Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...

COMMENT.

WE were told before, what Means would be Proper and Effectual for the preser∣ving an Even and Composed Temper of Mind,

in the midst of all those Hardships that fre∣quently attend our best Actions. That this might be accomplished by the Power of Pre∣meditation; by representing these Inconveni∣ences, as sure to happen; and when we had made the worst of it, convincing our Selves that such Notions were worth our Undertaking, even with all those Incumbrances. Now that Rule proceeded upon the Work of our own Minds, but there is another here, fetch'd from the Nature of the Things themselves, and the Consideration of those Difficulties and Dangers that use to give us Disturbance. And here he changes his Method, and confirms what he says, not by some slight and trivial Instances, as he did before, but by Death, the greatest and most confounding one to Humane Nature that can be. For if the Argument hold good in this case, it must needs be a great deal stronger with re∣gard to all the rest, which are, by our own Confession, less dismal and affrighting.

To this purpose then he tells us, That those Things which we apprehend to be Evil, and which for that Reason discompose our Spirits, because we think our Selves miserable under them, are really neither Evil themselves, nor the true Causes of any Evil to us: But that all our Troubles and Perplexities are entirely ow∣ing to the Opinions which we our Selves have entertained concerning them.

For proof of this Determination, he produ∣ces that, which of all the Things that we ap∣prehend as Evil, is confessedly the greatest and most terrible; and shews, that even Death, nay a violent and untimely Death, is yet no Evil

The Argument he uses is short indeed, but very full and conclusive; the Method and Conse∣quence whereof lies thus. Whatever is Evil in its own Nature, must needs appear so to all Mankind, and especially to those whose Appre∣hensions are most improved, and most suitable to the real Nature of Things. Thus all Things that are naturally hot, or cold, or beautiful, or the like, appear to all People in their right Senses. But Death does not appear evil to all People, nor are they universally agreed in this Notion of it. (For Socrates did not think it so; He chose to undergo it, when it was in his Power to have declined it; He endured it with all the Calmness and Composure imaginable: He spent that whole Day in which he died, with his Friends, demonstrating to them the Existence and Immortality of the Soul, and the Efficacy of a Philosophical Life in order to Vir∣tue and Reformation.) From all which Premi∣ses, this Conclusion evidently follows; That Death is not in its own Nature evil: And con∣sequently, That our Fears and Troubles con∣cerning it do not come from the Thing it self, but from a disquieting Persuasion of its being evil, with which we possess and disorder our own Minds.

And such a Persuasion there may very well he, though there be no Ground for it in the Na∣ture of the Thing. For Honey is not bitter, and yet Men in the Jaundice, that have their Palates vitiated, from a constant Bitterness oc∣casioned by the overflowing of the Gall, are prejudiced against it, as if it were so. Now, as the only way to bring these Persons to dis∣cern

Tastes as they really are, is to carry off that Redundancy of Choler which corrupts their Palate; so in this Case, we must remove the Distemper of the Mind, correct our Notions of Things, and make a right Judgment of what is really Good and Evil to us, by just Distinctions between Things that Are and Things that Are Not in our own Power; what is properly ours, and what belongs not to us. For according to this Rule, if Death be none of the Things in our Power, it cannot be evil; and though it should be granted such, with regard to the Bo∣dy; yet if it do not extend to the Soul, nor do that any Harm, it cannot be evil to us.

Plato indeed, or Socrates as he is introduced by Plato, goes a great deal farther, and boldly affirms, that it is Good, and much to be pre∣ferred before this Life that we lead in the Bo∣dy; and this, not only to some Persons, and in some Circumstances, as Men may be better or worse; but in general, and without Excepti∣on, to all. For thus Socrates expresses himself in his Phoedon; It may possibly surprize you, and seem a strange Paradox, That this should be the on∣ly Accident, that is good at all Times, and without any Reserve; but yet so it is. In all other Cases, nothing happens to a Man, which, as his Circum∣stances may alter, he might not at another time bet∣ter be without: But no Time, no Circumstance, whatsoever, can render it more for a Man's Advan∣tage to Live than to Dye. And Plato, in his Book concerning Laws, speaking in his own Person, delivers himself to this purpose: If I may be allowed to speak my Opinion freely, it is real∣ly my Judgment, that the Continuation of Soul and

Body together, upon no Consideration, ought rather to be chosen than the Separation and Dissolution of them.

