Arcana aulica, or, Walsingham's manual of prudential maxims for the states-man and the courtier

ARCANA AULICA, OR Walsinghams Manual; Of Prudential Maxims, for the Statesman and the Courtier.

CHAP. 1.

The several ends of Courtiers, and the means to maintain them.

IT is necessary that all men, who desire with prudence and order, to govern their Af∣fairs; do in the first place, propose unto themselves, an end whereunto all their acti∣ons must tend? Those that look towards the Court, do not all fix upon the same ends; some the hope of gain, and others the desire of honor; leads; the Ambition of Rule; draws not a few; and very many

steer that Course, meerly out of a busie in∣clination, to the Engrossing, Crossing, or Inter∣posing in other mens affairs; whilst the num∣ber of those is very small, who Princitively intend the Honor, Safety, and Advantage of the Prince.

But though their ends be diverse, yet the way to attain, to whatever end any man there hath pitcht upon, is but one, and Common to all that move in that Sphere, to wit, the Favor of the Prince; in obtaining which the industry, and labor of all Courtiers is im∣ployed. In order whereunto it is in the first place necessary, that you be known unto your Prince; and then either by your behavior, your parts, your actions, or some other laud∣able means, that you make your self Grateful in his eye; yet there are those for whom the splendor of their Family, the authority of their Office, or convenience of their imployment (whether it be high, or low, come unto them by inheritance, or got with money) hath pre∣pared an access unto the Princes person; so that they being hereby exempted, from the toil of seeking how to become known unto the Prince, finde half their work performed unto their hands; whilst those to whom these introductions are denyed, finde their greatest difficulties in their first beginnings: But when they are once known unto the Prince, as he judges them fit for his Service;

they are often preferred and trusted before others; by reason that being lifted up from a low Condition, or a mean Fortune; they are more addicted and subject to the Princes will, whom they submissively reverence, as the one∣ly Author of their advancement.

It is otherwise with Courtiers that are born Great, for upon those the Dignity either of their imployment, or their Family, imposes a necessity of having a regard unto their own Honor, and of referring sometimes their own to the Princes opinion; who besides is more oft unwilling to promote these through a certain emulation, or fear, lest their swelling greatness should insult at last against him that is the Author of it; and he not able to repress them without danger to himself and his Kingdom; whilst on the other side, the op∣pression of him that riseth from a mean Condi∣tion, is far more easy; onely let the Prince turn his back upon him, or abandon him to the great ones (who for the most part look with envy upon such) and he is lost. I intend here onely those wise Princes that have known, how to limit within due bounds, the Power of those they love, and advance; not conferring all the authority and trust of his Kingdom upon one of these men, in sub∣jecting even the Peers unto him; which ha∣ving been done by some Princes, did seldom or almost never succeed well.

CHAP. 2.

The ways to obtain the Princes favor.

THe ways whereby Courtiers get into au∣thority and favor with the Prince are two, above all other most usual and frequen∣ted. The one is of those that seek after pub∣lick Offices and Dignities, Climbing up the stairs of honor till they come within a stage of the Favorite himself; The other is of those that follow the Court, sedulously seeking all occasions of being imployed in the secret af∣fairs of the Prince, and made use in business of the greatest trust.

The last of which ways, is without doubt the shortest, and traced with their steps, who have lived in the greatest Favor with their Princes; as Mecaenas was to Augustus, and Sa∣lust both to him, and his Successor Tiberius, of whom Tacitus, Annal. 3. Salust, although the ways of honor were easie unto him, imita∣ting Mecaenas, without the senatorial Dignity, outwent in Power many that had been honored, both with triumphs and the consulship, & varying from the custome of the Ancients through his deli∣cacy, and neatness, seemed prone to nothing but the Plenty and aboundance of luxary; although he had indeed a vigorous minde, capable of the weightiest business; by so much the more sharp

and active by how much the more he made sh••w of dulness and floth.

Like to him was Mella, of whom speaks the same Tacitus, Annal. 12. Mella born of the same Parents, that Gallio and Seneca were; through a Preposterous ambition laid aside all pre∣tence to publick honors; to the end, that being only Roman Knight, he might equal in power those that had been Consuls; Besides, he beleeved it the shortest way to the getting of money, to be im∣ployed in Agencies, and solliciting the Princes business.

CHAP. 3.

The ways to become known to the Prince.

THe ways of becoming known and grateful to the Prince are various, according to the diversity of the Courtiers, and the times; there are some that make themselves known by their actions signally, either profitable, or glorious; or else by a more then Common vertue, and honesty. The Commendation of others gives to many, both access to, and interest in the Prince, which is indeed the most usu∣al way of all. For Princes live in such a de∣gree of eminence above others, and are ••o hedged in with the number of Peers, and train

of Veterane Courtiers that a stranger can hard∣ly thrust in amongst the throng that stand in his way, unless either there be some one to take him by the hand, and make his passage, or else that himself by some extraordinary enterprize do attract the Eys of all men up∣on him, and amongst others, those of the Prince.

And here the fact of the Architect Dima∣crates, or as some call him Stasicrates, is ve∣ry memorable. He desiring to become known unto the Great Alexander, when all the Cour∣tiers had refused to bring him to the King, bethinks of a way of presenting himself all naked, anointed with Oyl, a poplar Crown on his head, upon his left shoulder a Lyons Skin, and holding a great Club in his Right hand: And thus Accoutred he comes into Alexanders presence, as he was sitting in his Throne. The novelty of the thing drew the Eyes of all upon him, and moved Alexander himself so far, as he caused the man to be brought unto him; And though he appro∣ved not of what he propounded, yet he commanded he should be enrolled amongst his Family.

I do not bring this example to perswade any body with the like foolery, to insinuate himself into the Princes favor, but to the end I may demonstrate, That those who are strangers and unknown, unless they be holpen

by some one in great authority, can hardly scrue themselves into so great a train, as do surround the Prince, except either by some memorable action as we have said before or, by some unusual accident, they deserve as the Poet saies.

With fingers to be pointed out, For some strange thing amongst the rout.

CHAP. 4.

The humor and inclinations of the Prince, and his familiars are to be known.

OUr yong Courtier, who desires to be known and loved by the Prince, must observe well the maners and conditions, not onely of the Prince himself, but also of such of his fol∣lowers, as he most trusts, and relies upon; to∣gether with the Peers, and all those others who may either afford him any help, or coun∣tenance; or else on the contrary stirred up either with emulation, fear, envy, hate, their own, or their Friends concernments, work him any prejudice. It is chiefly necessary that he make a full discovery of the inclinations and customs of the Prince, that for the most part follow the temperature of his body;

which though by wary Princes, they be much concealed, and smothered, yet it seldom happens but that sometimes they break out, and as it were laying aside disguises, show themselves. Since all their actions are so exposed to the eyes of men, it cannot be, but some one or other, must observe whereun∣to their inclinations tend. Sometimes they are so opprest and vext with the weight of bu∣siness, that forgetting their Artifices, they be∣tray their dispositions; Tiberius himself al∣though a most skilful Master in dissembling, could not set so good a face upon it, but that time would by little and little, bring all his Arts to light.

But since those of other men are so many, the propensions of Princes must needs be di∣verse, and almost infinite; yet they may be reduced to two heads. The one of which, in∣cludes all that tends to the greatness of his State, The other his personal pleasures; His greatness consists either in his Fame and Au∣thority, or in Riches; the duty of his Subjects; or lastly, in the strength and faithfulness of his Armies. In these things he ought to ac∣commodate his endevors to the nature, and disposition of the Princes affairs; which he that shall with Dexterity and Skill perform, provided he be neither suspected nor hated for other Reasons, cannot fail of becom∣ing acceptable unto the Prince.

Make the same judgement of the pleasures, and vitious affections of the Prince. If he be diffident and of a fearful disposition, believe that a bold informer will be grateful unto him, who sticks not at the displeasure of the great ones, and is ready to execute the Princes commands, whatsoever they be; as Tacitus ascribes Sejanus. He had a body (says he, Annals 4.) patient of toyl, a bold minde; he was a close concealer of himself, and a rash ac∣cuser of others: Composed he was of a mixture of flattery, and pride, with an exterior face of modesty; and yet inwardly fraught with an ex∣cess of ambition.

If the Prince delight in Drunkenness, he will all also take pleasure in men addicted to the same vice; for which cause Tiberius loved Pomponius, and Lucius Piso, of whom Suetonius, Cap. 24. de Tiberio. After this, the Prince to the corruption of publique Maners, spent two whole days and nights, eating and drinking with Pomponius Flaccus, and Piso; to one of which, he gave immediately the Pro∣vince of Syria, and to the other the Government of the City, calling them in his Letters, his most pleasant and familiar Friends. The same Tiberius, as Suetonius relates, preferred a most ignoble Fellow to the Questorship, before many Noble pretenders, because at a Banquet, where himself was drinking, he drunk of Nine Gallons of Wine.

Their society in their lust, did indear Ti∣gellinus to Nero. Tigellinus was more power∣ful (saith Tacitus, Annal. 14) in the bosom of the Prince, as being admitted to his most private lusts. So Petronius, that Master of elegance (for those are the Historians words, Annal. 16.) was taken in, amongst few, to the familiari∣ty of Nero; who thought nothing pleasant or sweet, but what Petronius approved of. And according to this example, did Commodus and Heliogabalus, confer all the dignities of the Empire upon men for lust and licencious∣ness, most like unto themselves.

Mutianus was not beloved by Vespasian so much for his fidelity, duty, and the merit of his passed services; as that, because he was more dexterous then others, in feeding his avarice. To Isacius Angelus, who after the death of Theodorus, got the Empire; the same avarice endeared a certain Boy, who though he scarce knew how to write, kept the Accounts of his Exohequer, out of hope onely of sharing in the Bribes, which were given him largely, from all those that used his assistance.

Manuel Comnenus, also Emperor, seeking some rough exactor and crafty raiser of his Tributes, that might supply his prodigality with money, chose John Pucius, a rude un∣sufferable man, difficult of access, and in∣tolerable harsh.

Whose language, and his looks did well His nature and his office tell.

And not content with this, lifted him up to that Authority, that he did not onely excel all others in dignity, but also would dare to violate the Edicts of the Prince, and Or∣ders of the Senate; abrogating, under pre∣tence of encreasing the Treasury, some of the greatest and most necessary Offices of the Empire: Such as was the Commander of the Gallies, the chief strength and defence of that Imperial Monarchy.

CHAP. 5.

The Princes affections whether, and how to be complied with.

BUt that they, who desire to become ac∣ceptable to the Prince, ought to sooth him in all his inclinations, is not onely a thing publiquely granted, but also too au∣thorized by the daily practice of Courtiers. An honest man will wonder at it, and think that by this rule that teaches us to humor all the dispositions of the Prince, he is shut out from Court; since that Princes often run courses, much astray from the paths of Rea∣son and Justice. Truly, he that desires to

lead a life altogether innocent, and remote from the conversation of men addicted to vice, and to their own corrupt inclinations; shall in my opinion, do very well to absent himself from that great Courtisan, the Court (if I may so call it) that sometimes corrupts men of the greatest integrity and inno∣cence.

Let us see an example or two of this cor∣ruption. Festinus the Friend of Maximinus▪ during Valentinians Reign, governed Asia with a wonderful repute of Gentleness and Modesty; being a sharp reprover of the vio∣lence and cruelties of Maximinus, and of the calumnies and frauds, wherewith he cir∣cumvented many: But at last observing that his Companion by these means had got∣ten the command of the Praetorian Bands, next in dignity to the Emperor himself, he changed his maner of life, and imitating Maximinus, did many unjust and cruel things. John Pucius (whom I mentioned but a little before) administred for a time the Affairs and Treasures of the Emperor Manuel with great integrity; which caused, that the Em∣perors pride and inhumanity was in some sort tolerable to those that were well dispo∣sed amongst the Subjects: But at last (as N••cetas witnesseth) giving himself over to the de∣sire of wealth, he was in covetuousness in∣ferior to none, that ever had born those

offices before him; exhorting his very friends and servants, to imitate his example, as many of them did; and the rest, though better, and incorrupted themselves, yet were fain silently to suffer others to be de∣praved, for fear of the danger that hung over those that should oppose him.

Aristides the first, both in name and na∣ture, being by the Athenians made Treasurer; In the first place, according to his own dis∣position, and the duty of an honest man, went about to hinder all those that were under his charge, from robbing the Treasury; where∣upon they presently accused him of cheat∣ing, and bribery, as one of the corruptest persons that ever bore that office; inso∣much, that he had like to have been con∣demned: But being at last quit, and his office still continued, he determined to imitate his Predecessors, and wink at the thefts of his Companions; by which means, he pre∣sently reobtained the name of a good man, in the opinion of all.

Such things often fall out in the Courts of Princes, either through the malice of those that are in most authority, who can endure no man more vertuous then themselves; or else through the folly and imprudenee of the Prince. The preservation of our integrity in Court, I confess, is therefore very difficult; yet if any, either through the necessity of his

Fortune, the eminence of his Birth, the dig∣nity of his office, or the desire of serving, either his Friends or Country, is lead unto it, or called thereunto by the Prince, shall un∣dergo this kinde of life; and as occasion shall require, seek to do thereby good unto himself, and serve his Friends; in my judge∣ment he may persist therein, without pre∣judice to his upright heart, at least-ways for a time.

I speak of the Courts of the worst Princes; for to live in the Court of a wise Prince, that loves honest and vertuous men, the difficulty is not so great. In times past, good men did not always undergo Publique employments with a desire of doing service to their Coun∣try, so much as meerly to keep wicked and corrupt men out of those charges: And for the same reasons, ought they to seek access unto Tyrannical, and voluptuous Princes; to the end, That if they durst not directly, at least obliquely, and as much as in them lay, they might impede the evil, and pernici∣ous Counsels of the Prince; either by fra∣ming delays, and contriving difficulties in his way, or by offering unto him more milde and plausible resolutions.

Burrhus and Seneca, who according to the rate of those times, were accounted not onely good Courtiers, but vertuous men also; when being made Governors of Nero's youth,

they observed the humor of this Prince apt and prone to lust and pleasure; lest he should break out to the rapes of the Noblest Women, they permitted him a Mistris, where∣by for a time they kept him in order: Who took into his familiarity Annaeus Serenus for a cloak unto his lust, Who faining to be in love with this freed Woman, did openly own those gifts to be his (saith Tacitus Annal 13.) which the Prince in private bestowed upon her. This must a good man do, who not being able to master the luxury, liberty, and perversness of the Prince, must at least divert them, and bend them other ways, whence there is least danger like to arise, either to the publike, or the Princes honor.

CHAP. 6.

The scarcity and Condition of honest men, in corrupt and vitious Courts; The swarms of ill men, and their Arts of ingratiating themselves.

PErhaps some one will say, that it seldom falls out, that a Tyrant or a dissolute Prince, will take into his favor an honest man; I do not deny but it is very rare, but

yet I must affirm there are few Princes Courts in which there are not some good me•• found; if not cal'd thither by the Prince▪ at least drawn thither by their own desire of doing good to others, and infringing the power of evil men: Who stand their ground there to that end, through the assistance o•• the best disposed Courtiers, and through the friendship and patronage of some Great man, observing carefully there, that wholesome rule of Lepidus, whom Tacitus (Annal. 4.) brings for an example of a good and wise Courtier, who neither with an unseasonable Contumacy did exasperate the Prince, nor with a sordid flattery sooth him in his vices. The same Tacitus for these reasons com∣mends Capito and Labeo. That age (saith he) had at once two Ornaments of peace; But Labeo was of a more incorrupted liberty, and therefore more esteemed, whilest Capito's pleasing humor was more acceptable to the great ones.

I do not deny, but a Courtiers life will be far more dificult to an honest man then to another; But withall I must affirm, that the advantage of Glory and content of Minde that will arise from thence, will much re∣compence the trouble of it. Since that, if he carry himself wisely and accommodate him∣self to those things that he sees, he cannot change nor overcome; I dare say, he will at last become acceptable to the worst of

Princes, and dearer then others that are of a worse repute; who seldom manage the Princes business with a due fidelity and care; or at least not equal to that he might easily promise to himself from the hands of a vertuous and honest man. And hither tends the Counsel of Salust and Mecaen••s, whereby the first recommended to Julius Caesar, and the latter to Augustus, the choice and friendship of Good men. Because con∣science and care of their reputation re∣strains these more powerfully from disho∣nest things, then the fear of punishment, or the want of power doth others.

But as I have said, the vicious are always in Court in greater thrungs; who chiefly by two ways do ingratiate themselves with the Prince first by flattering and fulfilling whatever he shall please to command; and that by so much the more servilely, by how much the more their hopes of gain are grea∣ter. Next for that, Princes are pleased to have those about them in comparison of whom, themselves, though bad God knows, seem to be good. Some there are that think al∣so their lives more secure in the company of those that are most like unto themselves. Dionysius the Tyrant, being requested to ex∣pel out of his Court one, who for his villany was hated by all men, answered, No, he would keep him, lest otherwise he himself should

become the most hateful person in the Court. It is natural to those who finde themselves ob∣noxious to any vice, by comparing them∣selves to those that are worse, to seek to purchase to themselves some shew of pro∣bity; And it hath been an old trick of Prin∣ces, on purpose to choose unlikely Successors to the end, their own acts and vertues migh•• appear better and more illustrious: Fo•• Tacitus is of opinion, that for no other rea∣son did Augustus adopt Tiberius, whose arro∣gance and cruelty he knew full well; no•• Tiberius choose Caligula.

It is principally necessary, that a good man be very sober and circumspect in hi•• discourse; for Princes seldom or never love an unwary and careless liberty in any kinde of men, how vertuous soever they be. Nei∣ther did Plato's freedom with Dionysius suc∣ceed well, for therefore was he delivered up to a needy Marriner, and sent to be sold in the Ile of Creet; whence being redeemed by certain Philosophers, he was admonished either to abstain wholly from the conversation of Princes, or to speak plausible things: With the like advices did Aristotle furnish his Co∣zen Callisthenes, then going to attend upon Alexander, to wit, That he should very seldom speak, and then never but pleasing things, to him upon whose Tongues-end lay the dsposall of his life.

CHAP. 7.

Whom, when, and how we ought to flat∣ter; the nature of a free and tolerable flattery, and the necessity of it in Court.

THough it be inconsistent with the strictest rules of Morality and Vertue, yet of necessity, if you live in Court, you must sometimes so flatter the Prince as may gain him unto you. But all maner of flattery is not tolerable, a base and servile one was displeasing even to Tiberius himself, of whom it is written by Tacitus, Annal. 3. that go∣ing out of the Senate he was once heard to say of those flattering Senators in Greek; O men born to slavery. There are circum∣stances wherein flattery used, is as prejudici∣all, as when it is wholly omitted; For it happens often, that he whom we flatter too grosly, suspects deceipt. It is requisite still that flattery have something of truth, and some show of liberty mixed with it, (it is the opinion of Aeschines and Plutarch) whereby we may perswade not onely the Prince, that we speak heartily, and as we think, but others also, and so preserve our Credit.

