Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...

CHAP. IX.

In every Action you undertake, consider first with your self, and weigh well the Nature and Circumstances of the thing: Nay, though it be so flight a one, as going to Bathe; re∣present to your self beforehand, what Acci∣dents you may probably meet with. That in a Bath is often Rude Behaviour, Dash∣ing of Water, Justling for Passage, Scurri∣lous Language, and Stealing. And when you have done thus, you may with more Se∣curity go about the thing. To which purpose you will do well to say thus to your self; My Design is to Bathe, but so it is too, to preserve my Mind and Reason undisturbed, while I do so. For after such wise prepara∣tion as this, if any thing intervene to obstruct your Washing, this Reflection will presently rise upon it: Well, but this was not the on∣ly thing I proposed; that which I chiefly in∣tended, is to keep my Mind and Reason un∣disturbed; and this I am sure can never be done, if I suffer every Accident to discom∣pose me.

COMMENT.

AFter giving Instructions concerning our Be∣haviour, with regard to the things of the World, that use to engage our Affections,

either upon the account of the Delight they give us, the Convenience they are of, or the Relation they bear to us; the next Step in or∣der, is to consider our Actions; for these too, have a great many Circumstances that lie out of our power, and must therefore be undertaken with great Prudence, and much Preparation. The Rule then that he lays down is this, That you take a just account of the nature of each Action, and fairly compute the several Accidents, which though they do not necessarily, yet may possibly attend it, and to expect that these are very like to happen in your own case par∣ticularly. And the Fruit of this will be, either not to be surprised, if such Difficulties do en∣counter you; or, if the thing be not of abso∣lute necessity, to decline the hazard, by letting it alone. For the Great Cato reckons this for one of the Errors of his Life, that he chose to take a Voyage once by Sea, to a Place whither he might have travell'd by Land. Now in such a case, though no misfortune should actually happen, yet if there be a likelihood of any such Accident, and if it do frequently happen to o∣thers, it is an act of Imprudence to make choice of such a Course, without being driven to it by necessity: And this Answer, that many Peo∣ple do the same, and come off safe, will not bear us out, in choosing a more dangerous, when it is left to our own Liberty to take a safer Passage.

But now, where there is absolute occasion for our running some Risque, as if we have neces∣sary Affairs to dispatch, which require a Voy∣age to or from some Island; or if we are obli∣ged

to stand by a Father, or a Friend, in some hazardous or unlucky Business; or if we are called upon to take up Arms in defence of our Country: Then there is no thought of decli∣ning the Matter wholly, and our Method must be to undertake it upon due deliberation; and after having first laid together the several ac∣cidental Obstructions that use to arise in such a case: That so by this timely Recollection, we may render them easie and samiliar, and not be disturbed when any of them come upon us. For a Man thus prepared, hath this double Advan∣tage; if they do not happen, his Joy is the greater, because he had so fully possest himself with an expectation that they would, that it is almost a Deliverance to him. And if they do, then he hath the advantage of being provi∣ded against them, and so can encounter them, without much danger or disorder.

Now against this Counsel I expect it will be urged, First, That if any one should take such Pains to represent all the Crosses and Disap∣pointments that may probably happen to them in every Undertaking, the Effect of this would be Cowardice and Idleness; for Men would find themselves utterly discouraged from at∣tempting any thing at all. Besides, that no∣thing can be more grievous to any Man, than to have the Image of his Troubles and Misfor∣tunes constantly before his Eyes; and especial∣ly if the Affair he be engaged in, continue any time, to converse all that while with this gast∣ly Apparition. Therefore that Demosthenes his Advice seems much more Prudent and Eligible; To be sure that what you attend, be Good

and Vertuous; then to hope well, and whatever the Success be, to bear it generously and de∣cently.

But by the Objector's good leave, if by ho∣ping well, Demosthenes mean a good Confidence grounded upon our undertaking what is Vertuous and Commendable, and a resting satisfied in this Consideration, whatever the Event be, he says the very same thing with Epictetus; only indeed he gives us no Direction which way we shall at∣tain to this generous Temper of Mind, that may enable us to entertain the Dispensations of Providence decently, though they should hap∣pen to be harsh and severe. But Epictetus de∣clares himself of Opinion, that the Method to qualify our selves for so doing, is to take a true Prospect of the whole Affair, and repre∣sent to our selves, that it is what is fit for us to undertake, and that there may be several Circumstances attending it, which though they may not be agreeable to us, are yet very tole∣rable, and such as we may reconcile our selves to, upon these Two Accounts. First, Because the Action it self which brings them upon us, is Vertuous and Becoming; and then, because whenever they happen, they are no more than what are expected, and were provided against before.

