Jus regiminis, being a justification of defensive arms in general and consequently, of our revolutions and transactions to be the just right of the kingdom.

CHAP. V.

Some Opinions of Hobs's Machiavil, Pulpits, and others, examined. The Peo∣ples Power asserted in chusing, refusing, and rejecting Kings, according as they did or did not observe Laws and Covenants. Covenants equally oblige. If broken by one, the other is thereby set free. Ʋsages and Customs of other Nations. Sad examples of Perjury.

IT is true that Machiavil, Hobs, the Pulpits, and others do inculcate, That Kingly Pow∣er is so founded by God immediately, that there remaineth nothing human in it, and that publick consent is nothing at all requisite, and that Kings are responsible to God only: which is the ground of all Tyrannical, Arbitrary, and Unbounden Sway. For if Kingdoms by common consent can neither set Bounds nor Conditions, nor judg of them when limited to Kings, but must consider them as things meerly Divine (the greatest tye in the World) above all human Laws, Consent and Comprehension, then all Nations are equally Slaves, and born to no more Liberty than the Subjects of Rex Asinerum, whose Wooden Shoes and Canvas Breeches proclaim what a blessedness it is to be born under a meer divine Prerogative.

But the surest Basis of all right Government is common consent; and the most just and honourable End is common good, and not such a divine Prerogative as none can understand, nor possible for any Mortal to prove.

God is not more the Author of Regal then of Democratical, Aristocratical, or any other Form of Government or Power; nor more the Author of Supreme, than of Subordinate Powers: Subordinate Magistrates have their Power as much from God as Kings have, and as responsible to God only as they, and yet their Powers are not beyond human reprimand and de∣termination. Laws are not now to be understood to be any special Ordinances imme∣diately sent from Heaven, as of old by the Ministry of Angels or Prophets: they now can be nothing else amongst Christians but the Pactions and Agreements of such and such Politick Societies and Power; nay, the very Essence of Power is so Originally inhe∣rent in the People (that they cannot justly, without injury to God and Natures Law, devest themselves wholly of it,) and it is nothing else but the Might and Vertue, which such or such a Society of Men contains in it self; and when by such and such Laws of Common consent and Agreement it is derived and deligated into such and such Hands; God confirms that Law, and so Man is the free, natural, and voluntary Author; the Law is the Instrument, and God is the Establisher of both. All other Powers, not derived from common consent of the People, are but Sophisticate and Adulterate in all Princes, and they that imbrace such Powers, imbrace a Cloud instead of a Juno. The Fountain or Efficient Cause of Power is most certainly in the Governed: And from hence the inferrence is just, That Kings, though singulis majores, yet are uni∣versis minores; for if the People be the true efficient cause of Power (as undeniably they are) its a Rule both in Nature and Politicks quicquid efficit tale est magis tale. Hence it's manifest, that as the Governed are the efficient cause, so they, and their happy estate and condition, are the final end of all Governments. And it were strange, nay mon∣strous, that in conferring and deligating their own Power and Vertue to this or that Man, or to these or those Persons, to command in Chief for Order and Regulation sake only, should aim at any thing but at their own Good and Happiness, both in the first and last place. Or to express it in another Dialect, the Publick Power and Autho∣rity of all Societies, is above every individual contained in the same Societies, of what qua∣lity soever, Kings or not Kings.

All Imperial and Royal Dignities are instituted by the Commonwealth to preserve it self, and not erected to preserve Royal Dignity otherwise or farther than it conduces to the Honour, Safety, and Happiness of the Commonwealth. And that which is the End, is far more honourable and valuable, both in Nature and Polity, than that which is the Means, which leads us to the transcendent Law of Salus Populi; to which all Imperial and Prerogative Laws are justly subservient: and were they not conducing to those ends, they were neither necessary nor yet expedient.

