Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...

CHAP. XXXIV.

As no Man sets up a Mark, with a Design to shoot beside it, so neither hath the Ma∣ker of the World formed any such real Be∣ing, as Evil in it.

COMMENT.

THE Disputes which are wont to arise concerning the Nature and the Original of Evil, by being unskilfully managed, have been the Occasions of grievous Impiety to∣wards God, and subverted the very Founda∣tions of Vertue and good Manners; and per∣plexed many unwary Persons with several dan∣gerous Scruples, and inextricable Difficul∣ties.

First, As to that Opinion which makes Evil a first Principle, and will have Two com∣mon Principles, a Good and a Bad one, from whence all things whatsoever derive their Be∣ing, it is attended with a Thousand prodi∣gious Absurdities. For, whence should this Power of being a Principle, which is one, and is imparted to both these Contraries in com∣mon, whence I say, should it come? Or how should one and the same Cause give it to them both? And how is it possible, that these Two should be Contraries, unless they be ranked under one common Genus? For we must di∣stinguish

between Diversity and Contrariety; that which is White, cannot be termed Con∣trary to that which is Hot or Cold; but Con∣traries are properly those things that are most distant from one another, yet still under the same common Genus. White then and Black, are Contraries, because both bear relation to the Genus of Colour; for they are both Co∣lours alike. And Hot and Cold are Contra∣ries, for they likewise meet under the Genus of Tactile Qualities; and this is Reason e∣nough to shew, that Contraries cannot possi∣bly be first Principles, because there must have been some common Genus antecedent to them, or they could not be Contraries; and fur∣ther, because one must needs have a Being, before many; for each of those many Beings must subsist, by vertue of its Essence, be∣ing communicated from that first Being, o∣therwise nothing could ever have been at all.

Again, Some single Original Being there must needs have been, which must have been a Foundation for particular Properties, and from which those Properties must have been distributed among the many. For from the Divine Original Good, all Good things what∣soever proceed; and in like manner all Truth, from the same Divine Fountain of Truth. So that though there be several Principles of se∣veral Properties, yet still these all are com∣prehended in, and resolved into one Principle at last; and that not some subordinate and particular one, as these are in their own kind

only, but a Principle from whence all the rest spring; one that transcends, connects, con∣tains them all, and communicates to each of them its Causal and Productive Power, with such Limitations and Abatements as their re∣spective Natures require. So exceeding irra∣tional and absurd it is, to think of advan∣cing Two Principles of all things, or to sup∣pose it possible that there should be more than one.

Besides, They that will have this Universe to proceed from Two Principles, are driven by their own Tenets into a Thousand wild Inconsistencies; they tell us, one of these Principles is Good, and the other Evil; they call the Good one God, but yet at the same time, they do not allow him to be the Uni∣versal Cause: They cannot worship him as Almighty, for indeed they have clipped the Wings of his Omnipotence, and are so far from ascribing all Power to him, that they divide it into Halves; or to speak more pro∣perly, they give the greater share by much a∣way from him; they call him the Source of Goodness, and Spring of Light, and yet de∣ny, that all things receive Light and Good∣ness from him.

Now what horrid Blasphemies, what op∣probrious Reflections does these Mens Do∣ctrin cast upon the Majesty of God? They represent him as a Feeble and a Fearful Be∣ing, uneasie with continual Apprehensions that Evil will invade his Territories. And to ease himself of these Fears, and buy off his Enemy,

contrary to all Justice, and Honour, and In∣terest, casting some Souls away, (which are so many Parts and Parcels of himself, and never merited by any Offence of theirs to be thus delivered up,) that by parting with these, he may compound for the rest of the Good ones with him. Like some General in Distress, who when the Enemy attacks him, sacrifices one part of his Army, to gain an Opportunity of bringing off the other. For the Sense of what they say, amounts to thus much, though it be not express'd in the very same Words. Now he that delivered up these Souls, or commanded them to be delivered up in this barbarous manner, had sure forgot, or at least did not duly consider, what Mise∣ries those wretched Spirits must endure, when in the Hands of that Evil Principle. For (according to them,) they are Burnt, and Fryed, and Tormented all manner of ways, and this too, notwithstanding they were never guilty of any Fault, but are still parts of God himself. And at last they tell us, that if any such Souls happen to Apostatize, and Degenerate into Sin, they never recover them∣selves; nor from thenceforth are in any pos∣sibility of returning to Good, but continue inseparably united to Evil for Ever. (Only here it is fit we take notice what Souls these are, and how they thus degenerate; for they do not admit their Crimes to be Adultery or Murder, or any of the grossest and most sla∣gititious Enormities of a dissolute and wicked Conversation, but only the denying of Two

Principles, an evil and a good one.) In the mean while, this God, it seems, is left maim∣ed and imperfect, by the Loss of so many of his Parts; he is stupid and sensless too, (in their Hypothesis I mean, for far be it from me to entertain so irreverent a Thought) for he understands nothing at all either of his own Interest, or the Nature of Evil: If he did, what Dread could he be under, or how should Evil enter into any part of that Province which Good possesses, since their Natures are so very distant and irreconcileable, that they cannot run into each other, but their Bounds are fix'd, and immovable Barriers set between them from all Eternity?

For this they say too: But who, in the Name of Wonder, set these Bounds and Bar∣riers? Did Chance? Then it seems they make Chance a Common Principle too. Did any other Being that had Authority over both these, and prescribed to them as it self thought fit? Then it seems That had a Sub∣sistence before They made the World. But how could that be done before the Creation? For the Division they make is like this upon Earth, for they assign the Eastern, Western, and Northern Regions to Good, and reserve only the South for Evil.

Afterwards they go on, a••d fancy that Evil hath five Apartments, like so many Dens or Caverns; and here they tell us of Woods, and all manner of Animals, such as frequent both Sea and Land; that these are at eternal Wars with one another; and though these

are said to be immortal, as being originally Good, yet they pretend at the same time, that they are devoured by their Five-formed Monster.

