Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...

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Title
Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...
Author
Epictetus.
Publication
London :: Printed for Richard Sare ..., and Joseph Hindmarsh ...,
1694.
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Subject terms
Epictetus. -- Manual.
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"Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ..." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A38504.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 1, 2024.

Pages

COMMENT.

THE first Care of a Man, should be to con∣sider what things are worth his Pains; and those that deserve to be thought so, 'tis plain, must have the following Qualifications: They must be possible, for none but Fools lay them∣selves out upon what can never be compassed. And they must be decent and proper for the Person that takes pains for them; something that suits his Character and Conveniences, and such as he may call his own when he hath them. For nothing can be more impertinent, than to concern one's self in other People's Matters,

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and neglect our own; or to be extreamly solli∣citous for obtaining that, which another will always retain the propriety to. A Third Con∣sideration should be, of what value the Prize we propose to our selves will be, of what con∣stancy and continnance; and whether we can be secure of keeping it when we have got it. For no prudent Man will give himself trouble a∣bout Trifles, and things that will turn to no account; or such as are likely very soon to de∣cay, or forsake him.

And therefore in pursuance of his Design, to call off his young Philosophers Affections from the World, and to drive on his former Di∣stinction of Things that are, and Things that are not in our own power; he proves, that all exter∣nal Advantages whatsoever, are really not ours, but anothers. And he had shewed at the be∣ginning, that whatever is another's, cannot be any of the things in our own power, nor con∣sequently a proper Object of our Choice.

When a Man then is desirous, that his Wife, and Children, and Friends, may never be taken away from him, this Man is sollicitous for a thing in which his Choice hath nothing to do; a thing that it is not possible for him to bestow upon him∣self; for when things are not entirely at our own Disposal, nor submitted to the Determi∣nations of our own Wills, it is not for us to make our selves Masters of them; but we must depend upon the good pleasure of those Per∣sons for them, in whose Possession and Disposal they are.

Besides, there is not any of those Advantages we are so fond of, but they are really mean, and

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of no value at all, frail and perishing, and the Enjoyment of them short and uncertain. Who then would give himself trouble, for so low, so poor a Recompence? Or who would engage his Affections upon what so many Casualties may, and daily do conspire against, and what they must at length destroy, and rob him of? So vain is it to fix ones Happiness or ones Desires, in the Lives of our Tenderest Friends, (for in∣stance,) or to delude one's self with vain Hopes, and fond Wishes of their living always; when at the same time they are Mortal, and must submit to the same fatal Necessity, with every thing else that is so; which is, to depart with∣out delay or mercy, whenever Death summons them away.

So again, If a Man wish that his Servant may be Virtuous, nay, even an Honester and better Man than himself, (as many of us are apt to do sometimes, when provoked by the Knavery of Servants,) this Man, (says Epictetus) is a Fool, and wishes an idle and impossible thing. For since all Knavery proceeds from Vicious Princi∣ples, and the Corruption of the Mind, how can it possibly be, that a Man who takes care to Go∣vern or Reform his Brutish Appetite, but sub∣mits and lives according to it, should act any otherwise than Viciously? So vain is it for Men to expect Success in these Matters, when they place their Affections and Concern upon things that are either impossible to be had, or at the disposal of some other Person, or poor and pe∣rishing, and as hazardous and unsure in the En∣joyment, as they were difficult in the acquisi∣tion. Must not Men needs fail of their hopes,

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where so many Accidents concur to disappoint them? And if they lead a Life of Disappoint∣ment, must they not of necessity lead a Life of Sorrow and perpetual Torment too? Against all these Miseries, there is but one Remedy, and that is an effectual one indeed: 'Tis to make our Selves, and what Nature hath put within our own power, the sole Object of our Care and Concern. Now Nature hath given us an absolute power of consining our Desires to such things as she hath made necessary and ex∣pedient for us. And therefore we shall do well not to be too lavish, nor squander them away upon vain and unprofitable Matters, but to lay them out upon those others, for they can never fail our Expectations, and will be sure to turn to good account, when they have at∣tained them.

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