The life, and philosophy, of Epictetus with The embleme of humane life, by Cebes / rendred into English, by John Davies of Kidwelly.

THE LIFE OF EPICTETUS.

EPICTETUS was born neer the end of Nero's Em∣pire, at Hierapolis, a City of Phrygia. Of his birth there is no certaine ac∣count, for his Father and Mother are equally unknown, All the certainty we have of him is, that he was ab Slave of one, named Epaphroditus, a Libertine, and one of the Captains of

Nero's Life-Guard, a person recom∣mendable upon no other score, save that of being Master to so illustrious a Slave.

Arrian relates of this Epaphroditus two actions, among others, worthy cer∣tainly the Genius of the person, and which I the rather take notice of here, because, I conceive, they perfectly ex∣presse his character. One day, this Man, sold to another Officer of Nero's, one of his Slaves, named Felicion, by profession a Shoo-maker, as accounting him no ex∣pert Workman. That Slave coming af∣terwards, by that means, to be the Em∣perour's Shoo-maker, and Epaphroditus hearing of it, treated him with extra∣ordinary civilities and respects, and at length made him his greatest Friend and Confident.

c Another time, a certain Man casting himself at his feet, extreamly deploring the crossnesse of his Fortune, and com∣plaining, that, of all his estate, he had but a hundred and fifty thousand crowns left, Epaphroditus made answer, In troth, Friend, I much wonder, that you have had the patience to forbear speaking of it so long. Which he sayd, not by way of ralliery, but very seriously, and out of a real admiration.

It was under the verge of this impe∣rious Master thatd Epictetus pass'd away the first years of life. About what time, or how he obtained his Liberty, is not known; onely this we find, that under the reign of Domitian, there being a publick Edict, for the departure of all the Philosophers out of Rome and Italy, Epictetus was oblig'd, among others, to retire to Nicopolis, a City of Epirus, now called Preveza. This is a clear argu∣ment, that he had then obtain'd liberty, since he was forc'd, as a Philosopher, leave Rome. Nor indeed is it to be ima∣gin'd, that a person of his merit, belov'd and esteem'd by the Emperours of his time, should continue in Slavery.

It is generally beleeved, that after his exile, he never return'd to Rome, and that his constant aboad was at Nicopolis, † for Arrian affirms in severall places, that the Discourses he collected of his, were held by him at Nicopolis. But I question the truth of this conjecture, notwithstanding the Authority off Sal∣masius. Forg Spartian writes, among other things, that the Emperour Hadrian entertain'd this Philosopher with much familiarity. Now how that could be, I

cannot imagine, if Epictetus continued still at Nicopolis. But whether Epictetus liv'd in that City or not, is of no great concern to his Life.

Nor do I know whether he were ever married; but as I affirm it not, so do I neither deny it. Forh Arrian obferves that Epictetus blam'd the Epicureans for their speaking against Marriage. But that he was not married, seems deduci∣ble hence, that though he did not ac∣count Marriage imcompatible with ver∣tue, yet he thought it a great obstacle to the attainment of perfection. But whether he were married or not, it is very likely he had no Children, or at least no Daughters. For besides that his having any is not mentioned in any Author;k Lucian relates, that one day Epictetus perswading Demonax to take a Wife, Demonax jeeringly made answer,

Well, I am content to do it, condition∣ally you give me one of your Daugh∣ters.

Moreover,1 Spartian affirms, that Hadrian exercis'd great liberalities and respects towards the Poets, Orators, Philosophers, Mathematicians, and all Professors of Science. But whatever

Spartian relates of that Prince, of whom it may be sayd, that never any man took such pleasure in abusing and scoffing at those very persons, as he did; certain it is, that Epictetus was always very poor, and that neither the sayd Emperour, nor his Successors, who so highly esteemed him, did advance him much, if at all, in matter of wealth; and possibly this might proceed from his great contempt thereof. For it is granted, he lived at Rome in a little house, which had not so much as a door.m All the Attendants he had was an old Servant maid, and all his Houshould-stuff, an earthen Lamp, by the light whereof he brought forth those noble and divine reflections; of which we have at this day the remain∣ders in the Books of Arrian. Whence it may be guessed how poor he was.

But to return to his Sentiments and Morality; Modesty was his darling and most familiar Vertue. Hence came it, that he affirmed,

There was no necessity of adorning houses with Tapestry and Pictures; but that they were to be fur∣nished with Modesty and Temperance; for those were the ornaments that last alwaies, and never grow old, or are

out of fashion.

He had so far re∣nounc'd ambition and ostentation, that if ever Philosopher did things out of hu∣mility, it may be said that he was the person. For as there was not any man, in his time, that did so many good A∣ctions as he; so was there not any that ever made it so much his business to con∣ceal them, and to have it believ'd that he had not done them. Whence it came, that amongst the Instructions he gave his Disciples, these were the chiefest: If you are so happy as to have learnt to satisfie your body with little, make no ostentation of it. If you have brought your self to a custom of drinking only water, forbear bragging of it. If you have a desire to enter upon some pain∣ful exercise, do it privately. Whatever may come of it, do nothing out of a design to be observ'd, or admir'd by the people. All these affectations are vain, and unbecoming a Phi∣losopher.

And indeed Epictetus was at so great a distance from vanity, that though he were the ablest of any of his time, to Write, yet was he never inclin'd to do it; though that be an humour which hath been predominant over the noblest Souls. For if his Disciple Arrian had

not reduc'd to writing, what he had heard him deliver by word of mouth, Epictetus would haply have been a name unknown in the world.

He was of opinion also, that a true Philosopher ought to do, and not to speak. He accordingly affirm'd, that most of those, who took upon them to be Phi∣losophers, were only such as to the de¦nomination; but not such in effect. One day, a certain person being displeas'd at some others pittying of him; Friend, said Epictetus to him, you are much to blame for being so angry. For upon this very account that you are offended at your being be∣moan'd, you are deservedly pittied. Another time, observing a Man who was engag'd in a most infamous Debauch, and care∣less of all honour and reputation, fal∣ling into discourse of Study and Philo∣sophy, he cryed out; O extravagant man! what dost thou mean to do? Hast thou con∣sider'd whether thy Vessel be pure and clean, before thou pourest any thing into it? For o∣therwise, whatever thou hast put into it, will be corrupted and turned into Vrine or Vine∣ger, or something worse.

A. Gellius, who relates this passage, conceives there could not be any thing

more judiciously, or more truly spoken; as if he would insinuate, that when Phi∣losophy, and the other Sciences fall in∣to a sordid soul, defil'd with Vice; they are, as it were, in a foul and unclean Vessel, where they are tainted, and be∣get nothing but corruption.

