The five days debate at Cicero's house in Tusculum between master and sophister.

SECT. XXIX. Whether the Peripateticks may consistently to themselves hold what the Stoicks do.

S.

BETTER I can tell nothing, but I would will∣ingly beg the favour of you, if it be not too much trouble, because you are not under engage∣ments to any certain Sect, but cull out of all, what∣ever works upon you, with any apperance of truth, whereas you seem'd a little before to exhort the Peripateticks and old Academy, that they would take the boldness to say freely without biting in their words, that wise men are always most happy,

I would fain learn of you, how you think it com∣porting with their Principle so to say; for much hath been said by you against their opinion, and concluded after the Stoicks way of arguing.

M.

Use we therefore our liberty, which we on∣ly can use in Philosophy, whose discourse judges nothing it self, but argues on all sides, that it may of it self, without the shelter of any ones Autho∣rity, be judg'd by others. And since you seem to be wishing this, that whatsoever be the opinion of dissenting Philosophers, about the several chief Goods, yet Vertue hath in it self sufficient Power, to the securing of an happy Life; which we have been inform'd Carneades was wont to maintain; but he did it as against the Stoicks, whom he did always most earnestly confute, and against whose Doctrine his Wit broke forth into Heats. We will do the same thing, but calmly; for if the Stoicks have rightly set the bounds of things good, the matter is at an end; the wise man must of necessity be always happy, but let us enquire into every opinion of the rest; if it be possible, that this excellent, as it were, Sanction of an happy Life, may agree with all their Judgments.