Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...

COMMENT.

THE Reason why many of us lay out so much of our Thoughts and our Pains up∣on the World, is not always a Desire to be

supplied with what is necessary and convenient for our Circumstances, but to avoid the Cen∣sure of being thought Singular, and Insensible, and Speculative Drones. Now in opposition to this Principle, and all the Discouragements such Apprehensions give us, he advises every Scholar of his, who would be wise in good earnest, not to let so poor a Pretence prevail upon him, to abandon himself to the Cares of the World, and neglect the true and in∣ward Advantages of his own Mind. For what a Monstrous Absurdity is it, for a Man to be really Mad, for fear of being thought so; and to commit the most desperate Act of Folly, lest he should be called Fool by those that are no better than Fools themselves? And in truth, there is nothing contributes to a Ver∣tuous Life, and such a Behaviour as is every way suitable to the Character of a Man, consi∣dered as a Rational Creature, more, than to re∣solve not to be a Slave to the Opinions of the World, not to make what idle and silly People approve, any measure of our Actions, or rule to walk by; but to use ones self to despise both their Commendations and their Censures, and to keep our Eyes steady upon the Dictates of right Reason, and the Judgments of those few Good and Wise that live in Conformity to it; and let these guide and govern us in the Ma∣nagement of all our Affairs: For Reason is the proper Standard that all our Actions should be agreeable to, and all they whose Opinions are worth our regarding, will be sure to ap∣prove whatever is so.

Do not affect to be thought exceeding Wise; and if other People think you something more than ordinary, let this make you so much the more Distrustful and Jealous of your self. For be assured, it is no easie matter to pro∣secute your Designs upon Vertue, and other ex∣ternal Advantages, at one and the same time. But he that sets his Heart upon either of these, will of course find his Concern for the other a∣bate and grow cold.

Epictetus hath taken a great deal of Pains to confine the Soul of his Young Philosopher within a narrow compass, that all his Care may be employed at Home, upon the improve∣ment of himself; especially when he first en∣ters into this reformed course of Life. And since the Desire of Riches and Cares of the World, are but a part of those Temptations that engage the Affections, and misplace them abroad; for a Superstitious value for Reputa∣tion and Applause, are every whit as dange∣rous Baits; (and so much the more so indeed, as they are accomplish'd Persons, and have some real Excellencies to recommend them to the World, are apt to be insnared by them,) he advises to root out this vain-glorious Appetite by all means.

Do not affect to be thought Wise, says he; not that he condemns the most Zealous Desires or Endeavours aster Knowledge, but only to sup∣press the Vanity of desiring to appear Know∣ing. For this swells the Mind, and puffs it up with flashy Imaginations, and inclines it to

the World. It represents the Opinion of o∣thers, as the Rule of Acting, rather than Du∣ty, and the Dictates of a Man's own Con∣science; and makes him live no longer to him∣self, but to his Masters, the People; and which is worst of all, it makes a Man satisfied with the empty Shadows, and outward Ap∣pearances of things; and neglect the Substance. For the Vain-glorious are not half so much concerned to be really Virtuous or Wise, as they are to impose upon themselves and the World, in seeming so. For this Reason he expresses himself very prudently here, and says not, Do not be thought Wise, but Do not affect to be thought so: For in truth, the Esteem other People have of us, is a thing by no means in our own power; nor can we make them think as we would have them; but the courting that Esteem, and being fond of such a Character, is entirely our own Act and Deed.

And therefore since the World will sometimes have a great Opinion of our Abilities, whether we seek it or no; in such a case, says he, let their Commendations make you but so much the more distrustful and jealous of your self. For this will be a most excellent Preservative against the giving your self up to be governed by o∣ther People's Judgments, and taking up with the Fame or False Images of Goodness, instead of the thing itself. Besides, that the suspecting and thinking more meanly of ones self, when the World extols them most, is a Duty parti∣cularly seasonable for young Philosophers. For they that are Masters in it, sit secure above the Breath of Fame, pass just and impartial

Judgments upon their own Actions; and, as they do not think the better, so neither need they think at all the worse of themselves, for what the World say of them.

Now Reputation and Applause, we know ve∣ry well, is not the Attendant of Knowledge on∣ly, but of Temperance and Moderation too, of Justice and Fortitude, of Prudence, and indeed of every Virtue whatsoever. Every Accomplish∣ment that qualifies us for Business, and makes us useful to our Country, and one another, of every Character of any extraordinary Eminence in the World; all which he hath comprehended here in this short Expression of being though something more than ordinary; which extends to e∣very kind of Opinion that is for our Advantage, let the Ground of it be what it will.

At last, he shuts up all with a Conclusion, ap∣plicable not only to this Chapter, but to those that went before, concerning the Care that is due to our own Minds, and intimates, that a Learner in Philosophy, will find it no easie Mat∣ter to prosecute his Designs upon Wisdom and Virtue with Success, and at the same time to grasp at Riches or Fame, or any other World∣ly Advantages. And the Reason is, because the keeping our Minds tight in the prosecution of Virtue, consists in an extraordinary Vigilance and concern for our selves, and the regulating our own Wills; and in making all without us, all that are called the Goods of Fortune, little or no part of our Concern. But now an eager pursuit of Fame, or any other external Advan∣tage, utterly overturns this whole frame of Mind; for it engages our Affections upon Fo∣reign

and distant things, and makes us cold and careless for our selves. Therefore it can be no easie matter to reconcile these wide Extremes, and manage both at once. But still you may observe with what Caution our Author delivers himself; he declares it difficult, but he dares not pronounce it impossible; because there are some exalted Minds that exert themselves to the wonder of Mankind, and consequently must be admitted for Exceptions from the general Rules of Nature. But as for the rest, who are of the same Mould and Tempering with their Neighbours, to them the Rule in the Close holds good, That he who proposes to follow one of these in good earnest, and to purpose, must wholly lay aside all Concern for the other.