Now then, since these distinct Regions have been set out, as you see, from the Beginning of the World at least; and each assigned and accommodated to its peculiar Inhabitant; I would fain be satisfied, which way Evil should make an Incursion into Good's Dominions? Or, if we should suppose this possible, yet could it be done however, and still these Two remain contrary to one another? May we not as well say, that White may be Black, and yet retain its Whiteness still; and that Light can admit Darkness, and still be Light, as that perfect Evil can make Approaches to perfect Good, and still continue perfect Evil? And if this Impossibility be evident and una∣voidable, what Occasion is there to describe God as they do, committing an Act of so much unnecessary Fear, and Folly, and Injustice, as is the casting away Souls to Evil for his own Security, and ever since labouring to no pur∣pose (for so they will needs have it too) to redeem these Souls from Misery? A Design never to be effected, because, as I observ'd before, some of them have lapsed, and so must abide under the Dominion of Evil to all Eternity: And all this they will not allow the Good to have had any Knowledge or Foresight of, though with the same Breath they pretend, that Evil knew perfectly well what Number of Souls would fall into his

Hands, and laid his Stratagems accordingly.

Their Scheme certainly had been much bet∣ter contrived, had they represented the Good Principle, as always employed and taken up with the Contemplation of it self, and not engaged it in perpetual War with an Enemy never to be vanquished or destroyed. For they make Evil to be no less Eternal and Immor∣tal than Good. And this, indeed, is a con∣siderable Objection, and a just Reproach to their whole System, that Eternal Existence, and Incorruptible Duration, no Beginning, and no End, are allowed to Evil as well as Good. And when these glorious Attributes are given to that which we cannot but detest, what Difference is there left, or what can we say more in Honour of that which we cannot but love and admire?

Let us now proceed, if you please, to take a short View of the Account they give con∣cerning the Creation of the World. Pillars then there are, they tell us, not like those of the Poet,

That this vast Globe of Earth and Heav'n sustain,

(for they scorn that any Poetical Fictions, or the least fabulous Circumstance, should be al∣lowed a Place in their Philosophy;) but (as one of their greatest Masters hath informed us) of solid unhewn Stone, and twelve Win∣dows, one of which is constantly opened eve∣ry hour▪

But their marvellous Wisdom is not more eminently seen in any one Instance, than the Account they pretend to give of Eclipses: For they tell us, That when in the Framing of the World, the Evils that were in Con∣junction together gave great Disturbance by their justling and disorderly Motions, the Lu∣minaries drew certain Veils before them, to shelter them from the ill Influences of that Disorder; and that Eclipses are nothing else, but the Sun and Moon hiding themselves still behind those Veils, upon some extraordinary and threatning Emergencies.

Then again, How odd and unaccountable is it, that of so many Heavenly Bodies which give Light to the World, they should hold only the two great ones in Veneration, and contemn all the rest; assigning the Sun and Moon to the Good Principle, but putting all the Stars into the Possession of the Evil, and deriving them from a Bad Cause?

The Light of the Moon they do not agree to be borrowed from the Sun, but think it a Collection or Constellation of Souls; which she draws up, like so many Vapours from the Earth, between Change and Full; and then translates them by degrees into the Sun from the Full to the next New Moon.

In short, they have a World of extravagant Fancies, which do not so much as deserve to be reckoned among Fables; and yet they are by no means content to have them look'd up∣on as Fabulous, nor do they use them as Fi∣gures or Hieroglyphicks, so as to signifie

something else of more substantial Goodness, but will needs have them believed to be strict∣ly and literally true. Thus the Image they give us of Evil, is a Monster compounded of five several Creatures, a Lion, a Fish, an Eagle, and some other two Things, I do not well remember what; but all these put to∣gether, are supposed to make a very ravenous and formidable Composition.

Such abominable Impiety against God are these Notions and Principles chargeable with; and yet (which is still more amazing) the Persons that advance them, profess to take Sanctuary in these Opinions, out of a more than common Respect, and a profounder Re∣verence to the Divine Perfections, than the rest of the World (as they think) express. They could not bear the imputing any Evil to God, and, to avoid this Inconvenience, they have found out a particular Principle and Cause of all Evil; a Principle equal in Honor and Power to the Good, or rather indeed Su∣perior and more Potent than He. For in all the Attempts that have been made hitherto, to corrupt the World, and render it mise∣rable, Evil seems plainly to have got the bet∣ter. For they represent Evil upon all Occa∣sions taking Advantage against Good, and contriving all manner of Ways not to let it go. This is constantly the bold and daring Aggressor, while Good, in the mean while, gives way to, and mingles it self with Evil, would fain compound the Matter, and for any thing that yet appears, hath discovered no∣thing

in its whole Management but Fear, and Folly, and Injustice. Thus, while they abhor to call God the Cause of Evil, they make him nothing but Evil in the most exquisite Degree, and (according to that vulgar Proverb) leap out of the Frying-Pan into the Fire.

But besides these vile Profanations of the Majesty of God, this System of Philosophy does, as much as in it lies, tear up the very Roots of all Virtue and moral Instruction, by destroying and utterly taking away all that Liberty of Choice which God and Nature have given us. For besides those Attributes of Eter∣nity and Immortality, it does also ascribe to this Principle of Evil a compulsive Power over our Wills, and that so very absolute and strong, that it is not only out of our own Disposal, whether we will commit Wickedness or no, but such as even God himself is not able to controul or over-power. In the mean while it must be confest, that this is a very idle and extravagant Imagination: For if our Souls are violently thrust, and born down in∣to Murder or Adultery, or any other that are reputed the most grievous Crimes, and com∣mit these merely by the Impulse of some stronger Power, without any Consent or vo∣luntary Concurrence of their own, then are they clear of all Guilt. And this is a Matter so evident and acknowledged, that all Laws, both Divine and Humane, acquit Persons in Cases of Violence, and such a Force as they could not resist, and where it is plain they acted against their Will. And indeed there

is not, nor can be any Sin at all in such Acti∣ons, where Mens own Minds are supposed to have no Concern, but to proceed upon Ne∣cessity and Constraint, and such as could not be resisted by them.