But, if by hoping well, Demosthenes intend a firm perswasion of Safety and Success, then I think it is very difficult, nay, I may venture to say, it is impossible to conceive how a Man thus perswaded, can ever bear Disappointments and Crosses with Moderation and Temper. For when a Man falls from what he was in imagination,

the shock is the same, as if he were so in rea∣lity. And neither the Body, nor the Mind, are of a Constitution to bear sudden and violent Alterations, without great Disturbance. You see that the very Weather, and Seasons of the Year, though they change gently and by de∣grees, yet put our Humours into a great fer∣ment, and generally occasion many Distempers among us; and the more Violent this Change at any time is, the Greater in Proportion the Disorders that follow upon it, must needs be.

For it is true, that a just Computation of all the Difficulties and Dangers that are used to attend our Actions, must needs condemn Men to Slavish Fears, and an Unactive Life: For if our Reason convince us, that what we attempt, is good for the advantage of the Soul, or (which is all one) of the Man, (for that Soul is the Man,) the Desire of that Good must needs in∣spire us with Courage and Vigour, notwith∣standing all the discouraging Dangers that at∣tend it. And the consideration of this danger, will be very much softened by this most Ratio∣nal and Vertuous Perswasion, that we ought to persevere in such an Undertaking, though at the expence of some Hazard and Inconvenience. For all Danger and Detriment, that concerns either our Body or our Fortunes, is not pro∣perly an Evil to us; nor shall we think it ours, if we be wise. But the Benefit of choosing a Vertuous Action, and persisting in it, in de∣spight of all Dangers and Discouragements, is our own Good; for it is the Good of our Souls, which are truly and properly our selves. And

this Advantage is considerable enough to be set against many Troubles, and Losses, and Ba∣nishments, and Disgraces; nay, it is sufficient, not only to be set against, but to over-balance them all; because the Good of this, does so very much exceed the Evil that seems to be in them. For if a Man think himself obliged to choose a Greater Good, when attended only with a Less Evil, how is it possible that he should be discouraged and uneasie, under the expectation of some cross Accidents that sometimes follow upon Vertuous Actions, when the Good of these Actions is truly and properly his own, but the Evil of those Accidents, is only something re∣mote, and not His? Especially too, when this is by no means a superficial and notional Di∣stinction, but such a real Difference, as his whole Practice and Behaviour shews him sensible of. This is the very Reason, that Men of Virtue and Wisdom have made it their Glory to choose Good with the greatest Dangers; that they have done it chearfully, and sacrificed their very Lives for it; and accounted their Suffer∣ings upon such an Account, matter of the greatest Joy to them. So did Menoeceus particularly, and all those other Heroes, famed in Story, who have voluntarily devoted themselves, and

died for the Service and Sake of their Coun∣try.

Now Epictetus couches his Advice here, under one of the Meanest and most Insignificant In∣stances that can be; partly to illustrate what he says, by an Example taken from common Conversation, and so to gain the Assent of his Hearers, to the truth of what he would infer from it; and partly too, as himself hath told us before, to put his Scholars upon exercising their Virtue in Lesser Trials; that so from Tri∣vial Matters, they may rise by degrees to o∣thers of greater Difficulty and Consequence. And the Success of this Method, hath been already shewn, to depend upon Reasons which need not be repeated here. But his Design is also, that we should be careful to apply these things to Affairs of Moment, in proportion as the Hazards of them are more discouraging; and in those Occasions, always to take our Mea∣sures from the Nature of the thing, whether it be what is agreeable to Decency and our Du∣ty, and what those Hardships are that usually accompany it: And after such Prospect taken, to settle our Minds in this Resolution, that if the worst happen, yet we will bear it with Temper and Moderation. For this is the way to maintain the Character of Vertuous and Ra∣tional Men; this must let us into all the Ad∣vantages of doing well, and defend us from all that Perplexity that unexpected Events com∣monly betray Men to. For he that is troubled and Discomposed, and fancies himself unhap∣py in what he suffers, it is plain, either had not sufficiently considered what he went about,

before he engaged in it; or if he did foresee all this, then his Disorder is the Effect of Effe∣minacy and Cowardice, which makes him give out, and repent his Undertaking. And both these Failings are highly Criminal, and con∣trary to the Rules of Nature, and Right Rea∣son.

Notes

• This Person was Son to Creon, King of Thebes, and upon an Answer of the Oracle, that a Plague which then in∣fested the City, could not be removed, till the Race of Cad∣mus were all extinct: He, who was the only remainder of that Family, slew himself. Of the same nature was that Act of Cur∣tius, and the Decii so much celebrated by the Roman Poets and Historians.