Craesus, who whilest he was a King him∣self, had learnt well the humor of Kings, and what would either please or displease them: When upon a time Cambyses, King of the Per∣sians, demanded of those that were about him, What they thought of him in Comparison of his Father Cyrus: They all affirmed, That he was greater then Cyrus, as who unto his Fathers Kingdoms had added Egypt, and the dominion of the Sea. When Craesus (then a Captive) came to speak, he affirmed, That he was much inferior to his Father, by reason that he had as yet begotten none equal to himself. This answer had some taste of freedom, and therfore was more pleasing to Cambyses vanity, then all the rest had said.

That flattery is very notable of Valerius Messala, recorded by Tacitus Annal. 1. Messa∣la Valerius added, That it was convenient the Oath of Allegiance should every yeer be renewed in Tiberius name; who being demanded by Ti∣berius, whether he had any commandment from him to give that advice, he answered, That he spoke it of his own accord; and that in what concernd the Common-wealth, he would use no mans advice but his own, whatever the offence or danger were: Which was a wonderful un∣practised kinde of flattery.

Like unto this, is that which the same Author relates of Ateius Capito, Annal. 3. Lu∣cius Ennius, a Gentleman of Rome, was accused

of Treason for melting the Image of the Prince, and making it into Plate; Caesar commanded he should not be prosecuted for it: Ateius Ca∣pito, openly complained with a seeming liberty, that the power of determining in such a case ought not to be taken from the Senate, nor so great a Crime pass unpunished; and that he was slow in resenting his own, least he should also punish an injury done to the Common-wealth. It were easie to bring more examples of this kinde, but these are sufficient to instruct those up∣on whom there is imposed a necessity of flattering, that they may take heed, lest their flattery bring upon themselves, or o∣thers, any Private or Publick damage; it is sufficient that it be such as may sometimes satisfie thy Princes vanity.

CHAP. 8.

How to manage the Counsels of a Prince.

OUr Courtier ought to beware how he engages himself (though called) in the Counsel of a Proud and Violent Prince; for such as those do ask Counsel in no other sort, then as Xerxes did when he went to invade Greece: He called together the Prin∣ces of Asia, as it were to deliberate with

them about the Conduct of the War; b•••• they being come before him, he said, Le•• I should seem without your advice to a•• all things according to my own will; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 have called you my Lords to Counsel: ye•• I would have you know, that I expect here from you obedient minds, and not trouble∣some debates. Cambyses, the Predecessor o•• Xerxes, being about to Marry his Sister, de∣manded of his Counsellors, whether any Law of the Persians prohibited such a Mar∣riage; They perceiving the King did no•• ask this question, so much to resolve himsel•• of any doubt, as to sound the dispositions o•• the Nobles, answered, That truly there wa•• no love that warranted expresly this tha•• the King was about to do, but there wa•• one that affirmed, that whatever the King thought fit to do, was lawful. Thus out of the Humor of the Prince, and the Nature of the affair, we must first make a judgement, whether it be fit, or safe, when he asks ou•• Counsel, to deliver freely our opinions; o•• to humor him in his inclinations.

You have Royall examples of this already, I wil now bring you one of a man, who though he were not a King, yet bore the Office of a King; not above an Age agoe in Spain: Ferdinand being dead, the Pope and Maximi∣lian the Emperor, exhorted, Charls of Austria then in Flanders to take upon him the title

of King of Spain; although his Mother Ione, Ferdinands daughter were still living, but wholly unfit for Government, by reason of her want of health. The States were here∣upon assembled, and before them Cardinal Ximenes, to excuse the novelty of the thing, discoursed excellently of the reasons of what was done. The Grandees more obser∣vant of ancient customes, and the Queen, then was fit against a King that was short∣ly to succeed of Course; Protested very ob∣stinately against it. Ximenes being angry, rises up and tels them, the thing that was trea∣ted of, was not to be called in queston; neither was there any need of their ndvice in the case: That Kings being to enter upon their Kingdoms, are not to expect the consent of their Subjects; that they who were assembled, were not called out of any necessity, but that they might have ••ccasion by the Promptitude of their suffrages to endear their Prince unto them. But since they inter∣preted that as a due, which was onely a favor, they should see that without their approbation he would proclaim King Charls at Madrid; which example all the rest of the Cities quickly followed.

Such a maner of proceeding, not onely in these cases, but in all others in a maner do Princes use; scarce asking any mans ad∣vice, but either to the end they may Coun∣tenance their own resolutions with the con∣sent

of many, or else to discover the dispo∣sition of the person they advise withal, as Tacitus witnesseth that Tiberius oft did. The Courtier must therefore sollicitously sift into the Princes Mind, lest otherwise he should chance to give offensive Counsel. If the Princes inclination in the thing debated be doubtful unto him, let him seem to discuss the matter, and so laying down arguments both for the one, and the other side, let him leave the Prince to his own election: Who (if the thing advised of, be not unalterably resolved upon already) having heard the reasons that may be brought against it, if he be discreet, will change his Minde.

Neither in this case will there be any ground for that bashfulness (of blushing, to seem so much inferior to any body, as to fol∣low their Counsel) which though it be ve∣ry hurtful and unbecoming unto them, is ve∣ry familiar amongst great men; for having said what you can, you leave the freedom of determining all to the Princes prudence, whereby you will also avoid the danger that many times Counsellors are obnoxious unto, if their advices succeed ill. And if the Prince following his first resolutions meet not with success, he will by so much the more acknowledge and esteem the prudence of that Courtier, who foresaw the approaching misfortune, when it was yet avoidable.

If you be prest to deliver your opinion in ••n unlawful matter, either seek some pre∣••ence of delay, or else intreat that some third person may be called for the better discussing of the business; whereby the case being more maturely weighed, it may appear what is most for the dignity and safety of the Prince. By this means Burrhus defeated Neroes first attempt against his Mo∣thers life; Promising that himself would kill her if she were found guilty; But since it was afforded unto every other person, a trial could not be denied unto his Mother. Whilest the ex∣aminations are taking, Nero's fury asswages, and his fears grow less, so that his determi∣nation, though it was not quite altered, yet it was laid aside to another time.

But this manner of proceeding takes not place upon all occasions, being proper only in desperate and ambiguous cases. More∣over, before we adventure upon it, we ought to know, whether the nature of the Prince is compatible with delays: for there are some so headlong and impatient, that there is no means more certain of incur∣ring their displeasure, then by using de∣lays.

CHAP. 9.

The sudden resolutions of Princes, ho•• to be moderated.

WHen as it often falls out, our advi•••• is not asked in the resolution, bu•• for the maner of execution of what is resol∣ved upon already; if the business do seem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 consistent with reason and honesty, we mu•••• propose the remotest means we can think 〈◊〉〈◊〉 for the effecting of it; and countenance th•••• our advice with the pretences of facility equity, and security; shewing withal, tha•• sudden undertakings, are full of hazard and difficulty. When we have to do wi•••• those impatient kinde of Princes, we ough•• to be ready, and have always our Wits a∣bout us for these sudden occasions, an•• then if they be not unsufferably rash and wilful, no doubt but they will follow the course which we shall demonstrate to b•• most safe and easie: Yet if their madness be such, that they will not hear milde and gen∣tle Counsels, his adviser may yet excuse th•••• his wary prudence with a Care and Affecti∣on to the Prince; desiring rather, that things should be done slowly with security, the•• rashly with the ruine of his Master.

Now if so be, that in that headlong course that the Prince hath wilfully chosen, diffi∣culties

or straits do occur, he will much more reflect upon the prudence of him that would have disswaded him in time, and per∣haps for the future, be willing to hearken to him, propounding milder ways. Besides this gaining of time doth frequently afford subject of moderating the Princes passion, and of bridling his desires, or else of let∣ting him see, that what he is about is either wholly impossible, or else cannot be effected without great absurdity.

For it after happens, that the ways which Princes propose unto themselves, are accom∣panied with such circumstances of difficul∣ty, as are not to be overcome; and to these kinde of straits, as I would not have you ex∣hort him, so I would not have you too much disswade him from them, (rather suf∣fer him with a respective silence to take his own course, least you disswading out of these difficult ways, he seek out some more easie one of compassing his will;) which o∣therwise having toild himself out of breath amongst the Obstacles that he met with, he would voluntarily give the business over. But sometimes it falls out that Princes com∣mit the execution of some Wickedness or Injustice to an honest man: In which case truly (though all good men ought to suffer any violence or misfortune rather then con∣sent to be made the Minister of villany) I

fear the number of these is very few that are so generously resolved, as by a passive diso∣bedience to expose themselves to the sacri∣fice for another; especially if the occasion offered, and the nature of the Prince admits of no denial, or excuse, nor affords any way of casting that displeasing imployment upon some third person.

Which later course Burrhus took, Nero re∣solving the second time upon his Mothers murther, full of so much the more care and eagerness, by how much the danger of her contrived Shipwrack in the Tyher had pro∣duced no other effect, then that the Woman always before malicious and greedy of re∣venge, was after so great an injury become more inraged then ever. Burrhus and Se∣neca, being call'd to Counsel, stood long ambiguous and doubtful what to say, as Ta∣citus reports Annal. 14. saying: They were both of them a long time silent, fearing lest they disswade in vain; At last Seneca hitherto the forwarder man, cast his eye upon Burrhus, as if he would have asked, whether the execution of that Murther should not be left to the Soldiers; Burrhus prevented him with an answer, and sayes that the Pretorian Bands were all devo∣ted to Caesars house, and so mindful of Germa∣nicus, that they would act nothing of cruelty a∣gainst his Progeny; and therefore that Anice∣cetus should perform his promise. So he freed

both himself and his soldiers, from the ex∣ecution of that ugly act.

I confess, he is not beholding unto you, whom, to save your self innocent, you shall intangle in such an imployment: But should such an occasion happen, I think it fitter that some such man as Anicetus was, should undergo the infamy of such an act, then any vertuous or honest man.

Yet the safest way of all is in time to fore∣see, and in their birth to prevent, and occur to the unjust desires, and the unlawful de∣signs of the Prince; and before they either take Root, or appear above Ground, to suppress and pull them up. There are many, who with seasonable and gentle admonitions, and silken words, as Parisates calls them, have done much good, and had wonder∣ful success in these cases; yet it is necessary, that whosoever would use such remedies as these be of great authority with the Prince, who, must hear as much out of reverence as love: And nevertheless, when all is done, though it may succeed well in this or that case, it will hardly do so in all. I am much pleased with the way of those men, who are of a conceited and pleasant humor, and for that faculty, acceptable with the Prince; who as it were, intending something else, with a fit similitude, or a well chosen story, will represent unto the Prince the danger,

and foulness of those Counsels, wherewith he seems to be carried headlong away.

But to do this, there is a great nimbleness of wit, and pleasantness of discourse requi∣red; besides, they must take heed the Prince smell not out, that himself is the argument of the jest. As Tiberius, who in the Tragedy of Atreus, composed by Scaurus, believed he was reproached of his Brothers murther; and Domitian, in that which Helvidius had writ of Paris and Cenon, thought himself upbraid∣ed with his divorces: Wherefore it is necessa∣ry, that these kinde of stories be skilfully interwoven amongst other things, not squa∣ring or applyable to the Prince; and it is very pertinent to this purpose, That they take care not to inculcate too plainly, that mat∣ter which makes most to the purpose; though, least it should quite escape the Prin∣ces observation, it may be, as it were, by a casual repetition i••erated. The conceit and continuance of the story, by how much the greater, and more cheerful it is, by so much the more it will imprint those things that are said; and because they seem to come by chance, not of purpose, or design, they will not distast the ticklish ear of the Prince.

For this kinde of moderation, whereby you may neither contribute to the Princes vices, nor in vain resist them; there are many critical times, and means, which

those that attend upon the persons, and are Employed in the affairs of Princes, cannot but meet with. If so be that the case be such, that you must needs contradict the disposition and inclination of the Prince, you must seek out some other passion or humor in him, whereunto he is equally inclined, and so beget a strife and contention in the Princes minde; but we must carefully pretend still, that what we say, comes from the duty and reverence that we bear him. By this means did Mutianus keep Domitian in orde, and hinder him from joyning with Cerealis, as (out of what hopes, I know not) he was about to do, says Tacitus, Hist. 4.

CHAP. 10.

The several natures, and tempers of Princes, how to be handled; with the art of Courtiers in introducing their Companions.

YEt to do these things successfully, it doth much conduce, that we know the inclinations of our Princes, which de∣pend upon the natural temperature of their Bodies. The difference and variety of

which is common to them with other men; except, that as they are more powerful then others, so they are less masters of their affecti∣ons and inclinations; which are for the most part, more violent and more unreasonable in them, then in meaner persons.

He, in whom Choler rules, is, Hasty, Proud, and prone to Anger; a lover of Ceremony, and Respect; a sore enemy to those that are but in the least sort refractory; impatient in execution, and rash in resolution; a con∣temner of all mens opinions, that differ from his own; very apt to commit injuries, yet soon friends with those he hath wrong∣ed, if they renew not the memory of passed enmities; but a hater of those that rip up old offences, and to the end, he may prevent such as he is afraid of, watching all occasi∣ons of doing them a greater mischief.

Whoever hath to do with such a Prince, must always have his eyes and ears open, that he may readily understand and obey the first beck, without making any reply or delay, least by contradiction the Prince come to suspect him of arrogance, as one that would seem to think himself wiser then he; let him not stick to submit himself to the low∣est kinde of imployments, if need be, though they suit not with his condition. He must be patient of injuries, and no ways mindful of them; but after a wrong, so much the more

officious: He must not brag of his merits, least he should seem to reproach the Prince with them; but rather heap services upon services, least the memory of those that are past should wear out, and to the end, the pleasure and gratefulness of fresh ones, may revive the remembrance of the old. When the Prince is angry, let him not come near him, for all things displease him then; nèi∣ther are those that are dearest unto him, grateful in any thing they can devise, to say or do. Familiarity with such humors as these, turns into contempt; which for that reason, although the Prince invite us to it, is to be avoided: Let all things rather tend to modesty and respect. For these Lyons, though sometimes they be meek and gentle, are at other times enraged against those they love best, and who are in most authority with them.

They that are of a Sanguine Constitution, are for the most part of a pleasant humor, lovers of mirth, and recreation; flying sad∣ness, the seriousness of business, and trouble of debates, lovers of peace, leaving the ad∣ministration of their affairs to others, in whom they suffer nothing more unwilling∣ly, then complaints. They are courteous, gentle, and free, if not from all, at least, from any grievous injuries; more mindful of benefits received from others, then done by

themselves▪ complacent, willing to help, and for the most part liberal.

He that lives with such as these, must omit no circumstances of veneration and re∣spect, but very seldom must they treat of business, or serious affairs. Those that are im∣ployed in the greatest, and most important Offices, and concernments of the Kingdom, ought not to come near these Princes, be∣fore they be either called, or certain that the Prince is not engaged in any recreation; least otherwise, they should interrupt him in his greatest delights, and make him blush to be surprised by those, who, he may appre∣hend, are secretly angry, to see him no better entertained. For so when Philip of Mace∣don, was once at play, it was told him, That Antipater was at the door, who pre∣sently troubled, and conscious of his trans∣gression, hid his dice under his Pillow; blushing, that Antipater should catch him at that sport. Therefore with such a Prince, as those that manage the greatest affairs of the Kingdom, in serious and weighty trusts do exceed others; so also are they out-gone by others, in a familiar and free access to the Princes person; who naturally avoids these kinde of serious men, as much as may be. Those men that are of a jovial and well tempered disposition, and capable as well of pleasure, as of business, are chie••ly

acceptable to these kinde of Princes. Pro∣vided, That whilst they are out of the Princes sight, they do not with too much facility and complacence, loose their authority with others; but they must preserve the ho∣nor of their rank intire, for without that (as the Proverh says) Familiarity breeds con∣tempt, and contempt gives encouragement to quarrels, upon the first appearance of an injury: Which the Prince being an enemy to trouble and strife, to free himself of, will endeavor to remove him that shall appear most faulty.

A Melancholly Prince is slow in his Coun∣sels, anxious, thoughtful, diffident, jealous, witty, and for the most part peevish; given to silence, and when he speaks, involving himself in ambiguous words, a dissembler, apt rather to sound other mens opinions, then deliver his own; an enemy of jests, and free∣dom; a lover of solitude, difficult of access, a friend to few, and to those but coldly; prone to hatred, out of diffi••ence, an insepa∣rable companion unto him; covetuous and fearful, even to absurdity; one that hates equally those that he hath offended, with those that have offended him; implacably greedy of revenge, and whom, though re∣conciled unto you, you ought to be jea∣lous of.

With these kinde of dispositions, we

cannot deal with too much wariness and circumspection; principally we must take care of our Tongues, and call, as it were, a counsel upon every thing we say; to the end, we may speak nothing strange or offen∣sive, nor indeed, scarce at all, unless we be called upon: In our respect, we must ra∣ther exceed, then fall short, and altogether abstain from contradiction, without pressing him, when he demurs in his Counsels, least his melancholly once kindled in choler, never quench till it convert to hatred. In our demands, we must not be importunate, when we see him deny us readily; for it is not convenient to accustom the Prince, to give us repulses, especially such a Prince, who being by his nature prone to ill suspi∣cions, will think that man his enemy, that he hath given a refusal unto; neither will you easily afterward, by any skill, take this apprehension out of him; for with such, the memory of an in••ury endures long; and measuring others by themselves, they believe all men as malicious, and as obstinate in their hatred, as they. In short, these kinde of men are the worst, and most difficult of all others; and whose temper, by reason of the variety of cloudy thoughts, that hover in their dark imaginations, is most unequal; which makes their conversation exceeding troublesome.

The Phlegmatick Prince participates of the heaviness and slowness of the melan∣cholly; but as in understanding, so in peevish∣ness and disturst, is inferior to him; for his heart is, as it were, congealed with cold; and hence it comes to pass, that he is diffident of none so much, as of himself; fearing to un∣dertake great matters, because he despairs of the success, and knows not how to go about it. He is doubtful in his Counsels, fearful in Execution, not of a quick capacity; and as his hate is not great, so his love is not vehement.

To supply the heaviness of these Princes, an active and ready Minister is necessary. When the Prince hath once found him cap∣able to effect those things, that himself thought desperate, discovering the weak∣ness of his own wit; he loves, admires, and cherishes this man, as necessary unto him. And that kinde of favor, which leans upon the opinion of such a necessity, is of all others most durable. Which our Courtier once ob∣serving, let him make it his business to bring to a prosperous issue, those businesses that seemed most difficult, and from which, the Prince expected little or no success; as it was the constant practise of that great Minister of France, Cardinal Richeleiu, who always kept the King intangled in such dangerous undertakings, That if he would,

he knew not how to be without him.

Let our Courtier also, if it can be so con∣trived, compass these things, and execute the most material part of his business him∣self alone, taking heed, however he do, that he take not to his assistance, a helper or companion, more habile and dexterous, then himself: Withal, let him beware he be not too long absent from Court, least he chance to loose the Prince, who if he shall once finde one more able or useful then him, he will be either less valued, or at least be held less necessary; and so being laid aside once or twice, in imployments that shall succeed in other hands, will at last fall into contempt.

