Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...

CHAP. LXXVI.

The first and most useful Topick in Philoso∣phy, is the Moral part, which teaches Men their Duty; as for instance, That they should not lie: The second is the demon∣strative part, which gives us infallible proofs of it, and shews us evident Rea∣sons wherefore we ought not to lie: The Third is the distinguishing and argumen∣tative part, which instructs us what a Demonstration is, and how this in the case before us is one; What is a Conse∣quence? What a Contradiction? What is True, and what is False? Now from hence it is plain, that the last of these is subser∣vient to the second; that the second is sub∣ordinate to the first, and that the first is the most important and necessary point of all: That which all our Studies should be directed to, and wherein they should all center and rest at last. But we quite invert this Order. The third employs most of our Time and Pains, and the first is not thought worth either: So that by a strange Absurdity we commit the Crime, and at the same time value our selves ex∣ceedingly, for being able to demonstrate beyond all contradiction, that we ought not to do it.

COMMENT.

IT is absolutely necessary, that a Man who makes any pretensions to Philosophy, and aims at the peculiar perfection of his Nature, both as he is an Animal, and a Rational Crea∣ture, should have a clear and demonstrative know∣ledge of the Truth: For otherwise, he may be liable to great Errors, and run into infinite Incon∣veniences, by taking things upon trust, and lean∣ing too much either to the bare Authority, or the insufficient proofs of confident Pretenders. Ver∣tue is a thing of the highest Consequence, and it is not fit we should take up with so slight and fee∣ble Perswasions concerning it, as mere Opinion and Probabilities are capable of creating in us. Now this clear and undoubted Evidence is an ef∣fect owing only to Demonstration. And it is Logick's peculiar Province, to inform us in the Nature of a Demonstration, as, That it is a Syl∣logism consisting of Propositions, put together according to Rules of Art; and that those Pro∣positions must be of clear and undoubted Truth: As also to acquaint us what Propositions are thus qualified, and what Method is to be observed for the forming them into a true Syllogism.

Now from hence we may plainly perceive, that the whole compass of Philosophy may be reduced to three Heads, and that these will comprehend if not all absolutely, yet all that is material and necessary in it. The First is the Preceptive part, that which converts our Speculation into Practice, that prescribes Modesty and Temperance in our Actions, and prohibits lying in all our Discourse and Conver∣sation.

The second is the demonstrative part, which shews us clearly not only that we should or should not, but also assigns convincing Rea∣sons, why we should or should not do this or that. The third is the illustrating and arguing part, that sets Rules to our Reasoning, and assists Nature by Art; and prevents our being imposed upon by false appearances, by teaching us the difference between a real demonstration, and a pretended one; and shews the mutual Connexions and Con∣sequences of some Propositions, and the irreconci∣leable Opposition between others; as, That the Species necessarily inferrs its Genus and the Be∣ing of a Man implies that of an Animal; That a particular Affirmative and an universal Negative; and so likewise a particular Negative and an uni∣versal Affirmative, are direct Contradictions, never to be reconciled, and impossible to be both true or both false together. It acquaints us too with the qualifications of a Syllogism, What Pro∣positions it consists of; How these Propositions must be put together; What difference there will be in the Conclusion, according to the manner of forming it; and what differences there are between true and fair Syllogisms, and irregular, sophistical, and ensnaring ones.

Now nothing can be more plain, than that this Third Topick, which instructs us in all the Subtleties of Reasoning, is intended to serve the Second, and that this is an Ingenious and Artifi∣cial Expedient, contrived, as we see, to re∣move all the Scruples and Disatisfactions of our Minds, to direct and fix our Judgments, and give us the most uncontestable and satis∣factory Assurance, what is our real Happiness,

and what our Duty. This, I say, is the Business of the Second Head, which consists in Demonstrative Proofs; but then it is every whit as plain too, that this Second is subordinate to something beyond it; viz. The Practical and Preceptive Part; and consequently both the other are resolved into the First: For our Knowledge is intended only to qualifie us for Action, and lead us to it; and therefore the Poactice of Vertue and a Good Life is the ulti∣mate Design of alll Study, and all Instruction: Here we must fix at last; for every thing else conspires to promote this; but beyond this there is no End of greater Consequence, or higher Perfection.

And happy were it for us, if we governed our selves by this Rule. But, alas! we take quite contrary Measures; the greatest part of our Time and Pains is employed in the Third Head; in nice Disputes and Controverted Points; and we can spare but very little for the Second; That which should convince us of the Excellence, and the Necessity of being Ver∣tuous, and possess our Souls with a lively and vigorous Sense of our Duty: But for the First of these Topicks, which consists in reducing our Knowledge into Practice, we allow this no Portion of our Care at all. We wrangle and dispute eternally, about curious and unprofita∣ble Questions; and overlook that which would conduce to the promoting true Goodness. We study this now and then, and talk learn∣edly, and affectionately upon it; but still we do no part of what we say. Nay, which is the most monstrous inconsistence that can be, we are

guilty of gross Enormities in our own Per∣sons, and at the same time are proud that we are able to convince and perswade others, That we can shew, we ought not to be what we are: And it pleases us much to think, that no body can expose the Deformity of our own Actions better than our selves.

Now all this is turning things up side down, and beginning at the wrong End. The Method in which we ought to proceed is this: First to learn how to argue against Vice, then to employ our Talent in demonstrating the Baseness and In∣congruity of it to our selves; and when we are arrived to a full and undoubted Conviction, then actually to decline it, and to persevere in the Practice of what we have learnt, as considering that we learned it for that very purpose; and that the Preceptive Part, though Superiour to all the rest, is yet it self subordinate to the Practical.

This is the Substance and Design of Epictetus in the Chapter now before us, where he does with great Dexterity inforce the Practice of his Moral Maxims, and exposes the Vanity of those Men, who make Speculation the End of their Knowledge, with that Indignation, which so ex∣quisite a Folly deserves.