Separation of churches from episcopal government, as practised by the present non-conformists, proved schismatical from such principles as are least controverted and do withal most popularly explain the sinfulness and mischief of schism ... by Henry Dodwell ...

CHAP. II. That we cannot be so well assured of our Salvation, in the use of Extraordinary, as of Ordinary Means.

THE CONTENTS.

[§ I] The 2. Head, That for proving this want of so solid Assurance of the welfare of particular Persons out of Ecclesiastical Com∣munion as may be had in it, it will be sufficient to shew that, however God may provide for the Salvation of particular Per∣sons, in an Extraordinary way, without this external Commu∣nion, yet, that this is a Case indeed rare and Extraordinary, and not easily to be expected, and therefore not to be trusted with any confidence; and that, at least, the Ordinary Means of Salvati∣on are confined to the External Communion of the Visible Church. The difference betwixt the Ordinary and Extraordi∣nary Means of Salvation. §. I.II.III.IV. The former Head proved in both particulars: 1. That we cannot be so well assured of our Salvation in the use of Extraordinary, as of Ordinary, Means. The Extraordinary Means whereby we may be assured of our Salvation are Conjectures concerning the Divine Uncovenanted Goodness. Concerning these it is proved 1. That the Assurance grounded on these Conjectures is not such as can afford any solid comfort to the Person concerned. The extream difficulty of making application of what might be con∣cluded from this Divine Uncovenanted Goodness to particular Cases. §. V.VI.VII.VIII.IX.X. The particulars necessary for Assurance in this Case are such as God is not obliged to by his Uncovenanted Goodness. §. XI.XII.XIII.XIV.XV.XVI.XVII. 2. The comfort that might otherwise have been expected from these Conjectures is not comparable to that which may be had from those general Ordinary Means which God hath provided for by express Revelation. This proved by three Degrees. §. XVIII.XIX.XX.XXI.XXII. 3. These expectations from Extraor∣dinaries

not seasonable in our Adversaries Case who might ob∣tain the Ordinary Means by Concessions not Sinful. §. XXIII. 4. The relief by Extraordinary pretences to Gods Uncovenanted Goodness must needs be rendred more difficult since the establish∣ment of Ordinaries. §. XXIV.XXV.XXVI.XXVII.

I PROCEED therefore to the 2. thing proposed, That none be can so well Assured of his Salvation out of this visible Church, or consequently out of that part of it of which Providence has made him a Member, as in it; And that this Visible Church must be the Episcopal, that particularly to whose Jurisdiction he belongs. This may be resolved into two easie parts: 1. That though our Salvation might be equally sure in it self, yet, at least, that none can be so well assured of it in the use of Extra∣ordinary, as of Ordinary, Means; 2. That the Ordinary Means, at least, of Salvation are indeed confined to the External Com∣munion of the Visible Church; And that the Episcopal Church, under whose Jurisdiction any one lives, is that Visible Church, out of which the Ordinry Means of Salvation are not to be had by any whilst he lives under that Jurisdiction.

[§ II] 1. THOƲGH our Salvation might be equally sure in it self, yet none can be so well assured of it in the use of Extraordina∣ry, as of Ordinary, Means. For clearing this it must first be un∣derstood what we mean by Ordinary, and what by Extraordina∣ry, Means of our Salvation. The Means therefore whereby we may be assured of our Salvation are those whereby the Difficul∣ties occurring in the procurement of our Salvation are most Re∣gularly provided for. And they are reducible to these Heads: 1. To assure us that our past misdemeanors Antecedent to our ad∣mission into the Favour of God, both of Original and Actual Sins, shall not be imputed to us for the future, to our Prejudice. For till we be assured of this we shall have very Just reason to Question the real security of our condition. And because our Natural Strength is not sufficient to perform our Duty for the fu∣ture, though all our past offences had been really forgiven us, and yet without probable hopes of our future performance we can have no assurance of our future Security; therefore it is further re∣quisite 2. That we be, upon our own Endeavours, assured of those Supernatural Divine Assistances without which our unassisted natural Endeavours are not likely alone to prove sufficient. For

Rewards promised to impossible performances cannot afford us any comfort, and without these Assistances our Duty would prove im∣possible to us. And yet, notwithstanding these Assistances, we are still obnoxious to so many inadvertencies and impure mixtures by reason of the faint concurrence of our Wills, as might render our best performances unacceptable if God should deal in rigor with them, so that even these Assistances themselves could not sufficiently secure us of the Event, unless 3. We may also be Assured further that neither the frequent Imperfections and faileurs to which the most regular Lives here are obnoxious shall be rigorously insisted on to the Prejudice of the principal Duties to which they do adhere; nor that even those lapses into Sins, to which Sincerely-meaning Persons are sometimes inclinable, shall hinder their reception again upon a serious Repentance and Refor∣mation. And yet further after all Heaven is a Supernatural re∣ward and therefore not due nor proportionable, to our performance of Duty though it had been more accurate than we can pretend it is; and therefore it is requisite 4. That we be assured actually of these Supernatural rewards on performance of these Duties, which, though performed by the assistance of Divine Grace, and expiated from their appendent weaknesses and Imperfections, do very much fall short of an adaequate proportion to so glorious a reward. These are the true inducements to all those Duties which are required of us in the Gospel, and upon these depends all that rational comfort of our Consciences which we are capa∣ble of receiving in this Life even from the performance of our Du∣ty; and therefore those are the Means of our Salvation by which we may be secured of them.

