A treatise of jealousie, or, Means to preserve peace in marriage wherein is treated of I. The nature and effects of jealousie, which for the most part is the fatal cause of discontents between man and wife, II. And because jealousy is a passion, it's therefore occasionally discoursed of passions in general ... III. The reciprocal duties of man and wife ... / written in French, and faithfully translated.

CHAP. II. The Original of Jealousie, and what it is.

PAssions then in themselves are all good in their kind, to speak as the same Philosopher doth, and there is no∣thing else incumbent on our parts to be done, but to avoid the wrong use and excess of them Yea, they are the very principles of all our actions, in such man∣ner, that what is internally a passion, is externally an action most commonly. From whence it is consequent, that passions are so far from partaking of a crime, that on the contrary, a man clearly without Passion would be stupid or sensless, or rather not a man; yea, he would fall into discouragement, lan∣guishing, and contempt of himself, for which he must-stand answerable to God and Nature. In sum, as an Animal, and particularly Man is fitly compared to a Political Estate a; and as an Estate cannot subsit without Counsil and Force, to procure the requisite advan∣tages,

and repel what tends to hurt; in like manner Nature has imparted to other Animals a natural instinct, and to Man the use of Reason, which is the seat of Prudence, for their Councel, and to every of them Passions correspon∣ding to Armies, to the end they may procure to themselves what good is Convenient, and avoid the hurt that is imminent. Wherefore the use of Passi∣ons in Man, saith the same Philosopher, consists in the disposing and exciting the Soul to Will the things, which the dictates of Nature pronounce to be convenient; and at the same time to keep in Action, the Spirits Serving to make us persist in this Will, and to pro∣duce the Action necessary, for the ac∣quiring the good we propose to our selves; whether it be a real good in it self, or the avoiding of an Evil, which in this case occupies the place of a real good.

But it will be very difficult to obtain the knowledg of a Passion, what it is, and how it is form'd, without a compe∣tent knowledg of the structure of the Body. To which purpose we shall make use of the descriptions of some

Philosophers, and particularly of the Modern, who have abundantly enrich∣ed and enlightned the Philosophy of the Anclents, with the curious and admira∣ble Discoveries they have made in Na∣ture.

There are very few but know e∣nough of the external Structure of the Body, and every one may see that Na∣ture has bestow'd on us, as on the most part of Animals, Natural Senses, whose Organs, these I mean that are external, are double in every one of the Senses.

It is also known to every one, that within are contained these Visceras, viz. The Brain, the Heart, the Liver, the Spleen, &c. Now the mutual Com∣munication of all these Parts, both ex∣ternal, and internal, is so admirably framed, and their respect one to ano∣ther so adequated, that the motion of one part causes the motion of another, much like the Springs of a Watch. All which is perform'd much after this manner.

The Brain, which is placed in the highest part of the Body, is the Origi∣nal of all the Nerves, which are dis∣persed into all the Muscles of the Body,

and have their Extremities inserted into all the Sensible parts thereof. The Heart is the Centre of Natural Heat, which is the principle of Life, and by consequence, of all the Motions of the Body: and therefore it is placed in the m••••dle, That, as Aristotle saith, it may the more ap••ly communicate to all the Ex∣tremities. a, and there indeed it ope∣rates by the means of the Blood and Spirits, which it sends out without in∣t••rmission, to all the parts of the Bo∣dy. And to this effect, also contri∣butes the Juice of the Meat we Daily feed on, for this Juice being prepared in the Stomach, and from thence run∣ning through the Lacteal Veins, (so called, because this Juice as yet retains the colour of Milk,) after it has been transmitted by these Veins into other Channels, for its exacter Purification, it comes at last to enter into the right Ventricule of the Heart, where it rari∣fies and expands it self, and begins to be tinged with the colour of Blood: then passing through the Lungs, it re∣turns, and is discharged into the left Ventricule of the Heart, where it re∣ceives its last Perfection. After which,

being thrust out with Violence into the great▪ Arterie, and into every Branch thereof, it passes through all parts of the Body, imparting to them Life and Nourishment: from whence returning again to the Heart, and being again sent out as before, it makes a continual Flux and Reslux by means of its Circu∣lation, which is apparently known by the continual Pulsation of the Heart and Arteries: For when the Blood is in the Heart, it dilates and rarities it self, whereby it extends the Heart, and af∣terward the Arteries, which is the im∣mediate cause of this Pulse and Beat∣ing. And it is this Blood that main∣tains that Fire or Natural Heat in the Heart, even as the Oil maintains the Flame in a Lamp.

