The pattern of catechistical doctrine at large, or, A learned and pious exposition of the Ten Commandments with an introduction, containing the use and benefit of catechizing, the generall grounds of religion, and the truth of Christian religion in particular, proved against atheists, pagans, Jews, and Turks / by the Right Reverend Father in God Lancelot Andrews ... ; perfected according to the authors own copy and thereby purged from many thousands of errours, defects, and corruptions, which were in a rude imperfect draught formerly published, as appears in the preface to the reader.

CHAP. IIII.

2. The way to come to God is onely by faith, not by natural reason alone, as the Mani∣chees held; reasons against them. The way by faith more certain. The necessity of belief. Rules for coming by faith.

How to come to God.

THe second general point is, that the means to attain to the end (that is to come to God) is by faith. Omnis motus ab appetitu est, every motion is prosecuted by desire, and ut moveatur cognoscenda est via, we must know the way before we 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to motion, for ignoti nulla est cupido, a man hath no lust or desire to attempt that whereof he is ignorant. Therefore in the first place the way must be known to go to God, before we can come to him.

There are two wayes to come to God, one held by Hereticks which is by the reach of reason. 2. The other held by Christians, which is by faith.

1. The Manichees (as Saint Augustin testifies of them) in opposition to the Ca∣tholiques, held that men were to come to God by reason, and not by belief: and therefore vaunted, that whereas others did imponere jugum credendi, impose a yoke of beleeving upon men desirous to come to God, that they would bring men to God, by opening fontem sciendi the fountain of knowledge onely, they would effect it by demonstration. This way because it was most plausible grew strongest, and prevailed long: In so much that if any Philosopher had entred Christian reli∣gion he first became a Manichee: which appeared by Faustus the Manichee, whose heresy was most dangerous and of longest continuance.

The like sectaries are in our dayes, who are called by the learned 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that must have a reason (forsooth) of every thing: and as long as you go with them in the way of reason, they will keep you company, so far will they go with you, and no further.

Therefore we are to prove, that the way to God by belief, is most convenient and necessary, and that the way by reason without faith is the worst and most in∣convenient.

1 If we must come to God by reason onely and knowledge, then it wil 〈◊〉〈◊〉 follow, that none shall be saved, but the learned, and those of excellent wit and ca∣pacity: for none but they are capable of demonstration: but that way (of all othe) is most inconvenient, that but few onely can go in. This is, as if many undertake a Journey together, and because some can climbe hedges and ditches, the rest must passe that way also. But Gods way is Via regia. The kings high-way.

2 Againe, besides the excellency of wit and apprehension, there are great paines necessarily required to come to knowledge: and many are so weake by nature, that they cannot take the pains that shall be needful to acquire it: many also are so imploy∣ed in several affairs, that they cannot spare somuch time as is requisit: and many (as we see by daily experience) that bend themselves that way, are cut off before they can attain to it: so that we may say, that if there were no other way to get the know∣ledge of God but by reason, there would be few that should enjoy that felicity: But God hath prescribed a more compendious way: we need do no more, then be∣leeve, & 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 we have attained it.

3 And whereas they object as Porphirie did to the Christians of his time, that too much Credulity is a signe of levity, and was an hindrance to many in coming to God by belief, we may 1 answer them by another saying of their own. Nemo cre∣dulus, nisi credis stulto aut improbe, No man is to be accounted credulous, but he that shall beleeve a fool or a knave. And of folly and impiety God must needs be acquitted, lest we fall into Blasphemy. for Deus, as he is perfecta veritas perfect truth and cannot deceive, so is he perfect wisdom and perfect righteousnesse too, even righteousnesse, truth, and wisdom it self, and cannot erre, therefore it is no danger to be taxed with credulity, for coming to God by belief.

Now, that this way by beleeving is the surest and most certaine way, cannot be de∣nied, because faith is grounded upon the word of God, though published and set forth by man. And this appeareth by four effects or circumstances, as Origen sets them down.

• 1 As healing of incurable diseases, such as were the leprous, hydropique para∣lytique, and men possessed with unclean spirits, which Physick could not cure.
• 2 By raising and reviving men from death.
• 3 By shaking the powers of heaven.
• 4. In that simple and unlearned men, in one hour proved excellent, and wonderfully skilsul in all the tongues.

And therefore, there must needs have been a divine power in them that wrought these things, whereby appeareth the certainty of the effect, though not of thecause.

2 A second answer to Porphiries objection is. That the suspition of credulity ap∣peares rather in the way of reason, then faith: because,

• 1 There being two hundred eighty eight severall opinions of Philosophers, and every one of them having a reason for his summum bonum or felicity, there must needs be many crosse wayes among them; And the way of truth being simplex & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 but one, it were impossi le for a man, among such diversitie of opinions to be in any certainty, and therefore necessarily must fall into the tax of greater credulity.
• 2 Aristotle saith, theres no necessary thing without mixture of contingency in it: and therefore there can be no absolute demonstration, and consequently theres no∣thing subject to knowledge without contradictory opinions. And this being so, what can be more uncertain?
• 3 But chiefly in the knowledge of prima emia things that have the first being, they confesse themselves to be in the dark, they transcend theire understanding, aswell in re∣spect of the object, because they are 〈◊〉〈◊〉 immaterial, without matter, as of the fountain or cause of our knowledge, because Principia rationis a sensibus 〈◊〉〈◊〉, the senses are doors letting in what reason worketh upon.
• ...

