The history of the government of Venice wherein the policies, councils, magistrates, and laws of that state are fully related, and the use of the balloting box exactly described : written in the year 1675 / by the sieur Amelott de la Houssaie ...

THE HISTORY OF The Government OF VENICE.

I Write the History of the Government of Ve∣nice, without contradiction, in its kind, the best in all Europe; as being a true Copy of the ancient Republicks in Greece, and as it were an Amass, or Collection of all their most excellent Laws. Some Authors have handled this Subject before me, among which Cardinal Contarin, San∣sovin, and Jannotti were the chief. But all three of them have given us no more than a bare de∣scription of the Magistrates and Tribunals in Ve∣nice; and so far have they been from sounding the mystery of that Government, that they would not so much as touch it by the by, in respect of some pri∣vate interests of their own. Wherefore I under∣take this Relation, out of an opinion it may satisfy sober men by the importance and variety of its matter, in which something possibly may be found, that being new will have at least its novelty to recommend it.

To begin with Order, It seems to me convenient to premise something about the several States and Conditions through which this Republick has past since its Foundation; which will be, as it were, an Epitome of the whole History, and serve as a Scheme or Ground-plot to my Work.

Venice has often chang'd the form of her Go∣vernment. Her first Government was by Consuls, but that lasted not long: Her next was by Tri∣bunes, annually chosen by the people of each Isle, which in those days made a separate Common∣wealth, not much unlike the Cantons in Switzer∣land, or the Ʋnited Provinces in the Low-Coun∣treys; and to those Tribunes it is that Cassiodorus addresses his Letters with this Superscription, Tribunis Maritimorum. But because their Ma∣gistrates many times disagreed, and the Lombards took advantage of their dissentions, whilst they lost their time in contesting among themselves: The people wearied with their delays, took a fan∣cy to make experiment of a single person; and to that end, creating a Duke, they transferr'd upon him their Soveraign Authority, which they had en∣joyed for 270 years. Nevertheless, being quickly weary of their Dukes, they abolished the very name and dignity in the person of the third Duke, who abused his Power; and in their place substitu∣ted a Military Tribune, called in their ancient An∣nals Magister Militum, by corruption Mastromiles, whose Office was annual. This form was laid aside in the fifth year after its institution, Fabricio Ziani, the last of that quality, having made himself odi∣ous to the People, who at that time were very hard to be pleased; insomuch that these Islanders regrating the deposal of their first Dukes, by com∣paring them with their present Tribunes; by com∣mon consent reviv'd the Ducal Authority, and ad∣vanc'd Theodate, Son of their last Prince, to the Throne.

From this Election in the year 742, to the year 1173, there were 34 Dukes successively; who go∣vern'd the Isles with an Authority so absolute, that it is not to be admired if there were so many Re∣volts

and Conspiracies against them; some of them having been expuls'd, some having had their eyes put out, and others most cruelly massacred.

After the death of Vital Michieli the second of that name, slain upon Easter-day, 1173, the Peo∣ple being weary of the long Dominion of their Dukes, reassum'd the Government; yet for more reputation to their affairs, they continued to elect a Prince, but with such manacles and restrictions, that they left him scarce any thing but the Title and Precedence. All was managed by the Grand † Council, which was composed of 470 Citizens nam'd by 12 Electors, selected out of the six Quar∣ters of the Town, called by them Sestieri: These 470 were changed annually every Michaelmas-day, that all persons might have their share in their turns. This method continued to the time of Duke Peter Grandenique the Second, who reform'd the Grand Council in the year 1298, by imposing upon the Quarenty Criminal a new Law to this purpose: That all those who were of the Grand Council that year, or had been of it in the four pre∣cedent years, should continue so, and their children after them in perpetuum, if they were able to ob∣tain twelve voices in the Quarenty; and that all the rest of what quality soever, whether of the Populace or Nobles, (for they call those Nobles which were descended from the ancient Tribunes) should be for ever excluded from the Civil admi∣nistration. Insomuch that the said Decree having been proposed in the Grand Council by Leonard Bembe, and Mark Badoer, in the name of the Qua∣renty, and received by plurality of voices, the So∣veraignty was transferr'd from the People to the Nobles. This change (as is common in all revolu∣tions of State,) produc'd the famous Conspiracy of the Quirins, the Tiepoles, and other ancient and

considerable Families, who were excluded either totally or in part; for several of them were di∣vided betwixt servitude and liberty: witness the Nani, the Navagiers, the Trevisans, and the Pas∣qualiques, who in consequence of this Decree found their Families mingled with the People and the Nobles, with Masters and Servants; upon which the Quirins did eagerly complain, That this Re∣formation cut the knot of Amity and Concord be∣twixt all the great Families in Venice, and would endanger the kindling a Civil War. But their mur∣murs were in vain; and the enterprize of Marin Bocconi to break open the doors of the Grand Council, and there to assasinate the Duke, had no other success but his own Execution, and the ruine of his party.