Plea of Force or Conquest cannot acquit Princes of that which is due to the People, who are the Authors and Ends of all just Power, for meer force ought not to alter Laws of Nature, or frustrate the tenor of Laws of God or Man; and if it could, yet there were more reason why the People might justifie force to re-gain their undeniable Rights and Franchises, than the Imperialists might to subvert the same. It being unna∣tural that any Nation, by it's own inherent and natural Virtue and Prowess, should meerly establish Tyranny, and countenance Slavery, and to make that which is most Excellent subservient to that which is most Vile, or to advance one from among them∣selves to the Throne, that they themselves might be brought under Axes and Harrows. Even Heathen Princes, that have been Absolute, have acknowledged themselves Subject and Servants to the Publick, and born for that service, as being well satisfied, Populi rem esse non suam. No Captain-General hath such unlimited, and uncircumscribed Power, but that, if he should turn his Cannon upon his Soldiers, they were ipso facto absolved of all Oaths of Allegiance, and bound by a higher Duty, both to God and Na∣ture, to preserve themselves by Resistance and Defence: such tacite and implicite Trusts and Reservations are in all Publick Governments, though of the most Absolute Na∣ture; and there must be these necessary conditions, viz. that the Governed be Safe, Free, and Happy.

There is in all Laws a literal and an equitable sense. No Government did ever give Power to their Kings for their woe, but for their happiness. If by the Letter of the Law Kings mis-improve their Power against the equity thereof, then they give li∣berty to the commanded to refuse Obedience to the Letter: for the Law taking ab∣stract from its Original Reason, End, and Equity becomes a Shadow without a Sub∣stance, a Body without a Soul; which distinction, if not allowed, the very end of all Laws (which is to minister impartial Justice indifferently to every Man, and to give bounds and limits to the exorbitant wills of Princes and Governors) will be disap∣pointed, Salus Populi being the Suprema Lex. Execution of Laws according to their Equity and Reason is the Spirit; that gives life to Authority, the Letter kills. Equity is so naturally implied in all Laws, that are not meerly imperial from the Analogie, that all bodies Politick hold with the natural; whence all Government and Governors borrow a proportionable respect, except we deem Obedience binds Men to cut their own Throats or their Neighbours. For Kingdoms must not be without means to preserve themselves, which always is intrusted in some certain hand with a Power to provide in an orderly way for the good and safety of the whole.

All the Priviledges, Prerogatives, and Authorities conferred on Kings by any Peo∣ple, are but as so many Trusts reposed in them to improve for the good and glory of King and Kingdom, and not to abuse or use at their own pleasure, what ever the exegency of the Kingdom should be. If that were so, all our Laws would signifie little; and therefore if Kings Govern not according to Equity, and the Trusts reposed in them, that Nation, or it's Representatives, may demand an Account and Redress: For Kingdoms by no Law of God or Nature are to be left without a power and means to preserve themselves.

The Charter of Nature entitles all Subjects of all Countries to safety and freedom by its Supreme Law. If Kings receive all Royalty from the People, and for behoof of the People, and that by a special Trust of safety and liberty expresly by the People limited, and by their own Concessions and Oaths ratified (as for certain they do) then Emperors and Kings cannot be said to have so unlimited and high a property in our Lives, Liberties, and Possessions; or in any things else appertaining to their Crowns, as the Governed have in their Dignity, or in themselves. The safety of Kingdoms is to be valued above any right of any Monarch, as the end is to be preferred above the means. It is not just, nor possible for any Nation so to enslave it self, to re∣sign its own Interest to the will of one or many Lords, as that they may destroy or abuse it without Injury, and yet to have no right to preserve, or right it self: For since all natural Power is in those that obey, they which contract to obey to their own Ruine or Slavery, or having so contracted, they which esteem such contract before their own preservation, are fellonious to themselves, and rebels to Nature.

Livy lib. 1. ab. V. C. describing the beginning of the Roman Kingdom, Records, that among those Hundred named Kings after the Death of Romulus, who succeeded and governed that People successively, That if they did not please the People, it was or∣dained by common consent, that the People should chuse their Kings, and that the Autho∣rity of the Senate should confirm them.

