeaks some Vindication from her Ec∣clesiastical Rulers, or Dignified Members in these Matters. Or it is easie to be imagined who will Suffer under the Im∣putation and Dishonour of them. In the mean time, a sober Inquiry into, and Disquisition of these Points, may, I hope, be pursued without Offence to any; e∣specially being managed without passio∣nate

Heats, or Invidious Reflections. In∣vectives and Satirs do not only disparage Religion in general, but betray the Cause in whose Behalf they are used: Nor are they Adapted to proselyte any, but such who have forfeited the Use of their Judg∣ments, and Resigned themselves to the Conduct of Impudence, Noise, and Cla∣mour. For my self, I profess, such an Aversation to the Method some of our Modern Writers take in Treating their Adversaries, that I shall not so much as insinuate Suspicions, or raise Misprisi∣ons of the Tendency of the Notions here contended against, further than the Un∣folding and Pursuing them to their Springs necessitates me: And if thereby any who wear the Livery of the Church of England, shall be found to do the Work of the Assembly at Cracovia I cannot help it▪ unless I should betray the Cause I am pleading for. Yet I do here∣by no ways intend to List even those a∣mong them whose Principles they have imbib'd: Remembring what one said of the Milesians, that, may be they were no Fools, though they did the same things which Fools are wont to do. However, 'tis fit to be declared upon whose Foun∣dations

they Build, and with whose But∣tresses they support their Fabrick; and withall, that it falls too evidently under the Prospect of every discerning Person, who are like to Reap the Harvest of these kind of Sowings. Now though I might be thought sufficiently to acquit my self by continuing on the Defensive, and only examining the Reasons which have swayed Mr. Sherlock, to depart from the Common Judgments of other Men; and though this would be the easiest Under∣taking, and in the Judgment of every in∣different Person, enough both to Unde∣ceive such as are already Misled, and to pre-arm others against the Danger; yet Designing the same universal Usefulness to the Reader, as if I were not confined to Reply to anothers Book; I shall (to∣gether with an Answer to my Adversaries Exceptions) endeavour to State and E∣stablish the Doctrines in whose Defence I appear, and withal Attaque him in the Opinions he Erects against them.

Nor am I without Hope, that I shall find the Generality of those who are stiled Conformists, as well as those who are termed Non-Conformists (notwithstand∣ing their Disciplinary Controversies)

Candid and Favourable. The things here contended for, are the Joynt-Con∣cernment of both; and the Opinions opposed, are inconsistent with, and De∣structive to the Hitherto Received Do∣ctrine of that Party, as well as this. If I receive no other Fruit of this Interpo∣sure, but the Awakening others to more Matur'd Productions, I shall not Repent my Labour; the putting a Common Adversary to a stand till greater Forces Rally, being of some account, though the Victory be Reapt by other Hands.

Sect. 2. As to the Method here ob∣served; 'tis such as I judge Rational, be∣ing not only Adapted to the Discovery and Vindication of Truth, the Un∣masking and Conviction of Errour; but accommodated to the Instruction and Be∣nefit of the Reader, which would be greatly obstructed by following our Au∣thor, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Nor is it needful in a way of severe Disquisition, to pursue every Inconsiderable passage in his Book, of how bad Aspect soever it be; for if his Prin∣cipal Notions be overthrown, and if the Pilla••s upon which the Mayn of his Fa∣brick bears be Under-min'd; to follow

the Quest and Chase of every Ex∣pression in Reflections and Digressions, would be of little Use, unless to Swell this D••scourse, and Enhance the Price of it.

The only thing I am aware of lyable to Exception, as seeming to have no Rela∣tion to the Theme here undertaken; is, that which follows in the present Chap∣ter, concerning The Interest of Reason in matters of Religion. Now though the Usefulness of such an Essay will be a suf∣ficient Apology with the Candid and In∣genuous; yet I have two things else to ju∣stifie it by, should any prove severe and morose.

1. I find a People (so far as I know) Innocent of all Undue Reflections up∣on Reason, publickly Arraigned of ha∣ving rais'd a Cry against it, as the great Enemy of Free-Grace and Faith, and zealously endeavouring to run it down, under the mis-applied Names of Vain Philosophy, Carnal Reason, and the Wisdom of this World. And that here the Enemies of Dio∣cesan-Government of the Church began,

upon this they insisted still; and filled their Books, and Pulpits, and private Corners with these Cantings. That this is now their Engine to overthrow all Sober Prin∣ciples and Establishments; that with this the People were Infatuated, and Credit was reconciled to Gibberish and Folly, En∣thusiasms and vain Impulses, (Idem, ibid. p. 230.) That this is the Food of Con∣venticles to this day; the Root of the Mat∣ter, and the Burthen of their Preachments. That under pretence of Reasons being con∣trary to Religion, Men have been prepa∣red to Swallow any thing but what is Sober, and to make every thing that is Absurd a Mystery; and that the Non-conformists (for 'tis those he there Impeacheth) by the Disparagement of Reason, have made Re∣ligion a Medley of Phantastick Trash Spiri∣tualiz'd into a heap of Vapours, and formed into a Castle of Clouds, and expos'd to ev••ry wind of Humour and Imagination. (Idem, ibid. p. 224.) And as another is pleas'd to charge them, That a thwack∣ing Contradiction can neither Stagger nor Astonish them; but that they will stand their Ground against all the Dint of Argu∣ments▪ and by the Assistance of the Spirit of God, maintain Conclusions in Defiance

to their Premises: That say what you will, prove what you can, demonstrate the In∣coherence of their Notions, and the Wild∣ness of their Conceits, they will Foil all your Wit and Carnal Reason with a Caution a∣gainst vain Philosophy and Humane Learning, and a Disdainful Reflection a∣gainst the Natural Mans Ignorance in the things of the Spirit. And that they become acquainted with the Workings of the Spi∣rit, because they are not capable of Understanding the Methods of Reason, and Laws of Argumentation. Is it not now necessary, that we should Vin∣dicate our selves from these Aspersions, and endeavour to give a Stop to those Groundless and Unjust Clamours; at least, to make appear that the whole Party ought not to be Traduced, because of the Extravagancies of a few? And were there nothing else in it, this alone is enough to justifie the Expediency, as well as the Seasonableness, of Unfolding the whole Concernment of Reason in Religion. But,

Secondly, I find that the chief To∣picks, by which our Modern Writers

Accost whatsoever they dislike, is either a pretended repugnancy in the things themselves to Reason; or at least that they are things unintelligible.

As to the first. We are told that Calvin and his followers obtrude pure non-sense and contradictious blasphemies upon our belief, with as much Rigour and boiste∣rous zeal as the most indispensable truths of the Gospel. And an instance is given, by alledging that there is required as confident an assent to the black do∣ctrine of irrespective Re∣probation, as to our Savi∣ours Death and Resurre∣ction. And that it is made as necessary a point of Faith, to believe that the Almighty thrust innumerable Myriads of Souls into being, only to sport himself in their endless and unspeakable Tortures; as that he sent his own Son into the World to die for the Re∣demption of Mankind; Or as another represents it, That God so decreed some to eternal ruine, that he made him∣self the Author both of their sin and Destruction. Were this a true account of the

doctrine of their adversaries in the matter of Reprobation; I should not only par∣don, but commend their zeal in opposing it. But they are so far from doing either Calvin or his followers justice in the de∣claration they make of his and their opi∣nion, that they betray either wonder∣full ignorance in the writings of those au∣thors, or a very bad Conscience in re∣porting them. Suppose that Calvin and his followers, mean generally no more by Reprobation, but the negation of E∣lection, or a purpose of Soveraignty backt with justice of leaving a certain number of the lapsed Sons of Adam in their fallen state; I would fain know what in all this interferes with principles of Reason▪ or what attribute of God militates against it. To leave persons in a condition into which they were willfully brought by the Protoplast, without Gods withdrawing of any aid from him necessary to have pre∣vented it, or having any other accession to it, save his not hindering it; is not of difficult Reconciliation to Reason, as nei∣ther reflecting upon the divine Justice nor Goodness, and is very suitable to Soveraignty, which at least implies God so far master of his own Grace, that he is

Debtor to no sinner for the Communi∣cation of it. Yea, should we besides a Negation of Grace to fallen man, In∣clude in our Idea of Reprobation, a pur∣pose in God, (partly with regard to Cor∣ruption arisen in us through the destitu∣tion of the divine Image, partly with re∣gard to those sins which will infallibly, but still upon the election of the creature ensue) not to entertain such Creatures in the arms of his Love, but to adjudge them to the punishment deserved. I know nothing in it, that thwarts the Rational nature of Man, or grates upon the per∣fections of God. And as I take this to be a truer draught of the doctrine of Re∣probation as defended both by Calvin and his followers, than the Scheme pre∣sented us by Dr. Parker and Mr. Lamb: So I know no considerable exception that it is liable to, except that it doth not serve the design of charging the Non-conformists for obtruding contradictions upon the World, so well, as the other doth. I might also add that Gods Eter∣nal purpose of Glorifying his Soveraignty in way of mercy upon a certain num∣ber of the defiled Guilty sons of Adam, in decreeing to give them Grace and

Glory, without respect to foreseen Faith or good works, as the cause, motive or inducement of his Decree; though in the execution of it he as well designs Faith and Obedience, being made the Qualifications of Life, as that they shall precede our being Crown'd with Bles∣sedness; is traduced by not a few of our modern Divines as repugnant to Rea∣son. But when they should demonstrate it to be so, they betake themselves to mis-representing their Adversaries. Some of them alledge us affirming God to make Heaven our Fate, not our Recompence; and Bliss our destiny, not our Reward. Others report us asserting a Predestina∣tion to the end without regard to the means; And that being Elected, we may indulge our selves in a course of sin, for nothing shall obstruct our Felicity. There is no opinion so innocent which these men will not substitute a perverse Gloss upon; nor any Do∣ctrines so far from being either absur'd or blasphemous, but they will improve them till they become so. I reckon that ignorance of Books, together with an unhappy education, hath led many to undue thoughts of the sentiments of

their Brethren: But that some are in∣fluenced to these sinistrous representati∣ons by worse causes, I fear there is too much ground to suspect. However, should any of our opinions either concer∣ning the subjects before mentioned, or any other, be found to involve any thing in them reflexive on the Holiness and Goodness of God, or to draw along with them consequences repugnant to princi∣ples of Reason, I dare say it is to be as∣cribed to our ignorance, and not to our Design. And the evincing of this was one main thing which influenced me to the writing of this Exercitation. What∣ever can be made appear to lie in a con∣tradiction to Reason, we profess our selves ready to disclaim it. But we are apt to believe that a great deal which only crosseth some false and lubricous Princi∣ples that Dogmatists have baptized with that Name, falls under the imputation of disagreement with Reason. The repug∣nancy to Reason fastned upon some Te∣nets, is rather the result of Ignorance, prepossession, and sometimes Lust; than their contrariety to universal Reason, or any genuine Maximes of it.

And as diverse Doctrines which men

of late are come to be in a dislike of (for from the beginning of the English Refor∣mation it was not so) are endeavoured to be discredited upon a pretended in∣consistency that is in them to Reason: So there are some others which are at∣tempted to be run down, because sup∣posed unintelligible. And a loud cry is raised against whole societies of Men, as if they never imagine themselves Chri∣stians, till they have transubstantiated the common Creeds, into unaccountable and inexplicable Problems; and never be∣lieve themselves to be good men, till they have brought their Bodies and Minds into that Fame, that they can with ease be ecstatical in all their devotions & expressions of Religion, and that they do therefore disbelieve propo∣sitions because they may be understood. Or as another chargeth them with holding things then fit to be believed, when they are impossible to be proved or understood. It hath been hitherto judged that the incomprehensibleness of a Doctrine through the Sublimity and extension of its object, is no

just Bar to the Truth of it. Nor can I but wonder that any who have studi∣ed the weakness of their discursive Capa∣city, the feebleness of intellectual Light, how soon it is dazled with too bright a splendor, the confinement and bounda∣ries our understandings are subject to; together with the Majesty of Gospel Truth, the immensity of the objects of the Christian Faith; should think the arduousness of framing distinct and a∣dequate conceptions of them, a suffici∣ent ground for their being renounced and disclaimed. And yet this seems to be the Standard that some men regulate their belief by: And if I mistake not, had no small influence on M. Sherlock in the carrying him off from the recei∣ved opinion of the immediate Union of Beleivers to Christ. For as himself in∣forms us; any other Union save a po∣litical, is a Riddle and Mystery which no body can understand, the perfect know∣ledge of which must be reserved for the next world, or the coming of Elias, p. 194. And that whosoever asserteth any other Union, doth make it more than a mystical Union, that is an unintelligible union, p. 197. That the Immediate union

of Believers to Christ, is to be reckoned a∣mong things Unintelligible, p. 147. And to do him Right, as he describes it, it is so; but I hope to make it appear, ere we have done, that he both injure's the Truth, and those whom he there personates in his ac∣count of it: However, it is mainly be∣cause of the Unintelligibleness of an im∣mediate Union, that it is disclaym'd. For, as the same Person tells us, He cannot un∣derstand how our Union to Christ, can be an Argument to unity and concord among our selves, if we are united immediately to the person of Christ, without being first uni∣ted to his Church, p. 152.

We shall enquire hereafter whether our Author hath in this point justly enter'd his charge or not. But because we can neither distinctly understand what it is to be above the grasp and fathom of Rea∣son, nor duly judg of Objects that are so, nor arrive at any solid resolution how we are to demean our selves towards Doctrines of such a Genius and Complexi∣on, without enquiring into the whole use and concernment of Reason in matters of Religion; I have therefore upon this ac∣count as well as the former, undertaken this disquisition.

§. 3. In the pursuing this great Enquiry; we are first to fix and settle the sense and meaning of the Terms. The neglect of this would expose us to confusion and im∣pertinent wrangling in all that we are to say. Reason then is first taken properly for the faculty of Reason, or the Soul as it falls under the denomination of Mind and Understanding; And in this acceptation it may be considered either as it ought to be, and originally was; or as it exists sub∣jectively in us, weakned, darkned and tainted by the Fall. The rational Facul∣ty as it exists in us since the ingress of sin, differs much from what it was in its pri∣mitive Creation. It was then like the Sun in his Meridian exaltation, when without the interposure of a cloud to en∣velope and obscure it. Knowledge then inhabited our minds in no less plenty than light doth the universal Luminary. Be∣sides what the Soul consider'd in it self as it came out of the hands of God under the stamp and impress of his Image lay's claim to; it was wonderfully advantaged by a delicate and apt disposure of bodi∣ly Organs, and due proportion and tem∣perament of the Animal Spirits, as well as by an excellent Harmony that appeared

in all the parts of the visible Creation. There was no jarring in our Humors, no blemish in our material Organs, no de∣fect in our vehicular Spirits, no obstructi∣on in their meatus or passages, no disorder in the world, nor fallacious medium in the Universe, till the Fall caused them. But alass! Now, the mind is not only weakned and rendred groveling by the loss of its primitive Sanctity and Rectitude; but is infected with Lusts, biassed by Passions, brib'd by the sensual Appetites, clogg'd and hindred by the distemperature of in∣disposed Organs; not to mention the pre∣possessions and anticipations of Infancy, the prejudices of Education, with the deceits and impositions we are liable to, by the delusion of external Objects; for such the World is filled with, since dis∣order and confusion arrested it. Howe∣ver, Reason considered thus, namely as denoting the rational Faculty though e∣ven corrupted by the Fall, is First, That which disposeth and adapteth us for con∣verse with objects of Revelation. As the Light of the Sun had been useless to us, had we not enjoy'd an Organ suited to re∣ceive the impression of its Beams; so all supernatural Revelation had been both

impertinent and superfluous, were we not endow'd with Faculties fitted to con∣verse with it. God in all his Transacti∣ons with us, supposeth us Rational; and, he is a degree worse than an Enthusiast, who affirm's that the way to be a Christian, is, first to be a Brute. Revelation doth not cassate the use of our Intellectual Powers, but supposeth them; and by en∣riching them with discoveries which they could not by their own search have arri∣ved at, it perfects them; and they plain∣ly acquiesce that these are the things they sought for, but could not find. There neither is nor can be any thing in Divine Revelation, that overthrow's the rational Faculty, or crosseth it in its Regular and Due Exercise. There is a Spirit in Man; And the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding, Job, 32.8. For, as Austin saith, Poss•• reci∣pere fidem est Naturae, licet actu credere sit Gratiae. De praedest. Sanct. cap. 5. Both external Revelation, and internal Illumi∣nation presuppose us to be Rational; and through the want of a Faculty that is so, Brutes are incapable both of the one and the other. Secondly. Reason taken for the intellectual Faculty, or the Principle of

Apprehension, Judgment and Ratiocina∣tion, is both the instrument whereby we certainly discern the grounds and motives of Faith; and the vital Principle of the Act it self. Faith is not only an Elicit act of our minds, but besides, there can be no act of Faith without a previous exercise of our Intellects about the things to be believed. Faith being nothing but an unwavering assent to some Doctrine up∣on the account of a divine Testimony, our Reason must be antecedently perswa∣ded that the Testimony is Divine, before it can assent to the Doctrine upon the Au∣thority and Veracity of the Revealer. Though in many things we can give no Reason for what is believed, distinct from Divine Testimony; yet we ought to be always able to give a Reason for the Au∣thentickness, and the Divinity of the Testimony. For, as Austin saith, Quod intelligimus aliquid, rationi debemus; quod autem credimus, auctoritati. Lib. de utilit, Credendi, cap. XI. The Authority of God in the Scripture is the formal reason of Assent to such and such Doctrines, but it is by the means and exercise of our intellectual Faculties that we come to un∣derstand such a Declaration to proceed

from God; and that these things are the sense of such and such Propositions. Thus the Understanding of Man is the Candle of the Lord, resolving us in the Authentick∣ness and Sense of Revelation; though Faith be built upon the Credit only of the Revealer. To this purpose is that of Maximus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; Should I neglect the Scripture, Whence should I have Know∣ledge? Should I relinquish Reason, How should I have Faith?

Secondly, Reason is taken Metonymi∣cally for common Maxims, or principles whose Truth is inviolable. And these are. (1.) Such as be so connate to Sense and Reason; that upon their bare Repre∣sentation they are universally assented to. These Principles are not borrowed from Reason as their first Spring and Ori∣ginal, but having their Root in the nature of God, and Essences of Things, are only discerned by the Rational mind and In∣tellect. I do not say that we are brought forth with a List and Scroll of Axioms 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Imprinted upon our Faculties; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that we are furnished with such

Powers, upon the first Exercise of which about such things without any Ha∣rangues of Discourse, or previous Ratio∣cinations, we cannot without doing Vio∣lence to our Rational Nature, but pay them an Assent. Those Truths whether Logical, Moral, Physical, or Mathematical; Whether General (because of their Uni∣versal Influence upon all Disciplines) or Particular (from their being confined in their Use to some one Science) are justly stiled Natural, being Founded in the Na∣ture of God, the Essences of things, and the intrinsecal Rectitude of the Rational Faculty. These are the Foundations and Measures of all Science, Knowledge, and Discourse; being in themselves certain and incontestable. Nor is there any o∣ther proof to be Assigned of them besides their Consonancy to the Rational Facul∣ty, to which they are centrally co-united. And forasmuch as all men pa••take of the same Reasonable Nature, the certainty of these Principles is Universal. What is disconvenient to the Essential Nature of one Man being so to the Nature of ano∣ther; nor is it possible to dissent from them, without doing Contempt to our Faculties. Of this sort are these; That

a Thing cannot at the same time be, and not be: That every Effect supposeth it's cause; and many such like. Nor doth Theology borrow these from Philosophy, but they are pre-supposed to both, and Sci∣ence as well as Faith builds upon them. 2dly. There are others whose Truth and Certainty are not understood; nor do they win our Assent upon their first and naked Representation; but they are discovered by a Chain of Ratiocinations, and their Verity established by a Haran∣gue of Inductions. These are stiled Ac∣quired Principles, being by an Industri∣ous Exercise of the Discursive Faculty, raised, and superstructed upon the former. Nor are they less True than the other, though more Remote from the first View of our Understandings. Whatsoever is rightly deduced from Unquestionable Pre∣misses, hath the same stamp of Truth upon it, that the Principles have from which it is inferred. Where there is a just Con∣nexion between Conclusions and Princi∣ples; the latter cannot be denied without questioning the former, from which they are fetch't. The Deduction of these by regular Trayns of Argumentation, is the work of a Philosopher; and these being

Systematically digested, constitute Phi∣losophy. So far then as Philosophy in∣cludes only Conclusions duly inferred from Unquestionable Principles, so far there is not only a Friendly Alliance be∣tween it and Divinity, but a wonderful Subserviency in it to Faith. Nor is any thing true in Philosophy that is not so in Theology. For, as Aristotle sayes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Whatsoever is true must be Con∣sentaneous to all that is so. lib. 1. Prior. Analyt. cap. 32. And as he adds else∣where, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. All Truth is consentient to Truth, lib. 1. Ethic. cap. 8. What our Souls in the Re∣gular Exercise of Reason instruct us in, is as much the Voyce of God to us, as any Revelation he vouchsafeth us in the Bible. Nor can we Impeach the Genuine Issues of Reason, without Reflection upon God who hath Endowed us with a Faculty ne∣cessarily swaying us to those Determinati∣ons. The Connexion of one thing with another, together with their mutual De∣pendencies, ariseth not from the Arbitra∣rious Appointment, and Designation of Men; but is involved in the Essences of Beings, and Results from the Habitudes

which the Soveraign Author hath link't them in, one to another. Ipsa veritas Con∣nexionum, non instituta sed animadversa est ab hominibus & notata, ut eam possint vel discere, vel docere. Nam est in re∣rum ratione perpetua & divinitus insti∣tuta. August. lib. 2. De Doctr. Christ. cap. 31. Might we not upon Prolep∣tical Principles which are assented to as soon as the Terms are under∣stood, superstruct innumerable others; There were no Room left for Medi∣tation, Study, Ratiocination, and Dis∣putes. All our Knowledge would be either Intelligence instead of Science, or else we must in all things, save a few Self-Evidents, introduce and Estab∣lish Scepticism. Were there no secon∣dary Principles, which when once de∣duced from self-evident Maxims, we may with safety rely on; we must either deny that there are any Habitudes, Re∣lations, Dependencies, or Oppositions betwixt one thing and an other; or we must affirm the rational Faculty to be in it's Natural Exercises universally Falla∣cious. The indissoluble Connexion that is betwixt one thing and another, transferrs the Denomination of Truth

to the Acts of our Mind stiled Judg∣ments, and the Declarations of these Acts to others called Enunciations; whenso∣ever we Judge and Pronounce of things as they really are. For, as the Philosopher sayes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. I readi∣ly grant, that partly through the Weak∣ness and Darkness which have arrested our Understandings; partly through the Nature, Quality, Extent, and Arduous∣ness of Objects, and our Inadequate Conceptions of them; partly through Prepossessions, Prejudices, and the B••as of Lusts, and Passions that we are sub∣ject to; partly through Supineness, Sloth, and Inadvertency, we do often prevari∣cate in making Deductions and Inferen∣ces from self-evident, and universal Max∣ims, and thereupon establish Mistaken and Erroneous Consequences, as Prin∣ciples of Truth and Reason. But then this is the Fault of Philosophers, not of Philosophy; or of Philosophy in the Concrete, as Existing in this or that Per∣son, not in the Abstract, as involving such a Mischief in it's Nature and Idea. Our intellectual Faculties being vitiated & tinctur'd with Lust, enthralled by Pre∣dices,

darkned by Passions, engaged by vain and corrupt Interests, distorted by Pride and Self-Love, and fastned to Earthly Images, do often impose upon us, and lead us to obtrude upon others, absurd Axoms for Undoubted and In∣contestable Principles of Reason. It is this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Adulterate Reason, which we charge, for being Un∣friendly to Religion. And that it is not without Grounds, shall be after∣wards evinced: For I doubt not but that I shall make it appear, that the most malignant Heresies which have Infected the Church, had their Founda∣tion in Vulgar, and received Axioms of Philosophy. Whoever will trace the Errors which have Invaded Divinity to their Source, must resolve them into ab∣surd Maxims of Philosophy, as their Chief Seminary. Herein we intend not to offer any Disparagement to Reason, but rather to pay it our Utmost respect, by rescuing it from being accountable for every vain Imagination, and false Conse∣quence, which are super-scribed with the Venerable Name of Principles of Reason.

§. 4. Having setled the Notion of Rea∣son,

we are next to fix the meaning of Religion. And this is the more needfull in that men have always had the art of Baptizing their weaknesses, fooleries, yea blasphemies with the sacred name of Mysteries of Faith; and afterwards defen∣ding them from the assaults of Reason, by saying, They are Mysteries against which Reason is not to be hearkned to. By matters of Religion, then, we mean in general as well the Agenda as the Creden∣da of it; What we are to perform as well as what we are to believe; what re∣lates to Obedience as well as what re∣lates to Faith. Now the rule, measure and standard of both is the Revelation of God in the Scripture. The Bible is now the only perfect Code and Register of na∣tural Religion, as well as the only Systeme of supernatural. Those very Articles of Belief, and Duties of obedience which were formerly Natural with respect to their manner of promulgation, are now in the Declaration of them also Superna∣tural. The Scripture is the only Canon of Faith and Rule of Practice. So the Apostle stile's it in more than one place, Phil. 3.16. Nevertheless whereto we have already attained, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, let us

walk by the same Rule. As if he had said, what ever dissensions there be amongst us in lesser things, let us orderly regulate our life and course (for that is the import of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) according to the Canon of the Gos∣pel. And in the same sense, Gal. 6.16. as many as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 walk ac∣cording to this Rule, peace be on them, &c. The Apostle, having to do with such as in∣troduced 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 an other Gos∣pel, Gal. 1.6, 7. for their conviction and plainer refutation, he gives us a brief epi∣tomy and summary both of the Law and Gospel, and at last shuts up the whole debate with this, that whoever walks ac∣cording to this Canon or Rule, peace shall be on him. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies originally either a Reed made into an instrument wherewith they measured buildings, or the limits and bounds of land: or a small Line which Ar∣chitects square out their work by, that all the parts of it may bear a just symmetry & proportion one to another; and from this proper use of it, it is Metaphorically trans∣ferred to signifie any kind of Rule. Thus Aristotle useth it. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; By that which is right we know both its self, and that which is crooked: for the Canon is the judg

of both. And thus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Canon is a law that cannot err, and an infallible measure. Phavorin. Or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies that which is over Scales, commonly called the Tongue of the Ba∣lance, which is the director whereby what∣soever is put into the Scales is tryed, and hath its just weight adjudged. So the Scho∣liast upon Aristophanes tells us that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is that which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 over the Scales & which brings them to equality. This Original signification of the word also, hath given rise to its Metaphorical use of denoting any rule or measure, by which either Doctrines or Practices are tried and ad∣justed. And thus the Scripture is the true and only perfect rule of all matters of Religion. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the exact balance and Rule or Canon of all Truths. The 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Rule of im∣mutable and unshaken Truth. Austin improveth this Notion of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 excellently) De baptism. cont. Donat. lib. 2 cap 6.) Let us not, (say's he,) bring our deceitful balances, where we weigh what

would, and do as we would, saying accord∣ing to our fancy, Behold this is heavy, or behold this is light: but let us bring the Di∣vine Balances of the Scriptures; and weigh things, or rather not weigh them, but learn and take notice what the Lord himself hath weighed. I rather chuse to fix the import of Religion thus by its reference to its Rule, than by an enumeration of particulars. First, that it may appear that whatever be the concernment of Reason in Religi∣on, yet it is not to invent or introduce a∣ny new Doctrine; nor to propose or in∣stitute any new Media of Worship, nor to obtrude and force upon us any new mo∣ral Duty. Nothing Magisterial doth here belong to it, its highest preferment is to minister. Secondly, Because there is nothing in the Scripture but what we are under the Sanction of; and, as it is oc∣casionally made known, we are to pay a rational subjection to it. Though every thing in the Bible be not alike Necessary, yet every thing in it is alike True, and our concernment lie's more or less in it. There is no other Rule by which we are to be regulated in matters of Religion but the Bible, and therfore the import and meaning of those Terms can be no other∣wayes

decided but by their habitude to their measure. For this end did God give forth the Scripture that it might be the foundation and standard of Religion, and thence therefore are we to learn its Laws and constitutions. The instructing mankind in whatsoever is necessary to his present or future Happiness, was the design of God in his vouchsafeing the World a supernatural Revelation, and foreseeing all things that are necessary to such an End, the respect and veneration which we pay to his Sapience & Goodness oblige us to believe that he hath adapted and pro∣portion'd the means thereunto. Now the Doctrines of the Bible are of two sorts: 1. Such as besides their being made known by revelation and believed on the account of Divine Testimony, have also a foundation in the light of Nature, and there are natural Mediums by which they may be prov'd. These are com∣monly called Mixt, but I think amiss, seeing they are not made up of dissimilar parts, nor have they objects complicated of different natures; are only discove∣red by different Lights, proved by diffe∣rent Media, and assented to as well upon Motives of Reason as Divine Authority,

of this kind are the Being and Attributes of God, the Immortality of the Soul, the certainty of Providence, the Existence of a Future State, and Moral Good and E∣vil. 2dly. Such as have no Foundation at all in Nature, by which they could have been found out, or known; but we are solely indebted to Supernatural Revelati∣on for the Discovery of them. Their Objects having their Source and Rise only from the Will of God, a Supernatural Revelation was absolutely expedient to promulge them. And these also are of two Sorts. (1.) There are some Do∣ctrines which though our Understandings by Natural Mediums could never have discovered; yet being once revealed, our Minds can by Arguments drawn from Reason, facilitate the Apprehension of them, and confirm it self in their Belief. Of this kind are the Resurrection of the Body, and Satisfaction to Divine Ju∣stice, in order to the Exercising of For∣giveness to penitent Sinners. (2.) There are others which as Reason could never have discovered, so when revealed, it can neither comprehend them, nor produce any Medium in Nature, by which either the Existence of their Objects can be De∣monstrated,

or their Truth Illustrated. Of this kind are the Doctrines of the Trinity, and the Incarnation of the Son of God. I know that there are many Divines, who though they confess that the Doctrine of the Trinity could never at first have been discovered by Reason, yet being once Revealed, they contend that Reason cannot only Illustrate, but De∣monstrate it. But upon the best Inquiry into their Arguments, I find most of them palpably Fallacious; and others of them so Disproportionate to what they are brought, that they do not so much as af∣ford some saint Adumbrations of it. I readily grant that this and the other My∣stery are by a clear and necessary Connexi∣on united with other Doctrines of Faith, which Reason enlightned by Revelation, can give a rational Account of. For the My∣stery of the Trinity hath a necessary Con∣nexion with the Work of our Redemption, by the Incarnation of the Son of God; and the Work of our Redemption by the In∣carnation of an infinite Person, hath the like Connexion with the necessity of sat••s∣fying Divine Justice, in o••der to the Dis∣pensing

of Pardon to repenting Offenders; and the necessity of satisfying Divine Ju∣stice for the End aforesaid, hath a necessary Connexion with the Doctrine of the Cor∣ruption of Mankind; and the Corruption of Humane Nature is both fully confessed, and can be demonstrated by Reason. Thus though all the Objects of Faith have not an immediate Correspondence with the Objects of Reason; yet these very Do∣ctrines of Faith which lye remotest from the Territories of Reason, and seem to have least Affinity with its Light, are necessarily, and clearly connected with those other Principles of Faith, which when once discovered, Reason both ap∣proves of, and can rationally confirm it self in. As two Neighbouring Kingdoms are joyned together, though some of their Provinces touch not one another: So by those Objects of Faith which have a clear Connexion with Objects of Reason, there is a mediate Connexion between Reason and those Objects of Faith that lye farther off. I need not add that the most Mysterious Doctrines of Religion are necessarily connect∣ed with the Belief of the Bibles, being the Word of God; and that is a Truth

which Reason is so far from rejecting, that it can demonstrate it.