In the mean time the new Government, that was as yet but an Oligarchy, grew up by degrees to an absolute Aristocracy, by addition of several Il∣lustrious Families that had been excluded by lot, and by establishing the Council of Ten to imprint respect and obedience in the hearts of the People; who, when they are in no awe themselves, are ever to be fear'd. So that it may justly be said, the Common-wealth of Venice began by Prince Peter Grandenique, because it was he who in spight of all difficulties, by his own courage and address, wrested it out of the hands of the common People, to give it that excellent form which it retains to this day.

Tant ae molis er at Venetorum condere gentem.

So then Venice was governed by Consuls and Tri∣bunes in its Infancy, which lasted 270 years, during which time she kept her self within her Islands, as within her Cradle. She past her Childhood under 37 Soveraign Dukes, that is to say, from Lucius

Anafestus, to Sebastian Ziani. This comprehended 470 years, part of which time she employed in Wars against her neighbours, and part in extending her Conquests to greater distance, as she found her Power increase. The Populace having rescued themselves from the Tutelage of their Dukes, un∣dertook the Conduct of her Youth, from 1173 to 1298; which was effectually robust and vigorous, but disturb'd and agitated (as happens frequently in that age) with many dangerous paroxisms both of Wars and Revolts. Her Virility began under the Nobles 1298, and lasted from the reformation of the Government, which they called, Il serrar di Consiglio, where the Democracy ended, till the war of the League of Cambray 1509, which, to speak properly, was the beginning of her Old-age. Be it how it will, Venice has this advantage, she has main∣tain'd her self longer than all the famous Republicks of the Ancients. The Commonwealth of Sparta lasted but 700 years: Athens, Thebes, and Rhodes lost their liberty several times: Corinth continued not long in that form: and Rome, the most illustri∣ous of them all, had much ado to preserve it self free 500 years together; a strong presumption of the excellence of the Venetian Common-wealth, whose present State and Condition is the only thing I design to represent in this Book.

There are three principal Councils in Venice; that is to say, the Grand Council, which comprehends the whole body of the Nobles: the Pregadi, which is the Senate; and the Colledg where Embassadors have their audience. I do not reckon among them the Council of Ten, because it is only a Tribunal in∣stituted for the trial of matters against the State. In all these Councils the Seigniory (which is a kind of Septemvirate, consisting of the Duke and six Councellors, and called il Consiglietto, being an

abridgment of the rest) presides: so that the Seigniory is as it were the Head of that Republick of which the Duke is the Mouth, because it is his office to give answer to the Embassadors. The Councellors are the Eyes and the Ears, it being their business to peruse all Letters directed to the Senat; all Memorials, or Requests, presented to the Col∣ledg; and to hear all forreign Ministers, all Depu∣ties of Towns, or whatever other persons are em∣ployed in any negotiations with the publick. The Colledg is as it were the neck of this body Politick; by which, as by a Pipe, all affairs pass to the Pre∣gadi, which may be called the Stomack, or Belly, as containing all the parts of that Government, and deriving all its nourishment to it. The private Ma∣gistrates are as it were the Nerves and Bones that move and sustain it; and the Council of Ten are the ligaments, hindring the parts from unknitting, and preventing any violent motion from putting them out of their natural place.

But the Grand Council being the basis and foun∣dation of this Republick; it seems to me most pro∣per to begin my description with a particular of that, its Jurisdiction, and all its Essential parts: which I shall endeavour to do with as much me∣thod, clearness and brevity, as is possible.

THE FIRST PART.

Of the Grand Council

THe Grand Council is a General Assembly of the Nobles, which meets on Sundays and Holydays for the Election of Magistrates. It is called the Grand Council, because it compre∣hends all the rest; and therefore when that is held, the rest do cease on course, as formerly all the Courts in Rome did during their Comitia: and the reason why Sundays and Holy-days are chosen for the meeting of the Grand Council, is, that other days might be left free for other Courts, without interruption to the course of affairs.

In Summer-time the Grand Council meets in the morning, and sits from eight of the clock till noon. In Winter they meet after dinner, and sit till Sun∣set. Their Session in the morning begins in April, and ends at All-Saints; at which time begins their meeting in the after-noon.

