A humble endeavour of some plain and brief explication of the decrees and operations of God, about the free actions of men, more especially of the operations of divine grace written by Mr. John Corbet ...

PART II. Of the Operations of God about the Actions of Men.

1. God is the Cause of all Good.

AS there is a Divine Decree, so there is a Divine Effici∣ence of all the Good, as well Moral as Physical, as well of common as of saving Grace, that ever comes to pass. It is the perfection of God, as God, to be the Author of all Good; and to be the Author of it, is to Decree and Ef∣fect it.

2. Of Gods Agency about Humane Actions, and the Natural Li∣berty of Mans Will.

GOds part in all Humane Acts is to us unsearchable; but this is sure, that the way of his Operation on man is agree∣able to the Nature of Man, who is a free Agent.

The Natural Liberty of the Will is not a perfect Indifferency, but an Indetermination with a Power of self-determining.

This self-determining Power of the Will makes us capable Sub∣jects of Gods Moral Government by Laws. And its present in∣determination between Good and Evil is not a state absolutely best, but most sutable to a Creature during his Probation in Or∣der to a Future Confirmation.

3. The Self-Determining Power of the Will is no Derogation from God.

THat which is ascribed to the Creature, doth not always detract from the Creator. For much of his Honour is in the nobleness of his Creature. It his honour to make a Creature of so noble a Faculty as is this of self-determination. And the Faculty and Exercise of it Exists no otherwise, than as upheld and actuated by him.

The denying of this Self-determining Power, in design of ascribing the more to God, is clogged with these incongruities; 1. Of limiting his Power, as not able to make a Self-determi∣ning Creature. 2. Of overthrowing his Moral Government by Laws.

Notwithstanding this noble Faculty, mans will is not in∣dependently free, but God is still Lord of it, and disposeth it according to the counsel of his own will, and can do with it as he pleaseth, by a sapiential Government, without a ne∣cessitating hand over it. Yet that there may be, and some∣times is, a Divine Predetermination of it, is not here denyed.

4. Of Gods Physical and Moral Operation upon Mans Will.

IT is most congruous to the Nature of reasonable Crea∣tures, that the general course of Gods Government over them should be by Moral Means. And it is also congruous that the Father of Spirits, the God in whom we live, move, and have our being, should have an inward and most inti∣mate access tò our Spirits in his Operations.

God acts by his Essence, and not by an Act, that is an accident in him. In his Physical Agency what there is be∣tween his Essence and mans Act, effected by the said agen∣cy, may be above the understanding of mortals to apprehend. Some Express it by an inward urgency to the act, whereby the mind is more disposed to it, than it was before. All that I can speak of it is this, That the said urgency denotes no act of God besides his Essence, but it is God himself so urging or influencing the mind of man without any alte∣ration in himself.

5. Of Commmon Concurse and Gracious Operation.

IT is most generally and safely said by Divines, that Gods Acts on the part of the Agent are all one, and all E∣ternal, as being his Essence; and that on the part of the Objects and Effects they are many, and some of them new and temporary. It is likewise wisely and humbly said, that the comprehending of this passeth the understanding of mor∣tal men.

In a sinners turning to God, and in every holy act, there is besides a common concurse from God, as the Fountain of Nature, a special Influence from him, as the Fountain of Grace. The diversity of the said Concurse and Influence is undiscer∣nible by us in it self, but in the Effects it is made manifest to us. And that, which on Gods part hath no difference, is diversified to us in the Effect.

6. God doth not Operate to the uttermost.

GOds Agency upon Mans will is not always in the same, but generally in very different degrees. For he doth not operate to the uttermost, or to the infinity of his Power, in every Effect that is wrought by him. It is true, that God is Infinite in Power, and whatsoever he doth, he doth it with an omnipotent facility. But that his Power is equally or always irresistibly put forth in all his Agency on the Crea∣ture I apprehend not. For if it were so, it would follow, that whatsoever is brought to pass, comes under the highest Necessitation.

7. God may so operate as to leave the Effect in part to Mans Will.

THat in some Cases God should Irresistibly Predetermine the Will to a good Act, is not against its Essential Li∣berty. For such Predetermination is not inconsistent with a Self-determining Power, but only supposeth it to be subject to God's Omnipotence. And it being to a good act, it is

a Premotion perfective of our Nature, and to its well-being, and therefore not unbecoming the Goodness of God.

Nevertheless the being of all Moral Good doth not necessa∣rily require such Predetermination, but God may so operate, as to leave the Effect in part to the liberty of Mans Will. Otherwise a man could do no good, to which he is not ne∣cessitated. Yet when man doth his part, he doth it not inde∣pendently on God, but in a total subordination to him, and by the Power and Liberty which God only gives, upholds, and actuates.