But Epictetus had a quality, which I esteem the more, in that it is a rare one, even in a Philosopher. He was an ex∣traordinary lover of Neatness; and would say sometimes, that he would ra∣ther see one of his Disciples with his hair well comb'd, and in good order, than tangled and nasty. But though he were so great a lover of Neatness, yet was it not ever the more observable in his own person. He was infirm of Body, and lame, by reason of a defluxion fal∣len down into his leg. He does inge∣niously acknowledge as much in an E∣pigram he made of himself, which might be thus rendred;

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Born, indispos'd of Body, and a Slave; Kindness, from Fortune, I could never find; But this advantage from the Gods I have, Their unexhausted Treasures fill my Mind.

Planudes, in his Collection of Greek Epigrams, falsly attributes this to Leo∣nidas, as Vincentius Obsopaeus hath well ob∣serv'd: and after him, Salmasius, who also pretends that this Epigram is not Epictetus's, and that it was added to A. Gellius by some not-deeply-learnt person. All the reason he gives of it, is, That it is not found in an ancient Manuscript of Aulus Gellius's: I am apt to believe it might be so. But if this conjecture be true; it must be also granted, that the same not-deeply-learned person had got it added to Macrobius, who cites it, as Epictetus's, in the first Book of his Saturnalia, and brings in the same words of Aulus Gellius. But indeed the reason, arguing this Epigram not to be Epicte∣tus's, is this, that it cannot easily be presum'd, a Philosopher, so remarkable for his modesty and humility, as he was, should speak so advantageously of his own worth.

Howere it might be, this is most cer∣tain,

that Fortune had not the least kindness for Epictetus; yet did not her Persecutions ever oblige him to make his addresses ever the more to Great Persons. They are very much to blame, said he sometimes, to pride themselves in the conceit that so many court them with their respects and services. Do they imagine, that it is for their own sakes all these submissions are made? Everyone, as to that particular minds his own concern, which taken away they are soon slighted. They are justly serv'd, as Asses are: If they be rubb'd or curry'd, it is in order to some service to be got out of them. So we reverence those men, as men do the Fea∣ver at Rome. If Altars be erected to her, it is out of a fear of the hurt she may do. But what so great mischief, continu'd he, are we afraid of at their hands? The worst they can do is to send us into another World. What mat∣ters it? Must we not alwaies expect death? Are not all the waies of Death equal? And is not that, through which a Tyrant sends us, many times the shortest and the easiest? In a word, no Tyrant was ever so cruel as to be a∣bove six months in torturing a man to death, Whereas a Feaver is sometimes above a year ere it dispatches him.

When he met with any of those Per∣sons,

who are of opinion they transcend others, because they are in favour with the Prince, or can derive their Pedigree from a long series of Ancestors; he treated them after a very pleasant man∣ner. You imagine, said he to them, be∣cause your Grand-father was Consul, your Father a Senator, and you are Caesar's Fa∣vourite, that you are more at liberty, and of better quality than another. Know that you are more a Slave, than the meanest Slave among the popular, and that the condition of such a one is better than yours. For if he be ill-treated sometimes by an imperious Master, you are continually domineer'd over and tormented by Ambition, or some other Passion. The only advantage you have over him is, that he is but a Slave in some course-cloath, and you are one in a Scarlet-coat. Besides, if he does not his duty, he must expect the lash or some such pu∣nishment; whereas, if you do not yours, you are somewhat more honourably dealt withal; for your head is struck off, as beseems a Favourite of Caesar's.

Thus were Persons of quality treated by Epictetus: So that his extream po∣verty, aud the meanness of his extracti∣on, could not check him out of the hu∣mour of making sport at their Wealth,

and imaginary Grandeurs: His vertue had exalted him above all those things, And though Fortune alwaies wreak'd her malice upon him, yet would he ne∣ver repine, but pass'd away his life in perpetual content.

But if he might justly complain of the niggardlyness of Fortune towards him, as to corporeal accommodations; he was on the other side to acknowledge the profuseness of Heaven towards him, as to the advantages of his Mind. It seem'd the former had not declar'd her self his enemy; but that his triumph over her might be the more glorious. Nay, I dare affirm, that Bondage, and the infirmity of his Body were the ne∣cessary retinue of his Vertue, that it might appear with greater lustre to po∣sterity. For, without flattery, never did any person force up constancy to so noble a height.

While he was yet a Slave to Epaphro∣ditus, that humerous Brute would needs one time, make it his sport to wrinch his Leg. Epictetus, perceiving that he took a certain pleasure in so doing, and that he renew'd the exercise with great∣er strength, said to him smiling, and

without seeming any way mov'd there∣at; If you continue this sport, you will cer∣tainly break my Leg: Accordingly, that having happen'd, as he had foretold it; all he said to him was, Well, did I not tell you that you would break my Leg? Was there ever Constancy equal to this? Was it not, as I may say, an out-braving of Fortune's extravagance, and the in∣firmity of our Nature. Celsus trans∣ported with an Enthusiasme of Philoso∣phy, makes this patience of his tran∣scend whatever might pretend to that name, so far as to be guilty of an abho∣minable impiety, by heightning the pa∣tience of Epictetus above that of our Saviour Jesus Christ. If the malice of Time had not depriv'd us of the Book. which Arrian writ of his Life and Death, I am confident, we should have found many other as great examples of his Patience. Nor is it to be doubted, but that a man, who so suffer'd his Leg to be broken, had before made discoveries of his Constancy upon several other occasions. And indeed this Vertue was so attendant on him, that it forsook him not even in the most considerable actions of his Life. Thence it came that he said,

If your Oyle be spilt, or your Wine stollen out of your Cellar; you are to make this refle∣ction in your self, That by such casualties is Constancy purchas'd. But if he maintain'd these Maximes with much earnestness, he observ'd them with no less rigour.

For one day this Philosopher having bought an Iron-lamp, which he thought a very precious piece of Houshold-stuff; as he was in a deep meditation in the Chimney-corner, a Thief came in∣to his Room, and stole away his Lamp, without his perceiving of him. So that a while after, Epictetus looking about, and missing his Lamp, fell a smiling, and without any disturbance, said, I shall deceive this Thief to morrow, for if he come for another Lamp, it shall be but an Earthen one.