§. 5 Having setled the meaning of the Terms, namely, what we understand both by Reason and Religion. We are next particularly to enquire of what Signifi∣cancy and Use Reason is in Religion; that so we may give to Reason the things that are Reasons, and yet reserve to Faith the things that are Faiths. And whereas we have said, that there are some Princi∣ples of Religion, which besides the Evi∣dence that they have in Revelation, have Foundation also in the Light of Nature, it may be easily apprehended, that more is to be allowed to Reason in and about those, than about these the Knowledge of which we are Debters only to Revela∣tion for. As to the Latter, Reason, acquits it self in all that belongs to it, by consi∣dering what Doctrines are revealed to us in the Scriptures, and deduce••ng Conse∣quences, which by clear Connexions, proceed from them; leaving Faith to assent to them upon the Authority and Veracity of the Revealer. But as to the former, Reason doth not sufficiently dis∣charge it self by discovering that they are

Revealed; and thereupon committing it to Faith to Embrace them upon Divine Testimony: But it ought further to en∣quire what Inducements and Media there are in the Light of Nature, by which they may be also Known and Demonstra∣ted. And as this is to be allowed to Rea∣son in all Matters of Religion, which have Foundation in Natural Light; so especi∣ally in and about such Principles of it as are necessarily pre-supposed to Faith; of which kind are the Being of God, and the Divinity of the Scripture. Though all our Religion be in an eminent Manner, built upon the Divinity of the Scriptures, and some parts of it know no other Foun∣dation but the Bible; and accordingly a∣mong such as own that Book for the Word of God, We need no other Bottome to Erect our Faith upon, nor any other Mea∣sure to regulate our Debates, and to de∣termine our Controversies by; yet when the Divinity of the Scripture it self is con∣tended about, it is neither a just nor a rati∣onal Way of Procedure, barely to affirm that 'tis Divine, but we are to prove that it is so. If we will not believe the Alcho∣ran, to proceed by Inspiration from God, upon the Testimony of a Mahometan; no

more is it to be expected, that a Mussul∣man should believe what we call the Bible to be God's Word, upon the naked Testimony of a Christian. As upon the one hand, we should betray Religion to every Infidel, by pretending to build our Faith upon a Book, whose sacred Autho∣rity we cannot justifie; so upon the other hand, we oblige our selves to the worst of Drudgeries, in being resolved to believe what we can give no Reason for. Besides, we should not only by such a Method, un∣avoidably expose our selves to the Di∣ctates of every Enthusiast; but with all Minister a just Plea to such as dislike Religion, because of it's Unfriendliness to their Lusts, for the renouncing of it.

Now our Belief of the Scripture sup∣poseth the Existence of God, and there∣fore our knowledge of his Being must precede our Faith of the Divine Autho∣rity of the Bible. I readily grant that the Scriptures may be brought not only to such as own their Truth; but even to Infidels as a proof of a Deity: But then it must not be upon the Score of their naked Testimony, but upon the account of their being of such a Frame, Nature, and Qua∣lity

that they can proceed from no other Author. And thus we Arrive by the Scripture at an Assurance of God's Exist∣ence, as we do at the Knowledge of a Cause by it's Effect. But so far as we assent to any thing upon the Credit of the Scriptures meer Testification, we are necessitated to presuppose the Existence of God; it being only upon the account of his Veracity in himself, and that the Bible is a Divine Revelation, that we do without the least guilt of vain Credulity, because upon the highest Reason, impli∣citely believe it.

In discoursing the Serviceableness of Reason in demonstrating the fore-menti∣oned Articles, together with those other Doctrines that have their Foundation not only in Revelation, but also in Na∣tural Light, and such common Principles which all men assent to: I shall confine my self to wonderful Brevity; and rather point at Arguments than pursue them. And to begin with the Existence of God. Were there no Supernatural Revelation in the World, there is enough both with∣in us, and without us, to Convince us of the Being of a Deity. Hence though God hath wrought many Miracles to Con∣vince

Infidels and Mis-Believers; yet he never wrought any to Convince Atheists. Nor do the Pen-Men of Scripture at∣tempt to prove it, but take it for granted, as being evidently manifest both by Sen∣sible and Rational Demonstration. I shall not here insist on the Cartesian Ar∣gument, drawn from an Innate and In∣graft Idea of God: For upon a most seri∣ous perusal of what is alledged by Cartes himself, Claubergius, De Bruin, Doctor More and others, in Vindication of it; together with what is produced by Gas∣sendus, Ezekius, Vogelsangius, Derkennis, Doctor Parker, and others against it: I look upon it as little better than a Sophism; and to maintain an Article of such Import by a Medium, either Weak or Fallacious, is to betray the first Fundamental of Re∣ligion. I know no Idea's formally In∣nate; what we commonly call so, are the Results of the Exercise of our Reason. The Notion of God is not otherwise in∣bred, then that the Soul is furnished with such a Natural Sagacity, that upon the Exercise of her rational Powers, she is Infallibly led to the Acknowledgment of a Deity. And this is first effected by her looking inwardly upon her self and her

own Acts; and we are with Facility, and by a short way of Argumentation, conducted thence to the Existence of God. For, (1st.) We perceive that the Faculty re∣sident in us, is not furnished with all per∣fections, and therefore not Self-existent, nor indebted to it self for those it hath, o∣therwise it would have cloathed it self with the utmost perfections it can Imagine; and by consequence, finding it's own Ex∣ility and Imperfection, it Naturally, and with Ease, arrives at a perswasion of de∣riving it's Original from some First, Su∣preme, and Free Agent who hath made it what it is; and this can be nothing but God. (2dly.) We perceive that we have such a Faculty that apprehendeth, judgeth, reasoneth; but what it is, whence it is, and how it performeth those things we know not: And therefore there must be some Supreme Being, who hath given us this Faculty, and understands both the Na∣ture of it, and how it knoweth, which we our selves do not. (3dly.) Our Natures are such, that assoon as we come to have the use of our Intellectual Faculties, we are forced to acknowledge some things Good, and other things Evil. There is an Unalterable Congruity betwixt some

Acts and our reasonable Souls, and an Unchangeable Incongruity betwixt them and others. Now this plainly sways to the belief of a God: For all distinctions of Good and Evil relate to a Law under the Sanction of which we are; and all Law supposeth a Superiour, who hath Right to command us; and there can be no Uni∣versal Independent Supreme but God. (4ly.) We find our selves possessed of a Faculty necessarily reflecting on it's own Acts; and passing a Judgment upon it self in all it does: Which is a further Con∣viction of the Existence of God; for it implies a Supreme Judge to whom we are accountable. (5ly.) We find that we are furnished with Faculties of vast Ap∣petite and Desires, and that there is no∣thing in the World that can satisfie our Cravings; and by consequence, there must be some Supreme Good, adequate and proportionate to the Longings of our Souls, which can be nothing but God. This is his Meaning who said of the Hea∣then, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, By the Light of Nature, they nodded after a Summum Bonum: It were to put a Slur upon Nature, to suppose that she hath put those Propensions and Inclinations into us,

only to delude and abuse us. (6ly.) We find the Frame of our Rational Powers to be such, that we cannot form a Notion of God, though it were in denying him, but we include his Actual Existence in it. Optimus, Maximus, or a perfect Being is the Idea we have of God, whensoever we think of him. Now this includes actual Ex∣istence, it being a greater Perfection for a thing to be Essentially, Independently, and Necessarily; than to be contin∣gently, and by Origination from another, on whose Pleasure it's Existence depends. Nor do the School-Men mean more when they tell us, that this Proposition, God is, is Self-evident: For all Propositions whose Predicate is included in the Essence of the Subject, are stiled Per se nota; be∣cause if we do but once understand the import of the Term, stiled the Subject, we necessarily assent to it's Identity with the Praedicate. The Exceptions of Doctor Parker which he hath borrowed from the Thomists, who herein differ from the Fol∣lowers of Scotus, I judge not worthy of a Reply; unless he should be so Importu∣nate as to demand it, which if he think fit to do, I do faithfully promise it shall be in Readiness for him. (7ly.) By consult∣ing

still our Faculties, we do not find any thing included in our Idea; by vertue of which, we must either ever have been, or through existing this Moment, must ne∣cessarily exist the next, which Naturally conducts us to a Perswasion of a God, from whom we derived our Being at first, and to whom we owe our continued Subsist∣ence. Nor is this the Argument of Des Cartes alone, but of the School-Men in general; though in this, as in most other things, he was not so Ingenious as to con∣fess at whose Breasts he had Suckt, nor out of whose Gardens he had gathered his best Flowers.

Secondly, As we have incontestable E∣vidence of the Existence of God, by the first efforts of our Souls, in and about them∣selves and their own Acts: So our Under∣standings being awakened, and excited by outward and surrounding Objects, they do by short and infallible Ratiocinations, lead us to the Belief of a Deity: We are advantagiously placed in the midst of Magnificent Works, and have Faculties adapted for the Contemplation of them: Nor is there one of them, but what bears those Signatures and Impresses of Almigh∣ty power and Infinite Wisdom upon it;

as to convince us that there is a God that fram'd them all. I judge this sort of Ar∣guments fetch't from the Frame of Na∣ture, so uncontroulable a Proof of the Existence of God; that I am afraid it was not without Designe, that Des Cartes not only over-look't, but disparaged them. I will not charge the like Intention upon him in his Meditationes de prima Philoso∣phia, that his Country-Man Vaninus was guilty of in his Aeternae providentiae Thea∣trum. But this I dare say, that those he slighted are Solid, Easie, and accommo∣dated to popular Understandings; where∣as those he chose to rely on, are some of them Sophistical, and all of them too Me∣taphysical for every one to understand. Nor did it become any, who paid a Ve∣neration to the Scripture as the Word of God; to represent this kind of Argu∣ments as weak, and infirm, seeing the Holy Ghost hath preceded us in this way of Ratiocination. See Rom. 1.18, 19, 20, 21. Psal. 19.1 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Acts 14.15, 16, 17. and 17.23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28. Job 12.7, 8, 9, 10, &c. Now by viewing the curious Structure of this noble Ma∣chine, the World, how many Convincing Proofs of the Being of God, present

themselves to our Intellectual Facul∣ties.

First, If we consider the naked Exist∣ence of things, how they came to be in the Posture they are; we shall discover thence not a few nor mean Arguments of their Divine Author. 1st. The many glorious and beautiful Objects which we are encircled with, did not cause them∣selves: Existence is always presuppos'd to Acting; nothing can be both before and and after it self. Nor 2dly. Were they Eternal; For (1st.) It is an Hypothesis pregnant with Contradictions, that any thing Finite, and Dependent, as all things in the World are, should be Eternal. (2dly.) We see every thing subsist by a succession of Generation and Corruption; which is plainly repugnant to self, and e∣ternal Existence. Production from Eter∣nity is a palpable Contradiction. What∣ever is produced passeth from a state of Non-entity into a state of Being; and therefore we must conceive a time when it was not, ere we can conceive the time when it was. (3dly.) The Recency of the Existence of things is plain from the De∣ficiency either of History or Tradition an∣tecedently to Moses. And he is so far

from Recording the World to have been Eternal, that he instructs us particularly both how, and when it began. These Topicks are so largely prosecuted by o∣thers, that I supersede them. And as the World was not Eternal; so neither did it result by a casual Concourse of Particles of Matter, moving in an infinite Ultra-Mun∣dane Space, and justling one and another, till they fell into this Form and Order which we now behold them in. For (1.) The Eternity of Atoms, is attended with the same Contradictions that the E∣ternity of the World is. (2.) Motion is hereby supposed intrinsecal to Matter, which is not only False, but Impossible. It is the greatest Absurdity that can be imposed upon Reason, to ascribe Motion to such a stupid and unactive Principle as Matter, without the acknowledgment of a First and Divine Motor. (3dly.) If all things be the Result of Matter; how comes a Principle of Reason to be con∣vey'd into us, by that which had it not In∣herent in it self? (4.) This Hypothesis supposeth that to have been the effect of Chance, which carries in it the Characters of a wise Contrivance: But of this more anon. (5.) If the Fabrick of the World

be nothing but the result of the casual Meeting and Concatena∣••ion of Atoms; How comes it to pass, that by their daily Motion, and justling one another, they do not dance themselves into more Worlds; at least into some one Animal or other. (6.) Epicurus's Infinity of Atoms, carries a Repugnancy in it to his Inane Space; and yet without this his whole Hypothesis, falls to the ground. (7.) Nor is it pos∣sible to salve the Permanency of the World, and the Continuity of Bodies, by the fortuitous Concatenations of Atoms, through their different Configurations, and jagg'd Angles, without the Superin∣tendency of an Omnipotent Goodness, who sustains both the whole Creation, and every part of it. Especially, it is not con∣ceivable, how such Bodies as are made up either of Globular particles, or of those Mi∣nute-Corpuscles which Des-Cartes stiles his First and Second Elements, should hold together without the Influence of a higher Principle to keep them in their Consistency. And thus from the Con∣sideration of the Existence of things

we are convinced of the Being of God.

Secondly; as Reason demonstrates that there is a God from the existence of things; so it is further persuaded of the same from the beauty, pulchritude and or∣der of the Cre••tures; especially the Fa∣brick of Animals, and the suitableness of their Members for their Functions. Chance hath no orderly designs nor is symmetry and proportion to be attributed to the fortuitous jumbles of blind matter. If contrivances of art be not effected with∣out an industrious skil, much less are the works of Nature which infinitely exceed the former, performed without the con∣duct of an intellectual Principle. The consideration of the Fabrick of things made Plato say 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which I may english in the words of the Holy Ghost, that all things are made in number, weight and measure. Who can observe the great Luminary the Sun, his distance from the Earth, the motion communicated to him, that he move's in an orbicular and not in a straight Line, that in his circular motion he chalk's out to himself an oblique road, that in his journey throug the Zodiack he employ's so much time; and not confess a Wise as well as a Powerful Agent to

have been the contriver of all this; see∣ing in every instance things might have been otherwise, and yet it cannot but be acknowledged that it is to the best and most universal advantage for them to be as they are. Is it possible philosophical∣ly to view the body of Man; the Fabrick of the Organs of sense; the situation of the Heart; the structure of its Ventricles, the communication betwixt it and the Bo••dy by Veins and Arteries; the contrivance of the Larynx; the Frame and use of the Epiglottis; the contexture of the Brain, the correspondency betwixt it and all the parts of the Body by Nerves; the Fa∣brick of the Muscles those pullies of mo∣tion, &c. and not confess an Al∣mighty and Wise Artist to have contri∣ved and performed those excellent o∣perations.

In the Third place what convictions are we furnished with of the Being of God, from the Innate Harmony that is in the several parts of the Creation; and the convenient disposure of all the Creatures to a subserviency to one another in mutu∣al offices. Chance cannot have link't one thing to another, nor can contraries com∣bine into a mutual coalition without the

influence of a supreme Being, who over∣rules them. An establshed order among multiplicity of things void of understan∣ding, is the work of an infinite Under∣standing. Order and Harmony, being no∣thing but a congruous disposition of things, according to their Dignity and use∣fulness; He must be supposed to know their natures, Dignity, and uses that regu∣larly disposeth them; and this can be∣long to none but to an Infinite Wisdom. To this might be added the orderly and sagacious operation not only of Brutes, but inanimate Creatures, for ends which they neither perceive nor understand; which as certainly argues a Supreme, Wise, Su∣perintender of all things, as the regular course of a Ship in the Ocean argues that there sits a Pilot at the Helm. Upon these foregoing Motives, not to mention many other, hath mankind in all Ages and places subscribed to the Being of God. So universal hath the Notion of a Deity been, that men have rather chosen to worship any thing for God, then wholly to be without one. Being both persua∣ded that there was a God and that he was infinitely good, they made every thing that was beneficial to them a Deity, Nor

can the Atheist who denies the Existence of God, give any rational account of the universal consent of mankind that there is One. Wheras he that maintains One, can easily resolve it, by shewing how such a persuasion flows naturally from the ex∣ercise of every mans understanding. And forasmuch as it is alledged that there have been some who have dissented, and consequently that the persuasion is not Universal: It Amounts to no more but that there have been some who did 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 speak false∣ly of and bely our Nature, that I may use Porphyries phrase. Nature may be so perverted by Vice, that men will not ac∣knowledg what lyes most proportionable to Reason, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; Being corrupted by bad Education, evil Customs, and wicked institutions, they destroy their natural Notions, saith a Philosopher. If the Contradiction of a single Individual, or two, were enough to invalidate an universal Persuasion, or to impeach a Natural Truth; there were neither the one nor the o∣ther in the World. For not only Cicero tells us,

that there is nothing so absurd, which some of the Philosophers have not maintained: But Aristotle informs us, that there have been some who have held, That a Thing might at the same time be, and not be; And as the same Person tells us; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. That is univer∣sally known, not which every one acknowledg∣eth, but what every one who hath not De∣bauch't his Faculties, doth discern, Topic. 6. c. 4. It is enough that the Existence of God lyes even to our Understandings; though some who affront their Faculties will not acknowledge it. I shall shut up all this with a Saying or two of Heathen Philoso∣phers; The Denyal of God is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Irrational, and can be approved by none but those who have nei∣ther Understanding nor Sense. The A∣theist doth e••adicate 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; That which is Naturally planted in all reasonable Souls, sayes Plutarch. No∣thing but the Prophaness of the present Age hath tinctur'd it with Atheism. Sen∣suality smothers the most connate Noti∣ons; and Reason becomes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Infected with those evil Opinions which proceed from Lusts as Plotinus saith. When Men are once sunk into the grossest Sensualities, their Reason becomes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, complyant with their sensual Appetites. Besides such Men living as if there were no God, can make no Apology to the World for it; but by espousing such No∣tions which may justifie them in their courses. Withall Men being resolved to live as they list; it becomes their Interest in reference to their Tranquillity in the mean time, to Believe, through Holding that there is none to call them to Ac∣count, that they may do so. He that finds cause to Fear a God, will soon wish that there were none; Et Quod valde volumus facile credimus, What we earnestly desire, we easily believe. However, I hope there is enough suggested, to prove that there is sufficient Foundations in the Light of Nature, were there no such thing as Re∣velation in the World; whereby we may Arrive at a Persuasion of the Existence of a Deity. Nor shall I further Com∣bate the Atheist, by shewing how impru∣dent, disingenuous, and absurd his Opinion is; all these being Largely done by o∣ther

Hands: And my Concern was only to declare, that there are Demon∣strative Arguments in Nature, where∣by our Reasons can previously to all Revelation, Assure us of the Being of God.

§. 6. The next thing to be considered, is the Use and Serviceableness of Reason in proving the Divinity of the Scripture. And here Reason is of great import, for by this alone we demonstrate the Divine Authority of the Bible. The ancient Heathens reproaching the Primitive Christians, that they grounded all their Do••••rine upon meer Belief; that their Religion consisted In sola ratione creden∣di, and that their simple Faith was all they had to trust to: The Christians com∣plained of the Charge as a gross and im∣pudent Calumny; appealed to Reason for Proof of their Belief, and offered to joyn Issue with them upon that Title. And as they that owe their Belief of the Bibles being the Word of God to Re∣port, Principles of Education, or the Fe∣licity of their Birth, and the Clime where they were born, receive the Scripture upon no better Motives than the Turks do

the Alcoran. So if pretended Inspirati∣on may pass for a Demonstration of the Truth of what every bold Pretender will obtrude upon us; We expose our selves not only to the Belief of every Groundless Imagination, but of innumerable Con∣tradictions: For not only the grossest Fol∣lies, but Doctrines palpably repugnant both to Reason, and one another, have been delivered by Enthusiasts and pretended Inspirato's. I readily grant that the Te∣stimony of the Holy Ghost in the Souls and Consciences of men to the Truth of the Scripture, is the most convincing E∣vidence, that such Persons can have of it's Divinity. But (1st.) The Holy Ghost convinceth no man as to the Belief of the Scripture, without Enlightning his mind in the Grounds and Reasons up∣on which it's proceeding from God is evi∣denced and established. There is no Conviction begot by the Holy Ghost in the Hearts of men, otherwise than by ra∣tional Evidence satisfying our Under∣standings, through a discovery of the Mo∣tives and Inducements that ascertain the Truth of what he would convince us of. (2.) No mans particular Assurance ob∣tained thus in way of Illumination by the

Holy Ghost, is to be otherwise urged as an Argument of Conviction to another, than by proposing the Reasons which our Faith is erected on. The way of such Mens Evidence is communicable to none, unless they could kindle the same Rayes in the Breasts of others that have Irradiated their own; and therefore they must deal with others, by producing the grounds of their Conviction, not pleading the man∣ner of it. And that an other is convinced or persuaded by them, depends wholly upon the weight and Momentousness of the Reasons themselves, not on the man∣ner that such a person came to discover them. For should he have arrived at the discerning them by any other Mean, they had been of the same Significancy to the Conviction of an Adversary. (3.) The Holy Ghost as a distinct Person in the Dei∣ty, is not a Principle demonstrable by Reason. Seeing then it is by the Scrip∣ture alone, that we are assured of the Ex∣istence of the Divine Spirit, as a distinct Person in the Godhead; therefore his Testimony in the Hearts and Conscien∣ces of men to the Scripture, cannot be al∣lowed, as a previous Evidence of it's Di∣vinity. To prove the Divine Authority

of the Scripture by the Testimony of the Holy Ghost, when we cannot otherwise prove that there is a Holy Ghost, but by the Testimony of the Scripture is to argue Circularly and absurdly. I know the Pa∣pists to be even with the Protestants, for the Circle we charge on them in their pro∣ving the Church by the Scriptures, and the Scripture by the Church; do pretend to fasten the same way of Circular Argu∣mentation upon us, in that we prove the Spirit by the Scripture, and the Scripture by the Spirit. Whereas even those Pro∣testants, who contend that the Spirit and Scripture do mutually prove one another, may easily acquit themselves from a Cir∣cle: Seeing whatever Proof the Scripture and Spirit mutually Minister to one ano∣ther; it is in Diverso genere. The Scrip∣ture proves the Spirit either in way of Witness, by plainly testifying that there is such a Being as the Divine Spirit; or Objectively, and by way of Argument, bringing into Light such Truths as can be conceived to proceed from none other, save 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, From the Holy Ghost: But then the Spirit proves the Scripture not in way of a naked Witness, nor in way of Argument; but under the

notion of an Efficient Cause, Ele∣vating and preparing our Understandings, to discern the Lineaments, Characters, and Signatures of Divinity, which God hath impressed upon the Scriptures; which through that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is upon our Minds, we many times do not at all dis∣cern; much less do we at any time dis∣cern 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, without it: Or else by giving Efficacy to Scripture Truths in and upon our Hearts and Con∣sciences; so that the Word arriving with us 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the De∣monstration of the Spirit and Power; we have 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 by the ef∣fectual Working of his Power, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a spiritual Sense, and Taste of the things themselves. And this Spiritual Gust, that I may use Origen's Phrase, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Diviner thing and more Convincing, than any De∣monstration. For the Word of God, as well as God himself, is best known 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by an Intellectual Touch, as the Philosopher sayes. But, as I have said al∣ready, this is no convincing Proof to an Adversary; nor doth the evi∣dence

of it reach further than the party immediately concerned. And therefore our Recourse must be to Arguments of another Nature. In brief, when we have to do with such, as either Question or Deny the Divine Authority of the Scrip∣ture, we are to prove it by Ratiocinati∣on from common Principles received a∣mongst Mankind; and by Topicks that lye even and proportionated to Intel∣lectual Nature. And here Reason is justly magnified, as hugely Subservient to Religion, in that it demonstrates the Di∣vine Authority of the Scripture, upon which our Faith, as to all particular Ar∣ticles and Duties of Religion is grounded. Not do I doubt but that Reason can ac∣quit it self in this Undertaking, to the Conviction of all that are not wilfully obstinate; and for such, I know no means either sufficient, or intended by God to satisfie them. Many great Men both An∣cient and Modern, as well at Home as Abroad, have already laboured, and to good purpose, in this Theme. Nor can there be much added by any to what is already said, much less am I likely to do it: Neither is it my Intention to treat this Subject at large, but rather to touch

at the Heads of Arguments than handle them. And I suppose this will suffici∣ently answer my Designe, which is to vindicate the Non-Conformists from the Aspersions lately cast upon them; as if they were Defamers of Reason, dis∣clayming it from all Concern in Religi∣on, and deserving to be charged with the Reproach which Julian slanderously fa∣stned upon the Primitive Christians, that they had no Ground for their Faith, but that their Wisdom was only to Believe; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The Method I shall here confine my self to, shall be; First, To justifie the Ne∣cessity of some Supernatural Revelation, in order to the Conducting us in Religi∣on. Secondly, To evidence the Expe∣diency that this Revelation should be some where Consigned to Writing. Thirdly, To make appear that nothing can pretend to this Claym of being a Re∣velation from God to Mankind, but the Bible. Fourthly, I shall endeavour posi∣tively to demonstrate, that the Scrip∣ture is indeed this Supernatural Law; and that as well by those Authentick Marks and Signatures, which it hath Sub∣jectively impressed on it; as by those

Objective Evidences, which in way of External Testimony God hath given to it.

As to the First, There are many things offer themselves in proof of it. (1st.) All Men being convinced of the Existence of God, are hereupon necessarily, and by short Deductions led to a Belief, that there ought to be such a thing as Religion in the World. There hath been no Nation so Savage, nor People so Barbarous, who have not acknowledged some kind of Ex∣ternal Performances necessary for the Ex∣pressing of the inward Sentiments of De∣votion and Honour which they bear to a Deity. I know Epicurus by denying God either to have made the World, or to Govern it, doth in effect both over∣throw his Being, and undermine that A∣doration which he alledgeth, must be paid him, because of the Transcendent Ex∣cellency of his Nature. For Omnipo∣tence, Justice, and Goodness, are be∣stowed upon him in vain, if he neither made the World, nor regard it being made: Nor will it be easie to persuade men to worship God; if we neither be beholding to Him for our Being, nor un∣der his Care; and if he no more respect

our Adorations, than if we did reproach and blaspheme Him. Yet this I say, that never any acknowledged a God, but they withal confessed that he ought to be Wor∣shipped. Now forasmuch as without be∣ing Instructed concerning the Nature of God, the Certainty of Rewards, and Punishments, &c. this can never be Re∣gularly nor Rationally, if at all, perform∣ed; and seeing Natural Light at least as Subjective at present in us, hath in many thousand Instances, appeared Insufficient to inform us of these things: We may from hence reasonably conclude the Ne∣cessity of a Supernatural Revelation. (2ly.) As all Mankind are Imbued with a persuasion both that God is, and that he ought to be Worshipped; so they are al∣so convinced, that all the Religion of Men at present towards God, is the Religion of Sinners. In all the Addresses of the Sons of Men to God, they constantly Ap∣ply to Him under a sense of Defilement and Guilt. In all their Transactions from time to time with a Deity, they have been studying how to purge and cleanse themselves, and atone and appease Him. Now Sinners can perform nothing duly in Religion towards God, without a know∣ledg

of the Subordination we were created in at first to Him; his Right and Autho∣rity to prescribe Laws to us; the Capaci∣ty we were in, both of knowing and keep∣ing them; the Way and Means by which Sin entered; that God will not Desert the Work of his Hands to that Ruine which it hath Incurred by it's own Folly; but that he is yet Appeasable towards us, and will accept a Worship and Service at our hands; with the Way, Means, and Terms, that he will receive us again into Favour, and rescue us from the Defile∣ment we labour under. Without some Information in every one of these, there is no solid Foundation for Sinners to ap∣ply in way of Religion to God at all; and should they attempt it, they will do nothing but prevaricate. Seeing then the Experience of some Thousands of Years, hath evidenced the Ineffectualness of Na∣tural Light to instruct the World in any one of these things: We may from hence also infer the Necessity of a Supernatural Revelation. (3ly.) All Mankind hath universally consented in this, that besides the Light of Reason, there ought to be some Supernatural Revelation from God to Man for his Conduct and Guidance in

Religion. The necessity of Commerce in way of Revelation betwixt God and Man, had so universally and deeply pos∣sessed the Ethnick World, that they thought every Invention that was Excel∣lent, whether in Sciences or Arts, to have derived it's Original immediately from Heaven. Of this Principle did the An∣cient Politicians and Legislators serve their own Ends, and particular Designs; and therefore to make the people the more plyable to their Institutions, they pretended Converse with some Deity or other, by whom they were prompted to such and such things. The necessity of a Divine Interposure, in determining the Rites and Mysteries of Religion, gave rise to all the Heathen Oracles. Upon this Principle was the Credit of Dreams and Divinations erected. The Thing of it self being one of the first Dictates of the Reason of Man, but perverted in the Ap∣plication, laid the Heathen World open to be imposed upon by Enthusiasts, Astro∣logers, Sooth-sayers, Diviners, &c. being convinced of the absolute Need of a Pro∣phetick Light, they conceived it as much Diffused as the Natural; and that as eve∣ry thing did in some design or other, par∣ticipate

of the Goodness of God, they thought that it did so of his Prescience. Hence not a Stick in the Wood, Bird in the Air, Line in the Hand, Gut in the Sacrifice, but was judged Prophetical. Upon this account Celsus expressing the Judg∣ment of the Heathen in general tell us, That 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Brute Beasts were not only wiser than Mankind, but more dear to God: and the reason was, because they conceived that God con∣veyed the knowledge of Futurities to Man through them. Not only the Soul was judged to come into the Body preg∣nant with a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a prophetical pow∣er; only that it is muffled by it's Commix∣ture and Confusion with this Earthly Lump; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Plutarch expresseth it. But the very Earth was thought Big with a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Prophetick Efflux and most Divine Spirit, by which the Pythia that stood over it was held to be inspired. I know that in all these

things, as also in their Opinion of the In∣spiration of their Poets, and such others as were reputed the first Instituters of their Mysteries, they were grosly mistaken; yet the Principle which they only foolish∣ly mis-applied, was Genuine, Natural, and True; namely, that all Religion was to be regulated by some Divine Discove∣ry. See to this purpose Plato de Legibus, and in his Alcibiades, together with what is said by Camero de verbo Dei, and Sir Charles Wolseley in his Reasonableness of Scripture Belief, from pag. 123. to 128. I have also said somewhat else∣where about it. The Necessity of a Supernatu∣ral Revelation, in order to the Guiding and Con∣ducting men in Religious Concernments, being thus briefly Declared and Establish∣ed, I shall in the next place endeavour to make appear that it is expedient, that this Revelation should be somewhere or other consigned to Writing: Nor is this the safest way only of conveying Do∣ctrines down from one Age to another, but in some Cases, the only way that can be possibly imagined of doing it with

Security. I readily acknowledge, that the Articles and Precepts of Religion, may in some Cases and Circumstances be safely preserved, and securely conveyed down from Age to Age by Oral Traditi∣on, namely, when the Things themselves to be preserved and reported, are Few; the Number of the Persons to be instructed in them Small; the Age of those to whom the Successive Communication is given, lengthened out for several Hundred years; and Mankind in the mean while, neither Slothful nor greatly Corrupted. And accordingly God, who doth all things by excellent Counsel, and in his most extraordinary Works, useth Na∣tural Agents, as far as their Capacities will serve, did for some time take this Method, not thinking it fit in the first Ages of the World, to commit the Re∣velations He vouchsafed it to Writing. But taking the Case as it now is, namely, that Mankind is vastly multiplied; that our Lives are much shortned and contract∣ed to what at first they were; that the Doctrines, Institutions, and Duties which we are to be instructed in, are numerous and many; and that Carelessness and De∣bauchery have Arrested the World. And

I affirm, that some other Means besides Oral Tradition, are necessary for the safe Conveyance of Revelation from one Age to another. For (1.) The failure of Oral Tradition in the preserving either Things Humane or Divine, argues that God ha∣ving Mercifully condescended to give a Revelation of His Will to Man, should pitch upon some more certain Method of conveying it to such as live in Places and Times remote from the first Delivery of it, than Tradition is. How many fa∣mous Institutes of Ethnick Legislators, and Theories of Ancient Philosophers are lost through not being committed to Writing? I will take it for granted at pre∣sent that the World had a Beginning; that Men were not self-Originated, and that they were not Created Impure; but that Sin by some accident or other, made it's Entrance afterwards into the World: I will likewise take it for granted, that the First common Parents of Mankind who∣ever they were, made their immediate Posterity acquainted with those important Things: And yet doth not Experience tell us how insufficient Oral Tradition hath been, to preserve them among the Gentile Nations? The 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

out of which those Philosophers, who ap∣proach nearest the Truth, alledge things to have been at first made, are plainly borrowed from the Mosaical Records. The Entrance of Sin by the means of cer∣tain 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, insolent Daemons, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Serpent, which some of them suggest, is evidently stollen from the Sa∣cred Writings; or at least learned by Converse with the Jewish Nation, to which the Oracles of God were commit∣ted. But should we grant that all these and whatever else we meet with in the Heathen Writers of this kind, were pre∣served by Tradition among themselves. Yet their Accounts about these great Im∣portant Matters are so scanty, inconsist∣ent and ridiculous, that we cannot be so Foolish as to believe them to be the just and full Reports which were Communi∣cated by our First Parents to their Imme∣diate Off-spring. I shall only add that the Tradition of the One True God though most easie to have been preserved, being not only short and plain, but having Foundation and Evidence in the Light of Nature, was nevertheless soon Corrupt∣ed and Defaced by the Worlds lapsing in∣to Polytheism. (2.) In order to Tradi∣tions being a sufficient means of convey∣ing

down Revelation to Successive Ages; we must suppose both a Care from time to time in all to learn it, and that perfectly, an equal Capacity in all to Understand and Remember it, a regard in every one to instruct others without the least Varia∣tion in what themselves had learned; for if either through Sloth, difference of Abi∣lities, Entanglements by the World, or Corruption of Manners, there should be a Failure in any of these, it is easie to be apprehended what would soon become of Revealed Doctrines, were there nothing else to secure their Communication from one Generation to another, besides Tra∣dition. Now he that will believe all Men to be of equal Capacity, equal Fidelity, equal Diligence, &c. not only contradicts the daily Experience which we have of Men in the World, but withal affirms that to be impossible, namely, that there should be any Errour in Doctrines of Faith, or Mistakes about Institutions of Worship, &c. which yet we find Actual∣ly to be. (3.) That cannot be a suffici∣ent and certain Medium of conveying Re∣velation to Mankind, by which the grossest and most palpable Falshoods, under pre∣tence of Being parts of Divine Revela∣tion, have been obtruded upon the World.