Wherefore it is an old art of Courtiers, not to take unto themselves any Companions, but such as in Vertue and Prudence they shall much excel, to the end, that in comparison of these, their own lustre may so much the more appear, and that the Prince being sur∣rounded with such as these, may not easily know where to finde one, whom he may either prefer or oppose unto the introducer of these. Moreover, these grosser souls, as often as he hath need of them, to whom they do now their present, and may ow their juture advancement, are easie and ob∣noxious to be debau••hed by him, and ready for corruption, which he cannot easily ex∣pect

from one that is his equal in condition, or in parts, and who stands upon his own legs. These are the several kindes of humane inclinations, whereunto Princes are no less subject then other men, inclining now to this, and then to that side, according to the prevalence of this or that temperature in them.

CHAP. 11.

That Age, Business, Custom, and Sick∣ness, alter the temper of the Bodies, and Constitution of the Mindes of Princes.

NOtwithstanding that for the most part hings are thus, yet these rules are not infallible and without exception; for Age, Custom, and Business, alters the temper of the Bodies, yea, and the Inclinations and Acti∣ons of Princes. In the time of war, the Prince cherishes Military men, but peace be∣ing returned into his Kingdom, the Authority and Interest of these men doth soon wax old; and then, if the Prince inclines to pleasure, or any other affection, he will be

apt to save those that can serve or further him in it.

See what Tacitus writes of Tiberius, An∣nal. 6. He changed his maners strangely with the times, whilest he was a private man, and under Augustus his Government, both his life and maners were of good repute; as long as Ger∣manicus and Drusus lived, he was close and crafty in counterfeiting vertue; as long as his Mother was alive, he kept a mean betwixt Ver∣tue and Vice: For cruelty he was infamous, but for his Lusts as long as he either loved or feared Sejanus, secret. But in the end, he burst out into all wickedne••s and dishonesty, and cast∣ing away both fear and shame, he suffered him∣self to be carried wholly by his vicious Inclina∣tions.

Of Caligula, this judgement of Passienus is very notable; There was never a better Servant, nor a worse Master. It is almost in∣credible, what variety of dispositions were found in Marius and Sylla; so that Plutarch doubts, whether Fortune wrought this change in their Natures, or onely brought to light what before of wickedness lay con∣cealed in them. In which case, if I should speak my opinion, I would declare, I thought they did not change their Natures; but onely pull of those Masks, that fear and a narrow Fortune had muffled them withal. Just as Leontius said of Zeno, That a Serpent

frozen with cold, hurts not; but warm'd by the fire, thrusts forth his sting.

Tryphon, as Josephus witnesses, whilest he led a private life, to win upon the people, did personate a good man; but being made a King, he threw of his disguises, and quickly let them see, that all that vertue which ap∣peared in him, was forced and counterfeit: And that of Agamemnon is not much unlike, if what Euripedes writes of him be true; he was modest, affable, and easie of access, be∣fore he was chosen Generalissimo of the Greeks. But after that election, he became an enemy to his friends, and inaccessible to all, in keeping himself shut up, whereby he became so distastful, that the Precept the Poet gives upon this occasion, is worth re∣cording.

These men are wise, that great advancement gain, And still their ancient modesty retain.

An excellent sentence, but observed by few. Pollio truly seemed to follow it, if we may believe Seneca. Afterwards (saith he) be∣ing promoted to the highest degrees of honor, he, never corrupted by any occasion, deviated a whit, from his former modesty, temperance, and civili∣ty: He was never pufft up with prosperity, nor with the variety of business was he so disorder∣ed, as that any one could surprize him in a humor,

derogating from the reputation he had gained before.

For truly, the defects and blemishes of Princes and Courtiers, proceed for the most part out of Pride, the inseparable hand∣maid of greatness. This is that makes them despise other mens counsels, being vainly perswaded, that they do excel other men, as much in Prudence, as they do in Power. And some are so carried away with this stream, that they think it below them to keep within the limits of Law or Reason; believing they cannot be Princes, to whom all things are not lawful, they have a minde unto, according to that of the Poet.

Vertue, Truth, Faith, such private things as these, Are not for Kings, they must do what they please.

But if these kinde of opinions did onely corrupt the weakest, and worst of Princes, I should wonder the less; but I see the mindes of the best men to be blinded also with the witchcraft of Power and Rule. No man ever yet exceeded the Seven Sages of Greece, in giving Precepts of modesty; nor ever were there worse Tyrants, then such of them as came to Government. Appianus be∣ing to speak of Aristo, reckoned up not a few that bore the name of Philosophers, that had plaid the Tyrants at Athens; naming

also some of the very Pythagoreans, who being called to Government in Italy, did exceedingly abuse their power; which makes me doubt much, whether most of those Philosophers, who so proudly contemn honors and dignity, do it in good earnest, or not rather for a cloak and cover to their small deserts, their poverty and idleness. Sure∣ly, if we will believe Aristophanes, they did not live so frugally and neerly, so much out of vertue, as necessity; and would not refuse to feast plentifully, when ever they were invited.

CHAP. 12.

How much Impostors are able to do by flattering Princes; and how a Prince is to beware of them.

THere are oftentimes Impostors, who with flatteries, and hidden sly suggestions, creep into the Princes bosom, and corrupt their nature; To these kinde of men, doth Tacitus impute the pride and cruelty of Vitel∣lius. Vespasian, who was of a gentle nature, learnt from these people to oppress his subjects with heavy Tributes, as the same Tacitus

affirms: In short, it is certain, that many who have used the service of these kinde of men, have sadly degenerated. These Im∣postors seek favor unto themselves, by show∣ing the Prince ways to Greatness, Power, and Profit; who by so much the more willingly doth hearken to them, by how much the less he understands himself. He poor man, not reflecting, nor observing that these men praise and sooth him; to the end, they may at last betray him to contempt, and expose him to the hatred of his people. And truly, to humor and comply with the Cruelty, Co∣vetousness, and Lust of a Prince, is of all others, the securest way to betray him, for he cannot condemn the Traytor, without discovering his own guilt and vices.

The Franconians, by the help of Aegidius, at that time governing in Gaul for the Ro∣mans, had expelled Clodius Comatus out of his Kingdom, whom one of his friends desiring to see restored, goes over to Aegi∣dius, and fostered upon all occasions, as much as in him lay, the Avarice, and Cruel∣ty of the man, which was but too notori∣ous before; whence the injuries of this Roman growing insufferable, the Franconi∣ans begin to wish for their King again, and at last recal him to his Kingdom. Thus this honest Franconian made good use of his flattery, and by feeding him in his own vices,

betrayed his Masters enemies. Sejanus, who gaped after the Roman Empire, see what arts he used: After he saw that Tiberius, who by his instinct had imprisoned Agrip∣pina, and her children, grew weary of the City; spur'd that inclination on, hoping, that when the Prince was once retired, the Trust and Government of the Empire should be cast upon him, as indeed it came to pass; so that for a time, Tiberius was onely Lord of a little Island, and Sejanus Emperor. Perrennius also thirsting after the Empire, first circumvented and made away all those that stood in his light, under pretence of a conspiracy, that Lucilla had contrived against Commodus; and then intices the Emperor to pleasures, whereby he himself might come to the managing of all things, and at last attain unto the Empire.

The same way took Bardas, Uncle to Mi∣chael, Emperor of Constantinople, who having taken away Theoctistus, his Associate and Tutor to the young Prince, contrived also his Mothers banishment; perswading Mi∣chael to take the Government into his own hands; whose yong years incapable of rule, he soon diverted to delights, and plea∣sure; so as he gave himself wholly to these entertainments, and intended nothing e••••e: Bardas, in the mean time, fishes eagerly after the love of the people, and to that end,

converses with good and learned men, restored learning in the City, and made many good Laws; by which means, he would doubt∣less, have slept at last into the Imperial Throne, if another had not prevented him. I do not bring these examples, that I may teach how Princes are to be circum••ented, but that I would have Princes themselves learn hence, what Prudence and Caution is necessary for them to discern, and distinguish the Counsels of their Ministers; and cheifly, that they may beware of those who are apt to sooth them in, and applaud their Lusts and Vices; and learn to think well of such, as will sometimes modestly adventure to ex∣press their dislikes of their excesses.

CHAP. 13.

Of the Familiars and Servants of the Prince, and the ways to win them.

HAving considered all things, that our Courtiers was to observe in the Prince himself, let us come to his Servants, who by reason of the Offices they bear, are con∣tinually about his person, and may be useful to those that pretend at Court, either by procuring them extraordinary accesses, or by

making seasonable mention of them, or by instructing them of the ways, times, and occasions of doing their business. There are many Princes, who being private, put on a quite other face, then that they bear in pub∣lique; and who more willingly do trust and disclose their thoughts, to such of their Ser∣vants, as they think faithful to them, esteem∣ing the lowness of their condition incapable of treachery, or wicked practises: Who does not know, that Claudius was governed by his Freedmen, one of which, called Pallas, he had so inriched, That upon a time com∣plaining of Poverty to some body, he was advised to get Pallas adopt him for his Heir. By this mans perswasion, Claudius married Agrippina, after by the help of Narcissus (a freedman also) he had destroyed Messa∣lina?

Who can be ignorant, that during the continuance of the Eastern Empire, the Eunuches many times governed all? if that had not been so, it had been impossible for Arbetio, the cheif Ruler of the Empire, to have escaped with life, when Verissimus ac∣cused him. Borilus and Germanus, two slaves, by the absolute authority they had with Botoniates, one of the Emperors, made him an enemy to Isacius, and Alexius Comnenis.

Yet let us suppose, That the Prince does not impart his Counsels to these men, they

are more easily pryed into by these, then any others: For it cannot be, that Princes al∣ways wear their Masks in private, often∣times the throng, and a publike life, makes him suppress and hide those affections, which when he is at liberty, and in private, do break out. Wherefore, I conclude, it is very necessary in Courts, To think all kinde of men, even the meanest, useful unto you. And we must believe for certain, That together with their Authority and Fortune, their pru∣dence and discretion, will grow up; which Arrian demonstrates to Epictetus in Epaphro∣ditus, and his two slaves; The one of which coming to wait upon the Emperor at his Stool, and the other to have the charge of his Shoes; Epaphroditus himself, who had sold them not long before as unuseful, sought now their Favor, and praised their Pru∣dence.

Fortune hath never scarce been so favor∣able to any one in Court, as not to afford him as many enemies as friends; neither hath it ever yet cast any man so low there, as that he was neither able to hurt, nor help an∣other: Whence it was, that in the time of Tiberius, as Tacitus says, It was a great honor to be known to Sejanus his Door-keepers. It will therefore be a wisemans part, by all becoming ways, to endear the Servants of the Prince, whatever their condition be.

CHAP. 14.

Four kindes of Noble Courtiers; how to be handled, and made use of; how warily we ought to deal with inconstant Princes.

FRom the Princes Servants, we come to the Nobles of the Court, which are of sundry kindes: There are some illustrious for their birth, but destitute of the Princes favor; others in favor with the Prince, but not laden with honors; a third sort, that have honors and offices, far exceeding their Interest and Favor; and lastly, Those who flourish both in Favor, and great Imployments. The friendship of the first of these, will perhaps avail our Courtier very little, who are nevertheless to be honor∣ed and respected, according to their quality; least, though they cannot hurt you them∣selves, by their friends and followers, they should do it: For in such Trains of defen∣dancies and followers, great Families are often very powerful, either by reason of old benefits, or reverence to their greatness; or lastly, (since Princes mindes are mutable) out of respect to the Fortune and Favor these great men may yet chance to come into; with this, or the succeeding Prince.

Archelaus, King of Cappadocia, to his great

disadvantage, did neglect to Honor and Court Tiberius, when he came to Rhodes; for Tiberius afterwards meditating revenge, but pretending another cause, called him to Rome, where he perished miserably: Which respect nevertheless the Historian says, He omitted not out of pride, but for that he was warned by some of Augustus his Favorites, That whilst Cajus Caesar flourished, and was sent into the East, the Friendship of Tiberius seemed unsafe. We must look therefore up∣on these great men of Fortune, though not able to deserve well of us, yet powerful enough to hurt us: And though they be un∣acceptable and suspected by the Prince, we must yet reverence them, to avoid the blam of others, and their emnity.

If it chance, that the Prince will oppose you to one of these great ones, as it is usual with Princes to do; as you must not refuse the task, so you must with great art, dexteri∣ty, and choice of occasions, undertake it; taking care, that you may both satisfie the Prince, and justifie your endeavors to other men: It is an enterprize full of danger, but if at the Princes instance, it be taken in hand, it is the way to rise.

Yet after you are once ingaged in one of these Brigues, there are the choice of two ways to be taken, according to the nature of the Prince you act for, the persons you have

to do with, and the times you are in: Some men act all these things in their own name so boldly, and with so high a hand, That all kinde of men, except those that are great indeed, strike easily sail unto them, for fear of offending the Prince; who approves (as they believe) all these men say or do. There are others yet, that take another course more safe and sweet, by continually waiting upon the Prince, their interest, in whom they will make no shew of, but upon the best opportunities; neither will they take any occasion for these contentions, but such as with great choice they have selected, as both likely to succeed; and having took effect, to redound much to the advantage of the Prince and Publike.

For you must take great heed you under∣take nothing you cannot go through with; for besides that, the common people judge of all things by the event, believing still, that Justice and Prudence, are on the side that Fortune is; by ill successes, you will soon di∣minish the esteem and favor, you have with the Prince. For he to take away the dis∣grace received, and by reason, That he fears either to be despised of his Subjects, or con∣temned by his Enemies, whom he hath oppo∣sed in vain, will be compelled to remove his favor from, and abandon you.

Beware, that when I speak of your con∣tention

with these great persons, that you understand not, that I wish you to inter∣meddle, when you see it cannot be done without tumult, or that you should provoke them with contumelies and reproaches, for that becomes onely a base soul, whose judge∣ment is corrupted by Fortune: The end of which kinde of men is seldom happy; as is to be observed in Piso, whom Tiberius sent into Syria, to cross the hopes and designs of Germanicus; against whom, he carried him∣self so insolent••y, that when Prince Germani∣cus was dead, Caesar was compelled to sacri∣fice and abandon Piso to the publike hate.

When I advise you to oppose these great men, it is in cases onely, wherein they are to do something that is unjust, or against the Publike good, or Religion, or that is prejudi∣cial to the Government of the Army, or the Treasures of the Kingdom: In which occa∣sions, you must so comport your self with Prudence and Modesty, that all others that are concerned, and all honest men may per∣ceive, that what you do proceeds not out of any private emnity, but onely from your zeal to the Publike good. If you demand an example to imitate, behold Cardinal Xime∣nes, chosen by Isabelia, Queen of Castile, on purpose to tug with those Grandees, that were not so subject to the Kings pleasure, as they are now: Of a Franciscan Frier, he

was first made the Queens Confessor, after∣wards by the advice of Cardinal Mendoza, Archbishop of Toledo, and Inquisitor Gene∣ral of Spain; which Offices he bore with great authority, being there during the whole Reign of Isabella, and Ferdinand, and was even to the time of Charls the Fift, the sole Arbiter and Moderator of all Affairs; ever contending with the great ones, but so discreetly, That he always held both the Prince and people fast unto him.

It is reported that he was poysoned, and he himself suspected it, but the fact could never be proved. Wherefore it is better to attribute so late a death as his (for he was very old) to age and nature; and not with∣out reason, since he preserved his fortune and authority (both which he owed prin∣cipally to his own industry) entire unto his end. Chico Simoneta had not so good suc∣cess, who whilst Francis Sfortia ruled in Milan, was called to the helm of business, and afterwards chosen by yong Galeacius Mother, by reason of his known fidelity, and experience in Publike Affairs, to con∣tend with his Masters Brethren. He to pre∣serve the Dukedom for Galeacius, banished Galeacius Brothers, and Robert de St. Seve∣rin out of Milan, with how much envy you may imagine: Yet see how wickedly he was afterwards deserted, for the Widow,

Galeacius his Mother, reconciling her self with her adversaries, sacrificed Simoneta to their new friendship; by whom being cast into prison, and there flayed alive, he died miserably. Learn hence, how warily we must trust Princes, of whose steadiness we are not assured; for often upon a light oc∣casion, they are wont to prostitute their Servants to the will of their Enemies.

CHAP. 15.

The three other kindes of Noble Cour∣tiers; how they are to be dealt with.

THere are a second kinde of Noble▪ C••ur∣tiers (as I said before) who are in favor with the Prince, and yet not very eminent in any dignity or imployment. These though they can contribute nothing else unto us, may make our way unto the King, seasonable and easie, besides they may be useful in calling to minde our deserts, or if occasion require, in excusing our errors; protecting us also from the calumny and detractions of our Enemies; by which means, if they be real∣ly our Friends, they may serve us highly; as on the contrary side, if they be our foes, they may prejudice us exceedingly: Where∣fore

we must seek the friendship of these men, by all means, that are not unworthy our con∣dition; and we must consider, that they seldom stay any long time about a Prince, unexalted to honor: Nay, suppose that for some reason or other, they be not advanced, yet by their help and commendations, they do advance their friends, and lift them up above others, though either equal or superior to them in desert.

The third sort of Nobles, are those who are in great Offices of Authority, and have a great share in publike business, and yet have little interest in the Princes favor. And these kinde of men are chiefly found about such Princes, who live quietly, attending to their pleasures, mindless of Publike business, which they commit wholly to one or two of their tryed Servants, abhorring the trou∣ble that is attending it themselves. In such a Court as this, we must rather seek the Fa∣ver of these Ministers, then of the Prince himself; who since he trusts them with the administration of his Affairs, leaves also the choice of his Officers to these men, being himself unfit to chuse men for duties, which he knows nothing what belongs unto.

There are other Princes more jealous of their Majesty, and sparing in their Power; who though they intrust one or two with their Affairs, do seldom or never admit

those men to their Presence or Conversation, but when they are to treat of weighty busi∣ness; and do not leave the disposal of places to them, for fear that by the multitude of Creatures and Dependants, their power should swell to that height, that it cannot be abated, if they transgress. Wary Princes are wont to keep their Ministers in aw, and make them believe, That they can in a moment cast them from all their Authority, and di∣vest them of all that power, that with the services and labors of many years, they have been acquiring towards such persons as these; whose power is thus circumscribed, you will have a hard task, how to demean your self. Their friendship can avail you little, nay perhaps if the Prince observe it, it will do you hurt. Again, if they stand in your light, you will hardly come to the management of Affairs, and yet you must of necessity run the hazard of clashing oftentimes with them. Wherefore, a most circumspect gentleness of Nature will here be needful, for you must render them all the duties of respect, and as occasion presents it self (yet warily) ex∣press the inward devotion of your minde un∣to them: But in the mean while, without openly seeking to, or relying upon the Patron∣age of any other, you must your self, work out your way unto the Princes person, and his favor.

There remains now unspoke of onely the last kinde of Noblemen, who are in short, The Favorites, as being hoth highly in the Princes Favor, and great in the administration of Affairs: Which kinde of men, are to be honored with a respect almost equal to the Prince himself. Their wills and inclinations are to be pryed into, as being more necessary to be known and executed, then the Princes own. Here you see, what you may expect, or hope for, from the Authority and Patron∣age of the Peers, and Grandees of the Court; and how you may use each of them in his several degree and kinde.

