Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...

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Title
Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ...
Author
Epictetus.
Publication
London :: Printed for Richard Sare ..., and Joseph Hindmarsh ...,
1694.
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Subject terms
Epictetus. -- Manual.
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"Epictetus his Morals, with Simplicius his comment made English from the Greek, by George Stanhope ..." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A38504.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 1, 2024.

Pages

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THE PREFACE.

I Do not give the Reader this Trou∣ble out of any Intent to make an Apo∣logy for shewing the following Book in English; for sure the rendring such admirable Instructions as diffusive as it is possible, cannot need an Excuse. Nor do I intend to give him a tedious Account of the Performance it self; but shall only say, that it hath been my Endeavour to express the Author's Sense with all the Easiness and Freedom I could, so as to decline both the Slavery of a Literal, and the Licentiousness of a Loose and Luxu∣riant Interpretation.

My Design at present, is only to make some necessary Reflections upon those Parts

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of the Stoical Philosophy which are apt to prejudice Men against it, and tempt some Persons from these extravagant Sy∣stems of Moral Perfections to think, (at least to plead in Vindication of their own Excesses) that the Generality of Rules prescribed for the Reforming our Manners, are Things too nicely thought, sublime, airy, and impracticable Speculations.

It is not my Purpose, nor ought it to be any Man's, to vindicate these, or any other Masters of Heathen Morality, in every particular Notion they advanced. But I must beg Leave to put my Reader in mind, what is the proper Advantage to be made of these Errors; and that sure is not to run down Morality as an empty Name, (which they must be allowed, in despight of all the Aggravations their Failings are capable of, to have done ex∣cellent Service to,) but to discern in this the Wisdom of Almighty God, who in the midst of his most liberal Endowments, never suffered the greatest Heathens to

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be without some notable Defect of Judg∣ment, but ever debased their Knowledge with an Alloy of Ignorance and Folly; And that, no doubt, to create in us a more just Esteem and Veneration for his own Christian Philosophy, to which alone this Perfection was reserved, of Truth with∣out Error, and Light without Darkness.

I think it therefore my Duty, so far to comply with the Objector in condemning these Schemes of Ethicks, as to shew upon this Occasion, That the Principles of Religion have exalted our Virtues, and adjusted the measures of them infi∣nitely better than any Humane Institutions were ever able to do. For, though the Stoicks are most deservedly admired for their Noble Notions in these Matters above any other Sect, and the brave At∣tempts they made towards the reducing Nature to its Primitive Purity and Per∣fection; yet, I think it cannot fairly be denied, that in their Way of Treating the Passions and Powers of the Soul, they

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much overshot the Mark, and have quite mistaken the Case. How far it is possible to go, in subduing the Passions absolutely, I shall not now Dispute; but take it for granted, that the generality of People might do a great deal more in it, than they either do, or imagine they can do: And that Sloath, which is the prevailing Vice, and the most fatal Obstruction to a good and happy Life, affrights us with many Difficulties and Discouragements, by no means of Nature's, but entirely of our own making. Yet to deliver our selves from those inward Commotions, which are visible Ocoasions of so much Mischief, we must not presently pass a rash and rigorous Sentence of utter Ex∣cision upon them, but try some gentler and more prudent Method, because the same things are equally capable of producing a great deal of good.

These are indeed the secret Springs that move and actuate us; and all the Care incumbent upon the Governing Part

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of the Mind, is to set them right, and at a true Pitch, that so every Motion which flows from thence, may be Just and Regular. They are like the Acid in our Stomachs, that constantly provokes and renews our Appetites, and prevents the most necessary functions of Life, from becoming flat and nauseous to us. And ac∣cordingly, he who contrived, and conse∣quently must be best acquainted with our Frame, found them necessary to inspire and invigorate this heavy Mass; He saw, that thus to ease us of all our Pains, would be to rob us at the same time, of all our Pleasures; and for this reason he hath made Promises and Threat∣nings, Rewards and Punishments, the Gayeties and Anxieties of Heart, (all which are but so many different ways of working upon our Passions,) the most proper and powerful Inducements to the best Religion in the World. So that in truth, the main, I might say the whole of our Duty and Happiness, consists not

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in stifling these Affections, and condemn∣ing them to a State of utter Inactivity, but in moderating and regulating them: And no Degree of Love, or Hatred, or Desire, or Fear, or Anger, or Grief, or any other simple Passion, can be too intense when placed upon worthy Objects, and di∣rected to worthy Ends.

The same Difficulty lies against Sto∣icism, with regard to Civil Society, and the mutual Concern we feel for one ano∣ther. For some Rules given here, if li∣terally and strictly followed, may seem to threaten the Destruction of all Natural Affection and Charity among Men; which therefore Christianity hath taken into its peculiar Care and Protection. It repre∣sents Temporal Afflictions as Chastise∣ments, and expects we should feel the Smart, in Order to be amended by the Rod. It remits us for Comfort to higher and better Considerations, and does not amuse us with vain Notions, that these Things neither touch nor ought to affect

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us; but tells us, That the more sensibly they do so, the more glorious the Improve∣ment and the Reward is capable of being made. It inspires Compassion and good Nature, and the tenderest Resentments of other Peoples Misfortunes. It commands no Man to attend the Funeral Obsequies of his Friend or Dearest Relation, with a gay or perfectly composed Countenance, as knowing very well, that this Behaviour is Barbarous and Brutish; and that what some have called Philosophy and Constan∣cy in such Cases, may seem rather the Effect of Stupidity, or Sullenness, or Pride; that this is an imaginary Perfe∣ction, which Few ever did, and None ought to attain to: And, in a word, that the Excess and Inordinacy of our Passions is the only Thing blameable in them. Against which therefore it makes ample Provision; such as offers no Violence to the Original Softnesses of Humane Nature, but preserves all those Respects entire which we owe to our selves and to one

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another; such as may be used with a ve∣ry good Grace, and such as will be most effectual, when rightly applied.

This Censure is no more than what appeared to me highly seasonable and expedient to convince the most partial Admirers of Heathen Philosophy, that wherein soever those Systems of Morality differ from the Christian, they are mani∣festly inferiour to them. In other Points we can scarce give them greater Commen∣dation than they really deserve: And among them all, I know none that chal∣lenges more Esteem than this Book. The Instructions are so wise, the Allusions so lively, the Exhortations so moving, and the Arguments so strong, that they may well be allowed not only to convince our Reason, but to excite our greatest Admi∣ration. The Application is so easie, by a light Change of Philosophy into Religi∣on, and the Plurality of Divine Beings into the one only True God, that any considering Christian may here find a

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Scheme of what Himself ought to be. And except some particular Subtleties in the First, Thirteenth, Thirty Fourth, and Thirty Eighth Chapters, (which I men∣tion here particularly, that the more un∣learned Readers may, if they please, pass them over, without suffering them∣selves to be prejudiced against the rest of the Book) the Arguments are so plain and substantial, as to recommend them∣selves to the Sense, and to Sute the Ca∣pacity of every Common Man. But it must be remembred again, what is the proper Benefit of such Writings, and that, no doubt, must be, to let us see what a Reproach the Perfection of these Ancients is to us at this Day. And I heartily wish, that the present Treatise may have its due Influence upon every One who shall peruse it; by provoking them to a holy Emulation and generous Disdain, that Epictetus his Proficient should out∣do any Professor of the Gospel, who walks by a clearer Light, and excels in

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every Advantage of Goodness, except such as he wilfully denies to himself, those of Consideration and Resolution, and an active Zeal.

G. S.

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