Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...

COMMENT.

THere are some Notions concerning the na∣ture of things, in which all Mankind con∣sent; and not any one considering Person ever pretended to contest or contradict them. Such are these that follow; That whatever is Good, is Profitable, and whatever is truly Profitable is Good. That all things are carried by a na∣tural Propension to the Desire of Good: That Equal things are neither less nor more than one another: That Twice Two make Four. And these Notions are such as right Reason hath re∣commended, and riveted into our Minds, such as long Experience hath confirmed, and such as carry an exact Agreement with the Truth, and nature of things.

But when we descend from these general Truths, to the particular Ideas and Doctrins of single Persons, there we very often find our selves mistaken. And these Erronious Opinions

are of different sorts; some of them deceive us, by too credulous a dependance upon the report of our Senses, as when we pronounce the Cir∣cumference of the Moon, to be as large as that of the Sun, because it appears so to the naked Eye. Some we are prepossessed in favour of, by inclining too much to our Sensual Inclinations; as when we say, that all Pleasure is Good. Some are owing to the admitting of Arguments, be∣fore they are well weighed, as those which ad∣vanced the belief of the World's being made by Two Principles, and that the Soul is Cor∣poreal. Now these are what Men argue diffe∣rently upon, and they are so far from being always true, that many times the Truth lies on the contrary side of the Question. And it can never be safe for us to depend upon such particular Assumptions, for the knowledge of the true state of things, which Epictetus means here by the Condition, the Laws and Methods of Nature.

Now nothing can be a more pregnant proof how exceeding fickle and unfaithful, particular Opinions are, and how firm and unalterable those general and acknowledged ones, than the variety of Mens Behaviour, in one and the same case. For let any Accident happen to a Man's self, and he is quite another Person, transport∣ed with the vehemence of his Concern, and all his Reason too feeble to support it. But when the very same Misfortune happens to another, there is none of this Disorder; he then looks upon it as it really is, considers it calmly and coolly, without Passion or Prejudice, and passes the same Judgment upon it, that the rest of

the World do, who have no partial Affection, or Concern of their own to perve••t them; but only regard Truth, and the clear Reason of the thing.

This he illustrates by a very trivial instance, that of breaking a Glass, which when done by a Neighbour's Child or Servant, we are apt pre∣sently to excuse, by putting him in Mind how exceeding common this is, that it is what hap∣pens every Day; that considering how little a thing throws a Child down, how often they let things drop out of their Hands, and withal, how exceeding brittle the Matter it self is, of which the Vessel is made, and that the least Blow in the World dashes it to pieces, it is rather to be wondered that such things happen no oftener: Thus we say, when our Discourse is Sober and Dispassionate. But when one of our own is broken, then we rage and storm, as if some new thing had happened to us. And yet in all reason, the same Consideration of the Ac∣cident being so usual, ought to offer it self to our Minds too, and with the same Success.

Now this (says he) you may, if you please, apply to Matters of greater importance: When any of our Acquaintance buries his Wife, or his Child, who is there that does not presently say, this is every Man's Case? And the Reason of it is, because they pass this Reflection from the common Principles in their own Minds, and the plain constant course of Nature, which they find agreeable to them. For to Dye, is a Ne∣cessity unavoidable; 'tis the very Condition of Humane Nature, and to be Man, and not sub∣ject to this Fate, would imply a Contradiction.

And yet for all this, when such a Loss happens in a Man's own Family, what Groans, what Tears, what loud Exclamations, what wild Ex∣travagances of Passion do immediately follow? Nay, how hard is it to perswade Men, that there is not a justifyable Cause for all this, or that any besides themselves, ever suffer'd such an Affliction before? Now why should not such a one recollect how he felt himself affected, when he saw his Neighbour in such Excesses, and how wisely he could tell him then, that he mistook his own case? that Death was inevitable, and nothing more frequent, and that there was no∣thing in the Accident it self, that could create all this Disorder, but that was owing entirely to his own mistaken Apprehensions, and the violent Passions of his own Mind, which shewed it him in a false Light.

Now indeed there are Two Reasons why we should be thus partial, and passionate in our own case: One is, the exceeding Fondness, and tender Sympathy, between the Rational Soul, and the Mortal Body; which considering that this part must Dye, is much more close and mo∣ving, than in Reason it ought to be. The other is, that though we know, and are satisfied, that Dye we must, yet we do not care to think of it; but these Two dear Friends live together, as if they were never to part. Now there is nothing that gives a Man so much disturbance and confusion, as the being surprised with any Accident; for whatever we have foreseen, and made familiar to our Thoughts by long expecta∣tion, never gives us those violent disturbances.

And this I take to be sufficiently plain, from what we see in Men's Behaviour afterwards; for even those that are most intemperate in their Griefs, yet within a little while, when they come to be used to the being without what they lament the Loss of, return to themselves and their Reason again, and all is quiet and easie, as if no such Misfortune had ever happened. Then they can suggest to their own composed Thoughts, what at first they could not endure to bear, that this is no more than we see daily come to pass; that other People are liable to it, and have born it as well as they; that the Condition of our Nature is Mortal, and most absurd it is to suppose any Man can be exempt from the common fate of his Nature; that our Friends are only gone a little way before, in the beaten Road, which all our Fore-Fathers have led, and in which we our selves shall very shortly follow them.

Now if this Separation, when a little Time and Custom hath rendred it familiar, become so very supportable, after the thing hath hap∣pened, I would fain know what Reason can be alledged, why the making such a Separation fa∣miliar to us beforehand, by frequent Thoughts, and perpetual Expectations of it, should not enable us to bear it with great evenness of Tem∣per, whenever it shall happen. For surely the true cause of all our immoderate Concern upon these Occasions, is, that we do not represent these things to our own Thoughts, nor accu∣stom our selves to them so effectually as we might, and ought to do. And the Reason of

this again seems to be, that the generality of People have their Minds fastened down to their Fortunes, and all their Imaginations formed ac∣cording to the Model of their present Condi∣tion. Hence it is, that the prosperous Man is always Gay, and Big, as depending upon the Continuance of his Happiness, and never dream∣ing of any possible Change in his Affairs. And thus People that lye under unhappy Circum∣stances too, are as commonly Dispirited and Diffident, and can entertain little thought of a Deliverance, and better Days. But another Cause which contributes to this Fault as much as the former, is the unreasonable Fondness of these things which they lament the Loss of so tenderly: They perfectly dote upon them, while they have them, and cannot therefore ad∣mit any Thought so uneasie, as that of part∣ing with them; for no Man alive cares to to dwell long upon Meditations that are trou∣blesom and afflicting to him. This Fondness is the thing we should guard our selves a∣gainst, at least cut off all the Excesses of it, by reflecting seriously what we are our selves, and what that is, which we so passionately ad∣mire. We should consider, that it is what we cannot call our own, and that though we could, yet it is so imperfect a Bliss, as to cloy and weary us with long Enjoyment. Our Kindness therefore should be reduced, and brought within such Proportions as are consi∣stent with Decency and Moderation: And in all our Conversation, it will be great Pru∣dence to abstain from all Expressions and Dis∣course,

and especially from all such Actions in our Behaviour, as tend to endear these things the more, and serve in truth for no other End, than to cherish our own Folly, and make our Passions more Exorbitant and Ungovernable.