Now Epictetus, 'tis true, hath drawn his Ar∣gument from that, which is generally esteemed the most formidable Evil that we are capable of suffering: But however, since most of us, when we lye under the present Smart of any Calamity, straitway imagine it worse than Death (for what can be more usual, than for Peo∣ple in Pain, and very often in no great Ex∣tremity of it neither, to wish for Death to de∣liver them from it, and when reduced to Po∣verty, to tell us they had much rather be Dead than Live in Want,) upon this Account, we may apply Epictetus's Argument to these Instan∣ces also.

As to Pain, What Degree of it is there so violent, that Men, nay even those of low and vulgar Spirits, are not content to go through, to cure a dangerous Disease? They do not only Endure, but Chuse and Pray for it: They thank their Physicians for putting them to Torture, and look upon Cutting and Burning as Acts of the greatest Tenderness and Friendship. Now, though this makes it pretty plain, that Men who are well pleased to purchase Life so dear, must needs be of Opinion, that no Pain is so terrible to Humane Nature as Death; yet the principal Use I would make of this Observation is, to shew, that Men can really suffer with great Patience and Resolution; can harden them∣selves against what they count very dreadful, and meet it with a composed Countenance, when once they are persuaded, that the enduring it

will be for their Advantage. What prodigious Instances of Patience were the Lacedemonian Youths, who endured Scourgings so barbarous, as almost to expire under the Rod, and all this, merely for a little Ostentation and Vain∣glory? Now this, it is evident, they did not out of any Compulsion, but freely and cheer∣fully; for they offer'd themselves to the Tryal, of their own Accord. And the Reason why they held out so obstinately, was, not that their Sense of Pain was less quick and tender than other Peoples, (though more hard'ned too than People that indulge themselves in Effeminacy and Ease) but because they thought it their Glory and their Virtue to suffer manfully and resolutely.

For the same Reason, Epictetus would tell you, that Poverty is no such formidable Thing neither, because he can produce the Example of Crates the Theban to the contrary; who, when he disposed of all he was worth to the Publick, and said,

Let others keep or mourn lost store, Crates own Hands make Crates poor,

That Moment put an End to his Slavery, and that his Freedom commenced from the time he had disburdened himself of his Wealth, Now the manifest Consequence of all this is, That nothing of this kind is terrible and insup∣portable in its own Nature, as we fondly ima∣gine; so far from it, that there may be some Cases, when they are much more eligible, and better for us: I mean, when they are convert∣ed

to higher and more excellent Purposes for our own Selves; by tending to the Advantage and Improvement of the Reasonable Soul.

The only Expedient to retain an Even Tem∣per in the midst of these Accidents, is, to pos∣sess our Minds with just Notions of them; and the regulating of these Notions is in our own Power: consequently, the preventing those Dis∣orders that proceed from the Want of such a Regulation is in our own Power too. And one great Advantage to Persons thus disposed will be, The Learning how to manage those Things that are not at our Disposal, as though they were. For if it be not in my Power to prevent Defamation or Disgrace, the Loss of my Goods or my Estate, Affronts and violent Insults upon my Person; yet thus much is in my Power, to possess my self with right Apprehensions of these Things; to consider them, not only not as Evils, but sometimes the Instruments and Occasions of great Good. Now such an Opinion as this, makes it almost the same Thing to a Man, as if they did not happen at all; or, which is all one, makes him think himself never the Worse, but sometimes the Better for them, when they do. And I take it for granted, that every Wise Man will allow it more for Our, that is, for the Souls Honour and Advantage, to have beha∣ved our Selves gallantly under Afflictions, than never to have been afflicted at all: And the greater these Afflictions were, the greater, in proportion, still is the Honour and Advantage gained by them. For, as to Bodies that are able to bear it, the violentest Motions exercise them best, and make greatest Improvements of