Their Election of Magistrates is in this manner. The Chancellor having read in the Assembly a Me∣morial of what Offices are vacant; and the Avoga∣dors, the chief of the Council of Ten, and the Censors, having sworn to observe the Orders of the Council; the Nobles draw lots to become Electors. The Electors (who are always 36, and make four Mains as they call them, or separate

Bands) do each of them name a Competitor, which is baloted afterwards by one Main of the Electors.

To understand it the better, you must know there are three Ʋrns raised above the ordinary height of a man, to the end that no body might look into them. One of these Ʋrns is placed before the Duke, the other two at the ends of the Table; and three Councellors are appointed to look to each of them.

Into the Ʋrns on the right and left hand are put as many little white Bouls as there are Nobles in the Council; that is to say, sixty all gilt, thirty for each Ʋrn. Into the Ʋrn in the middle are put sixty, 36 gilt, and 24 white. The Nobles come up two by two, one on each side, and draw by turns: If the Boul be white, they throw it into a little box under the Ʋrn, and return to their place as nothing had been done. If the Bowl be gilt, it is presented to the Councellors belonging to the Ʋrn out of which it was taken. From thence they proceed to the Ʋrn in the middle, out of which, if they draw a white Bowl, they are ipso facto excluded; but if it be their fortune to light upon a gilt Bowl, they are received for Electors of the first Main: after which they remove to a Bench placed before the Duke's Throne, where they sit down with their faces towards the Duke, that no man may have opportunity by making signs to recommend himself to them; and having done this, they are proclaim'd aloud by one of the Secretaries of the Council. If in the first Main the lot falls to two Nobles of the same Family, the second is reserv'd for the second Main; and all the Gentlemen of that House retire out of the Council, the Law ex∣cluding them that day, because there cannot be in the thirty six above two Electors of one Family; So that every Main consists of nine Gentlemen of indifferent Families.

The first Main being fix'd, a Secretary delivers to the youngest of them a Note of what Offices are to be supplied, and conducts them out of the Council into a Chamber on purpose; where he causes them to draw by turns out of a Vessel which contains nine Bowls, mark'd each of them with a figure from 1 to 9, which answers to the Magistrates to be nam'd: so that the Nobleman who draws the figure 1, names a Competitor for the first Office, and so of the rest. Every Com∣petitor is baloted, or chosen by lots afterwards by this Main; and if he has two thirds of the Suf∣frages, he carries the place: whereas if he has not two thirds, he who nam'd him must propose another, till he pitches upon one who passes; and then the Secretary writes the name and quality of the person so nam'd, under the note of the vacant Office for which he is Competitor. And the same is observ'd in the other Mains: but here it is to be observ'd, that all four of the Mains do name persons for every Office, and so to each Office there are four several pretenders.

After the Competitors are concluded, the Ele∣ctors withdraw, unless they be Councellors, Sage∣grands, Members of the Council of Ten, Avogadors, or Censors, who have priviledg to return again in∣to the Council to justify their Election. The four Secretaries of the respective Mains deliver the Note of Competitors to the Chancellor, who reads them aloud to the Table; to the end it may appear, if among them there be any in divieto, that is, excluded by the Law. After this he exhorts them in a short speech to postpone their private animosities to the good of their Countrey, and not prefer their passions to their duty. In the mean time the Competitors for the first Office de∣part the Council, with all their kindred, who are

not allowed their suffrages by reason of their rela∣tion. This done, certain children called Balotins are appointed to receive the Balls in two Bossols or boxes; one white to signify exclusion, the other red to signify admission, by pronouncing the name of the Competitor.

The balls made of white stuff very small, are put into the white or the green box thorow a common mouth; so that no man need fear the eyes of another, because no man can see where they are put; and those who have given exclusion may swear truly according to their usual oath, Caro Signor l'ho servisa, si da servitor vero. The balls being taken out, are carried to the Councel∣lors to be counted; and the Competitor who has most of them carries the Office.

After this the Chancellor mentions the next Va∣cancy; and the persons propos'd, who immediately retire out of the Council with all their relations, the first being admitted into the Council to elect these; and this is called Render il partito, because they render what was borrowed: and 'tis the same with the rest.

If it happens that none of the Competitors for any of the Offices has more than half the balls, the place is to remain void till another Session: but the Competitors shall not be the same again, be∣cause the lots will hardly give them the same Ele∣ctors. Again, if any of the Competitors should be left to be drawn after Sun-set, he loses abso∣lutely his right; for as it is not permitted to draw, nor indeed any thing else in the Grand Council at Venice (no more than it was formerly at Rome to deliberate in the Senat) after Sun-set; so whatever is then done being thereby actually void, the nomi∣nation of that person becomes utterly useless. And if of the four Competitors three be in divieto,

the fourth who remains cannot be chosen for want of a Competitor. But on the contrary, if all the Mains concur in the Election of one person, (as it falls out sometimes,) he must be chosen, because he was Competitor to himself. And the same rule holds for those who are nam'd by two Mains, which is intimated by the Chancellor in his pro∣claiming the Competitors.