In proof of this I need only instance the Oral Law of the Jews, and the un∣written Tradition of the Papists, among which I may say with modesty, there are some Doctrines to be met with, so far from having been at any time revea∣led by God, that 'tis a wonder being so Tri∣fling, Absurd and repugnant to Prin∣ciples of right Reason, they should have ever have been invented by men. (4) No man can be obliged to believe what arriv's with him in way of Tradition, till he have some assurance that all man∣kind are agreed and of the same persua∣sion with his instructers, unless he should take his teachers to be Infallible. Now as the first of these is morally impossible, at least for most persons in the World, who neither have Time, Ability nor op∣portunity of resolving themselves by converse with every Individual; so the last is groundless and absurd, and indeed constitutes all men Infallible, neither ca∣pable of being imposed upon themselves nor imposing upon others. What I have said against the conveying down Reve∣lation with security by Oral Tradition, makes equally against its conveyance in writing by men not divinely Inspired.

As words are the representation of Con∣ceptions, so writing is the Register of Words; and if men may deceive in their vocal Reports, they may do the like in the consignment of their Thoughts and Words to Script. Besides we shall be first at a loss to know, whether those that did not write of matters of Religi∣on, who were ever the major number, were at an agreement with those that wrote. Secondly: is is not only difficult but impossible for persons of mean Parts, secular Vocations, &c. to consult the Writings of all those that have written of matters of Religion; and yet this is necessary ere we can make a judgment in this matter. Thirdly, we shall find our selves endlesly entangled, when we find them contradicting one another. And Fourthly, to add no more, we shall be still at a loss both whether in that they wrote they were not imposed upon by those of whom they received it, and also whether they lived and dyed in the belief of all that which may be in their younger, and unexperienced Years they threw into Paper, or whether after∣wards in some thing or other they did not alter their Opinions. As a superna∣tural

Revelation than is necessary in or∣der to the regulation of mankind in Religi∣ous Concernments, so it is also needful that it should be somewhere or other con∣signed to writing, and that by persons immediately inspir'd. There is no o∣ther medium that we can imagine but it would be obnoxious to fallibility. Nor is there any way besides a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Di∣vine Inspiration of such Records, by which we can rationally justify our re∣ception of them, or attain to an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 se∣curity in the things that are so Recor∣ded. I have discoursed the two forego∣ing particulars in way of surplusage, the Theme I am upon not requiring them. For if we can but demonstrate the mat∣ter of Fact, viz. that God hath given the World a Supernatural Revelation of his Will, and that it is consigned to wri∣ting in the Book we call the Bible, our Obligation to receive that Book is indispensable, and our Concern in it is infinitely Momentous; though we should grant that a supernatural Reve∣lation from God to Man in order to his conduct in matters of Religion was not needful, and much more that it was not necessary to commit it to Wri∣ting.

Yet pursuing the Threed I have be∣gun; and taking it for proved both that a Supernatural Revelation is necessary, and that it ought to be Registred some where or other in writing. I advance to the Third particular, namely, that no writ∣ten Records besides the Bible can lay claim to the priviledg of being 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of Divine Inspiration or that they were written by persons 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 acted and moved by the Holy Ghost. There is no Book can rival the Scripture in this pretence. First the writings of the Ethnick Legislators, Poets and Philoso∣phers, are not fit to put in a Demurrer to the Bible in this matter. Many of the Records of the Institutions and Laws of the Ethnick Religion are lost beyond all possibility of Reprive; and those which remain, whether relating to their Mythick, Politick, or Natural Theology, contain matters so extravagant and absurd, and are stuff't with Dogm's so repugnant both to natural Light and one another, that he must have forfeited his Reason, who can suppose them to have proceeded from God. The whole Heathen Religi∣on, was nothing but an abuse of that na∣tural Inclination which all men have to

worship a God; whom because they neither knew, nor how he would be ser∣ved, they guessed at both in the dark, Mankind being furnished with Faculties instructing them both in the Existence of God, and that he ought to be Wor∣shipped, fell to exercising their rational Powers, not only in enquiries after the Nature of the Supreme Being, but in what manner he would be served. And whereas had they attended to Reason, they might by short ratiocinations have learned a great deal as to both, in the Negative, namely what He is not, and what service will not please Him; and had they improved the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the Seeds of God which were in them they might have arrived at something not in∣considerable as to the affirmative, in re∣ference to the First. Yet partly through a stretching their Line beyond its Mea∣sure; partly through Supiness and Care∣lesness in their Deductions, they became vain in their imaginations, and prevarica∣ted in the whole they undertook. And whereas they might have been assisted in their Theologick Speculations by the Works of God, and ancient Traditions which were the objective helps left them,

they did as to both shamefully corrupt themselves. For instead of being con∣ducted to the acknowledgment of God by his Works, these they Deified serving the Creature which should have guided them to the Creatour. And hence sprung Sabaism and all the Oriental Idolatry. And for ancient Traditions, these they wofully disguised and adulterated by In∣numerable Fables, and thence arose their Mythick Theology. But still finding themselves at a loss, and being also posses∣sed with a persuasion that a Revelation from God, was necessary to instruct them in Religious Concernments, they became exposed to a twofold further inconveni∣ence. First, Cunning Men by preten∣ding either to Inspiration or converse with some Deity, obtruded upon them what they pleased. And here statesmen did in a special manner play their parts; whence it came to pass that much of the Heathen Religion was nothing but Strata∣gems of Rulers, and litle Arts of govern∣ment. Secondly, Sathan took an occasi∣on hence of abusing mankind by Oracles either immediately uttered, or by men whom he acted, and who were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the Divels Organs, uttering what he

inspired them with. Nor do I mean this only with reference to their Oracular Priests and Pythian Virgins; but I in∣clude both their▪ Poets and Philosophers. The Poets were the first and most Anci∣ent Authors of the Ethnick Divinity, and were generally judged Inspired. Plato expresly tells us that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; God speaketh to us by them in his Dialogue stiled Jon. It is likely enough that some of them were inspired, but by whom, their Writings abun∣dantly discover. Nor were their Philosophers whom Plato also affirmed to have been 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, acted by any better Spirit: Many of them of one Sect as well as another being rank Magici∣ans. In brief, the multiplicity of their Gods, their stuffing their Worship with Adulteries, and impure Mixtures, their appeasing their Deities by Humane Vi∣ctims; not to mention a Thousand things else, that might be mustred against the Religion of the Gentiles, are so many Demonstrations, that it could not be Divine. Who can suppose that to be Sacred, which is impure, or conceive that which Over-throws Humanity,

should have proceeded from God? There is little Hope of finding any thing there for our Conduct in Religion, where we are so much at a Loss to find the Mea∣sures of Moral Vertue. The Writings of the Heathen whether Poets or Philosophers being then Void of all just pretence of Admission for Supernatural, and Divine Records, Reason will with the like De∣monstrative evidence, convince us, that this Claim is unduly also ascribed to the Alcoran. It is true, Mahomet pretended to have received it by Inspiration: Most think that he Counterfeited in his pre∣tence; and it is certain, that as to recei∣ving it by Inspiration from God he did so, but that there was not an immediate Inter∣posure of the Devil in the Case; so that he was deceived himself, ere he went about to deceive others, I am not so well assur∣ed. The Epileptical Distemper to which he was subject, hath in others been at∣tended with Diabolical Insinuation. The Age in which he lived, was Enthusiastically inclined: And the Grosseness of the Ara∣bian Wits, together with the Subservien∣cy of Ethnick Idolatry, which remained up and down among them, might encou∣rage Satan to make an Attempt that way

among that people. But whether it was indeed so, or whether the whole be singly to be attributed to himself and one or two Impostors more that assisted him, is not material, and makes not to the business it self. Mahometism began not, till the sixth Century; about which time, and for a considerable season before, the whole East was sorely Infected by Heresies, and rent by Schisms, which together with the im∣pure Lives of the Professors of the Gospel, both there and in the West, might justly provoke God to permit this Deceiver to accost the World. Arabia had been ever Fertile of Dotages and Dreams; for be∣sides other Hereticks, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and the Collyridians sprung from thence; so that we may the less wonder, that it gave Birth to the Distractions of Mahomet. Obtruding a New Religion upon the World, and such an one, as neither Reason nor any former Revelation of God be∣friended, it concern'd him to have justi∣fied his Mission by some Miracle or other, as to what he went about. But these himself plainly disclaims, and though some of his Followers ascribe such to him, yet there is so little brought in Proof of them, and withal they are so silly and ridiculous in

themselves, that they serve for nothing, but to disparage both the Person and Cause in whose behalf they are brought. I know that all Persons who have spoken immediately from God, have not had the Attestation of Miracles; nor was it al∣ways needful, especially when they only called Men to Obedience to that which had been sufficiently so attested before. In such a Case, it became the Wisdom of God to be sparing of Miracles; and indeed he thereby better provided for the Credit of such Doctrines as were either really, or only in appearance New; and also more served the Interest of Mankind, than if he should have wrought Wonders in At∣testation of every ordinary Messenger and familiar Truth: And this may be a reason why none of all the Pen-men of the Scrip∣ture are reported to have wrought Mira∣cles, save Moses the Giver of the Law, and the Apostles the Promulgers of the Gos∣pel. But though every Herald of Hea∣ven had not the Attestation of Miracles, yet no one came inspired by God, who had not some Testimony or other born to him, to distinguish him from an Impostor. Either the Doctrines they delivered were of that Sublimeness, that no Finite Un∣derstanding

could have invented them, and yet when discovered, were so Cor∣respondent to our Rational desires, and so perfective of our Natural Light, that being duly weighed, the Reason of Man acquiesceth in them, and sayes, this is what I look't for but could not find: Or else they made known some present Matter which lay out of the reach of all Humane Knowledge, such as the Secrets of the Heart; or declared some Fact done either at a distance, or with that Secrecy that no Man could know it: Or else they foretold some future Contingent soon after to come to pass, which accordingly fell out in every Circumstance. Nor is it unlike∣ly, but that most, if not all the Old Testament Pro∣phets had their Missions con∣firm'd by the Prediction of some thing future, which no Humane Prudence could fore-see. Or else they were born Witness to by the Prevalen∣cy and immediate Success of their Prayers in the preventing some impendent Judg∣ment, or in the procuring some needful Mercy; for thereby was declared either their Fore-sight of what God was ready to do, or the Interest, Favour, and Power

they had with him. Nor is it without probability, that most of the Prophets under the Mosaick Dispensation, justified their Mission by some such thing. But as for Mahomet, though he not only pretended to speak immediately from God, but with∣al introduced a Doctrine really New; yet he came Authorized by no Miracle, Sign, or Badge, by which he might be distin∣guished from an Impostor. Yea, where∣as he owns that both Moses and Christ were sent from God, it is an Infallible Argu∣ment that He was not; their Doctrine and his being altogether inconsistent. It hath been generally acknowledged, not only by Jews and Christians, but by Hea∣thens, and that agreeably to the Light of Reason, that Prophetick Illapses never befel Impure and Unclean Souls; and that God never made an Unhallowed Person his Oracle; at least, that never any such were imployed for the Divine Amanuenses. Now if we examine the Alcoran by this prophetick Test, we find the Author of it to have been a Person Lustful and Tyran∣nical, made up of nothing but Bloud and Dirt, grosly Sensual, and prodigiously Cruel; which plainly demonstrates how

unfit he was to lay Claim to the prophe∣tick Priviledge and Dignity. If we con∣sult the Doctrine of the Alcoran, we have all the Evidence that the Reason of Man can desire, that it neither did, nor could proceed from God. It is true, there are some things in it stollen from the Scrip∣ture, but even those are so perversely re∣lated, and so wretchedly Corrupted with Fables, that they lose the very similitude of Truth through the villanous Manage∣ment of them. Persons are so Mis-nam∣ed, Times are so Mistaken, the whole so Interlarded with Contradictions, and dis∣guised with Absurdities, that we must needs say, the Contriver had a bad Me∣mory and a worse Understanding. In a word, the whole Alcoran is nothing but a Cento of Heathenism, Judaism, and Chri∣stianity, all miserably Corrupted, and as wildly blended together. The Doctrines of it are for the most part, either impossible, Blasphemous, or Absurd. The Rewards promised to the Embracers of it, are impure and foolish. The whole was at first Inven∣ted out of Pride and Ambition; pro∣pagated by Violence and Rapine; and is still maintained in the way's that it was Esta∣blished. Profound Ignorance, sensual

baits, and force of Arms gave it its first promotion and do still maintain its credit in the World. The meanest Reason if duly exercised is able to disprove the Di∣vinity of the Alcoran.

Some Revelation from God in order to our guidance in Religion being neces∣sary, and it being also needful that this Revelation should somewhere or other be consigned to writing; and no other writing that we either know or ever heard of be∣ing sit to enter the list and stand compe∣titor with the Bible in this matter, we have hereby lay'd a considerable Foun∣dation in Reason, for the evincing the Divinity of the Scripture. However in the Fourth place we shall further consi∣der by what positive Media the Divine Authority of the Scripture may be rati∣onally Demonstrated. And First, we shall consider it with respect to those Sub∣jective Characters, which as so many Authentick marks, and infallible Sig∣natures of its Inspiration from God, are impressed upon it. And these are so ma∣ny Mediums of artificial Arguments to Reason, by which we may Scientifically demonstrate its Divinity. 'Tis but rea∣sonable to suppose that every Work of

God should be of that frame and com∣plexion as to reveal its Author. We find this in the Works of Creation, where there needs no other evidence to assure us who made them, but what them∣selves are fraught with. God hath left those impressions of his Infinite Power, Immense Wisdom, and exuberant Goodness upon them, that we need not the Authority of any Man or Church to convince us whose they are, but they carry a demonstrative assurance of their Au∣thor in themselves. The like evidence may be justly expected to attend the Word of God, as we find to accompany his Works. And indeed Gods End in Revelation being more Noble than his End in Creation, and the World being more liable to be imposed on in that mat∣ter, than in this; 'Tis but Rational to believe that He should leave at least as conspicuous, and glorious impressions, and characters of himself upon his Word, as upon the Works of his Hands. And if men in the writing of Books, do not onely leave on them such an impression of Reason, that we may know them to be the product of rational Creatures; but withal according to their several degrees

of accomplishments either as to eminency of knowledg, heavenliness of mind, elegancy of stile, &c. do imprint on them those footsteps of their several qua∣lifications, that we can for the most part by the very frame of the writing disco∣ver its individual Authour: It may be justly expected that what proceeds im∣mediately by inspiration from God, should carry something in it correspon∣dent to the Wisdom, Holiness, Power, Omniscience, and Goodness of Him from whom it Flows. And yet let me premise, That as we do not build our as∣surance of the Worlds being the Manu∣facture of God upon every petty Phaeno∣menon, which like the image of Foam that Apelles struck upon his Table by a hasty cast of his pencil, some, may be, look upon onely as a disport of matter in the fortui∣tous encounters of one particle with an o∣ther; but we raise our persuasion on the curious Fabrick of the nobler pieces, and the Harmonious Structure of the Uni∣versal Machine. In like manner we are not so much to seek for the evidences of the Divinity of the Bible in every Verse and Chapter, as in the complex of the whole, and in the principal Parts,

Branches and Sections of it. The in∣trinsick Evidences of the Divine Reve∣lation of the Scripture may be reduced to several Heads. The First Topick re∣gards the matter of it. And here the plain and convincing enlightning of us about natural Truths, of which we are at best doubtful is one internal Evi∣dence of the Divinity of the Bible. The bringing into Light such things as we could never have thought of, which yet being discovered, have that admira∣ble Connexion with all true Reason that we are Ravished with the Glory of Truth that shineth in them, is a Second. The purity and fulness of Scripture-Pre∣cepts, commanding every Virtue, for∣biding every Vice, and enjoyning nothing either superfluous or burdensome, is a Third. The greatness and spirituality of the Scripture-promises, where we have the nature of Happiness so describ'd and stated, the directions for the attainment of it so full and clear, the grounds of its cer∣tainty so many and incontestable, and the whole so fram'd as to be both a powerful inducement to an alacrous and uniform Obedience, and a powerful Antidote a∣gainst all Temptations to sin and sensu∣ality

make a Fourth. The quality of Scrip∣ture Prophesies, and the Events still answering the prediction, is another un∣deniable Evidence of the Divinity of the Bible. The Nature and exactness of Scripture History relating things of the greatest Weight & with the greatest Truth, is another Evidence arising from the sub∣ject matter of the Scripture. It alone informs us of many matters of Fact, which no other Writings either have or could; and as the knowledg of such things was indispensably necessary, so being examined as they are recorded in the Bible, we find the account of them rational and satisfacto∣ry. What other Nations have onely faint glimpses of in fabulous Stories, of those the Scripture gives us exact and authentick Records. Not to speak of the Date of the Bible it self! what Book can vie with it as to antiquity of con∣tents? As all Ethnick Histories are lat∣ter than some parts of the Scripture, so most of them are traductions from thence, and are but parts of the Mosaick Story corrupted and debased with Egyptian being Grecian Fables. Where have we such an exact and full display of the Ori∣gine and several periods of the World,

and the Original of Nations, as the two first and tenth Chapt. of Genesis do afford us. Yea, in the Narration of such things whereof we have also some register in Humane Records, it were not difficult to demonstrate that there are peculiar Characters in the History of the Scrip∣ture, differencing it from all writings of meer Humane Original, and manifest∣ing it to be of Divine extract.

The Second Head of Arguments, by which evidence is given to the Divine O∣riginal of the Scripture from the Characters impressed on it, respect the Form of it, or the manner in which things are deliver∣ed and treated. And here the Majestick Authority that it dictates to mankind in, is hugely remarkable. In no other wri∣ting whatsoever is there that Soveraign∣ty of Commanding usurped, that the Scripture assumes. It alone treats with us in a way of Supremacy, Majesty, and Authority, becoming Him in whose Name it pretends to speak. What∣ever else hath laid claym to the be∣ing a Revelation from God to Man∣kind, doth by its sneaking, creeping, flattering way of address, evidently

betray the meanness of its Original. 2dly. The Stile of the Scripture doth plainly breath of God. With what Bre∣vity without Darkness; with what Sim∣plicity without Corruption; with what Gravity without Affectation; with what Eloquence without Meretricious Orna∣ments; with what Plainness without Flatness or Sordidness; with what Con∣descensions to our Capacities, without Unsuitableness to the Subject Matter, is the Scripture written? When the Holy In∣spirer of the Sacred Pen-men stoops most to our Capacities, he even then retains a Prerogative in his Stile, above what is to be met with in meerly Humane Wri∣tings. There is that Succinctness, Pre∣spicuity, Plenitude and Majesty in the Stile of Scripture-Laws; that Sweetness and Spirituality in Promises; that Auste∣rity in Comminations; that wonderful 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, force and Emotion in Expostulations; that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 meet Accom∣modation of Words unto things through the whole Bible, that no Humane Writing can equal. If there be at any time Ob∣scurity in the Scripture-Stile, it is either from the Sublimity of the Matter declared, which no Words though never so easie

in themselves, can help us to adequate Notions of: Or it is from some Refe∣rence to ancient Customs and Stories, which made the Expressions easie to the Age and Persons first concerned in them, though they may be Dark to us, through our Unacquaintedness with those things, that were both the occasion of them, and the Key to them: Or else it is because they regard Futurities, which it was nei∣ther for the Safety of the Church in Gene∣ral, nor the Interest of Primitive Belie∣vers to have had plainly foretold; and as the fulfilling of them will give Convincing Light about them; so I do no ways que∣stion, but that after-Ages will admire what we do not Understand: Or God in∣tending the Scripture for Persons of one sort of accomplishment as well as another, we may very well suppose that it became his Infinite Wisdome so to frame and a∣dapt the stile of it, that there might be some things in it to find exercise for the most elevated Capacities and specula∣tive Wits, especially there being not only enough suited to Weaker enquirers, but all that is absolutely necessary to be known being plainly revealed, and no∣thing left difficult to be understood but

what is not necessary to be understood at all. The pretence of want of Elo∣quence in the stile of the Scripture is a groundless, as well as a false calumny. And it ariseth first from a mis∣take of the Nature of True Elo∣quence, as supposing it to consist in a flourish of painted Words, or a smooth structure of periods, &c. which chiefly influence the affections, and leave not those lasting impressions that calm Rea∣son doth. Such Arguments might possibly become the Ancient Sophists and Dema∣gogues whose end was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Ostentation and amazement; but do not at all become the Holiness and Majesty of God, in whose Name the Bible speak∣eth to Us. Nor doth a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a grandiloquency and bewitching smoothness agree to the end and scope of the Scrip∣ture, which would have the great effects it aims at, produced by the things where∣of it treats, and not by flourishes of Wit, and flowers of language. For, as Origen observes, if the Scripture had used that E∣legancy of speech which is admired among the Greeks, one might have suspected that it was not truth it self that prevailed with men,

but that they were deceived by the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The splendour and elegancy of words. Upon this account Paul, though he came behind no man in manliness of expression, yet he declined all 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 artificial affect∣ed Wisdom of words, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 en∣ticing Words of mans Wisdom 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, lest the cross of Christ should be made of none effect. Or 2ly. It pro∣ceeds from want of consideration that the Easterne Eloquence might differ vast¦ly from the Western. If that which even among our selves is accounted Eloquence in one Age, ceaseth to be held so in another, why might not the Scripture stile have admi∣rably suited the Genius of those times it was first calculated for, though it do not accord to our western Rules of Oratory? And who knows but that our Europaean Stile may be as little relished by the Asi∣aticks, as theirs is by us. In a word if E∣loquence and propriety of Spech ought to be judged of by its commensurate∣ness to its End, namely its accomoda∣tion to the matter that is handled, and condescension to the capacities of them

to whom it is directed; and if a regard in a determining concerning a stile, ought also to be had to the quality of the Speaker, I am sure in none of these doth the Scripture faile; but on the contrary there is that of every one of them shi∣ning in the Language of the Scripture, that plainly argueth it to be of more than Humane Original.

A third, Medium considerable in the Form of the Scripture as a further im∣planted evidence of its Divinity, is the ad∣mirable Harmony and agreement betwixt one part of it and another. Though given out at times, ages, and places distant from one another, and by persons of different educations, accomplishments, and inte∣rests, yet there is an excellent consonancy of one part with another, and of every part with the whole; which plainly shows that they all spake by one Spirit, and though they treated of different things that they were all the Amanuenses of Him that is uniform to Himself and the same for ever. The seeming diffe∣rences in the Scripture are so few in number, so inconsiderable in the matter of them, and withal so easily salved, that they strengthen the evidence by shewing

that the Harmony of the Scripture is without Craft and Conspiracy in the Pen-men of it.

The fourth Common place of Argu∣ments, drawn from Implanted Chara∣cters for the Divinity of the Scripture, ariseth from a Consideration of the End, Aim, and Scope of the Bible. The Scripture hath plainly an End, wherein no other Writing hath any share, further then as it is taken from it, or fram'd in Conformity to it; and yet the very best of such Writings being compared with the Scripture, do vi∣sibly fall short in the Way and Manner of Representing and Enflaming to the pursuit, and conducing to the Attain∣ment of that End. The Supreme End of the Bible is the Glory of God by Jesus Christ. It is true, the Works of Creation and Providence do manifest the Glory of the Divine Attributes con∣sidered Absolutely, and in themselves; yet so as that they neither extensively nor intensively display the Essential Perfections of God as the Scripture doth: But as to the Manifesting the Glory of God in and through Jesus Christ, they are wholly silent. This

Priviledge is the Peculiar of the Word alone, and reserved to it as that Au∣thentick Character by which he Honour∣eth it above all his Name. The Subor∣dinate End of the Scripture is the resto∣ring of falne Man; with a discovery of the Way, Means, and Terms of his Recovery. And as the Scripture alone doth this, so it doth it eminently, and to all rational Satisfaction. It were easie to branch this into many particular Me∣diums, by displaying how it alone instructs us in the Remove of the many insuperable Obstacles; how it resolves us in the great Entanglements and Per∣plexities that our Reasons are exercised with; how it brings into Light Pardon∣ing Grace, without giving the least En∣couragement to the Practice of Sin; how it provides for our being renewed to the Image of God, as well as our being reconciled to Him; and shews us the Way and Means of being delivered from Lust and Corruption, as well as Wrath and Guilt. In a word, that it is Defective in informing us of nothing that is necessary for us to know, either with reference to our Duty or Happiness; but that it fully instructs us in every

thing that our Natures look after, or are capable of. And all this it so perform∣eth, that the several Lines of it Center in the glory of God by Jesus Christ, through whom we have not only Happiness con∣ferred upon us, but Grace to fit us for it. There are other Intrinsecal Evi∣dences insisted on for the Proof of the Divinity of the Scripture; which as I shall not endeavour to enervate, so for Reasons that it is not needful to de∣clare, I shall wave the producing of them. Nor is it Number so much as Weight of Arguments that is to be trusted to in any Case, especially where the Theme is important, and the Con∣troversie to be decided only by Demon∣stration. Now as upon the one Hand, I know not one of these 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, I have alledged, by which I am not able to de∣monstrate the Divine Inspiration both of the Bible in general, and of most of the particular Books in it; so if there be any Books received into the Canon, where any of these are wanting; they are such as are Narratives of things done among Men, and most of those are born Witness to in such other Books, as have all the fore-going Characters;

and if there be any of them that are not Testified to, yet we have all desirable Evidence that they were Written by Persons Divinely inspired; and though all the preceeding Signatures do not oc∣cur in them, yet some one, or more, by which they manifest themselves to be of God, do; and in none of them is there any thing inconsistent with the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, we have produced. Upon the other hand, it is easie by the preceeding Marks to discharge from all Interest in Divine Inspiration a vast Number of Books that pretend to a Share in it. By such I mean not only the Sibylline writ∣ings, the Prophecy of Enoch; the E∣pistle of Christ to Abgarus; the Gospels of Nicodemus, James, and Andrew; the Canons of the Apostles; the Reve∣lation of Paul, his Epistles to Seneca, and the Laodiceans; the Missals of Mathew, Mark, Peter, &c. but all those Books which are Commonly stiled, Apo∣cryphal.

§. 7. Besides the Characters impres∣sed on the Scripture, by which the Di∣vine Inspiration of it is plainly eviden∣ced: There are many External Motives

by which the same might be further de∣monstrated. And here may be pleaded the quality of the pen-men; their can∣dor, sincerity, inability of being the im∣mediate Authors of such a contrivance, that they had no base nor secular Ends, that they are impartial in laying open their failings, and that they always father the whole upon God. (2) The antiquity of Scripture Records at least some part of them, to which all the rest are con∣sonant and upon which they superstruct. (3) The preservation of the Bible through so many Ages, when so many of Wit, Power, and interest in the World had set themselves against it. (4) Its spread, suc∣cess, and entertainment in the World, with the manner of its propagation, with∣out force of Arms, or aft of Eloquence. (5) The effects it hath wrought in great, sudden, & lasting changes that it hath pro∣duced, in men principled in their Judg∣ments, prepossess'd with Educations and prejudiced by Lust against it. (6) The attestation of Miracles, which are Gods Seal to authorise the person in whose behalf they are wrought, and Doctrines to which they are annexed. For a Miracle is an extraordinary work transcendent to the

powers and capacities of natural Agents. It is either the altering and stopping the Course of Nature, or the produ∣cing some effect above its Laws and pow∣er. A Miracle is an operation of God in Nature either without interposure of a Second Cause, or above its abil••ty. In a word it is the production of something out of nothing, either as to matter, or manner of production. Now such Works are the immediate effects of Almighty Power. It is the Peculiar Title of God to do Won∣ders; and he only can do Wonderful Things. Were there not some things im∣possible to Natural Agents, there were no room for a real Miracle; and were there not other things which we only think to be impossibles in Nature, we were not capable of being deluded by an ap∣pearing one. Effects exceeding the lines of ordinary operations may be pro∣duced by a combination of material A∣gents, and Sathan may wonderfully ape a Miracle by the impressions he is able to make upon matter; but every true Miracle is the product of a Power that is infinite. As God alone can work Mi∣racles so he never exerts His Power in the production of any, but in order to

humane instruction. The Devil loves to be acting his Power, to fill men with Amazement and to make them Wonder, but God reserves his Power to seal some portant Truth, to relieve men in some Urgent straight, or to afright them from some destructive Practice. Miraculous Works are one of the greatest attestati∣ons that God can give either to person or thing, and are usually his Seal to some great Truth. God is a spirit & cannot be seen to give Testimony, yea should he as∣sume a shape and in that declare him∣self, there would be still a great deal of lyableness to exception; and therefore one of the most convincing Evidences that God can give to Person, Doctrines, or Cause, is by the effecting of some such Work as is only possible for an Almighty Power to produce. Hence those ancient Im∣postors that usurp'd the Title of Prophets either among the Jews, Christians or Heathens, pretended to Miracles and Signs, knowing that without that counterfeit Seal their Doctrine would never have been received by the Peo∣ple, and the better to Ape a Mira∣cle the greatest part of pretenders to En∣thusiasm, were in all Ages Magicians.

True Miracles, being the effects of Gods immediate Power; the Notions which we have of his Wisdome and Goodness do not admit us to suppose, that he should lend His Omnipotency to confirm a falshood: For this were the way to induce men into error in a matter of the greatest Moment. And therefore while I believe God to be True and Good; I will never believe that He will lend his power to Impostors to cheat and abuse mankind. Yea were it consistent with Divine Truth and Justice so to do, yet it is repugnant to his Wisdome, in that he should hereby not only weaken but wholly take off all the Evidence that Himself can give to Truth by miraculous Operations. For if God can exert his Power in the confirmation of a Falsity in one Case, what security can we have that He may not do so in another? To say that God doth never work a Mira∣cle for our Tryal, in reference to a false Doctrine, till he hath unquestionably con∣firmed his own Truth before, and that the having an established Rule to exa∣mine after Doctrines by, is enough to preserve us from being imposed upon by Error, though it should come backt with

the attestation of Miraculous Works: I affirm that this plea is not sufficient, and and that there are objections to the con∣trary which it doth not resolve. For First. As primitive Revelation is not ca∣pable of receiving confirmation from its consonancy to any Revelation formerly acknowledged, it being it self the first; so after Revelations that are either really or according to the best judgment that we can make, New, are as little tryable by their congruency to what went be∣fore. And if we allow Miracles to be an Authentick attestation in such cases, I see not how we can admit them to be fallacious in any. Secondly, The ancientest portion of Scripture are the Mosaick Writings; now antecedently to the giving forth of these as the Standard of after Doctrines, Idolatry, Superstition and Error had greatly over-spread the world; I would therefore ask, if God may im∣mediately work Miracles in behalf of following Errors, what assurance we have that he could not do so in reference to such as preceeded? I know no argument that can be brought in proof of the Ne∣gative in the latter Case, but what will equally conclude in favour of the Nega∣tive

in the former: For if we resolve it into the Nature of God, that he could not do so in the last Circumstances; the same Essential Perfections in God which lead us to judg so of him in them, will persuade us to have the like thoughts of him in all Circumstances that we can imagine. Thirdly, It is expresly against the Evidence of Scripture-Testimo∣ny, that God should work a Miracle to confirm either the Mission, or the Error of a false pretender, See Joh. 9.16.29, 30, 31. Christ having restored Sight to one that was born blind, the Phari∣sees do notwithstanding question whether he was an Embassador from God, yea, expresly affirm him to be an Impostor; as for this Fellow we know not whence he is. Now let us observe after what manner that miraculous Work is urged in Justi∣fication that Christ could be no Decei∣ver, p. 16. How can a man that is a Sin∣ner 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 i. e. one that falsly avoucheth himself to be sent of God, do such Miracles, and 30, 31, The man an∣swered and said unto them, why herein is a marvellous thing that ye know not from whence he is, and yet he hath opened mine Eyes, now we know that God heareth not

sinners: i. e. doth not by miraculous Works, bear witness to them that come in their own Name. I know that we are to distinguish between what the Scrip∣ture it self saith, and what is only ••aid in the Scripture. And that the Scripture it self is true though there be many false sayings Historically recited in it; because though the expressions themselves be false, yet it is true that these Untruths which it reports were spoken. But he that looks into the Chapter, will plainly perceive that the Holy Ghost doth not only Register these Sayings, but Adopt them. And that he doth not barely affirm that such Pleas were made, but that the Pleas themselves were true and solid. The Exceptions why Miracles are not in themselves an Incontestable Evidence of the Doctrine they are wrought in Con∣firmation of, and of the Divine Mission of the persons that work them, may easily, I think, be taken off. The 1st. is, That Miracles have been wrought by Hereticks, Pagans, and others, whose Persons were neither Authorized by God, nor their Doctrine true. And here the Wonders reported in History to have been done by Aesculapius, Vespasian, and especially

Apollonius Tyaneus, whom Hierocles durst in point of Miraculous Works compare with Jesus Christ, are alledged. To which I return these Five Things: (1.) We may justly question the matter of Fact as to many of them; nor are the Reporters such, as that we are bound to yield them an Implicite Faith. Piaefrau∣des have found Entertainment not only a∣mong Heathens, but Christians. Nor do I doubt, but that most of the Ethnick and Popish Miracles are meerly Romantick, and that it is enough to discharge our selves from them, by putting the Patrons of them on the proof, that ever any such things were wrought. (2.) Many of these seeming Miracles may be salved by Natural Causes. We use to Baptize the extraordinary Phaenomena of Nature with the Name of Wonders, because of our Ignorance of the Ability of Natural Agents. How many things were look't upon by the Pagan World, as the imme∣diate Effects of a Supernatural power; that we can now give a distinct and Phi∣losophical account of? (3.) Many of them are to be ascribed to the Power and Operation of the Devil, who can 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, make a Lye as well as tell one.

