Aristotle's Rhetoric, or, The true grounds and principles of oratory shewing the right art of pleading and speaking in full assemblies and courts of judicature / made English by the translators of The art of thinking ...

CHAP. III.

What things are are to be consulted.

VVE shall once more define how many, of what nature, and what things are to be consulted, as well at Council-Board, as in

Public Assemblies. For if we distinctly under∣stand every one of these things, the things them∣selves will afford us words for every Consultation. Breifly then, Consultation is to be had concern∣ing seven things; either about Religion, or Laws, or Political Preparations, or of Leagues against other Cities, or of War or Peace, or of the Public Revenue.

Now let us divide every one of these, and let us consider in what manner we are to make use of Oration concerning any of these things. Of Ceremonies there is not much to be said; for we either say they are to be continu'd as they are, or that they ought to be more sumptuous, or else that some of the Pomp is superfluous, If we say they are to be continued as they are, we are to find out reasons from what is just, and then to alledge how unjust it is to alter any thing from the ancient and Establish'd Customs of the Country. How all the Prophesies command men to perform the Sacred Ceremonies accord∣ing to ancient Customs and Use. That that worship is chiefly to be observ'd which was esta∣blish'd by those that first built Citys, and erect∣ed Temples to the Gods.

From Profit we may argue, That it will be more for the distribution of Money, both pri∣vately and publickly, that the ancient Sacrifices be continu'd; That it creates a confidence in the Citizens one of another, and consequently makes 'em more bold and daring. For the Citizens seeing the Souldiers feasting and performing their Military Sacrifices, shake off their former fears, as being Ambitious to be of the Number.

From honest, by alledging those Ceremonies

to be the occasion of several Friendly Meetings among vertuous Society.

From delightful, if there be any Variety in the Ceremonies. From possible, if there be nei∣ther want nor excess.

Therefore when we consult about things that have been long establish'd, we must take into consideration what things have been already said and their Resemblances, and then as the na∣ture of the things will bear, to discourse upon the several recited Subjects.

But when we advise to make the Sacrifices more pompous, then we bring proper Arguments to prove that it may be lawful to change the Customs of our Country; alleadging, that to add to what is already, is not to abrogate, but to adorn the settl'd constitution. Then, that it is probable the Gods will be the more Propitious to us, when they see that we give 'em greater honour: then, that our Fathers did not always ob∣serve the same Ceremonies, but varied accord∣ing as times and Seasons and their Prosperity admitted; and thereupon made particular changes both in public and private worship. And again, that it is requisite so to do, if any profit, splen∣dor or pleasure will thence arive to the Common weal; in regard we order our Cities, as we do our private Houses.

If the debate be about reducing the Sacrifices to a meaner Condition, then our Oration must be adapted to the Season, by urging that the Condition of the City is Lower then formerly: Then, that the Gods are better pleas'd with de∣votion then Gaudy Pomp. Then, that both Gods and Men will condemn the Stupidity of

those that do any thing beyond their power. Then, that the public Expences are not at the disposal of men, but according to their Prosperity or Ad∣versity. Now then, that we may know how to propose and Establish those things that appertain to the best way of Sacrificing, we are to consider, that that is the best Sacrifice, which is made to the Gods piously and holily: Moderate, as to Ex∣pences; profitable, as to War; but splendid for shew. Now thou shalt behave thy self piously toward the Gods, if the Customs and Consti∣tutions of thy Country be not infring'd; mode∣rately as to expences, if all the presents that are made be not consum'd at once. Profitably for the War, if Infantry and Cavalry feast and main∣tain their pastimes together in their Arms: splen∣didly for shew, if there be a magnificent use made of Gold and other precious Ornaments which are not consum'd and wasted. And thus from these things shall we agree about the chiefest Ornaments that concern the Gods: and out of what we have already said, we may plainly un∣derstand after what manner we are to discourse concerning the several sorts Sacrifices.

In the same manner we may frame Arguments in reference to the Laws and civil Constitutions. For the Laws, as we have already briefly hinted, are the public consent of the Commonweal, which determines in writing, and commands how every one is to act in such and such particulars. Now for making of Laws in Democracies, the meaner Magistrates are many, and chosen by Lot, which prevents Sedition: But the Superiour Ma∣gistrates, by the suffrages of the People. For thus the People having in their Power to confer Ho∣nonrs

upon they please, will never envy those that accept it: and they who are most eminent, will be most diligent to exercise Probity and Sincerity, knowing they shall gain by being in esteem with the People. And thus much concerning the Electi∣on of Magistrates in Democracies.