Truly we must carefully take heed, that we ask nothing of either the Prince, or any of all these that is impossible, or cannot be effected without great absurdity; For nothing is more troublesome to humane nature, then not to be able to fulfil the requests of those we love; and surely, the friendliest and gentlest dispositions that are, will be offended with an uncivil and unreasonable suit. Know moreover, that he from whom you have received such a repulse, is not pleased with seeing you again, for fear lest with the im∣pudence of a like request, you should make him ashamed; and also, lest he should seem to want Authority or means to perform what you desire. But you must note by the way, that access unto the great ones, is not sudden∣ly

obtained, we must by degrees also gain that; and to this end, all that have any in∣terest in them, whether they be Strangers or Domesticks, and the Dependants of these (ac∣cording to their usefulness) are to be won unto you.

CHAP. 16.

The meaner sort of Courtiers, how they are to be handled; as also such as are enemies to us, for the sake of others, to whom we relate.

THere are yet in Courts below these great ones, others of a lower stage; some of which are our betters, others our equals, and some perhaps our inferiors; all which, since we are to make use of, we will divide into two kindes: The first, of those that may help and advantage us; the second, of those that are likely, or able to hurt us. The interest and power of both of them, is diligently to be weighed, to the end, we may gather what help or impediment we are to expect from them. We must consider also, their friendships and alliances, to the end, that if necessity press us to seek their votes for the

promotion of our designs, if they themselves are through envy or any such respect, back∣ward or averse unto us, we may work upon them by their friends and dependants: But we must be sure to take heed, that we do not then begin to seek their friendship, when we have apparent need of them, or their assistance; we ought to have it prepared long before, and assured unto us by the pledges of a long professed kindness, and good will. Let this suffice for the first sort, (to wit, of those that may help us) for e∣very mans industry will prompt him, How to insinuate with such, as he findes may be useful unto him.

Of the second sort (to wit) those that may hurt us, there are three kindes; either those that are our enemies, or those that envy us, or lastly, those that are our competitors. Those I call enemies that hate us for our own, or our friends sake; but this latter kinde of hatred, is not for the most part so in∣veterate and sharp as the first; and it may be mitigated much by our civilities and pro∣fessing, That we can love our friends, notwith∣standing our relations to their enemies: Yet the friendships of the Court are for the most part factious and cruel; compelling us to break off all friendship and familiarities that may bring us into suspicion: For which reason, many publikely pretending a friendship to

one, have notwithstanding complied under∣hand, and kept fair quarter with the adverse party; not out of design to betray their friend, but to the end, if he should chance to fall, they may finde a refuge and support. And truly, this care of our preservation may be sometimes blameless, but all kinde of treachery is unworthy an honest man.

This kinde of Prudence hath not onely been practised in the Brigues of the Court, but in Kingdomes also, and that very for∣tunately. Syenneses, President of Tharsus, when the War broke out between Cyrus and Artaxerxes, fearing to resist Cyrus, took his part in person, and sent his son to Artaxerxes, to the end, that if Cyrus were vanquished he might be a refuge to his Father. Bar••us Durus escaping out of the hands of the Saracens, where he was prisoner; seeing Phocas created Emperor against Basilius, applied himself to gain the friendship of Phocas, hitherto his enemy, and followed him; but caused his son, wi••h a contrived flight, to take part with Basilius, to the end, that if Phocas were vanquished, he might intercede for his Father, as it afterwards fell out. Solon made a law, That in case of a civil discord in the Commonwealth, none should be permitted to stand neuter; not in∣tending, I believe, that friends taking several sides, should break off their private friend∣ships,

but rather hoping that friends being severally engaged, could not but labor for the Publike peace, by so much the more eager∣ly, and with more su••cess.

After this maner in Court, a man though of a different faction, may yet discreetly, and without prejudice to integrity, retain his friendship with a man of another party; to the end, That he may both have a retreat in the change of Fortune, and that if their ani∣mosities should begin to asswage, he may be a fit instrument of reconciliation between the factions: Which is the safest and most com∣mendable way amongst the strifes and dis∣cords of great men; and the means of gain∣ing at last the favor of both the contending parties.

CHAP. 17.

How we are to treat with those Enemies that hate us for our own sakes; also concerning threats and injuries.

THose who hate us for our own sakes, do so either, because we have offended them, or else (as it is frequent from great men to∣wards their inferiors) because they have in∣jured us; and the Italian Proverb says, He

that offends, never forgives. It is a custom amongst mindes, puft up with a prosperous Fortune, to hate those themselves have wrong∣ed. The injuries that these kinde of men do us, are best remedied in our seeming not to understand them: But if it chance, that the greatness of the wrong, do wrest out of us some testimony of our sense of the injury received, we must quickly after our grief is over, seem to have lost the memory of all; otherwise, if they see us still impatiently suffer it, fearing our revenge, they will seek to prevent us with a greater mischief.

Cheifly we must beware of threats, if that we not ready, and sure to execute them; for threats do both warn our adversary to be∣ware, and provoke his hatred to double our in∣juries; affording us nothing but shame, in seeming to breathe revenge, but to be destitute of power. I know this kinde of moderati∣on will not be approved by all kinde of men, especially such as are greedy after vengeance; who think no injury is to be passed over without resentment, not onely by reason of the sweetness that is found in revenge; but also, because they say by suffer∣ing one injury, you invite another; where∣fore we must persecute those that offend us with an immortal hate: But these men whilst they desire to render themselves formidable, do effect nothing else but make all men flie

their Company. For since we mortals are Creatures prone to falls, and slips, and are carried away sometimes with affection, and at other times with passion; and in conside∣ration, every one for fear of offending, will flie from these kinde of malignant, rash, and revengeful persons; and as wilde beasts, leave them to their own solitude. Since, if any one offends one of them, he must expect all that rage and malice can afford at his hands; Lastly, if any one provoke one of the malicious Hot-spurs, he expecting a se∣vere resentment, and fearing a home revenge, will strive to be aforehand with him.

For this Reason therefore, for the avoid∣ing all these evils, I think the contrary way is to be chosen, and gentleness to be preferred; which truly, in the greatest injuries is not hard to be personated, when we consider the reasons and consequences of a passionate resent∣ment, and the condition of the persons from whom we receive them. In lighter injuries, that we see arise rather out of passion, then malice or design, we ought to be so little offended with them, that it may not be perceived we are sensible of them. If the injury is great and foul, we must not show our selves wholly careless of our esteem and reputation; yet without seeming too implaca∣ble towards them that provoked us, as they may have reason to think there is no hope of

a reconcilement, or place for pardon upon any reasonable satisfaction left them. And there∣fore it will be pertinent in this case to com∣plain unto his friends that hath injured us, of our wrongs, and to make them judge of our difference.

Injuries that are offered in a petulant in∣sulting humor, I think ought to be presently vindicated, not so much out of a desire of revenge, as for the chastisement of him that did them; and to teach him how to demean himself more modestly hereafter, as well towards others, as our selves. But these in∣juries also are not to be prosecuted with an inveterate hatred, nay, we ought to declare, that the necessity of complaint, and seeking revenge is put upon us, and that we are ready to be friends after a satisfaction given vs, that is any way compa••ible with the in∣jury we received. And if so be they give any secret testimonies of ••egret, or seek in the least maner unto us, we must return into favor with them, and by way of amends, let this suffice instead of a submission, That they profess they cannot want your friend∣ship.

CHAP. 18.

The injuries of the more and less power∣ful, how to be avoided, and hand∣led; the several artifices of recon∣ciliation.

BEcause these kindes of injuries are done, for the most part, by those that are much more powerful then our selves, and who have some way or other, great advantage of us: The first way to avoid them, is to treat these kinde of men respectively, and to avoid all freedoms as much as may be with them: Or if they be very cross and unruly, to flie their conversation altogether. This saying of Mar∣tial is in this case very notable.

Wouldst thou avoid what may displease? Or seek'st thou for content and ease? With no man be thou over free; As joyes, so griefs will fewer be.

The second way will be, as I said more then once before, to seem unsensible of the wrong; for it is neither safe nor prudent for us, to strive too much with one that is too powerful for us; and the inequality of our forces, will be a just pretence to excuse our dissimulation. I know there are some that are perswaded, That if we can but fright

our adversaries, they would soon seek unto us, and desire to be reconciled; and I do not deny, that there are some slie dispositions that will descend to do so; but believe me, it is always a dangerous, unsound, and faint re∣conciliation: And these will seldom or never omit (if an occasion of injury present it self) to give way to their disposition; which is by so much the more revengeful, by how much their dissembling was the tamer; besides, a private enemy is harder to be taken heed of, then one that is publikely so. It is better to have such as these, our professed enemies, then out of fear, our reconciled friends; yet I mean, those who are not greater then our selves, nor whose friendship being lost, can hurt us notably.

For if we have to do with one that is much superior to us, and whose emnities will stand in our light, it is better to have a fained friendship, then open emnity with him; though he offer us the wrong, yet we must endeavor by the mediation of friends to appease him, as if we had done the injury. To discern who is most able and likely to prejudice us, we must consider not onely their power, but also the nature of their malice towards us; for some have a desire of revenge, like a handmaid, always waiting upon their hate; others a fear, lest that ha∣ving got what we aspire unto, we should be

more able to hurt them. Though the sting of this revenge is very sharp, yet the fear I mentioned, is the most violent and frequent cause of our Court oppressions, and far the most unavoidable. The first may be miti∣gated with the satisfaction of a continued duty and respect; but you shall hardly ever perswade fear, to put on the confidence of friendship, and good will again; yet we must seek by all means possible to effect it: and occasion will better instruct us how to do it, then any rule can.

Agesilaus desiring to become friends with those that he had offended, did put them into great offices and imployments, which whilst they ill administred, bringing euvy (as is usual) upon them; being accused, they were compelled to have recourse unto the Prince; who delivering them from the danger and infamy, won them by the benefit, to be afterwards sincerely and heartily his friends. It is an ordinary thing in Courts to supplant one secretly, to the end, that being supported by your favor, he may become your Creature. It is no less frequent as Eu∣trapelus craftily practised in Horace, to lend those men money for to seed their lusts and vanities, whom we desire to ruine. So it proves, that for the most part, they who applaud us in our pleasures, our humors, and expences, and exhort us to undertake things

that are unreasonable, and above our strength, do seek our destruction.

But let us now return unto the ways of renewing our friendships with our Enemies. A∣mongst all which, it is none of the worst to help both with your Counsel and Assistance, the desires and endeavors of your Enemy, in such things as you see by succeeding will no∣thing hinder, nor prejudice you; to the end, he may seem to ow you his love, for your benefits. In this maner Cardinal Ascanius Sforza ob∣serving, That in vain he opposed himself to the practises of Julian the Cardinal, who labored to advance John, the Nephew of Alexander the Sixt, to that dignity; did so eagerly move in the business for John, that it succeeding, he got the start of Julian in his friendship. If the stubbornness of our Enemy be such, as that all our endeavors for a reconciliation are fruitless; we must at last look out, if there be any body else that he ha••es or fears more then he doth us, and let us fain this man (if the circumstances will bear it) to be a competitor to us, and him; to the end, That his hate towards the other prevailing, may induce him either to favor, or less oppose us in our designs.

An a••tifice not much unlike to this, was that which Gerla••hus Archbishop and E∣lector of Mentz used, when he intended to create Adolphus of Nassau, his Kinsman,

Emperor: He knew that those Princes that stood for the Empire, (for which a Governor was now a chusing) were divided amongst themselves; which discords and factions, he to make use of, dealt thus with the Electors severally apart. He tells Wenceslaus King of Bohemia, That the Votes of the Electors, for the most part, would favor Albert, Duke of Austria, Wenceslaus his Enemy: But if he were certain of Wenceslaus his concurrence, he was ready to hinder it. Having thus won Wenceslaus, he sets upon the Duke of Saxony, and tells him, That his Enemy Brunswick was like to carry it; and then assures the Palatine, That Wenceslaus (at that time hated by him) unless prevented, was like to defeat them all. So promising to op∣pose every mans Enemies, he circumven••ed them all; making by that means, his Kins∣man Emperor, who if he had been first pro∣pounded, had without doubt been rejected by the common consent of all.

CHAP. 19.

Of Envy, how it is to be overcome.

NOw I must say something of Envy, which is so great an evil, that we have need of a strange felicity, and fortitude to

overcome it; which is not to be satiated with any thing, but the participation of that which it envies in another; for every one eager after its own advantage, desires to toyl in nothing but that, whence if nor, the whole, at least a great share of the honor, and emolument will redound unto himself. Yet although, I confess, it be very hard, yet this envy is nevertheless with industry and prudence, to be mastered; and that not one∣ly by this means alone, of sharing with them, that very thing we seek for: For sometimes it will suffice to perswade them that envy us, That the thing they desire, if it chance to light upon us, will turn much to their honor and profit. To which end, we must court them with friendship and familiarity; and though their envy to us be very palpable, yet must we express on our parts great Inclina∣tions and Affections towards them; profes∣sing, That we wish nothing more, then that their desires should succeed, and that we desire this very thing that we now pursue, for no other end so much, as that we may become capable to serve our friends, and principally themselves. In short, we must act our part so, as from the augmentation of our fortune, they may conceive hope of ad∣vancement to their own.

By those that desire to be free from envy, all pride, over-sumptuous maner of living, un∣seasonable

feasts, and boasting, is sedulously to be avoided; especially, by those who have risen from a mean condition; unless the plea∣sure of the Prince, or the dignity of their Office, require it otherwise; for then a be∣coming magnificence, will not be unfit, pro∣vided, That in these expences, he lets the world see, he doth rather comply with the pleasure of the Prince, then follow his own inclination. With this kinde of modesty and prudence, the beginnings of Cardinal Ximenes were very fortunate, and notable; for he was born of so mean a parentage, that it was doubtful, whether he were a Gentleman, or no; although his prosperous fortune found those afterwards, that would undertake to prove his Nobility. This Ximenes whilst the world went hard with him, became in his youth a Frier, whence soon after for his singular endowments, he was by the com∣mendation of Cardinal Mendoza, made confessor to Isabella, Queen of Castile, and not long after Archbishop of Toledo, (as I said once before) which Archbishoprick upon Medoza's death, Queen Isabella having ob∣tained of the Pope for Ximenes; he finding himself too weak for the envy it would draw upon him, refused to accept it; and was so stiff in his refusal, That he scarce suffered himself to be won to the acceptance of it, by all the Nobles of the Court, who one by one,

at the Queens direction, prest him to im∣brace it: And having accepted of it, he was fain to be so intreated over again, before he could be perswaded to live in a condition and splendor equal to his dignity; nay, after that, he was personally so observant of his for∣mer maner of life, in this great fortune, that no way else, but by the Popes express com∣mand, could he be induced to change it.

This modesty succeeded so well with him, that hereby he appeased and avoided that great envy, which must otherwise of necessi∣ty have oppressed him, being the possessor of a dignity gaped after, by all the Grandees of Spain, and of Revenue, scarce inferior to those of the Crown.

But yet as this maner of proceeding is in the East of our fortunes, an antidote against envy, so it little avails those who have once already carried themselves insolently and proudly; for the moderation of these men, is still looked upon as counterfeit: Of which thing, the Constantinopolitan History affords us an example in a Metropolitan, called Con∣stantine; who being banished from the Courts, both of Isacius Angelius, and Alexi∣us, the Emperors, returned afterwards with the Empress Euphrosine; pretending a great aversion from business, and a Courtiers life; to the end, he might be the more credited, and sought unto the more eagerly, he took

orders upon him: In short, he carried his business so craftily, That the Emperor him∣self causing him to be absolved from the oath of Priesthood, called him to Court; and trusted him with the management of his greatest affairs: Who presently, not content with his own advancement, introduced his two Brothers to wait upon the Emperor; and as it were, to stand Centinels for him, if at any time his business called him away: But because his former prosperity had dis∣covered the insolence of his nature, every body feared him still, although he now made show of great temper and moderation, which was the cause that he was again supplanted and removed from Court, without ever be∣ing restored more.

CHAP. 20.

Of Emulation, the Sister of Envy, and the remedies of it.

THe same remedies that are good against Envy, prevail also against Emulation, which hath less malignity in it truly, then Envy hath; but more of Ambition, and the treachery of self-concernments. But these Competitors of ours, are to be stroked with a

a certain specious respect, and ceremonious veneration, which will powerfully divert these kinde of humors; especially, if we feed their hopes with higher thigns then those we aim at, and seem to contribute our Votes and assistance to them; on the other side, vilifying that which we seek for, as below them to stoop unto, and fitter for our selves; whose merits as they are less, so our pretences ought not to be so high. If we fear that they will smell our drift, we are to hol•• them in suspence, and seem to discourse the case with Arguments on both sides; yet giving the greatest weight to those, which we intend should divert their ambitions. But the surest and best course of all, is to conceal, if it be possible, what we aim after, till it be out o•• the power of our Enemies, or Competitors 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hinder us.

A too great eagerness in our pretences, i•• sometime odious, even to those that would if it were more modest, contribute thei•• assistance to us; pulling with it besides, othe•• greater inconveniencies upon us, as if we succeed, more envy, and if we fail, a great•••• disgrace: It is much more safe, as I said eve•• now, to hide our designs, and as Rowers do•• turn our backs upon the place we are goin•• unto. Those that look after the greate•••• Commands, have taken this way; nothin•• hath been more usual unto them, then afte••

the example Agamemnon in Euripides, to ex∣press a greater desire of rest and retirement, then of honor or imployment. And many have found this a singular remedy, to divert the wiles of those that would oppose them, and to escape the disgrace which attends those fierce pretenders; nay, they have had hereby the glory, to have it often thought, That this honor or imployment was cast upon them, meerly for their merits, and not ob∣tained by begging or buying of voices, as it too often falls out.

Last of all, in our pretences we must take heed, that we clash with no rival, that is greater or more powerful in Friends and Dependants, then our selves. In this case we must imitate Marcus Lepidus, a man in Taci∣tus his opinion, of great wisdom; who being drawn, as it were, into the Senate by Tiberius, to stand with Junius Blaesus, Sejanus his Un∣cle, whether of them should be chosen Pr••consul of Africk, pretended presently against himself, want of health, the tender years of most of his Children, and the mar∣riage of a Daughter, that he was to take care of; fearing doubtlesly to make Sejanus his Enemy, if he carried away the Province from Blaesus. Neither must we obstinately contend with him, whom some great man is about to advance, although the Law favor us against him; for without doubt, Favor

weighs down the Law, as Tacitus instances in Germanicus and Drusus, creating Haterius Agrippa Praetor, notwithstanding the ex∣press contradiction of a Law; But let the Historian speak himself. There arose a dispute of substituting a Praetor in the place of Vipsa∣nius Gallus lately dead; Germanicus and Drusus favored Haterius Agrippa, Germani∣cus his Kinsman; others on the contrary side, did contend, That the number of Children should carry it, according to the Law. Tiberius was glad to see his Sons, and the Laws of the Senate, clash together; without doubt the Law was overcome, but yet not easily, nor by many voices: By which means, when they were in their great∣est vigor, they were wont to be overborn.

CHAP. 21.

How to avoid a threatening ruine, and when it is upon us; how to make the best use of it: Examples of the fall of great men.