Now if these wise Philosophers, while they were at a loss where to fix the true Cause of these Things, considered as Evils, bethought themselves of this Remedy, and set up such a Principle of Evil, as you have heard, to re∣solve the Difficulty; they have done their own Business effectually, and by a very pleasant Blunder over-turned their whole Scheme at once. For if it follows likewise (upon the Supposal of such a Constraint put upon the Wills of Men by that Principle) that nothing they do is any longer Evil, then observe how pleasant a Conclusion they have brought their Matters to: for, the Consequence lies plainly thus. If there be such a Thing as a Principle of Evil, then there is no such Thing as Evil in the World; and if there be no such Thing as Evil, then there cannot possibly be any such Thing as a Principle of Evil; and so upon the whole Matter, they have left themselves nei∣ther a Principle of Evil, nor any Evil at all.

Since therefore this is discovered to be but a rotten Foundation; if any, conscious of its weakness, shall presume to affirm, that God is the Author of Evil as well as Good, the Falshood and Impiety of this Assertion will ask but little Time and Pains to evince it. For how indeed can we suppose it possible, that that Opinion should be true, which casts

such unworthy Aspersions upon him, who is the Author and Giver of all Truth?

And first, which way can one conceive, that God, whose very Essence is perfect and immutable Goodness, should produce Evil out of himself? For since Evil and Good are con∣trary to each other, as our Adversaries them∣selves grant, How can we imagine one Con∣trary to be the Production of another?

Besides, He that produces any thing out of himself, does it by being the Cause of its existing, by having the Cause within himself, and having some Likeness to it in his own Nature; and so if you respect him as the Cause, the Producing, and the Produced, are in some degree the same. So that the Promo∣ters of this Opinion seem not to have attend∣ed to the manifest Dishonour they put upon God, by making him not only the Cause and Author of Evil, but to be the first and origi∣nal Evil in his own Nature.

Since therefore there is no such Thing as a Common Principle of Evil, and since God is not the Author and Cause of it, what Ac∣count shall we give of its coming into the World? For it is impossible any Thing should have a Beginning without a Cause. And the best Course we can take for this will be, first to explain what we mean by Evil, and then enquire into its Original; for the Causes of Things will very hardly be found, till their Natures are first known.

Now as to that Evil which they suppose who profess to believe a Common Principle of

Evil, and many of those that dispute this Question understand, we may be bold to pro∣nounce, that there is no such Thing in Na∣ture. For they pretend, that this Evil hath a positive Subsistence of its own, as Good hath; that it hath a Power equal to Good, and contrary to it; that its Essence is in∣compatible with that of Good, and will no more endure any Mixture with it, than White will with Black, or Hot with Cold. But if there were any such real and substantial Evil, like the Substance of a Man, or a Horse, or any other Species, that really and actually subsists; it must needs have some sort of Per∣fection in proportion to its Nature; and a particular Form, that makes it what it is, and distinguishes it from all other Beings. Now every Form, considered as such, is Good and not Evil, because it is endued with the Per∣fections peculiar to its Nature. And indeed they are so sensible of this, as to make that Evil of theirs desire Good, and embrace and court it, and receive Advantage by it, and love to partake of it, and use all possible Di∣ligence not to part from it. And how very ridiculous an Attempt is it, to impose a Thing upon us that does all this, for a Being simply and absolutely Evil?

But then, if we consider in the next place, that Evil, by the Commission whereof Men are denominated wicked, and are punished by God and Man for contracting it; this is pure∣ly accidental, and hath no real Essence of its own: For we find, that it both is, and ceases

to be, without the Destruction of the Subject, which is the very distinguishing Character of an Accident; and likewise, it never subsists but by Inherence in some Subject: For, what Evil of this kind was there ever in the Ab∣stract, without being the Evil, that is, the Crime of some Person that committed it? And so in like manner, Moral Good, which is the true Opposite of Evil, in this Sense is merely an Accident too.

Only herein they differ, that Good is that Quality of its Subject, by which it is rendred agreeable to Nature, and attains its proper Perfection. But Evil is the Depravation or Indisposition of its Subject, by which it swerves and departs from Nature, and loses or falls short of its natural Perfection, that is, of Good. For if Evil were the right Disposi∣tion, and natural Perfection of the Form to which it belongs, then would it by this Means change its Name and its Nature, and commence Good. So that from hence we may conclude against any primary Nature and positive Subsistence of Evil; for it is not in Nature as Good is, but is only an addi∣tional Thing superinduced upon Good, the Privation of, and Fall from it.

Just thus we may conceive Sickness, with regard to Health; and the Vices of the Mind, with respect to Virtue. And as the Walking strong and upright is the designed and prima∣ry Action of an Animal, and the end which it proposes to it self when it moves; but Stumbling or Halting is an Accident beside

the purpose, and happens throught some De∣fect, and missing the intended Aim, being a Motion, not of Nature's making, nor agree∣able to her Operations; directly so we may affirm of Evil, when compared to its opposite Good. And though these be Contraries, as White and Black are, yet no Man can main∣tain that they do equally subsist, or are equi∣pollent to one another, as White and Black are in a Physical Consideration. For these do both subsist alike, and neither of them can pretend to a greater Perfection in Nature than the other; and consequently, one is not the mere Privation of the other. For, a Pri∣vation is properly a Defect or kind of false Step in Nature, whereby the original Form is not fully come up to, as Limping is in a Man's Gate. But now each of those Colours hath its Form entire, and as much of what Nature intended should belong to it as its Contrary. Whereas, in the Case before us, one of the Extremes is agreeable to Nature, and the other contrary to it; and that which is contrary to Nature, is an accidental Addi∣tion to that part which is agreeable to it; for Good was first, and then Evil; not Evil first, and afterwards Good. As no Man can say, that Missing the Mark was antecedent to the Hitting of it; nor Sickness before Health; but quite otherwise. For it was the Archer's primitive Design to hit the Mark, and he shot on purpose that he might do so; thus also it was the original Intent of Nature to give us sound Health, and good Constitutions; for,