It's manifest that Kings being set up by the People on conditions, which if they per∣form not, the People being Convocated according to their distinct Orders and Ranks, by the same Authority they had to set up Kings on Tearms and Conditions, by the very self∣same Authority they may curb and dethrone them; which they made good against proud Tarquin their last King. Moreover Seneca observes out o•• Cicero de Republica, that Appeals do lie from the King to the People, (as in the case of Horatius that killed his Sister, who by Delegates, appointed by Tullus Hostilius the King, was condemned, yet was afterwards absolved and quitted by the People.) Dionysius testifies the same, that Ro∣mulus, when he consulted about settling the Kingdom, did declare, That the King was the keeper of the Laws, yet in the mean time, that the Power of creating Magistrates, ma∣king Laws, War, and Peace, was still left with the People, as inherent in them. Populi suffragia sunto: Magistratus creanto: leges sciscunto: pacem bellumque jubento. Calv. 985. Which farther appears by the History of Collatinus, who first was Consul with Brutus, that the People (by which Title is understood the Plebeian State, which now is called the Third State, as among the Romans, viz. Patritian, Equestrian & Plebeian) had the same Power against the Consuls, although they had the Supreme Power when there were no Dictators. To this Livy lib. 2. ab. V. C. gives Testimony. Timens the Consul fearing to be called to Account at the end of his Consulship, quitted it: But Collatinus the Consul, though accused of no crime, yet being of the Name and Family of the Tarquins, was suspected and removed by the People. Hence it is easily gathered, that the People would much more use their Authority on any Consul, if criminally accused, although by the Law they were not to be questioned till their time was ended. It's true, after the Decemvirate was constituted (which was Anno 302.) no Appeal did lie from them to any other Magistrates: But when they alternately Governed, it was lawful to Appeal from the Judgment or Sentence of one to the Judgment and Sentence of another. So far unpleasing was an unlimitted Power to the Romans, that at last the Decemvirate was forced to quit their Power. It's true, no Appeal lay from the Dictatorship, but that Power was never erected but in very perillous times, and extreme oppression necessi∣tating, and lasted but a very little while. Cal. 1050. Semestre scilicet. And (which is yet more admirable) if at any time an Appeal to the People, from the Supreme Power of the Dictator was brought, he of his own accord consented: As may ap∣pear by the Transactions between L. Papyrius Dictator & 2. Fabias, Anno ab. V. C. 429.

Tho' Julius Caesar violently obtained his Power over the Romans, yet would seem and did pretend to have had all his Dignities and Gifts, according to the ancient custom from the People; for which Usurpation he was afterwards slain. So Augustus, no Heir of the Empire, but adopted by him to be his Successor, pretended that he was of right chosen by the consent of the People: Neither did Tiberius by any other way succeed him: and after him Caligula was chosen by the consent both of the Senate and the People; but Claudius first obtained the Empire and the Military Power by Bribes, but did not go∣vern without the consent of the People. Nero having poysoned him, succeeded him, and reigning tyrannically, the Senate resumed their Power (which had a long time slept) condemned him as an Enemy to the Roman State: By all which it appears, that Caesars becoming Tyrants, may lawfully be resisted and censured; and tho their Empire seem very large by the Lex Regia (made for Augustus and confirmed for Vespasian,) yet it was circumscribed and limited; neither was it approved of without exception, as long as there were places for Law and Equity. So the Athenians, when they changed their Democracy into an Aristocracy, they set over themselves, first Thirty, then Ten, who abusing their Poower, they soon removed and punished them by the same Power by which they created them.

The Lacedaemonian Kings having been wont to be chosen out of the Family of the Heraclides, which Lysander endeavoured to have altered but could not, Plutarch: their Kings being chosen on Terms and Conditions, the People appointed certain called Epho∣ri, to be a Bridle to them. These Ephori sometimes deposed, banished and beheaded, till at last Cleomenes the Tyrant traiterously slew them all. Zenophon records of the Lacedae∣monians, that both the Kings and Ephori were wont every Month mutually to swear to each other; these in the Name of the People, and the King in his own Name, That he would govern according to the Prescript of their Laws, and that they would keep the Citizens true to him, if he kept his Oath. This was the Right, Power, and Pra∣ctice of the Heathen, of which more hereafter.