• 4. And in Metaphysiques Deus &coelestia fensibus non subjiciuntur, God is above nature, and sense can give no reason nor rules concerning Coelestial matters: our rea∣son and understanding are confounded; but they are simple and unconfounded. There∣fore we cannot come to God by reason alone, we must finde out some other way.
• ...
  • 1. The way of necessity then must be by faith. For take away belief, and overthrow all commerce, men will be friends to none, nor any to them. Saint August. saith, that if upon our report of that we have seen, to another that was not present, nor did see that which we related, he should not believe it, unlesse we make proof of every cir∣cumstance conducing to the sight thereof, nonne adigerit nos ad insanidm? would it not almost drive us into madnesse?
  • 2. Again he saith, If a man should come to me and say, Shew me the true way by reason, and I reply, thou comest but in the way of dissimulation and hypocrisie, not out of any good meaning: then will he make protestation of his integrity and good in∣tent, and explain it with words, as well as he is able: then I say, I believe you Sir, yet you cannot perswade me to it by reason. And seeing you will have me believe you, is there not as great equity, that you should believe me, seeing that your be∣lieving me redounds not to my benefit, but your own? Who dares call in question the word of a Prince? And God being at least as good as a Prince, ipsius 〈◊〉〈◊〉 non credere quanta impietas? it were great impiety not to believe his Word. Therefore the way by belief is not altogether to be rejected. There are many things that cannot be demonstrated by reason, yet of necessity must be believed; as a father to be a fa∣ther. A man that would travail to a place which he knows not, must believe those that have been there. And if a man returning from travail, report that he hath seen such aman, or such a place, it were hard he should not be believed except he bring proof, or witnesse, it being impossible to make demonstration by reason, of that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the like.

So much for the necessity of belief.

In the way of Faith, we are to observe four Rules.

1. It was the Rule of the Heathen, that into what art soever a Scholar was initi∣ated, Oportet discentem credere, the Scholar must beleeve his Master: for whatsoever good we receive at the first, we receive it from our Teachers. And this ground, hath this principle, Actio perfecti in imperfecto recipitur, we are imperfect before we can come to any perfection, first imperfect, then perfect. Wood receives heat from fire before it can burn and be fire. So learners receive knowledge by faith from others, before they come to be perfect themselves. This is confirmed by the Prophet, Nist credideritis, non stabiliemini, if you will not beleeve, surely you shall not be esta∣blished.

2. When we have received by beleef, then we may seek for demonstrations, either a prieri, or a posteriori to confirm our belief, because, ut virtutum 〈◊〉〈◊〉, ita & religionis principia quaedam in nobis innata sunt, some principles of religion as of other vertues are inbred and natural to us, though much defaced and depraved by humane corruption: and principia religionis non sunt inter se contraria, the principles of religion are not contrary one to another, for then we should never come to any certainty of true knowledge. But reason and religion agree; and the true worship of God is proved by the principles of natural reason. True reason is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 help to faith, and faith an help to reason: but faith is the Lady, reason her dutiful Handmaid. Eaith and right reason are not contrary, but as a greater and a lesser light, yea faith is sam∣ma ratio.

3. Having thus submitted our selves to belief, and strengthened it with reason, we must look for an higher teacher. For though faith be a perfect way, yet we being unperfect, walk unperfectly in it: and therefore in those things which transcend nature and reason, we must beleeve God onely, and pray to him, that by the inspiration of his holy spirit we may be directed, and kept in this way.

4. Because this inspiration cometh not totally at the first, all at once, we must grow to perfection pedetentim by little and little: and come up by degrees, till it please him to send in full measure to us. Festinandum lente we must hasten, yet slow∣ly, and take heed of, and avoid praepropera consilia rash attempts: according to the Prophets rule, Qui crediderit non festinabit, he that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 shall not make haste, but go on according to the Apostles gradation, Adde vertue to faith, and knowledge to vertue, &c. and so by degrees.

And thus much for this point of via ad Dominum, the way to come to God. 1. By beleeving. 2. By strengthening that belief. 3. By expecting the Spirit for our Di∣recter. 4. And lastly by proceeding by degrees, in a right path.

Notes

• 1
• By Reason
• 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉.
• 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 10.
• By Faith 1.
• de utilitate cre∣dendi ad Hom∣rat. c. 10.
• Esa. 7. 9.
• Act. 17. 18.
• Rom. 1. 19.
• Esa. 28. 26.
• 2. Pet. 1. 5.