Health, and Strength, and Activity; so the Mind too, must be put upon sharp Tryals some∣times, to qualifie it for suffering gallantly whe•• any Accident gives us an Occasion. And this may be accomplish'd these two Ways: By get∣ting a right Notion of them; and, By being well prepared against them: which is to be done partly, by accustoming the Body to Hard∣ship, which indeed is of general use, and hath enabled even Ignorant and Ill Men to slight Blows, and other Pains, which we commonly think intolerable; and partly too, by fixing the Mind in a provident Forecast; and distan•• Expectation of them. And all these Things we may certainly do, if we please.

Now, if neither Death, nor any of those Things we dread most, have any Thing that is formidable in their own Nature; it is plain, neither they, nor the Persons that inslict them, are the Cause of our Trouble, but we our Selves, and our own Opinions bring this upon our Selves. When therefore the Mind feels it self perplexed with Grief or Fear, or any other Passion, the Blame is our own; and nothing but our Opinions are accountable for such Dis∣orders.

None but ignorant and undisciplin'd People tax others with their Misfortunes. The Young Proficient blames himself; but the Philosoph••r indeed blames neither others nor himself.

The Connection of this with what went be∣fore, is so close, that if a Conjunction were added, and we ••••ad it thus, For none but igno∣rant

and undisciplin'd People tax others with their Misfortunes, it had given a very good Reason why we should never lay our Troubles, or Fears, or Disorders, or any other Calamity we fancy our Selves in, to any Thing or any Bodies Charge, but our own. Since this Way of pro∣ceeding, he says, comes from want of being taught better. And then to this Character of the Ignorant and Undisciplin'd, he adds that of One who is a Beginner only in Philosophy, and one who hath attained to a Mastery in it.

The Perfect Philosopher never thinks any Thing that befalls him, Evil, nor charges any Body with being the Occasion of his Misfor∣tunes, because he lives up to the Dictates of Nature and Reason, and is never disappointed in his Pursuits and Desires, nor ever overta∣ken with his Fears.

He that is but Raw and unfinish'd, does in∣deed sometimes miss of his Desires, and falls into the Mischiefs he would flec from, because the brutish Inclinations move too strongly in him at such Times. And when this happens, the first Elements he learn'd, which taught him to distinguish Things In and Out of our Power, teach him too, That he himself, and none but he, is the true Cause of all his Disappoint∣ments, and all his Disasters. And the Occasion of them all was his mistaking the Things with∣out us, and placing a Man's proper Good and Evil in them.

But you will say, perhaps, Since this Young Philosopher knows, That our own proper Good and Evil depends upon our own Power and Choice, (and the accusing himself implies that

he knows thus much) how comes it to pass, that he takes wrong Measures, and renders himself liable to this Blame? Probably, because the Knowledge of Good and Evil is the first step to be made toward Virtue; this being the pro∣per Act of Reason: But the brutish Appetites do not always presently submit to Reason, nor suffer themselves to be easily reduced and tem∣pered by it: and especially where it happens, as it does very often, that Reason is Negligent and Sluggish; and the Irrational Part active, and perpetually in Motion; by which means the Passions gather Strength, and usurp an ab∣solute Dominion. This was the Case of her in the Play;

Remorse and Sense of Guilt draw back my Soul, But stronger Passion does her Powers controul. With Rage transported, I push boldly on, And see the Precipice I cannot shun.

So that for some time it is pretty tolerable, if Reason can work upon the Passions, and either draw them by Force, or charm and win them over some soster way: For, when this is done, then the Knowledge of the Intelligent Part is more clear and instructive, and proceeds with∣out any Distraction at all. No wonder there∣fore, if Men but little trained in Philosophy make some false Steps, while their Passions are not yet totally subdued, and their Reason does not operate in its full Strength. And when they do so, they accuse Themselves only, as having admitted that Distinction of Things in and out of our own Power, though as yet they

seem to have but an imperfect Notion of it.