Now the most Vivide and Subtilest Particules of the Blood, are carried into the Brain, there to serve for the Execu∣tion of the Principal Functions of the Animal, and to be distributed into the Nerves and Muscles, for the moving of the Body in all the different Motions it is Capable of; and these are they which we call the Animal Spirits, which not∣withstanding the Appellation are Minute Bodies.

These Spirits are, as it it were, Fil∣tred thorough the Substance of the Brain, and afterwards Reunite by their Concourse in some one part, which is the Imagination, and which cannot be far distant from the Origination of the Nerves, by which these Spirits are dis∣persed afterwards into every part of the Body.

Now as it is this Organ that re∣ceives the Impressions or the Species that are sent thither by the External Organs or Senses, it must by Consequence be in this Place, and in the Brain that Sensa∣tion or the Perception which we have of things is perform'd, and not at all in the External Senses themselves, or a∣ny other part of the Body. For al∣though the outward Senses are as the Instruments, that the Imagination makes use of, for thee Reception of the Species of Sensible Objects; although they are as the ports of the Soul, by which the Species do enter; yet the Objects are Imprinted, and as it were Limned in these Organs (for we find by Experi∣ence that we see by the Eyes, hear with the Ears, and that the Hand or Foot gives us the Sense of Pain) neverthe¦less

without all doubt, we can have no Sensation, no Perception or discerning, ••f the Species or Impressions have not passage to the Principal Seat of the Ima∣gination or Common Sense. We have experience thereof in this, that if we 〈…〉〈…〉e very attentive to any thing, we per∣ceive not the Pain of any hurt received, nor do we see the things that are before our Eyes; as it happens to these that are Apoplectick, they perceive not at all when they are pricked, no nor when they are Wounded, which must proceed from hence, that the Organ of the Ima∣gination ceasing its Action, it receives no Impression, and consequently it pro∣duces no Sensation; And what is more, these that have, for Example, their hand Amputated, do complain of great Pains in that very Hand, that was cut off.

The Sensation which is form'd in the Imagination proceeds from hence, that in the First place, the Nerves, which are the Instruments of Sense, having their Origination in the Brain, as we said before, extend themselves to every part, and Occupie with their Endings all the Extremities of the whole Body, in such manner that the least thing that moves

the Surface of the Body, into which there must be the Extremity of some Nerve Planted, moves at the same time that part of the Brain where that Nerve hath it's beginning; in the Second place these Nerves being always full with the Spirits which are continually sent from the Brain to all the parts of the Body, these Spirits which are first moved, or re∣ceive the Impression of the Object, Trans∣mit that Impression, as from Hand to Hand, to their very Original, which is the Seat of the Sense Common. I say, from Hand to Hand, that I might thereby Intimate that this Motion is not made by a disorderly Retrogradation of the Spi∣rits, but in manner of certain waves, as we see are made in standing pooles, where, by the throwing in of a Stone, the Wave first moved, is put forward by the Subsequent waves, following one another to the outmost Edge thereof▪ Only there is this difference, that the Motion of the Spirits is made with al∣most inconceivable Swiftness, being of such an Extraordinary Subtile Nature, that they exceed all other Bodies in the Swiftness of their moving. This is the formal reason of Sense.