In the Election of the Doge, their form is quite different; and I shall give it in as few words as are possible.

All the Nobles past 30 years of age being met in the Palace of St. Mark, as many little bowls are put into an Ʋrn as there are Gentlemen pre∣sent; 30 of which bowls are gilt. Those to whose lot they fall, present nine of the gilt bowls before the Seigniory, among 24 of the white; and the nine Gentlemen to whom the gilt bowls come, are Ele∣ctors for 40 others, all of different Families, among whom they have liberty to comprehend themselves. By lot they are reduced to twelve, which twelve choose 25 others; the first chooses three, the other eleven two a-piece. These 25 drawing by lot as the 12, are reduc'd to 9, who have the nomination of 45; that is to say, each of them names five. The 45 are by lot reduc'd to eleven, and they again choose 41, which are the last and principal Electors of the Duke, after they have been confirm'd by the Grand Council. Nor is it without reason the Venetians have esta∣blished this unusual form of Election; for by these variations, and diversity of Electors, it is, that all private ambitions are defeated: because all de∣pending upon the choice of those who are fa∣voured by lot, (which no man can force) all their plots and stratagems are ineffectual. Be∣sides, it is a way of contenting most of the

chief Families by the share they have in the Ele∣ction.

Anciently the Dukes of Ʋenice were chosen by the acclamation of the People; but that way of Election being confus'd and tumultuous, they esta∣blish'd another after the death of Vital Michieli the second; whose successor was nam'd by eleven † Electors, whose number was advanc'd to 40 in the following interregnum, and 60 years after fix'd in 41, to avoid the difficulty which sometimes hap∣ned of having their voices equal. Which custom has been observ'd since the time of Duke Marine Morosin to this day; only with this difference, that in his days it was sufficient to have 21 voices to be elected Duke; and at present there are 25 required at the least.

In the Election of Magistrates there are no doubtful voices, because they have too much choice among the Competitors, to be in doubt what is to be done: but yet in their Balotings certain rules are observed, as also in their Criminal Judg∣ments, where the doubtful voices are allowed to the weaker party. For example, If one of the Nobles, against whom process is form'd, has fewer voices in the Baloting than his accusers; the Non∣sincere (for so it is they call the doubtful voices) are reckon'd to him, with which adddition, if yet his number be found inferior to his adversary, the Noble is condemn'd: On the contrary, he is dis∣charg'd, if the adverse party, with the addition of the Non-sincere voices, has fewer than he. But if he be not clear'd without the addition of the Non∣sincere voices, the Baloting begins again, and con∣tinues till either the one or the other has more than a moiety of the Yea's or the No's: for the Non-sincere voices serve only to suspend Judgment, as the Code of Venice tells us; Non faciunt Judi∣cium, sed illud impediunt

Furthermore, there are great abuses in the Ele∣ctions and Judgments of this Council, in which all things are carried according to the caprice or ignorance of the young Gentlemen, of which it is full. Hence it was, that the Senator John Sagrede said well in his Oration for General Morosini; that it was not to be admir'd if the plurality of voices went at first for the Avogador Correr the accuser, among such a number of young men, who receive blindly the first impressions, and suffer themselves to be carried away like the Tide: 'tis the very word he used after he had compared the Grand Council to a tempestuous Sea. From whence we may judg, whether the Government has done wise∣ly to allow the Nobles deliberative voices from the first day of their entrance into the Council; whereas formerly they were novices for two years before they were admitted to the lots.

Selling of voices is another great mischief, the rich buying the suffrages of the poor, whereby they make themselves slaves to their equals. 'Tis true, it may be objected that kind of trade keeps up the correspondence and concord betwixt the one and the other; but whether that be so or not, it is an abuse that draws many inconveniences along with it. Anciently this bartering and am∣bition of Office was forbidden; now there is no∣thing more frequent among them, and the Bro∣glio is a publick Fair licensed by the corruption of the times, where all Offices are to be sold.

The Law permits not any of the Nobles to sit in the Graud Council before they be 25 years of age; but the Seigniory admits every year a cer∣tain number which they call the Barberins: and this they do by lots, to avoid the envy and dis∣content of the pretenders, who thereby have no reason to complain, or be dissatisfied, when fortune

is not so favourable to them as to the rest. Their method is thus.