HItherto we have observed the principal precepts that are to be observed by our Courtier; if any want, every rational mans (for such onely we intend to instruct) Prudence and Dexterity will supply it. Now

because these kinde of Rules are no less necessary, for the preserving our Greatness and Fortune in the Court, then for the gaining of it; it will not be impertinent to have by us, the examples of some of those that have faln from their power and greatness, to the end, we may grow wise by other mens mis∣chances; and learn, if not to avoid a ruine, at least to arm and prepare our selves for it: For this latter is almost as necessary as the first, since the indeavors of those that seek to escape their approaching misfortunes, are for the most part vain; whilst he that pre∣pares himself for it long before, makes that fall, which few or none of them can avoid; that fortune hath lifted up on high, to be much more gentle and easie, then otherwise it would.

These falls happen unto us, either through our own faults, through the arts and contrivance of our Enemies, or through the perverseness of the Princes nature, or perhaps his death. Since the lives of all men are obnoxious to faults, and full of errors, and failings, it is so especially with those that are on high, who by reason of their greatness, are out of the lists of reprehension; all that are about them, being compelled to approve of whatever they do, be it well or ill. A∣mongst all which faults, the foulest they are incident unto, is, A treacherous turning against

their Prince, who is the Author of their Dignity, and Power: A crime marked out with the blackest note of an ungrateful and faithless Soul; and a most just subject of the Princes hate and indignation. All men that are in Authority ought to flie the very shadow of this crime, and to the end of taking all ground of suspicion from the Prince, to de∣cline those honors and places, that are oppor∣tune for such attempts.

Paterculus esteems Sejanus to have been one of the wisest Courtiers that ever was; and truly it is likely, That he that flourish∣ed so long in the favor of a Prince, so subtil, and diffident, as Tiberius was, did comport himself with great modesty and wariness. He was (saith our Author) in appearance given to ease, assuming nothing to himself, and by that means obtaining all things; Crouching still willingly beneath the opinion of other men, and striving to come behinde them in repute; His countenance and his life, was calm and quiet, although his minde was restless, and ever a wake; yet ambition at last transported this provident and wary man so far, as to aspire to the Empire. To which end, Drusus being dead, he married Livia his Widow, that so being linked into the House of the Caesars, he might more easily compass his desire: And although he perceived out of Tiberius his tergiversations, when he demanded his

consent in the case, that it had drawn a suspicion upon him; yet did he not change his minde; but what he had failed of this way, he sought to compass another.

He knew that Tiberius was grown weary of the City, whereupon he presently spurs him on, and perswades him to retire to Caprea; read Tacitus, Annal. 4. who says, That lest he should either infringe his Power, or weaken his Authority, by debarring the multitude from the Court, or minister matter of slander, and suspicion by entertaining them, he took this course: He perswaded Tiberius to go live in some pleasant place, far from Rome; foreseeing many conveniencies in it. First, There could be no access to the Prince, but through him; then, That the disposal of all Letters would be in his hands, since the Soldiers, by whom they were to be conveyed, would be at his devotion; and last∣ly, That Caesar now growing old, and waxing effeminate with the privacy of the place, would easily transfer the burthen of Affairs, and Go∣vernment upon him. And truly, his hopes de∣ceived him not, for in a short time, under pretence of easing Tiberius his age, he drew all the power of the Empire into his own hands.

Yet at last, the event showed, That this way of Sejanus, was both perilous and tedi∣ous; to mention which more accurately, seems worth my labor here, to the end,

That both Courtiers may be more wary in governing their Fortune, and Princes more cautious in exalting their Mini••ns. Tiberius did either love or suffer patiently Sejanus, as long as he found his help useful to the op∣pression of Agrippina, and her Children, Nero, and Drusus; to which kinde of imploy∣ments, Sejanus shewed himself very ready, knowing, That thereby he should not one∣ly win the favor of the Prince, but also e∣stablish his own power and hopes; there be∣ing none left of Caesars house now but two youths, whose tender age, if they should come to the Government, must needs leave the Authority, and ordering of Affairs, to him; until he saw his opportunity of usurp∣ing the Empire it self.

But mark how rash and blinde ambition makes us; He did not see, that the nearer he came to the top, the more he became suspected of this jealous Prince; who now sought all means of lessening, rather then advancing him; that strove as much on the other side to climb still on; For though he wanted nothing, but the name of Emperor (which some did not stick to give him) and the Tribunes power (which the Emperors never intrusted to any) yet was he not content, but daily endeavoured to augment his Authority. By which course, as he ren∣dred himself venerable to all others, so he

made himself formidable to Tiberius; For when he saw that Sejanus had not onely won the Pretorian Guards, but also very many of the Senators, and principal Fami∣lies of Rome, by either benefits, or hopes, or fears, unto himself; and likewise, That his secrecies were by his own servants told unto Sejanus, and not Sejanus his to him again; he determined his destruction, as one that was become his rival: But before he went about it, he thought fit to sound the inclina∣tions of those about him, to the end, That he might know how to chuse out some that would like of his design.

Lest that Sejanus should smell out any change in Caesars affection towards him, he makes him Consul, and calls him both pre∣sent and absent in his Letters to the Senate, and the People, His friend and companion of his labors. Lastly, he faigns himself sick, to discover thereby, the affections both of Sejanus, and several others. Sometimes he writes to the Senate of his recovering con∣dition, and that he would shortly come to Town; sometimes praising, sometimes blaming Sejanus; sometimes receiving those that came recommended by him, and at other times refusing others; that thus he might keep him ••suspended between hope and fear, who, whether trusting to his favor with the Prince, or for fear of losing of

his hopes, resolved to attempt nothing by force; hoping, that the disgusts of the Prince, if there were any, would wear out with time. In this interim, others who had hitherto fawned upon Sejanus his fortune, not upon himself, seeing Tiberius stagger, began to carry themselves more warily, and the devotion of many towards Sejanus, grew cold.

Tiberius having discovered long ago the pride and insolency of Sejanus, and fearing withal, lest provoked by contempt, he should run some desperate course, caused it to be given out, That he intended to confer the Tribunical Power upon Sejanus; and presently after, Commands him to be laid in prison, writing Letters, to that end to the Senate, which were carried by Macro, Cap∣tain of the Guards: Who coming to Rome, first communicated the Princes pleasure to Memmius Regulus, then Consul (for the other Consul was more addicted to Sejanus) and then to Graecinus Laco, Captain of the Watch, it being not yet break of day. Thence going to the Senate-house, he met Sejanus, who startled to see him, demanded if he had brought him any Letters from Tiberius, he whispered in his ear, That he should anone be saluted Tribune; where∣upon, he entring the Senate-house, not with∣out an inward joy, Macro commanded the

Pretorian Guards to go home, showing them to that end, a Warrant from the Emperor, in which also, he promised them a Largess. The Pretorian Soldiers being departed, and Laco's Company placed there in their room, Macro enters the Senate, and delivers his Letters; immediately going forth, with∣out expecting the reading of them, to bid Laco stand well upon his Guard, lest Se∣janus raising a tumult in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Senate, should break away; and went thence himself to the Pretorian Guards to hinder them, lest they should attempt any thing.

The Letters that were then a reading, were spun out into a great length, to the end, That Macro might have time enough to order his business; and truly they were interwoven with a wonderful contrivance. In the beginning there was no mention of business, nor any thing concerning Sejanus; a little after he was touched upon, as they say, with a gentle hand; then some other things interlaced, there followed a more open, but that also a slight accusation against him: At last, after sundry excursions about the Affairs of the Commonwealth, two of Sejanus his favorites were named, and the Senate commanded to proceed against them; and withal, that Sejanus himself should be secured. All mention of his death being purposely left out, to the end, That hope

might be left to the accused, of clearing himself of those crimes, and those but light ones, that were there objected against him.

The Letters being read, many that had waited upon him into the Senate, seeing things of another nature in hand, then making Sejanus Tribune, rose up and com∣passed him in, lest he should escape; which it is believed, that he would at least have attempted to do, if in the beginning, the Em∣perors Letters had thundered any thing sharply against him. But he then despising those slight touches, sate still in his place; and being called upon, either two or three times, by the Consul Memmius to rise up, with much ado he obeyed at last, as being accustomed to give, and not receive commands. When he was risen, Laco followed him close at the heels, and after him came Re∣gulus, accompanied with other Senators, who led him from the Senate to the prison; and thence, soon after, to execution at the Scalae Gemoniae, where he was put to death.

Behold here the ruine of a great Courtier, and a Favorite, who for craft and power had scarce ever his equal. The contrivance of whose fall, though it may seem due to Tibe∣rius his Prudence, yet it is rather to be at∣tributed to his own greatness and prosperity, which ruined it self with its own weight, so evidently, That all those sleights and strata∣gems

of Tiberius, were not very needful; as may be gathered out of the example of Perennius, who aspiring to the same height that Sejanus did, and by the same arts, was subverted by Commodus, a Prince of a judgement far inferior to Tiberius. It may well be, that many will not be moved with these examples, because they will seem to be wiser then others, and to know some∣thing more then these did, whose misfortunes are here recounted. I will not move them to passion, with telling them what I think; although truly, I will not deny, but in those latter ages, there have been some, whose projects succeeded less unhappily, as Boylas, whose story we read in the History of Con∣stantinople; who being caught in a conspiracy against Constantinus Monomachus, then Empe∣ror, did not undergo so heavy a punishment; as for such crimes, are wont to be in••licted, the reason being, because he had the luck to transgress against a milde and gentle Prince.

It will not be amiss to recite the story briefly here, to the end, you may see how the secretest Counsels, and undiscoverably by the eyes of man, are oftentimes discovered by the divine Providence, after an unlookt for maner; not being able to escape punishment, by whatsoever Caution they are managed. No mortal man would have believed, that

this Boylas should have any inclination to, or could have any ground for, so great a villany. The greatness of the favors, which were heaped upon him, had possessed the good Prince with a great hope and opinion of his singular fidelity, who seemed also by nature unapt for great undertakings: He was not onely of very mean birth, but also stammered so much, as he could hardly be understood; which stuttering, since he saw it pleasing to the Emperor, he did afterwards affect on purpose: With this assentation and flattery, he so insinuated himself into the Princes familiarity, That the Bed-chamber and Ca∣binet of Constantine, were always opened unto him: At last being inriched by the Prince, he was chosen into the number of the Senators, and begins to cast his thoughts higher; wherein he went so far, that he de∣termined by the murther of the Prince, to make his own way to the Scepter. This design he first opened to those he knew surely hated the Emperor, promising moun∣tains to such as approved it, and offered him their assistance; and praising greatly those that disliked it, and refused it out of their affection and loyalty towards the Prince; as whose spie, he would seem to propound such things, to discover the inclinations of his subjects.

By which means he was undescryed by

all, but such, whose fellowship in the Treason, make him secure of them; and had at last, effected that abominable act, if at the very time, when he had the Weapon in his hand, which he had prepared for the Emperors Throat; one of the Conspirators, touched with a sudden remorse of Conscience, had not seasonably disclosed, and discreetly pre∣vented it. The Emperor took the injury so patiently, That having condemned some of the Conspirators to die, he was satisfied in inflicting banishment onely, on the Author of the Treason.

It were too long to recount all those here, who having undertaken such Treasons, were caught in them, or else, though inno∣cent, were falsly believed to be guilty of some such design, and made shipwrack in Court. But contenting our selves with what we have already said, this onely is to be added, That all Pride, whether through Ambition, Bragging, Reproaches, Detraction, Ostentation, or other pompous maner of li∣ving, it displease the Prince, is the high rode to ruine.

CHAP. 22.

Boasting, Presumption, Arrogance, too much Familiarity, Pride, and Per∣f••dy, noted with examples.

THis Boasting and recounting of services past, destroyed Philotas and Clytas in the Court of the Great Alexander; and Craterus himself had like to have been over∣born with those winds: Certainly, he had been much more acceptable to the Prince, if he had contained himself within the bounds of a generous modesty; so Cajus Silius with Tiberius; Antonius Primus with Vespa∣sian; and Sillas with King Agrippa; by boasting of their services, deprived them∣selves of all the fruit of them: As Tacitus witnesses of the two first, Annal. 4. and Hist. 4. And Josephus▪ of the last. Princes do believe their Fortunes and Favors lost, and cast away upon these Braggadoshaws; for they will have their subjects seem to ow all they have to them, and their bounty; not to their own vertue, and merits.

The liberty of reprehending the actions of Princes, or inveighing against others in their presence, is to be carefully avoided, as bordering upon Arrogance, and Presumption. Eumenes complaining before Alexander,

somthing petulantly, That Hephaestion should assign the Soldiers Quarters to Musicians, Comedians, and such kinde of people, in∣curred the displeasure of the King.

To treat with the Prince over familiarly, or to seem to make one self the sole Arbiter of his principal cares, savors of Pride, al∣though it may proceed onely out of Vanity and Covetousness; as it appeareth in the example of Zotirus, once the favorite of Heliogabalus; and also of Turinus, who scarce worse then Zotirus, yet more unhap∣py, was commanded to be stifled to death with smoke, by Alexander the son of Mam∣mea; the Executioner crying out, Let him perish with smoke, who sold smoke. He was wont to brag, That the Prince was govern∣ed by his advices; and so by intruding upon the Princes retirements, and with imperti∣nent senceless whispers in publique, pretending to favor, was sought unto by very many; and gathered together great riches, through the bribes, and presents of those, to whom all his interest in the Prince, could not avail a straw.

The Arrogance of Plancianus is also wor∣thy of memory, which being accompanied with great vanity, broke out at last into open perfidy: His arrogance was such, That he did not stick to contend with Bassianus, the Emperors Son; who was Author both

of his Dignity, and Fortune; and he was withal so vain, that as he passed through the City, he would not onely interdict all access unto him, but also would not suffer them to behold him; his Ushers going before still to cleer the streets, of all that they could see. Becoming a Traytor at last against his Prince, and convicted of his Treason, he was Beheaded. In France, during the time of Philip le Bell, Enguerrandus Marigny, daring to contest personally with Charls de Valoy, what misery he did pull upon himself, and his friends, may be observed in the French Histories.

Above all things, we must take heed, That we give not our selves in Court, to sowing of strife between Princes, and great men; for they becoming friends, do for the most part sacrifice such unto their friend∣ship; of which, though the stories of all Nations are full, yet the Bavarian History furnishes us with one example very memo∣rable, of Otho Crondoferus, who flourishing with Rodulphus the Palatine in singular fa∣vor, was the Author of great emnities be∣tween this Prince and his Mother, for a time; but the Mother afterwards reconciling her self unto her son, Crondoferus had his Eyes and Tongue pull'd out.

CHAP. 23.

How we must, not onely take care to pre∣serve the Princes Favor, but also that of those in Power about him.

IT is not enough, that the Princes them∣selves be not averse unto us, but we must also keep our selves aright with those that are in favor with them. Germanicus at his death, gave that advice to Agrippina his Wife, of which Tacitus, Annal. 2. speaks thus. Then turning to his Wife, he intreated her by his memory, and for their Children sake, which were common to them both, That she would pull down her stomach, and submit her great heart to the rage of Fortune; lest re∣turning to the City, she should with emulation of her greatness, stir up against her, persons more powerful then her self; Agrippina's neglect of this document, ruined her and her children. I told you before, how much Eumenes his favor was diminished with Alexander; after that, railing against Hephaestion, he carried himself irreverently towards the Prince; and discovered his spleen and envy, to him that he accused.

Wherefore, when we see any one in the Princes favor, we must carefully weigh his Authority, and compare it, as it were, in a

ballance against our own; that we may know certainly which weighs down the other: And in the tryal of this, we are not so much to observe outward appearances, as the circumstances of inward causes. Craterus and Hephaestion, for a time did flourish both of them, in great and equal favor with Alex∣ander; until Alexander himself determined the business, in calling one of them, The Kings friend, and the other, Alexanders friend.

Out of which decision, Craterus might have made this judgement, That since Prin∣ces, for the most part, are more in love with their own wills, then their Authority; they also are held more dear unto them, who ra∣ther adore and worship Alexander, that is their Person, then their Fortune and Kingly Dignity: And though that afterward upon a strife that arose between him and Hephaesti∣on, when all the Court was divided into factions, Alexander seemed to incline to neither side; but chiding them both heavi∣ly, threatned punishment, if ever they should harp upon that string again; yet his maner of dealing with them, shewed ra∣ther his singular Prudence, to be imitated by all Princes, then his equal affection to them both. He apprehended, that this discord might produce great tumults, and mischief; For he knew both Craterus his great interest

in the Macedonians, and how much Hephae∣stion was envied for his favor to him. There∣fore to diminish Hephaestions envy, he repre∣hended him publikely; and to avoid giving offence to the Macedonians, he reproved Craterus in private.

Amongst those that in this tryal and ex∣amen of the Princes favor, between them∣selves and others, were out of negligence and discretion, most grosly mistaken: Anto∣nius Primus ought to have the first place, who daring to contend with Mutianus, learnt at last, That he had better have con∣tested with Vespasian himself. And in this maner, you will finde it is a thing wit∣nessed by the examples of all Courts, To vindicate more sharply an injury against the Favorites, then against the Prince himself. Dio tells us the reason of it, when he had re∣counted how the same thing happened to Sejanus, thus, As those whom vertue and con∣sciousness of their own deserts, hath lifted up to dignities, do not much stick upon the vain Cere∣monies, and outward Circumstances of Honor: So on the contrary side, those who seek to ••limb by Ambition, Pride, and Vice, thereby to hide their unworthiness, and meanness, do presently take ill, and understand as a contempt, the least neglect of Ceremony, and respect towards them. Insomuch, that it is harder to preserve the friendship of these men, then of the Prince

himself, for he thinks it a glorious and Prince∣ly act to forgive injuries: When these, lest they should seem to remit that which they cannot revenge, even to ostentation, do use their borrowed power, in persecuting those that have offended them.

CHAP. 24.

Pride even in the meanest persons at Court, noted with examples; as also Treachery in betraying the Princes secrets.

NEither truly hath it been destruction to great ones onely, to have carried them∣selves insolently and amiss, but also to men of the lower stage. John King of Arragon, loved Alvarez de Luna so much, that he trusted him with all his Affairs, and even his Kingly power it self, notwithstanding the repining of all his Nobles. But when he by reason of his prosperous Fortune, fell into that pride and presumption, That he caused a Nobleman, who in the Kings name admonished him of his duty, to be precipitated and murthered; he was by the Kings command beheaded. It is also an ordinary cause of shipwrack in Court, when any one hath rendred, either himself,

or the Prince, hateful to the Peers, or Peo∣ple; For, either the Prince is fain of his own accord, to cast such a one off, to rid himself of envy, or else others never leave, till they have overthrown him. During the Reign of Commodus, Cleander once armed the Pretori∣an Guards against the Roman people; which was a ground of so great tumults in Rome, that unless the Emperor had sacrificed Clean∣der to the peoples fury, he himself could not have been secure.

The same Commodus, had rendred himself odious to all men, by his affection to one Anterus; from which envy, that they might free their Master, some of Commodus his ser∣vants being very desirous, slew this Anterus as he was coming from Court. Eutropius who had been long dear to Arcadius, the Emperor; since, he was believed to be the Author of the Sedition raised by Tribigildus, was given up as a price of the Peace, by the Prince, to the Enemies.