Let us now consider the State of the Israelites, the most perfect Government in the World, if they would have been contented with it; for they had God for their only

Monarch, not only because he was Lord of the whole World, but because he chose them to be his peculiar People, in that he gave them Laws by Moses, and gave them the promised Land by Jeshua, who governed them by Judges; at which time the Govern∣ment was Monarchical, tho by the Ministry of the Judges; which if Kings would now imitate and govern accordingly, there would be no need of these Disputes, as it is now most necessary.

Tho God appointed David King, yet he was to be chosen by the People, 2 Sam. 5. 1. So Solomon, 1 Chron. 29. 22. and tho the Crown of right did belong to David's Family, yet the People did choose which of the Family best pleased them, and that by a double Obli∣gation, as may appear by the History of Joas, 2 King. 11. 4. and 17. For the King and the People by a Solemn Oath, did promise to God, that they would keep his Laws both Ecclesiastical and Civil. Afterwards there was another Oath between King and Peo∣ple, at which time there was a Right in the People (i. e. Ordinibus Populi) to call him to Account, whom they had ordained King if he performed not his Duty.

Which is made out by Examples. If it were lawful for David to defend himself from the Tyranny of Saul, and for the City of Libnah (the City of the Priests and inferiour Magistrates only) to withdraw themselves from the Obedience of Joram (the sixth Successor from David) because he had forsaken the Lord God of his Fathers; which City belonging to the Priests, it is very apparent that their case was far diffe∣rent from that of the Idumaeans which hapned at the same time, under the same King; for it is not likely that the Edomites withdrew themselves from the Subjection of the Israelites, that they might serve God whom they never served, but hated him and the Israelites, but desired to free themselves from thier Subjection.

But the Priests and Inhabitants of Libnah, not being able to serve two Masters, God and the Tyrant, threw of his Yoak, that they might the better serve God; will it not naturally follow, that the States of a Kingdom may lawfully defend and free themselves from Tyranny? The Fact also of the Rulers over Hundreds, with the Captains, by the Advice of Joida against Athalia, and of the Israelites against Amasia, 2 King. 14. 19. whom they slew, which was not seditiously but lawfully done, for it is no where said that Amasius was slain by his Servants, (as it hapned to his Father Joas, and to Ammon the Son of Manasses) but by the common consent of Jerusalem, and that not treacherously (the end of most Tyrants) but by publick force, and publick Authority; not tumultuously, but after he had fled to the City Lachish, from whence his Body was carried to the Sepulchers of his Fathers; which is confirmed, for that after his death, we do not read of any Inquisition made how he came to be slain, or that any Body was punished or called in question for it, either by the People, or his Children (as there was for Ammon and Joas, 2 King. 12. 10. & 14. 5. & 21. 24.) but on the contrary, in respect to Kingly Dignity and his Fathers Family, they chose Azariah his Son King. Hence we may conclude, that the chief States or Ordines of Jerusalem had a rightful Power to choose a King out of the Family of David, whom they pleased, and when elected, him either to eject or punish according as he did or did not observe the Laws.

So the Danes dethroned and imprisoned Christiern their Tyrant King till he dyed, and chose his Uncle in his room.

It is not unknown how Gustavus Erickson freed himself and his Subjects from their Subjection to the Danes, and also how they kept their King Captive for Male-Govern∣ment, which they translated to his Brother.

To say nothing of England and Scotland, Poland keeps its ancient Right of choosing their Kings on certain Terms and Conditions, with this Salvo, That it may be lawful to be quit of their Oath if the King keep not his, as it may appear by their Election of Henry, Brother to the King of France, which agrees with Bishop Valentine, Procurator for the King in that Election, who in his Oration to the People, publickly made and printed, commended them for that they did limit and circumscribe the Power of the King by wise Laws.

So the Venetians, whose General Council hath Authority of choosing their Duke, re∣serving Power to themselves of deposing or punishing them if he endeavour or do a∣ny thing Tyrannically.