[§ III] AND the difference betwixt Ordinary and Extraordinary Means, upon these Principles, is, that we call those Ordinary to which God has left the Generality of that part of Mankind for whom he has intended these Favours to assure themselves of their performance; but those Extraordinary by which those may as∣sure themselves of them whose Case has something singular, not comprehended under▪ those Generals for which Ordinary Means are calculated, and therefore not capable of being Judged by those General Measures by which other Mens Cases are generally to be Judged, and yet withal has something singular not only to excuse the deviation, but also to intitle to the principal Benefits at∣tainable in the use of Ordinary Means by the Equity of Gods de∣sign

in settling those that are Ordinary. For without these excu∣sing Circumstances, which may expiate the deviation; and with∣out these recommending, which may in Equity i••••itle them to the reward according to the true design of God in giving it; the Sin∣gularity of such a Persons Case is so far from intitling him to Ex∣traordinary Means of Salvation, that as it plainly supposes him destitute of all good hopes by Gods Ordinary provisions, so it can secure him no other refuge in that destitute condition.

[§ IV] SO that, to explain this difference by an Ordinary familiar Parallel, the Ordinary Means of Salvation are like our Courts of Common Law by which he only can expect any benefit who can justifie his Title by Ruled Cases or standing Laws or some such other express provisions of the Legislative power, but the Ex∣traordinary are like our Courts of Chancery to which he only has recourse who finds himself unable to hold out in a Legal way of tryal, and who can expect no advantage to his Cause from the general express Provisions, but only from the Equity of the true design of the Legislators.

[§ V] THESE things therefore being thus premised to clear the meaning of the terms, I now proceed more immediately to shew the thing designed, That we cannot be so well assured of our Sal∣vation in the use of Extraordinary as of Ordinary Means. And though I might, from the Explication now given, appeal to the Consciences of our dissenting Brethren themselves, whether themselves would not be more confident of a Title which might abide a Legal tryal, than of such a one as must need the relief of Chancery; and of such a one as might be cleared from the plain and express words of the Legislator, than of such a one as is capa∣ble of no other Evidence than only Conjectures concerning the de∣sign of the Legislator, and Conjectural Consequences deduced from it, which may be judged of so very differently by different Per∣sons; Yet to satisfie them of the reasonableness of it, and to make a more particular application to their Case, and that they may not think my following Discourse superstructed on any gra∣tuitous Presumptions which have not been proved true in that sense which is requisite for my design, I shall therefore consider it a little more particularly. In order whereunto I consider that, though the Ordinary Means whereby Men were to assure them∣selves of the Particulars now mentioned which are necessary to assure them of their Salvation, were, before the Revelations of

the Gospel, at least in regard of the greatest part of Mankind, no better than such indefinite Conjectures concerning the Divine Goodness, yet God may alter that Case, and actually has done it since the Gospel, and clear and express Revelations of his Will when they are made are as capable of being the Ordinary Means whereby Mankind may assure themselves of their Security in these Particulars as those indefinite Conjectures to which they had been necessitated formerly for want of better Evidence. But we do not call express Revelation an Extraordinary Means, though it had been concerning a particular Case which is the only possible pretence for calling it Extraordinary.

[§ VI] HOWEVER as to what we are at present concerned for, it is plain, and I believe unquestionable by our Adversaries them∣selves, that the Means of Salvation mentioned in the Scriptures are such only as are common to the Generality of Mankind, and that there are no favours there promised to particular Persons but such as may be equally expected by all upon an equal performance of Conditions; so that though Means of Salvation provided for by express Revelation might, in propriety of Speech, be called Ex∣traordinary, yet that is not a thing capable of being pleaded in our Case. And therefore all the Assurance of which a Person is capable whose Case is so singular as that it cannot be Judged of by the general provisions of the Gospel, and who therefore can derive no comfort from any Topick deducible from thence, can only be grounded on those general indefinite Notions of the Di∣vine Goodness, whereby he is ready to pardon unavoidable fail∣ings, and to accept of our Wills and sincere designs for Perfor∣mance even in order to the reward which he had designed for us upon performance, when it is not our own fault that we are hin∣dred from actual performance. I shall therefore endeavour to shew 1. That the Assurance which can be grounded on this No∣tion of the Divine Ʋncovenanted Goodness is not such as may af∣ford a Person concerned any solid comfort for the performance of the things now mentioned; 2. That though it might afford some comfort, yet that comfort cannot be comparable to that which may be had from those general Ordinary Means which God has provided for by express Revelation; 3. That the expectations from Extraordinaries are not seasonable in our Adversaries Case who might obtain the Ordinary Means by Concessions not sinful; and 4. That the relief by Extraordinary pretences to Gods

Ʋncovenanted Goodness must needs be rendred more difficult up∣on the establishment of Ordinaries.

[§ VII] 1. THE Assurance which can be grounded on this Notion of the Divine Ʋncovenanted Goodness is not such as may afford a Per∣son concerned any solid comfort for the performance of the things now mentioned. I will not in general deny it to be possible that a Man may be actually saved by being actually assisted in the perfor∣mance of his Duty, and actually indulged in the defect•• of that Performance, and actually settled in the possession of this reward. Nor will I deny that God may actually do this on account of his Natural and Essential Uncovenanted Goodness; nay may be pre∣sumed frequently to do it, where he is not confined in his transacti∣ons by Threat•• expresly denounced, and clearly promulged, against Offenders (which, besides the obligation on his part from his own Veracity to performance, must certainly prove, in the Event, an exceeding aggravation of their guilt, and an incapaci∣ty of pardon to them, to whom they are so denounced and pro∣mulged) Not only because God is naturally Arbitrary in the di∣stribution of his Favours, and he is not in that Case supposed to have confined himself by any voluntary Obligations; but also because the pardonableness of such Persons in their omissions of those Duties which to such Persons are Morally impossible, and their good meaning to the uttermost of their Abilities Morally considered may be rational inducements to a Nature so generous and beneficient as God is, not only to pardon, but reward, them. Nor will I deny further that even after God has been pleased to provide better for us Ordinarily, by admitting us into Covenant with him, and by giving us express Revelations, yet he may be merciful to particular Persons wanting the Ordinary Means with out any fault of their own, that is, when they are in a place where they cannot be had at all, or where their Fallible Superiors are so unreasonable as that they cannot be admitted to them with∣out Sinful complyances. This is a thing so universally acknow∣ledged, as that it is not denyed by the Romanists themselves who are the most rigorous Assertors of strict Discipline, and blind Obedience, who hold Ordinary Superiors generally Fallible, and others Fallible at least in matters of Fact, of which kind some∣thing is generally mixed in most exercises of Ecclesiastical Disci∣pline. And I am so sensible that this is an undue deference to Ec∣clesiastical Powers to make all their Censures even where mi∣staken