Seeing then Sensation is perform'd in the Imagination, and not in the Exter∣nal Organs, or parts of the Body, whereon the first Impression is made, so likewise the Passions are not form'd in the Heart; as some beleive, but in the same Imagination also. And although the Heart indeed does Foment and Aug∣ment them, by the means of the Spi∣〈…〉〈…〉its sent continually by it to the Brain▪ ••nd though also in Violent Passions it is much affected and altered, yet this pro∣ceeds only from the Communication it 〈…〉〈…〉as with the Brain, by the means of certain small Nerves, which serve to 〈…〉〈…〉raiten or enlarge the Orifices of the Heart, and so to give Entry to a small∣er or greater quantity of Blood.

The Passions then are formed in the same Organ that is the Seat of the 〈…〉〈…〉ancy or Imagination, and arise either 〈…〉〈…〉om the Temperament of the Body, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from the Perceptions, Imprinted by 〈…〉〈…〉e Natural Appetite or Affections, or 〈…〉〈…〉stly, from the Impression of External Objects on the Imagination. They pro∣ceed from the Temperament, for if, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Example, Choler abounds, it excites 〈…〉〈…〉nger, if Blood, it enclines to Love.

They arise from the Perceptions, Im¦printed by Natural Appetite and Affec¦tions, as Hunger, Thirst, and other that Retain the Name of Natural Ap¦petites; likewise Pain, Heat, and other Affections, which stir or move the Nerves, that are the Instruments of the Organ of Common Sense▪ and Trans¦fer the Impression to the Brain. We de¦sire to Drink, as▪ Aristotle saith, it is the Natural Appetite, Commands it for the Preservation of the Animal: Natural instinct, tells us it is water, for Exam¦ple, and not Ink that we must Drink and immediately this Natural Passion puts the Animal in Motion fit to perform it. And lastly, Passions are produced by the Impressions of outward Object made upon the Fancy, by the mediation of the External Senses. But we must observe that the Fancy or Imagination (which is the Perception arising from the Internal Motion solely of the Spirits) 〈◊〉〈◊〉 not the same, as Aristotle saith, with Sense (which is the Perception produ¦ced by External Motions) since it is ea¦sie to observe, that the Imagination Act when the Senses Act not at all; (a) from whence are the Passions that arise by

calling to Remembrance, or the bare ••magination of any thing (b) or by Dreams, and the Actions that are done in Sleep, because of the di••••rse Impres∣sions that the casual Motion of the Spi∣rits, does then make upon the I∣magination. The Image, the•• or Spe∣cies of▪ any thing passing, for Example, 〈…〉〈…〉w the Eyes, and Imprinting it self upon the Organ of Imagination where of we speak▪ by the Mediation of the Spi∣rits always Eviron••ng it, it so falls out, that if that Object be Terrifying▪ by its Similitude or respect it has with any thing, that Nature or Experience Dic∣tates to be hurtful to the Body, then it excites the Passion of Fear, or else Cou∣rage, according to the different Consti∣tution of the Body; and at the same time, the Spirits Reflected from the I∣mage so formed upon the Organ, do en∣terpa••t by the pores of the Brain, that Conducts them into the Nerves, serving to produce the Motions and Postures necessary to turn back, or Fly, part in∣to the Nerves that enlarge or straiten the Orifices of the Heart, or which A∣gitate the other Parts from whence the Blood is Conveyed to the Heart, in such

sort, that this Blood being r〈…〉〈…〉ed after an unusual manner, it a〈…〉〈…〉 Spirits to the Brain, such as m〈…〉〈…〉 i〈…〉〈…〉¦fie the Passion viz that continue to keep open the same pores 〈…〉〈…〉h〈…〉〈…〉 by they 〈…〉〈…〉te〈…〉〈…〉 into the same N〈…〉〈…〉es And i〈…〉〈…〉 be cou∣rage that's excited 〈…〉〈…〉x〈…〉〈…〉•• P〈…〉〈…〉 the•• Spi¦rits enter by the Motion of this Organ in∣to the pores of the Brain, that Conduct them into the Nerves▪ serving to move the Members to defend its self, as well as into th••se that Agitate and put for¦ward the Blood to the Heart, in a man∣ner suitable to produce proper Spirits, for the continuance of these Actions.