So the Venetians constitute their Duke, not as an Idol, but as a Prince and Mo∣narch, from whom, without any danger of Tyranny, all the Lawful Priviledges and Prerogatives of Kings do issue and flow. Now as their General Council have all the Authority of choosing him (observing their ancient Rites and Customs used therein,) so the same Council retain to themselves the Right of deposing, or punish∣ing

him if he govern Tyrannically; without which Power all the rest would sig∣nifie little.

So consider that Wise and Prudent Nation of Spain.

In the Fourth Council of Toledo, cap. 74. held 1144. according to Sigibert's Computation, and consisted both of Ec∣clesiasticks, and of the States of that Kingdom, it is thus recorded, viz. Nullus apud nos sub presumptione regnum arripiat, &c. Let no Man presume to take upon him the Government of this Kingdom, no Man move or stir up Sedition among the Citizens, no Man design the Destruction of the King, but when the King dies, let the Princes and Peers of the Nation, with the Priests, constitute the Successor in Common Coun∣cil; that whilst Unity and Concord are preserved amongst us, no Discord may a∣rise: But if this Admonition do not quiet our Minds, and move our Hearts to en∣deavour the common Good, then hear our Sentence: Whoever of us, or of all the People of this Nation, shall by any Conjuration or Study, violate the Sacrament of his Faith or Allegiance, (which for the State of his Country and of the Gothick Na∣tion, or for the Preservation of the Welfare of the King he had promised or plighted) or shall compass the Kings death, or divest him of his Power, or by any Tyran∣nical Presumption, shall attempt or usurp the Crown, Let him be Anathema, Ac∣cursed in the sight of God the Father and his Angels, and from the Catholick Church, which by Perjury he hath profaned, and from all the Company of Christians, with all his Associates in iniquity be for ever debarred; because it must needs be, that the same Punishment is due to all the Complices and Companions in the same Crimes; which we again the second time repeat, Quod iterum secundo replicamus dicentes quicunque à modo, &c. And therefore may it please all here present, by your consent, to confirm this Sen∣tence the third time, by the Universal Clergy or People it is pronounced, that who∣ever shall presume against this our definitive Sentence, Let him be Anathema Mara∣natha, i. e. Accursed at the coming of the Lord, and that he and his Fellows may have their Portion with Judas Iscariot. Amen. Wherefore we admonish the whole Church of God and the People, that no Man presume to condemn this dreadful Sentence, but that they keep their plighted Faith towards our glorious King Sise∣nand, &c. And we humbly require thee our present King, and all future Princes, that you be moderate and mild towards your Subjects, and that you govern them with Justice and Piety, and that none of you in your own Person give Judgment on any Captive or guilty Person, but that it be done by the publick Judgment of the Judges appointed thereunto, using both Severity and Indulgence with great Wisdom and Moderation; that whilst a pious Temper is used by us all, the King may rejoyce in his People, and the People in their King, and God both in King and People. And concerning our future Kings we pronounce this Sentence, That if any of them contrary to the Reverence of our Laws, by Regal Haughtiness and proud Domina∣tion shall treat us Tyrannically, Anathema sit, Let him be accursed from Christ, and be separate from God, for that he presumed to bring the Kingdom into trouble and distress.

De Smithilane vero, &c. As for King Smithilane, who being guilty and sensible of his own hainous Enormities and Wickednesses, deprived himself of the Kingdom and laid down his Royal Ensigns, and we decreed with the consent of the Nation, that neither he, nor his Wife, nor his Children for his Tyrannical Government, should never be joined to our Society, neither would we at any time promote them to Ho∣nour or Dignities. This is a singular and excellent Example, to which we may add a another Decree of the sixth Synod, Toledo, cap. 3. In which, after the Statute of ba∣nishing the Jews, it is said, That in vain they did ordain good Laws, except they did also provide that they should be kept. Therefore afterwards if the King, having the Reins of Government, do violate the Observation of his Faith promised, Let him be Ana∣thema Maranatha in the sight of God, and made Fuel of Eternal Fire, and whoever else, Priest or Christian shall comply with him in so doing. By which it is plain what Power the States of that Kingdom have over their Kings if they violate their Oath, when by the Feudary Right (which comprehends the Kingdom) a Vassal or Slave owes no Service to his Master, if excommunicated, but is free from his Oath of Fidelity, lib. 2. Feud. tit. 28. §. 1. v. de Jure Magstr. p. 67, 68, 69.