But they that are Ignorant, and absolutely untaught, must needs commit a World of Er∣rors, both because of that violent Agitation which their Passions are continually in, and of the Ignorance of their rational Part, which hath not yet learn'd to distinguish real Good and Evil, from what is so in appearance only: Nor does it take them off from Brutality, not so much as in Thought only. By Brutality I mean such low and mean Notions, as persuade us, that our Body is properly our Selves, and our Nature; or, which is yet worse, when we think our Riches so as the Covetous do. Now while we continue thus ignorant, there are several Accounts to be given for our doing amiss: We do it, because we think all our Good and Evil consists in Things without us; and, not being at all sensible, what is properly the Happiness or Unhappiness of Humane Nature, or whence it proceeds, we fall foul upon other People; and fancy, that they who obstruct or deprive us of those External Advantages we so eagerly pursue; or that bring upon us any of the Ca∣lamities we would avoid, are the real Causes of all our Misery. Though in truth, neither those External Advantages which we call Good, nor those Calamities we call Evil, are what we take them for; but as Circumstances are sometimes ordered, may prove the direct contrary. For our Folly in this case, is just like that of silly Boys, that cannot endure their Masters, but think them their worst Enemies, and the Cause of a World of Misery; but value and love those as their Friends indeed, that invite them to Play and Pleasure.

Thus Epictetus hath given a short, but exact Character of these three sorts of Persons. The Perfect Philosophers are guilty of no Miscar∣riages, for their Understanding is sufficiently accomplished to direct them, and the Irrational Part readily submits to those Directions. So that here is nothing but Harmony and Compli∣ance, and consequently, they have no Body to lay any Misery to the Charge of; for indeed, they cannot labour under any Thing that is truly and properly Misery. They cause none to themselves; for this were a Contradiction to the Perfection of their Wisdom and Virtue; and nothing else causes them any, for they do not suppose any External Causes capable of do∣ing it.

The Ignorant and Untaught err in both these Respects. Neither their Reason, nor their Passions are rightly disposed. And they lay all their Unhappiness to others, upon an Er∣roneous Imagination, that it proceeds from Things without us. And indeed, it is easie and pleasant, and fit for ignorant Wretches, to shuffle off their own Faults from themselves, and throw them upon other People.

The Young Prosicient, who hath attained to the first Principles of Wisdom, though he be guilty of some Miscarriages, and fall now and then into Evil, yet he understands wherein it consists, and from whence it is derived, and what it was that first gave Birth to it; and therefore he lays it at the right Door. And these Marks are so distinguishing, that no Man, who makes a wise use of them, can be in dan∣ger of confounding these three Classes of Men,

the Accomplish'd Philosopher, the Rude and Un∣taught, and the Young Proficient.

This Metaphor is so much the more warrant∣able and pertinent, from the Resemblance which Education bears to the Management of our Selves: For this is properly the Training up of a Child under the Care and Correction of a Master, Our Sensual Part is the Child in us, and, like all other Children, does not know its own Good, and is violently bent upon Pleasure and Pastime. The Master that has the Care of it, is our Reason; this fashions our Desires, prescribes them their Bounds, reduces and re∣strains them, and directs them to that which is best for them. So that the Ignorant and Untaught live the Life of a Child left to him∣self, run giddily on, are perpetually in Fault, as being heady and heedless, and minding no∣thing, but the gratifying their own Inclinations; and so these Men never think themselves to blame. The Young Proficients have their Ma∣ster at hand, Correcting and Instructing them; and the Child in them is pretty towardly, and begins to submit to Rules. So that if these Men are at any time in the wrong, they are presently sensible who hath been to blame, and accuse no body but the Offender himself. But the Perfect and Accomplish'd Philosophers are such, whose Master keeps a constant Eye upon them, and hath conquered the Child's stubborn and perverse Spirit. So that now he is cor∣rected, and improved, and hath attained to the Perfection he was intended for; that is, the being observant to the Master, and absolutely at his Direction. For the proper Virtue of a

Child is this, Readiness to receive and to obey Instructions.