the Preservation and Continuance of the Creation, was the very End she proposed to her self in forming it. And in general Terms, whatever any Action is directed to, that is the proper End of it. But now the missing of the Mark happens afterwards by Accident, when the Operation does not suc∣ceed as it ought, nor attain the End at first proposed, but hits upon something else, some Disappointment instead of it. Now then this Disappointment which comes in afterwards, and by the Bye, may very truly be said to be Additional, and Accidental to the Origi∣nal Purpose of Hitting the Mark; but that Purpose can with no good Propriety of Speech be called so, with regard to that which happened afterwards, besides and a∣gainst the Man's Purpose.

If then all Things naturally desire Good, and every Thing that acts of any kind, does it with a prospect of, or in order to, some Real, or some Seeming Good, it is manifest, that the obtaining some Good is the primary End of all Operations whatsoever. Some∣times, indeed, it happens, that Evil steps in between, when the Desire is fixed upon some Object that is not really and truly good, but such in outward Appearance only, and which hath an Allay and Mixture of E∣vil with it. Thus when a Man, in pur∣suit of Pleasure, or greedy of Wealth, turns a Robber, or a Pirate, his Desire, in this Case, is principally fixed upon the seeming Good, and that is the Spring upon which all

these Actions move; but as Matters stand, he is forced to take the Good and the Bad together. For no Man alive was ever yet so unnaturally profligate, as to be guilty of Lewdness for Lewdness sake; or to Rob any Man merely for the sake of Stealing; or in∣deed, disposed to any manner of Evil, pure∣ly for the Satisfaction of doing evil. Be∣cause it is past all doubt, that Evil, consi∣dered and apprehended as Evil, can never be the Object of any Man's Desire. For if it were the principal and original Cause of those Things that proceed from it, then would it be the End of all such Things: As an End it would be desirable to them, as good. For good and desirable, are Terms reciprocal and convertible, and consequent∣ly, at this rate, it would become good, and cease to be evil.

'Tis most certainly true then, that all Things whatsoever do desire and pursue their own Advantage; not all their true and real Advantage indeed, but all their seeming Benefit, and such as they at that time take for the true and best. For no Man is wil∣lingly deceived, no Man chooses a Falshood before Truth, nor Shadows before Substan∣ces, who knows and is sensible of the Dif∣ference between them when he does it. But this Misfortune happens generally from a blind Admiration of some apparent Good, which so dazles our Eyes, that either we do not at all discover the Evil it is attended with, or if we do discern that, yet we see

the Thing through false Opticks, such as magnifie the Good, and lessen the Evil to the Eye. Now it is a frequent and a reasonable Choice, when we are content to take a great∣er Good with the Incumbrance of a less Evil: As for Instance, When we suffer an Incision, or a Cupping, and account the Evil of these Pains much too little to counterbal∣lance the Good there is in that Health which they restore to us.

Once more yet; That all Things desire Good, is farther plain from hence; That sup∣posing Evil to have a real Being, and a Pow∣er of Acting, whatever it did would be for its own Advantage, that is, in other Words, for its own Good. And thus much they who ascribe a Being and Operation to it confess; for they pretend, that it pursues after Good, would fain detain it, and uses all possible Endeavours not to let it go. And if Evil be the Object of no Desire, then is it not any primary and designed Nature. But since the Condition of it is in all Parti∣culars according to the Description here gi∣ven of it, it is most truly said, to be an Accidental and Additional Thing, superin∣ducive to something that did subsist before, but to have no Subsistence of its own.

Well (says the Objector) I allow what you say. We will suppose, that Evil is on∣ly an Accident, a Defect, and Privation of Good, and an additional Disappointment of the first and original Intent of Nature. And what of all this? How are we advanced in

the Question before us? For let this be what, or after what manner you please, still it must have some Cause; otherwise, How, in the Name of Wonder, did it ever find the way into the World? How then will you get out of this Maze? You allow God to be the Cause of all Things; you must grant that Evil hath some Cause; and yet you tell me, that God is infinitely Good, and so can∣not be that Cause.

This Objection hath been already consider∣ed, and spoken to, both at the Beginning of the Book, where we explained this Au∣thor's Distinction of the Things that are or are not in our own Power; and also in the Comment upon the XIII. Chapter, upon Oc∣casion of those words, Trouble not your self with wishing, that Things may be just as you would have them, &c. But however, I will speak to it once more here too, and that briefly, as follows.

God, who is the Source and Original Cause of all Goodness, did not only pro∣duce the highest and most excellent Things, such as are good in themselves; nor only those that are of a Rank something inferiour to these, and of a middle Nature; but the Extremes too, such as are capable of falling, and apt to be perverted from that which is agreeable to Nature, to that which we call Evil. Thus; As after those incorruptible Bodies which are always regular in their Mo∣tions, and immutably good, others were cre∣ated subject to Change and Decay; so like∣wise

it was with Souls; the same Order was observed with these too; for after them which were unalterably fixed in Good, others were produced liable to be seduced from it. And this was done, both for the greater illustration of the Wise and Mighty Creator, that the Riches of his Goodness might be the more clearly seen, in producing good things of all sorts, as many as were capable of subsisting; and also that the Universe might be full and perfect, when Beings of all kinds, and all Proportions, were contain∣ed in it. (For this is a Perfection to want nothing of any kind.) And also to vindicate the Highest and the Middle sort, which ne∣ver decline or deviate from their Goodness, from that Contempt which always falls upon the Lowest of any sort; and such these had been, if the Corruptible and Mortal things, had not been Created, and Supported the o∣thers Dignity, by their own want of it.