Take here also the ancient Form, whereby the Kingdom of Arragon did oblige their King, not only at his Inauguration, but iterated it also in their Triennial Conventi∣ons, in which the King was present, that he might receive his Power from them, and they theirs from him; where after many Ceremonies performed and past, between that which is called the Justice of Arragon (which represents the Person of the Supream

Power, and to which the King by Oath is obliged to submit) and the King himself either to be created, or already created. Formula qua Hispaniarum reges inaugurantur. Nos qui volemos tanto comme vos, y podemos Mas que vos Elegimos Rey: con est as y est as conditiones intra vos y nos, un que manda mas que vos, i. e. We that are as great as you, and can do more than you, choose you King on these and these Conditions between you and us, and one can com∣mand more than you: By which you may see that that wise and Prudent People, do honour their Kings as they ought, Ibid 71, 72.

If we consult the Empire of Germany, what Power the Princes Electors have there, it is manifest to all the World both in choosing the Emperor and deposing of him, as it hapned to Adolphus Anno 1296. and to Wencesla••s Anno 1400. Emperors; for there was such an Oath, whereby their Caesars were bound and obliged, as is described in a Treatise entituled Speculum Saxonicum, lib. 3. § 54. For when the King is chosen he is obliged by Oath to perform Faith and Homage to the Empire, and promise that with all his might he will promote the Administration of Justice, and punish all Injuries, and by all endeavours main∣tain the Rights of the Empire.

Now, that they that had power to chuse them Kings, had power also to curb and punish them, is manifest by undisputable reason and matter of Fact. Ejus est tollere, cujus est ponere. Childerick was expulsed, Anno 361. and Gilo substituted, who was not of the Family of the Meroves, and Chilperick Anno 578. and Theodorick Anno 667. Moreover Anno 890. the States neglecting Charles the Son of Lewis Balbus, chose Euden alias Oden, to be King. We read also that Hugh Capet cheated Charles the Brother of L••thari••s whilst he neglected the Government. In short, if the Kingdom of Fra••cegalli had no Pow∣er to choose, then neither Pepin nor Capet had any right to the Crown, there being no want of Heir Males of Merovey when Pepin usurped the Crown; nor were wanting Sons of Charles the Great when Capet challenged the Crown. How great the Power of the States (ordines regni) of that Kingdom in the first Constitution thereof was, and how long it continued so, and how the Face of that Government is now altered and degenerated into Tyranny, Histories are full; which no Prescription of what date soever, by any Law of God, Man, Nature or Reason can justifie, it being con∣trary to the Solemn Oaths they take at their Inauguration, which justifies all the rest. It was but about Anno 1380. that the States of that Kingdom cancelled and made void the Will of Charles the Fifth, surnamed the Wise: and but Anno 1467. when Lewis the XI. (endeavouring to turn that Monarchy into Tyranny) was deservedly impeach∣ed for Male-Government; and therefore the States being assembled at Turin they ap∣pointed Thirty Curators (alias 20. 16.) by whom he should be governed; but he soon got quit of them, because (under pretence of the Idol Claronensis, which he worship∣ped with great Superstition) he slighted and ridiculed all his Oaths and Promises, but with so much unsuccessfulness, horrour, and unquietness even to his death, that he sadly experienced which was the better and more happy Condition to be loved or fear∣ed of his Subjects.