On the third of December the pretenders pre∣sent themselves to the Avogadors to certify their age, which must be full twenty years; as also that they are legitimately descended from Noble Venetians. Having satisfied them in that, the Clerk of the Avogadory gives them Attestations sign'd by that Office, which Attestation they carry to the Secretary of the Quarenty Criminal, who all put their names to so many several Notes.

The next morning the said Secretary presents the Notes to the Colledg, where there are two Ʋrns plac'd before the Duke; in one of which so many Copper-bowls are put, as there are pretenders: but let their number be what it will, there are never more of the bowls gilt than 31. In the other Ʋrn are put the Notes, which the Duke draws out one by one; and delivering them to the Secretary, causes him to read the name pub∣lickly; and then the Balotin, who is a child, takes a bowl out of the other Ʋrn for the Gentleman whose name is proclaim'd; and if he lights upon a gilt-bowl he is admitted of the Grand Council; but if his bowl be white he is excluded: and so with the rest.

Sometimes the Seigniory dispences with the age of their Nobles, in recompence of the service of their Fathers, Brothers, or other Relations. Sometimes they sell those Dispensations, (as they did during the war in Candy,) and the money they receive for them is called il deposito del Consiglio, the depositum of the Council.

And here it is to be observed, The Nobles are not of the body of the Republick but from the day of their admission into the Grand Council which for them is a kind of second Nativity, see∣ing

it gives them possession of a Civil life, and makes them members of the State; whereas be∣fore they were members only of their own Fa∣milies.

Those who are pretenders to the dignity of the Nobles, present a Petition, in which they set forth their reasons; and then go seven or eight times to the gate of Palais St. Mark, as Clients do to the Gates of their Judges, to recommend themselves to the Gentlemen in their passage to the Council. If these pretenders have more than a molety of suffrages in their Baloting, they are received as Nobles, otherwise they are excluded. But if the voices be divided, (which is called at Venice, Im∣pattar,) the business is put off to another Session: or if there happens a Patta, or any other difficulty in respect of the Non-sincere, (which are used like∣wise in these Balotings,) all is referr'd to a third and last Council; for one and the same business cannot be protracted above three Sessions.

The Procurators of St. Mark are excluded the Grand Council by reason of their dignity, which being the most eminent in that State next to the Ducal, is the cause they have no passive voice in the Council; that is to say, there is no Office to which they can pretend, till the Interregnum, in which they are in election to be Dukes. It is the Law in Venice, that the Nobles which have no passive voice in the Councils, can have no active voice there. But when the Procurators are Sage-Grands, which is a dignity in the nomination of the Senat, they are admitted to the Grand Coun∣cil as Sage-Grands, not as Procurators.

Some are of opinion the reason of this exclu∣sion is, because these Lords are oblig'd to watch as Guards of the Palace, and of the place St. Mark, during the Session of the Grand Council; that if

in the mean time any popular Commotion should arise, there might be persons of Authority ready to suppress it.

But though the Grand Council comprehends the whole body of the Nobles, it has not the whole authority of the State; for the rights of Majesty are divided betwixt the Council and the Senat. The first has Authority to make Laws, or abolish them, to elect Magistrates, and other in∣ferior Councils; as formerly that in Rome was in∣ferior to the People, according to that ancient say∣ing, Auctoritas in Senatu, potestas in Populo. The second has power of making War and Peace, Leagues and Truces; to lay Imposts and Taxes up∣on the People: to put the value upon money, with the absolute disposition of the Treasury. It disposes of all military Commands both at Land and Sea; and all temporary Offices, called by them Cariche a tempo, created only upon emergen∣cy. It sends Succors to their Allies, names Em∣bassadors, Residents, Secretaries of their Embas∣sies, who depend wholly upon it, and are recall'd, continued, corrected, or rewarded as it pleases. So that the rights of Majesty being equally divi∣ded betwixt the Grand Council, which consists of all the Nobles, and the Senat, which is a select party; the Republick of Venice may be said to be almost an Aristo-Democracy, like that in Sparta after the institution of the Ephori; and that in Rome, when the Authority was divided betwixt the People and the Senate, who made distinct and separate Laws; the first the Plebiscita, the second the Senatus-consulta; though to take it in strict∣ness, it is a pure Aristocracy, seeing the Duke has no absolute power, and the People no part in the publick administration. Sometimes there have been contests about Jurisdiction betwixt the Grand

Council and the Senat; as it hapned in the affair of General Morosini, where the Senat nam'd an Inquisitor to inform against the said Gentleman, though the Grand Council pretended to name him. But besides that these differences are rare, they end always without noise or confusion.