and unjustly inflicted to destroy the possibility of the Sal∣vation of such a Person who is not only Innocent of the Crime for which he is censured, but is ready to submit to all unsinful Con∣ditions whereby he may recover the Communion he has lost, and in the mean time behaves himself Modestly, and gives Active Obedience as far as his Conscience will permit him, and Passive where it will not; as that, according to my own Observations in the Introduction, §. 10.11.12. I shall readily acknowledg those Arguments Fallacious that prove it, and shall therefore be wary that my own Arguments be not liable to any such Excep∣tion.

[§ VIII] THAT therefore which I shall at present endeavour shall be only to shew that how much soever Gods Natural Goodness may incline him to do for us; yet these general Presumptions con∣cerning it are not so satisfactory to our particular Consciences, to assure us of any of the Favours now mentioned, barely on that account; And consequently cannot Encourage us either easily to presume that God may not be of the mind of our Superiors in matters Disputable, or that he will not confirm their censures, though mistaken, if we do not make use of all the Modesty and Endeavours now mentiond for recovering actual Communion. For though it be indeed most certain that God is good, and that his Goodness does exceed infinitely that of the best natured Men; yet it is withal as certain that he is not Fond, and that his Good∣ness must be reconciled, not only with his other Attributes, but also the Intrinsick Merit of the thing, especially as it may have influence on the Government of the Word, and particularly on that of Mankind, that is, that his Goodness cannot prompt him to do any thing but what, on some of these accounts, is really rea∣sonable. Now in this regard many things may be so pernicious, not only in respect of their intrinsick malignity, but also of the ill influence of their Example for encouraging others by their Im∣punity, as that even his Goodness may not hinder him from an Ob∣ligation to punish them. It is certain that in this regard many faults neither otherwise very great in themselves, and very par∣donable in their Circumstances, are yet thought very Necessarily and Justly punishable with great severity, as the sleeping of over-watched Sentinels.

[§ IX] AND considering the Obscurity of many things very requi∣site in this way for passing an accurate and Impartial Judgment

concerning any particular Action; and withal considering the weakness of our Faculties either for discerning or judging with∣out Prejudice; and Considering that what may indeed be great in regard of Us or that Society for which we are concerned, may yet be very little in comparison of the great designs of God for the Universal good of Mankind, and on the contrary; so that it may be as Just and Obliging, for any thing we know to the contrary, to destroy whole Nations for the good of Mankind in general, as it is confessedly obliging, notwithstanding any pre∣tence of the Obligingness of Goodness to pardon, to destroy many Criminals for the good of a particular Nation; and con∣sidering particularly what Liberty our dissenting Brethrens Cal∣vinistical Principles allow God in the actual exercise, not only of his Justice, but, his Soveraign Dominion, notwithstanding any Obligingness of his Goodness to the contrary; and Lastly consider∣ing that the Sin of Schism, of which they must prove guilty if by their own faults they are deprived of actual Communion, is of that sort which is mischievous to the Publick and for whose Pu∣nishment God is therefore more concerned, and wherein his Relation of a Governour confines that Liberty he might other∣wise have of pardoning it: I say, all these things being im∣partially considered, it cannot be thought so easy a matter to assure him of his good condition that, upon any account so∣ever is deprived of actual Communion, as our Brethren con∣ceive it.

[§ X] SEEING therefore that in these Extraordinary Cases, God may, with perfect Justice, withdraw his Ʋncovenanted mercies, such of them especially as he is not by his Goodness obliged to grant us; and Seeing that our Information is so extremely im∣perfect as that we cannot secure our Selves in these Cases, whe∣ther his Justice be not only permitted, but obliged, to the actual infliction of Punishments (in which Case it is unreasonable to expect that his Justice should be over ruled by his Goodness) and Seeing that his Justice which is infallibly guided by his Omnis∣cience is certainly obliged in many Cases which our weaker and more Prejudiced Faculties may not Judg so dangerous; the com∣fort must needs be very small that can be gathered from these general Presumptions. Nor is it in the least disagreeable with the design of God as a Governour, that even they who in the event shall have the benefit of his Indulgence should at present

want the comfort of it. Not only to oblige them to greater cautiousness in approving their own Sincerity by all Lawful en∣deavours to recover Communion; but also to discourage all others who might otherwise venture on their Case though they would not manage it with like Sincerity. For by rewarding them in the other World God sufficiently corresponds with his natural Goodness; and yet by making their condition uncom∣fortable in this World he does no more than what becomes him as a Governour to deter others from imitating them without the like necessity; Seeing nothing but a like necessity can make it any way Prudent to venture on a State in it self so extremely dangerous and uncomfortable.