Next to Oracles, Satan hath served his Ends on the World by counterfeit Mira∣cles, and in both, he hath set himself to Ape God: And though we cannot so readily in every one of them detect the Imposture; yet in most of them, we meet with some Circumstance or other, which may in∣duce us to give the Devil the Honour and Reputation of them. (4.) Some of them, and those such as descend to us with the greatest certainty, seem to have been wrought to prepare the World for some strange and new Providence that God was to bring upon the Stage, or to give reputation to some person that God de∣signed for some solemn undertaking, and not in the least to confirm any erro∣neous Doctrine or false Religion; and as to such miraculous Works, I know no∣thing hinders why they may not be ascri∣bed to God. Thus would I resolve the Cures wrought by Vespasian on the blind and lame Men, to have been done for the better introducing and establishing him in the Romane Empire; God have∣ing intended him for the Minister of his Wrath against the Jewish Nation: But that from some Circumstances of the Sto∣ry as it is related by Suetonius, and Taci∣tus,

I am apt to think that the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Enemy not easily discovered; or the Agency of the Devil was in the whole. For I find the infirm Persons alledging their being advised by Serapis, to make their Address to Vespasian for Relief a∣gainst their Maladies: Now it is not like∣ly, that God should employ the Daemon for the Herald of what himself would ac∣complish; or that he should encourage I∣dolatry by Communion with Votaries at the Devil's Temple. (2dly.) The Me∣thod of restoring the blind Man to his Sight by spitting upon his Eyes, seems plainly to have been done in Imitation of Christ; and that Satan was the principal Agent in the whole, intending hereby either to disparage some of the Miracles of our Savi∣our, or to maintain his own Kingdom in the way that He had erected his. (5.) Some of the wonderful Works urged in the proof of what we are contending against▪ might be wrought in Confirma∣tion of the Truth of God; and yet with∣out any respect to the justifying the Mis∣sion

of the Publisher of it. And with re∣ference to such works, I know no danger in entitling God to be the Author of them. An instance to this purpose, we have Mark 9.38. Where the Person casting out De∣vils, was neither Commissioned by Christ, nor did so much as directly own and em∣brace Him; and yet God lent him his Power to accomplish these Effects. And supposing a Truth in the Matters of Fact, as reported of the Romish Missionaries in the Indies, I should think this Key suffici∣ent to unlock them.

The second and great Exception, why Miracles are not always a sufficient Proof of the Doctrine in whose behalf they are wrought, is fetch't from Scripture. And truly if the Texts pressed in this Service, be not found either mistaken or urged be∣yond their true Intendment; we will rea∣dily resign both our selves, and the Cause we have been pleading. Nor shall any Shew or Appearance of Reason in favour of it, weigh with us, there being no Rea∣son so great as to believe what God hath said. The first Argument levied from Scripture for this Warfare, is drawn from what the Magicians did in their Contest with Moses in Egypt; whereof we have

an Account in the 7th. and 8th. Chap∣ters of Exodus. To which I reply (1.) That most, yea all, saving one or two Inter∣preters, deny any thing done by them to have been truly Miracles. (2.) The Way, Manner, and Rites they used in effecting what they attempted, do plainly acquit God from any Agency about their Works, further than the permitting them. For they are said to have done so by their Inchantments, Exod. 7.11. and 8.7. I dare not think that God was at the Magi∣cians Beck; or that he would conciliate Credit to their Hellish Arts by subserving them; or that he would exert his Sacred and Almighty power in Honour of Satans Institutions and Ceremonies. (3.) The Magicians finding themselves out-done by Moses in the matter of turning Dust into Lice; cry out, that the Finger of God was there, Exod. 8.19. which I take to be no less than an Acknowledgment, that whatsoever they had done before, they had done it by Magick: And that it was through the influence and Agency of the Devil, that their Rods had been turned into Serpents, and that Frogs had been brought upon the Land. (4ly.) Though what they did in the two first Instances,

wherein they confronted Moses, seems to bear such a Resemblance to true Mi∣racles, that it was not at first easie to di∣stinguish the one from the other; yet it were easie to demonstrate, that the things which they effected, were not without the compass of the Power of Daemons. And that it might appear, that the Power by which Moses acted, was different from that by which they acted; God therefore wisely ordered it, that his Rod should de∣vour theirs; thereby leaving an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, singular Peculiarity in the Mira∣cles of Moses to witness their Divine Ori∣ginal. The second Argument mustred from Scripture to fight in this cause is brought from Mat. 24.24. 2 Thes. 2.9. Apoc. 13.13. To all which I answer. (1.) By granting that the Expressions are lofty, wherein the Holy Ghost predicts the Signs and wonders which false Christs, and false Prophets were to work; yet I think we are not to conclude from the Ma∣jesty of the Terms in which they are fore∣told, that the Works themselves were real Miracles: But that God would inti∣mate to us, either that they should be such, as would so hugely resemble true Mira∣cles, that it would not be easie to detect

them; or that he would thereby awaken us to examine the Doctrines of Men by their Consonancy to the Scripture which was then given out and established, ra∣ther than Implicitely to resigne our selves to the Conduct of every Wonder-mon∣ger. (2.) The best Key to judge of the quality of the Signs and Wonders there foretold, whether they be true Miracles or not; is to take a View of the extraor∣dinary Works, Recorded to have been done by the pretended Jewish Messiahs, and the Apostatical Roman Church, one or both of whom are referred to in the objected places. And if we will apply our selves to this Method of Tryal, I dare undertake that there is not so much as one Sign or Wonder truly Recorded concern∣ing them, which may not be solved either by a Co-incidence of Natural Causes, or by the hidden Power of Daemons. (3.) They are expresly stiled 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, lying Wonders, and that not so much Respectu finis, because they were wrought in Confirmation of a Falsity; as Respectu Materiae, because they only Ap'd true Miracles, but in truth were not such. Yea, as if that were not enough to acquit God from being the Author of them, they

are expresly ascribed to an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Agency of the Devil. The third, and last Argument brought in Relief of their Opinion, who think that God may exert a Miracle-Working Power in the Confirmation of a Falsity, is taken from Deut. 13.1, 2, 3. To which I answer: (1.) That the place doth more especially relate to the fore-telling of Events, than to the working of Wonders. And there∣fore if God never lent his Omniscience to the Service of an Impostor; we have no reason to think that he should lend his Omnipotency to the Service of one. And if all the Predictions of false Prophets may be salved without Recourse to Divine Inspiration (as indeed they may) I suppose their Wonders may be al∣so salved without Recourse to God's In∣finite Power. (2.) They are the Pro∣phets after the Promulgation and Esta∣blishment of the Law of Moses that are there spoken of; and therefore the Law being given out as the Test of after-Re∣velation, at least during that Oeconomy; God tells his People that they are not to try the Mission of Prophets only by Mi∣racles, but especially by the Agreeable∣ness

of their Doctrine to that of Moses. And this may be a reason, why we do not find, that other Pen-men of Old-Testa∣ment Scripture were honoured with the working of Miracles. I know indeed that some Prophets were intrusted with Miraculous Power; but so far as I remem∣ber, there was not one besides Moses who was made use of in giving forth the Re∣velation of God to the Old-Testament-Church, that had this Priviledg conferred on him.

Having thus made appear, that all Mi∣racles are Effects of a Divine Power, and that wheresoever God exerts his Miracle-Working Power in Confirmation of a∣ny Doctrine, he declares it to be of, and from himself, and to be Unquestionably True. I shall not now insist on the pro∣ving, that the Bible is justified by In∣numerable, Great, and Undeniable Mi∣racles; that being largely, and beyond all possibility of Reply done by other Hands. I shall only say, that even those who suppose that God may sometimes put forth his Wonder-working Power, in Attestation of an Error, do not hereby de∣sign to Rob us of the Evidence of Miracles

for the Divinity of the Script. For as none have gone beyond them in the proof of the Divine Authority of the Bible in ge∣neral, so no one hath improved the Me∣dium of Miracles to better purpose. As they have shewed that the Scripture is at∣tested by a greater Number of Miracles, and those both more eminent, more conspicuous, longer continued, and oft∣ner repeated, than ever any Errour ei∣ther was, or ever could be. So they not only prove that God never wrought a Miracle in confirmation of a Falsity for Tryal, till he had first incontestably esta∣blished his own Truth, but they also de∣clare that he could not. It is not then upon an apprehension of their having dis∣served the Authority of the Bible in this particular that I have assumed the freedom of discoursing these things, but that an op∣portunity of more light in this matter may be afforded. The Cause of the Scripture will suffer nothing in the main, on what side soever this Controver∣sy issues. And as I know my self in more need of being instructed than of capacity to offer information to any; So it is the same pleasure to me, to have my

Notions confuted when unsound, as it is to be restored to health when I have been sick.

§. 8. Having briefly viewed the servicea∣bleness of Reason as to the demonstra∣ting the Divinity of the Scripture; we may, ere we make any further proceed, in∣fer and conclude from hence its Autho∣rity, For upon its Divine Original doth its Authority bear. The formal reason of our submitting our Hearts and Con∣sciences to the Bible, is Gods speaking in it. The Authority of God is his right to command and require Obedience, and it is founded not only in the supereminence of his Nature, but his Relation to us as our maker. Having made us Rational Creatures capable of moral Government, he may accordingly Rule us by Laws backt with promises and threatnings. I acknowledg that de facto, men may withdraw themselves from under the Authority of God, and may deny him Obedience; but that militates nothing against the Right that is vested in Him of ruling them, nor the obligation that they are under of obeying him. Now

the Authority of the Scripture ariseth from its being Gods Word and his spea∣king in it. Nor are the most momen∣tous Reasons of that significancy to de∣termine our Assent, as the Testimony of a person of infinite Power, Wisdom, Goodness and Truth. What grea∣ter Assurance can we have to ascertain our belief, than that the affirmer is infi∣nitely Wise, and cannot be deceived himself, and infinitely Good and cannot deceive others. To say, as the Papists do, that the Scripture hath its Autho∣rity in se, in its self, from its self; but that it hath its Authority quoad nos, with respect to us, from the Testimony of the Church; is to talk without either Rea∣son or sense. For (1) Authority being a Relative Term, nothing can have Authority in it self, which hath it not in respect of others: Nothing is a Law properly but what is a Law to some. It is impossible to suppose an actual Right in any to Command, without supposing an obligation in some to o∣bey. If the Scripture therefore have no Authority from it self in respect of

us, it neither hath, nor can have any Autho∣rity in its self, at all. (2) If the Scripture have no Authority with re∣spect to us but what it hath from the Church, how comes the Church it self to be under an Obligation to receive and obey it. There can be no obligation but in Relation to some Antecedent Authority, and if there be no such Authority obliging the Church to receive the Scripture, there should be no Sin in her rejecting it. (3) If the Scrip∣ture have no Authority from its self, and Gods speaking in it, with respect to us, then the Church should be the first Credible, which is altogether false, it being by the Scripture that we both know that there is a Church, and how far her Testi∣mony is to be trusted to, (4.) every Testimony is posterior to the thing te∣stified, and is accordingly true or false, as it is agreeable or disagreeable to the na∣ture of the Thing it beareth witness to, If therefore the Scripture have any

Authority with respect to us upon the Te∣stimonial of the Church, it behoved to have it antecedently. In a word, if God have not a Right of commanding us in∣dependently on the Testimonials of the Church; then no private Revelation that ever God made, or could make of him∣self to any, is of the least force or sig∣nificancy. Nor could they to whom God by Visions, Dreams, Inspirati∣ons or otherwise made himself, his Mind and Will known, take upon them to give forth and publish to others what was thus revealed to them, till they had the Testimony of the Church that it was Authentick. Having established the Authority of the Scripture upon its true basis namely on its being Gods Word and speaking in it. Now forasmuch as no man either is, or can be obliged to believe a lie: We may hence learn what to judg of that Notion of Des-Cartes and some others, viz. Deum posse fallere si velit, that God can deceive if he please. No one denies but there both may be, and are, those things in the Word of God, which men may turn into occasions of

being Deceived; all that is contended for, is this, that there can be nothing in a Revelation from God, which may be a proper Cause of Error. To say that God may Deceive if he would, is no less than to affirm that he may cease to be God if he would. God can do nothing, but what in sensu diviso, abstracting from his Decree to the contrary, he may Will to do. If we prove therefore that it is repugnant to the Nature of God to be Willing to deceive his Creatures, we at the same time demonstrate that it is contradictory to his Power to do so. First then, If God may Deceive if He please, what assurance have we but that he hath, and may chuse to do it? Nor is it enough to say that he hath told us that he will not; for if he may deceive at all; I know nothing hinders, but that he may even then deceive us, when he in∣forms us he will not. Secondly, no one can deceive an other, but it must proceed either from Ignorance, Errour, or Malice; but all these interfere with the Nature of God, and by consequence this posse fal∣lere lyes cross to his Nature also. To deceive argues either want of Wisdom, Goodness or Veracity, and therefore in

no sense can God Deceive, seeing he can neither cease to be Wise, nor give over to be Good, nor fail to be True. Thirdly, though a finite, ignorant, and mistaken Creature, may impose upon us, without saying one thing, when he thinks ano∣ther: Yet it is impossible that an Infinite, Wise, and Omniscient Being should de∣ceive any, but that at the same time he must lie: But that God cannot lie, we have both the Testimony of Scrpture Tit. 1.2. and the highest assurance that Rea∣son can give us. Hence no one ever ac∣knowledged a Deity, but he withall included in his Nature 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to speak nothing but truth.

§. 9. Having unfolded the Nature and Quality of the Motives, that our assent to the Divinity of Scripture is raised on; we may hence infer, that our Belief of the Bibles being the Word of God, is Di∣vine and Infallible. For as Doctor Hammond sayes in another case, if the Person affirming be Infallible, then is the Belief of such a Person Infallible also. So if the Grounds of our Assent to the Scriptures be∣ing

a Revelation from God, be Infallible, our Assent which is built upon these Grounds, is Infallible likewise. Assents are not specificated and Denominated from their Objects, nor yet from the Faculties that elicite them, but from the Foundations and Grounds on which they are raised. Whilst then the Mo∣tives upon which we believe the Scrip∣ture, are more than Moral, our assurance of it's Divinity is more than Moral also. For as we distinguish between the Conse∣quent and the Consequence, the thing in∣ferred, and the manner of Inferring it; and as we reckon every Consequent right∣ly deduced from an Infallible Antecedent to be Infallible also, though the Faculty by which it is deduced be in it's Nature Fallible, and in it's Operation lyable to prevaricate and mistake: So every Assent built upon infallible Inducements, is an In∣fallible Assent, though the Instruments by which the Assurance of the Existence of such Inducements arriveth with us, may in their Nature be lyable to Errour. Besides, the Incertitude of the Subject or Mind, doth not at all weaken the Cer∣tainty of the Object, or the Certainty of it's Motives. That God is, is in it self certain; and there are Indubitable Ar∣guments

by which his Being may be de∣monstrated, though all the World should Hesitate either about his Existence, or suspect a Fallacy in the Media of it's Probation. The Incertitude of the Mind doth not arise from any Fallacy of the Media, but from want of Evidence into, and Cognition of them. The principal Grounds of our Receiving the Bible for the Word of God, are it's Internal Mo∣tives, or Arguments impressed up∣on it; nor is the manner of it's Con∣veyance from Age to Age of so great Import in this Matter, as some do ima∣gine. For should we have Light on it by chance, or had it dropt out of the Clouds, yet while it carries these Sig∣natures upon it which it doth, we might by the meer Exercise of our Rational Faculties, without the Testimonials of any Man or Church, have concluded that it could have proceeded from none but from God. And should it be granted, that the conveying down the Miracles, and other External Evidences, that are brought in Confirmation of the Divine Inspiration of the Bible, is done by Hu∣mane and Fallible means; yet it no ways follows, that our Assent to the

Scriptures being the Word of God, though built upon those motives, is Fal∣lible For Tradition is not the Formal Ground of our belief in this case, but only a means and Instrument of handing the Grounds of it to us. Nor do I think but that it may be defended, that as the External Motives upon which we receive the Scripture for the Word of God, are in themselues Infallible, that they are also in∣fallible in their manner of conveyance to us. For as it may be demonstrated that the first Reporters of these Eviden∣ces were infallibly inspired in the Reports they make, and in the writing of the Records which they left behind them, so it may be likewise demonstrated that the Providence of God hath watched o∣ver the preserving them down to us. The exception made by a very learned Person, that there are degrees of Certain∣ty as to the Divinity of the Scripture, whereas there cannot be degrees of infal∣libility; May I think easily be taken off. For if by Degrees of Infallibility, he mean no more but that there are some who have their Faith established upon more Media, than others have theirs; There are thus degrees of Infallibility,

as well as there are degrees of Certain∣ty. And though Faith superstructed u∣pon any infallible Medium be Essentially an an Infallible Faith: yet that which is built upon a plurality of such Media, may be stiled a faith intensively & gradually more Infalli∣ble. But if by Infalli∣bility, he mean the in∣fallibility of the Mind, then I must crave leave to say, that it is not to the purpose. For as in an Apodictical Syllo∣gism, there may be a certainty both in the Consequent and Conse∣quence, and yet our mind, through either not discerning the necessary connexion between the Terms of the Antecedent, or not seeing into the regular and order∣ly deduction of the Consequent from the Antecedent, may remain uncertain: So our Assent built upon unerrable Mo∣tives, is an infallible Assent, though the mind in the mean time through not dis∣covering the Infallibility of those Motives, may remain subject to doubts and fears. And indeed the Schoolmen call the Cer∣titude

of the Act only by the Name of a Certainty of Infallibi∣lity; whereas they stile the Certitude of the Mind by the name of a Certainty of Adhesion. The Infallibility of the Act of Assent, re∣sults from the Infallible Certainty of the motives which ground such assent; but the firm Adhesion of the mind, or that which we have called the Infallibility of the mind, though it radically arise from the Nature and quality of the motives, yet it doth withal & that immediately con∣notate a perception of the motives them∣selves that they are Infallible, and such as we may venture our Faith upon, without either fear, doubts or Jealousies. And herein lies our first Duty about the Scrip∣tures, that our Faith answer their Cre∣dibility, and that the Adhesion of our Minds to them be as firm as the Objects themselves are Immutable, or the mo∣tives afforded us in their Confirmation, are Infallible and sure.

§. 10. Having declared the great ser∣viceableness of Reason in demonstrating the Divinity of the Scripture, we are next

enquire into the use of it in our attainment to the sense and meaning of the Word. God in vouchsafeing the World a super∣natural Revelation, supposeth us not only furnished with the sensitive Faculties of Seeing and Hearing, but endowed with intellectual principles by which we may understand it, judge of, and assent to it. Were we destitute of the latter, Scripture were of no more significancy to us, than to Brutes: and were the former denyed us, we were no more capable of being trans∣acted with in this way, than Stocks and Stones are. Now the letter of the Bible without the genuine sense of it is not pro∣perly the Scripture; nor will it availe us to any end or purpose, more than the ha∣ving a shell without a kernel. Words are of no further use, than as they are represen∣tations of conceptions & Images of things. Could we communicate our Conceptions to one another immediately, or by any o∣ther signs, and that with the same facility and certainty as we do by Words, there would be no Occasion for Words, nor any need of them. As conceptions are the re∣presentation of things in the mind, so words are the representation of these concep∣tions to others. But forasmuch as we can

have no perception of the thoughts of ano∣ther though he should express them in Speech or writing, unless we first know that such and such words are in the use of mankind appli'd to denote such and such things, therefore all words as they are Ma∣nifestative signs of Conceptions, so they are Suppositive signs of things. And though they be first Indicative of Concep∣tions in the intention of the Speaker, yet as to execution with respect to the hearer, they are first Manifestative of things; for unless we know what things such and such words are ordained to signifie, they can be no interpreters of the thoughts of him that Speaks. I know no greater dispa∣ragement that can be put upon the Bible, nor affront that can be offered to the Au∣thor of it, than to stile it, a little Ink va∣riously figured in a Book, or a few unsensed Characters: And yet at this rate do the Papists frequently talk. It is of the essence of words properly taken, to be significa∣tive. For this end were they invented and appointed, and it is this that gives them their Form. Brute Animals though they may be taught to utter many Words, yet because they understand not truly & really any thing they say, therefore they cannot

be said be said properly to Speak. To affirm, that by the Scriptures we cannot mean the sense of them, but only a Book of such and such unsensed Characters; is to degrade God below a Man, and to treat a writing endited by Him, more opprobri∣ously than we will allow our own Scribes to be dealt withall. Do we not judg and account other Books to be Interpreters of their thoughts and judgments that wrote them; and shall this be denied to God? If there be not a sense intrinsecally inclu∣ded in every Word and sentence of the Scripture, he was ill employed that gave it forth. In brief, if words be devoid of sense, when they are Written, they are also de∣void of it when they are spoken; Speech & writing no otherwise differing, but that the one is the Register, Substitute and Vicari∣ous of the other. If the Scripture have not a Sense Originally in it self and essentially belonging to it, it can never have any, see∣ing for the Church to affix a sense to it, is only to declare her own sense, not its; and indeed to impose both upon God and Man. Now God in giving forth the Re∣velation of his will, not only inspired the Penmen of the Bible, as to the Doctrines and things they delivered, but as to the

Words, Terms and Expressions in which they declared them. It was God himself that spake in the Prophets, Heb. 1.1. The very Words they used were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Words which the Holy Ghost put in∣to their hearts and Mouths. 1 Cor. 2.13. The 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The Writing, or Word written was by Inspiration from God, 2 Tim. 3.16. And surely God, if he please, can speak in as plain Words as any of h••s Creatures can do. Men many times through some defect in their Judgment, or through a penu••y of Words, or through an incongruous disposition and texture of them, are at a loss to express themselves in∣telligibly; but to none of these imper∣fections is God incident, and therefore if he please he may declare himself so as that men may understand him. Now Words that are Intelligible when they are spoken, are as Intelligible when they are Written. Yea, there are advantages of understand∣ing them better in the one case, than in the other. We can better observe the Re∣striction and Ampliation of Terms; the quality of every particular proposition; the connexion of an Enunciation that is obscure with what is more clear going be∣fore, and following after; the light that it re∣ceive's

from expressions to the same pur∣pose, in other parts of the Book; the Ge∣nius of the Stile in general; the nature of the several periods; the manner and Form of Argumentation, and a hundred things more which we can better search into in the perusal of a written Book, than we can do by the swift & transitory hearing of an Oral Discourse. Now as God can speak as plainly as any of his Creatures can, and as Words are at least as easie to be under∣stood when they are written, as when they are Spoken: So we have no Reason to think that God affects obscurity or envies that men should understand him. Men being influenced by Pride, may endeavour not to be understood, that they may be admired, & may seek estimation by study∣ing to be obscure: And many of the An∣cient Philosophers are justly arraigned up∣on this account. Heraclitus grew famous by the only obscurity of his Wri••••••gs. The Platonick and Pythagorick numbers grew into a proverb for their Darkness. It is said even of Aristotle, that being reproved by Alexander for publishing his Acroama∣ticks he should make this reply, that though they were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, made publick, yet they were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 not Published. There is

nothing more notorious than that there have been some writers in all Ages who have endeavoured not to be understood: But this is every way as much repugnant to the Nature of God as Pride or envy are. It is Inconsistent with his Wisdome, to give out the Bible for the end which he did, and yet to do it in such a manner as that it cannot be understood. Nor is it agreeable to his Holiness, Justice, or Good∣ness to leave the Doctrines of the Bible Unintelligible, when he hath made it our Duty to know them.

Having made appear that the Scripture hath a sense, and that this Sense may be known, & that it is the main thing which we are to look after. It is now time that we should intimate what we mean by the sense of the Scripture. By the sense of the Scripture then, we Understand that which the Words according to the Intention of the Holy Ghost do signifie. We are not to bring senses to the Scripture, but to receive them from it. It is his Mind and Will we are to learn who endited the Bible, and therefore are not to impose Minds and thoughts upon it. And when I speak of Scripture Words, I do not

mean letters, nor syllables, nay nor Words apart, but entire propositions, Sen∣tences, Enunciations, paragraphs, yea Chapters and Books. Nor can we judg rightly of the sense of Words but by con∣sidering them as they lie in propositions, nor ought we to determine of the sense of a proposition but in relation to the verse, Chapter and Book where it occurres, yea nor without having a respect to the whole and entire Systeme of the Bible.

There is but one sense of Scripture which we may call Literal, Dogmatical, or Histo∣rical. I call that sense Literal which God doth intend in the Words, whether the Words be taken properly or tropically. That which ariseth from a figurative acceptation of the Word, is as truly a Literal sense, as that which flows from their proper acceptation. In texts of Scripture where Types are lay'd down, in which other things typi∣fied are intended, there is not a twofold sense of the Words, but there is one only of the Words, and the other is of the Types

themselves: which being designed to pre∣figure other things do accordingly carry a key along with them by which they may be unlocked. I do not deny, but that of one Sense of a Text there maybe two parts, namely when those things which are im∣mediately signified, do denote or at least lead us to somthing more Sublime. Though even in this case there be but one proper sense of the Words, namely the Literal, the Mystical being not so much the sense of the Words, as occasioned by, and built upon the things signified. Or if you will, there is that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and habitude between the Literal sense and the Mystical, that they do both together make up one entire, compleat sense of the place. Yea, it may be said that in all propositions which admit a Literal and a Mystical sense, though there be but one Explicite Enunciation, yet there are two implicitely. And if any have a mind upon this account, to distinguish be∣twixt the Literal sense and the Mystical, they may for me, nor will I quarrel with them. But to assign a plurality of coordinate or Ambiguous senses to one and the same text, is the height of Mad∣ness, invented only to re∣proach

the Scripture and to make way for the Autho∣rity of the Church in the expounding of it, and is indeed repugnant not only to the perspicuity of the Scripture, but to the unity of Truth, and the end of Gods revealing the Word, which is to instruct us in Faith and Obedience; for wheresoever there is a Multiplicity of Disparate Senses, we can never be sure that we have attained to the true meaning of any one proposition. Now when we enquire into the Sense of Scripture, and asse••t its being Intelligi∣ble; we always distinguish betwixt the perspicuity of the Object, and the capaci∣ty of the Subject actually to understand it. The easi∣ness of the Scripture to be

understood in respect of it self, and our disposedness to understand it right, are things vastly distant. The Sense of the Word may be in it self facile and plain, though in the mean time it remain dark and obscure to those who have shut their eyes, or that have their understanding de∣filed, tinctur'd, and darkned by fuliginous vapours. The Bible is only plain to such who apply themselves to the study of it without prepossessions, prejudice, and forestalled judgments, & are withall hum∣ble and diligent in the use of means to find out the meaning of it. Though the Ethere∣al Regions be replenished with rayes of light emitted from the great Luminary, yet it is both necessary that men have eyes, and that they open them, in order to their discovering and receiving the benefit of it. If our understandings either from that darkness and ignorance which they are en∣veloped and muffled with through the Fall, or from malignant Habits occasioned either by unhappy education, or sensual lusts, do not discern the sense and meaning of Scripture; it is no impeachment of its perspicuity, but a manifestation of our weakness, corruption and folly. Besides, when we speak of the plainness of the

Scripture & its easiness to be understood, we always put a difference betwixt Scrip∣ture Texts relating to Doctrines of Faith & manners, which are absolutely necessary to be known; and such of whose Sense we may be safely ignorant, the Doctrines they refer to, having no indispensable connexion with Salvation. The whole Will and Mind of God, as to all that is needfull to be known in order to our duty and Happi∣ness, is revealed in the Scripture with∣out any such ambiguity or obscurity as should hinder it from being under∣stood, though God in his Soveraign Wis∣dome hath in many things whose simple Ignorance doth not interpose with Sal∣vation, left many hard and difficult Texts; partly to make us sensible of the weak∣ness of our Understandings, partly to imploy our minds unto diligence, part∣ly to induce us to implore Divine in∣struction, and to make us depend upon God for illumination, and partly to ex∣ercise our Souls unto reverence: But in Fundamental Truths the Case is o∣therwise, for the end giving measure, and fixing bounds unto means, it is not con∣sistent with the Wisdom, and Good∣ness, yea nor Justice of God, to leave

that hard to be understood, which upon no less peril than the hazard of Salvati∣on, he hath required the indispensable knowledg of. As first, principles of Rea∣son need no proof of their Truth, being self-evident to every one that under∣stands the Import of Terms: So Fun∣damental Doctrines of Religion car∣ry an Evidence in the plainness and per∣spicuity of their Revelation, that every one who reads the Bible without preju∣dice and a perverse mind, may be satisfi∣ed that such Doctrines are there pro∣posed. Nor is it any Argument that those Texts of Scripture where such Ar∣ticles are revealed, are not easy to be un∣derstood, because some out of prejudice or perversness have wrested them to a Corrupt sence; seeing God did not en∣dite the Bible for the froward and Cap∣tious, but for such who will read it with a free and unprejudiced mind, and are willing to come to the knowledge of the Truth. For, as Aristotle says in the Case of the first principles of Rea∣son 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; A self Evident Principle is not Evident to all men, but only to such who have found and undepraved

Understandings. Topic. 6. Cap. 4. So it is no impeachment of the perspicuity of the Revelation of Fundamental Truths of Religion, that men who have their minds defiled and darkned by Lusts, infected with evil Opinions, and filled with pre∣judices, do not believe and acknowledg them. And by the way, while all Truths absolutely necessary to be known, are easy and plain, and while we are in∣dispensably obliged to believe and receive whatsoever is so, an Enumeration of Fundamental Truths is neither necessa∣ry, nor useful, and possibly not safe. Now as all Doctrines necessary to be Under∣stood are so revealed in the scripture, that they are easy enough to be so; so be∣ing understood, they are as well the Standard and Measure by which dark and obscure Texts are to be interpreted, as the Key to the opening of them. As Curve lines are best discerned when ap∣plied to straight, so are Heterodox sen∣ses imposed on Obscure Texts of Scrip∣ture best perceived, when examined by their Habitudes to necessary and plain Truths. Whatsoever bears not a Sym∣metry with the Foundation, can be no Superstruction of God: And whatso∣ever

Notion either Formally, or Virtu∣ally, directly or consequentially, inter∣fere's with a fundamental Truth, though never so many Texts be pressed in the proof of it, we maybe sure both of its falsity and that they are all wrested and mistaken. But though the Scripture be most plain in points necessary to Salvation, yet no one Text of the Bible is in it self unintelligible; for as Dr. More say's, to affirm that the Holy Writ is in it elf unintelligible, is aequi∣valent to the pronouncing it nonsense, or to averr that such and such Books or Passages of it were never to be un∣derstood by men, is to insinuate as if the Wisedome of God did not only play with the Children of men, but even fool with them. Mons. Wolzogen therefore in his late Book de Interprete Scripturarum, hath not only in this matter shamefully betrayed the Protestant cause, but reflected reproach upon the Spirit of God. There are som∣things, says he, in the Scrip∣ture which we cannot un∣derstand, not through any defect or fault of our Minds,

or through the Sublimity & Majesty of the Doctrines themselves, but through the Frame of the Scripture it self, and the manner in which they are revealed. If there be but one passage in the Bible in it self unin∣telligible, I cannot imagine any use that it should be off, or that it should ans∣wer any end, which we must needs suppose so wise an Agent as God had in the giving of it forth. Be∣sides, when we discourse of the Serviceableness of Rea∣son towards the attainment of the Sense and meaning of the Scripture, we put a vast difference betwixt discerning the Literal, Grammatical and Histo∣rical sense of it, and the discerning it in a saving & Spiritual manner. I know our Divines sometimes express this as if they dis∣tinguished betwixt the Grammatical or Li∣teral

and the Spiritual sense. But their in∣tendment is not to diversifie the things themselves, and what is understood in such places, but the manner and way in which they are understood. Though the Natural man may discover the true and genuine intendment of a text no less (may be) than he that is born of God; yet their perception is not of one and the same kind, nor do they understand it after one & the same manner. Though the Sense there∣fore be Physically the same, yet in the way of discove∣ring it, there is a Moral dif∣ference.

The meer Rational mind may discern the literal Sense of Scripture proposi∣tions, but without a super∣natural Irradiation from the Spirit of life, there can be no saving knowledge of

them. The Spirit which breathed out the Scrip∣ture at first, is in this Sense the only Inter∣preter of it. And as the Text is his, so also is the Gloss. He that unveiled the Object, must enlighten the eye; for we need as much the spirit of Wisdom for the one, as the Spirit of Revelation for the o∣ther.