It is the same respectively in all other Passions, from what Original soever they arise: so that in speaking general∣ly, the cause of Passions is not solely in the Sense, or in the Brain; but also in the Heart, in the Spleen, in the Liver, yea, and in all the other parts of the Body, insomuch as they Concur to the producing of Blood, and consequent∣ly of Spirits conducing: for although all the Veins do carry the Blood they contain towards the Heart, neverthe∣less it many Times falls out, that that which is in some, is thrust forward with

much more force than that in others: And likewise it happens that the Ori∣fices of the Heart by which the Blood enters, or by which it is expelled, are at sometimes more enlarged or more straitened than at others.

Now all this is perpetrated only by the disposition of the Engine of the Bo∣dy; that is to say, by the conformation of the Members and the Course which the Animal Spirits, excited by the Heat of the Heart, do naturally pursue in the Brain, in the Nerves, and in the Muscles •• in the same manner as the Motion of a Watch is performed, as we said before, which goes and moves it self, by the Disposition of it's peices: for which reason, if it were possible, to ••magine a Man without a Soul, we should see him Act in the same manner. For we must not think that it is the Soul that gives Life and Motion to the Body, although in some respects, it can dis∣pose thereof, being Conjoint, but the Motion and Life Depends on the Fabrick of the Body. So that we may truly say, that the Separation of the Soul does not make the Body to Die, but that the Soul, 〈…〉〈…〉t Death, retires it self from the Body▪

because that then the Natural Hea〈…〉〈…〉 which we have mentioned, ceasing, the Organs that serve to the Actions of the Soul Corrupt and fail.

Which makes us beleive, that since the holy Scripture a says, that Beasts have the Blood for their Soul, they have no other but what consists in this Sym∣metrie of the parts Vivified and moved as we have said, by the Animal Spirits▪ drawn from the Blood by the Fire of the Heart. And this might very well be the Reason why the Pen-Me〈…〉〈…〉 of the holy Scriptures, observing on one Hand, that Beasts have almost the same Passions that are incident to Man, for as much as they have a Love for their Young, a Jealousie for their Females, Anger, Fear, &c. And that on the other Hand, they are Destitute of Judgment; they have made use of this Word▪ Blood▪ b to express the Sensual and Fleshly Mo∣tions that allure the reason and Agitate us like Beasts.

And indeed this does contribute very much to the Excellency of the reason∣able Soul. For though it may be said that other Animals have the same Natu∣ral Motions as Men have, yet it may be denied

with Seneca c that they have Re∣〈…〉〈…〉l Passions, all their Actions being no more than certain Impulses that Resem∣ble Passions. Which also our Philoso∣pher d confirms saying, brutes have 〈…〉〈…〉o Conduct of their Actions, but certain Corporal Motions, resembling these in Men, which Passions do follow Custo∣marily; and for this very reason they are not only easily allured into Snares, but often run Head long into greater Evils to Eschew a less. Now these Mo∣tions are Naturally produced in them, no otherwise than by the apt Disposition and Symetrie of their Parts, whereof we have spoken before, as though they were performed by different Springs, as in an Engine, or the different Motions of any Instrument variously moved, a without having the least Enlighten∣ing of Reason. We may see an Exam∣ple of this in a Dog, who Bites the very Stone, that was thrown at him; for his Anger seems to proceed from this, that the Stone having with force pitch'd upon him, and thereby infering Pain, 〈…〉〈…〉is Spirits are incited so as to produce the Passion of Anger, or at least such Motions as Imitate it, and having not the

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use of Reason, the Stone is the Object of his Passion, which he Bites in Re∣venge. This is likewise the Opinion of Aristotle, who saith, there is no Reasoning, where there is no Reason, and in Brutes there is no reason to be Found.