And Corruptible they must be, for it could ne∣ver be, that while the First, and the Middle sort of Bodies continued as they are, some Immu∣table, both as to their Nature and their Ope∣rations; others Immutable indeed, as to their Substance, but Mutable in their Motion; it could not be, I say, that the Lowest and Sub∣lunary Bodies, should ever hold out, while the violent Revolutions of the Heavenly ones, were perpetually changing their Sub∣stance, and putting them into unnatural Dis∣orders.

For these Reasons certainly, and perhaps for a great many others more important than these, which are Secrets too dark and deep for us, these Sublunary Bodies were made, and this Region of Mortality, where the Per∣verted Good hath its Residence. For there was a Necessity that the lowest sort of Good should have a Being too, and such is that which is liable to Change and Depravation. Hence also, there is no such thing as Evil in the Regions above us; for the nature of E∣vil being nothing else but a Corruption of the Meanest and most Feeble Good, can on∣ly subsist where that Mean and Mutable Good resides. For this Reason the Soul, which con∣sidered by her self, is a Generous and Immu∣table Being, is tainted with no Evil, while a∣lone in a State of Separation; but being so contrived by Nature, as to dwell in this lower World, and be intimately united to Mortal Bodies, (for so the good Providence of our great Father and Creator hath ordered it, making these Souls a Link to tye the Spiri∣tual and Material World together, joyning the Extreams by the common Bonds of Life,) it seems to bear a part in all those Distem∣pers and Decays which Evil subjects our Bo∣dies to, by disturbing their natural Habit and Frame. Though indeed I cannot think this to be Evil, strictly speaking, but rather Good; since the Effect of it is so: For by this means, the simple Elements, of which these Bodies are compounded, come to be set free from a great Confinement, and severed from other

parts of Matter of a different Constitution, with which they were interwoven and entan∣gled before; and so getting loose from the perpetual Combat between contrary Qualities, are restored to their proper Places, and their primitive Mass again, in order to acquiring new Life and Vigour.

And if this proceeding be the occasion of perpetual Change, yet neither is that Evil; because every thing is resolved at last, into what it was at the beginning. For Water, though evaporated into Air, yet is by de∣grees congealed into Water again; and so even particular Beings, lose nothing by those Vicissitudes.

But that which ought to be a Considera∣tion of greater Moment, is, that the Disso∣lution of Compound Bodies, and the mutual change of Simple ones into each other, con∣tributes to the Advantage of the Universe in general, by making the Corruption of one thing, to become the Rise and Birth of ano∣ther: And by this perpetual Round it is, that Matter and Motion have been sustained all this while. Now it is obvious to any ob∣serving Man, that both Nature and Art, (as was urged heretofore,) do frequently neglect a part, when the detriment of that in parti∣cular, may conduce to the good of the whole. The former does it as often as our Rheums, and Ulcerous Humours, are thrown off from the Vitals, and turned into Sores or Swellings in any of the Extream Parts. And Art imi∣tates this Method of Nature, as oft as a

Limb is seared, or lopped off for the preser∣vation of the Body: So that upon the whole Matter, these Shocks and Corruptions of Bodies, deserve rather to be esteemed Good than Evil; and the Cause of them, the Cause of Good and not Evil Events. For those Sublunary Bodies that are Simples, suffer no Injury, because they are subject to no De∣cay or Destruction: And for the Evil that the Parts seems to undergo, this hath been shewn to have more Good than Evil in it, both in Simples and Compounds, even when considered in it self; but if taken with re∣spect to the Benefit which other Creatures reap by it, then it is manifestly Good. So that the Distempers and Decays of Bodies, take them which way you will, are not Evil, but produce great Good.

But if any one shall be scrupulous upon this occasion, and quarrel with that being called Good, which is confessed to be no better than a perverting of the course of Na∣ture; let not this Nice Caviller take upon him however to call it Evil, in the gross Sense, and common Acceptation of the Word; by which we understand something utterly re∣pugnant and irreconcileable to Good. But let him rather call it a Necessity or Hard∣ship, as being not desirable for its own sake, but having some tendency, and contributing to that which is so: For were it simply and absolutely Evil, it could never be an Instru∣ment of Good to us. Now that which I mean by Necessary, though it have not

Charms enough of its own to recommend it, yet does it deserve to be accounted Good, for leading us to that which is Good; and that which can become a proper Object of our Choice, under any Circumstance, is so far forth Good. Thus we choose Incisions, and Burnings, and Amputations, nay, we are con∣tent to pay dear for them, and acknowledge our selves obliged both by the Prescription, and the painful Operation; all which were most ridiculous to be done, if we thought these things Evil. And yet I own this is but a Qualified and an Inferior Good, not strictly and properly so, but only in a Second and Subordinate Sense: Yet so, that the Creator of these things, is by no means the Cause of Evil, but of a necessary and meaner Good, but a Good still; for such we ought to esteem it, since it is derived from the same Universal Fountain of Goodness, though em∣based with some Allays and Abatements. And thus much, I hope, may be thought suf∣ficient, in Vindication of the Nature and Cause of that Evil which Bodies are con∣cern'd in.

Nothing indeed can so truly be called E∣vil, as the Lapses and Vices of the Soul of Man; and of these, too much hath been said before; but however we will resume the Discourse upon this Occasion, and enquire afresh, both into the Nature and the Cause of them.