It is the Grand Council the Nobles play all their pranks, and exercise all their private ani∣mosities, to exclude their adversaries from Of∣fice, without the least regard to their merit. There it is they pretend to do all by Lots; but it is not with little balls of white stuff, but with large pre∣sents quite contrary to their promises.

In a Monarchy 'tis sufficient if we please our Prince; in a Republick we must please every bo∣dy, which is the more difficult, if not impossible; because Birth, Fortune, Honour, and even Vertue it self is enough to create a man enemies, unless he manage with more than ordinary prudence. Nobilitas, opes, omissi, gesti{que} honores pro crimine, & ob virtutes certissimum exitium. Tacit. Hist. 1. So that Nobleman was not ill-vers'd in their Po∣licies, who said, that he made no difference betwixt the Noble Venetians; that to him all the Families seemed equal, and that there was not one of which he would not be a member. For by pretending to know no such odious distinction of Case Vecchie, and Case Naoie, they assured themselves of the affection and favour of two thirds of the Nobility, and were certain of their suffrages upon any occa∣sion.

Furthermore, because it is the Grand Council which makes the Laws; in my judgment it is not unnecessary to take notice of such of the prin∣cipal of them as do more particularly concern the Nobles, as the predominant part of that State.

Principal Laws of the Govern∣ment of Venice.

I. THE Ecclesiasticks as well of the Nobles as Populace, are excluded from all Office, and uncapable of being of any publick Council, though the Bishop and Curats of that City were admitted into the Councils before the Reformation 1298. But this Regulation shuts the door upon all Enterprizes from the Court of Rome in temporal matters. For the Pope having the nomination of the Bishops, and the disposing of almost all the Benefices in that State, it would be no hard thing for him to get a party in the Senat that might carry most of their deliberations, by the assistance of such of the Nobles, as, like the Ecclesiasticks, depend upon, and expect recom∣pence from him. The Law excludes also such of the Nobles as have Cardinals to their Brother, Unckle or Nephew, from all deliberations touch∣ing Ecclesiastick affairs. It excludes likewise out of that sacred Office those who are pretenders to the Cardinalship, or any other dignity at Rome, lest their private interest should dispose them to com∣pliance with that Court to promote their de∣signs.

II. No Nobleman is permitted to trade, lest his private affairs should obstruct or delay the pro∣ceedings of the Publick. Besides, Traffick and Merchandize agree not with the majesty of Go∣vernment:

Upon which consideration it was that Commerce was forbidden to the Senators of Rome.

III. All the Noblemen are subject to rules in respect of their age; not one of them but must attend the just number of years, and begin by in∣ferior Offices, rising by degrees, Sin dalle ultime mosse, as they say: that is, they must begin at one end of the course, and from thence advance gra∣dually to the other; so that before one can ar∣rive at the great Offices, he must be of a consi∣derable age: as it was anciently in Lacedemon, where they were to be old men before they could be capable of great honours, In sola Sparta expe∣dit seniscere. And the same thing is imply'd by the two baskets of Medlars covered with straw, which is painted at the foot of the great Stair-case of St. Mark, (by which we ascend to the Grand Council, and to the Pregadi,) and shews, that as the Medlars ripen in straw, so the minds of young men must ripen with expectation, till they have gain'd experience and qualification that may re∣commend them to the Government. It is more∣over no ill policy to conduct their Nobles by de∣grees, and as it were from Tribunal to Tribunal, if it were only to keep them in perpetual pra∣ctice and emulation, and to encourage them in the service of their Countrey, by the hopes of ar∣riving one day at the highest dignity and prefer∣ment. Whereas if the young Noblemen should jump into the great Offices at Venice, where there is nothing perpetual, they would refuse the rest, and there would be no body to execute them. This has already hapned too often; and those who have exercised great Offices, thought it beneath them to accept of inferior. For this reason the Seig¦niory

has done wisely to prescribe bounds to the acquisition of Honour, to prevent the insolence and elation of their young men, who are naturally ambitious, by calling them gravely, and in good time, to those preferments; as Tiberius said to the Senat of Rome .

IV. The Noblemen cannot hold many Offices at a time, how small or inconsiderable soever they be: by which means the Publick is better serv'd, and more of them are employed. But it is law∣ful to quit one Office for a better, if he be chosen to it, though in his first Office his time be not ex∣pir'd.

V. Those Noblemen who refuse any Office to which they are chosen, are obliged to pay a Fine of 2000 Ducats to the Publick; so that even their disobedience in some measure turns to ac∣compt; after which they are to absent themselves for two years from the Graud Council, and the Broglio, which is little better than an Exile.