[§ XI] BUT besides this extreme difficulty in making application to particular Cases even in those very Instances wherein God may be supposed Obliged, by his natural Goodness to do something for them (without which particular application it is impossible that particular Persons should enjoy any solid comfort) I consider fur∣ther that the particulars now mentioned, for which we are at present concerned, are such as purely depend on his Arbitrary pleasure, and to which he is not obliged by that Beneficence which is natural to him as he is the Creator and Governour of the World. And when this is proved it will then appear how little ground there can be for any to be confident of any comfort in this con∣dition so as to venture on it on any avoidable, that is, on any unsinful conditions. For how can any one assure himself of Gods actual will in things depending on his Arbitrary disposal without particular express Revelation? And I have already given warn∣ing that that is not to be expected in this Case of Extraordinary Means of which I am now discoursing. And yet this will ap∣pear true in all the Particulars now mentioned. For neither is he obliged by this Natural Beneficence to do any good to his Creature as Offending, but only as Obedient; Nor does any necessary reason oblige his natural Goodness to pardon that of∣fence of which his Creature must be supposed Guilty Antece∣dently to his Indulgence; Nor, if he would pardon the offence, does his natural Goodness oblige him to give his further assist∣ances for future Obedience; Nor, if he would do this, is he obliged to reward his Creature having once offended, and much less to accept of an imperfect instead of a perfect Obedience in order to a reward; Nor, if he would be further pleased to

admit us to a capacity of a reward, is he obliged by this na∣tural Goodness to reward our best performances with a Superna∣tural and Eternal reward.

[§ XII] He is not Obliged by this natural Goodness to do any good to his Creature as Offending, but only as Obedient. For as a good Go∣vernor of the World he is only so far Obliged to do good to his Creatures as may make them voluntarily subservient to the end of his Government. Now to this purpose, the most rational way (and it is by the reasonableness of the thing that this sort of Obli∣gation is to be measured) is only to do good to those that are Obedient. For if they who are disobedient do yet partake of the Divine Goodness as well as the Obedient, it will thence appear that Obedience is not made the only Means of obteining the in∣fluences of that Goodness, and therefore that such Goodness cannot be a rational inducement to secure actual Obedience, if it may be hoped for without it. I desire it may be remembred that I am not now speaking of the Divine Goodness as inducing, but as Obliging, God, that is, only of that precise degree of Goodness which is necessary to be exerted by him if he would approve himself a gracious God and a good Governour. And so the Argu∣ment will proceed with greater cogency. For if, notwith∣standing our Sins God be Obliged by his natural Goodness still to do us good, and especially if he be obliged to shew his Goodness to us in the instances now mentioned, to forgive us our Sins and to receive us to Favour and Rewards, &c. So that he cannot ap∣prove himself a good God, and a gracious Governour, without it (and it is impossible that he should not act according to the Obli∣gation of that natural Goodness, as impossible as it is for him to cease to be a good God, and a gracious Governour) than it will be plain that our Sins can prove no hindrances to his Goodness to us. Which if they do not, what rational Obligation can car∣nal Persons have to leave them, when notwithstanding their com∣mitting them they can lose nothing by them?

[§ XIII] POSSIBLY it may be Objected, that God may be as much obliged by rational inducements as others are by Positive Commands, and it may be conceived to be as difficult for him not to do what he knows to be fit and rational, or to do what he knows to be otherwise, as to omit what he knows necessary to be done, or to do what he knows necessary to be omitted; inasmuch as he may be conceived obliged, not only by the necessity of the

thing, but by that also of acting rationally. But besides that this Objection does as much overthrow the Divine Liberty in other things as in the distribution of his Goodness, and therefore must in other regards be acknowledged solvible by our Adversaries them∣selves as well is in this: I am not at present particularly con∣cerned to undertake it. For my present design it is abundantly sufficient that by the same reason whereby we Judg any thing else free to God. (and it must be a great violence to our own Faculties and a contradiction to the Current of the Scripture totally to deny the Divine Liberty) we have also reason to believe that he freely distributes the good things for which we are at pre∣sent concerned. For supposing there were nothing really free as to God himself, the reason then why we should conceive any thing as▪ free to him would be only this, that we should conceive those things as free to him for which we knew no necessarily ob∣liging reason, and we must necessarily be ignorant of such a rea∣son in such things which exceeded our natural capacities. And therefore considering that, Antecedently to Positive Revelation, the only reason which we can conceive as obligatory to God, to do any good to his Creature, is his Relation of a Creator or Go∣vernour to it, whatsoever is not obligatory to him on these ac∣counts must, in this way of proceeding, be conceived as free to him. At least our Ignorance of any obligatory Cause is perfectly sufficient for my present design, to shew how little ground of comfort we can have from such an expectation on these Terms.

[§ XIV] NOR did any necessary reason oblige his natural Goodness to pardon these Offences of his Creatures, at least no such reason as is discoverable by us▪ from these Relations of his being our good Creator and Governour. This appears clearly from the Revelations of the Gospel by which we know that we were, upon account of our Offences, perfectly liable to the actual inflictions of his Justice. If we had not been so, what need had there been of the Satis∣faction and sufferings of Christ for attoning the Divine Justice for our Sins Antecedently to our admission into the Evangelical Co∣venant? And if we were, it must necessarily follow that he was not obliged by his Providential Goodness to pardon us. For the Divine Attributes must not be conceived as inconsistent with each other, and they must needs be so if God may there Justly punish where he is, by his natural Providential Goodness, obliged to