See among many other places Eph. 1.17. 1 Cor. 2.11, 12. 1 John 2.20 and 5.20. John 6.48. Psal 119.18, 27. But seeing the Socinians and Remonstrants preclude the necessity of the influence of the spirit of God upon the mind, in order to the understanding the meaning of the Scrip∣ture

either one way or an other; and forasmuch as diverse who are not will∣ing to be catalogued a∣mongst them, do yet in this fight under their ban∣ners; I shall 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 pro∣duce something in proof of it. (1) We have the Te∣stimony of the Scripture, that Reason without auxi∣liary beams can never dis∣cern Spiritual things Spiri∣tually. The natural man re∣ceiveth not the things of the spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritual∣ly discerned, 1 Cor. 2.14. Where by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the Natural man, we are neither to understand the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the babe, the In∣firm, the Weak. For though such be often unskilfull in the Word of Righte∣ousness, neither able to frame due con∣ceptions of the mysteries of the Gospel, nor throughly disposed to a due savouring of them, nor fully capable of improving them to all the holy ends, and in all the usefull deductions and inferences to which

they are designed, and to which they are admirably accommodated: Yet the things of the Spirit of God are not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 foolish∣ness to them. Nor are we by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 here, to understand only the Sensual man, or one that is wholly sunk into the Animal Life, and enslaved to the satis∣faction of his corrupt appetites, and inor∣dinate fleshly desires; seeing the natu∣ral man in this place is directly opposed to the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the spiritual or rege∣nerate man; and to the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Wise, and the Scribe; to the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Dispu∣ter and the Princes of this World, qui domi∣nabantur in scholis, Who bare sway & rule in the Schools. But by the Natural man, we are to understand the meer Rational man, even him that doth most excolere animam, Cultivate his Intellectuals. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the per∣son endowed with meer humane Wisedom as the Greek Scholiast says. Now! what is affirmed concerning this Souly man? 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, neither can he know them. There is not only an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a dimsightedness, but an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 an impotency through a dispropor∣tion

in his faculty with respect to them. They are seen in another light, than he is endowed with; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they are spiritually discerned. They are known only by a divine irradiation and conque∣ring sun-beam of the Spirit of life upon the mind. And therefore God is said to shine into our hearts to give the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 light (i. e. the clear and evident manifestation) of the knowledge of the Glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, 2 Cor. 4.6. (2.) We have the attestation of Reason, which tells us that nothing is well known, but by that which hath a just analogy to it. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 every thing is best under∣stood by that which bears a resemblance of it. Things of sense and life are only known by vital & Sentient Faculties. Vegetables do not admit every particle that comes to nourish them, but only such as bear a pro∣portion to their own pores. Where there is not a congruity betwixt the Subject and the Object, the Object can never be discerned in its true light. As the eye can∣not behold the Sun, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, un∣less it have some resemblance of the Sun in it self; no more can any Man understand the things of God in a due manner 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, unless he be made to partake of

of the Divine Image. Every thing acts in a way consimilar to its own Nature; and therefore let the Ob∣jects be never so spiritual, the natural man can ne∣ver know them in a way, analogous to them, i. e. spi∣ritually, but only in a na∣tural way, that alone being homogeneous to himself. We are told in philosophy, that quicquid recipitur, re∣cipitur ad modum recipientis, every thing is received in a way agreeable to that which re∣ceiveth it. And therefore where there is nothing but a natural Mind, it can act no otherwise than in a Natural way. In a word, without a vital alliance & cognation to Spi∣ritual things, we can never understand them in a Spiritual saving Manner. I take these two here in an aequipollent sense, without medling with the questi∣on, whether there be no difference be∣twixt knowing Gospel truths in a Spi∣ritual manner, and the knowing them in a Saving. (3) If we be in the alone Virtue of our Rational Faculties adapted to a due discerning the things of the Spirit of God, and that i••

their proper light; I see no reason why an unregenerate man should be more stiled blind in reference to the Word of God, than in reference to Euclids Elements, or Aristotles Organon. Nor indeed why he should be esteemed so inept for that, as for these. I might add in the fourth place, that accor∣ding to the Doctrine of the Ancient Church, be∣sides the external Reve∣lation of the Word, there was also an in∣ternal Inspiration of the Spirit supposed necessary, in order to the understand∣ing of it in a saving manner. And in this, the Church of England, not to speak of Forraign Churches, hath hitherto har∣monised with the Ancients. For though a few are, and have been otherwise min∣ded, yet they are as far from deserving the name of the Church of England, as an excrescency is from obtaining the name of the Body upon which it grows. The way and manner how the Spirit assists us in the understanding of spiritual things spi••itually, I shall not at this time enquire largely af∣ter; only in brief we may conceive of it thus. (1) There is either through the immediate in dwelling of the Spirit, or

through the Communication of new prin∣ciples, a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 an ablation of every thing extraneous; a dissipation of those fuliginous vapours that both obnubi∣late the mind, and do imbuere Objectum co∣lore suo. By the purification of the Heart, the Understanding is clarified. Scales drop off from our Eyes, and the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Governing Faculty becomes purged from those prepossessions, prejudices, and Lusts which obstructed its perceptive Powers. (2) By the Spirit of Life in the new Birth, the subject is elevated and adapted to the Object. Grace renders the mind idone∣ous for, and consimilar to Truth. The Eye is not so much relieved by the pros∣pective and Telescope, as the Understanding is by Grace. (3) There is a suggesting of Media for the Eluci∣dating of Truth. A revi∣ving in the Memory clear texts, to illustrate such as are dark. (4) There is fre∣quently an irradiation of the Word it self. An atti∣ring and clothing it with a garment of Light, that is impatient either of Cloud or Shadow. And upon the whole, the Soul both feels,

and is transformed into what it knows. Its apprehensions are no longer dull and languid, but vigorous and af∣fective. As every thing relisheth ac∣cording to its contemperation to the palate, so the mind being seasoned with Goodness, tastes a pleasure and delight, and feels an efficacy in what it under∣stands. It sees things in a steddy Light, and exerts its self in all suitable opera∣tion, both in matter of internal acts, and outward Duties. However, though we contend that the Spirit of Wisdom is ab∣solutely necessary for the Understanding the sense of Scripture-propositions in a Spiritual saving manner, yet we do not deny, but that the meer Rational mind, may discern the Literal Sense of the Word, in a way congruous to its own state, and condition. It is true, even with re∣ference to the perception of the bare Li∣teral sense, that the person renewed in the Spirit of his Mind, is greatly advan∣taged above the Unregenerate Man. For the Spirit of God makes us of quick Understanding in the fear of the Lord. Isay. 11.2, 3. The mind is defecated from those impure fogs and mists of Lust and Passion, which greatly hinder and

prejudice the Understanding in the per∣ception of Natural Truths, and much more of Supernatural and Divine. Grace both helps us to use Reason aright for the discovering the true meaning of Scrip∣ture Enunciations; and furnisheth us with a holy Sagacity of smelling out, what is right and true, and what is false and per∣verse; and especially by impressing, im∣planting, and working in us the thing re∣vealed, it confirms us in, and causeth us ra∣ther immediately to feel, than logically to discern, the sense of such and such a place. Yet I know none who affirmeth that to conceive the sense of Theological proposi∣tions, the supernatural Light of the Spirit is absolutely necessary. For if it were thus, Infidels which reject them, would not dis∣claim them as False and Incredible, but as unconceivable and unintelligible. Yea thousands destitute of the Divine Unction, have in a theorical way actually understood the Bible. All that have usefully commented on the Scripture, were not born of God. The means con∣ducive to the Understanding of the true sense of Scripture, are besides Hu∣mility, Teachableness, frequent Reading of the Bible, and prayer; an acquain∣tance

with the Signification and use of Words, the Nature and kinds of Rheto∣rick, with the Rules and conditions of Ar∣gumentation, &c. Three things occur to to our consideration, in enquiry after the sense and meaning of any Book: The mind of the Writer, the Words in which he declares it, and the connexion, habi∣tude and relation betwixt the Words spo∣ken, and the Mind of the Speaker. What ever there is often in Men, yet in God there is never a separation betwixt the Judgment himself hath of things, and that which the words he maketh use of, manifest and import. He can declare nothing as our Duty, but what indeed is so, & what himself judgeth so to be. Men hav∣ing then by common consent & agreement established, that such and such conceptions shall be united with such Words, according∣ly whenever such a word is heard or read, such a conception doth arise in our minds; and if at any time we would make known to others such a Cogitation, such words do presently occurr, to express it by. To arrive therefore at the knowledge of the sense of the Scriptures, There is nothing required on the part of the Object, but that it be intelligibly written, and that the words in which it is given forth, sig∣nifie

according to the Institution, Use and Custom of mankind. For as one sayeth, Scriptura non esset Scriptura nisi ver∣bis, ex usu significanti∣bus, scripta extaret. And here the knowledg of the Etymology of Words, their usage in Exotick Au∣thors, is of great import, but that which is chiefly to be attended to, in the sensing of Scripture, is their use in Sacred Writers. God is many times pleased to restrain or enlarge the signification of Words, as in His Wisdom he judgeth meet. Hence many Terms taken up from other Disci∣plines, Artes, and usages, are peculiarly applied and confined to denote things otherwise, than they do there, whence they are borrowed. God useth ra∣ther a practical and Oeco∣nomical way of speaking, than a Theorical and Acro∣amatical.

Nor do Scripture Enunciations, signifie philosophically, as in Dialectical Schools, but practically, according to their Use in Families and common converse. And unless there be very urgent Grounds to the Contrary, we are to determine the signification of Words, not with respect to their Etymologie and Grammatical pro∣priety, or their usurpation in Schools, but according to their popular Use,

Quem penes arbitrium est, & jus & norma loquendi.

Many a Text otherwise plain, hath been rendred abstruse, and unintelligible, by mens glossing it in analogie to their Me∣taphysical notions and querks; fathering those nice and subtile fancies to Terms occurring in the Scripture, which they find the Schoolmen have applied them to, in their wanton, luxurious and Aenigmatical Debates. Yea, the same Words are in Scripture, used sometimes in a larger, sometimes in a narrower signification. And in such cases, the only Rule to deter∣mine their import, is the context and subject Matter. Hence the Hebrews have a saying, that he preverts the Word from

its true intendment, who doth not observe what precedes and what follows. And the Civil Law tells us, that, in∣civile est tota Lege non in∣specta, ex una ejus tantum parte proposita, judicare velle de toto legis sensu: It is an irrational thing to judge of the whole Law by, consulting only one part of it. Scripture texts hang together in a chain of mu∣tual dependance, and to know the Sense of one Scripture, requireth a due consideration of many. And though some passages of the Bible be in themselves difficult, yet there is such light reflected on, & lent to them, in other places, that the meaning of God in them, may be sufficiently understood. And this is what our Divines generally intend, when they say that Scripture is the Inter∣preter of Scripture. God in the enditing the Bible, hath spoken with that perspi∣cuity, & accommodation of himself to our Capacity, that we may know what he aimes at and intends; and if any Texts be obscure and dark, yet by those rays of

Light which they borrow from other pla∣ces, their sence and meaning may be easi∣ly understood. Nor is there one Text al∣ledged by the Anonymous Author of Phi∣losophia Scripturae Interpres, after all his operose and impertinent wrangling to prove the Scripture ambiguous, and ob∣scure, which may not be plainly unfolded, either by a due observation of the subject matter, and Context, or by comparing it with parellel places, where the same things are declared in equivalent Terms, but with more clearness and evidence; without the least necessity of recourse to Philosophy as the Standard of sensing the Bible. Nor is the forementioned Book any thing else but a plea for Soci∣nianism; only instead of Reason, we have Philosophy advanced to a Dictatorship over the word of God, and Des-Cartes made master of the Chair. And wheras Mons^r. Wolzogius in a pretended reply to the said Author, hath constituted the Custom and usage of Speech, the only Rule of Interpreting Scripture; I must crave leave to say, that he confounds what he ought to have distinguished, namely the Rule of expounding the word with the media of Interpretation. And besides, a know∣ledg

of the usage of words in common speech, is rather adapted to help us in the Verbal sence of Scripture, usually called Version or Translation, than in the Exe∣getical and real Sense, vulgarly and truly stiled exposition. And withal, there are many things which God designs our in∣struction in, by Words and Phrases as they lie in the Systeme of the Bible, and in a Habitude to the things there treated of, which they were never in Forraign Au∣thors, or customary Speech among men, applyed to the manifestation of. Scrip∣ture is avowedly the best expositor of it self. God by framing it in the manner he hath done, by giving it such a Texture, and by inculcating the same things in the greatest variety of expressions, hath made it self the alone measure by which it is fully to be understood, and hath ta∣ken upon himself to be suorum eloquio∣rum optimus Interpres. Now the line that in order to our attaining the sense of Scrip∣ture we are to be guided by, is this: That Scripture Phrases, Propositions, Pa∣ragraphs, Sections, &c. do actually signifie every thing, which in such a disposition and Texture, with reference to the subject matter and context, and in Analogy to the

Systeme of the whole Bible, they can signi∣fie. I do not say, that they always excite that sense of themselves, in the heart and mind of the Reader; but my mea∣ning is, that they are then only rightly appre∣hended, and the intend∣ment of the Holy Ghost in them, fully attained, when this latitude of signification is alow'd them. There are no empty frigid phraseologies in the Bible, but where the expressions are most splendid, and lofty, there are No∣tions and things enough to fill them out. God did not design to endite the Scripture in a pompous tumid stile, to a∣muse our fancies, or meerly strike to our I∣maginations with the greater force, but to instruct us in a calm and sedate way; and therefore under the most stately dress of words, there always lyes a richer quarry of things and Truths Words being invented to express natural things and humane thoughts, the utmost signi∣fication they can possibly bear, proves but scanty and narrow, when they are apply'd to the manifesting Spiritual and celestial Objects. The serviceableness

of this Notion against Jews, Socinians, Arminians and others, lies in the view of every discerning person, and the ad∣vantage I promise my self from it, Chap. 3. hath led me to suggest it here. How are the most plain and magnificent Testi∣monies in proof of Christs being the Messiah, the true God, Reconciling us by his death, mans inability to Good, the necessity and efficacy of renuing Grace, &c. enervated, by affixing some low, secondary, and metaphorical mea∣ning to them; or by turning the Scrip∣ture into meer Hyperboles, Allegories, rampant and empty Schemes of Speech. Nor, secluding this from being the mea∣sure of our judging of the sence of Scrip∣ture, is it possible to arrive at any Cer∣ta••nty about the meaning of it. If it do not actually signifie all and every thing which with respect to the subject matter, the context, the agreement of one part with another, and every part with the whole, it can signifie; there is not one 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 assignable, by which we can make a judgment what it doth signi∣fie. God being Omniscient, knows what all words are by men ordained to de∣note,

and what import they have in their combinations one with another, and in the several textures into which they may be disposed; being Wise he can pitch upon such Words, and digest them into that frame, as is most adapted to be∣get a Conception and apprehension of those things in us, which he would in∣struct us in the knowledg, and win us to the belief and obedience of; And being Veracious, Good and Faithful, it is repugnant to his Nature to design the imposing on us, or the leading us in∣to Errors and Fallacies. Men either through unaccquaintedness with the just Valor of Words, or through Igno∣rance of the Nature of things, or through oscitancy and neglect in the Election of Terms, may diliver themselves in ex∣pressions both too lofty for the things they intend, and dissonant to their own Conceptions; but all these being incon∣sistent with the Divine perfections, we dare admit no such thing in reference to him. It is the character of the Spirit of man to speak much and in effect to say little, but 'tis the Caracter of the Holy Spirit to speak little and therin to

comprehend much; nor do we through∣ly penetrate into Scripture Misteries without enlarging our Conceptions be∣yond the letter. The Stile of the most reputed Oratours is for the most part too pompous, & flatulent for the subjects they treat of; neither the Images which they form in their minds, nor the Arrayment of them in Words, are adapted and proporpo∣tioned to things. They are like boys walk∣ing upon stilts, who seem higher then they are, and their discourses are like a load of flesh in the body of man, that serves on∣ly to embarass it with an unprofitable weight. But to imaigine so of God, or to ascribe 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, great swelling words of vanity to him, 2 Pet. 218. Jud. 16. or to think that in the enditing the Bible, he did 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, only feed us with gaudy phantasms, poetical Schemes, & lux∣ariunt phrases, is to impeach more than one of his perfections. In a word, Gods design being to instruct us, and it being repugnant to His Nature, either to be deceived himself in the nature of things, or to deceive others, it necessarily fol∣lows that the Scripture doth actualy de∣denote all and whatsoever it is capable of

denoting. Nor are we in the interpreting of the Word to restrain and con∣fine its sense, but to take it in the greatest La∣tude of sign••fication it can bear, I shall shut up this w••th that of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 14.6, 11. So like∣wise yee, except yee utter by the Tongue 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Words easy to be under∣stood, how shall it be known what is spoken? For yee shall speak into the Air: Therefore if I know not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the mea∣ning of the voice (the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 pos∣se vocis, the whole force, vertue, power and signifi∣cation of the Words) I shall be unto him that spea∣keth a Barbarian.

§ 11. The next thing considerable with respect to the interest of Reason in Re∣ligion, is its Use and serviceableness in drawing Consequences from Revealed

and supernatural Truths. And this fol∣lows from what we have said concerning the sence of Scripture-propositions. It is by this means, that Divines have al∣ways laboured to clear Mysteries of Faith, by making appear the Connexion of things obscure with these that are plain, and those that are contested with these that are not. It is by this Method also that the Fathers have refuted Heresies, by shewing that those evil Doctrines which they introduced into the Church, either had not any agree∣ment with the true Mysteries of Faith, or that they were altogether opposite to them. To disclaim all Scripture Consequences & the ministration of Rea∣son in deducing them, is plainly to deny all the Connexions Relations, dependencies, and oppositions of one thing to and upon an other▪ and to betray Religion into the Hands of its Enemies. And as this is one of the last, so I look upon it as one of the most shameful Refuges of the Ro∣manists. Finding themselves in their dis∣putations about matters of Religion, foi∣led and bafled by the Protestants, some of them have thought it their safest course to renounce all Principles of Reason in the concernments of Faith,

& to reject all Conclusions as well inferr'd from premisses, where both are of Revelati∣on, as where one only is of Faith and the other of Reason. It must be a desperate Cause that cannot otherwise be maintai∣tained; And nothing but a failure in other defences would have reconciled them to a method pregnant with so ma∣ny absurdities. But when men are pre-engaged in the defence of a Cause, what will they not rather seek relief from, than reject what their lusts, interests and educations oblige them to? The first forgers of this new Armature for¦warding off the blows of Protestants, with the entertainment that the Inventi∣on met with at Rome as well as Sorbon, he that hath a mind to inform himself, may learn from Vedelius in his Rationale Theologicum, and Bochart contre Veron. And how far the Socinians those Idola∣ters of Reason when it serves their de∣signs, do conspire with the Papists to disparage it in this matter we are now enquiring about, when it doth not be-friend them, such as are inquisitive, may read in Hoornbecks Socinianismus con∣futatus, Tom. 1. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 211. But that we may address to the matter

it self: By a Consequence we mean ei∣ther a proposition standing in that habi∣tude, relation, and having that connexi∣on with another, that if that be true, this is also true; or a proposition lying in that repugnancy and opposition to a∣nother, that if the first be true, the latter must be false. There is either that co∣herency betwixt them, that the one in∣fers and draws the other after it; or that contrariety that if truth be the portion of the one, falsehood must fall to the lot of the other. Now conclusions are of two kinds; first when there is nothing in the Antecedent but what is in the Con∣sequent, and this is always between two Terms and no more; and these Terms are either convertible, as no Innocent per∣son is a sinner, therfore no sinner is an Innocent person: Or they are subalter∣nate the one the other, as every man is guilty before God, therefore this and that man is so: Or else they are Terms Equivalent, as Believers have the guilt of sin remitted to them, therefore their liableness to legal Wrath is re∣moved. 2 dly. When there is somthing In the Antecedent that is not in the Conse∣quent, and to Conclusions of this Na∣ture, there are always required three

Terms, and the Foundation of dedu∣cing one proposition here from ano∣ther, is either the connexion, or op∣position that is betwixt the one and the other. All Conclusions are virtually included in their premises, and he that assents to these, doth in effect grant those. It is all one whether both the premises be in Scripture, or one onely be there, the other being either fetch't from undoubted Principles of Reason, or evidence of Sense; for in all these Cases, the Conclusion is as much the Word of God, as if it were in so many letters and sillables in the Bible. Hence that common saying quaedam in Scripturis sunt, et dicuntur; quaedam in ii••dem sunt etsi non dicantur: There are some things in the Scripture, and are accordingly reported to be in them; and there are somethings in them, though they be not in so many Words there related, &c. Men through Ignorance, ositancy, or the like, do not always dis∣cern what ariseth and followeth from what they say, and do often therfore af∣firm that, from whence something doth ensue, which they are so far from holding, that they do detest it; and accordingly we frequently argue against them, per deductionem ad absurdum seu impossibile.

But God always foresees whatsoever followes up∣on every declaration he makes; he understands all the hab••tudes, con∣nexions, dependencies, and oppositions of one thing upon and to ano∣ther, and accordingly we not onely may with safe∣ty, but he expects that we should, inferr and de∣duce from what he hath said, all and every thing that necessarily bears up∣on and follows from it. And though what is thus inferred, be not in the Scripture, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in so many letters; yet while it is there, either 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in the equivalent, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the sense, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 by way of Consequence, it may be truly said to be there 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in effect. And though some Conclusions lye more con∣nected with the principles from which they are deduced, than others, yet they are both equally true, providing the princi∣ples be so, whence they are inferred. Let the trains of Ratiocination be shorter or

longer, nothing can flow from Truth but Truth; only there is more difficulty in the deduction, and more liableness to mis∣take in the illation of the latter, than the former. And accordingly we desire no man to assent to the thing concluded, till he have examined, or at lest may, and be satisfied, that there is nothing false and so∣phistical in the Way and Manner of its deducement. Though our understandings be in some cases subject to mistake, yet there is no ground to suppose that they universally do so. Though our Facul∣ties be fallible in their Ratiocinations, yet there are Connate Notions and Conge∣nite Criteria, by which we may discern, when they deceive us, and when not. There are certain Rules which the universal Rea∣son of mankind hath agree'd on as the Test and Standard, to judge of legitimate deductions by, and of those we have as infallible certainty, as that it is day when the Sun is in the Meridian. As we dis∣cern pure Mettal from embased, by bring∣ing it to the touchstone, so we discern regular Consequences from Sophistical, by incontested Maximes. To argue aga∣gainst the use of Reason in drawing Con∣clusions from undoubted Principles, pre∣cludes

the whole service of the Rational Faculty, and lead's to the worst of Scepti∣cism. Whosoever impeacheth the fit∣ness of our understandings to draw conclu∣sions from evident Articles of Revelation, doth equally endite them of ineptitude to deduce Inferences from first Maximes of Natural Light. Scripture principles are as certain as any in Philosophy, and they lye in the same Habitudes of congruity and incongruity to other things, that first Principles of Science do; & therefore if we may not argue from those, I see no reason why it should be thought lawful to argue from these. Nor are we otherwise secure in any Ratiocinations of Philosophy no more than Theologie, unless God had giv∣en us a Logick to instruct us in the Rules of Argumentation, as he hath given us the Scripture to inform us in matters of Faith and Obedience. In a word, we must ei∣ther implicitely resign our selves to the dictates of every one that accosteth us, or we must as brutishly reject them; unless there be both a Rule to which we may apply, and by which we may try them; & some Certain Measures by which we may discern, whether we have rightly commensurated and examined them in

Order to discerning what of them is false, and what is true. Now though Reason be the instrument of deducing Conclusions from Principles of Faith, yet it is not the foundation and ground, on which we believe and assent to the Truths so deduced. Nor doth Reason judg of the Verity of the Conclusion, but only of the regularity of the de∣duction of it. When an Architect ap∣plieth his line or square to a Building, they only are the Rule by which he judgeth of the Symmetry of his Work, but it is his eye that serveth him to discern how the Work agrees to the Rule. 'Tis one thing, (as Austin saith) to know the truth of propositions, and another to understand the rules of Connexion and Laws of Argumentation. And as Camero says, to determine of the goodness of a Conclusion, or its re∣gular illation from its pre∣misses, is the Work of Rea∣son, and that according to the Rules of Logick, which is the same in Theologie, as

in Natural Phylosophy, or in Mathematicks; but to determine of the Truth of the Conclusion is the Work of Faith, through the Testimony of the Word. As a Demonstration in Ge∣ometrie doth not consti∣tute that a Truth which was not one before, but only evidenceth it to the Mind: So we do not be∣lieve a Conclusion to be an Article of Faith upon the formal Reason of its deduction, but upon the Authority of God in the Bible; Argumentation serves only to show that God, hath said it. As Computation in Arith∣metick doth not constitute the Total of the lesser Numbers, but only col∣lects and adjusts it; so Ratiocination from Prin∣ciples

of Revelation doth not make a Conclusion to be the Word of God, but only sheweth that it is so. Nor is there any weight in that exception, that in all Conclusions of this Na∣ture, one of the Premisses only is of Revelation, the other being fetcht ei∣ther from Reason, Sence, or Experience. For as that act which we could not have exerted without the assistance and in∣fluence of a supernatural subjective Principle, is rightly stiled a Supernatu∣ral act, though it be Elicited by our Nutural Faculties: So every Conclu∣sion which we arrive at the knowledg of, through the assistance and conduct of Revelation, is rightly stiled a Con∣clusion of Faith, and esteemed a part of Revelation, though a proposition of a∣nother kind be assumed to help us in the deduction of it. As a Child is Fede∣rally holy, wheresoever one of the Parents is a Believer, though the other remain in the mean time an Infidel, so from the Conjunction of two Propositi∣ons, whereof the one is of Faith, there results a Conclusion of Faith, though the other proposition be drawn only

from principles of Reason, or Evidence of Sense. All men acknowledg that particulars are included in Universals, and if the Universal be of Revelation, the several particulars involved in it, are Revealed also. For as much then as there is not one Conclusion which we deduce from Principles of Faith, that may not be inferred by some Syllogisme or other in the first Figure, where the major Proposition is always Universal, and the Conclusion is either contained in it as a Species, or as a particular; it naturally follows, that the Major be∣ing of Divine Revelation, and an Ob∣ject of Faith, the Conclusion must be esteemed, revealed, and admitted for an Object of Faith also. While the subject of the Conclusion is included in the Middle Term which is the sub∣ject of the Major proposition, and the Predicate of both is the same, there is nothing more plain and evident than that if the Major proposition be of Re∣velation, and to be believed with a Di∣vine Faith, the Conclusion is so like∣wise. Yea, were it so, that the Minor proposition were only revealed in the Scripture, yet while the Major, which

is fetcht from some incontested Maxime of Reason, contains either the whole, or a part of the Definition, or the Cor∣relate, or the Essential property, or the Contradictory, or the Contrary of the Predicate of the Assumption which is from Scripture, one of which it al∣ways doth, the Conclusion must needs be reck'ned as a part of Scripture, and submitted to in the same manner, as we do to that, which carries the express and explicite Authority of God upon it. For whosoever explicitely reveal's the thing defined, reveals in effect all those things which we have enumerated con∣cerning it. While the Scripture, for example, assureth us that Christ is a man, it doth at the same time assure us that he is a Rational Creature; and by telling us that he is a man, it doth in effect tell us, that he is not an An∣gel. And however some late Papists talk in this Matter, (not to speak of o∣thers) that they may shift the Pro∣testant Arguments which they cannot Answer: Yet I am sure the most learn∣ed that ever espoused the Romane Cause, are at an agreement with us in

this point. That is an Article of Faith, says Bel∣larmine, which God hath either revealed by the Pro∣phets and Apostles or which may be evidently inferred from thence. Smiglesius against Mascorovius pro∣claims it ridiculous to think otherwise. That is not only a part of the Christian Doctrine which is expressly revealed by the Apostles, but whatsoever can be evidently deduced thence, though one of the propositions going to the deducement of it, have its certainty only in Natural Light; saith Canus. And whereas they say that Con∣clusio sequitur debiliorem partem, the Conclusion re∣ceives it specification, and is denominated from the weakest proposition. I reply (1) Were that Logical

Maxime to be taken in the universal Latitude which they affix to it, they are yet so far from gaining any thing thereby, that their whole Cause in this Matter, is supplanted: For if both Propositions be evidently true, their Dogm's must be evi∣dently false, seeing the Conclusions that lye in repugnancy to them are, our Ene∣mies being Judges, deduced from true propositions. God is as much the Author of the Rational Faculty in its Regular Exercise, as of Scrip∣ture; and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to be persuaded by God, and to be persuaded by Right Reason is one and the same thing. (2.) That proposition in a Philosophical sense, is the weakest which is remotest from self evi∣dence; and therefore where there are two premisses, whereof the one hath no other Evidence but what it borrows from the Authority of the Infallible Revealer, the other in the mean time hav••ng ••ts Evi∣dence from a light residing in it self, and from its Congruity to the Essential Recti∣tude

of our Intellectual Faculties; if the Conclusion follow the fortune of the wea∣ker proposition, it must be a Conclusion of Faith, and not of Science. For though the Certitude of Faith be not only equal, but transcendent to the Certitude of Rea∣son, Sense, and Experience. 2 Pet. 1.16, 17, 18, 19. Yet the Evidence of Reason, and Sense, is with respect to the Object as∣sented to, & the habitude it stands in to us, beyond the Evidence of Faith, 2 Cor. 5.••.1. 1 Cor. 13.12. Nor do the School men only allow a proposition grounded on an Axiome of Reason to be more evident than a pro∣position founded only on Revelation, but withal, not a few of the Learned'st. Roma∣nists, both School-men and others, will have the former to be also more Certain at least quo ad nos, than the latter. See Bel∣larm. lib. 3. de justifi••. cap. 2. Durand. in 3. d. 23. quest. 7. Compt. Tom. poster. disp. 9. (3.) The forementioned Logical Axiome referrs only to the Quantity and Quality of the premisses, and not to any o∣ther affections incident to them. If one of the Premisses be Negative, the Conclu∣sion in the virtue of the alledged Max••me must be Negative also; or if one of the propositions be a particular, nothing be∣yond

a particular can be concluded, though the other be an Universal. And howsoe∣ver in some cases it may hold further, yet this and no more was the intendment of the first establishers of it. Nor indeed is it admittable in the full Latitude which the Terms seem to bear, seeing of two propositions, whereof the one only is true, there may follow sometimes a Con∣clusion that is true, though the other pro∣position be in the mean time palpably false. But ere I undertake the probation of the thing it self, two or three things must be necessarily premised. (1.) That all Fundamental Articles are contained 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in so many letters and syllables in the Scripture: Nor is there a∣ny thing necessary in order to our assent to them, but that we understand the Terms of the Enunciations in which they are de∣livered. 'Tis true, there are Terms, and Phrases, made use of to declare them unto the edification of Believers, & to secure the Minds of men from undue apprehen∣sions of them, that are not in the Scrip∣ture; but this is no more than what is needful in the explaining of all Divine Truths, yea, all Moral Duties. For ex∣ample, That there is One God, and that

the Father is this one God, and that the Son is so also, and the Holy Ghost like∣wise, is declared in many express Te∣stimonies in the Bible; but in the Ex∣plication of this Doctrine, and in the ap∣plication of it to the Faith and Edification of Believers; namely, how God is One in respect of his Nature and Essence; how being Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, He subsists in these three distinct Persons, what are their mutual respects to each o∣ther, and what are the incommunicable Properties in the manner of their sub∣sistence, by which they are distinguished the One from the other; there are such wo••ds and phrases made use of, as are not literally and syllabically contained in the Scripture, but teach no other thing but what is there revealed. (2.) That these very Fundamental Articles may be also confirmed by consequences and logical deductions from express literal Testimo∣nies; nor do probations of this nature al∣ter or enervate the quality of them. The thing is in it self the same, though the method of proof be varied. For exam∣ple▪ the Doctrine of the Trinity is equally a Fundamental, whether we prove it from express Texts, or by consequences from

literal Testimonies, or by its connexion with the whole Systeme of the Gospel, the Incarnation of the Son of God, the Oeconomy of Redemption, &c. (3.) That though all Fundamentals be in Terminis expressed in the Scripture, that yet these very Truths do include others in them which cannot be proved but by Conse∣quences. For instance, That God is a Sp••rit, is revealed in so many letters and syllables in the Bible; but that therefore he hath not hands, nor feet, nor any cor∣poreal members, can only be concluded by way of Consequence. In l••ke manner the Incarnation of the Son of God, that the Word was made Flesh, is expresly taught in the Scripture▪ but yet there are many things predicable of the Word In∣carnate, which cannot be otherwise de∣monstrated, but by Consequences, and by borrowing some proposition or other from principles of Natural light.