Take the sad Example following of Perjury: Charles VII. whilst yet the Dauphin most wickedly caused John the last Duke of Burgundy, of the Stock of the Gallick Kings to be miserably slain in his presence, contrary to all Faith, Peace, and Friendship plight∣ed unto him a little before, near Melo dunum, i. e. Melun. This Perjury was afterwards expiated by the death of many Millions of Souls, almost to the subversion of the King∣dom; and Charles himself the King reduced to that misery, that he was disinherited of his Father, and saw his Capital Enemy Inaugurated by the Kingdom at Paris, and from thence was rather Rex Biturigum, i. e. King of a People of Aquitane, inhabiting Bourge, then King of France: at last was forced to redeem his Peace on shameful and dishonourable Terms, as may appear in a treatise Apud Atrabates with the People of the Province of Artois; in which (the King himself treated with Duke Phillip, Son of the said murdered John his Subject) this Clause was expressed, to which the King himself did assent, and by his Diploma approved of it.

Which Transaction if violated by him, all his Subjects, Feudataries, &c. both present and to come, shall neither obey nor serve him, but shall rather be subject to obey the Duke of Burgundy and his Successors.

Such was the issue of the violation of Royal Faith plighted. And may not all Kingdoms expect the just performance of their Oaths and Stipulations made by their Kings at their Inau∣gurations, who are thereby made the Keepers and Protectors of their Laws? And what better Issue can any Kings expect that violate their Oaths and Trusts, though by Wiles, and Shams, and Royal Influences only on Judges and other Officers of their Kingdoms, through whose Hands the management of Laws do pass Judges, Sheriffs, Ju∣stices of the Peace, Constables, Privy-Counsellors, Juries? &c.

In summ, The chief Impery is so in Kings and other Supreme Magistrates, that if they transgress the Laws and turn Tyrants, and will not be governed by just Laws, unto which they have Sworn, it is the just right of Inferior Magistrates, and Ordines regni to hinder their Tyranny, and reduce the Government to its Pristine State and Condition. And in so doing they are so far from being seditious or rebellious, as that they do but their Duty to God and their Country, as by the above-recited ex∣amples appeareth. The truth of which appears by many reasons. 1. By the Law of Nature (on which depends the preservation of all human Societies) of which there can be no doubt. In all Pacts and Contracts mutually made and consented unto, the same Parties by whom the Obligation was made, have the same Power to dissolve the same as often as just Reason shall require. So they that have Power to create Kings, have Power also to curb and censure them. So if the Essential Conditions of the Con∣tract, for which the Contract was made, be manifestly violated and broken, the Con∣tract (as between Rahab and the Spies) is absolutely void. Let those that hold Kings accountable to God only, shew if they can, any Nation so foolish and unwise, that willingly and wittingly, without force or fear, ever submitted so absolutely to any King or Government, that they did not expresly or tacitely provide for their own safety and good, by observance of their own good Laws. It a Conqueror oblige the con∣quered by Oaths, then according to the Civil Law, that those that are extorted by force and unjust fear ought not to be accounted Lawful. I confess the Pulpits Preach a contrary Doctrine; but it is not possible that irreligious or unnatural Conditions, got by force, unjust fear, fraud, or wicked practices, should be binding or esteemed as Lawful, it being a general Rule of right and just founded on the common Principles of Nature, so firm and jure, that nothing that is manifestly adverse and repugnant to the Laws of Nature, can be held for right and just amongst Men. This is generally to be understood of Pacts manifestly unjust or irreligious, which no Man can justly require, nor any Man justly submit unto, though required. Such was the reproachful condition required of them of Gabesh Gilead, by Nahash the Ammonite, that he might thrust out all their right eyes, 1 Sam. 11. 2. Such and worse was the condition required by Antiochus (the cruel Ty∣rant) of the Citizens of Jerusalem, viz. that they should abjure the true religion, 1 Macc. 1. 51. In such cases where the conditions of Temporal estate are only heard, and Religion not concerned, it is better to have respect to their Oath than to their Lives: But when Religion is concerned, Oaths must be very strictly observed.