forgive. For in this Case the very Right of his Justice must be overpowered by his Goodness. And it is further considerable in this Case, that his Justice does as well concern him as a Gover∣nour as his Goodness; whence it will also further follow that, if the Justice of his Government will permit him actually to pu∣nish, then the Goodness of his Government cannot oblige him actually to forgive. For no actual Practice of God can possibly oppose any Obligation of his Nature. Nay further yet it is to be remembred that the Obligation of his Justice it self is indeed no other but a higher Obligation of his Goodness. For it must not be conceived that the essentially-Good nature of God can be ob∣liged to inflict any evil whatsoever as an evil. But that he is obliged to punish the offences of particular Persons, when either a greater good is promoted by the punishment than could be by the Impunity, as none can doubt but that the good of the Publick is greater than that of a particular Person, and more concerning God as he is a Governour; or even when the mischief likely to befal even the particular Person himself, if permitted to go on without Punishment is indeed greater than that of the Punishment it self (which may also be applied to our present Case, not that any evil can be greater to the Individual than Damnation, but that real Damnation, which may be avoided by the fear of it in this Life, is indeed incomparably a greater mischief than the fear it self) this is indeed only a higher Obligation of his Goodness, and therefore uncapable of being taken of by such an Obligation of the same Attribute as is certainly inferior.

[§ XV] NOR, if he would be actually pleased to pardon his Creature, is he yet obliged further to give it his further assistances for future Obedience. For besides that this is a favour Additional to the former, and of which the Creature cannot, even by the Law of Gods Goodness it self, be supposed capable till it be fitted for it by the former (I mean of that Goodness which obliges him to act, not Fondly, but Justly and Rationally, and in compliance with his other Attributes) and therefore cannot be due where the former is not, as none can think him to have any Title to higher, who has none to lower, degrees of favour; I say besides this, there can be nothing said for disobliging God in point of his Goodness from preventing those Sins which were Antecedent to our admission to his favour at first but will proceed with as much force here, and no Objections can be urged for impeaching Gods

Goodness, for not giving his restraining and assisting Graces for prevention of future misdemeanors, but will as well reflect on it for not giving the same Grace at first for hindring those Offences which at first made us need his pardoning favour. So that the same Reasons, which prove the former Favour undue, must also prove these Objections false and unconcluding. So that there will be no need for us at present to be-solicitous for their parti∣cular Solution. Besides that this Presumption lies against them, that this is a Case wherein Reason is so far from concluding ne∣cessarily on either hand, and wherein it is so little able to inform us of those Secrets of Government which if we understood we may conceive very likely exceedingly to alter the merit of the Cause, and therefore actual Revelation concerning it must needs be a surer way of arguing, and in Prudence much fitter to be trusted for regulating our Practice than any of those general Conjectures, which our Reason is able to propose concerning it.

[§ XVI] NOR yet further (though he should be pleased to grant the Assistances of his Grace for the better security of our future Obe∣dience) does his Goodness oblige him to reward his Creature having once offended, and much less to accept of an imperfect instead of a perfect Obedience in Order to a reward. It does not oblige him to reward his Creature having once offended. Indeed Reason of State may sometimes oblige such Princes, whose wellfare depends upon the State, to connive at Rebellions where the Persons en∣gaged in them are numerous. But where Princes themselves are less dependent, and can Right themselves notwithstanding any whatsoever opposition of their Subjects, it may indeed become their Clemency, but they cannot be obliged to reward them even upon their return to their Duty and their better observance of it after they have once been pardoned. Especially where Justice and the Publick Interest require a publick satisfaction, for fear of the ill consequence of an Example of Impunity, as our dissenting Brethren themselves confess the Satisfaction of Christ to have been necessary in our present Case. If it be requisite for the Good of Mankind that Divine Justice should be satisfied before the Creature could be pardoned, no Providential Goodness could oblige God to give his own Son to suffer for that purpose; much less to give him for Mankind, and not for the fallen Angels; least of all to purchase rewards for Us whilst we were in a Condition

of Hostility, and to reward those Services which as they come from us are weak and imperfect and full of impure ad∣herences, and as they come from him are no other than his own Gifts.

[§ XVII] BUT if his native Goodness should even thus far prevail with him as to pass by these disadvantages on our part, and to pay this debt of a Reward, not to our performances, but to his own ••ative Generosity; yet the highest Rewards which concern him as a Creator and Governour of the World are only Natural. And the concession of these as they were abundantly sufficient, to prevail with the Creature, in a way of rational inducement, to comply with the designs of his Providence; so they were enough to intitle him a good Creator, and a bountiful Governour. But it could have been nothing more derogatory to his Providential bounty to have refused Supernatural Rewards than it is that he has not given all Men the uttermost advantages for the Goods of their minds their Bodies and their Fortunes, which there is no doubt but that his Omnipotence could have procured for them.

[§ XVIII] 2. THOƲGH this Assurance, which may be grounded on this Notion of the Divine Ʋncovenanted Goodness, might indeed afford some comfort to a Person who had nothing else to rely on; yet that comfort cannot be comparable to that which may be had from those general Ordinary means which God has provided for by express Revelation. And this Observation comes perfectly home to the Case for which we are at present concerned, that is, to prove our dissenting Brethren obliged to submit to all unsinful compliances rather than want the use of the Ordinary means of Salvation. For, by the Principles proved in the former Chapter, the less security of a State for Salvation (but especially then when this less security is extremely little, as I have now immediately proved it to be) is sufficient, not only in Prudence▪ to perswade them to endeavour for a State more secure; but also in Conscience, to oblige them rather to submit to any condition of gaining it that is not Sinful, than fail of it. For proving therefore that the Assurance which may be gained by the use of these Ordinary means is indeed greater than that which may be had by Extraor∣dinary, I consider that whatever is pleadable from this Ʋncove∣nanted Goodness is much more strongly pleadable from that Good∣ness which may be expected by such as are in Covenant; That

none of those Exceptions which have been objected against the former way of Arguing in Case of Extraordinary means are capable of being urged in Case of Ordinaries; And that indeed the thing is of that Nature that, as it cannot be proved by any necessary consequence from the Divine Nature, so, the only competent proof to be expected for it is only actual express Revelation.