The Soul of Man therefore is only Capable of sharing of Reason and Free-Will, whereby Man is Master of his own Will, that is to say of himself, and there∣in resembling his Maker: I say, sharing or En••oying, as his Part, Reason, which is, A Right and Just Judgment of things Divine and Humane; which is that Li∣ving Law we carry continually within us, or to Express it in the words of Phil••n▪ A Law that knows not how to Err, a Law Immortal, not like that Es∣tablished by Mortal ••y••en; a Law not without Soul or without Life, like those Laws written on Paper, or inanimated Colomns; but it is a Law Exempt of all Corruption, being Engraven by Im∣mortal Nature, on the Immortal Soul of Man. Hence, although the Soul does not Act without the Body, yet it is altogether distinct from it, and infi∣nitely above it, by its Immortality, free and exempt from all Composition in its substance. b

The Soul then has no different parts, as some suppose; It is simply one, and unitely join'd to the whole Body, and all its parts, without being more in one than in another; for the Body is one, and in some respects, not divisable, by the relation it has to the disposition of its Organs, which have such a reference one to another, that if any one be want∣ing, the whole Body becomes Defective. So it is the same individual Soul that Imagines, Remembers and Reasons; all which it performs by the means of this Organ we have Treated of.

For when the Soul would call a thing to Remembrance, this Organ pushes the Spirits to these places or pores of the Brain, where the Traces or Foot∣steps remain of the Object which it would recal to mind, which Spirits re∣flecting, present the same Object to the Soul.

When it will imagine, this Will has the force to cause that this Organ move it self, and in such a manner as is ne∣cessary to push the Spirits towards the Pores of the Brain, by whose aperture the thing may be represented: and if it would consider the same thing with attention, the Will retains this

Organ in the same Situation

As to Discourse Reasoning or Judg∣ing; for these, the Soul makes use of both the Faculties aforesaid, viz. Ima∣gination and Memory: for a not on∣ly the Soul cannot Judg without the help of the Species, which the Imagina∣tion or Memory presents to it, but al∣so, it cannot Reason or Discourse by the one, without the help of the other, because that Reasoning or Discourse, Is a Judgment made, Comparatively, with some other Judgment made before. b

So this Organ, which is in the Brain as is shewed before, seems to be the Seat of the Soul, where it Wills, that is, exercises all its Actions: For to Will is properly the Action of the Soul, be∣cause that comes directly from it, and seems to depend upon nothing else. The Soul is there, as a Sun who glances his Rays through the whole Body, by means of the Spirits, the Nerves, and also of the Blood: For it disposes all the Sensations that are imprinted o•• this Organ, and also reimprints his own. And on the other hand, because of the strait Union between the Soul and Body, this Organ affects the Soul also with all the Impressions it receives, and

by that means, as it were, solicits it to Will, whatever this Impression shall dis∣pose the Body to; so that there can be 〈…〉〈…〉o Passion rais'd in the Imagination, whereof the Soul is not sensible.

Although indeed the Soul or Will of Man, be so far Free, that it cannot be changed nor constrained by the Body, but indirectly only, yet the Passions ex∣cited by the course of the Spirits, and not at all produced by the Soul it self, are of such force, that they must have their Course, and cannot be changed by the Soul, but also indirectly only; in so much that there may be Motions and Passions in the Body, and the Soul not at all Contributing thereto: as for Example, it may so be, that by the Sole Disposition of the Organs, the Spi∣rits may run towards the Nerves of the Heart, and that this Course, in passing, gives a Motion to the Organ of Ima∣gination, that imprints the Passion of Fear in the Soul, and in the mean time, the Spirits Running towards the Nerves, that serve to move the Legs for Flight, this Organ by their Course receives a∣nother Motion, which Imprints the Sense or Perception of this Flight in the Soul, without the Souls consenting thereto▪

It is also from this strait Conjunction that, as we see, if we have once Joyn'd any Corporal Action with any distinc〈…〉〈…〉 Cogitation, neither of these shall present it self afterwards to us, but the other shall present it self also. Moreover it may be said, that the Motions of the Organ of Imagination, are so natural▪ that they rather Obey the Motions o〈…〉〈…〉 Inclinations of the Spirits, or other di∣stinct Organs, than the Will we have to give them this Motion; as it falls out, for Example, When a Man would dis∣pose his Eyes to View an Object at a di∣stance; for then the Pupil of the Eye enlarges it self, rather because of this Action, to which the Eyes are Deter∣mined by this Organ, then for that we would that it should be enlarged.