True it is, we cannot affirm this a∣ction was of equal gallantry with the former; yet, in my judgment, it is no less remarkable. There is not ought wherein the Genius of persons is so discoverable, as in their trivial things inasmuch as the Soul appears therein as it were▪ stript of the disguise of all sorts of Passions: Whereas in grea•• matters she is in a manner alwaies dis∣guis'd;

Interest, or Ambition causing her, most commonly, to act contrary to the natural bent of her inclination.

But to return to our Philosopher; it may be truly said, That never man knew better how to suffer, than he did. It was a Science he had learnt even from his tendrest age, and wherein he improv'd himself to the last moment of his life. He needed not Companions in his misfortunes, that he might derive Consolation from their joynt-suffer∣ing. He never sought any but in him∣self; and if his mind were sensible of any grief, it was only of the grief of others. He thought it the greatest mark of the malignancy of a corrupt nature, to imagine evil less burthensom, when several other persons participate of it with us: as if our sufferings were heightned, or remitted, proportionably to the augmentation or diminution of theirs.

According to this Principle was it, that he affirmed those persons were ri∣diculous, who complain'd, that none were unjustly dealt with but themselves. How, said he, if you are sentenc'd to have your head struck off, would you have all other

Men condemn'd to the same punishment; and can you find no Consolation, but in the destru∣ction of Mankind? Thence it came that Epictetus so highly celebrated the con∣stancy, and great courage of Lateranus. For Nero having condemn'd him to have his head struck off, and the Execution•••• having but slightly wounded him at th•• first blow, he had the heart to lift up his head, and to stretch forth his neck the second time. Nay, a little before his death, Epaphroditus making some In∣terrogatives to him about the Conspi∣racy he was charg'd withal, he undaun∣tedly made this Answer; If I had any thing else to say, I would tell it thy Master, and not Thee.

As Epictetus was the most resolute, and the most constant of all Men; so were the judgments he made of Resolu∣tion, and Constancy, better and more sound, than those of any other. For though he were most intimately ac∣quainted with these two Vertues, as being his first and most ancient inclina∣tions, yet could he not endure them, if they had the least blemish, that rendred them insupportable. A•• he would not have a Man to be heartless and coward∣ly,

so would he neither have him to be temerarious. When a man might go through a plain, or some easy pas∣sage, he would not have advis'd him, to take his way through steepy and rough places. He was not of the hu∣mour of that Philosopher, who would rather have a Cart pass over his body, then turn out of his way to avoid it. Epictetus behav'd himself otherwise; for when Epaphroditus made it his sport to break his legg, he generously en∣dur'd it; but if Epaphroditus had had the good nature, to have forborn that diversion, he had very much oblig'd him. He thought it as great a vanity and shame, for a man to run himself into danger, where there was no necessity for the doing of it, as there was honour and Virtue, to em∣brace it, when his duty oblig'd him thereto.

But when Reason requir'd a man's exposing of himself to danger, he would then have him think of no de∣lay, but look on all inconveniencies and difficulties as so many trials of our Virtue, and occasions, contribu∣ting to our glory. Had Hercules,

said he, ever been Hercules, if that Lyon, that Hydra, that wilde Boar, and all those Monsters, whereof he disbur∣then'd the Earth, had not exercis'd his courage? How is it to be imagin'd, he should come to the height he attain'd, if his Virtue had not met with employment? What advantage could we have made of all his strength, all his patience, and all his cou∣rage, had he not embrac'd the occasions of making discoveries thereof? Not that it is to be inferr'd hence, that he would have a man wish to see whole Provin∣ces pester'd with Lyons and Hydraes, that he might thereby signalize his va∣lour: but he only maintain'd, That the casuall meeting with these Mon∣sters had made a fortunate discovery, what kind of person Hercules was.

Epictetus said further, that Helvidius had been admirably well convinc'd of this truth; that he had perfectly studi∣ed these Maximes, and that never any man had been more indivertible from his Sentiments, then he. When he once thought it his devoir, and con∣ceiv'd himself oblig'd in Conscience to do something, though the Emper∣our, the Senate, and the People should

have conspir'd together, and contri∣buted their joynt endeavours, to ob∣struct what he was resolv'd to do; yet was not all that combination of Emperour, Senate, and People able to tempt him to the least act of mean∣ness.

It happen'd one day, that Vespasian was desirous to get something pass'd in the Senate. He, well acquainted with the humour of Helvidius, and knowing he would be sure to oppose it, forbad him to come that day into the Senate. Helvidius having receiv'd that message made the Emperour this return, That it was in his power to deprive him of his charge; but that while he continu'd a Senator, he could not exempt himself from doing his duty, and coming to the Senate. Be it so, reply'd Vespasian; I am content you should come thither, conditional∣ly you say nothing. If I am not press'd to give my vote, answers Hel∣vidius, I promise you to be silent. But there is a necessity of my requiring your advice, saies the Emperour. There is in like manner, replies Hel∣vidius, a necessity, that I should an∣swer

you, and that I should speak what I conceive just and reasonable. If you do so, and that it oppose what I would have done, added Vespasian, I shall put you to death. When did I ever tell you, replies Helvidius, that I was immortall? you will execute your charge, and I will endeavour to do the like by mine. It may be your part to sentence me to banishment, and it is mine chearfully to submit thereto. It is your part to order my death, and mine, resolutely and undauntedly to receive it.

I make the less difficulty to fall into these little Digressions, because I ob∣serve that Plutarch is no enemy to the like, and that they are not the meanest Ornaments of the Lives which he hath written.

Epictetus was also a great admirer of the Constancy express'd by Agrippinus. For, some one telling him, that an Information, which concern'd his life was put in against him in the Senate, he made answer, I am glad of it; but what time of the day is it? Being told, it was about five in the After-noon, Come, repli'd he, let us go to the

Bath, it is time to part. Being return'd home a little while after, news was brought him, that the Information was found against him. Well, said he, what am I sen∣tenc'd to? to Death? No, repli'd he who brought him the tydings, you are only condemn'd to banishment. Very well, repli'd Agrippinus, let us sup to night at Aricia.

Epictetus had further a particular veneration for Pyrrho, the Sceptick, upon this account, that he put no dif∣ference between Life and Death. He esteem'd above all the reply he made to a certain person, who thought to make some sport with him. For that man saying to him, Why dost thou not therefore dye, Pyrrho, since it is indifferent to thee, whether thou livest or diest? That is the very rea∣son of it, repli'd he.