[§ XIX] WHATEƲER is pleadable from the Ʋncovenanted Good∣ness of God is much more strongly pleadable from that Goodness which may be expected by such as are in Covenant. For God does not cease to be naturally Good by entring into Covenant with us; and whatever is necessary for approving himself thus Providenti∣ally Good before, must also be necessary after. For his being pleased to condescend so far as to enter into Covenant being only a higher instance of his Goodness cannot be conceived to disoblige him either from being or appearing as Good as he was formerly, and whatever is necessary to make him appear so, being necessary on account of its own nature, must be so unalterably and eternally. And though it be certain that God is not by his natural Providen∣tial Goodness obliged to be alike Good to all; yet that it self is not pleadable in our present Case, as if he might on this Arbitrary account in the actual Dispensation of his Goodness be expected better to those who are not in Covenant with him, than to those who are. For they who are so far favoured already as to be admitted into Covenant with him are not only thereby intitled to the further Favours which are expresly treated for in the Covenant, but also to the indefinite expectations of his Provi∣dential Goodness. For by admitting them thus far, he plainly owns them as his peculiar Favorites; and Favorites are always looked on as the most likely Candidates for unpromised, as well as promised, and Covenanted, Favours. And as they who are thus far owned have, even in this way of Arguing from the Equity and reasonableness of the thing it self, a much fairer Title, and consequently a much better Argument for assuring themselves in their pretensions to those indefinite Favours than they who are not; so they have above them that evidence of express Revelation of which the condition of others is not capable. Which is not only an Additional but a surer Argument in things of this nature, and of which Men in their Ordinary Conversation are generally more confident. Every one is much better satisfied with the

express Promise even of a good Man than with his good inclinations and well wishes; and wher ever they are any thing diffident, it is to these express Promises that they have their ultimate recourse for satisfaction.

[§ XX] NOR are any of those Exceptions, which have been objected against the former way of Arguing in Case of Extraordinary Means, only from Gods indefinite Goodness, capable of being urged here, in Arguing from his formal Covenant, and express Revelation. All those Arguments concerning the obscurity of many things to our Rational faculties, which in this way of proceeding, are absolutely necessary for Judging accurately, or indeed with any Probability are here prevented. For how obscure soever they are to us, yet they are sufficiently clear to God, on whose Testi∣mony it is that we are obliged to believe what he has been pleased to reveal. And when we are thus assured of a Truth by the Testimony of him who infallibly knows it, we are not then so much concerned for other things which may have a connexion with it, either as Objections or Arguments, because we are sure such a Testimony is a much better Argument to prove it true than any deducible from such Topicks, either for proving or dis∣proving it. Especially when the thing is such as we have shewn the Subject of our present Disputes to be, that it does not it self fall immediately under our cognizance, and when the Objections also do not disprove it, but only weaken the force of some Argu∣ments produced for proving it, as those are which we have made use of against the Arguments only producible by Reason unassisted by Revelation. Especially considering also that not only Gods actual Revelation is a much better Argument to assure us what may be expected from him than only indefinite Conjectures con∣cerning his natural Goodness; but also that the Arguments, whereby an actual Revelation may be proved, are more clear, and cogent, than such Conjectures. Nor are those Arguments, which were there made use of, to prove him not obliged by his natural Goodness to confer those favours on us which he has designed for us in the Gospel, conclusive here; because it may please him to do many Favours for us to which he is not obliged by his natural Goodness, and it is his actual pleasure that we are assured of by actual Revelation.

[§ XXI] FROM whence also appears the Reasonableness of what was proposed in the last place as considerable for clearing this present

Head, That the things necessary to be proved, in order to the com∣fort of Persons here concerned, are such, that, as they cannot be proved by any necessary consequence from the Divine Nature; so, the only competent proof to be expected for them is only actual ex∣press Revelation. This is so clear from what has been already said, that it will only need application. For having shewn that our Title to these favours does not appear from any necessary Obligation incumbent on him by virtue of his natural Goodness, it plainly followes that their distribution is free and Arbitrary to him. Now in such things as these the only way of knowing his actual pleasure is by an actual Revelation. So that from hence it appears, not only, that Revelation is a much more solid Argu∣ment for comfort than these Conjectures from the Divine Natural Goodness, but also that it is the only Argument in most of those Particulars requisite for this purpose where these Conjectures are not capable of proving them actually true, but only possible to be so▪ that is, indeed where they are not capable of being any Argu∣ments for positive comfort, but only Exceptions against those Argu∣ments, that are deducible from the Divine Nature Antecedently to Revelation, which might drive them into direct Despair. Which none can in Prudence think it safe to trust to where better may be had by unsinful condescensions. Especially considering how far actual Revelation may after the Case, and that God may be obliged to do many evils to us, on account of his actual Reve∣lation, to which he had not been obliged by any of his Essential Attributes.