And here we shall do well to take notice, That the Soul is of a more excellent Nature,

which dwell in the Regions above us, are immutably fixed in Goodness, and wholly unacquainted with any Evil. There are also the Souls of Brutes, of a Baser alloy than ours, and standing in the middle as it were, between the Vegetative Souls of Plants, and our Rational ones. These, so far forth as they are Corporeal, are liable to that Evil, to which Bodies are subject; but so far as concerns their Appetites and Inclinations, they bear some resemblance to the Humane, and the Evil they are in this respect obnoxious to, is in proportion the same; so that one of these will be sufficiently explained, by giving an account of the other.

Now the Humane Soul, is in a middle Sta∣tion between the Souls above, and those be∣low; it partakes of the Qualities of both; of those more Excellent ones, in the Subli∣mity of its Nature, and the Excellence of its Understanding: Of the Brutal and inferiour ones, by its strict affinity to the Body, and Animal Life. Of both these it is the common Band; by its Vital Union with the Body, and by its Habitual Freedom, assimilates it self sometimes to the one sort, and sometimes to the other of these Natures. So long as it dwells above, and entertains it self with Noble and Divine Speculations, it preserves its Innocence, and is fixed in Goodness; but when it begins to flag and droop, when it sinks down from that blissful Life, and gro∣vels in the Filth of the World, which by Na∣ture it is equally apt to do, then it falls into

all manner of Evil. So that its own Volun∣tary Depression of its self into this Region of Corruption and Mortality, is the true Be∣ginning, and proper Cause of all its Misery and Mischief. For though the Soul be of an Amphibious Disposition, yet it is not forced either upwards or downwards, but acts pure∣ly by an internal Principle of its own, and is in perfect Liberty. Nor ought this to seem incredible in an Agent which Nature hath made Free, since even those Brutes that are Amphibious, dwell sometimes in the Water, and sometimes upon dry Ground, without be∣ing determined to either, any otherwise than by their own Inclination.

Now when the Soul debases her self to the World, and enters into a near Intimacy with the Corruptible Body, and esteems this to be the other consistent part of the Humane Na∣ture, then it leads the Life of Brutes, and exerts it self in such Operations only, as they are capable of. Its Intellectual part degene∣rates into Sense and Imagination, and its Af∣fections into Anger and Concupiscence. By these the wretched Mortal attains to Know∣ledge, just of the same pitch with that of other Animals, such as puts him upon seek∣ing fresh Supplies for a Body that is conti∣nually wasting, and upon continuing the World by Posterity, to fill the place of one that must shortly leave it; and upon making the best Provision he can for his own Preser∣vation and Defence in the mean while. For these Cares are what no Mortal would have,

were he not endued with Sensual Faculties and Passions. For what Man that is any thing Nice and Considering, would endure to spend so many Days and Years upon the support of this Body, when the Burden of the whole Matter comes to no more, than always fill∣ing, and always emptying, if Sensual Incli∣nations did not whet his Appetite? Or who could undergo the tedious fatigue by which Succession is kept up, if vehement Desires did not perpetually kindle new Flames, and the prospect of Prosperity, make us more easie to be warmed by them? These Arguments have been in some measure insisted on be∣fore, and I take them to be abundantly clear in this point, that though our Passions and Appetites be the Cause of Moral Evil, yet they are extreamly Beneficial to the Crea∣tures, in which Nature hath implanted them, as being necessary to their Constitution, and giving a Relish to some of the most indispen∣sible Actions of Life. Upon all which accounts, even these cannot with any Justice be called E∣vil; nor God who infused them, the Cause of it.

But the truth of the Matter is this: The Soul is by Nature superior to this Body, and Animal Life, and hath a commanding power over them put into her Hands; this Digni∣ty and Power so long as she preserves, keep∣ing her Subjects under, and at their due di∣stance; while she uses the Body as her In∣strument, and converts all its Functions to her own Use and Benefit; so long all is well,

and there is no danger of Evil. But when once she forgets that the Divine Image is stampt upon her; when she lays by the En∣signs of Government, and gives away the Reins out of her own Hands; when she sinks down into the Dregs of Flesh and Sense, (by preferring the Impetuous Temptations of Pleasure, before the Mild and gentle Per∣swasions of Reason; and enters into a strict Union with the Brutish part, then Reason acts against its own Principles, divests it self of its Despotick Power, and basely submits to be governed by its Slave; and this Con∣fusion in the Soul, is the Root of all Evil; an Evil not owing to the more Excellent and Rational part, while it maintains its own Station; nor to the Inferior and Sen∣sual, while that keeps within its due Bounds; but to the inverting of these, the violent U∣surpation of the one, and the tame Submis∣sion of the other; that is, The perverse Choice of Degenerating into Body and Mat∣ter, rather than forming ones self after the similitude of the Excellent Spirits above us. But still, all this, as I said, is Choice, and not Constraint; it is still Liberty, though Li∣berty abused.

And here I would bespeak the Reader's Attention a little, to weigh the Reasons I am about to give, why Choice and Volition must needs be the Souls own Act and Deed, an Internal Motion of ours, and not the Effect of any Compulsion from without. I have already urged the Clearness of this

Truth at large, and that the Soul only is concern'd, and acts purely upon the prin∣ciples of her own Native Freedom, in the Choice of the Worse, no less than the Bet∣ter part. Thus much I apprehend to have been plainly proved, from the Example of Almighty God himself; the Determinations of all Wise Laws, and well Constituted Governments, and the Judgment of Sober and Knowing Men, who all agree in this, That the Merits of Men are not to be mea∣sured by the Fact it self, or the Events of things, but by the Will and Intention of the Person. And accordingly their Rewards and Punishments, their Censures and their Commendations, are all proportioned to the Intention; because this alone is entirely in a Man's own power, and consequently, it is the only thing he can be accountable for. From hence it comes to pass, that whate∣ver is done by Constraint, and Irresistible Force, though the Crime be never so grie∣vous, is yet pardoned or acquitted, and the Guilt imputed not to the Party that did it, but to the Person that forced him to the doing of it. For he that used that Force, did it Voluntary, but he that was born down by it, had no Will of his own concerned in the Fact, but became the mere Instrument of effecting it against the Inclination of his own Mind.