In a word, Epictetus would have all Philosophy to consist in Constancy and Continence. Whence he had allwaies these words in his mouth, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Bear and Forbear, but the grace and energy of the saying is much greater in the Greek, than in

any modern Languages. Thence it came, that he was so much taken with the procedure of Lycurgus towards a Lacedemonian, who had struck out one of his Eyes. For the people having deliver'd up the person to be punish'd; Lycurgus, instead of revenging him∣self upon him, instructed him in Vir∣tue. Wherein when he had made a considerable proficiency, he order'd him to be brought upon the Theatre, to the great astonishment of the People, who thought him dead long before; and said to them, This man, whom you deliver'd up to me as a wicked and perfidious person, I now return you vertuous and just.

The more we look on Epictetus, as an unbyass'd esteemer of mens Actions; the more glorious is it to the memory of these great Persons, to have had such an Approbator as he was. He, all his life, made profession of the Stoick Philosophy; that is, the severest and most austere of all Antiquity. Never was there any person who knew better how to reduce to practice the Maximes and Precepts of that Sect. For though he may be numbred among the last

that apply'd themselves thereto, yet was he one of the greatest Ornaments of it. In his Discourses and Actions, he imitated Socrates, Zeno, and Dioge∣nes. When he undertook any work, he first consider'd, what they would have done, upon the like occasion. When he reprov'd, or instructed any one, he alwaies entertain'd him with some example of those Philosophers. In fine, he look'd on them as per∣sons infinitely transcending all o∣thers.

But, above all, he had a particular esteem for Socrates, and had fram'd himself to a stile like his. In his Dis∣courses, he us'd comparisons so fami∣liar, and so pertinent, that he insen∣sibly won all to his Opinion. He was so persuasive, that he forc'd even such as disputed against him, to be witnesses of the truth he spoke. He was no af∣fector of polite or elegant expressions; but if his Discourse were intelligible, and full of good sence, after the ex∣ample of that of Socrates, he was satis∣fy'd. In a word, He had propos'd that Philosopher to himself, as the model, and rule of all his actions.

Though he much esteem'd Pyrrho him∣self, yet had he so strange a contempt for the Pyrrhonians, that he could not endure them. A certain Pyrrhonian one day taking a great deal of pains to prove, that the Senses alwaies deceiv'd men, he said to him, Who of your Sect intending to go to the Stoves, mistook his way, and went to the Mill? It was also an ordinary saying with him, Were I a Servant to some of these Pyrrhonians, I should take a pleasure in tormenting them. When they said to me, Epictetus, poure some Oyl into the Bath, I would cast some Brine on their heads. When they call'd for Water-gruell, I would bring them Vineger. And if they complain'd of that usage, I would tell them their senses were deceiv'd, and would perswade them that Vineger and Water-gruell was the same thing, or I would make them renounce their own senti∣ments.

He declar'd himself a perpetuall e∣nemy of Opinion and Fortune, by whom yet others thought the world go∣vern'd. The greatest part, said he, of those things which we admire are but pure fantasticall humours. For instance, The Iliad, which is so much talk'd of, is it not

a pure humour? An humour came into Pa∣ris's head, to carry away Helene; she was in a humour to follow him, and Mene∣laus must needs be in an humour to be angry at it. And this speaking properly, is the main design of the Iliad. But if Menelaus had behav'd himself like a prudent man, and had imagin'd, that he was no small gainer, by the loss of such a Wife, what had become of the Iliad? Would not it, and the Odys∣ses, have been clearly lost.

As to Fortune, Epictetus compar'd her to a Lady of Quality, who pro∣stitutes her self to Servants, and the meanest among such. He said that the Life, which had any dependence on Fortune, was like a Torrent after a violent shower, muddy, foule, hard to be got over, impe∣tuous, and of short continuance. He main∣tain'd, on the contrary, that a minde addi∣cted to Vertue was like an unexhausted ever∣flowing Spring, whose waters were clear, sweet and pleasant to drink, in a word, not chargeable with any manner of corrup∣tion.

In like manner, it was his highest care to heighten himself up more and more towards perfection in the study of vertue. He had renounc'd all other

pleasures, that he might the more in∣tentively prosecute those of the mind. When he was at any great Feast, he minded not so much the satisfaction of his body, as that of his mind. For it was his persuasion, that what was be∣stow'd on the body perish'd, and was never recover'd again; whereas what was bestow'd on the mind conti∣nu'd and was never lost: For this reason did he prefer the Tranquillity and indisturbance of the Soul, before all other things imaginable. And he held it for a Maxime, That as a man would be loath to be cast away in a Ship, though it were ever so beautiful, and loaden with Treasures and wealth: so how rich and sumptuous soever a House may be, a man should never be so carefull in the preserving of it, as to be crush'd by the burthen of excessive cares and disquiets.

This was also another saying of his. If Persia had been the place of your Nativi∣ty, it is certain you would have had no in∣clination to live in Greece; you would only have wish'd to live happily in your own Country. When therefore a man is born in Poverty, to what end shonld he have the

ambition to be rich? Why does he not rather frame himself to a contentedness in that con∣dition, and endeavour to live happily there∣in? As it were better for a man never to lye in any but a narrow Bed, and to have his health; then to be sumptuously lodg'd, and to be sick: So ought it to be a mans wish rather to preserve an indisturb'd tran∣quillity and composure of mind, in a mean condition, then be tormented with Grief and Vexation, amidst a greater liberality of Fortune. We must not imagine, that our unhappiness proceeds from Poverty, but from Ambition. Nor are we deliver'd from fear, by Wealth, but only by reason. Whence it comes, that he who makes pro∣vision of Reason is content in himself, and charges not his grievances on Poverty. These were the reflections of Epictetus on those things whereof men make so great account.

He could not endure those persons, who sought pretences to conceal, or justifie themselves in their miscarria∣ges. He said they imitated the Roman Curtezans; who to cover their shame and to justifie their Lewdness, made their advantage of Plato's Books of Common-Wealth; inasmuch as that Phi∣losopher

would have women to be common: not piercing into the sense, but lewdly interpreting the words of that great man. For he does not hold that a Woman married to one man should afterwards prostitute her self to all others; but he would abrogate that kind of Marriage between one Man and one Woman, to introduce another. For this reason Epictetus never bethought himself of any excuse, when he was once sensible that he had done amiss: on the contrary, he was never better pleas'd, than when his miscarriages were discover'd to him.

One day, Rufus bitterly reproving him, that he had not observ'd an omis∣sion in a Syllogisme, he made answer. I have not committed so great a crime, as if I had set the Capitol on fire. How, wretch, replies Rufus, dost thou think there is no other crime, than that of firing the Capitol? Epi∣ctetus was so far from being displeas'd at so sharp a retort, that he gave Rufus thanks, and afterwards told the story to all the World.