8. How God is a Total, and not a Partial Cause, and wherein a Sole Cause.

THe Notion of a Partial Cause is properly applyed to that which is in coordination with other Causes, and there∣fore not fit to be applyed to God, to whom all things are wholly subordinate, and nothing coordinate. Yet seeing there are other Causes evidently in conjunction with him, their own share in producing the Effect may be ascribed to them, without Impeachment of his honour. But it must be also considered, that they have all their Causation from him and in him.

God, and nothing besides him, is the Cause of his own Act, and so far he is both a total and solitary Cause: But he is not the sole Cause of Mans Act, because man himself is a Cause thereof in Subordination to him. Yet he is a total Cause of the Act done by man, as it is an Act, and of all that is laudable in the Act. For none is coordinate with him or assistant to him in his Agency. And whatsoever man doth, be it that wherein his Privilege is greatest, viz. the determining of his own will, he doth it altogether as therein upheld and actuated by God, and dependent on him.

9. Gods Agency is not determined or limited by the Creature.

MEn do variously receive Gods Agency, but they do not determine or limit it, any otherwise than the various

terminating of it may be called a determining or limiting of it. And the variation is not of Gods act, absolutely consi∣dered, but as variously terminated on men, according to their various disposition. God hath enabled men freely and vari∣ously to receive his Influx. So that it is not the Creature, but God himself, that determines his Agency by the condi∣tion of the Creature, according to his own Will. And men do not limit Gods Will, but only the Effect, which Gods Agency would produce, if mans will concurred.

10. How Gods Operation on man is never without Effect.

IF the good Effect in man doth not follow the Operation of God that is designed thereunto, yet that Operation is not without Effect. For by it there is wrought in man a Power or Capacity for that Effect, which doth not follow. And that the Power in Man is not brought into act, it is for want of Self-excitation.

God doth act wisely, and sutably to his Government over man, in giving him Power to such Effects as come not to pass I mean a Power properly so called, and which is adequate to' the Effect.

11. God in giving ••e Power gives the Act, whensoever the Act follows.

GOd giveth the very Will and Deed, in giving the Power to will and to do. If any have devised this Distincti∣on, that the Power of Willing and Doing is from God, but that the very Willing and Doing is from men themselves, it is a Distinction that I understand not. For, the Act is from him that gives the adequate Power to it, more than from the Immediate Agent.

The Power here supposed to be given, is seated in the Will; and the Will by it is supposed to be fully enabled and sufficiently excited to act. For God to give to will and to do, I cannot comprehend what it is, more than to give that compleat Power by which man doth will and do; that is,

to give man the Faculty, and rightly to dispose the Facul∣ty to act, and to sustain it in acting; and likewise to ascer∣tain the Act by his Decree, according to his Prescience, in a way unsearchable to us.

Though the power be one thing, and the Act it self ano∣ther thing, yet undoubtedly he that gives the said Power, doth therein give the Act it self. He that gives the Power of Self-excitation to the Act, and of all other Indeavour, gives that very Self-excitation and Indeavour, when it is in Act. And how God should have an Influx upon the Act otherwise, than by his Influx on the Agent, to give him active Power and Vertue, I cannot conceive.

12. Of Gods Agency about Sinful Acts.

GOd, as the Universal Cause, doth concur to that which is the Substratum of Sin, but is not Sin, viz. to the Act as an Act, or considered in the meer Nature and Physical be∣ing of an Act. This is not so to be understood, as if the Effect of Gods Concurse were a Non-Existent Universal, but a singular Act only, according to its general Nature; and as such, it hath no morality or sinfulness

In the Hatred of God, the Physical Entity of Hatred is not Sin, but as it is unduly terminated on God. The Morality of a sinful Act (or if you please to call it Immorality) is as it is exercised on an undue Object, and in undue Circum∣stances, and as such God doth not concur to the effecting of it.

To concur to the effecting of the Act, as having an undue Object, Order, End, &c. and not the contrary, is to effect it as sinfully qualified, or according to its moral specification, and the formale Peccati. For it is to effect the fundamentum of the Relation of disconformity to Gods Law, which Re∣lation is called the formale peccati, and follows the said funda∣mentum by a bare Resultancy, without any further Causation. But no sober judgment will ascribe to God the Causation of the formale peccati.

13. Gods not Effecting the sinful Act, as morally specified, infers not the Creatures Independency.

THe denying that God by his Efficience causeth mans Will to chuse the Forbidden Object, and Refuse the contrary, or to Will rather than to Nill the forbidden Object; and the affirming that the sinful Act, as morally specified, or ex∣ercised upon the undue Object, or in undue Circumstances, rather than the contrary, is to be resolved into Mans Will, as the first Determining Principle, not predetermined, is less to be dreaded from the imagined Consequence of the multi∣plication of Deities, or the Creatures Independency, than the contrary Opinion is from those Consequences which really and palpably follow upon it.