Since then our own Choice is the Cause of Evil; and since that Choice is the Souls Voluntary Act, owing to no manner of Com∣pulsion,

but its own internal mere Motion, what can we charge Evil upon, so justly as upon the Soul? But yet, though the Soul be the Cause of Evil, it is not the Cause of it, considered as Evil; for nothing ever is, or can be chosen under that Notion. But it disguises it self, and deludes us with an Appearance of Good; and when we choose that seeming Good, we take at the same time, the real Evil that lay concealed under it. And thus much in effect was said before too.

And now, having thus discovered the true Origine of Evil, it is fit we proclaim to all the World, That God is not chargeable with any Sin; because it is not He, but the Soul that does Evil, and that freely and willing∣ly too: For were the Soul under any Con∣straint to do amiss, then indeed there would be a colourable Pretence to lay the Blame on God, who had suffered her to lye under so fatal a Necessity, and had not left her free to rescue and save her self: (Though in truth, upon this Presumption, nothing that the Soul was forced to do, could be strictly Evil.) But now, since the Soul is left to her self, and acts purely by her own free Choice, she must be content to bear all the Blame.

If it shall be farther objected, That all this does not yet acquit Almighty God, for that it is still his Act to allow Men this Liber∣ty, and leave them to themselves; and that he ought not to permit them in the Choice

of Evil; then we are to consider that one of these Two Things must have been the Con∣sequence of such a Proceeding: Either First, That after he had given Man a Rational Soul, capable of choosing sometimes Good, and sometimes Evil, he must have chained up his Will, and made it impossible for him to choose any thing but Good: Or else, that it ought never to have had this Indif∣ference at all, but to have been so framed at first, that the Choice of Evil should have been naturally impossible. One of these Two Things the Objector must say, or he says nothing at all to the purpose.

Now the former of these is manifestly ab∣surd; for to what purpose was the Will left Free and Undetermined either way, if the Determining it self one way, was af∣terwards to be debarred it? This would have been utterly to take away the power of Choosing; for Choice and Necessity are things Inconsistent; and where the Mind is so tied up, that it can choose but one thing, there (properly speaking) it can choose no∣thing.

As to the latter, It must be remembred in the First Place, that no Evil is ever chosen, when the Mind apprehends it to be Evil: But the Objector seems to think it were very convenient, if this Freedom of the Will, which is so Absolute in the Determining of it self sometimes to real Good, and sometimes to that which deceives it with a false Appearance of be∣ing so, were quite taken away. Imagining it to be

no Good to be sure, and perhaps some great Evil: But alas! he does not consider how many things there are in the World, that are accounted exceeding Good, which yet are not really in any degree comparable to this Freedom of the Will. For in truth, there is no Thing, no Priviledge in this lower World so desirable. And there is no Body so stupid and lost, as to wish, that he were a Brute, or a Plant, rather than a Man. And therefore, since God displayed the A∣bundance of his Goodness and Power, in gi∣ving Perfections inferior to this, how incon∣sistent would it have been with that Bounty of his, not to have bestowed this most excel∣lent Priviledge upon Mankind?

Besides, (as hath been intimated former∣ly,) take away this Undetermined Propen∣sion of the Soul, by which it inclines it self to Good or Evil, and you undermine the very Foundations of all Virtue, and in effect, destroy the Nature of Man. For, if you suppose it impossible to be perverted to Vice, you have no longer any such thing as Justice or Temperance, or any other Vir∣tue left; the observing of these things, may be the Excellence of an Angel, or a God, but impeccable and indefectable Good∣ness, can never be the Virtue of a Man. From whence it is plain, that there was a necessity of leaving the Soul in a capacity of being Corrupted, and of committing all that Evil consequent to such Depravation, be∣cause otherwise a Gap had been left in the

Creation; there could have been no Medium between the Blessed Spirits above, and Brutes below; no such thing as Hu∣mane Nature, nor Humane Vertue in the World.

So then we allow, that this Self-determi∣ning Power by which Men are depraved is, a thing of God's own Creation and appoint∣ment; and yet consider withal, how necessary this is to the Order and Beauty of the Universe, and how many good Effects it hath. In o∣ther respects, we can by no means admit, that he should be traduced as the Cause and Author of Evil upon this account. When a Surgeon lays on a Drawing Plaister, to ri∣pen a Swelling, or Cuts or Sears any part of our Bodies, or lops off a Limb, no Man thinks he takes these Methods to make his Patient worse, but better; because Reason tells us, that Men in such Circumstances, are never to be cured by less painful Applica∣tions. Thus the Divine Justice in his deser∣ved Vengeance, suffers the Passions of the Soul to rage and swell so high, because he knows the condition of our Distemper; and that the smarting sometimes under the wild Suggestions of our own furious Appetites, is the only way to bring us to a better Sense of our Extravagance, and to recover us of our Phrensy.

'Tis thus, that we suffer little Children to burn their Fingers, that we may deter them from playing with Fire. And for the same Reasons, many wise Educators of Youth, do

not think themselves oblig'd to be always thwarting the Inclinations of those under their Charge; but sometimes connive at their Follies, and give them a loose; there being no way so effectual for the purging of these Passions, as to let them sometimes be indul∣ged, that so the Persons may be cloyed, and nauseate, and grow Sick of them. And in these Cases, it cannot be said, that either those Parents and Governors, or the Justice of God, is the Cause of Evil, but rather of Good, because all this is done with a Ver∣tuous Intent. For whatever tends to the Re∣formation of Manners, or confirming the Ha∣bits of Virtue, may be as reasonably called Virtuous, as those things that are done in order to the Recovery, and Continuance of Health, may be called wholsome. For Actions do principally take their denomination and quality from the End to which they are di∣rected. So that although God were in some measure the Cause of this necessity we are in, of deviating from Goodness, vet cannot Moral Evil be justly laid at his Door. But how far he is really the cause of our Defle∣ction from our Duty, I shall now think it be∣comes me to enquire.