It is this Repugnance in Nature, that has given place to believe, That the In∣feriour part of the Soul should War a∣gainst the Superiour; when as this Re∣pugnance ariseth only from hence, That the Body on one side, by means of the Spirits, and the Soul on the other, by its Will, endeavour at the same time to excite different Motions in this Organ And indeed, all that contradicts Reason▪ comes from the Body, and not at all

from the Soul. It is then these Two dif∣fering Impulses, that are made together on this Organ, that causes this Com∣bat: For Example, The Spirits strive to push this Organ we speak of, so as to excite the Desire of any thing in the Soul; and the Soul strives again to Re∣pel that Motion, by the Will it has to avoid the same thing: If it gets the up∣per hand, it remains Victorious; if not, the Spirits presently resume their first course, because of the disposition that has proceeded in the Nerves, in the Heart, and in the Blood, and then the Soul ceasing its Endeavours, finds it self prest to Desire, and not to Desire, one and the same thing.

Lo here the Warfare between the Spi∣rit and the Flesh, which is so Violent, that no Humane Prudence is capable to resist it. It is therefore certain, that the Soul cannot in an instant overcome the Passions: For they are accompani∣ed with such Commotions, excited in the Heart, and by consequence, in the whole Mass of Blood and Spirits, that the Passion remains always present with our Thoughts, till this Commotion have ceased; in the same manner, as Sensi∣ble Objects are always present, during

the time they Act on the Organs of Sense. But I mean here, the stronger Passions, which do indeed constrain us to confess, That we are not at all Ma∣sters of our primary Motions.

The Soul has then a necessity of Powerful Helps, for the obtaining the Victory; which is no other than Pru∣dence that Seconds it in this Combat: For this Prudence is no more than Rea∣son it self, illuminated with the Lights of Morality and Experience, whose principal use is to prescribe Rules for the Regulating of Passions, making known to the Soul the quality and real usage of them; She undeceives it in the Errours of Sense and Imagination; She gives it to know what is really Good, or really Evil; in one word, She teacheth the Soul to put a right esteem upon things, and what is conve∣nient, or inconvenient to Humane Na∣ture. And indeed, the greatest Out∣rages of Passions cannot avail against us, without the Inward Commotions of the Soul. It is upon this, that our Good or our Evil depend: For the Commotions of the Soul have much more Power over us, than the Passions themselves, From whence it is, that

seeing the Soul may have always with∣in, whereon to relie and satisfie it self, all the Troubles that can acrew thereto, from any other thing, have no power to hurt it; which does evidently de∣monstrate its Perfection. But now it must be by means of Vertue it can have this Content, Constancy and Immovea∣bleness we speak of; that is to say, by the Testimony a Man can bear for him∣self, That he has always prosecuted the things he Judged to be best.

So when a Passion Attacks the Soul, it opposes thereto, as Armed Sol∣diers, Judgments firm, Convincing, and undoubtedly decided by Penetrating and Unraveling the Nature of the Ob∣ject that causes this Passion: Which a Christian Philosopher, not Ignorant of these Principles understood, when he said, That Vertue cousists not in Regulating the Passions, but their Objects; because, saith he, One may commit very great Crimes, when the Motions of the Passions are but weak; and on the other side, The Motions of a Passion may be very Violent without a Crime. a The Soul weakning the Motion of the Organ of the Imagination, by strong Arguments, may at last stay it altogether: Or if it

find its Arms to be too weak, it joins Policy, and strives to divert the Cur∣rent which it cannot stop, and to that end Excites an other Passion, by moving this Organ some another way, with the Re∣presentation of some Object able to in∣stigate a Ballancing Passion. As for Ex∣ample, If the Soul would remove the Passion of Fear, She endeavours her self to Impress an other Motion or Pas∣sion on the Organ, by alledging the Reasons, or representing the Objects or Examples fit to create an Inclination to Generosity. But in the last place, If the Passion, agitating the Soul, do make so violent an Assault upon it, that it gives no time to deliberate; the Soul then makes a Couter Assault upon Na∣ture, and stays, at least, the greatest part of the Motions, to which that Pas∣sion, or the Organ, disposed the Body, as, for Example, That of the Hand, which Anger had caused to be lifted up to strike withal.