Now these things being premised, the lawfulness of arguing from express Scrip∣ture-Truths, by deduction of Conclusi∣ons, which though they be not mentioned in the Bible in letters and syllables, are yet there in effect, and were accordingly in∣tended, may briefly be thus justified.

(1.) In that to preclude this is to render the Word of God of no significancy to any particular person; seeing 'tis by this method alone that general precepts, pro∣m••ses, and Comminations are applicable to single Individuals. Nor can any one Universal direction be otherwise brought down to a particular case. (2.) God in instructing us how we are to demean our selves towards his Word, doth it in Terms and Phrases which are peculiar to such as Discourse, ratiocinate, and deduce Conclusions from acknowledged Princi∣ples. See Rom. 3.28. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 there∣fore we conclude, Rom. 6.11. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 likewise reckon ye also your selves, 1 Cor. 2.13. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 comparing Spiritual things with Spiri∣tual, Act. 17.11. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 they searched the Scriptures, namely, whether the things which the Apostles deduced from the Testimonies of Moses and the Prophets, had foundation in them, yea or not, 1 Thes. 5.21. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 prove all things. Hence we are enjoyned 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 rightly to divide the word of Truth, 2 Tim. 2.15. and to Pro∣phesie, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 according to the analogy of Faith, Rom. 12.6. and

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to convince by argu∣ment and demonstration gainsayers. And 'tis said of Paul that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 he reasoned wth the Jews out of the Scriptures, Acts 17.2. And of Apollos that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he mightily in the way of ratio∣cination convinced the Jews, demonstrating by the Scriptures that Jesus was Christ, Acts 18.28. Nor was it possible by any text of the Old-Testament for the Apostles to prove Jesus of Nazareth to be the Messiah, but by argumentation & trains of deducti∣ons. There was no other way or Method by which this could be don, but by shew∣ing from Moses and the Prophets, that to whomsoever such properties, Characters, &c. agr••ed, such a one behoved to be the Messiah, and then evincing from History and Experience, that all these Characterisms centred in, and agreed to Jesus of Nazareth. And in this way the Apostles proceeded in their dealing with the Jews, by producing places out of their own Scriptures where the Proper∣ties, Signatures, Characteristical notes of the Person, Natures, Offices and Work of the Messiah were foretold and described, and by which the Faith of the Church

was guided to him, and on which the World was bound to receive him; and then in shewing that all these agreed to, were verified of, and met in our Lord Jesus as their Center, they concluded that he was infallibly the person concerning whom the Promises were made unto the Fathers. And this leads me to the 2d. argument in proof of that we have under∣taken to justifie; namely the Method which the Inspired Writers observed in the conviction of Jews and Heathens. There can be no fallacy where we act con∣formably to such a pattern; nor can that be disclaimed as Sophistical in others, which we find practiced by the Sacred Penmen, without impeaching both the Wisedome and Truth of God by whom they were inspired. To allow it to have been lawful for them to argue by Conse∣quences, and yet in the mean time to deny it to others, is to be perverse, partial and humoursome: and to lodg it as an accusa∣tion on Them that they mistook in the course they steered, is not only to justifie the Jews in their unbelief, and the Hea∣then in their Idolatry, but to blaspheme the Holy Spirit by whom they were acted and conducted in what they did.

Now that this was the Method which the Apostles observed, in their demonstrating many of the chief Articles of the Chri∣stian Faith, may be made good by many instances scattered up and down the New-Testament, See Act 9.22. Act 18.28. Act 15.8, 9. Act 17.16.17. Act 2.16, 17, 18. Act 3.22, 23. Rom. 1.20. Rom. 3.9. to 21. Gal. 3.10. 1 Cor. 15.4, 5, 6, 7. Joh. 1.33, 34. In all these places, not to name more, (nor to urge the suffrage of the Author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, in whom this way of procedure manifests it self in every Chapter and paragraph,) We must ac∣knowledg that they not only argued by consequences, but that if their Argu∣ments were digested into syllogisms, there will be only one proposition found that is of Revelation, the other being assumed either from Reason or Sense. Besides the attestation of Apostolical practice in this matter we have also the example of our blessed Saviour, to convince us not only of the lawfulness, but to assure us of the obligation that lyes upon us, of accounting all that for the Word of God, which can by any train of Natural deduction be con∣cluded from it. If men were not resolved

to be obstinate, this alone were enough to issue the debate, and to advance what we are pleading for beyond all jurisdiction of being gainsaid. It is by way of argu∣mentation and by consequences that he proves the Divinity of his Person. Mat. 22.44, 45. The Quality and Autho∣rity of his Office, John 5.39, 45, 46. John 10.25, 37, 38. Luke. 7.20, 21▪ 22. The necessity of the Death and suf∣ferings of the Messiah, Luke 24 26.27. The Resurrection of the Dead in General Mat. 22.31, 32. All his Reasonings in the forecited places, should they be redu∣ced into a Logical Form, will be found to bear upon one only Scripture premiss, the other being constantly either a propo∣sition drawn from natural Light▪ or from the evidence of Sense. And to affirm that the Ratiocinations of Christ and the Apo∣stles, though they joyned one premise from Reason or experience, to another from Scripture, were nevertheless conclusive, because the Proposition from Reason by their very using of it, became upon the ac∣count of the infallible authority they were clothed with, a part of Divine Revelation; I say to affirm this, is ridiculous and im∣pertinent. For had they intended to have

immediately concerned their authority in what they said, Argumentation from an acknowledged Scripture Truth had been both needless and superfluous. Where the whole evidence depends upon the Authority of the immediate Speaker, a naked assertion is not only sufficient but most becoming. Let the Authority of a person be what it will, yet so far as in transacting with others, he recurrs to argu∣ments either from Reason, or the Testi∣mony of an other, so far in that instance he plainly declines his Authority. Nor did all these with whom Christ and the Apostles dealt in way of Argumentation, acknowledg any such authority by vertue of which, whatsoever they said in such a case became immediately a part of Divine Revelation, to have belonged to them. When the Scribes and Pharisees confes∣sed Christ in the way and Method of proving the Resurrection to have said well, Marc. 12.28. Luke 20.39. They did not thereby intend the acknowledgment of Christ as a prophet sent from God, or that any authority upon that account resi∣ded in him, For that they disclaimed: but it was the Authority of God, Exod. 3.6. and the rationalness of his deduction from

thence, though made by the joyning of a proposition of another Nature to it, which they paid a respect to. The Multitude were swayed in this case by the meer strength and weight of his argument, and are therefore said to have been astonished at his Doctrine, Mat. 22.33. They ad∣mired his Wonderful Wisdom and pro∣found Sagacity; nor were they influenced by any Authority they held him vested with. Nor indeed is it any great evidence of a profound Wisedom or of his insight into the Scripture, to argue from Media which have no further convincing efficacy or force, but what they borrow from his authority that useth them. In brief, either the Text quoted by our Saviour was sufficient, antecedently to Christs using of it, and abstracting from his Authority, to demonstrate the Resurrection, or it was not. If it was, then it was not meerly from his Authority, that they came under an Ob∣ligation to a belief of that conclusion: If it was not; than how comes Christ to lodg their unbelief in reference to the Resurre∣ctiō upon their ignorance of the Scriptures? Marc. 12.24. Mat. 22.31. For if they stood not under the obligation of that con∣sequence, but meerly because of his Au∣thority,

then the best acquaintance imagin∣able with the sense and meaning of that place, could have ministred them no relief in that point, yea it had been utterly un∣lawful to have drawn any such inference from it. (5.) Exclude Scripture-Con∣sequences, and the Papists are not able to impugn one Tenet of the Protestants, nor are they in Capacity to prove the first Article of the Roman Faith, namely, the pretended Infallibility of their Church. While they wrest such Weapons out of our hands, they at the same time disarm themselves. And by endeavouring to disserve the Cause of the Reformed Churches, they utterly undo their own. For if our Reasonings of this kind be insig∣nificant against them, theirs are also in∣significant against us, and by the same art that they endeavour to blunt the edge of our Swords, they are bound to throw a∣way their own. I shall discourse this no farther, only shut it up with a saying of Justin Martyr, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 without Philosophy and right Reason, there can be no knowledge nor sci∣ence in the World.

§. 12. The next thing that belongs to Reason in matters of Religion, regards

those Doctrines, which besides the Foun∣dation that they have in Revelation, have also Evidence in the light of Nature. And as I intimated before §. 5. more is allow∣able to Reason in and about these, than about those we are indebted only to the Scripture for the discovery of. 'Tis not enough that we enquire into the declara∣tion of them, as it lyes in the Bible, and how they are there expressed, &c. but we are further to see what Media there are in the light of Nature, by which they may be both discerned and confirmed. Yet I shall here crave liberty to premise; That where the Authority of the Scripture is owned, our chief Topicks in all Theolo∣gical debates ought to be fetcht from the sacred Records. Thence we should both frame our Idea's of them, and borrow as well the Arguments, as the Colours and Ornaments, by which we would commend them to the Minds and Consciences of Believers. Especially a regard ought to be had to this, in popular Discourses and Sermons. As humane Authority ought to have very little place, if any at all, in the Pulpit, so we ought not there to serve our selves too much from Maxims of Philoso∣phie, and principles of Reason. As God

hath impressed more of his Authority up∣on the Scriptures, than upon any thing else that he hath made Himself and his Will known by; so there is an Efficacy of the Spirit promised to attend the naked Preaching of the Word, beyond what we can expect to accompany our Ratiocinati∣ons from principles of Reason. As Faith prepares the spirits of men to a submission to what they hear immediately out of the Bible, so there is something great and ele∣vated, which I know not how to express, in Truths, as nakedly delivered by the Holy Ghost, which Argumentations from Na∣tural Maximes, doth for the most part ob∣nubilate and darken. The Majesty of God, whose commands we deliver, doth above all things most attract the respect of our Auditors, nor do we at any time so effectually persuade, as by the meer autho∣rity of him in whose Name we speak. Yet I do not deny, but that Rational proofs are of great use, not only to such with whom Scripture-Testimonies signifie no∣thing, but even to those who own and a∣dore its Authority, by shewing that as it is highly reasonable to believe whatsoever God hath said, so the things themselves are agreeable to, and have foundation in Rea∣son;

and the two lights of Revelation and Nature do excellently harmonise. This being premised, among other Truths which besides their being plainly revealed in the Scripture, have also evidence given to them in the Light of Nature, the Im∣mortality of the Soul, and the certainty of Providence, are especially remarkable. 'Tis True there are many other Doctrines of this quality, viz. the Attributes of God, the Creation of the World, Moral Good and Evil, &c. All which, as they are revealed in the sacred Scripture, so they are demonstrable from undoubted principles of Reason: But wav••ng these at present, I shall only by way of essay, and with all imaginable brevity, consider what media there are in Nature, by which the two former may be evinced, and the serviceableness of Reason in the doing of it. I shall begin with the Immortality of the Soul; and the Unhappiness of the Age wherein we live, doth render the inculca∣tion of this Truth not only seasonable, but necessary. Men having degraded them∣selves into Beasts by practice, they thence take the Measures of their Opinions, and allow no difference betwixt themselves and the p••ttifullest Brute, but that Matter

in them is fallen into a more lucky tex∣ture and modification. To justifie their sensualities, they contend that they have nothing but their Animal inclinations to gratifie; and indeed the soul of a Brute will very well serve all the Ends that some men propound to themselves. Next the Belief of the Beeing of God, the persuasi∣on of the souls being Immortal, is the hinge upon which all Religion turns. 'Tis this that leads us both to contemn the gratifications of the Flesh, and to be soli∣citous about a happiness hereafter, though it be with the undergoing of present in∣conveniences, rather than here. There is no one Truth hath a more powerful in∣fluence upon the whole course of our pre∣sent life, than a steddy and vigorous belief that the soul is immortal. Now when we assert the Immortality of the Soul, we do n••t intend that it is Immortal in such a sense, as that by no cause it can be annihi∣lated. God alone is thus Immortal, for as there are no principles of Corruption in his Nature, so there is no forraign Agent that can deprive him of his Being. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 He only hath Immortality, 1 Tim. 6.16. All things owing their Existence to him, there is both a Power

and a Right resident in him of depriving them (should he judg it fit) of their Be∣ings. Whatsoever is derived from his Power and Bounty, he may take away at his pleasure. Yet I reckon it absurd to think that he doth annihilate our Souls, it being contrary to the Method which he ob∣serves in other parts of the Universe. No substance yet ever perished. Under all the Mutations that Matter undergoes, by which this and that Individual body comes to be destroy'd, there is not so much as one single Atome lost. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. No substantial En∣tity is totally destroyed saith the Philosopher. Non perit in tanto quicquid mihi credite mundo. Ovid. By the Immor∣tality of the soul then, we mean no more, but that it includes no principles in its self, by which it can be brought to decay. And this it derives from it being Immaterial. No spiritual substance is capable of that dissolution which a Body is lyable to, and suffers. For seeing Material subjects come to be corrupted only by a separation of their conjoyned parts; The Soul being Immaterial, and so void of parts, is in dan∣ger of no such dissolution. Now in dis∣coursing the Immortality of the Soul, I think fit in the beginning to discharge my

self from an exception or two, which though hugely insisted on by those who will have the soul to be meerly corporeal, and consequently corruptible, yet are in themselves absurd and irrational. The first is this, that there is no such thing in the World as an Incorporeal Being, and that Existence is not to be affirmed of any thing, but what is perceivable by sense; and that we cannot have assurance that a∣ny thing is, but what we have ocularly be∣held. To which I reply (1) That they miserably beg the question which they ought to prove. They have not been a∣ble to assign any contradiction that lyes a∣gainst an Incorpo••eal Being, more than a∣gainst a Corporeal. (2.) Their Objecti∣on doth equally militate against the Being of God, as against the Immaterial Nature of the Soul. For if God be at all, he is Incorporeal, a Corporeal God being pregnant with Contradictions. (3.) We are not to require more proof of any thing than it is capable of. According to the diversity of Objects▪ we are furnished with distinct faculties in order to the perception of them, and there are different lights in which they are seen. Who questions the being of Sounds, Odours, &c. be∣cause

they are not discerned by the same Organical Faculty that Colours are? To require that an Immaterial should fall un∣der the perception of sight, is to demand that an Immaterial should be a Material. There are Innumerable things, whereof we have the most convincing Certainty, and yet they were never the Objects of Sense. No man ever saw a Thought, and yet we are fully assured that we have Thoughts. How many things do the Gentlemen that make this exception believe, which yet they never saw? (4) Though Incorporeal Beings be not Immediately perceived by sense, yet through diverse of their operations which affect our Sensitive Organs, we have a mediate assurance of their Existence by our very Senses. The second exception is taken from the inexplicableness of U∣nion, betwixt a Material and an Immate∣rial. There is no Cement, say they, by which the one can be knit to the other. Incorporeals are of a penetrating Na∣ture, and consequently cannot take hold of Matter, so as to make a Whole consist∣ing of two constituent parts so vastly diffe∣rent. To this I answer, (1.) That there is nothing more Unreasonable than wholly

to question the Existence of things, be∣cause we do not Understand the Modes ac∣cording to which they Exist. To dis∣charge a Cause out of the precincts of Be∣ing, because we cannot give a reason of all its particular effects, ought to be justly reckon'd amongst the greatest of absurdi∣ties. Whatsoever is prov'd by Reason, we are firmly to believe it, though there may be many things in the Theory of it that are wholly inconceivable. While we have all imaginable assurance of the con∣junction of the soul with the body, and that the soul cannot be corporeal, our Faith ought no ways to be weakned, though we know not the Physical way of their coalition, and how they come to be United. (2.) There is as much difficul∣ty in apprehending the connexion of one part of Matter with another, as in Under∣standing the Incorporation of the Soul with the Body, and yet no man questions but that there are bodies in which the par∣ticles of matter are united. I hope to make it appear, Ch••pt. 3d. that there is not any Hypothesis of Philosophy yet ex∣tant, by which the Union of the parts of Matter in cont••nuous Bodies can be solved, and yet we are very well assured

they are connected together. A 3d. Ex∣ception is rai••ed from the Sympathy that is betwixt the Soul and the Body, from which they would conclude an Identity of Nature between them. To which I briefly return to these things, (1.) There are ma∣ny cases in which our Souls are affected, without the least impression either from bodily Objects without us, or any previ∣ous excitation of the Spirituous Blood within us. For not to mention the im∣pression which the Soul receives from the consideration of things purely Spiritual and Divine, which do no ways immediate∣ly affect the Body, all the Influence ima∣ginable which they have upon it, pro∣ceeding primarily from the mind it self, and its dominion over the Animal Spirits. I shall only name Troubles of Conscience which arise only from Moral Causes, and the exercise of our Reasons about what we have done. I may add that there are ma∣ny cases wherein the Soul and Body seem to have no Communion with one ano∣ther, and that not only in Ecstasies, when the Soul is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in a manner for a season separated from the Body; but even in other. Hence men upon the borders of

Grave, when without strength, vigor, or pulse, yet even then they have their thoughts more refined, and their under∣standings more spritely, than at other times. And which is more strange, are so little affrighted at death, though they fully understand it, that they lay down the Body with the same compo••edness, and more delight, than if they were only putting off their Cloaths. Nor are they only persons tired with the miseries of the World that do so, b••t such many times, who have enjoyed all the delight that this earthly state can afford. (2.) We find our Souls frequently determining them∣selves in way of chusing and refusing, con∣trary to the provocations of sense, and the cravings of the bodily Appetite. Though our Intellectual Faculties have a percep∣tion of sensual Delights, yet they often chuse both that which is contrary to flesh∣ly pleasures, and which no Corporeal Fa∣culty is able so much as once to appre∣hend. Were we constituted of meer Matter, all our operations should be pro∣duced by a fatal Impulse, and in every act we should be under the like Necessity as Matter is, when forcibly determined to Motion. While we find our selves en∣dowed

with a faculty determinative of it self, We may rationally infer that the impulses of outward Objects upon the bo∣dily Organs, and the continuation of their Motion to the Brain and Heart, do only solicite, and not force out Assent, and that the Soul it self is of an Immaterial Nature. (3.) All that sympathie, which we observe between the Soul and Body ariseth meer∣ly from the close connexion of the one with the other, and is necessary both in order to the Souls governing the Body, & its being engaged to take care of it, and provide a∣gainst its necessities. And as a Lutanist loseth not his skill, because he cannot play melodiously upon an Instrument, whose str••ngs are either broken or ill tun'd: No more is the Soul prejudiced in her self by bodily Maladies, though she be hindred & discomposed in her operations, through the distemper of those Organical Instru∣ments which she is forced to use. That we are too much affected with every passi∣on and irregular motion of the blood and Animal Spirits, doth not prove that our Souls are Corporeal, or that our irregu∣lar actings upon those inordinate motions are the results of fatal Impulses; but only shew that we do excite our Intellectual

powers, to the preventing those violent Motions, and the keeping the Body Se∣date, and to the curbing and restraining them when excited, and that we do by sloth & neglect suffer our selves to be de∣pressed by those Terrestrial encumbran∣ces, and hurried by those Motions, which if we were not wanting to our selves we might easily tame and subdue.

Having free'd our selves from these exceptions, we now proceed to the thing it self, and in the mentioning the Ar∣guments which offer themselves in Na∣ture to prove the Immo••tality of the Soul, I shall not insist on that Argu∣ment which is so vigorously urged by some Modern as well as Ancient Wri∣ters: Namely that if the Soul were Corporeal we should not be the same to day, that we were yester day. We remain the same at sixty Years of Age that we were at twenty, though in the mean time we have worn away many bodies; and therefore, say they, there must be something Immaterial in us which is the foundation of this Identity. This I shall wave, for they who con∣tend for the Corporeity of the Soul, will reply, that we are no otherwise the same

this Year that we were the last, than Brutes and Vegtables are. Nor shall I press the Argument that is drawn from sensation, because what ever is in it for the Immateriality of the sen∣tient and percipient Principle, in us con∣cludes in behalf of Brutes that they have the like. For the Hypothesis of Des-Cartes that Beasts are meer Machines I look upon it as altogether indefensi∣ble. But though I decline and wave the using of this Medium for the rea∣son I have now suggested, yet I dare not censure it as trifling, much less disclaym it as Sophistical. These then being lay'd aside, there are others to be pro∣duced; and seeing that whatsoever is Incorporeal is upon the very score of its being so, incorruptible, and excepted from dissolution also: I shall mainly in∣quire what reasons there are in the Light of Nature, whereby we may be induced to believe that our Souls are Immaterial. First, if the Soul were only a Crasis of the Body, it were capable of no other distempers but what arise from the compression or dilatation of matter, or from the obstruction and inflamation of Humours while we therefore find it

subject to Maladies which spring meer∣ly from Moral causes, and which are no more curable by the prescriptions of Physicians, than the Stone or Gout are to be removed by a Philosophy Lecture, we have sufficient Cause to believe that it is of an incorporeal Nature. 2dly. The essences of things are best known by their operations, and the best guess we can make of the Nature and Condition of beings, is from the quality of their Actions. While therefore by contem∣plating our selves we find that we do elicite actions which exceed the power of matter, and the most subtile Motion of Corporeal particles; we have all ima∣ginable ground to think, that we are pos∣sessed of a principle that is Immaterial, as well as Intellectual. He who consi∣ders that there is not one perfect Organ in the Human Body, but the parallel of it is to be met with in the Noblest sort of Brute Animals, and yet that there are diverse operations performed by men, that no Beast whatsoever is capa∣ble of doing the like, must need appre∣hend that the Soul is not a Corporeal Faculty, nor a contexture of Material parts. Here all the Acts of Intellection

may be insisted on. (1) Acts of sim∣ple Apprehension. We are endow∣ed with a Faculty that frame's No∣tions and Ideas of things which exceed the Sphere of Sense, which are no ways capable of sensible Representation, nor were the Notions of them conveyed into us by the help of Terrestrial Ima∣ges. Such are the Notions of Immate∣rial Beings, infinite Space, the Habi∣tudes of one thing to another, Moral Congruities and Incongruities, ab∣stract and Universal Natures, Propor∣tions of Figures, Symmetry of Magni∣tudes, yea the notion of perception it self. (2) Acts of judgments whereby we contemplate the several Natures and properties of things, compare them in all their respects, rank them in their distinct orders and dependen∣cies, frame distinctions and divisions of Beings, connect and disjoyn Subjects and Predicates, and accordingly say that this appertains to the other, or it doth not, and affirm or deny one thing of another as we observe them to agree or disagree. (3) Acts of Ratiocination, whereby we infer one thing from another by Syllogisms, deduce Conse∣quences

of longer or shorter Trayns. (4) Acts of Reflection in which the Soul becomes it own Object, perceive's that it doth perceive, passeth a sentence up∣on its own judgements, which no mat∣ter though it be never so fine, and how∣soever modified and agitated, can do. (5) Acts of Correcting the Errours and mistakes of Imagination, whereby hav∣ing viewed all the representations of the Senses it compares them together, makes a judgement of them, forms ap∣prehensions contrary to those which are suggested to us by sensitive Organs, re∣jects the phantasms of Imagination, as insufficient Indications of the Truth of External Objects. Not that our Senses are deceived, for they only de∣clare their own Passions, and communi∣cate their Motions to the Brain, accord∣ing to the Impulses which they really receive from ambient Matter; but these representations being made with∣out judgment, the Soul examines them, perceives that it should be deceived should it always pronounce according to the Images conveyed to it by the Sen∣ses, and accordingly apprehends, cor∣rects and determineth contrary to them.

(6.) Acts of Volition, whereby it Chus∣eth and Refuseth by a self-determinating-Power, according as things are estimated, remaining exempt from all coaction and necessitation by the influence of any Prin∣ciple forreign to it. Now all these are im∣possible to Matter, because That acts al∣ways according to the swing of Irresistible Motion, nor can it be courted and soli∣cited to Rest, when under the forcible Impulse of a stronger Movent. 3dly. The Immortality of the Soul is plainly demon∣strated from the Attributes of God and his Government of the World. Without the supposition of a Future State there is no preserving the Authority of God from contempt, no due means provided for the preventing men from gainful sins, or the encouraging of them to hazardous Duties. And accordingly there have been few in the World who have believed a Provi∣dence, but they have likewise asserted the Immortality of the Soul; these two being inseparably connected. While we contemplate the state of things in the World, we find Prosperity for the most part attending Vice, and Misery the Com∣panion of Virtue. Good men are usually accompanied with Crosses, and have the

least proportion of present things, while Bad men are often glutted with success, and swim in pleasures. Now if there were not an Immortal state where both the Virtue of the Good might be compen∣sated, and they receive comfort for their Sufferings, and the Vice of the Bad might be punished, and they receive Vengeance for their Crimes; both the Wisdom and Goodness, as well as Justice of the Rector of the World, would be lyable to cen∣sure and Impeachment. Yea it seems the better of the two, wholly to deny the Providence of God, than to think that he should administer humane affairs with so much irregularity and injustice. In a word there is nothing can administer a satis∣factory resolution in reference to the present dispensation of things in the World, but a firm persuasion of the Im∣mortality of the Soul, and the Certainty of a Future state. Judgments inflicted on Sinners in this life, cannot fully clear the Righteousness of God, because the best of men are as well involved in them as the worst; yea, it is but now and then that the greatest Criminals are made as remarkable in their punishments as they have been in their lives. Besides an In∣finite

Eternal God is the Object of Wick∣ed mens contempt, and its his Law who lives for ever, whose Authority they de∣spise; nor can any punishment be pro∣portionable, but what is Eternal also. 4ly. That inbred desire which is in all men after Immortality, argues that there is such really provided for the satisfying this Natural and Universal appetite. For 'tis not to be Imagined that Nature should furnish us with longings, when there is nothing that may content them. To have such desires wrought into the complexion and constitution of our Souls, were there provision made of nothing that might answer them, would not only reflect upon the Wisdom of our Maker, who hath produced us with these longings; of which there is no use; but his Mercy, Goodness, and Justice also, in implanting those Appetites in us, which serve at once to abuse and torment us. And this leads me to the other particular which I pro∣mised to discourse; namely, the Cer∣tainty of Divine Providence. This is one of the Truths also, which besides the attestation given to it in the Scripture, hath evidence enough in the Light of Na∣ture. I confess, that if we take our Mea∣sures

in this Matter from the sentiments of the Wisest Heathen, we should be ready to think there is no foundation in Reason to convince us otherwise, but that all things go at Random. It was not the opi∣nion of Epicurus alone, but of many o∣thers, that the Gods concerned not them∣selves in sublunary affairs. Nor did the Poets only discharge God from the Go∣vernment of the World, but their very Moral Philosophers did the same.

Horaces, — Deos didici securum a∣gere aevum And Lucans—Nunquam se cura Deo∣rum Sic premit, ut vestrae vitae vestrae{que} saluti Fata vacent.—

Are not worse than Plinies, Irridendum curam agere rerum humanarum illud quic∣quid est summum: and Senecaes, Deus nihil agit, nec illum magis beneficia quam inju∣riae tangunt. Even many of them that owned some kind of providence, either confined it to Heaven, holding it Unsuita∣ble to His Glorious Nature to concern himself about frail and visible things, but

that he governs them by subordinate Causes, as the Grand Seigniour doth his Provinces by his Bashaws & Lieutenants; or they limited it to effects which de∣pend on a concatenation of Natural Causes, to which they are ligu'd by trains and connexions, excluding God in the mean time from any Care of Contingent Events, or Administration about the Un∣derstandings and Wills of Men; or lastly, they bound it up to Universals and Gene∣rals, allowing it little or no interposure a∣bout particulars and singulars. And this seems to have been the opinion of the Au∣thor of the Book de Mundo, who whether it was Aristotle or Philo, or any other, is not material. The reasons that prevail∣ed with them to question, yea, deny the providence of God, were 1st. That 'tis beneath and unbecoming the perfections of God, and an interruption of his Felicity, to concern himself in the affairs of the sublunary World, and to distract himself with the cares of it. But this is (1.) Ra∣ther to describe some effeminate Prince, than the Deity. And (2.) It proceeds up∣on a Foolish mistake, & an unworthy sup∣position; namely, that it is pain and trou∣ble to God to govern the World, which

none can imagine but they who are igno∣rant of his Attributes and Being. What∣ever God can do, he does it without trou∣ble to his Infinite perfections. Nor (3.) Is the Happiness of God more im∣peached in Governing the World, than in making of it. If without molestation to Himself, he could produce it at first, he can without encumbrance Rule it still. The 2d. Motive that sway'd them to doubt the Providence of God, was the Impunity of Wicked Men. But in this they conclu∣ded as Illogically▪ as in the former. God (1.) may have aims in the prosperity of Criminals that we are not aware of, and therefore we ought not to reflect on his dispensations, when we know not the grounds of them. He hereby testifies that severity is not the inclination of his Nature, but that punishments are ex∣torted from him. He hereby also allows offenders time, as well as Inducements to Repentance. He also herein sets us a pattern of mercy and forbearance, and teacheth us Meekness and Lenity by his own Bounty and Patience. He withal gives assurance to the World by this of a future judgment. The Prosperity of the Wicked here, is a pledge of their

punishment hereafter. (2.) Bad men are not so happy as they are commonly imagined to be. How can they be reckoned happy who have nothing suc∣ceeding, according to their Scope and Meaning? Every man intends well to himself, but it is the perpetual infelicity of the Wicked, that they never reach the mark they aime at. For by doing ill, they prosecute that, which at last them∣selves will find of all things to be the worst. Besides, Wickedness is its own punishment, not only in that it debaseth the Soul, degrades Humane Nature, and offers violence to the principles of Rea∣son; but that in the very pursuit of it, the offender forfeits all true tranquillity, for that only accompanies Virtue. That lust cannot be assigned, the gratifying of which, is not attended with disquietness. The Unbridled appetite is a scorching flame; Envy is a gnawing Scorpion; Co∣vetousness is a strangling and corroding care, &c. The multitude of Ends and Objects which exercise a wicked mans thoughts, do wonderfully distract him. His Soul is full of disquietness through the intestine and civil Wars maintained in it. Scelera dissident; Lusts are like the brood

of Cadmus. arm'd one against the other. Diversity of inconsistent Ends and oppo∣site Means do strangely rack and discom∣pose the Soul of a Sinner, and his Mind is like the Sea when it rageth with the stri∣ving of contrary Winds upon it. Nor is this all, but there is be∣sides, a secret shame linkt to every wicked action, and every Evil is preg∣nant with an inward Horrour. Let a man offend never so privately, yet when he thinks what he hath done, he is both a∣sham'd, and his Conscience fills him with remorse for what is past, and tormenting fear of what is to come. The joy and delight which he promiseth himself in prosperous wickedness, is withered by the dread of future punishment. (3.) All the prosperity of Sinners is constituted of Earthly Enjoyments, and the disappoint∣ment which they find in them, having no∣thing better neither in possession nor hope, doth not only lessen, but emb••tter the fruition. There is an insatiable Ap∣petite in the Soul of man, which nothing Terrene can content or satisfie, and the Meditation of this, is enough to make them vote themselves miserable in the midst of all their Grandeur and Opulency.