God does not by any Power, or immediate Act of his own, cause that Aversion from Good, which the Soul is guilty of when it Sins; but he only gave her such a power, that she might turn her self to Evil; that so such a Species of free Agents, might fill avoid Space in the Universe, and many good

effects might follow, which without such an Aversion, could never have been brought a∣bout. God indeed is truly and properly the Cause of this Liberty of our Wills, but then this is a Happiness and a Priviledge infinitely to be preferred above whatever else the World thinks most valuable; and the Ope∣ration of it consists in receiving Impressions, and determining it self thereupon, not from any Constraint, but by its own mere Plea∣sure.

Now that a Nature thus qualified is Good, I cannot suppose there needs any proof; we have the Confession of our Adversaries them∣selves to strengthen us in the Belief of it. For even they, who set up a Principle of E∣vil, declare they do it, because they cannot think God the Author of Evil; and these ve∣ry Men do not only acknowledge the Soul to be of his forming, but they talk big, and pretend that it is a part of his very Essence; and yet, notwithstanding all this, they own it capable of being vitiated, but so as to be vitiated by its self only. For this is the ma∣nifest consequence of their other Tenets, that it depends upon our own Choice, whether we will overcome Evil, or be overcome by it; that the Vanquished in this Combat are very justly punished, and the Victors largely and deservedly rewarded. Now the truth is, when they talk at this rate, they do not well consider how directly these Notions con∣tradict that irresistible necessity to Sin, which they elsewhere make the Soul to lye under.

But however, whether the Soul be depraved by its own Foolish Choice, or whether by some fatal Violence upon it from without, still the being naturally capable of such de∣pravation, is agreed on all Hands; for both sides confess it to be actually depraved, which it could never be, without a natural Capacity of being so. Therefore they tell us, the First O∣riginal Good is never tainted with Evil, be∣cause his Nature is above it, and inconsi∣stent with any such Defect; as are also the other Goodnesses in the next degreee of Per∣fection to him, such as in their Cant are called the Mother of Life, the Creator, and the Aeones. So then these Men acknowledge the depravable Condition of the Soul, they pro∣fess God to be the Maker of it, and to have set it in this Condition; and yet it is plain, they think the nature of the Soul depravable, as it is Good, and not Evil; because at the same time that they ascribe this Freedom of the Will to God, they are yet superstitiously fearful of ascribing any Evil to him. And this I think may very well suffice for the Na∣ture and Origin of Evil.

Let us now apply our selves to consider the Passage before us, and observe how artificial∣ly Epictetus hath comprised in a very few Words, the substance of those Arguments which we have here drawn out to so great a length. For in regard the Choice of Good, and the Refusing of Evil, are the Object and Ground of all Moral Instructions whatsoever, it was proper for him to shew, that the Na∣ture

of Evil was something very odd, and out of Course. In some Sense it has a Being, and in some Sense it is denyed to have any; it has no Existence of its own, and yet it is a sort of supernumerary, and a very unto∣ward addition to Nature. In the mean while, this shews, that we ought not to make it ou•• Choice, because Nature never made it hers; and whenever it got into the World, it was never brought in by Design, but came in by chance. No Man ever proposed it, as the End of any Action; no Artificer ever drew his Model for it: The Mason proposes the House he is Building, and the Carpenter the Door he is Plaining, for his End; but nei∣ther the one, nor the other, ever works only that he may work ill.

Epictetus his Argument then lies in the fol∣lowing Syllogism, Evil is the missing of the Mark: For what Nature hath given a real and a designed Existence to, is the Mark; and the compassing of that, is the hitting of the Mark. Now if what Nature really made and designed, be not the missing of the Mark, (as it is not, but the hitting it indeed) and if Evil be the missing of the Mark, then i•• is plain, that Evil can be none of those things which have a real and a designed Exi∣stence.

Now that Evil is properly the missing of the Mark, is plain, from what hath been spoken to this point already. For suppose a Man makes Pleasure his Mark, he aims at it as a Good and Desirable thing; he lets

fly accordingly, his Imaginations I mean, which indeed fly swifter than any Arrow out of a Bow. But if he do not attain the Good he desires, but shoot wide, or short of it, 'tis plain this Man is worsted, and hath mis∣sed his Mark. And again, that something to which Nature designed and gave a Being, is constantly the Mark every Man aims at; and the obtaining those things, the hitting of his Mark, is no less evident from the Instances I gave of the Mason and the Carpenter.

Now, when the Author says, there is no such real Being as Evil in the World, you are to understand, that Nature never formed or designed any such thing: And then if you please, you may take his Minor Proposition singly by it self, which consists of those Words, As no Man sets up a Mark with a De∣sign to shoot beside it. (For this intimates that Evil is a missing of one's Aim,) without men∣tioning the Major; which implies, that the principal Design, and real work of Nature, is never the missing, but the hitting of the Mark; and so add the Conclusion, which is this, Therefore Evil is none of the principal Designs, or real Works of Nature.

It may likewise be put all together into one single Hypothetical Proposition thus: If no Man sets up a Mark on purpose to shoot be∣sides it, then there is no such real Being as Evil in the World. For if there were such a thing, then it would be proposed as the End or Pro∣duct of Action. But Evil is never proposed as a thing to be produced or obtained, but

as a thing to be declined; for Evil is always the Object of our Refusal and Aversion. So that at this rate, it would follow, that there is a Mark set up, only that it may not be hit; which is contrary to common Sense, and the Practice of all Mankind. And therefore there can be no such thing in Nature as Evil, be∣cause Evil is not capable of being the End of any Action in Nature.