Amongst the evils that subvert Courtiers, there are two remaining yet, as very dange∣rous, so very frequent; A betraying of the Prince's secrets, and Conspiracy with his Ene∣mies. Crimes, for the most part, arising out of perfidy, but many times also out of levity, and indiscretion onely. And forasmuch as concerns the secrets of Princes, I think they do very well, who pry not into them; and

who, if their office exact it not at their hands, avoid the bare knowledge of them: For if you be the onely person, to whom they are imparted, and Fame (which often makes wity conjectures) chance to scatter any thing like unto them, you cannot avoid the suspi∣cion, that the secret came out by you: And although the Prince perhaps hath imparted it to some one else, yet it may fall out so, that he hath forgot; or else, that he is more confident of the other mans silence, and so the foil remain upon you still.

Not without cause, did Philippides the Comique Poet, when he was asked by King Lysimachus (to whom he was very dear) of what things he did chiefly desire to be made partaker by his Prince, answer, That he would refuse nothing that came from the Prince, his secrets onely excepted; from which he desired to be excused. Let us from the example of this man, as much as we can, and esteem it safer to be ignorant of secrets, so difficult and dangerous to be kept, then to know them. Hiero, Tyrant of Syracusa, was wont to say, That those who discover Princes secrets, do wrong both to themselves, and to those they impart them unto, by exposing them also together with themselves, to the hatred of the Prince.

CHAP. 25.

The causes, kindes, and examples of Conspiracies with the Princes Ene∣mies.

YEt their condition is, of all other, most hazardous and ticklish, who led either by avarice, ambition, or desire of providing for their own security, do conspire with the Princes enemies; whether they be either Strangers, or Domesticks. Cardinal Balaeus, a Taylors son, being by Lewis the Eleventh, made his Treasurer, and afterward a Bishop, at last also by the Kings intercession, and the Popes willingness, to oblige one that had been so sharp an adversary unto him, was promoted to the dignity of Cardinal: But afterwards being convicted of a Conspiracy with the Kings Enemies, he was sent to the Tower of L••ches, where he dwelt twelve years, un∣til Sixtus Quintus by great intreaties, and much ado, procured his release. For the like crime, the Cardinal of Prata under∣went the like punishment, in the Reign of Francis the Fift; and had never, perhaps, got his liberty, had he not deceived his Physitians with an opinion of the Strangury, by drinking his Vrine: When the King fear∣ing the anger of the Pope, if consumed with

that disease, a Cardinal should die in prison, dismist him. Petrus de Vineis, a chief Coun∣sellor of the Emperor, Frederick the Se∣cond, being suspected of intelligence with Pope Alexander the Third, the Emperors Enemy, lost his eyes.

Not onely designs of usurping the Empire of the E••st, but also private intercourse be∣twixt him and Alaricus, King of the Gothes, are believed to have caused Stilico's death: Which that shameful Peace he made with the same Alaricus, against the will of the Senate, seems to confirm; Lampadius (who always disclaimed it) calling it not a Peace, but a Contract of slavery; whereby the Em∣peror was obliged to pay Tribute to Bar∣barians.

CHAP. 26.

That our Courtier must not be the Au∣thor of Hazardous Counsels; the variety of Errors, whereby the Prin∣ces favor is lost.

THe Courtier that we are all this while a forming, must cheifly beware, That he never be the Author of Hazardous Coun∣sels; for the ill success of these, is always

wont to be imputed to the unfortunate ad∣viser, and the good unto the Fortune of the Prince; not onely by the vulgar, who judge all things by the event, but also by the Prince himself; who is always glad to have some one, upon whom to derive the envy of an un∣luckie undertaking, and scarce ever willing that any one should share with him in the glory of a prosperous action. A good while before and after Stilico's death, the Argument of the Publique Complaint, was, his unseemly Peace with the Gothes; until at last, Olympius who had procured his ruine, seeking fame from contrary courses, broke the Truce, Ala∣ricus in vain, pleading the injustice of the deed; But afterwards having made War for some time, still with ill success, this very man was, in the opinion of the people, esteemed, The Author of all their evils; And at last, being accused by the Eunuches, who were in great favor with the Emperor, he was fain to leave the Court, and flie into Dalmatia.

When either the beginning of a War, or breaking of a Peace, is treated of; the part of a wise Counsellor is to bring Arguments for both sides, and leave the Prince at liberty to make choice, of what likes him best. And if he be prest to deliver his opinion, it will be the safer course to incline to peace; unless invincible necessity, or an apparant advantage,

perswade the contrary: Which course was prudently taken by Jovius, the Successor of that Olympius, we lately mentioned.

He, though he was more inclined to War, that so himself might be more necessary to the Emperor; yet after the maner of some Statsmen, seemed to prefer a love to Peace, having met with Alaricus at Ariminum, whi∣ther he was sent to confer with him; he sends the Conditions that Alaricus propounded to Honorius; perswading him in other Letters apart, That he should offer the command of his Armies to Alaricus, to make him more reasonable in other things. The Em∣peror denying, That it was not safe for him to commit the strength of his Empire to a stranger, that had been hitherto his Enemy, answered, That he had rather consent to pay him Tribute.

When Jovius had read these Letters to Alaricus, he angry to see himself, and his friendship rejected by Honorius, broke off the Treaty of Peace, and Jovius returns to Hono∣rius; who being much offended with the insolence of his enemy, swore, He would never have any peace with Alaricus; and gave the same Oath to all his Courtiers and Com∣manders. Thus Jovius by the same art, re∣moved from himself, the envy of the broken truce, and endearing himself to Alaricus, by the testimony of his good-will, in ad∣advising

Caesar to give him the Command of his Armies, engaged Honorius in a War; whereby the power and authority of Jovius was wonderfully established. There is in story so great variety of those errors, by the means of which Courtiers have faln from their Princes favor, That no mans diligence can reckon them all up so; but when he hath recounted many, he shall finde still more behinde. Wherefore having here cull'd out some of the principal, we leave the rest to the industry and discretion of e∣very observing Reader.

CHAP. 27.

Of the Arts whereby Courtiers are sup∣planted by others; and first, under pretence of specious imployments a∣broad, or of calling them from their Commands, to attend upon the Kings Person.

WE have seen already, How by his own fault, a Courtier may loose the Princes favor; let us now show the means, whereby his Enemies are wont to supplant him; which are of three sorts. Either they

will endeavor to remove him from the Court, under an honorable pretence; or else they will render him suspected, and hateful to the Prince; or lastly, will by open force compel the Prince to remove him.

Of the first kinde of these three; as there are divers ways, so the ends are divers. For some are with shows of honor, or with the desire of living amongst their friends, willingly perswaded to depart the Court. Which course, during the Reign of Manuel Comnenus, Styppiota craftily used, to remove out of his way Hagiotheodorita that stood in his light: For there arising a Contro∣versie between Michael Paedagogus, and Joseph Balsamon, Styppiota perswaded the Emperor, That if Hagiotheodorita were made Governor of Peloponnesus, it would put an end to the contention of these great ones. Hagiotheodorita out of desire of assisting his Kinsman, undertakes the imployment; not dreaming that Styppiota having got his rival out of the way, would by this means come to the sole management of Affairs, as indeed it fell out.

Some men also tired out with the brawls and strifes of their Enemies in Court, to pro∣vide for their own quiet, do easily imbrace any plausible imployment for a pretence of their departure, As Agrippa did, who, Velleius testi∣fies, went into Asia, under the colour of a

great imployment, onely to withdraw him∣self from Court, where he had private grudges and heart-burnings against Marcellus, as the report goes.

Tiberius, whilst Cajus Caesar lived, retired to Rhodes, upon pretence of following his studies, and by his Mothers means (they are Sue••onius his words) to hide the disgrace of it, obtained to be sent, as it were, Ambassador from Augustus. If there want a pretext, whereby he whom you desire to remove, may volun∣tarily seek leave to go, and esteem it for a benefit; the Prince must be perswaded to give him some charge, by reason it can be exe∣cuted by none, so well as he: So also, if there be any man great and powerful in any of the Provinces abroad, and have emulators that seek to eclipse him; they must labor to call him thence to Court, as necessary to the Princes person; that so being crouded up amongst the Courtiers, his lustre may be ••bscured.

This art used Apelles in Polybius, when he stript Taurion of the Government of Pelo∣ponnesus. So Darius by the advice of Mega∣byzus, recalled Hyesteus out of Ionia; not, that he had any need of his presence, as he pretended, but to weaken his Authority. If these Courtiers would rest contented with removing others out of their way, for their own advancement, and proceed no further,

in comparison of many worse, these arts and practises would be something tolerable; but the most of them rest not here: In the Reign of Constantius, Sylvanus, General of the Foot (as Ammianus Marcellinus tells us) by Arbetio his procurement, was sent into France, to chastise the Barbarians for the injuries they offered to the Gauls; whether he being once come, and growing into fa∣vor with the Nation, and also rich; the envy of Arbetio wrought at last his utter destructi∣on with the Emperor.

Almost the same fortune under this very Emperor had Vrsicinus, the General of the Horse: Eusebius, the Eunuch, had together with some other Courtiers, conspired his ruine; and by these mens means, to the end he might be far enough from Court, he was sent upon some expedition to the Con∣fines of Persia; where having staid ten years, Sabinianus was sent to succeed him, neither in judgement nor experience, equal to the charge: Whereupon, presently a rumor being spred, That the Persians were prepa∣ring for a War, he was commanded to stay there still, though the power was already given to another. Eusebius contriving it so on purpose, to the end, That whatsoever good success hapned against the Persians, might be attributed to Sabinianus; and what ever fell out amiss, might be imputed

to Vrsicinus, as the event witnessed; for Vrsicinus cast down for another mans faults, retired and past the rest of his life in pri∣vate. The Reign of this Emperor doth fur∣nish us yet with another example; For Ruffinus, the Uncle of Gallus, Captain of the Guard, was sent to appease a mutiny of the Soldiers, out of no other intention, but that he might perish in the rage of the tumult: As Clytus did complain, That he was sent by Alexander against the Sogdians, to no other end.

CHAP. 28.

How Calumnies are used to make men suspected, or hated by the Prince.

THus much for the first way, whereby Courtiers are by their Enemies supplant∣ed, and stript of the Princes favor. Now let us come to the second, which are, The Calumnies that are used to render us hated and suspected by the Prince: In Calumnie, two things are to be observed; the first is, Whether it be sufficient to deprive him of the Princes favor? the second is, Whether it be probable? Of the first, We must make our judgement out of the present state of things,

out of the humor and inclination of the Prince, and out of the nature of the Calumny intended. No kinde of slander doth subvert more great men, then that which accuses us of conspi∣racy against the Princes person, or his Em∣pire, or else of contempt or disdaining to obey; with detraction, and derision towards the Prince.

These Calumnies are rendred likely to be true, not onely by the words and actions of those that are accused, and of their servants, friends, and kinred, but also by contrived Letters, and the disposition of the Prince; too apt to believe the Calumny, or too prone to think ill of the person accused; especially, if he were ever suspected before. These things which are by Calumny converted into a Crime, he that is traduced, either did, or said of his own accord, or else was ticed into them, by the sleights of his Enemies, and Competitors: The knowledge and practise of which Malice, whets the wits of those who will curiously watch their occasions; and know dexterously ••ow to use them.

There are some men that will put Pro∣jects into our heads, to the end, That if we imbrace them, they may make these very things, a subject of Calumny against us, and accuse us to the Prince of some wicked in∣tention. There was a certain Magician, called Santabarinus very much beloved by

Basilius, Emperor of Constantinople, but as much hated by Leo, the Emperors Son; who this Magician desiring to overthrow, did so besiege him with counterfeited duties, and feigned respects, that at last winning upon him, he grew into credit with the yong Prince: Then having got an authority and interest in him, he takes his time, and warns Leo, with great art and solicitude, That whensoever he went a Hunting with his Father, he should carry a Poignard under his Garments, to defend himself withal: He obeying this advice, the Magician goes to his Father, informing him, That his Son in∣tended to murther him, and for a testimony, told him, That he always carried a Dagger hidden about him, waiting for an occasion of performing it. In short, the business came to that pass, the yong Prince was searched, and the Poignard found, where∣upon he was cast into prison; and though he were protected by the joynt intercession of all the Court, yet he hardly escaped with his life.

Whilst Valentinian was Emperor, Aetius accused Earl Boniface, who was very dear unto Valentinian, and Governor of Africa, unto Placidia, the Emperors Mother, of Treachery towards the Prince, and of a design he had of subjecting Africk to him∣self; perswading her withal, That he should

be recalled quickly. At the same time he warns Boniface by his Letters, That he was accused at Court, and for that reason recalled; wherefore he should take heed how he re∣turned, if he loved his own safety. Boni∣face giving credit unto him, obeyed him so far, That (resolving to oppose those that would come to reduce him) he called in Gontarus, King of Valladolid, and Gensericus his Son, then reigning in Spain, unto his aid; who upon this occasion, possessed themselves of Mauritania. The deceipt be∣ing afterwards found out, to the end the truth might appear more plainly, they were permitted the tryal of a combat, wherein Aetius being vanquished, was banished the Court.

Not unlike unto this was the craft of Samona, beloved by Leo, Son to the Emperor Basilius (by reason of his detection of the Treason of Basilius, Kinsman to the Empress Zoa) who resolving to ruine Andronicus, that was General against the Saracens, caused him to be warned by a friend, that he should take heed of Hymerius, who came to deprive him of his eyes; which was in those days a punishment usual towards great persons, whose power was overgrown, and become formidable: Andronicus be∣lieving this to be true, which was feigned by Samona, withdraws himself from Hyme∣rius,

unto a place of strength, which he seized upon. This fact of his, Samona did not omit to exaggerate unto the Emperor, insomuch, that by his procurement, an Army was sent against him, which forced Andronicus, driven to despair, to quit the limits of the Empire, and flie unto the Saracens. A little before, we mentioned Arbetio, and it will be worth observing, how he added deceit upon deceit: When he observed the Emperor angry with Sylvanus, and feared, that he should come to Rome to clear himself of the objected crimes; he gives the Emperor his Letters, wherein he called Sylvanus to his presence, to an instru∣ment of his own, called Apodenius; who arriving in France, suppressed the Letters as he was directed, and tells Sylvanus, That nothing but destruction hung over him; where∣by Sylvanus running into Rebellion, as the onely means of his preservation, made good Arbetio his calumnies.

But we have too long been silent con∣cerning Sejanus (to whom being expert in all these tricks) this artifice we now treat of was very usual. That he might render Agrip∣pina suspected to Tiberius, He inveigled her friends to puff up her haughty spirit; and her own kinred were inticed to feed the swelling hopes of Agrippina, with crooked and per∣verse discourses; whilst in the interim, he

causes Claudia Pulchra, Agrippina's Cosen German, to be accused by Domitius Afer; which injury, this fierce and passionate Woman, complaining of heavily to Tiberius, did thereby exceedingly encrease the suspicions of this jealous Emperor. Yet Sejanus not content with this, but seeking the utter ruine of this unwary, and sorrowful Lady, sent those unto her, who under a show of friend∣ship, should warn her, That Tiberius meant to poyson her, and that she should beware of his Feasts; whereupon she over credulous, refused to take an Apple out of Tiberius his hand at Table, which grievously incensed Caesar against her. By the same Sejanus now, when Soldiers were set to watch over A∣grippina and her Children, were men suborn∣ed to advise her, to flie to the German Army, or to run to the Image of Augustus for sanctu∣ary; and there to invoke the help of the Senate and the people.

With the same ugly arts, whereby he in∣deavored to supplant this Lady, by making her suspected of Tiberius, he utterly over∣threw her friend Titius Sabinus; which thing, as it is described by Tacitus, you may read here in his own words, because the circumstances are very notable, Annal. 4.

Junius Silanus and Silius Nerva, being Consuls, the year had a foul beginning; for Titius Sabinus an honorable Gentleman

or Rome, was cast into prison onely for his friendship to Germanicus, which was such, That he never omitted any occasion of honoring or serving his Wife and Children; Of all Germanicus his follow∣ers, being the onely man which visited them at their house, and accompanied them abroad; wherefore as he was much praised by the good, so was he much ma∣liced by the bad: Against him, Latinius Latiani, Porcius Cato, Petilius Rufus, and Marcus Opsius, who had sometime been Consuls, bent their spight, through a de∣sire of the Consulship, which they could not obtain, but by Sejanus his means, and Sejanus his liberty could not be purchased, but by some notable piece of villany. Wherefore they plotted amongst them, That Latiani, who was somewhat a kin to Sabinus, should lay the snare, and that the rest being privately witnesses to what past, they might begin their accusation.

Hereupon Latiani began at first to cast speeches out at randome, and to extol Sa∣binus his constancie, that he did not as others did, fawn in prosperity, and shrink from a house in adversity; with other ho∣norable mention of Germani••us bewayling Agrippina's estate. And seeing Sabinus (as mens mindes are soft and tender in calamity) to pour down tears, and

complaints; Latiani began more boldly to touch Sejanu's Cruelty, Pride, and Ambi∣tion, not forbearing to reproach Tiberius; These seeming dangerous speeches, and such as durst not be avouched, made a strict friendship in shew between them: So far that Sabinus often frequented Lati∣anie's house, and as unto his faithful friend uttered his greifs unto him. Those I mentioned before, now began to devise with Latiani how these speeches might be heard by them all: For the place of mee∣ting must be in appearance private, and if they should stand behinde the door they did apprehend some noise, or other accident of suspition might discover them; wherefore between the Seeling and the Roof the three Senators (in a place no less unseemly then the Treachery was de∣testable) hid themselves, laying their ears close to the holes and chinks, to listen what was said.

In the mean time Latiani having found Sabinus in the Market place (as if he had some new matter to tell him, inticeth him home into his chamber, beginning there to rip up things past and present in a great a∣boundance; and to load him with new feares. Sabinus was not behinde hand with him, the nature of greifs being such, that when once we enter into them, we

can hardly make an end. This done, they began immediately their accusation, and writ unto Caesar the whole contri∣vance of their own lewd and shameful act. The city was never in greater perplex∣ity, and fear then at that time, every man estranging himself from his nearest Kin∣red, and acquaintance; avoiding all mee∣tings and conferences as well with their Freinds, as Strangers; yea they grew jea∣lous of mute, and sensless things, Prying into the Roofs and Walls of their houses. But Tiberius requesting in his Letters that the Solemnities of the new year might be Celebrated on the Calends of January, falls at last upon Sabinus, charging him that he had corrupted some of his Freed-men to attempt something against his person, and therefore boldly demandeth a re∣venge, which without delay was grant∣ed.

Sabinus being condemned, was drawn and haled away with his Garments over his head, so that he being almost Throtled was heard to cry out: Is this the beginnings of the new year? be these the sacrifices slain in Sejanus his honor? Which way soever he did cast his Eyes they all fled that he directed his speech unto; the places of Assembly and the Streets were empty, some come runing back and showed them∣selves

again afraid for that they were seen to be afraid. And what days think you now were exempt from executions, if amongst the sacrifices, and the vows, when the custome was to abstain from profane speeches, Fetters and Manacles were mentioned. It is beleeved Tiberius could not be ignorant of the envy he should in∣cur for doing so, but that he did it on purpose, to the end the new Magistrates might open the prisons, when they set o∣pen their Temples and their Altars. For after that he sent Letters of thanks, for that they had punished an enemy to the State.