[§ XXII] AND for bringing this whole Discourse more home to our dissenting Brethrens Case, I only desire further that it may be remembred that their Case, who cannot plead a Title to the Pro∣mises by the performance even of those External Conditions which are required by the Gospel, is exactly the same in this re∣gard with theirs who might have pleaded for Gospel Favours, by the performance of Moral Duties, Antecedently to actual Reve∣lation. They can plead as little Revelation for their comfort, as the others. For though the Gospel do not expresly deny its Fa∣vours to the performers of the Moral Conditions without the external and ritual ones; yet it is withal as certain, that it does, with as little expressness, intitle such to them. So that both of them are alike necessitated to depend not on its Letter, but its Equity. And it is withal as clear that this Equity of the Gospel

cannot be pleaded independently on the Letter, from any other Topick but only the Divine Essential Ʋncovenanted Goodness; and that what is either obliging to God in regard of his Essential Goodness, or the Equity of his design in promulging the Evan∣gelical Covenant, is alike obliging to him in respect of Heathens, who never heard of the Gospel, as in respect of those who have heard it, but cannot assure themselves of their Interest in it by their performance of its Conditions, Ritual, as well as Moral. For the only Favour he can be thought to entertain for Christians not performing Conditions is only this, that, by making that per∣formance more possible to them, he has thereby admitted them to better advantages for gaining a Legal Title to the Priviledges of the Gospel. But upon any faileur in performance of Condi∣tions, the Divine Goodness and Equity is so far from giving them any advantage above others, as that they are less excusable than others to whom that performance is not so possible; and none can doubt but that they, who may be admitted to Ordinary Means by compliances not sinful, and willingly want them rather than they will submit to such compliances, must be much more culpable than they who cannot be admitted to them by any compliances whatsoever. And therefore by the same reason whereby it has appeared that these Conjectures from the Divine Goodness are improper, and insignificant for comfort, in the Case of Heathens, without express Revelation; they will also be as insignificant to failing Christians. For it is altogether as Arbitrary to God whether he will excuse the non-performance of, even External, Conditions when they may be performed without Sinful com∣pliance••, as whether he will accept of the Moral Conditions alone where the Rituals are utterly impossible. And consequently those as well as these are as incapable of being assured of the Goodness of their Condition without express Revelation, which in this Case must be as private and particular as in theirs, seeing it is so little spoken to in the general Revelations of the Gospel.

[§ XXIII] BUT further 3. These Expectations from Extraordinaries are not so seasonable in our Adversaries Case, who might obtain the Ordinary Means, by Concessions not Sinful. So that whatever force this Argument might have in other Cases, yet it can have none in theirs. For the very name of Extraordinaries plainly implies that they are such Means as God is pleased to make use

of upon the fail••ur of Ordinaries; and that, if they may be ex∣pected by any, they may most probably be expected by them, who (as they cannot be supposed by any fault of their own to have failed of the use of Ordinaries, nor consequently to have for∣feited their interest in Gods good will to them as their Creator and Governour so,) may therefore expect those indefinite effects of that good will which is natural to him as so related to them; not only such to which he is obliged by this Good will, but also such as are supposed to be at his Arbitrary disposal. For as even such things may not be despaired of by such, to whom as he is naturally thus well affected, so they are not conscious to themselves of any neglect on their part that might demerit or diminish this Affection. So that it is plain that the whole reason of this hope is their present Interest in Gods good will; which if they have forfeited, God may still wish as well to his Creatures and Subjects as formerly, yet so as that his well wishes can administer no com∣fort to them who have lost their Title to it. And how is it possible that he should have the confidence to expect Extraordinary Fa∣vours from God, who has through any neglect of endeavour on his own part failed of those that are Ordinary? How can he with any reason expect any of those Favours to which God is not pre∣cisely Obliged by that Goodness which is natural to him as a Creator and Governour, whose actual performances have been so little endearing that he has nothing that can recommend him to this natural Love of God but precisely that he is his Creature and Subject, though an undutiful one? How can he expect that God should condescend so far as to vary from his own General Rules and Ordinary Provisions, and not only to excuse his deviations from them, but to contrive Extraordinary Means for his particular Salvation, who in the mean time is so unwilling for his sake to part with his own humour in compliances not Sinful? But this, as it comes also exactly home to our dissenting Brethrens Case, so, I conceive it so clear as not to need any further prosecu∣tion.

[§ XXIV] 4. THEREFORE it is further to be considered, that the relief, by Extraordinary pretences to Gods Ʋncovenanted Goodness, must needs be rendred more difficult upon the establishment of Ordi∣naries. For since the establishment of Ordinaries, there is reason to presume that God has declared it, not only as agreeable to his wisdom, but his actual pleasure, neither to save many without the

use of those Ordinary Means; nor indeed any but such as have these Ordinaries, at least in voto, and that so efficaciously as that no Difficulties, or Impositions not Sinful, howere Inconvenient, could hinder them from their actual use. So that such a Person who may have the Ordinary Means on any tolerable, that is, not Sinful compliances, cannot, if he want them, have any solid rea∣son for Comfort on account of Gods Goodness in an Extraordinary way. This is agreeable with the constant Rule of Gods pro∣ceedings in matters of this nature. Thus Naaman could not be cleansed from his leaprosy till he had washed in Jordan; nor the blind man in the Gospel cured of his blindness, till he had washed in the pool of Siloam; nor could St. Pauls companions have expected to have escaped Shipwrack, notwithstanding Gods Promise for it to him (which I am sure is an incomparably stronger and more convincing Argument than our general guesses at the Goodness only of his Natu••e) if they had not kept within the Ship. And in the Case I am at present discoursing of, the reason is very easy. For it is not conceivable that God should institute Ordinary Means of Salvation, and yet leave it to the Liberty of his Creatures to neglect them without any pretence of unavoidable Necessity, or Sinful compliances required as Con∣ditions of them. And particularly in these External Ordinary Means of Salvation, the only reason obliging us to the Observa∣tion of them is the Spiritual and Supernatural benefit to be pro∣cured in the use of them (as the Reward is the only Obligation to the performance of Duty in any Case whatsoever) and there∣fore certainly it must be the Intention of God, in inviting us to the Observation of these External Ordinary Means of Grace by the Promises of these Supernatural Assistances in the use of them, that they who are deficient to themselves, in not using their ut∣most Diligence to procure these Means, should fail of the Re∣ward.