Another time a certain person, who

had been very wealthy, but then was fallen into extream Poverty, came and intreated him to write on his behalf to the People. Epictetus, glad to do him any service, writ him a most Obli∣ging Letter, wherein he represented and bemoan'd his misfortune, in such terms, as might have excited compassi∣on in Persons the least inclin'd to any. But when the other had read it, instead of giving him thanks, he return'd it him again, alledging, that his addres∣ses to him were out of hopes of recei∣ving some assistance from him, and not of being bemoan'd, which he need∣ed not. That scornfulness so pleas'd Epictetus, that he thought himself more oblig'd to him for that Answer, than if what Worthy person had enter∣tain'd him kindness, with the most in∣sinuating Complements.

But above all things, Epictetus was extreamly nice in point of Friendship, and there needs be no more said, than that he was a Stoick, to give some se∣curity, that he was sincere and dis∣interess'd. He would not have a man think of consulting the Oracle, when he was concern'd in the vindication of

a Friend. He was perswaded, that it ought to be attempted even with the hazard of a mans Life. As he was main∣taining one day, That only a wise man was capable of Friendship; one made him this reply, That though he were no wise man, yet he tenderly lov'd his own Son. 'Tis your imagination, An∣swers Epictetus. Did you ever observe little whelps playing together? It might be infer'd, from their sporting, that they had an extream kindness one for the other. And yet cast but a piece of meat betwixt them, and you will finde whether they effectually love one another. The case is parallel with that of you and your Son. Cast but a piece of Land between you and him, and you will discover whether, to gain that, he will not wish your Death; and whether within a while after you will not have a mortall aversion against him. Eteocles and Poly∣nices, Were they not Brothers, the Chil∣dren of the same Father and Mother? Had they not had their Education together? Had they not made a thousand protestations of inviolable Friendship? And yet when the Kingdom fell between them, which is the fatall Morsell, did they remember, or reflect on their promises? Was not the

Friendship between them clearly forgotten? Did there not happen dreadfull Wars be∣tween them, and were they not desirous to kill one the other? Did not Paris live un∣der the same roof with Menelaus? Did they not lodge in the same bed? Were they not continually together? And yet, did not the imaginary beauty of a wretched Woman make an irreconcileable distance between them, and engage them in the most bloody and most cruel War that ever was heard of? When it would be discover'd, continu'd he, whether two men are truly Friends; there is no necessity of enquiring whether they be related one to the other, or have had a joynt education. These are uncertain marks, and such as commonly do but trapan us. We are only to inform our selves of their Opini∣ons, and their Manners; and if we finde they are truly vertuous, and well-princi∣pled, we may pass an assured Judgement of them that they are perfect in point of Friend∣ship.

One day, a person of Quality making him a visit, he very civilly en∣tertain'd him, and discours'd with him a great while. But after they had talk'd of divers things, Epictetus ask'd him whether he were married? I am

so, said the other to my great sorrow. What cause have you to be so much troubled, repli'd Epictetus, For me∣thinks people marry only in order to a more happy Life? I am so miserable, re∣plies the other, that I have not a quiet houre. I so tenderly Love my Chil∣dren, that I am in a perpetual appre∣hension, that some accident may be∣fall them. And upon the least thing being amiss with them, I am like a di∣stracted person, tearing the hair of my head, and deploring the wretchedness of my condition. Not long since, continu'd he, news being brought me, that my little Daughter was not well, I was so smitten thereat, that I had not the courage to see her, till I was as∣sur'd, that she had recover'd that fit, and was grown better. Certainly re∣plies Epictetus, you are a person of a very humorous Friendship; I could wish my E∣nemies had the same affection for me, as you have for your Children, and that they would Love me so well, as not to see me while I live. You do as a certain Gallant sometime did, who, being entred the Lists, was struck with such a fear, that he cast his Cloak over his Eyes, while his Horse

galloped, and having afterwards casually got the prize, they were forc'd to apply Sponges to him, to recover him out of the swound he was fallen into.

When some said to Epictetus, that if he still liv'd in Poverty, he would ne∣ver be in a capacity to serve his Friends. How are you mistaken! reply'd he, Do you think that the assisting of Friends consists in the lending of money? No, no. True it is that a man ought to do what lies in his power, to get Wealth, that he may therewith relieve them, in their necessities; but if you can direct me how it may be gotten, in the age we live in, with the preservation of V'ertuous life and Inte∣grity, I promise you my utmost endeavours to do it. And if you also expect it from me, that I should hazard the loss of those Goods I can call my own, in order to the acquisition of others which are not true Goods, Consider whether you are not very unjust, and whether you ought not to pre∣fer a faithfull Friend before money? This certainly was an Answer beseeming a true Philosopher.

But what's particularly observable in Epictetus, is, that, of all the anci∣ent Philosophers, he had the best opi∣nions

concerning the Deity, and the greatest insight into our Mysteries. His sentiments are so conformable to Christianity, that St. Augustine, as great an enemy as he was to the ancient Phi∣losophers, speaks very advantageously of this Man; nay so far, as to honour him with the denomination of Most Wise. And no doubt St. Augustine had great reason to give him that Chara∣cter, since Epictetus was clearly per∣swaded, of the Immortality of the Soul, a great admirer of Providence, a Mortall enemy to Impiety and Athe∣isme, acknowledg'd but one Divi∣nity, and made Modesty, not to say, Humility, the ground of his Morals, as we have already observ'd.

But what I more highly esteem in him, is, that having been Nurs'd up in the Principles of the Stoick Philoso∣phy, he suck'd nothing of its bitter. ness, And that he had wean'd his mind from most of its Errours and false Maximes. In a word, He had no tin∣cture of those insolent Opinions, and ridiculous qualifications, which the Stoicks requir'd in their Virtuoso, or Wise Man. A man who had reduc'd

all his Philosophy to Practice, and one, who, by the acknowledgment of all subsequent Ages since his time, was the most knowing and the most hum∣ble of all the Philosophers, such a man, I say, must needs be far from any ima∣gination of his being above God. So that if Epictetus was a Stoick, he was a much more reform'd Stoick, than any of the rest. he had not so great a Devotion for the School of Zeno, or was so sworn to the observance of his Morality, as that he would not some∣times transgress the rules of it. On the contrary he gloried in opposing them, when he thought them not con∣sistent with good Manners and Pru∣dence. and certainly, if St. Jerome made it no difficulty to place a Philo∣sopher of the same Sect in the Catalogue of the Saints, What may we think of Epictetus? For, not to urge that he alwaies spoke very clearly of the im∣mortality of the Soul, and that Seneca never fully express'd his sentiment as to that point, he hath this further advantage over him, that he never ap∣proved that pernicious and tragical Maxime of Stoicks Cloister, so receiv'd

and so inveterate, That it was lawfull for a man to be his own Murtherer: Wheras Seneca alledges it, and main∣tains it in several places. Which is a consideration so much the more pres∣sing, by as much as there is nothing so opposite to the Doctrine of the Gos∣pell.