VI. 'Tis forbidden to joy a new Officer upon his Election, to prevent flattery, which is too fre∣quent in those occasions, and to keep the Noble∣men in such a modesty as is convenient for Citi∣zens of that Common-wealth. But in this Law there is an exception for the Duke and Procura∣tors of St. Mark, in respect of the great merit of such as are advanc'd to those eminent Digni∣ties.

VII. The Magistrates in Venice, and upon the Continent, cannot lay down their Authority, though their time be expir'd, till the Grand Coun∣cil has appointed their Successors. They cannot

be absent from their Charges, without permission from the Seigniory, which will hardly be granted but upon very good cause; so that the Publick service is seldom interrupted: but in case of the sickness of an Officer 'tis otherwise; for if they see 'tis like to be chronical, others are immediately substituted in their place. And if it happens to any of the Rettori of the Towns, the Captain exe∣cutes for the Podesta, or the Podesta for the Cap∣tain; and in case both be sick, some other Noble Venetian in Office upon the place, till upon notice the Seigniory supplies them: by which means there happens no delay in their Affairs, and no con∣tradiction of Orders.

VIII. The Noblemen who are Knights of Mal∣ta, have no more part of the Government than if they were no Noblemen, because that Dignity sub∣jects them to the Laws and Statutes of a Forreign Prince: so that ordinarily there are but two Gen∣tlemen Venetians of that Order, one of the House of Carnarro, and the other of the House of the Lippomade; and that to preserve two considerable Commands, the first, the Government of Trevisa, with the Title of Grand Commander of Cyprus, and the other of Conillan in the Marches of Trevisan.

IX. It is forbidden to the Nobles to receive Presents or Pensions from Forreign Princes; as al∣so to purchase Lands under their Dominions, upon penalty of degradation from their Nobility, con∣fiscation of their Estates, and Banishment; which is the true way of obliging them to the common Defence of their Countrey, where all their Estates, and all their Hopes do lie: whereas if they were suffered to have their solid Establishment else∣where, they would many times betray the Publick

Interest, in Complacency to those Princes in whose Territories their Estates lay; which in time might be a prejudice, if not subversion to the whole Go∣vernment. And it was by this means the Repub∣lick of Genoa subjected it self to the King of Spain; who knew well enough to make his ad∣vantage of the foolish ambition those Nobles had for Authority and Jurisdiction in the Kingdom of Naples, not suffering them to dispose of them but to others of their own Countrey, to the end that they might preserve their Dominion over them, and oblige them in perpetual Servitude.

X. The Nobles are not permitted to purchase Fiefs or Lordships upon the Terra-firma, that there might be neither superiority nor dependance to destroy the Equality among them. Besides, it would occasion jealousie and disorder betwixt the ancient Nobility that are poor, and the new, who being generally rich, would in time buy the whole Terra-firma. Formerly they were not allowed Houses of Pleasure upon the Continent, but of late that has been indulg'd: so that in Venice 'tis quite otherwise than in Genoa, where particular Persons are rich, but the Government poor; but here private Persons are poor, and the Publick wealthy, having the Propriety of all the Lands, as in the Republick of Rome.

XI. The Noblemen are not suffered to marry with Strangers, nor their Daughters to the Subjects of another Prince, though they be Gentlemen: and the design thereby is to preserve their Riches among themselves, which otherwise would be in∣sensibly transported by those Marriages; and to stop the ambitious carreer of the ancient No∣bility, who by Marrying with Forreign Princes,

would by degrees come to despise all Matches at home; and lastly, to deprive those Families of a retreat to those Princes with whom they are al∣lied; which would render them more bold in En∣terprizing against their Country, as being not easily contented with the Parity there. Moreover, it would be almost impossible to keep any thing se∣cret in a Senat Constituted of such Nobles as were under forreign Alliance, which would beget new factions and divisions at home. But they may mar∣ry their Daughters to such Gentlemen of the Terra-firma, as thereby become better-affected to the Venetian Nobility, whose protection they are willing to purchase. The Law suffers the Nobi∣lity to marry with Citizens, to fortify their Party against the Populace, in case they should mutiny against them; thereby not so much communica∣ting, as corroborating their Power by uniting with the Citizens, as with a Body capable with the No∣bility to resist any Effort of the multitude. By this means likewise the Nobles that are poor do sometimes marry advantageously, there being no rich Citizen but is very ready to embrace an Al∣liance with a Noble Venetian, it being an honour and protection to his whole Family: And in this the Seigniory is not without a peculiar interest; for these sorts of Marriages do put the Nobles in∣to a condition of serving the Publick in Embassies and other expensive employments: Not, but that sometimes the Nobles, who marry these Citizens Daughters, grow contemptible to the People, who do frequently call their Children Amphibia. And yet 'tis every day to be seen in Venice, Noblemen of the last impression do marry Ladies of the first; the first purchasing their Wives, the latter their Husbands. But when a Nobleman marries a Citizen, his Contract must pass the approbation of

the Grand Council, otherwise their Children can∣not pass for Noble Venetians.