Though all God's Covenants and Promises are Yea and Amen, yet are they all tacitely or expresly conditional; so that if they keep not Covenant with God, God will not keep Covenant nor Promise with them. So, though God did solemnly swear unto the children of Israel, that he would bring them into that very good land that floweth with milk and h••••y, yet suffered he none of them to enter but Caleb (who was of another spirit;) and Joshua; doubtless yee shall not come into the land, concerning which I swear to make you dwell therein, Numb. 14. 30. and ye shall know my breach of promise, or altering of my Purpose, verse 34. I the Lord have said, I will surely do it unto all this evil congregation that are gathered together against me, verse 35. and that justly, because they first broke with him, Neh••m. 9. 16, 17, 18. there being always some tacite or explicite condition ex∣pressed or implied in all such Promises as well as Threatnings: Therefore as to one and the other God hath given us this general Rule, not only with particular Persons, but with Nations, Jer. 18. 7, 8, 9, 10. At what instant I shall speak concerning a Nation, or concerning a Kingdom, to pluck up, and to pull down, and to destory it, if that Nation against whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil I thought to do unto them: So when ever I shall speak concerning a Nation, and concerning a Kingdom, to build and to plant it, if it do evil in my sight, that it obey not my voice, then will I repent of the good wherewith I said I would benefit them, i. e. will not do it. Whereupon St. Jerom saith, Non ergo quod pollicetur Deus statim futurum est, sed in eos sua promissa implet qui custodiunt manda••a illius. Covenants and Promises on Conditions are equally obliging: whoever fails, the other is free. It is the same amongst Men that are in mutual Sti∣pulation and Covenant, whoever first breaks Covenant, is a Rebel to the Law, and the other is ••r••e.

For which cause God blamed and punished Zedekiah (the last King of the Family of David) for that contrary to his Oath he fell from the King of the Chaldeans. As I live, saith the Lord, surely in the place where the King dwelleth that made him king; whose oath he despised, and whose covenant he brake, even with him, in the midst of Babylon, he shall die, Ezek. 17. 16. ver. per 110. And Zedekiah, not only by his Oath, but by the express Com∣mand of God, he and his were to be subject to the King of Chaldaea; which circum∣stances

made Zedekiah guilty of that Defection, and of Perjury. I like not that Sub∣jects should on every breach of Oath withdraw their Obedience, and depart from their Oath; neither do I approve of that Proverb, Fragenti fidem, fides frangatur cidem: but on the contrary, do deem it unlawful to break Faith justly plighted; but I do deny that Subjects do violate their Faith against Tyrants, if they keeping within their own Bounds and Province, do use their utmost to make Tyrants keep their Conditions agreed on, and hinder them from breaking of them: For the Rule is general, That Contracts and Covenants (either plainly expressed, or tacitely to be understood) are broken and dissolved by him who violates them, and not by him who was obliged only on Conditions, and thereby becomes free of the Obligations not by his own Acts, but by him who first broke the Conditions. Therefore Su∣preme Magistrates, becoming Tyrants by their own Perjury, and breaking their Co∣venants, do free their Subjects from their Oaths and Allegiance, and not the People, when they deservedly make use of their Power to curb th••m, and to right themselves. That Kings should not be obliged by Law, is contrary to all the received Opinions and Sentences taken from the right of Nature, by the most profound and judicious Lawyers.

Eos qui leges ferunt, legibus quoqu•• ••btem••••rare: & quod quisque juris in alium statuerit, ipse ut codem jure utatur: & nihil ••••perio magis conducere, quam ex legibus vi∣vatur: dignam denique vocem esse, Principem leg••••us ••••se ••ubd••tum pr••fitert?

Itaque quod alibi à Juris consultis dici videtur. Principem esse supra leges, aut Principem à Legibus s••lutum, non nisi de legibus civilibus, deque particulari privatorum jure est intelligen∣dum: verbi gratia de testamentis, de detractione Trebellianae, aut Falcidianae: non autem de Jure public••, & ad statum, ut dici solet, pertinent••: mulcoque minus de jure naturali, aut di∣vino: cui quum on••••es & singuli homines subjiciantur quatenus homines nati sunt: omnino effi∣citur, aut Reges homines non esse, aut illos hoc jure teneri.