I know Wolfius is not of this opini∣on, and pretends that Epictetus was fallen into that Errour, as well as the rest of the Stoicks. but I know also, that it is very likely, Wolfius is mis∣taken, as to that particular. For the only Text on which he grounds that Conjecture, is this that Epictetus af∣firms, in Arrian, That when a man is weary of acting his part, he is to remember, That the Door is open.

But when he saies, The Door is open, He means not by those words, That a man may be his own Murtherer. His meaning is plainly this, that when we are weary of Life, and the condi∣tion we are in, it concerns us to re∣member, that our Term is almost ex∣pired, that within a short time we shall be delivered from that disquiet, and that infallibly we shall dye. This

was the reflection of Epictetus, And, to be assured of it, we need only ob∣serve, how clearly he expresses him∣self to the same purpose, in another passage, where he derides those, who are much troubled for the morrow. Thus then he speaks to them. If you have any thing to eat to morrow, you will eat, if you have nought, you will forbear eating: the worst that can befall you, is to go into the other World, The Door is all∣waies open for you. This passage is as much to the point in Debate, as the other; and yet no understanding per∣son will maintain that Epictetus his meaning in this place, is, That it is lawfull for a man to be his own Executio∣ner, For, two or three lines before, he holds, That, When we are persecu∣ted by Tyrants, We must have Patience, and wait Gods leasure, to deliver us from their Persecution. It is just, adds he, that we continue in the rank wherein God hath placed us. We must leave it to him to remove us out of it, when it shall please him. The time of our aboad will not be long. When a man hath once taken this re∣solution, there is no Tyrant but we may de∣fy. This is the Constant opinion of E∣pictetus,

which is clearly opposite to that, which Wolfius would impose up∣on him.

But to return to his Life. These were his true Sentiments; that admi∣rable Modesty, that profound Wise∣dom; and, above all, that inflexible Integrity so remarkable in him, were the recommendations which gain'd him the Esteem and Friendship of the greatest Persons of his time. There was an intimate Friendship between him and Favorinus, and Herod the So∣phist, two men very Illustrious among the Ancients, and whose Lives are written by Philostratus. Spartian, as I have already observe'd, numbers him among the most familiar Friends of the Emperour Hadrtan. Themistius, in his Oration to the Emperour sovi∣nian, affirmes, that he received great honours from the two Antoninus's. And indeed, Marcus Aurelius speaks very advantageously of him, in several places; so far as to parallel him with the Zeno's, Socrates's, and Crysippus's. In fine, he was in so great reputation, that Lucian satyrizes on an Ignorant person, who had given three thou∣sand

Drachmes for Epictetus's earthen Lampe, out of a conceit he should be∣come as eminent for Learning as he was, by the light of his Lampe.

His words were so efficacious, and men had such a respect and Veneration for what ever came from him, that none oppos'd it. One day Herod, the So∣phist, met with a young man who pro∣fess'd the Stoick, Philosopy, but had such an humour of talking and magni∣fying himself, as if all the Greeks and Latines had been ignorant persons in comparison of him. The Sophist having patiently given attention to all he thought fit to say, sent for the second Book of Epictetus's Discour∣ses, collected by Arrian, whereof he caus'd a Chapter to be read, treating of great Talkers, and presumptious persons, The young man was so startled, and out of countenance at it, that he had not a word to say for him∣selfe. From this instance it may be conjectur'd, what esteeme Epictetus must be in.

Of all his Diciples, we know not of any considerable person but Arrian; and yet the making of this one Diciple

is a sufficient argument of the great∣ness of the Master. This is the Arrian, who was afterwards Master to Antoninus Pius, and had the Title given him of young Xenophon, upon this account, that in imitation of that Philosopher, he had reduc'd to writing all he had heard his Master say, during his Life, and dispos'd it into a Volume, which he Entituled, The Discourses of Epicte∣tus, or his Dissertations, whereof there are yet remaining four Books. He afterwards made a little Treatise, which he called Enchiridion, which is an Abridgment of all the Moral Philo∣sophy of Epictetus, which is yet extant, and indisputabl'y one of the most ex∣cellent Pieces of Antiquity.

But what I am extreamly astonish'd at; is, that a person so highly learn∣ed as Lipsius, whose illuminated judg∣ment sound its way into the greatest obscurities of the Stoick. Philosophy, and who made it his principal study, should imagine that Epictetus was the Au∣thor of that Enchiridion, and how he mist observing, that Simplicius expressly affirms at the very be∣ginning of his Book, that the

Enchiridion was compos'd by Arrian, and that it was an extract of the no∣blest and most considerable Maximes of Epictetus's Philosophy. The Transla∣tor of Arrians Discourses into French, so well known by the Philarchus of Monsieur de Balzac, is guilty of the same Errour.

Arrian had also written another ve∣ry large Book, of the Life and Death of Epictetus, which is clearly lost. Mar∣cus Aurclius speaks of another Book, intituled, The Commentaries of Epictetus, which he had very exactly read over. But, in all probability, these Commen∣taries are no other than the Discourses of Epictetus, whereof I have already spoken. For Arrian, in the Preface he made before thosse Discourses, calls them also the Commentarie••, of Epictetus. I conceive the equivocation proceeded from the two publications made of that Book, during the life of Arrian, who possbly gave it different Titles.

I am also of opinion, that those Dis∣courses were much larger than we now find them, and, it may be, that, instead of four, there were five or six Books of them. This is so far certain, that

Gellius cites a passage of the fifth Book of Arrian's Discourses. And Stobaeus relates several passages of the same Au∣thor, now not extant elsewhere. It is possible also, that Arrian left out se∣veral things at the second publication which was made of his Book, and re∣duc'd the six Books he had made, to four. However it be, I cannot allow what is affirm'd by Suidas, that Epictetus writ much. For if we ever so little con∣sult what hath been written by Arrian, or reflect on the Maximes maintain'd by him, we shall hardly be induc'd to any imagination of it.