Nor is the frustration which we meet with in every single enjoyment to be either prevented or remedyed, by having re∣course to variety. For after we have traversed the Creation, we shall still find our selves unsatisfied. And how unsea∣sonable will it be, to bewayl our folly, for seeking that in sublunary things which they could not minister, when we find it too late to make better provision. (4.) As every Wicked man is not prosperous, so prodigious Sinners do seldom, even in this life, escape exemplary punishment. God now & than singles out some chief offen∣ders whom he punisheth in this World, that they may be as common Antidotes against the poyson of Wickedness, that it may not encrease and spread, through an Uni∣versal Impurity of bad men. (5.) If bad men were immediately punished, Moral government would be subverted, nor should there be room for the Influence of Comminations and Pro∣mises. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, If punishment were immediately inflicted upon Delin∣quents, obedience would cease to be a Vir∣tue,

as proceeding from fear, not choyce. The third Exception against the Provi∣dence of God in the Government of the World, is fetcht from the Miseries and sufferings of the Righteous. But that conclusion is ill drawn from those pre∣misses; nor is there any such Consequent chain'd to that Antecedent. There is e∣nough in the light of Nature to satisfie us in this Matter, though Men have not been so happy as always to discern it. (1). Many that seem to be good, yet in∣deed are not so. There are some stark naught, who nevertheless have the cun∣ning to conceal it. But though they de∣ceive us, they cannot impose upon Om∣niscience; and when we think that a Righteous person is ill entreated, God on∣ly punisheth a secret Malefactor. It be∣comes us to suppose a just Cause why God makes men Unhappy by adversity, though he do not acquaint us with it. (2.) There is enough in the Best to deserve worse than they suffer. God never chastens a Believer, but he strikes an offender. He never afflicts a Saint, but at the same time he punisheth a Delinquent. It is true, that though Men will confess themselves not to be so Good as they should be, yet e∣very

one thinks himself too good to suffer; and let their chastisements be never so justly and mercifully moderated, yet they judge them too great for them to under∣goe. But would men calmly examine themselves, they would not only find Cause to justifie God in what they meet with, but to magnifie his Mercy that they feel no more. (3) No Good mans Af∣flictions are so many, but his Mercies are more; and we ought to confront the one with the other. In the day of Prosperity be joyful, but in the day of Adversity consider, for God hath set the one over against the other, &c. Eccle. 7.14. The 70 read that place God hath tuned one thing to ano∣ther 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. As Harmony in Musick is perfected by sup∣plyes of different Notes; so God hath Checker'd our Conditions in the World, for the better beautifying of his Provi∣dence. And as the Night sets off the Day, & the Winter as well recommends as relieves the Summer, so doth God give us the quicker tast and relish of our Mer∣cies, by intermixing them with Crosses. (4.) Our hesitations about Providence up∣on the account of the sufferings of good men, proceeds from Unacquainted∣ness

with Gods design in them, and an ignorance of their Issue. He is our Friend when he seems to be our Enemy, and only acts the part of a Physician when we look upon him as an Executioner. He only withdraws what would be our snare instead of our advantage; and with-holds what he fore-sees we would mistake for God, instead of being lead by it to him. As there is no judging of a Picture by its first lines, nor of a Structure by seeing its Materials in heaps; no more ought we to pass sentence upon the Providences of God, without a prospect of them from the beginning to the end. Providence is one Entire System, nor can we judge of the parts but in relation to the whole. What at first we can give no account of, we are often brought to approve by a subsequent course of Dispensations. (5.) The a∣bridging Good Men in the fading Transi∣tory things of the World, doth not at all argue that God envies Good Men hap∣piness, but only declares that true Happi∣ness doth not consist in such things. There is no one thing speaks the Emptiness of the admired greatness, profits, and pleasures of the World more, then that God permits the enjoyment of them to the worst of

men, and with-holds them from such for whom he hath the greatest esteem. Who ever understands the Nature of true Good, must bid adieu to the hopes of it in any thing but God alone. And for those things that most state felicity in, a Wise and Good man would judg himself unhappy, if he could not despise them. Who can think that to live in a Palace, to lye in a soft Bed, to eat nothing but what is delicate, to give Laws to others, to be controlled in nothing we say or do, &c. were ever intended for the Felicity of an Intellectual and Rational Being? The Soul of a Brute would have served all the Ends that some men propound to themselves; but surely the bestowing of an Immortal Spirit on us, ought to instruct us, that Blessedness consists in something else than Gauds, Trifles, Grandeur, Airy Titles and the like. And he who cannot want these things without thinking him∣self Miserable, at once reproacheth his Maker, as if he had Created him for nothing more worthy, and degrades and dishonours himself, by intimating that such gratifications are suitable to Him. (6.) The advantages which Good men receive by afflictions, do amply compen∣sate

their feeling of them. They hereby both discern their sincerity themselves, and discover it to others. Nor is it easie to imagine the satisfaction, that the Con∣sciousness of a constant sincerity ministers to a Soul. To find that we love God, notwithstanding the narrow allowance he affords us, is a more soveraign Cordial to the Mind that would approve its self to God, than the flushest enjoyment of su∣blunary things can yield. Their Adver∣sity also gives them either relief in Morti∣fying those Corruptions which endanger them, or in exercising those Graces which glorifie God. And who dare reproach the Wisdom or Goodness of God for dis∣posing things in such a manner, as may turn not only most to his own Honour, but our advantage. Storms and Frosts are as Use∣ful to the Universe, as serene and clear weather. Nor are Sugar and Honey more necessary, than Salt and Brine are. If after all this, there remain Inexplica∣bles in the works of Providence, 'tis no more than what we daily meet with, in the Works of Creation. Nor must a finite Understanding hope to comprehend the Methods of an Infinite God. And the future state will set all that straight, which

we now judge Crooked. Having vindi∣cated the Providence of God from those Objections which seem to affront it, my next task is to suggest those Arguments which Reason, abstracting from all Revela∣tion, can muster to attest it. (1) Were there not an Omnipotent Power, and an Omni∣scient skill to restrain and govern the quarrelsome Spirits that are in the World, it would soon sink under the bottom of its own Confusion. This the Heathen inti∣mated in the Fable of Phaethon, who being admitted to drive the Chariot of the Sun but for one day, burnt both himself and it together. It was well said by the Stoick, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, It is not worth the while to live in a World empty of God and Providence. Nay it were the greatest unhappiness imaginable to be brought forth into the World, to be perpetu∣ally tossed up and down by blind Fortune. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, If there were not a Providence, there could be no Order in the World. And as another Philosopher saith 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; If there were no Su¦preme Orderer, whence comes order to be

in the World? (2.) Preclude Providence, & we remove one of the greatest foundations of venerating the Diety. 'Tis not a per∣suasion of the Excellency of his Nature, that can engage us to a hearty Adoration of Him, if we once discharge him from all concernment in us and our affairs. Though there be the like Eminency of Dignity in the French King as in the King of Great Brittain, yet we have a greater reverence for the one than the other, because the one protects us, which the other doth not. Nor can we well believe the Divine Nature to be excellent, should we assert it devoid of Goodness, which is the greatest perfecti∣on; much less will it be easie to honour him for a God, whose Felicity we judge to consist in Idleness. We find our selves capable of, yea, endowed with the affecti∣ons of Fear and Love, and God is an Ob∣ject most adapted for them; but seclude him from the administration of the World, and there is no Foundation left for the begetting and maintaining either the one or the other in the hearts of men towards him. For if he regard not what we do, instead of having provided due means for our fearing and loving of him, he hath left us under an unavoid∣able

temptation of acting towards with him with slight and contempt. (3) If there be no Providence, there is not the least ground for addresses to God out of hope of assistance, or the thanking him for the benefits we partake of; and yet the chief of natural Religion consists in these. Who would pray to God to be de∣livered when in straits, or praise him when he hath scaped his entanglements, if God no ways interest himself in us and our affairs. (4) If God govern not the world it is either because he Cannot, or because he will not: to say the first is to represent him contemptible for his Weakness; and besides, he that made the World cannot be supposed unable to Rule it: to affirm the Second is to bestow Omnipotencie upon Him in vain, and to impeach every one of his perfections, because of a faileur in their most natural and agreeable effects. (5) God is Soveraign of the World, and therefore he must needs Govern it. Through all things being the products of His will and Power, he hath an incon∣testable Dominion over them. Now we cannot fasten a greater reproach upon a Soveraign, than that he throws off all the Care and Gubernation of his Subjects. (6)

We see effects in the World, which could proceed from no cause but God, and dis∣coveries made to it, which he alone can reveal; and by consequence he hath not wholly withdrawn himself from the Rectorship of it. (7) He must needs Rule the World who hath given it Laws, for Law is the Relative of govern∣ment; and that he hath given it Laws, the inbred Notions which we have of Good and Evil, the Fears and hopes that haunt us, do abundantly demonstrate. These he hath woven into the composition of our Natures, and by these order is maintained in the World. Now 'tis the greatest af∣front that can be offered to Reason, to think that God should make use of a Fiction to preserve Truth, Justice and Righteousness amongst mankind; or that he should keep up the Respect of him∣self by falsehood and Deceit. Thus by singling out one or two Truths that have evidence given to them in the Light of Nature, as well as in Revelation; we have shewn what belongs to Reason about all Doctrines of this Genius and complexion.

§. 13. The next concernment of Reason in & about Religion is to defend the whole of it, from the Clamours, and Objections of gainsayers. For as Bisterfield says,

Though they who reject ar∣guments levied from Rea∣son against the Mysteries of Religion, act modestly, yet they do not throughly serve the interest, nor hereby de∣serve well of the Cause of Truth, which they own and profess. 'Tis true that the Authority of Divine Testi∣mony is enough to warrant our Faith, whatever Object∣ions lye against the thing so testified: but to rest here without warding off the thrusts of Adversaries, is to tempt them either wholly to throw off the belief of all Revelation, or to affix perverse Senses to it. Now there are some Articles of Religion, which may not only be defended, by shewing from the Testimony of the Bible, that their Ob∣jects have an Existence, but by explain∣ing how they are, and that either from principles of Natural Light, or from the account that the Scripture it self Gives of the Modes of their Existence. For Ex∣ample, How the Earth could be peopled in so little a time, as the Mosaick History

doth tacitely inform us, when all Man∣kind sprung 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 from one stock (for so the word there signifies) and proceeded from one Man and one Wo∣man as their Original Progenitors. How an Ark of that Capacity which the Scrip∣ture instructs us Noahs was, could receive into it all kinds of living Creatures, with provisions of Aliment for so long a time? How the Israelites could multiply to such a number in Egypt, within the compass of two hundred years or little more, when there went down but such a handful thi∣ther of whom they descended? There are other Articles of Religion, which we can only shew from Revelation that the Objects of them are, but the manner and way how they exist we cannot tell. And seeing the Measure of Faith doth only follow and suit the measure of Revelation, we are therefore in reference to such things only to believe that they are, but the Mode of their Existence is to be no Article of our Creed. And I crave li∣berty here to suggest, that it is both a piece of Tyranny to impose the belief of the Modes of their existence upon the Con∣sciences of men, and hath been found dis∣serviceable

to Religion to undertake to explain the Manner according to which such a thing exists, when God hath only revealed the Existence of the thing it self, but concealed the Way how it is. If in the explicating the Phaenomena of Nature, which is the proper province of Reason, the most that a discreet Philosopher will pretend to, is, to declare the possible ways by which a Phaenomenon may be accoun∣ted for; without presuming to say that it is only performed in this way, and that there is no other in which it may be ex∣plained: Much more doth it become us in the Great mysteries of Revelation, to abstain from defining the Manner how they are, and to content our selves with what God hath been pleased to tell us, viz. that they are; without prying into the Mode of their being, which he hath hid from us. Now in and about such Doctrines these things appertain to Rea∣son, First, To shew that 'tis not required that it should comprehend them. What∣soever God hath said is to be assented to, though we cannot frame adequate No∣tions of the thing it self, nor understand the manner how it should be. 'Tis as much against Reason as Faith, to think to

fathom the perfections, Counsels and Works of God; seeing Reason acknow∣ledgeth him to be infinite, and it self to be Finite. If we will pretend to Reason in Religion, we are to be believe whatever God hath said to be True, this being the greatest Reason, that he who is Veracious cannot lye. There is nothing more conso∣nant to the transcendency of so a high a Nature as that of God, than that it be ac∣knowledged incomprehensible; nor is there any thing more agreeable to his in∣finite Wisdom, than that his projects, designs, and contrivances should be held past finding out. 'Tis both unjust and ir∣rational to think that man should penetrate those depths and Abysm's, which the An∣gels desire only 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to look into as vailed and hidden from sight. But more of this anon. 2dly. We are to hold our selves assured, that every Argu∣ment from Reason, repugnant to a Do∣ctrine revealed in the Scripture, is a So∣phism, though, may be, we cannot disco∣ver the Fallacy. 'Tis one thing to be as∣sured of a Truth, and another to be able to answer all the Objections that are pres∣sed against it. There are Innumerable

things even in Philosophy, of which we are fully assured, and yet we cannot resolve all the difficulties that attend them. If every pusling Objection be enough to make us renounce what we have express Revelation for; by a parity of Reason, we must disclaim many a Natural Truth, which we have the evidence of sense and Reason for, because we cannot answer all the Objections that do encounter them. It were the way to introduce an Univer∣sal Scepticsm, to doubt of the Truth of e∣very thing, the knotts & intricacies about the Natures, Properties, Operations and Modes of whose Existence, we cannot unty. What a man hath embraced upon just and weighty grounds, he is not to desert it, meerly because he can not answer every Objection that is urged against it. 'Tis the height of folly and Madness to forego an opinion, when the Objections wherewith it is entangled, are not of greater, yea nor of the same importance with the reasons on which we received it. 3dly. We are to answer the Objection, not by explicating how the thing contested is, but by shew-that there is nothing in the argument that prove's it impossible to be. And this is done by shewing that what is stiled a Prin∣ciple

of Reason, in truth and reality is not so, at least in the degree and latitude that it is applied. There are many vulgar Axioms, urged as Maximes of Reason, which are as far from obtaining in Phi∣losophy, as in Divinity: there are others which though they hold in reference to some Objects, and in relation to some A∣gents, yet they are not to be allowed with respect to every Agent and every Object. For example, though a Finite Agent re∣quire a preexistent subject in order to its operation, yet this holds not in relation to an infinite and Almighty worker. And though Impenetrability may be affirmed of all Substances that are Corporeal, yet to apply it to all Substances Universally, and thereupon to reject Spirits as Mr. Hobbs doth, is grosly to prevaricate. Most re∣ceived Maximes have their limitations, nor are they principles of Reason farther, then as they are circumscrib'd by such condi∣tions and confinements, and to urge them beyond their bounds, is to contradict Reason, which tells us that they hold only so far, and no farther. That great Maxi∣me which is the Foundation of all Argu∣mentation, viz. that Extrem's identified to a middle Term, are identified the one

to the other, admitts more than one or two limitations, which if they be not at∣tended to, all our Syllogising is but meer Sophistry. For if either the Extrem's be only collectively identified to the Medium, not distributely; or if they be one with it inadequately only, and not adequately; or if they Center in the Middle Term only in the Concrete, and not in the Abstract, there is no concluding of an Identity be∣twixt the Extremes themselves. And I dare say that through a faileur in one of these, both most of the Arguments a∣gainst the Doctrine of the Trinity; and for Communication of Omnipresence to the Humane Nature of Christ, because it a∣grees to the Person of the son of God, (not to instance in more particulars,) may be easily avoided and answered. (2) by shewing that if it be an universal and true Maxime of Reason that the Objection is grounded on, how that there is not any thing in Revelation that doth contradict it. There is an excellent Harmony betwixt Truth and Truth, and though they be di∣stinct and different, yet they are not con∣trary and repugnant the one to the other. They who reject Gospel Mysteries on supposition of a Repugnancy they lye in

to Reason, have not been able to this day to justifie their Charge. 'Tis true the more we adventure too neerly to look in∣to them, the more we find our selves dazled with their Fulgor, but yet we find no thing in them that implye's a Contra∣diction to our Faculties, or that is repug∣nant to the Nature, and Attributes of God. Nor is there any one Argument produced to this day in proof of the re∣pugnancy of the Mysteries of the Trini∣ty, the Incarnation of the Son of God, his satisfying Divine Justice in the Room and behalf of Sinners, the Eternal De∣crees, &c. Which hath not received an answer, and the Authors of it been shame∣fully baffled.

§. 14. Having unfolded the Interest and concernment of Reason in and about Religion, it will be necessary ere we shut up this Discourse, more particularly to state and fix the Bounds betwixt these two, and to offer some Measures by which Reason may have allotted, all that belongs to it, and yet nothing in the mean time be detracted from Faith.

First then, Reason is the Negative Measure in Matters of Religion. No∣thing contradictory to right Reason is to be

admitted as a Mystery of Faith. What Right Reason say's cannot be done, we must not father it upon God to do. If Reason be objected against any Scripture Testimony how plausible and subtile soever it seems, yet Right Reason it cannot be, but only deceives through an Unbrage and shew of it. And if Scripture Authority be urged against an un∣doubted and evident Prin∣ciple of Reason, he that doth so, presseth not the true meaning of the Scripture, for that he doth not reach, but only imposeth, his own Sense, and urgeth what himself phancieth to be there, instead of what indeed is so. (saith Austin.) These two lights though different, yet they do not destroy one another. God is the Author of natural as well as Supernatural Light, nor can he bely himself. We have no greater Cer∣tainty than that of our Fa∣culties,

for by that alone are we inabled to discern a Divine Revelation from Hu∣mane or Diabolical Delusions. Should God reveal such Doctrines as contradict Natural Truths and Principles of Right Reason, He would thereby eradicate what himself hath planted in our Souls. The Law of Reason being the first declaration of the Will of God, originally annexed to, and communicated with our Natures, 'tis not to be imagined that by any after declaration, he should thwart his first. Besides, all Revelation is to instruct us in a reasonable, though supernatural way, and therefore, though in many things it may exceed our Reason fully to comprehend it, yet in all things it must be consistent with our Reasons. To admit Religion to con∣tain any Dogm's Repugnant to Right Rea∣son, is at once to tempt Men to look upon all Revelation as a Romance, or rather as the invention of distracted men; & with∣all to open a Door for filling the World with figments and lyes, under the pallia∣tion of Divine Mysteries. We cannot gratifie the Atheist and Infidel more, than to tell them that the prime Articles of our Belief imply a contradiction to our Facul∣ties. In a word, this Hypothesis, were it

received, would make us renounce Man, & espouse Brute in matters of the chiefest & greatest concernment, for without debasing our selves into a lower species, we cannot embrace any thing that is formally impossi∣ble. Nothing but mens entertaining opi∣nions which they cannot defend from be∣ing absurd and irrational, could have sway'd them to reproach Reason in the manner they do; but they do only decline the weapons they are sure to be wounded by. When men have filled Religion with Opinions that are contrary to com∣mon Sense and Natural Light, they are forced to introduce a suitable Faith, name∣ly, such a one that commends it self from believing Doctrines repugnant to the evi∣dence and principles of both. And thus under a respect that is pleaded to be due to sacred Mysteries, do the wildest fancies take Sanctuary: And meerly out of fear of violating that regard which ought to be paid to Objects of Faith, we must be∣lieve that to be true which the Universal Reason of Man-kind gives the lye to. Thus the first Hereticks that troubled the Christian Church, under pretence of teaching Mysteries, overthrew common sense, and did violence to the Universal

Uniform and perpetual Light of Man∣kind. Some of them having taught that all Creatures are naturally Evil; Others of them having established two Soveraign Gods, one Good, and another Bad; O∣thers having affirmed the Soul to be a part of the Divine Substance, not to mention a thousand falsities more; all these they defended against the assaults of the Ortho∣dox, by pretending that they were Myste∣ries, about which Reason was not to be hearkened to. Thus do others to this day, who being resolved to obtrude their fancies upon the World, and being nei∣ther able to prove nor defend what they say, they pretend the Spirit of God to be the Author of all their Theorem's. Nor can I assign a better reason for the antipa∣thy of the Turks to Philosophy, than that it overthrows the follies and absurdities of their Religion. This themselves confess by devoting Almansor to the venge∣ance of Heaven, because he hath weak∣ned the Faith of Mussul-men in the Alcoran, through introducing Learn∣ing and Philosophy amongst them. There is no Combating of the Valentini∣ans, Marcionites, Eutychians, and others, but by shewing the repugnance of their

Opinions to first principles of Reason. We do not make Natural Light the posi∣tive Measure of things Divine, do on∣ly allow it a Negative voyce. We place it not in the Chair in Councels of Faith, but do only permit it to keep the door, and hinder the entring of Contradictions and Irrational Fancies, disguised under the Name of Sacred Mysteries. This I thought fit to propose in the first place, and have the more largely insisted on it, because of its serviceableness against the Corporal presence of Christ in the Eu∣charist, and the ubiquity of Christs Body, and divers other Articles both of the Ro∣mane and Lutheran Creeds. What the Universal Reason of Man-kind tells us is finite, commensurable and impenetra∣ble, &c. they would have us believe it to be Infinite, Immense, and subject to penetration. The great Article of the Roman Faith, viz. Transubstantiation must needs be false, if there be any in∣contestable Principles of Reason, or True Maximes of Philosophy. For to omit at present, that 'tis Repugnant to Metaphysical and Physical Axioms, that Accidents should exist without a subject, or that there should be Whiteness and nothing white,

Sweetness, and nothing sweet; that one Body should be penetrated by another, when we find every Material substance ir∣resistibly to defend its self from coex∣istence in the same place with another that is Corporeal; that one & the same Be∣ing should be entirely at one and the same time in distant places (which is to be di∣stant from it self) yea, that it should be there with contradictory adjuncts; that the Sign and thing signified, or Relate and Correlate should be the same. I say to pass these by, as having been a thousand times urged against the Papists, and no∣thing replyed but what renders their Folly and Extravagance the greater and more remarkable. I shall only say that Transubstantiation is inconsistent with the first Principles of Logick. (1.) No Enunciation is true, but upon the account of Congruity to its Object; and the pre∣vious existence of the Object according to what is affirmed of, or denyed con∣cerning it, is that which grounds the veri∣ty of the Enunciation; If therefore the Sa∣cramental Elements be not the Body and Blood of Christ antecedently to the words of Consecration, the Enunciation by which the Priest affirms the one to be

the other must necessarily be false. (2.) Every Enunciation supposeth a pre∣vious Act and judgment of the Mind, of which it is Manifestative; for the End of words, is to indicate Conceptions: Un∣less therefore previously to consecration the Bread be judged to be the real Flesh of Christ, no one can truly assert that it is so. (3.) In every true Enunciation, the subject may by Conversion become the predicate, as is evident by an induction of all propositions in the World; while therefore the Body of Christ cannot in a proper and Physical sense be said to be Bread, no more can Bread in a proper sense be said to be the Body of Christ. (4.) No Disparate can be truly affirmed in casu recto of another, that interfering with the Nature of opposites; Bread and the Body of Christ therefore being Dis∣parates, the one cannot in a proper sense be predicated of the other. (5.) No real, positive Attribute or predicate can be affirmed of a subject which is not; for, non entis nulla sunt attributa. And there∣fore if the Bread be annihilated (as indeed it must be, unless instead of allowing Christ to have only one Body, and that formed of the substance of the Virgin, we

should hold that he hath many Bodies, and those formed of Material Particles distinct from what he was fram'd of in the Womb of the Virgin,) Our Saviour spake very illogically, in asserting con∣cerning that which it is not at all, that it is his Body. I shall wave what might be further added to this purpose, only con∣clude it with this brief remarque, That if Principles of Reason obtain so far in Things purely Supernatural, as that there can be no repugnance betwixt the one and the other, they ought more especially to have so much place in those things which Grace borrows and transports from Na∣ture for its Use.

Secondly: When we say that there is nothing in Religion which is truly repug∣nant to Principles of Reason, we do not by Principles of Reason, understand all that this or that sort of men vote and re∣ceive for such. The Universal Reason of Man-kind is of great Moment, but mistaken Philosophy and false Notions of things, which this and that Man admit for theorem's of Reason, are of very small importance. Men being mislead by their Senses, Affections, Interests, and Imaginations, do many times mingle er∣rours

and false conceits with the Genuine Dictates of their Minds, and then appeal to them as the Principles of Truth and Reason, when they are indeed noth••ng else but the vain Images of our fancies, and the conclusions of Ignorance and mistake▪ Though Reason in the Abstract, and those inb••ed notices implanted in our Souls, which upon the first exercise of our Faculties, command an Assent, be all consistent w••th the Mysteries of Faith; yet Reason in the Concrete, and as it ex∣ists in this and that man, being weak, maim'd, imperfect, and extremely remote from a full and just comprehension of things, we do accordingly find many Ar∣ticles of Revelation to have been little be∣friended by Axioms and principles of vul∣gar Philosophy. But this proceeds from the Corruption of Reason, its be∣ing vitiated by Lusts, byassed by Inte∣rests, perverted by Education, darkned by Passions, enthralled by Preju∣dice; rather than from Reason it self; and is to be ascribed not to the Light of Reason, but to the Dark∣ness that envelop's it. It hath been usual for men, according to the School they have been bred in, to expound and judg of Religion in Analogy to the prin∣ciples

they have suckt in from thence. By this means hath Religion been em∣based, through mens subjecting the Exa∣men and conduct of it to mistaken Philo∣sophy. He that would examine an Arti∣cle of Faith by a Proposition of Reason, must be careful that his Measure be just and true, and not deceitful and fallacious. No man ought to distrust an Article of Religion for its being against a propositi∣on which we take to be true only be∣cause we were taught it. The Prejudice done to Religion by mistaken Philosophy ought not to be dissembled; and I shall therefore crave a little liberty here to un∣fold it. And not to insist on the ill Influ∣ence that the Phenician and Chaldaick Philosophy had on the Judaick Theology; though it be of easie proof that their Pla∣netary Deities, and their Teraphims sprung from thence. Nor to do any more but mention, that the chief Errours of the Pharisees, Sadduces, and Esseans took their rise from the Grecian Philosophy; their Dogm's being a mixture of Pythago∣rean, Platonick, Stoick, and Epicurean Notions. I shall rather observe that the chiefest Errours that have infested the Christian Church, arose from a mingling Gentile Philosophy with the Doctrine of

the Gospel. Both Irenaeus and Tertullian affirm the Errors of the Gnosticks to have sprung from the Platonick Ideas; Though I think it not improbable, but that their 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 took their birth from Pythagoreanism. The Aeons of the Va∣lentinians, if we will believe Tertullian, were also ••orrowed from the Idea's of Pla∣to; but if any shall judge that they were rather derived from Hesiod, I shall not contend, seeing the Ancient Poets were not only the Ethnick Theologues, but their chief Philosophers. Epiphanius tells us that the Heresies of the Mar∣cionites came out of the School of Plato. Theo∣doret inform's us that Sa∣bellius became a Heretick by his obstinacy in Plato's Doctrine. Tatian being deeply tinctur'd with Pla∣tonism became thereupon Head of the Eucratists, if you will give Credit to Baronius. Holstenius hath shown us how the Ma∣nichean principles were fram'd from the Pythagorean. Hierom assureth us that Pelagius suckt all his Doctrine from the Philosophy of Pythagoras and

Zeno, and Jans••nius fully proves it. Nor did Samosatenus and Arius de∣rive their blasphemous opinions concern∣ing the Deity of Christ, from any other fountain, save from the Platonick Philoso∣phy. The Popish 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Saint-wor∣ship, is nothing but an imitation of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Daemon-worship of the Pa∣gan Philosophers. And that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of the latter gave rise to the Doctrine of Su∣pererogation held by the former. The Romish Purgatory was fetcht from Plato, as well as from Virgil and Ovid. Yea their Caelibate had its first foundation in the Doctrine of Py∣thagoras. I might also add that the Opinion of the Praeexistence of Souls, lately revi∣ved among our selves, and the Notion of Aethereal Vehicles of Angelical Spirits, were imbib'd from Plato and Pythagoras. It was not therefore without Cause that Tertullian sti∣led the Philosophers the Patriarchs of Hereticks; and that he af∣firmed Haereses a Philosophia subornari, Heresies to have been occasioned by Philoso∣phy; and that Philosophy was condimen∣tum, the seasoning of all Heresies. Nor

was He alone in this opinion, for Lactan∣tius, Arnobius, Epiphanius, Chrysostom, Gregory Nazianzen, besides divers o∣thers, speak all to the same purpose. The Platonick School at Alexandria, was the Seminary of the chiefest and most pesti∣lent Errors vented in the Church, during the four first Centuries. Joannes Bap∣tista Crispus hath wrote a discourse of Plato's Opinions, and hath at the End of every Chapter shewn what Heresies sprung from each. Yea, the Apostle Paul seems plainly to me, to have intend∣ed the Pythagoreans and Platonists, when he adviseth the Colessians to beware lest a∣ny man should spoyl them through Philoso∣phy, Col. 2.8. Platonism growing out of request, did the Philosophy of Aristo∣tle after it came into esteem, prove more friendly to Religion? No! The purity and simplicity of the Gospel, was no less corrupted by blending the Dogm's of Ari∣stotle with the Articles of Fa••th, than it had been by mingling the Philosophy of Pythagoras and Plato with the Doctrines of Christ. The primitive Centuries felt some of the mischievous effects of it. The Theodotians upheld their Errour by the reasonings of Aristotle. The Carpocrati∣ans

out of an inordinate zeal to his Do∣ctrine, erected an Image to him. The Aetians were transported to that degree of madness, as to teach their Schollars the Categories of Aristotle for a Catechism. So∣crates expresly informs us, that it was the Aristotelick Philosophy that lead Aetius into the Heresie of Arius. Hierom tells us, that the Hereticks shel∣tred themselves inter spineta Aristotelis a∣mong the briars of Aristotle, and that their Heresies were fostred from thence. And Tertullian assures us, that the Enemies of the Christian faith borrowed their Arms from him, by which they de∣fended their Errors. But the greatest mischief that befel Religion through the Philosophy of Aristotle, was, after the School-men had moulded Theologie to his Method, and undertaken the manage∣ment of Divinity in analogy to his princi∣ples. The vast Volumes of the School-men are stuffed with Peripatetick deprava∣tions, and their Scholastick controversies are resolved into the subtilties of his Phi∣losophy. Christian Morality lost its sim∣plicity and purity by being blended with

his Ethicks; and the Doctrines of Faith became depraved through the mixing them with his metaphysical niceties. It was by this means that Christianity which is a plain simple thing of it self, became corrupted into an Artificial kind of wrangling, and degenerated into contentious & unprofitable altercations. For partly through an usurpation of barbarous and insignificant Words; partly through an introduction of new Terms; partly through handling the great mysteries of Faith in Analogy to metaphysical Hypotheses; partly through accommodating the Articles of Religi∣on to a congruity with Philosophical Axioms; partly by applying Maxims of Philosophy beyond their proper Ob∣jects; partly by their disputing every thing pro and con; and especially by advancing Aristotle to an equal Autho∣rity with God himself, they wholly de∣faced and contaminated Religion. Nor have Luther, Melancthon, Bucer, Calvin, and other Protestants, only complained of it, but many of the most learned and sober Romanists, such as Mirandula, Be∣atus Rhenanus, Erasmus, Vives, Jan∣senius, Gassendus, &c. have severely

censured it. Nor is the case mended since the Aristotelick Philosophy grew out of repute, and the Cartesian, and Corpuscularian usurped the Chair. I rea∣dily grant that in reference to the solving the Phaenomena of Nature, there is more to be said for the Corpuscularian Hypothesis, than for any other. Nor do I envy Des-Cartes all due praise, though I would not be the person that should fasten the many Encomiums and Elogi∣ums on him, that some men adorn him with. I also allow that generous free∣dom which our Cartesians pretend to, of being baptized into no mans Notions, upon the meer Authority of his Name; and I wish they were true to themselves, and while they inveigh against the A∣ristotelians as Mancipata Capita, they did nor continue the Tyranny, though they have changed the Tyrant. Yet I crave leave to say, that as the Cartesian Hy∣pothesis is managed, it is like to prove as disserviceable to Religion, as any Philosophy hitherto entertained in the World. I will not insist on his renoun∣cing Arguments for the Being of God, derived from the Fabrick of things, though therein he plainly reflects up∣on

the Scripture, which in more than one place calls in Media of that Nature to demonstrate the Existence of a Deity. Neither will I Press his dischar∣ging all Spirits from place, though that seems consequentially to discharge them from Being; for what is no where, we cannot well apprehend to be at all. And if Ubication be nothing but the presence of things in place, and if place necessarily Exist, and that as well without the Circle of the Universe as within it, it would seem to me impos∣sible, but that if a thing exist at all, it should coexist with place. Nor will I dwell upon his disbanding all Final Causes out of the precincts of natural Philosophy. Though that would seem to imply, that all things are the effects of Fate or Chance, and that there was no design nor Counsel in the producti∣on of them. For if infinite Wisdom contrived, and infinite Power fram'd the World, such an Agent behoved to have an End, in order to which he acted, and this ought to be of prime conside∣ration in our speculations of the fabrick and nature of things. Nor shall I dwell

upon his attempting to solve all the Phaenomena of Nature secluding any Im∣mediate influx of Divine Providence: yea, that all the Phaenomena of the Uni∣verse might arise out of Matter by meer mechanical Motion, and that Matter alone, supposing such a degree of moti∣on communicated to it, and the Laws of motion established, could have pro∣duced the Sun, Moon, Starrs, Plants, Animals, and the Bodies of men in such Organization, Order, Beauty, and Harmony, as now they are. Though this seems wonderfully to be∣friend the Atheists, for if all that which we observe in the World, sup∣posing the Existence of matter and Mo∣tion, might result from the meer laws of mechanism, I do not see but that per∣sons Atheistically disposed, may goe a degree farther, and affirm both the self-existence of matter, and that motion was appendent to it; its Idea no more excluding motion than it includes Rest. Neither will I dwell upon his Notion of the Conflict between the Flesh and Spirit which the Scripture so emphatical∣ly mentions, namely, that it is nothing

but the repugnance of those motions which the Body by its Spirits, and the Soul by her Will, endeavour to excite at the same time in the Glandula pine∣alis, or little Kernel where he supposeth the Soul to be harboured and seated. As if the whole conflict which the Ho∣ly Ghost so solemnly describes under the Notion of a War betwixt the Law of our members and the Law of our mind, Rom. 7.23. and the lusting of the Flesh against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the Flesh, Gal. 17. were nothing else, but that the Kernel in the midst of the Brain, being driven on one side by the Soul, and on the other by the Animal Spi∣rits (which are minute bodies) it thence comes to pass that those impul∣ses being oftentimes contrary, the stronger hinders the operation of the weaker. When the Corporeal Spirits by their rude Joggings of the glandu∣lous Button, endeavour to excite in the Soul a desire of any thing, and the Soul repels it by the Will she hath to avoid the same thing, This constitutes the War betwixt the Law of the Members and the Law of the Mind. I am apt to think that

the Author of the De∣fence and continuation of the Ecclesiastical Polity, had this in his eye, when he undertakes to resolve all the Joyes, refreshings, Fears, Sorrows, &c. of a people he is pleased to stile Phanaticks, by the laws of Mechanism, and principles of Anatomy. And it is not unlikely but that Mr. Sherlock be∣fore he addressed to the Philosophy of Christs Satisfaction (for so he is pleased to call it) had throughly digested the Philosophy of this Combate we have been speaking of; and having accom∣modated the latter to mechanical Prin∣ciples, he may very well mould the o∣ther to a compliance with the Hypothe∣sis of Socinus. To wave all these and many more Tenets in the Cartesian Phi∣losophy which very little befriend Re∣ligion, I shall at present only call forth two principles of Monsieur Des-Cartes which he superstructs all his Philosophy upon, and which, if I greatly mistake nor, are likely to disserve Religion, beyond any thing occurring in the Ari∣stotelick Philosophy. The first shall be

that famous thing cal∣led Dubitatio Cartesiana, for which he is justly impeached of shaking the foundations of the house of Wisdom, and laying a ground for Universal Scepticism. The Sum of his Notion is briefly this, that in our enquiry after Truth we are not only to unhinge, and suspend our assent from all or any of those things which we former∣ly believed, but that we are to demean our selves towards them as if they were false, that is, as himself paraphraseth it, we are no more to believe them, than if they were so. Like as a needle placed be∣tween two Magnets, at a distance propor∣tionable to the different forces of the con∣trary Movents, remains in an aequilibra∣tion without a propension to the one more than the other; so in our researches of Truth, the Mind is to bind up its assent for a time, from affirming a thing either to be true or false. And this Dubitation or suspension of the Judgment he carries to that extent, that he hath not so much as allowed us the postulatum of Archimedes, viz. ground whereupon to set our foot. For he not only supposeth our Senses to

be fallacious where the Object is remote, the Organ tinctured and indisposed, and the Medium inept, but even where there is a concurrence of all those things which are commonly required to the certainty of Sensation. Yea he asketh us, how we know, that we were not created at first of such a frame as to be in all things invinci∣bly obnoxious to errour? & what assurance we have, but that some evil Genius, Wise, powerfull and malicious, doth haunt and impose upon us in all our consultations? ei∣ther by mingling false colours in seeing, or altering the undulations of the air in Hear∣ing, or by communicating various im∣pressions to the Nerves, different shocks to the brain, and agitations to the glan∣dula pinealis, or by impregnating the I∣magination with false Idea's, or infecting true ones with false tinctures, or by vari∣ously modifying and changing all the tex∣tures and motions of the Animal Spirits, or by disordering all the ranks and files of our Ideas, and discomposing all the Vesti∣gia of things which are imprest upon so soft and dissipable a substance as the Brain? Now how far these reasonings extend, and what an unhappy and trouble∣some Guest such a Genius were, if other

men could not with as much facility lay this Devil, as Des-Cartes hath raised him, is easy to imagine. A wariness in pro∣nouncing concerning natural things, where though there be many things certain which ought not to be called in question, yet there are many things doubtful of which we ought not precipitantly to de∣termine, was allowed by all the old philo∣sophers, and was especially practised by Plato and his successours in the Old Aca∣demy, whence arose the Academick 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or suspension of Assent. But the Cartesi∣an dubitation reacheth further, yea they extend it so far as to doubt whether there be a god or not. Yea that we ought to question the Existence of the Deity. And that if we would philoso∣phise to any purpose con∣cerning the Being of God, we must not only call into question, but for a time suppose it false that there is one: as a Cartesian lately proposed it in publick questions at Leyden. We have a further evidence of the ex∣tent and tendency of this Dubitation, vouch∣safed us by the Author of Philosophia Scripturae Interpres, who claiming the same right of questioning all things in