CHAP. 29.

Examples of other treacheries in subor∣ned witnesses, and forged Letters.

I Cannot avoid bringing here another ex∣ample out of the same Historian. Firmius Cato, a Senator, and one of Liboes inward freinds induced this simple yong man, easily led to vanities, to give credit to the Chaldeans pro∣mises, the Magicians ceremonie, and the inter∣pretation of Dreams, vainly putting him in mind that Pompey was his Great Grandfather, Scri∣bonia who had been Augustus his Wife, his

Aunt; The Caesars his Cozen Germanes; and that his house was full of the Statues and Monu∣ments of his Ancestors: He inticed him to Li∣centiousness, to borrow money, making himself a Companion of his Lusts, and Familiarities, the better to intangle him and convince with many evidences. That there might be witnesses enough, he also debauched such of his Servants as knew any thing of the matter. Then he desires access to the Prince, and by means of Flaccus Vescularius, a Gentleman of Rome, one of Tibe∣rius his Familiars, he discovered both the matter and the man. How after this Liho was treated by Tiberius and made much of, until accusati∣ons were brought against him in such aboun∣dance, that he was forced to kill himself; Tacitus Annal. 2. will tell you at large, to whom I had rather refer you, then exceed the bounds I had proposed to my self in this Treatise.

Styppiota, whose deceipt in supplanting Hagiotheodorita, I told you of before, could not avoid being circumvented himself, as Sabinus the Roman was; the contriver of that plot was Camaterus Logotheta, who being an enemy to Styppiota, accused him before the Emperor as an impostor, and one that intend∣ed to betray Sicily. And to the end he might give some face of truth to his Calumny, he hides the Emperor in his Chamber, and in his hearing begins on purpose to discourse

of the affairs of Sicily. At which time many things fell from the heedless Styppiota that were very displeasing unto Caesar; not content with this, Camaterus causes counter∣feit Letters to be mingled amongst Styppiota's Papers, which being searcht by the Emperors order, were the cause of Styppiota's condem∣nation, and the loss of his eyes.

This Story leades me to speak of another means of rendring slanders probable, to wit, by Counterfeiting Letters; A deceit in∣deed that for the most part breaks out at last to the prejudice of him that uses it, but nevertheless is of great power to make deep impressions of suspition in the Princes mind, and to alienate his favor: Which being once observed by the accused, will either induce him to withdraw himself willingly from busi∣ness, and the Court, least something worse should follow; or else cast him upon such attempts and practises, as will Confirm the slander. Which appears by that example of Sylvanus I mentioned before.

The perfidy of false witnesses is no slender confirmation of slanders, and this is cheifly necessary against such as are accused of Treason, and Capital crimes; And truly Do∣mestick Servants as most proper, so oftnest are made use of in this nature. In the reign of Arcadius, Eu••ropius seeking the de∣struction of Timasius, a great Captain, and a

man of much authority; corrupts his freind or rather his inseparable Com anion Bargus to accuse him of affecting the Empire. The freindship between Bargus and Timasius gave credit to the accuser, all men beleeving that he would not, unless the crime was most certain, accuse him; To this Counter∣feit Letters were added, to prove the Treason, by which means the innocent man and his son were sent into Banishment, to the Isle of Oasis, from whence neither of them ever re∣turned.

Caius Petronius was for his skill in plea∣sures preferd before Tigellinus by Nero, whereupon the other out of envy accused his Rival of Scaevinus his friendship, (who was convicted of a Conspiracy against Nero) and brought to witness it a Servant of Pe∣tronius his corrupted by him.

CHAP. 30.

Confirmation of slanders under the coulor of a feigned friendship; and the inclinations of the Prince to the accuser.

I Sayd before that to confirm Calumnies, the affection of the Prince to the slanderer did

much conduce, and for this reason did Se∣janus endeavoring to make the E••ip. ess Li∣via jealous of Agrippina, Germanicus his Wi∣dow, choose Julius Posthumus to do it; who, as Tacitus affirms, by reason of his Adu••••eries with Mutilia Prisca, the Empresses favorite, was very gracious with Livia. But calumnies never succeed so easily, as when they are used against one already suspected by the Prince: For it is very probable, That then the accuser shall not onely ruine the other, but also exalt himself. The familiars of Vitellius durst not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 upon Junius Blaesus, till they-observed him to grow less in Vitel∣lius his favor, and they compassed their de∣sires much sooner, because Lucius Vitellius, the Emperors Brother, lent them his assist∣ance.

Gracchus, a freed man of Caesars, and one as Tacitus saith, Annal. 13. All his life bred up in, and by a long experience, well practised in the Princes house, thought it the best way to preserve himself in the favor of the Prince, to accuse Cornelius Sylla, whom Nero he knew was jealous of already. The same art did ••ige••linus use against this Sylla, and Plautus afterwards, of which Tacitus, An∣nal. 14. writes thus. But Tigellinus credit increased daily, who thinking that his lewd practises, wherein he was a great pr••ficient, should be more acceptable, if he could engage 〈◊〉〈◊〉

Prince into the communion of his Villanies, be∣gan diligently to pry into all his fears, and per∣ceiving that Plautus and Sylla were above others suspected: Plautus being banished into Asia, and Sylla into France, he entreth into discourse of their Nobility, and how one was too near the Army of the East, and the other to that of Germany: That Sylla was poor and needy, onely counterfeiting a laziness; and Plau∣tus abounding in wealth, did not so much as pretend a desire of a quiet life.

I told you above of Vrsicinus accused by Eusebius the Eunu••h, to the Emperor C••n∣stantius, who was already s••ie towards him, by reason of his kinred to G••••••us; but I did not set down the success of the cause, which was thus. The accusation faultring, because the Arguments whereby the crime was to be proved, wer•• slend••r; the Eunuch intend∣ing a new mi••chief, causes the accused to be inlarged: And things standing in this posture undecided, he doth strive to indear Vrsicinus to himself, whom he would seem to have deli••ered from the danger of a tryal; but withal, removes him from the Court (where all his thoughts were placed) not∣withsta••ding this face of friendship he put on, perswading the Emperor under hand against him.

CHAP. 31.

The chief arts and ways of slanderers.

WHen any one is accused to have spoke ill of the Prince, how much the nearer these reproaches come to truth, by so much the easilier is the accusation credited; as appears in the example of Granius Marcellus, of whom Tacitus, Annal. 1. Whom Caepio Crispinus accused to have re∣viled Tiberius, which was an inevitable accu∣sation, for he having chosen out the greatest blemishes of Tiberius his life, did impose them the accused; which because they were true, were believed to have been spoken. This example have many slanderers followed, reproaching many Princes of their vices, under pretence of informing them of other mens detractions; which one would think should be a suffici∣ent reason to perswade them from giving ear to these Calumniators.

And Tiberius truly, who though he was a lover of informations, yet he hated his own reproaches; and therefore least he should hear them in the Senate, where they were occasionally brought in by way of accusing others, retired to Caprea, Believing (as Taci∣tus avers) that he ought to avoid the Assemblies of the Senate, least he should be compelled to

hear reproachful, but yet true, uttered of himself in his own hearing.

This way also do some take onely to reprove Princes for their vices; as they that would reprove Nero for his Mothers murther, did use to inveigh against others for the like acts in his hearing; yet more with a design to correct the fault in Caesar, then to ruine those that they accuse. These are the choicest ways that slander takes, but who will undertake to trace her in all her turnings? For calumny is a monster that hath a thousand shapes, and a thousand sleights to do mischief with.

CHAP. 32.

The deceits and danger of Court∣praises, and Masqued Courtiers. Lastly, The third way of oppressing our Courtier by force.

FRom Slanders, let us come to Praises, of which also as we have hinted before, there is great use in undermining others; for many men do by this means, Palliate secret Hate, Envy, and Emulation, to the end, they may deceive more easily. So Fabius Valens with secret criminations, defamed Martius Valens that suspected no such thing from him; who

to betray him more securely, did always speak well of him in publike, Tacitus Hist. 1. So Arbetio with the blandishments of a great kindness, did assault Vrsicinus, and frequent∣ly call him in publike, A valiant gallant per∣son, thereby craftily to intangle in more deadly snares, that harmless, and well-meaning man. Ammianus Marcellinus, Lib. 15.

Alphonsus, King of Arragon, as one was praising another man unreasonably in his presence, beyond his wont, turning about to a friend said, Without doubt this fellow seeks the destruction of him he praises: Neither was the King deceived in his opinion, for six moneths after, this intemperate praiser, ac∣cused before the seat of Justice, him that he had so highly extolled; and had undone him, had not the King interposed for his preser∣vation.

Mucianus having in the Senate heaped many praises upon Antonius Primus, whom he could not openly oppress; loads him also with secret promises, and points him out the further Spain, left void for him by the decease of Cluvius Rufus, giving to his friends and followers, several commands in the Army. And afterward, when he had filled him with ambition, and desire, he sud∣denly undermines his power by taking from him the Seventh Legion, which was exceed∣ingly devoted to Anthony.

Neither is this way traced by Courtiers onely, but also by Princes themselves, when they desire to abate or take down any body. For Tiberius did thus confer the Prae∣torship upon, and invite to his Table, Libo, (whom he secretly suspected and hated) without change of countenance or showing anger in his words, till he saw his time (he had so concealed his indignation) as Tacitus tells you, Annal. 2. By the same artifice, you saw he overthrew Sejanus: Domitian was never more to be feared, then when he smiled; the praises of Andronicus were the beginning of injuries. Nicetas called his liberality, An earnest of the confiscation of that mans goods, and his lenity a forerunner of a certain death.

Yet there are some that seek by their ap∣plauses onely, to stir up the Pri••ces envy to∣wards them they praise, for so Tacitus tells, Julius Agricola was ruined with Domitian. The cause of his destruction was no Crime nor Complaint against him, but the Princes envy to the vertues and glory of the man, stirred up by the worst kinde of enemies, unseasonable and trea∣cherous praisers. There is extant, a saying of the Emperor Julian, That there are no more dangerous Enemies in the world, then Masked Courtiers; whom Mammertinus describes in a Panegyrick, saying, That with a crafty artifice they did in all company, slander

men by way of Praises, and under the titles of friendship.

But we see that some have used these praises towards one, with an intention of reproaching another, whom they desired to affront with the dis••••militude of his merit: Plutarch accuses Herodotus with this spight∣ful kinde of dealing in his commendations of the Athenians, for the brave repulse they gave the Persians, which saith he, was not intended so much for the Athenians honor, as the shame and disgrace of the other Greeks. Seneca attests, that Kings are wont to praise their dead servants, to make those blush that are alive: So did Augustus extol the faithful services of Maecenas, and Agrippa, when his daughters lusts being discovered; he seeking thereby to reprove his familiars and servan••••, as negligent and careless of the honor and service of their Prince.

The same was Augustus his end in praising and dispraising of Tiberius, of whom Taci∣tus writes thus; Augustus when a few years before he demanded the Tribunicial power in the Senate for Tiberius, although he did in his speech touch upon many things of his behavior, his habit, and maner of living; which, as it were, by way of excuse he did reproach him with, &c. Therefore these things ought to warn us to look as well into the intention of those that praise us, as of those that caluminate us.

These two first ways of undermining our Courtier, to wit, Of removing him out of the way, under some fair pretence; or, of making him hated, or suspected by the Prince; being sufficiently discoursed of, there remains one∣ly untouched, the third and last way of all, Open violence; which principally takes place, when either the people or the sol∣diery offended with the dignity, or maner of the favorite, run into a publike sedition. The tumults of the Parisians, when the people raged at the captivity of their King John, with the English, are sufficiently known; as also the fortune of those, upon that sediti∣on, who bore the principal offices under his Son, then supplying his Fathers place in the Government.

But few years since, the Janizaries, more then once, have by sedition deprived the Turkish Emperors of their Ministers of greatest trust and authority: Out of more ancient stories, the time of Arcadius will furnish us with some examples; Ruffinus was amongst others, principally beloved by this Emperor, with whom Stilico being offended, and de∣termining his destruction, sent Gainas with his forces, as it were, to assist the Emperor, but indeed to deprive him of Ruffinus, as it came to pass: For Ruffinus going to the Army, the Soldiers of Gainas upon the signal given, ran together, and com∣passing

Ruffinus in, tore him in pieces.

Eutropius being then put in Ruffinus his place; when the chief Courtiers like∣wise grew discontented with him, by the contrivance of the same Gainas, Tribigildus raises a Rebellion, overrunning and spoil∣ing all Asia, and denies to accept any con∣ditions of a peace, till Eutropius were re∣moved out of the way; which by the per∣swasion of Gainas, the Emperor consented at last unto: Neither was this enough, for Gainas being afterward openly joyned with Tribigildus, to the end he might suffer himself to be reconciled to Arcadius the Emperor, demanded, That Aurelius Sa∣turnius, and John Chrysostome, then the chief Moderators of the Emperors Affairs, should be given up to him; which being done, he sent them into banishment, con∣tenting himself with giving them (before their departure out of his presence) the Edge of his Sword for to handle, that they might feel how sharp it was.

CHAP. 33.

Sometimes the Princes own ill and cruel Nature, envying the deserts of his Servants, is cause of the Courtiers fall▪ and this, how it is to be hand∣led.

OFtentimes, although our Courtiers un∣derprop themselves with all other sup∣ports, yet the nature of the Prince, as being either over light, vain, jealous, envious, covetous, cruel, or timorous, makes their ruine inevita∣ble. These diseases as being incorporated into them, do for the most part elude, and overgrow the circumspection of the prudent∣est men. Seneca, whose authority had with Nero far more of liberty, then flattery; in the beginning, being wise and skilful in the arts of Court, was fain to yield at last, as quite overcome by the malice of the Princes na∣ture: First, he was envied by him for his eloquen••e, then for his riches, and lastly, be∣ing opprest with malicious slanders, he lost both the Princes favor, and his life.

The jealousie and envy of Princes, hath been so formidable to some, that they had rather be lessened to their loss, then incur their envy by doing their business prosper∣••••sly and well. Publius Ventidius fearing

the envy of Mark Anthony, under whom he served, contented himself to have beaten the Parthians by three Victories into Media, and would not prosecute his good fortune any farther. Agathias tells us, that during the Reign of Justinian, the same was done by Bellisarius; least the greatness of his Victories, and the acclamations of the peo∣ple, should stir up the hate of the Peers, and envy of the Prince against him.

Truly such as these do not minde their own honor, and the profit of the Prince, as they ought to do; but the fault is not so much in them, as in the Prince himself; And therefore it was, that Maecenas per∣swaded Augustus, not to impute his ill successes to his Ministers, nor envy their prosperous acti∣ons. For (saith he) many of them that man∣age Publique affairs, have done it very negli∣gently, for fear of envy, choosing rather to hazard their glory, then their safety. Yet I do much more approve their way, who to avoid envy, whatever great and fortunate actions they did, would needs ascribe the glory of it to the Prince, though absent. Agrippa, Augustus his Son in Law, perswades us to undertake great adventures; but having performed them to attribute the glory of it to the Prince, as he himself was always wont to do.

So Joab besiedging Rabatham, though he could, refused to take it in, before David

himself came thither. Craterus when the business of Artacena was to be determined, waits for Alexanders coming; Julius Agri∣cola (as Tacitus writes) never did boastingly apply his acts to his own glory, but cast all upon Fortune, as the author and guide of all he did, who was but her servant.

This envy and emulation, though they are diseases incident to the generousest Princes (such as Philip and Alexander were) yet they are more predominant and malig∣nant in some, then others. Theodosius, the second Emperor of that name, committed the charge of building a Wall at Constan∣tinople from Sea to Sea unto Cyrus, which work he effecting in threescore days; This great dispatch was so grateful to the people, that they cryed out in the streets, That Constantine built the City, and Cyrus had restored it; which being heard by the Em∣peror, brought so great an envy upon Cyrus, that he could not expiate it any other way, but by putting on a Religious habit.

He that hath to do with such Princes, is to consider, That he walks upon ashes, under which fire lies concealed; and therefore must he still examine their inclinations with great diligence, to the end, he may either defend himself against them; or, if it fall out that he cannot, that he may have this satisfacti∣on of minde at least, That he hath done

his duty, and all that in Prudence he ought.

CHAP. 34.

How to preserve our Favor and Office, with the succeeding Prince.

HE is deservedly to be remembred a∣mongst the Darlings of Fortune, whose Authority and Interest being great with one Prince, continues so with his Successor. It is truly a thing very rare in Courts, be∣cause he that is to succeed, is for the most part suspected by the present Prince; and therefore, they who manage his affairs, are necessitated to be adverse unto the Heir apparent; from whence, commonly deadly emnities arise. Besides this also, the succeeding Prince hath for the most part Servants known, and en∣deared unto him, by a long fidelity, and many services; for whose advancement to dignity that he may make way, he will ordinarily, either of his own accord, or by the per∣swasion of those that desire to succeed, lay aside the Servants of the deceased Prince.

Yet there are some, whom either the state of affairs, for which they are more able,

and apt then others; or some other dexterous quality, and taking humor, doth so insinuat•• them into the succeeding Prince, That one Prince dying, they loose nothing thereby, but his person. Macro, that he might obtain Caligula his favor, sets his own wife Ennia upon him, to inveigle him with love, and binde him in a marriage. The same man commanded Tiberius to be smothered with clothes, as he was sick and dying, as Taci∣tus affirms. Julian the Emperor retained Arbetio still, because he thought him useful, although he hated him for his pride, and turbulent disposition. And Valentinian after him, called the same man unto him to op∣pose against Procopius.

We have hitherto handled onely such things as our Courtier, who will enjoy the Princes favor, ought to avoid; But the sum of all Counsels that can here be given to him, is, A modesty towards the Prince, such as becomes a man, more mindful of his duty, then of his swelling fortune; let him never boast, nor do any thing irreverently; and as much as possibly he can, let him avoid envy; which hath been so dreadful to many, and those great men, That some of them with pretending a love of ease, others imbracing a retirement to study, have showed themselves averse to publique affairs. Examples in both which cases, the Historians give us in Domi∣tian

and Galba. He must take heed, he pass not over carelesly, either those treacherous kinde of praises we spoke of before, nor the slanders that are cast upon him: They that Calumniate us, do say, That either we are wanting in some thing that is necessary to serve the Prince well; or else, That we have said, or done something, either really, or intentionally, to the prejudice of him, or his service. As to the defects imputed unto us, we must either modestly excuse, and justifie our selves, or else amend them; or lastly, endeavor with some other vertues to recompence those wants. Our words and actions ought to be so moderated▪ and weighed, That they may not be obnoxi∣ous to ill interpretations; we ought always to endeavor to search into other mens opinions, and inclinations, before we discover our own; And if either by chance or negligence, any thing slip from us, which may po••sibly offend, we must when we reflect upon it, by some respective means, or by some kinde of occasi••nal interpretation, amongst other discourse, let them see, what we spoke was not with an intention of offending any body.