The truth is, that Faculty, which cannot act without an irresistible Predetermination to all its Acts, is not a Self-de∣termining Faculty. And was it ever proved a contradiction or utter impossibility for God to make a Creature with a self-determining Faculty?

Duely to consider how much every action of the Creature is from God, and what that is which is left to undetermi∣ned liberty, would not make one judg that it doth infer the Creatures Independency on God. Let it be noted, That Acti∣on is very much held to be not properly ens, as distinct from the Agent, but only a Mode of the Agent. But however that be held, the thing that is now in debate, is not so much as Action qua Action, but a Mode of Action. And be it con∣sidered, whether in such a Mode of Action the Humane Will may not be the first determining Principle, without the mul∣tiplying of Independent Beings, when the very self-determi∣ning Faculty, and its Power of acting in such a Mode, is wholly of God, and is conserved in active power by him in every Instance; and when God doth concur to that Act in genere Actus, and that, which is left to the Self-determi∣ning Will of Man, is no Physical Being, but only a compa∣rative circumstantiated modifying of a Being. In loving or hating an undue Object, rather than a due, there is no Phy∣sical

Entity, which is not in loving or hating a due Object ra∣ther than an undue. In both there is no more Natural Entity than what is in the general nature of Love or Hatred as such.

14. Of the Consequences that follow Physical Predetermination to all Humane Acts.

THough I have a veneration for some men, both for their Learning and Godliness, who held Physical Predetermi∣nation to all Humane Acts, as well bad as good; yet I can∣not receive the Opinion in regard of its Consequences. For from this Opinion it will follow, that all the sin that is done in the world can no more be avoided, than Omnipotence be overcome; that a man could no more do that Good Act, whereof his sin is the Privation, than he could make the world; that all the sinful Deficiency that is in the world ine∣vitably comes from the Negation of that Divine Efficience, which is absolutely necessary to prevent it; that the Cove∣nant made with Adam in innocence, and all the Laws of God that have been violated, were impossible to be observed; that when God hath Necessitated the Violation of his Law, he Punisheth that Violation with Everlasting Punishments.

I do not charge those that held the Opinion, but the O∣pinion it self, with these Consequences. And in this case, to say that man sins Voluntary and upon Choice, and therefore deservedly incurs the Punishment, is but to put off a very harsh matter with fair words. For if it be a Choice, it is such a Choice as is made under an Invincible Necessitation. And if this be not to sin under a meer Natural Necessity of sinning, what is?

15. Whether God doth Cause sin as it is a Punishment.

THat God doth punish sin with sin, is undeniably evident from the Scripture; he punisheth Voluntary Hardness of heart with Judicial Hardness. Nevertheless, though to Punish be Gods Act, yet he doth not properly cause the penal sin; but in his Righteous Judgment he denies to give that help

of Grace, which is needful to keep a man from such sin, and which is forfeited by the abuse of Grace already recei∣ved; He doth also justly expose the sinner to more and grea∣ter Temptations. Hereupon the sin, which is the Punishment of former sin, certainly follows. But there is no Causation or Agency of God to the effecting of the sin; only by his Righteous Judgment it is ordered to be a Punishment of former sin.

16. Sin doth not necessarily follow the permission of it.

IF the Humane Will had been bent to sin by a Natural Incli∣nation, as the fire burns, sin must have necessarily followed upon the permission of it. But first man sinned with Free∣dom and Choice, and without any previous inclination to it, and therefore the bare Permission of it, which is no more than a Non-prevention, doth not infer a Necessity of sin∣ning. Nor did it causally ascertain the Event of sin. For it hath no Causation in it.

Yea, the first man sinned not only by Free Choice, and with∣out a Previous Inclination to it, but also against a Holy In∣clination to Obedience, called Original Righteousness. This holy Inclination, though it was not so natural, as burning is to fire, that is, naturally inseparable, yet it was necessary to Humane Nature in its right state, and as it first came out of its Makers Hands; and under the Necessary Influence of God, which was with him, it was so fully sufficient to his Per∣severance in that state, that his sin was a matter of inexcu∣sable Ingratitude, and high Contempt of the Divine Good∣ness towards him.

In the state of Fallen Nature the Will hath lost its Free∣dom to acts conformable to Gods Law, and is enslaved to sin. And while God permits him to abide in this state, man sin∣neth Necessarily; yet not by reason of Gods Permission, but his own Vicious Inclination. This Necessity of Sinning is not purely Natural but Moral, which is also Voluntary, be∣ing from no other Cause, than the obstinate Depravedness of the Will it self, which is not to be conquered by its own

Power. Moreover, it is not a Necessity of the very parti∣cular sins which men run into, as if they were inevitabe. For ordinarily the particular sinful deeds committed might be forborn, and the Duties omitted might be performed, as to the outward deed. But the meaning is, whatsoever an un∣renewed person doth, hath necessarily, in the manner of it, a disconformity to Gods Law. A Corrupt Tree cannot bring forth Good Fruit.