There is then so strait an Unity be∣tween the Soul, the Organ of the Ima∣gination, and the Body, that the Soul moves at its pleasure this Organ, by the means of this Prudence, and this Organ reciprocally Imprints in the Soul

all the Impressions it receives by the va∣rious Motions it undergoes; and the Body lastly, only from hence, that this Organ being diversely moved, ei∣ther by the Soul, or by any other cause whatsoever, and pushing the Spirits that surround it, into the Nerves and Muscles, it moves it self, and produces the Action to which it was deter∣mined.

The different Volitions of the Soul, then give different Motions to the Body; but it is to be understood, that these Volitions are of Two sorts, The one which Terminates in the Soul it self, as to Will the Love of God, or to apply it self to the Gonsideration of some im∣material thing: The other which Ter∣minates in the Body, and makes it to Act: Now if these last sort of Actions, or the Impressions which the Soul makes upon the Body, do happen to move the Spirits with such an Impetuous Mo∣tion, that extraordinary Effects may be observed in the Body, these Motions are called Passions of the Soul. For Exam∣ple, If the Body be observed to suffer, that is to say, to be alter'd in any thing from what it usually appear'd before, and especially in the Eyes or the Face,

as if it change Colour, Tremble, grow Faint, or fall in a Swound; if it Laugh; Weep, Groan, or Sigh; we may con∣clude, that the Mind suffers▪ and these Motions are called the Passions of the Soul, notwithstanding its Nature is not capable of Passion.

So that these Passions, Are the Per∣ceptions, or Sensations, or Motions, of the Soul, which are particularly refered to it▪ yet, which are Caused, Maintained and Augmented by the Motion of the Spirits. And because the Soul not only can ex∣cite Passions it self, but also perceives these that are rais'd by the temper of the Body, or from the impression of Objects, or the Natural Appetites, as we have remarked before; the number of Passions is almost infinite, seeing one Passion may be generated from ano∣ther, and all these may be mixt and compounded one with another. Yet notwithstanding, Authors are wont to Constitute some as General or Primitive Passions, from which the other are de∣rived as Species, that so they may be reduced to some Method: These are, Admiration, Love, Desire, Joy, Sad∣ness, Hatred, and if you will, Fear.

For if we be taken with any new and surprizing Object, we Admire it. If we find it to be good, and agreeable to our Nature, we Love it. If this good be absent, we Desire it. And after ha∣ving desired it, if we obtain the posses∣sion thereof, we Rejoice. As on the contrary, if after having possessed it, we lose it, this loss makes us Sad. On the other hand, if the Object present be a thing bad in it self, and hurtful, we Hate it. And if this Object be ab∣sent, but represented to us, as bad, and to befal us▪ it excites a Fear in us.

Now Fear, which conduces to our purpose, is a Commotion of the Soul, Agitated by the Spirits, in such manner as Creates an Apprehension, that an absent Evil will befal it, or that it will be bereft of some present Good. And it has under it, amongst other Species, the Passion of Jealousie, as the other General Passions have others su•• ordinate or deduced from them, as we said before: Where∣fore it ought to be carefully distinguish∣ed from others which do resemble it, yet are of different Species: For Ex∣ample, Jealousie is not the same with Envy, because Envy is deduced as a Species from Sadness; and is the Trou∣ble

one Resents for the Good which happens to another; when as Jealou∣sie is, The Fear one has to lose, or let ano∣ther partake with him in that Good, whereof he Loves the Possession. And this Jealousie has that as a property, that it does not arise so much from the force of Reason, Judging one may lose the thing he Possesses, as from bare Suspiti∣ons one has, which yet he mistakes for right Reason.