[§ XXV] AND though Antecedently to the Divine Positive Injunctions we might indeed expect the effects of the general Divine Good∣ness without such Positive Observations; yet the reason why we might do so is plainly this, because in that Case we should have no reason to fear least we should incur the Divine displeasure by such a neglect, and so being able to maintain a Conscience on our part of having kept a fair correspondence with God according to our weak abilities, we might expect the general ••ffects of the

Divine Goodness and Indulgence. But where God has expresly required an external Observance, and has sufficiently promulged his mind concerning it, and the Creature obliged knows its Duty, and yet neglects it, or does not use all Moral Diligence, or sub∣mit to all Lawful compliances rather than hazard the Probability of provoking God by its omission, there it is plain it cannot pre∣serve this clearness of Conscience on its own part, which is the only solid ground of any probable expectations of the Divine Favour; whence is necessarily followes, that, in this latter Case its hopes must necessarily be confined to the performance of its Ordinary Duty. And considering that it is God who requires this External Duty from them, and who must therefore be pre∣sumed displeased by its Omission; and considering that no In∣convenience whatsoever can in any reason be thought comparable to that of the loss of the Divine Favour; it plainly follows that no Inconvenience whatsoever can in any reason be sufficient to excuse this Omission, and therefore, that nothing can do it under Sin.

[§ XXVI] BUT in the Subject of our present Discourse it is further considerable that besides this general Diffidence which ought in reason to follow from the Omission of any of the Divine Com∣mands; there is a particular reason to distrust the conveiances of Grace when we do not make use of the Means of that con∣veiance: as in Gods Ordinary Providence there is reason to distrust a Harvest when we have neglected plowing and sowing; not only in regard of the displeasure of God to be feared from the neglect, but also of the nature of the things as he has been pleased to order and establish them. It is very true that God can, even since his establishment of the Ordinary Means of Grace, give his Grace without the use of the Ordinary Means, now as well as formerly, and that he has sometimes done it. And it is withal as True, that he can give a Harvest without the labour of the Husbandman, nay and has sometimes done it too, as in the Seaventh Year, and in other Cases, among the Israelites. But our Enquiry is not what may be done, but of what we may be confident that it will be done; and therefore not what is barely Possible, but what is also Probable: for of such things only we can have any comfort or confidence. And can any Prudent Hus∣bandman be confident of a Harvest in such a Case because God can give it him still, and sometimes has given it? If such a hope

be counted extremely Irrational and Presumptuous, and God be ordinarily thought obliged by the Rules of his general Providence to defeat and disappoint it, to confine Men to the Ordinary Means of their own Diligence, and so to oblige them to a regular and constant subserviency to the designs of his Ordinary Providence; let it be considered whether it be not as reasonable to expect the same dealing here, to confine Men to the use of the Ordinary means of Salvation. Is not the Salvation of Rational Creatures, for whose use the World it self is Created▪ as considerable in the Eyes of Providence as those Laws of the inferiour Creation which were only designed for their use? God himself has shewn the greater esteem he has for the wellfare of his Rational Creatures, when for their advantage, even in particular Cases, he has broken the general Laws of this inferior Creation.

[§ XXVII] AND is it probable that he should be more scrupulous in main∣taining the Rules of this less valued Government than the Rules of the Government of those whom he is pleased more highly to value? Is it likely that he should be more solicitous to oblige Men to use their utmost Diligence in providing for their Animal Life, than their incomparably more valuable Interests of their Eternal Sal∣vation? Or is not a confinement of their Diligence to the use of the Ordinary means of their Salvation as Prudent an Expedient to keep them lively, and active, and subservient to Providence, in working out their own Salvation; as a confinement to the Ordinary means of procuring external advantages is to oblige them to a subser∣viency to general Providence? Gods care for the Salvation of one Nation, the Jews alone, induced him not only to perform Miracles at the first Publication of his will to them, but also to a perpetual Succession of Miracles to future Ages. Such, besides those now mentioned, were those of the Shechinah over the Mercy seat, the Oracles of Ʋrim and Thummim, the ordinary Succession of Prophets, the water of Jealously, &c. And can we think that God would prefer the Rules of Ordinary Providence before this infinitely more valuable Dispensation of the Gospel? Could his care then be greater for a single Nation than it is now for the general Salvation of Mankind? Or for a Law designedly Temporal than for his Everlasting Gospel? Or for a Covenant confirmed by the blood of Bulls and Goats than that which has been confirmed by the invaluable blood of his dearest Son? For Promises, Primarily and Literally, only relating to their settle∣ment

in a terrestrial Inheritance than those exceeding great and pretious ones of an exceeding and eternal weight of Glory? I am sure the Apostle teaches us otherwise to argue. If he who bro••k Moses's Law died without Mercy under two or three Witnesses; Of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy who hath troden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the Covenant, wherewith he was sanctified, an unholy thing, and hath done despite unto the Spirit of Grace? If there∣fore God valued the Law of Moses before that of the inferior Creation, he must rather prefer that of the Gospel before it. And therefore if Men may not expect the benefits of Providence without the Observation of the Ordinary Means, and all possible Industry in obtaining them; no more can they, with any solid Prudent confidence, expect the benefits of the Gospel without their utmost Industry for procuring the Ordinary Means appoin∣ted by God for that purpose. Thus much concerning this. 1. Particular, that though our Salvation might be equally sure in it self, yet we cannot be so well assured of it in the use of Extraordin∣ary as of Ordinary Means.

Notes

• 2 Kings v.10. St. Joh. ix.7. Act. xxvii.31. Ver. 22.24.
• Lev. xxv.5.11. 2 King xix.29.
• Heb. x.28.29.