There are also certain Answers, which some pretend that he made to the Emperour Hadrian. But there needs only the reading of them to dis∣cover their being supposititious, and that they are falsely attributed to him. Wolsius put us sometime in hopes, that we should see Epictetus's Letters, which were, as he was told, in the Library of Florence. But it is very likely, that he, who told him that News, was not well informed of the truth, and that we may long expect the publishing of them.

Of what Disease Epictetus died, or at what time, is not well known. True it is, that Suidas affirmes he died un∣der the reign of Marcus Aurelius. But I much question the truth of it. Sal∣masius, who hath been very large as to this particular, brings several reasons to make it appear that Suidas was mi∣staken.

The first is, that the same Suidas af∣firms, that Epictetus was a slave to Epaphroditus, who was Captain of the Life-Guard to Nero. Now, from the death of Nero to Marcus Aurelius's ad∣vancement to the Empire, there are near ninety four years. Nay before Epictetus was in a condition to do E∣paphroditus any service, and to come from Hierapolis to Rome, he must be of some Age. So that according to this computation he must have lived near a hundred and twenty years: which is not easily believ'd. And yet there may be somewhat in the conjecture, though not enough to make it convi∣ctive, for it is possible, as Lipsius hath well observ'd, that he did not serve Epaphroditus, till after the death of Nero. Yet Lipsius may be answer'd,

by alledging that Epaphroditus is here stiled Captain of Nero's Life Guard; which argues that Nero was then living.

Salmasius's second reason is, that Marcus Aurelius numbers not. Epi∣ctetus among those whom he had heard. He only affirms, that he had seen his Commentaries, by the means of Junius Rusticus, who sent him them. This reason seems to me much weaker than the former. For, besides that Epictetus might at that time be retir'd to Nico∣polis, he died haply at the beginning of Marcus Aurelius's Reign. And Suidas affirms only, that he came to the time of that Emperour. And so though E∣pictetus had lived till the beginning of his Reign, it is possible that Emperour might not see the Commentaries of E∣pictetus, till after his death.

The third reason alledged by Salma∣sius seems to me to be of no validity at all. He saies, that Epictetus's Lamp was sold in Lucian's time, and thence he infers, that Epictetus was then dead. But this does not prove any thing. For there are very high probabilities, if not certainty, that Lucian died not till

after Marcus Aurclius. And so, that Lamp might have been sold in Lucian's time, though Epictetus liv'd to the time of that Emperour. Nay it is pos∣sible it was sold in the Life-time of Epictetus; and in that case, there would be no difficulty.

The fourth Reason is, That A. Gelli∣us, who writ in the time of Antoninus Pius, or at the beginning of Marcus Aurelias's Reign, affirmes of Epictetus thus, The memory of Epictetus the Philoso∣pher is yet fresh. The passage is not faithfully set down by Salmasius. For it is precisely said in Aulus Gellius, That Epictetus also was a slave, is of fresh Memory. That is, it was of fresh me∣mory that Epictetus had been a Slave, and not simply that he had been.

To conclude, The last Reason brought by Salmasius, is, that Aulus Gellius speaks in another place, in these Terms, I have heard Favorinus say that Epictetus said &c. So that, since Favo∣rinus died under the Emperour Hadri∣an, Salmasius, infers, that Epictetus could not have liv'd up to the time of Marcus Aurelius. This reason is not

convictive, because Favorinus might in∣form Aulus Gellius, of what, Epictetus said, though Epictetus were not dead. Yet must we allow it some ground. For Aulus Gellius, who writ in the time of Antoninus Pius, the Pre∣decessor of Marcus Aurelius, when he speaks of Epictetus, expresses himself in these Terms. Epictetus said. That ve∣nerable Old Man said, I have been inform'd by such a one, that Epictetus said. Which clearly argues that he was not then li∣ving. And what makes me the more inclinable to this opinion, is, that it is probable, that Arrian had not made any collection of the Discourses of Epi∣ctetus, till after the death of that Phi∣losopher. And if so, it is impossible that what is affirmed by Suidas should be true, and that Epictetus liv'd up to the time of Marcus Aurelius. For in the time of Aulus Gellius; who, as hath been observed, writ under Antoninus Pius, these Discourses were already published, and generally known. True it is, that Arrian might have made that Book in the Life-time of Epictetus, but there is little probability, and it will not easily be presum'd, that the Dis∣courses,

and memorable things of a person yet living should be publish∣ed.

There is yet another very consider∣able difficulty, which hath not been ob∣served by any one. This is; that, from Nero's death, to the Edict set forth by Domitian, touching the Banishment of the Philosophers, there is very lit∣tle above twenty years. For that E∣dict was published in the eighth year of his Reign, as is affirmed by Eusebius. Now if the conjecture of Lipsius be true, and that Epictetus did not serve Epophroditus, till after Neros death, it would follow, that at the time of that Edict, Epictetus could not be above eighteen or nineteen years of Age. Which cannot be granted, For then he had obtained his Liberty, and was e∣ven at that very time in great reputa∣tion; inasmuch as it is affirmed by Au∣lus Gellius; that, upon the qualificati∣on of a Philolsopher, he was forced to retire to Nicopolis. It must needs be allowed then, that he was at that time about thirty years of Age. But if he were of that Age, at the time of that Edict, it must necessarily follow, that

he lived near a hundred and eight or nine years, to come up to the time of Marcus Aurelius. Which is not pro∣bable; since Lucian, who lived in that very time makes no mention of Epicte∣tus, in his Dialogue Of Long-livers. True it is, that Eusebius speaks also of a second Edict against the Philosophers, which was not published till the fif∣teenth year of Domitian's Reign. But, not to take notice, that he is the only person of all the Chronologers and Historians, who makes any mention of this second Edict, Scaliger precise∣ly observes, that the Edict, whereof Aulus Gellius speaks, (which is the same we now discourse of) was the first which was publish'd in the eight year of Domitians Reign.