Notes

• That Pas∣sions are good; and the Prin∣ciples of our Actions.
• a

  Existi∣mandum profecto est constare animal u〈…〉〈…〉 civitatem bene legi∣bus muni∣tam Ar. de anim. motu▪ 〈…〉〈…〉
• The Stru∣sture of the Body.
• External Organs.
• Internal Organs.
• Ʋse of t•••• Internal Organs.
• a

  N••••••sse est p••os••∣•••••• p••••••c•• p••••m mo∣t••s 〈◊〉〈◊〉 m••∣di•• ess mov•••••••• ••ramae; ut••••rum{que} ••nim e∣tremor•• ••st 〈…〉〈…〉 ultim••m. Ari••••••t∣tle anim. cap. 9.
• The Ani∣mal Spi∣rits.
• How Sen∣sation is made.
• Where and how, the Passions are form∣ed.
• Biben dum est mihi dictat cu∣piditas▪ hoc autem esse po••ul•••• tum sensus, vel phantasia, vel mens affirmat, confestim bibitur, Arist. de animi mot. c. 7.
• a

  Phanta∣sia distin∣cta a sensi∣bus, quia vel ipsis quies centi∣bus ad est, ut in ••omno Arist. de ani. ••. 3. cap. 4.
• b

  Cogitatio & imagi∣natio agen∣tes addu∣cunt affec∣tiones, nam agentium species re∣proesentant Arist. de anim. mo••. c. 11.
• That the Body acts and moves it self by the confor∣mation of its Mem∣bers, with∣out the help of the Soul.
• a

  That Blood is the Soul of Beasts. Deut. 12. 23.
• b

  Joh. 13.
• That Beasts have not Passions, but only certain Im∣pulses re∣sembling them:
• c

  Muta animalia humanis affectibus carent. ha∣bent au∣tem simi∣les illis quosdam impulsus. Sen. de Isa. lib. 3. cap. 3.
• d

  Des Cart.
• a

  Des Cart. tr. de. hom. art. 16. & 55.
• Ratioci∣nari n••lli in est, ••••i non sit ra∣tio. Ar. de an. l. 3. c. 3. Quibus∣dam besti∣•••• phanta∣sia, non ve∣ro ratio in∣est. id. lib. c. 4. The Ex∣cellency of the Soul of Man.
• b

  Intel∣lectus est sepa∣rabilis & non mix∣〈…〉〈…〉us, & im∣patibilis, cum essen∣tialiter sit actus.
• Faculties of the Soul:
• The Me∣mory.
• The Ima∣gination.
• The Judg∣ment and Discourse.
• a

  Anima nunquam intelligit sine phan∣tasmate▪ Arist. de an. l. 3. c. 6:
• b

  Ro∣hault Phys. part 1. c. 2. The prin∣cipal Seat of the Soul.
• The power of Passion over the Soul.
• The war∣fare be∣tween the Spirit and Flesh.
• The Em∣pire of the Soul over the Body.
• a

  Non in moderan∣dis affecti∣bus sapien∣tiae ratio versatur▪ sed in cau∣sis ••orum, quoniam extrinse∣cùs moven∣tur: Nec ipsis potis∣simum fraenas im∣poni oppor∣tuit, quo∣niam & exig••i esse possunt in maximo crimine & maximi esse possun sine crimi∣ne. Lact.
• The mutu∣al corre∣spondency between the Soul 〈…〉〈…〉d the 〈…〉〈…〉dy.
• What it is that we call the Passions of the Soul.
• Non est quod ani∣ma aliquid patiatur; sed quia id patitur in quo est a∣nima: Arist. de an. l. 1. c. 5.
• Of the number of the Passi∣ons of the Soul.
• How the Passions are pro∣duced.
• What Fear is.
• What Jea∣lousie is.