As to what concerns the other part of Popu∣lar Administration, to speak briefly, This must be observ'd, That the Laws prohibit the Mul∣titude from gaping after the substance of the Wealthy; and the rich to a willing Munificence in public Offic's. Which may be done, by decree∣ing to the Rich certain peculiar honours in lieu of their Expences bestow'd upon the Public: as by preferring Husbandmen before poor Artists, and Masters of Ships before Ordinary Water-men. Also there ought to be a severity in the Laws to prevent neglect of Tillage, and the publishing the Estates of the deceas'd, with great Penalties upon the Contemners of these Statutes. Also there ought to be allow'd some public place of Scpulture for those that are slain in the Wars, and their Children ought to be brought up at the public charge, till they come of Age. Such Laws as these become a Popular Govern∣ment. In Oligarchies; the Laws ought to distribute the Power equally to all that partici∣pate in the Government. Of these Magistrates the most are chosen by lots, the cheifest private∣ly by Suffrage, with Oaths and a very great ex∣actness. And in an Oligarchy there ought to be the greatest punishments ordain'd upon those that go about to offer injury to any of their fel∣low Citizens. For the Multitude is not so much concern'd for being depriv'd of the Magistracy

as they are offended when abus'd and injur'd. It is requisite also to be very diligent in compo∣sing the differences of one Citizen with another, and never to suffer the Multitude to meet toge∣ther in any noted place; for such Assemblies ce∣ment the Multitude, and dissolve the Oligarchy. And thus much as to what is to be observ'd and desir'd in all Civil Constitutions.

Now he that would defend his cause by the Law, must shew that it is equal among the Citi∣zens, that it is agreeable to the rest of the Laws, that it is for the Peace of the City, for the ad∣vance of the Public Tributes, for the honour of the City, and that it will encrease the Power of the City; and whatever else to this effect. And then the Opponent must consider first whether the Law be common to all, whether agreeable or contrary to the rest of the Laws, whether profitable as the other alledg'd, or hurtful. Now as concerning Allies and Leagues against other Cities, Leagues must be made according to pub∣lic contracts. Allies are to be sought for, ac∣cording to the Condition of the times, when they that seek Assistance are weak of themselves, or that they are threaten'd with some War, and therefore a League must be made with others who they think will forsake their side in time of War. And these are the cheif reasons that induce men to make Leagues. Now he that would perswade the making of a League uses these Arguments, That it is Seasonable, that the People are a just and generous People, that they are already well affected toward us, that they are our Neighbours and Powerful. But if all these things cannot be alledg'd, then to urge as many as can be.

He that would disswade the entring into a League, must shew that it is needless at this time, that the People are not to be trusted, and that they have ever born us a grudge, that they live at a distance, and that they are in no capa∣city to assist us in time.

If the Question be whether to make War or Peace, Arguments are deduc'd from the Causes. Now the Causes of War are, For that now is the time to take our Revenge upon those that injur'd us before; or being now provok'd either in reference to our selves or our Kindred, or our Benefactors; or to assist our Allies unjustly invaded, or for the common benefit, for ho∣nour, or to enrich our selves, or for any other cause of the same nature. Therefore when we would exhort our Hearers to War, we ought to comprehend as many of these causes as we can, and to shew that the most of those things that ren∣der War successful, auspiciously appear to favour the exhorted. For all men become Victorious by the favour of the Gods, which we call Good Fortune, or through Multitude or strength of Bodies, through Riches, prudence of the Gene∣ral, stout Associates, and opportunity of strong holds. Therefore from these or Arguments like to these, which are most congruons to the mat∣ter, we may 'exhort the undertaking a War, extenuating the strength of our Adversaries, and extolling our own.

On the other side if we desire to prevent a War, first those reasons are to be found out, by which we may demonstrate, that the Injuries are very slight, or none at all that induce us to War, that the War cannot be advantagous,

and then the Calamities attending War are slightly to be run over. Then we are to shew, that all the Advantages which procure Victory are on the Enemies side.

If we would exhort the Surceasing a present War, then the first thing to be urg'd is, That they who are in their wits, will never stay till a misfortune happen, but will endeavour to make Peace while they are Victorious, and may pro∣cure it upon the best Terms. Then, because it is the chance of War, that they who win at first loose at last: but that it is the nature of Peace to preserve the vanquish'd, and that thereby the Victor enjoys the fruits of the War. Then repeat the many and various changes that are wont to happen in War. Thus are they to be exhorted who have the better. But they who have miscarry'd in the War are to be perswaded to give over another way: that is, by reasons drawn from the chances themselves that have befallen 'cm; and the miseries they endur'd be∣fore, when they refus'd Peace: and then, that it is better to part with a small Portion, then to hazard the whole at one throw. Breifly we ought to understand this, that men are wont then to give over War, when they believe their Ene∣mies desire what is just, or that any Quarrel happens between them and their Allies, or that they are weary of the War, or that they are a∣fraid of their Adversaries, or that they begin to fall out among themselves.

As for what concerns the public Revenue, First we are to consider whether any of the pub∣lic Lands be neglected; which neither yeilds any Revenue, nor yet is consecrated to the Gods. As

there are some public Lands neglected which would yield good profit, were they either sold or set out to private Persons. But if there be no such thing, of necessity Taxes must be lay'd; and the Poor must pay the Tribute of their Bodys, the Rich must find Money, the Tradsemen Armes. And thus much for Propositions in de∣liberative Arguments.