If we shall once discover, that we are calumniated by any one, we ought as little as may be, be absent•• from the Prince, to whom we are slandered; for besides that, love abates towards those that are absent, detraction also in time takes root, if it be not

seasonably contradicted with truth; for a jealousie being once put into the Princes head, in time through the many suggestions of the ac∣cuser, there being no body to gainsay; takes such footing at last, That oftentimes the Prince hates the person accused, before he exa∣mines the crime.

He therefore that will provide for his safe∣ty, must make himself at Court, one friend or more, to defend him in his absence against the dangerous assaults of Calumny: But withal, he must take care they be persons of Condition and Honor, or at least, men of In∣terest, and such as have access to the Prince's ear, as readily as our Enemies. I confess, the store of such Friends in Court, is but very small, where it is the usual custom, almost amongst all, if not to persecute their companions themselves, at least to suffer them to be oppressed by others. But yet it happens sometimes, That there is one that either out of gratitude for benefits received, or with a desire of obliging us, or else out of hatred, to∣wards our accusers, will perform that office.

CHAP. 35.

Ostentation of the Prince's favor, to be avoided: Something also concern∣ing our Friends and followers.

LEt our Courtier avoid all ostentation of the Princes favor, not onely to eschew the envy of the rest of his Companions, but also of the Prince himself: For lately, when the Grandees of Spain went about to sup∣plant Cardinal Spin••sa, under Philip the Second, see with what a wile they circum∣vented him: They all struck sail to him, they all seemed to acknowledge, that their fortunes depended upon his favor; the very domestick servants of the King, shewed themselves very obedient, and ready at his beck: Which when the Prince observed, he was removed from Court, and all that power and greatness which he had acquired, in less then two years fell to nothing.

Let therefore our Courtier learn to be contented with a modest ••rain of attendants, and with a ra••e of living rather beneath the dignity wherewith he is honored by the Prince, then above it; which he must be sure never to exceed. It is unseasonable to lessen your attendants, when your fortune is declining. It availed Seneca nothing, after

he had lost Neroes favor, to hide himself in his private house, and betake himself to his studies, nor to shut out visitants with his pretence of want of health. Neither did it advantage Agricola a whit, to have entred the City by night, and with a slender company of followers: Wherefore it is necessary, That we put on a face of modesty betimes, and hold on so.

Yet although I would not have our Courtier be besieged with too great a thr••ng of Friends and Servants, I would not have him neglect to make many Creatures and Fol∣lowers; not to serve him in his pomp, but to support and comfort him, if any adversity should happen: For although an adverse Fortune findes few of these prove friends, yet there are for the most part, some among them who will endeavor to shelter and assist you; if not out of friendship, yet out of respect to their own advantage, which they may well expect from the restauration of your For∣tune.

CHAP. 36.

How to manage and dispense the Princes favor, advices, and comforts in ad∣versity, with other rules.

BUt as it is a great content and help in ad∣versity, to have communicated your prospe∣rity freely and generously to many, in using the favor of the Prince, to their assistance and advantage; so our Courtier is to be warn∣ed, That he warily and industriously di∣spence these benefits; for it is certain, That whatsoever the Prince shall at our intreaty do for any man, a great part of it is by him imputed, as done to us. Wherefore, unless the Princes favor towards us, be very large, we must not be too prodigal of sharing it amongst others: And very seldom must we introduce or commend any unto the Prince, who are not in some measure known unto him, as well as to our selves, whose deserts we ought first carefully to look into, observing that saying of Horace.

Till thou art certain what his vertues be, In no mans praises be thou over-free; Least he transgress, and purchase shame to thee.

Moreover, let those favors also, which you demand for any body from the Prince, be

fit for the person, and suitable with the times, consistant also with the dignity, and emolu∣ment of the Prince; and lastly, such as you know have been formerly obtained by others. If the Prince grants it, we must let him see we take it as a great favor done unto our selves; if he refuse, we must take heed that he do not perceive we are offended.

That is also to be observed here, which we have touched upon before, That we must never vainly make show of the Princes favor, nor give it out, That he is governed by us; for we have told you before, how ill that suc∣ceeded with some. Princes whatsoever they do, desire to be thought to do it of them∣selves, without the help and authority of any others, especially their Subjects.

If the Prince shall lay any weighty com∣mand upon us, we endeavor to have it in writing, and as clearly interpreted unto us, as is possible: We must not omit to represent unto him, such difficulties before we under∣take the business, as we apprehend will oc∣cur unto us in the execution. If it be a thing committed to us in secresie, and unfit to be written, we are to repeat the Commands over and over (yet without absurdity) in the Princes presence, to the end we may better understand the intention of him that gives them, and also that he may not forget what orders he gave us.

We must also show our selves ready for the meanest imployments the Prince will cast upon us; for many times a small matter is the occasion of a great fortune; and Princes would have their commands to be weighed not by the importance of the affair, but by the greatness and dignity of him the giver; being no less incensed at our refusal of sleight enterpises, then our declining of great and hazardous undertakings, when imposed by him upon us. When we are attending upon the Prince, we ought to watch dili∣gently, that we be not surprised nor over∣whelmed with sudden commands; And to that end, always as much as may be, we ought to ruminate before hand all things then a∣foot, and to prepare our minde and under∣standing for whatever may come in agitation. We must likewise take heed, that we im∣portune not the Prince with unseasonable nor impertinent discourses, but onely with what we both know to be certain, and judge to be fit for him to hear. When the Prince speaks, we must appear attentive, not as if we thought of something else; not sad, not musing, least we should seem either to sleight, or dislike what he says.

If any one disgusted, or injured by the Prince, shall come and make his complaint to us, we must let him see we are sorry for his misfortune; perswading him to patience, and

silence, and encouraging him to hope well; lessening the injury, and excusing the Prince. But with such as these, we must deal wari∣ly, for there are those that counterfeit wrongs and discontents, to see if they can draw any testimony of an ill will to the Prince out of us, that thence they may take an occasion to undo us: Others are injured indeed, but yet are weak and imprudent, not being able to conceal what is out of friendship commu∣nicated to them in secret.

If our condition be such, that we keep a train of servants, we are to take great care that none of them speak licentiously, either of the Prince, or his Favorites; for many times the servants fault is cast upon the Master, from whom his words and acti∣ons are often thought to proceed. Amongst the principal rules of a Courtiers Prudence, this is one, To discover and smell out betimes, the change and diminution of the Princes af∣fection towards us, to the end, that the knot of love between you, may rather be gently untied, then cut in sunder. For so many times the cause of our distaste being removed, or worn away, there is sometimes an easie return for us unto our former favor, especially, if we seem, either not to remember, or not to have understood the injury.

CHAP. 37.

How to make a judgement of the con∣stancy, or change of the Princes affection to us.

TO the end our Courtier may judge of the constancy of the Prince's favor towards him, It is not enough that he know the Princes humor, with the authority and power, both of his friends and enemies in Court; but, he must principally weigh the original cause of the Prince's love towards him: For, if that once cease, or be found more prevalent in another, without doubt, the affection of the Prince will either wholly cool, or at least be much diminished.

Yet sometimes it is hard to divine what is the reason, that you are so beloved; and truly, it is sometimes onely a fortunate felici∣ty, for which no reason can be given, though ordinarily the Princes love arises, either out of similitude of disposition, out of the plea∣singness of your humor and maners, out of your services done him, or from your vertue; or last∣ly, from your obsequious plyableness to his will. That love which comes from the similitude, or takingness of your maners, although it seem very great for a time, yet it wears out soonest of all; both, because as we have said before

the nature of man changes daily with age, or with variety of business; and also, be∣cause it is hard to finde two dispositions so sympathizing together, as that they differ in nothing; and many times that wherein they differ, is of more power to divide them, then all the rest to unite them toge∣ther.

Yet I know not what Star doth so tune and temper some men still to the Princes liking, and disposition, that they can hard∣ly, if they would, do any dissonant or displea∣sing thing to him: And I do confess, That these men may make the best harvest, with a Prince of all others; especially, if they know skilfully how to choose and use their times, and how to take in their sails season∣ably before a storm.

CHAP. 38.

The Princes favor to Women: In∣structions for the Princes Mistresses; benefits conferred on Princes, often makes those persons hated by them, with other documents.

PRinces do sometimes also bestow this favor on Women, according as they are

more or less prone to venereal pleasures; but they also do frequently fall from favor, if not by their own faults, yet out of the Princes ••atiety, or finding out a fairer Mi∣stress. Wherefore, such Women as are crafty, are wont to divert Princes, as much as may be, from all commerce with other Women, especially such as may be likely to intangle the Princes minde; some also, by counter∣feiting disdain, and keeping state, have pre∣served their lover; and lastly, some more audacious and bold, when they saw the Prince once truly love them, have kept him still drunk in lust, and drowned in plea∣sure.

Which arts Poppaea practised upon Nero, For when she saw that he was enamored of her, becoming proud, if she entertained him a night or two, it was all she could afford him; saying, She was a married wife, and could not abandon her Husband Otho, who for his parts and be∣havior exceeded Nero: That in using a Bond∣slave, acts for his Concubine, had learned nothing from that servile familiarity, but baseness and nigardice: Thus Tacitus reports her dis∣courses, Annal. 13. And soon after, Annal. 14. the same Poppaea despairing now of marrying Nero, or of seeing him divorced from Octavia, as long as Agrippina lived: Sometimes taunt∣ingly, and sometimes merrily, began to reproach the Prince, calling him a Ward, and subject to

others controulment; and said, he was so far from the Government of the Empire, that he wanted his own liberty. Some Princes Mi∣stresses have by this means held their affecti∣ons faster, then by the dallyings and blan∣dishments of pleasure; yet, as I said before, there is no constancy in this kinde of affecti∣on to be relied upon long.

Truly one would think that love, which you have gained by your services, should be stable and more firm, then what comes from flattery or pleasure, as arising out of an honest cause; and which being cherished in you, is apt to stir up others to merit as well by vertuous undertakings. Yet experience often teaches us, that very great services have in Courts been the ruine of those that have performed them; by reason, that Princes are wont to hate, whom they cannot re∣quite. They will not be indebted to a sub∣ject, and therefore do fly the sight of those that have exceeding well deserved of them, as if they did with their looks reproach them of ingratitude; which is the reason, why the condition of such men in Courts, is much to be pittied; for when they have obliged the Prince by any service, they are ashamed by and by, to ask a reward, least they should seem not to have giyen, but sold the benefit they did him; who in the mean time, as Princes are often regardless of

the service received, and slow to reward, draws out, day after day, till the memory of the benefit wears out in the mindes of those that were privy to it; whose silent reproaches he feared before.

Which some men observing, have judged it fit, to strike the Iron whilst it was hot; and when they were designed for any business, to look to their reward, before they undertook the imployment; knowing well, that with Princes the hope of future services, is more prevalent to induce reward, then the memory of those that are past; and that it is better to be obliged to Princes, then to have them obliged to us; because they believe, who∣ever they have obliged, to wish well to them, whilst he that they are indebted unto, be∣cause he is believed not to love the Prince that hath denied him, what he pretended unto; is recompenced onely with hate. This Commines tells us, was Lewis the E∣leventh his opinion.

The love of Princes towards the Mini∣sters of their pleasure, would seem to be sta∣ble; and truly, it is of some continuance, as long as the inclinations of the Prince to pleasure continue; but those changing, the affections to those that fed them, change al∣so. Sometimes likewise, the Prince inclining to the ove of vertue, doth reject and abo∣minate those that are instruments of his

pleasures. But as some of the inclinations of Princes are more durable then others, so also is their favor (as I said) of a proportioned continuance, towards the Servants of those veral inclinations.

CHAP. 39.

Sundry precepts concerning the Plea∣sures, and Inclinations of the Prince, &c.

I Will not touch here upon all pleasures, whereunto the nature of the Prince is prone, because all of them are not fit, or apt to have the greatness of any mans fortune built upon them. Those passions that are of any greatest sway in Princes mindes, and familiar unto them, are three, to wit, Wan∣ton love, Cruelty, and Avarice: The first, as it is more vehement then all the rest, so it is more incertain, and inconstant; for though the vice still remains as to the Subject, yet it keeps not fixed still upon the same object: Ne∣vertheless, many have used this as a founda∣tion, whereupon to build their fortunes, not sticking to prostitute their Wives, so they might gain the favor of the Prince; as we read in Tacitus, that Otho did, although it

••ell not out well with him; for Nero re∣moved him from Court, least he should have a rival there.

Others that they might binde their Prin∣ces unto them, made themselves Witnesses and Companions of their wickedness and lusts, by the example of Tigellinus. These men do not think that Princes have a trick to free themselves of publike blame and envy, to sa∣crifice oftentimes such kinde of men unto it: And all those servants of their lusts are to expect the same fortune as hapned to Remirus de Orco, the Minister of Caesar Borgia his cruelties; whom at last, Borgia caused to be murthered, as guilty of all the ill that he had done.

And from the example of this Remirus, we may also read their destiny, who serve the Prince in his cruelties; for the Princes affection seldom endures towards them, both because he doth, as it were, daily read his wickedness in seeing them, and also is afrai•• of them, whom he knows so apt to villan•• Nero although hardned in vice, and of •• cruel nature, yet after his Mothers death hated Anicetus, as one whose face daily re∣proached him with his Mothers murther.

The affections of Avarice are least of all changeable; the diversity of the object doth not vary in these, as in those of love; it is not diminished, but encreases with age; and

although it is as hateful to the people; as cruel∣ty, yet it is longer endured, because it covers and cloaks all exactions, under the pretence of Publique necessity, Parsimony, and the Com∣mon good. Therefore, those that upon this score serve Princes, may long preserve them∣selves in their favor, whilst (which is rare in these kinde of men) they do not become froward and peevish, nor too much intend in∣riching themselves.

Frowardness, which for the most part is likewise contumelious, begets hatred both to the Prince, and to it self; The author of which, the Prince will at last cast away, to remove the envy of it from himself.

Riches are also obnoxious to envy, not of the people onely, but sometimes of the Prince himself; who if he be truly avaricious, will hardly be content, till he have squeezed the full Sponge, as we read that Vespasian was wont to do; but will rather imitate the Country Clowns, who when they have fatned their Hogs, do kill and devour them. Truly, France hath seen many such, who being proud and peevish, and who making too much hast to be rich, have thereby, and by their insolence, from a great height of fortune, faln to nothing.

In the time of Philip le Belle, Peter Ber∣chius, High Chamberlain, and Treasurer of France, was strangled at Paris; Lewis,

Philips Son, afterward coming to the Crown, Enguerrandus Marigny met with the same misfortune: Under Charls the Seventh, Gya∣censis, in dignity equal to B••rchias, was brought to the Bar, and afterwards sowed in a Sack, and drowned; his Successor Camus Beaulieu was killed at Poytiers; and the same end had come under Philip the First, to Peter Essart, if with an Hundred thou∣sand Florens he had not redeemed his life.

I could recount more neerer us, but that I am willing to spare their memory: In the mean time these examples are sufficient to instruct, That as the too great easiness of these Ministers brings too great a detri∣ment upon the Princes profit; so their in∣solent griping, and frowardness, draws hate and destruction upon themselves: And that as we ought not to refuse a just occasion of inriching our selves, so we must not show our selves too greedy after riches, nor amass so much together, as may expose us to the Publique Envy.

CHAP. 40.

Concluding with many choice, and necessary Admonitions.

THere remains onely now unhandled the last cause, why Courtiers are be∣loved by their Princes; to wit, An aptness, and singular ability to dispatch, and manage their Affairs: For which reason, When we see that we are become acceptable to the Prince, we must consider, Whether he love this apt∣ness for business, because of the usefulness and necessity of it; or else, because the Prince de∣sires to acquire from us that aptitude to himself. If it be grateful, because it is necessary, his favor to us will endure as long as the necessity remains; but his love, will rather be a forced, then voluntary love.

If we see the Prince aspire to the glory of this aptitude for business, there is no doubt, but when he sees; that he cannot either equal, or excel us, we shall become an eye-sore, and unacceptable to him; for there is in Prince; an innate desire, as well as in all other men, of excelling all persons in those arts they addict themselves unto; and therefore no man, al∣most, is pleased to be excelled in them by his own servant. As••••ius Pollio, some ex∣horting him to make a reply to those Verses

Augustus Caesar had made against him, an∣swered, That he would not by contending to seem the better Scribe, draw his envy upon him, that had power to proscribe him. There arising a dispute once between Favorinus the Phi∣losopher, and the Emperor Adrian, about some word, wherein the Philisopher at last seemed to yeild; his Friends wondring at it, he said, I am not ashamed to be overcome in knowledge by him, that commands Thirty Legions.

To this purpose, that saying of Solomon is very notorious, Do not seem wise before the King. It is necessary therefore, That who∣soever desires to purchase a Princes favor, must se•• aside the desire of his own glory; and not onely in verbal disputes, but in every thing else, yeild him the day: And to that end, it will not be amiss, on purpose to commit some errors and over-sights; so that they be not too gross, nor like to take too much from our repute.

Out of our discourse hitherto, it is evi∣dent▪ how little certainty is in all the great∣ness and favor at Court; Wherefore, the best counsel that can be given to all Courtiers, is, To prepare themselves for their fall; for al∣though it is thought a more generous thing to fight, then to flie, when you are once en∣tred these lists; yet if you are to do it with greater hazard of danger, then hope of success,

it is not indiscreet to sound a retreat betimes, and in imitation of the Parthians, to fight flying.

As it is also a more glorious thing to de∣scend gently by steps, and as it were, to go out at the door, then to be cast headlong out at the Window; so it is less shameful, under colour of some specious and contrived pretences, to bid adieu to your Honors and Offices, then to expect to be stript disgracefully of them: And hereunto may fitly be applied the saying of an ancient Roman.

Why dost thou weary tired Fortune so? Depart the Court, before thou art forc'd to go.

Seneca says, it is happiness to die in the midst of your felicity; but I on the other side think That Courtier happy, who in the midst of his prosperous race makes a retreat. Perhaps he that shall do so, shall not be applauded by all, but by some that look upon the outsides of things, be judged un∣worthy of the Fortune that he hath so abandon∣ed. Yet he that is wise, not regarding such idle discourses, will provide for his own safety, and remember, that in all games, it is better to give over a winner, then a looser; as also, that no prudent man will exchange or adventure certain things, for things so very uncertain.

Though our ascent to these heights of For∣tune and Dignities, is, as it were, by steps in order; yet our descents, if not timely fore∣seen, are for the most part headlong, and suddain: So that those that are flourish∣ing in Favor and Authority, if they chance once to slip, or stumble, their falls are light∣ly desperate and fatal.

Behold here the Compendium of all, that I desired to say, for our Courtiers instructi∣on: Whether these pre••epts be pertinent, and select or no, I will not determine, but leave that to the judgement and experience of my Friends. For my own part, I confess, I have at present no great use of them, and am so far from being transported with sadness, at my private and retired condition, that I do hearti∣ly say with Seneca;

Let him that pleases, stand upon The slippery Battlements of Court: I am well content to live alone, Obscure, and free from all resort. A sweet reti••ement I desire, To all things that are Great unknown: Where I to Vertue may aspire; Therewith my latter days to Crown.

That so when Time hath stoln away My health, and scarcely left me breath, Without disturbance, finde I may A quiet, and a happy death. And that may cheerfully imbrace, As being terrible to none But those, who known in every place, Die onely to themselves unknown.

FINIS.