This reason seems to me so strong, that I should make no difficulty to af∣firm, that Suidas was mistaken, if I had not met with a passage of Themistius, where he precisely saies, That the two Antoninus's rendred great honours to Epi∣ctetus. Yet might it be answer'd, that what is said is by an Orator, who ob∣served not that strictness, which was requisite in a faithfull Historian. Or

haply that Marcus Aurelius was a great honourer of Epictetus, in the time of Hadrian, and Antoninus Pius, and before he came to be Emperour. Or rather, that he did him those ho∣nours after his death. As indeed we see, by the Books he hath left us, that he had a particular Veneration for his Memory. In fine, This is not without some difficulty, and I should be loath to be absolutely decisive in the point. I therefore think it suffi∣cient, that I have simply laid down the doubts of both sides. And yet, after a mature examination of these things, if I may presume to give my judgment, I am the rather inclin'd to comply with what is affirm'd by Salmasius, that Epictetus reach'd not the Reign of Marcus Aurelius. For besides that Suidas is an Author who hath not alwaies light on the truth, it was a most undeniable mistake in him, when he affirm'd that Epicletus had written much. So that it is pos∣sible he may also be mistaken in his computation of the time. Howere it be, yet this is certain, that Epictetus was regretted by all the illustrious

Persons in his time, and that his memory will be precious to posterity. And this all I could meet with of his Life, which hitherto hath not been written in any Language, since that Life of Epictetus, done by Arrian, hath been lost.

A CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE, to find out the time of Epictetus's death.

Years from the Foundation of Rome.	Years from Nero.
807	1
808	2	Nero.
809	3
810	4
811	5
812	6
813	7
814	8
815	9
816	10
817	11
818	12	Epaphroditus.
819	13	Epictetus.
820	14	Galba.
821	15	Otho. Vitellius.
822	16

823	17	Vespasian.
824	18
825	19
826	20
827	21
828	22
829	23
830	24
831	25	Titus Vesp.
832	26
833	27
834	28	Domitian.
835	29
836	30
837	31
838	32
839	33
840	34	Edict for the banishment of the Philosophers.
841	35
842	36
843	37
844	38
845	39
846	40
847	41	Nerva.

848	42
849	43
850	44	Trajan.
851	45
852	46
853	47
854	48
855	49
856	50
857	51
858	52
859	53
860	54
861	55
862	56
863	57
864	58
865	59
866	60
867	61
868	62
869	63
870	64	Hadrian.
871	65
872	66

873	67
874	68
875	69
876	70
877	71
878	72
879	73
880	74
881	75
882	76
883	77
884	78
885	79
886	80
887	81	Favorinus's Death.
888	82
889	83	Antoninus Pius.
890	84
891	85
892	86
893	87
894	88
895	89
896	90
897	91

898	92
899	93
900	94
901	95
902	96	Epictetus's Death.
903	97
904	98
905	99
906	100
907	101
908	102
909	103	Aulus Gellius.
910	104
911	105
912	106
913	107	Marcus Aurelius.
914	108
915	109
916	110
917	111
918	112
919	113
920	114
921	115
922	116

923	117
924	118
925	119
926	120
927	121
928	122
929	123
930	124
931	125
932	126	Commodus.
933	127	Lucian's Death.

Notes

• Suid. in Epist.
• b

  Arrian. Diss. l. 1. c. 9.
• c

  Arrian. Diss. l. 1. c. 26.
• d

  Aul. Gel. Noct. Att. l. 12. c. 11. Suet. in Domit. Phi∣lost. l. 7. Dion. Chrysost. de Exil. Euseb. in Chron.
• †

  l. 2. c. 6.
• f

  In Not, ad Epist. & Sim. P. 4.
• g

  In Vit. Hadr. p. 8.
• h

  l. 3. c. 7.
• Arr. Diss. l. 3. c. 22.
• k

  In Dem.
• 1

  In Vit. Hadr.
• m

  Vincent. Obsop. l. 3. Anth. a•• Epig. Epi∣ctet.
• Strob. Ser. 38.
• Enchir. E∣pict.
• Aul. Gell. Noct. Att. l. 17. c. 9.
• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• Arr. Diss. l. 4. c. 5.
• A. Gell. Noct. Att. l. 17. c. 19.
• Arr. l. 4. Dissert. c. 12.
• A Gell. Noct. Att. l. 2. c. 18.
• In Antho∣log. Lib. γ. cap. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• c. 11.
• Arr. Diss. l. 1. c. 19.
• Arr. Diss. l 2 c. 6.
• Arr. Diss. l. 4. c. 1.
• Origen. l. 7. cont. Cels.
• Celsus af∣firm'd the patience of Epictetus, to be great∣er then that of Jesus Christ.
• Simpl. in Ench. E∣pict. init.
• Arr. Diss. l. 2. c. 6.
• Arr Dis. l. 1. c. 2.
• Diog. La∣ert. in vita Pyrrh.
• Arr. Diss. l. 1. c. 2.
• Arr l. r. c. 2.
• A Town a∣bout two Leagues from Rome.
• Arr. Diss. l 2. c. 20.
• Stob. Ser. 1.
• Stob. Ser. 38.
• Arr. Diss. l. 1. 6. 7.
• Enchir. E∣pict.
• Arr. Diss. l. 2. c. 22.
• Arr. Diss. l. 1. c. 11.
• Enchir. E∣pict.
• Arr. Diss. l. 1. c. 9. l. 2. c. 14.
• The Sto∣icks exal∣ted their Wise Man above God.
• Arr. Diss. l. 1. c. 9.
• Annot. in Diss. Arrian. l. 1. c. 24.
• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• Arr. l. 1. C. 9.
• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 &c.
• A. Cell. l. 17. c. 10 part l. 1. c. 8.
• In Vit. Hadr.
• Them. O. rat. 12.
• Mar. An∣ton. l. 17. Sect. 16. l. 11. S. 28. &c.
• Ad Iudoct.
• A. Gell. Noct. Att. l. 1. c. 2.
• Genebr. l. 3 Chron.
• Simpl. in Pro••••m. Enchir.
• Lips. in 〈◊〉〈◊〉. ad Sancto. Phil. l. c 19. E∣picteti scripta pa••••••a ex∣taut En∣chiridion ••••••••gre∣gium, &c.
• In Prooem, Enchir. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. See his Preface on the Dis∣courses of Epictetus.
• Mar. Ant. de is qua ad se. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• Arrian in Pras. ad Gell. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c.
• Suid. in. Epict.
• Altercat. Hadr. & Epict.
• In praef. ad Atlercat. Hadr.
• Suid. in Epict.
• Salm. in Not. ad Epic. & simpl.
• Lips. in Manud. ad St. Phil. l. 1. c. 19.
• Suid. in Epict. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ant. de his quae ad se.
• A. Gell. l. 11. c. 19. Ita Sal∣mas. resu∣lit locum Gellii in Not. ad Simpl De Epict. au∣tem Phi∣losopho recention est me∣moria. Itae Gell. De Epict au∣tem Phi∣losopho, quod is quoq ser∣vus fue∣rit, recen∣tior est memoria.
• Fuseb. in Chron.
• Them. in Orat. ad Jovin.