Divinity, till he should arrive at some∣thing certain and evident, that Des-Cartes hath in philosophy▪ doth at last issue it in making Faith wait at the elbow of Rea∣son, and in constituting Philosophy the Standard of Theology. Yea we have a more deplorable instance of this unbound∣ed Dubitation in the Anonymous Author of Tractatus Theologicopoliticus, (suppo∣sed to be Benedictus Spinosa) who being throughly tinctured with this and the rest of the Cartesian principles, hath in pursuance of them, endeavoured in effect to undermine and subvert all Supernatural Revelation. I cannot but commend the ingenuity of Henricus Re∣gius, who having imbib'd this Cartesian principle, and foreseeing that it would be charged as leading to Scepticism, he very candidly confesseth it, and withal add's, that it is impossible by any principles in Nature to avoid a perpetual Hesitation; and I will add, that if there be no princi∣ples in Nature to check Scepticism, the prin∣ciples of Revelation can never do it, for without presupposing both that our Senses & Reasons do not universally deceive us, we can have no assurance that there is any such thing as a Supernatural Revelation

at all. I would not say that the Cartesians are Scepticks, but I say, they owe it not to the principles of their Philosophy, that they are not so. Supposing us once to dis∣band, lay by, and to take for false, all that we have imbib'd from Education, or o∣therwise embraced, I would fain know where we can begin, and upon what foun∣dation we can superstruct Science? They who propose it as a Principle that we are to doubt of every thing, ought in pursu∣ance of their Hypothesis to suspect those very principles with they lay down for Certain. If there be not some princi∣ples incontestable and beyond the pre∣cincts of being gainsayed, it is not to be imagined but that we should be endlesly bewildred and entangled in a perpetual and inextricable maze. According to this new Hypothesis, no man can be sure that there are any Material effects or Beings in the World; for we can have no other Certainty of the Existence of Cor∣poreal Beings, but by their affecting the Organs of Sensation; and of this accor∣ding to the principles of Des-Cartes, there is no assurance can be obtained? For (1.) How can I be certain that there are any impressions made by forraign Objects

upon the Fibres and Nerves, seeing all may be but meer Phancy and Imagina∣tion? (2.) How shall I be ascertain'd that those impulses upon the Nerves which we ascribe to outward Objects, are not begotten and caused by the Malus Genius we just now heard of? And as I must in pursuance of this Principle abide in a perpetual Suspension of Mind, whe∣ther there be any Material Beings in the World, so I can no ways be assur'd from any effects which I observe in the Uni∣verse, either that they have a second Cause at all, or which particularly is their Cause; not the latter seeing God may produce the like effects by different Causes; not the former, because whatso∣ever is brought forth by the ministry of second Causes, may be produced immedi∣ately by God himself. I will only sub∣joyn that if there be any Truth in this Cartesian Notion, no man can be assured of his own Cogitation, or whether he doth cogitate at all. For we cannot o∣therwise know that we do know, but by a latter reflex act of the Mind upon the former; and of this I can have no certain∣ty, seeing I am not sure whether the Act I reflect upon, were elicited by the mind it

self, or only an impression begotten in me by some powerful and malicious Guest which doth continually haunt us. I am not ignorant of the restrictions, limitati∣ons, and expositions with some Cartesians give of the fore-going Principle, but up∣on an examination of what is alledged a∣gainst it by Gassendus, Schoockius, Daniel Voetius, Vogelsangius and others, and what is pleaded in justification of it by Clauber∣gius, De Bruin, &c. as well as Des-Cartes himself; I must needs say that all the Car∣tesian plea's in behalf of it, do either o∣verthrow what themselves would esta∣blish, and contradict what they endeavour to obtrude, or that they are wholly weak and impotent. But I am not without thoughts of discoursing this more largely some other time, and therefore shall at present supersede the further prosecution of it. The Second Cartesian principle which I impeach as disserviceable to Re∣ligion, is this, That whatsoever we have a clear and distinct perception of, is infalli∣bly true, and that we are no ways longer to doubt of it. This they make the only test of discerning and distinguishing Truth from Falsehood: Nor do they allow any other Measure or Standard of discrimi∣nating

betwixt Verity and Errour. If we should be deceived in these things which we have clear and distinct perceptions of, God himself, saith Des-Cartes would be Fallax & Deceptor (horresco re∣ferens) and all our Er∣rours and Mistakes must be attributed to him. Unless the Cartesians be infallible in what ever they imagine themselves to have a distinct perception and cognizance of, God must be cease to be Good and True, and must undergoe the blame of all their hallucinations. I do the rather touch on this Cartesian Axiom, because I not only find it introduced into Divinity by some Outlandish Writers, but by some Modern Theologues at home, particularly by the Author of Deus Justifi∣catus. Nor will it be amiss a little to enquire into it, as well upon the account of its being erected by the Cartesians for the first and only princi∣ple of all Certainty and Science, as upon the Score of the bad effects it is like to have upon the minds of men in Matters of Religion. Now the meaning and sense of this Theoreme must either be this, That whatever we apprehend and perceive

as it is, it infallibly is so, and our percep∣tion of it is true. But then according to this paraphrase of it, there cannot be a more nugatory and ridiculous proposition form'd; for it is as much as if we should say, what we have a true cognizance of, that we have a true cognizance of; and what is truly known by us, that we do truly know. But this cannot be the meaning which the Cartesians intend by it, for as much as they make the clearness and distinctness of perception the Rule by which we ought to judge of the Existence of Objects and things. For according to them our perceptions are not therefore clear and true, because of their congruity to the Objects about which our minds are conversant; but on the contrary they de∣termine concerning the Object, from the clearness and distinctness of our percepti∣on. The sense therefore of this Cartesian Axiom, if it have any at all, and be not per∣fect non-sense, must be this, namely, That every thing really is as we perceive it, pro∣vided our perception of it be clear and di∣stinct. That those Idea's of things which offer themselves to our Minds by clear and distinct perceptions, are infallibly the true idea's of the Natures and properties of the

things themselves. Now admitting this to be the sense of it, I affirm it to be the most silly, fallacious, and lubricous prin∣ciple, that ever men pretending to Philoso∣phy laid down. I shall wave that Medium, that there may be clearness and distinct∣ness of perception in acts of simple appre∣hension, and consequently that whatsoe∣ver we clearly and distinctly perceive is not true, because Acts of simple Appre∣hension are not capable of verity. This I say I shall decline the urging of, seeing I judge both Verity and Falsity to obta••n in all the operations of the Mind. For Verity being nothing else but the confor∣mity of the Act to the Object, there is as well an Incomplex Verity in acts of simple Apprehension, as there is a Complex Ve∣rity in Acts of Judgment. I may as well apprehend things to be as indeed they are, as I may affirm one thing of another as in∣deed it is. However, though I wave this Medium, yet my first Argument shall be drawn from acts of simple Apprehension, but built upon another Medium, and it is this; whatsoever I can clearly apprehend, separate, and apart, I can apprehend the same with the same clearness united and Conjunct, for example, as I can clearly

and distinctly apprehend a River and Wine apart; I can with the same clearness apprehend them conjunct and united; and yet I should be loath to trust this Carte∣sian principle so far as to assert that there is really a River runs Wine, meerly be∣cause I can frame a complex apprehension of these two together. (2.) It interferes with what the Cartesians else-where, and upon other occasions affirm. For ac∣cording to them when possibles offer them∣selves to our Rational Natures by a clear and distinct perception, we do not other∣wise perceive them, than as actually ex∣istent, and yet they themselves will not say that they do actually exist. (3.) The Objective Verity of Things, is the Rule and Measure of the verity of perception; for therefore are our perceptions true, be∣cause consonant to the Nature of things, and consequently clearness and distinct∣ness of perception is not the Test by which we are to judge of the Natures, Qualities, and Modes of Beings. (4.) We are bound to pay an assent to many Doctrines, and believe not a few things, whereof we can have no clear and distinct perception; such for example, are the Mysteries of the Trinity, and Incarnation of the Son of

God, &c. If we could distinctly and clearly perceive them, they were no lon∣ger Mysteries, and if we do not assent to, and bel••eve them, notwithstanding that we do not distinctly and clearly perceive them, we are hardly, yea, I may say not at all Christians. This is so indubi∣table, that we may, yea, ought to assent to many things which we have no clear and distinct perception of, that Des-Cartes himself is forced to subscribe to it; his words are that multis possumus assentiri, quae non nisi perobscure & confuse cog∣noscimus; which as it is most true, so he could have said nothing more contra∣dictory to, and subversive of his own prin∣ciples, (5.) Experience not only tells us that Men do often err and mistake, but that they do so in things about which they suppose themselves to have clear and di∣stinct perceptions: Yea, if we will believe Des-Cartes, impetrare a nobis non possis∣mus, ut obscure & confuse cognitis, quam∣di•• talia nobis apparent assensum praebea∣mus; We cannot obtain of our selves to as∣sent to any thing, so long as we only obscure∣ly and confusedly know it. Now though this be egregiously false, yet nothing could be said more to the overthrow of

this great and fundamental principle of his. For if men can assent to nothing but what they have a clear and distinct cogni∣zance of, and if daily experience assure that one or other is always embracing, venting, and justifying Errour, then fare∣well to this principle of the Cartesians, that whatsoever presents it self to us by a clear and distinct perception, is really, and in it self so as we do perceive it. (6.) Were it most true that it is impossible for any thing to be otherwise than what we clearly and distinctly perceive it; yet this can be no first principle of Science; because we are still at a loss how we shall know, whe∣ther we have a clear and distinct percepti∣on of things, yea or not. Let us suppose two men imbued with Opinions, whereof those of the one are repugnant with those of the other, and each of them pleading a clearness and distinctness of perception in reference to his own. Now I would enquire of the Cartesians, by what means these two men shall be satisfied that their knowledge is clear and distinct, for clear∣ness and distinctness of perception, can no more be ascribed to both of them, than truth can be predicated of the two parts of a contradiction. (7.) The Cartesians in

the justifying of this principle involve themselves in a most shameful Circle. For if it be enquired, how we shall know but that God hath fram'd us with such Fa∣culties as may in the most clear and distinct perceptions we have, abuse and delude us. They reply, that we know it from the idea which we have of Gods being per∣fect, i e. infinitely Good and True; and if they be again asked, what assurance they have that this is a true idea of God, they recurr to their Canon of clear and distinct perception for the justifying of it. Thus they prove the truth of their Rule and Measure from the perfection of God; and the perfection of God from the truth of their Rule; which, if I mistake not, is to argue circularly. Shall I add (in the eighth and last place) that it is nothing but Socinianism new furbished, and seems indeed shapen to justify them in their most detestable Errours. For it is re∣markable, that when they are in a sober mood, they tell us that they do not re∣nounce the Articles of the Trinity, In∣carnation of the Son of God, &c. be∣cause they are above our reason, but be∣cause they judge them repugnant to the di∣stinct and clear perceptions which they

of things. The words of Smalcius are; We readily acknowledge many things in the Chri∣stian Religion, which are above our Reason; and we know that Religion transcends Reason. Their quarrel with these myste∣ries is this, that there are many things which they clearly and distinct∣ly perceive, to which these Doctrines are con∣tradictious. This I thought convenient to discourse a little the more largely, because though nothing in Reli∣gion be repugnant to any true principle of Reason, yet there are many things voted for principles of Reason, which indeed are not so, and it is no disparagement to Arti∣cles of Faith to interfere with such. The Mind is so darkned by the Fall, and E∣clipsed by habitual Lusts, that there is but little right Reason in reference to spiritual things in the World.

Thirdly: Reason is not the positive Measure of things Divine. As there are many Doctrines of Faith, which Reason in its highest exaltation could never have dis∣discovered,

so being made known, it can∣not in its clearest light fully comprehend them. Though Revelation presupposeth Reason, and doth in no one thing contra∣dict it, yet the very End of Revelation is both to certifie Reason in such things wherein through its contracted darkness it doth mistake, and to inform it in those which through the essential quality of its Nature it could never have discovered. Accordingly men in all ages have not only been listning after some supernatural Re∣velation or other, but whatever they took for such, they always without more ado resigned themselves to the conduct of it. 'Tis true, they disparaged their Reason in admitting that to be a Divine Reve∣lation which indeed was not so, but on supposition that it had been such they acted most rationally in surren∣dring themselves to the guidance of it. The Article it self may be plainly re∣vealed, and yet not only the reason and mode of it lye altogether hid, but the thing it self may over-power our Facul∣ties, and dazle them with its Majesty and Splendour. (1.) Reason is often non-plust and puzled about its own proper Ob∣jects, and the phaenomena of Nature, and

shall we think it a competent judge of Ob∣jects it was never adapted for? It is be∣low many of the Works of God, and therefore much more below Mysteries of Revelation. See this Argument ele∣gantly and strenuously handled by Brad∣wardine de causa Dei lib. 1. c. 1. Here are many things which we ought to ad∣mire, but must never hope fully to un∣derstand. Our work here is to believe, not to enquire. (2.) If our minds will not submit to a Revelation until they see a reason of the proposition, they do not believe or obey at all, because they do not submit till they cannot chuse. Faith bears not upon demonstration, but upon the Authority and Veracity of the spea∣ker; and therefore to believe nothing but what we do comprehend is not to believe, but to argue, and is Sci∣ence not Faith. Ye that will believe in the Gospel what you please, and what ye think fit, ye will not believe, you renounce the Gospel saith Austin to the Manichees, for you be∣lieve your selves, not it. (3.) To believe nothing but what we can fully

comprehend, is to remonstrate to the Wis∣dom and Power of God, at least to chal∣lenge to our selves an Omniscience pro∣portionable to the Divine Wisdom and Omnipotence. (4.) The Rule and Measure of Faith must be certain, but no mans Reason universally is so, because one Mans Reason rejects what anothers assents to. Every man pretends to right Reason, but who hath it, is hard to tell. If it be lawful for one man to reject a plain Revelation in one particular, because he cannot comprehend it, why may not a second do the same with reference to Re∣velation in another particular. As the Socinians by making their Reason judge of what they are to believe, will not ad∣mit many of the prime Articles of the Gospel; so the Philosophers would make their Reason judge of what they should re∣ceive, & their Reason would not admit the Gospel at all. (5.) The certainty of Reve∣lation is preferred to all other Evidence, and we are commanded to subject our Reason to the Authority of God in the Scripture; and by consequence, Reason cannot be the positive Measure of Religi∣on. The Sacred Writers do every where remit us to the Scripture it self as

the Rule of Faith, and not at all to the Tribunal of Reason. Herein are the So∣cinians justly impeachable; for though sometimes they acknowledge Religion to be above Reason, as we lately heard; yet at other times they speak in a very indiffe∣rent Manner. By Reason alone (saith Smalcius) can we define what is possi¦ble, and what is impossi∣ble in matters of Faith. See to the same purpose Ostorod. Instit. cap. 6. Schlicting. de Trinit. ad∣vers. Meisner p. 67. &c. Hence that of Socinus, that he would not believe Christ to have satisfied for our sins, though he should read it not only once, but often in the Scripture; and that the Infallibi∣lity of the Revealer had not been enough to esta∣blish it, supposing Christ to have said it, and to have risen from the Dead to declare his own Veracity, unless he had declared it by its Causes and effects, and so shewn the possibility of it. To which a∣grees a passage of Smalcius in reference

to the Incarnation of the Son of God, that he would not submit to it, though he should meet with it not on∣ly often, but in express Terms in the Bi∣ble. I wish others did not say the same in effect: But while they renounce Do∣ctrines upon no other account but their incomprehensibleness, or because we can∣not fully fathom them, they must give us leave to think whose principles they have drunk in, and whose cause they plead. Thus have I discoursed the whole Interest of Reason in Religion; and as I know not that I have said any more in this Matter than what is generally maintained by all the sober Nonconformists; so I hope I may say that the charge which some men have fastned upon us, as if we wholly re∣nounced Reason in all Concernments of Religion, and that no Contradiction can astonish or stagger us; and that this is the foundation and support of the Credit of the party, especially amongst Vulgar Hearers, is a false aspersion, groundless calumny, and an impudent Crimination. And though I do not think that it sa∣vour's of over-much Modesty, that a few young Theologues of the Church of Eng∣land

(if indeed they be so) should mono∣polize to themselves the name of Ratio∣nal Divines; yet, for my own part, I nei∣ther envy them the Title, nor have any quarrel with them upon that account, it be∣ing indeed their want of Reason that I find fault with. And as it hath generally been the unhappiness of others who have too much boasted of, and relyed upon Reason, to fall into the most irrational sentiments; so I do not see but that it is in a very great measure the misfortune of our New Ra∣tionalists. As the Philosophers of old made Reason their only Rule, and yet most of their Religious opinions, whether in reference to Faith, Worship, or Moral Obedience were perfectly Irrational. And as the Socinians pretend to pay more than an ordinary veneration to Reason, and yet there are none in the world whose Tenets lye more cross to the Fundamental Maxims of it, than some of theirs do. For to give Religious Adoration to a meer Creature (for such they allow Christ only to be) to deny God the fore know∣ledge of future contingents, & to ascribe passions and affections to God in the man∣ner they are incident to us, are such Re∣pugnancies to Reason, that a man had need

renounce that, as well as Revelation, ere he can admit them. So I account it of easie proof that many of the Darling No∣tions about Original Sin, Converting Grace, the Nature of Regeneration, and Justification it self, &c. of our pretended late Rational Divines, are as well repug∣nant to Reason, as they are to Scrip∣ture.

Notes

• Glanvil in his Re∣commendation of Reason in the Af∣fairs of Religion, subjoyned to his Phil••sophia Pi••, P. 150.
• Def. and Con∣tin. of the Ec∣clesiast. Policy. p. 119.120.
• Def▪ & Con∣tin. of the Ec∣clesiast. Pol. p. 665.
• Mr. Lamb's Serm. before the Ld. Mayor, on 2 Thes. 3.2. p. 32.
• Mr. Lamb's Serm. p. 38.
• Mr▪ Glanvil, ubi supra, p. 222.
• In Orat. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• In Ran.
• Chrysost in 2. ad Cor. cap. 6. Iren. lib. 4. cap 69.
• Mornaeus. Keckerman▪ Claubergius, Bisterfield, &c.
• Pudet me gene∣ris humani, cu∣jus aures haec ferre potue∣runt. Aug.
• De Nat. Deor.
• Metaphys. Lib▪ 4.
• Plotin.
• 2 Cor. 2.4.
• Plotin.
• Jamblicus de myst. Egypt.
• Vid. Orig. con. Celsum. lib. 4.
• Plutarch, de de fectu. Orac.
• Enquiry into the Nature & Principle of Moral Vertue, &c. Cap. 3. Sect. 3.
• In his Dia∣logue, in∣scribed Me∣non.
• Deut. 18.21, 22.
• Jer. 27.18.
• 1 Cor. 1.17. & 2.4.
• Cognoscis pie lector falsam imitationem Miraculo∣rum Christi, sic solitus il∣luderehomini∣bus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Is. Casaub. not ad▪ locum.
• Humana dicta ar∣gumentis & testi∣bus egent, Dei au∣tem Sermo ipse sibi testis est; quia ne∣cesse est quicquid incorrupta veritas loquitur, incorrup∣tum sit testimoni∣um veritatis Salvi∣an. de vero judicio & providentia Dei lib. 3.
• Cartes. Medit. 3. & Resp. ad obj. 2••••. Wolzog. de in∣terpr. Script. p. 24.
• Of the Reasonable∣ness of the Christi∣an Religion. Cap. 1. Sect. 3.
• Actus qui ex his Principiis procedit, certus est & infalli∣bilis, quamvis illi, qui hunc actum eli∣cit, ejus Infallibi∣litas non semper sit comperta. Compton. Tom. poster. in Thom. Disp. 9. Sect. 5.
• Compton. Tom. post. Disp. Dis. 8. Sect. 1.
• Non••negamus dari Sensum Scripturae com∣positum, seu dua∣bus partibus con∣stantem; in quo, voces rem quan∣dam, res illa a∣liam divinâ na∣cura{que} rerū con∣sentaneâ ordina∣tione Significat Bisterfield. disp. de script. p 34▪
• Obscuritas quae est in Subjecto n••n est transfe∣renda in Objectū. Spa••hem. Disp. de Script. i. §. 4 i.
• Aliud est a∣gere de obscuri∣tate Subjecti seu personarū, aliud de obscuritate in Objecto, seu Scripturarum. Morus causa Dei. p. 18.16.

  Nihil impedit Scripturam esse claram & per∣spicuam, & ho∣minem nihilo∣minus, esse 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Coccei. Sum. Theolo∣g. cap. 6.

  Perspicuitas Scripturae est proprietas insita quam & semper retinet, homo li∣cet illuminatus sit necne; quam∣vis non illumina∣to homine istam claritatem i∣dem non videat Heidan. Causa Dei lib. cap. 6. Debemus distinguere inter Ob∣scurum in se & absolute, & quod Obscurum est no∣bis & quoad nós. Mares.
• Discourse of the true Grounds of Faith annex∣ed to his Divine Dialogues.
• Fatemur in∣quit, esse quae∣dam in Scrip∣turis quae non valeamus assequi, non tan∣tum vitio men∣tium nostrarum, aut sublimitate rerum, sed ipsa singulari qua∣dam constituti∣one Scripturae p. 16. ita verba composuit & o∣rationem, ut sci∣ret si in eam in∣cideret peccator, inductum iri in errorem p. 172. ita loquitur quando{que} Deus ut nolit intelli∣gi p. 173. Haec tamen dispensa∣tio Divini nu∣minis quae varia est & infinita prepemodumom∣nem continet ob∣scuritatis Cau∣sam, quae videtur non a nobis sed a Scriptura profi∣cisci. &c. p. 174.
• Distinctionem sensus Gramma∣tici, & intel∣ligentiae spiritu∣alis, ad Intelli∣gendi modum referimus. Vo∣gelsang. Exer∣citat. Theolog. Exercit. 6. p. 101.

  Haud quaeri∣tur de intelli∣genda Scriptura, sed de salutariter intelligenda. Hoornbeck. So∣cinian. confutat Tom. 1. lib. 1. cap. 5.
• Aliter enim homo naturalis videt, spiritualis aliter, vel ean∣de licet veritatē videat uter{que}. idem quando re∣praesentatur ho∣mini naturali objectum, ac spi∣rituali, uterque idem necessario recipit, at pro suo quisque Modu∣lo; Spiritualis qua talis, spiri∣tualiter; natu∣ralis è contr•• naturaliter,
• Joann Vander Waeyen pro vera & genu∣ina Reforma∣torum sententia de Interprete Script. lib. 2. p. 101.

  Duplicem sensum non fingimus, uti splendidè mentiuntur Remonstrantes, sed ejusdem sensûs diversos recipiendi modos, prout diverso aguntur homines principio. Idem. ibid. p. 226 vid. etiam Trigland, Antapol cap. 3.
• Ostorod. In∣stitut. cap. 1. Catiches. Ra∣cov. cap. 3.

  Remonstrant. Confess. cap. 1. Episcop. disp. 3. de Script. perspi∣cuitate. Velu∣thuis. de usu Ra∣tionis, p. 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 194. Wolzog. 209. de interpret. Script. p. 12.62, 63, 126.
• Sine Spiritu arcana spiritus quaerere, nihil aliud est, quam sine luce videre velle. Rivet. Isagog. ad Script. S. cap. 18. §. 3.
• Vid. Voss. Hist. Pelag. prestat. & pas∣sim.
• Exporrigit ra∣dios suoscaelestes per universum Dei verbum. hoornbeck▪ The∣olog. practic. part. 1. lib. 6. cap. 3.
• Joann. Van∣der Waeyen de Interpret. Scrip. advers. Wolzog. lib. 2 p. 5.
• Deus usus est genere sermonis practico, & Oe∣conomico potius quam th••orico & Acr••amati∣co, adeo{que} phra∣sis & enuncia∣ta non tam the∣oretice velut in Acroaterio Dialecticorum, vel in schola aliqua metaphysica vel captioso litigatorum foro, quam practice, veluti in domo disciplinae paternae, intelli∣genda sunt. Conrad. Berg. de fid. Cathol. dis∣sert 6. Thes. 179, 180, 222.
• Particulas quasdam de Scripturis eli∣gunt quibus de∣cipiāt, non con∣nectentes quae infra & supra sunt, ex quibus voluntas & in∣tentio Scripto∣ris posset intel∣ligi. August▪ contr. Adia∣mant. cap. 4.
• Verba sacrae Scripturae actu significant quic∣quid significare possunt. Hund. disp. 4. de ver∣bo Dei.
• Bonus In er∣pres non debet ipse Sensum Scripturae coar∣ctare; sed tam sumere latè quam sumi po∣test. Sebast. Schmidt. de I∣mag. Dei. cap. 4. p. 77.

  Deus censen∣dus est dixisse, quicquid ex suis dictis legitime colligitur, cum non nesciverit, quas ex illis, ho∣mines recta ra∣tione utentes, consequentias nectere possent. Mares System. l••c. 1 Thes. 17.
• Cum Deus sit sapientissimus, italocutus est, ut quicquid possit concludi ex eo quod dixit, ve∣lit inde conclu∣di, nam homi∣num ea est osci∣tantia vel stul∣tia aliquando, ut ea dicant, ex quibus aliquid colligitur, quod minime velint Cam. praelect. de Eccles.
• Aliud est nos∣se regulas Con∣nexionum, aliud sententiarū ve∣ritatem, lib. 2. de Doct. Christ. cap. 33.

  De Conse∣quentia stature rationis certe o∣pus est, (eadem scil. Logica est, ut in Mathe∣maticis, Physi∣cis, Metaphysi∣cis, sic etiam in S. Theologiâ) at vero de con∣sequente statu∣ere, certe fidei solius est. Cam.

  Nemo nost∣rum docet quod Conclusio sit credenda ut Ar∣ticulus fidei ra∣tione Conse∣quentiae, creden∣dam dicimus, quia est Verbum Dei, esse autem verbū Dei con∣sequentia osten∣dit. Hundius disp. 4. de Con∣sequent; ex Scriptura. Non enim consequen∣tias propriè sic dictas afferimus ad proban∣dam aut fun∣dandam conclu∣sionem fidei, sed tantū ad osten∣dam veritatem connexionum. Videl. Rationale Theolog. lib. 3. cap. 4.
• 1 Cor. 7.14.
• Id est de fide quod Deus per Prophetas & Apostolos reve∣lavit, aut quod evidenter inde deducitur. De verbo Dei. cap. 9.

  Quasi quod ex iis quae Pro∣phetae & Apo∣stoli de Deo do∣cuerunt necessa∣rio deducitur, in Prophetas & Apostolos refer∣ri non de••e∣at. Smiglesius. contr. Masco∣rov. de Bap∣tism. p. 7.

  Non modo ad Doctrinam Ca∣tholicam perti∣net, quod Apo∣stolis expresse revela••um est, verum etiam quod ex aliera propositione revelata, & altera certa in lumine Naturali, Syllogismo collectione{que} evidenti conficitur: Canus de loe. lib. 6. cap. ult. vide etiam Vasquez. in jam. Thom. quaest. ja. disp. 12. cap. 2. Veg lib. 9. in Concil. Trident. cap. 39. & Catharin. contr. Soto.
• Hierocl.
• Plotin.
• Suid.
• Sallust. de Diis & Mun∣do, cap. 19.
• Hierocl. Sallust. ubi su∣pra. cap. 9.
• Illi qui argu∣mēta á recta ra∣tione petita vio∣lenter rejiciunt, ea{que} solutione indigna pro∣nunciāt, mode∣ste quidem a∣gunt, sed pessi∣me de Religione mereri viden∣tur. In Synopsi praefixa libro cui titulus; My∣sterium pietatis defensum contr. Crell.
• Act. 17.16.
• 1 Pet. 1 12.
• Si Ratio con∣tra Divinarum Scripturarum autoritatem redditur, quam∣libet acuta sit, fallit veri simi∣litudine, nam vera esse non po∣test. Rursus si manifestissimae certae{que} Rationi Scripturarū Sanctarū obji∣citur auctoritas; non intelligit qui hoc facit: & non Scriptura∣rum illarum Sensum, ad quem penetrare non potuit, sed suam potius ob∣jicit veritati: nec quod in eis, sed quod in Seip∣pso pro eis inve∣nit, opponit. Aug. Ep. 7. ad Marcellin.
• Lib. de heres. Lib. de cu∣rand Affectib. Graecor. Annal. ad An. 174. Dissert. de vit. & Script. Por∣phyr. cap. 1. Ep. ad Ctesiph. Augustin. Tom. 1. cap. 18.
• Lib. 10. de Repub.
• Ad Hermog. lib. de prae∣script.
• Lib. 2. cap. 35.
• De prescript.
• p. 339, 340, 341, 342.
• Prim. Philo∣soph. Meditat. prim.
• Cartes. prin. Philosoph. & Epist. 10. Tom. Poster Velthuis.
• Prim. Phil. Medit. 6.
• p. 17.
• Nos vero ul∣tro fatemur, plurima esse in Religione Chri∣stiana quae ra∣tionem supe∣rant. contr. Frantz. disp. 3. de Sacramento. supra rationem Religionem esse novimus; de li∣ber. arbitr.
• Qui in Evan∣gelio quod vul∣tis, creditis: qúod nón vultis, non creditis, vo∣bis potius quam evangelio cre∣ditis, lib. 17. contr. Faustū. cap. 17.
• Sola ratione dijudicamus possibilitatem & impossibili∣tatem articulo∣rum fidei. prae∣fat. contr. Frantz. 2.
• Lib. de Ser∣vat. part. 3. cap. 6. Idem ibid. part. 2. cap. 4.
• Homil. 8. in cap. 1. Joan.