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SECT. XXXVII. The Cause of Passions, an opinion that they are our Duty.
WHERE then are those that say Wrath is use∣ful? Can Madness be useful? or natural. Can any thing be agreeable to Nature, and con∣trary to Reason? Now if Anger were natural, how could it be either that one man should be more hasty than another; or that it could be over before the desire of Revenge be satiated, or that any should repent of what they did in Passion; as we see by King Alexander, for (a) after he had kill'd his Friend Clitus, he could hardly forbear offering violence to himself, so strongly did Repen∣tance work upon him. These things being noto∣rious, who can doubt but that this motion of the Soul is also wholly in conceit and voluntary; for who can doubt but that the Diseases of the Soul, such as Covetousness, Ambition, arise from this, that the object upon which the Soul dotes, is over∣valu'd, whence ought to be understood, that every Passion also hath its being from opinion; and if assurance that is, a firm affiance of the mind, be a kind of Science and stedfast opinion of one yielding his assent upon good grounds only, then is Fear a diffi∣dence of mind, upon some expected and impend∣ing Evil. If hope be the expectation of Good, needs must Fear be an expectation of Evil; as Fear then, so the other Passions relate to Evil. As Constancy then is Fruit of Knowledge, so is Passion of Error.