By Citizens are meant the Secretaries of State, Advocates, Notaries, Physicians, Mercers, Drapers, Glass-makers, &c. And if a Nobleman marries out of this Category, his Children are ignoble, and de∣generate into Citizens. As appear'd in the Case of the Procurator John Baptisto Cornero Piscopia; who, during the War in Candia, was glad to purchase Nobility for two of his Children, because their Mother was Daughter to a Gondolier.

XII. There is no Eldership or Seniority among the Nobles; which Law agrees very well with the Form of that Government, and prevents disor∣ders that quickly would happen. If younger Bro∣thers, who have equal share in the Civil Admini∣stration, should find themselves inferior to their Elder Brothers in respect of their Estates, many of them would turn Enemies to their Country; and, as occasion offer'd, stir up and agitate ill hu∣mours in the State. Besides that, particular per∣sons would in time become too considerable and potent. For this Cause the Seigniory at one time obliged three Brothers of the House of Cornaro to marry, under penalty of Banishment, and con∣fiscation of their Estates, which was computed at more than 100000 Crowns per ann. which in those days was a prodigious Revenue. And last of all, this Equality of division renders them all capable of serving the Publick; whereas if the Eldest went away with the whole, the State would be depriv'd of the service of the Nobility, who be∣ing Younger Brothers, would be useless by rea∣son of their poverty. Nor does this way of par∣tage or division hinder the Greatness of their Fa∣milies, seeing for the most part all the Brothers

live together, and but one of them marries, and that is commonly the youngest; for whom the other are contented to scrape, and to spare, espe∣cially if he be a man of Compliance.

XIII. All the Noblemen, without excepting the Duke himself, are liable to Publick Charge during the War, and each of them pays according to his Revenue; as anciently in Sparta, where the Kings and Senat were tax'd as the People, who thereby were made more obedient to the Nobility, and the Nobility more moderate and just.

XIV. The Magistrates who judg in Civil Causes, are not allow'd to receive Visits from either of the Parties, nor any Recommendation from their Friends, under penalty of Degradation, and a Fine. But in Criminal Affairs solicitations are allow'd, un∣less in matters of State. Their reason is, because in Civil Affairs it would endanger the justice of a Cause, to allow such application to the Judges: But in Criminal Causes all ways are left open for the defence of the Accused, and for the compassion of their Friends, so that at Venice, if a man's Cause be not bad indeed, he may easily get off.

XV. A Nobleman may Plead at the Bar like an Advocate, without diminution to his Quality. About 200 years since, all their Advocates were Noblemen, appointed by the Grand Council to the number of 24; and had all of them allowance from the Publick, being forbidden to take Presents or Mony, that the nobleness of the Profession might not be sullied by so ignoble a Custom, and that in all Processes it might be their interest to give a dispatch. But this is now quite laid aside, there being scarce any of the Nobility that will

give themselves that trouble, any more than to read Law publickly at Padua, as formerly was done by the Patricians; who were so far from thinking it derogatory, that they made it their principal glory. But since this virtuous Emulation ceased among them, we have found debauchery and ignorance succeed, to the great prejudice of that State.

XVI. The Noblemen are oblig'd in the Coun∣cils to make use of the Venetian Language, to avoid the envy of such of the Nobility, as understanding no other, cannot endure a better; and therefore there has many times been clapping of hands, and crying out to hold, in full Council, when any of them has but begun to speak Latin; so wild are they in Commonwealths, and so odious is Novelty. 'Tis true, in Venice it is necessary all Gentlemen speak the same Language, especially in Council, lest otherwise many of them might be discoura∣ged from speaking their minds, out of a modest diffidence they should not deliver themselves as well as others. But if a man be Eloquent, his best way is to dissemble it, as a Swiss Deputy did when sent to Cecinna; otherwise the aversion of his Auditors will work more upon them, than the Orator's Arguments.

XVII. All sort of Correspondence with Embas∣sadors or Forreign Ministers is forbidden to the Noblemen upon pain of Death; by which means the transactions of the Senat are conceal'd, which otherwise would be no hard matter among so ma∣ny Gentlemen to pick out by Conversation and Presents: witness the Example of Cornaro, whose fidelity was corrupted by the Marquess de la Fu∣ente's Bills of Exchange. For this reason the Em∣peror

Claudius forbid such of the Patricians to en∣ter the Senat, as had not wherewithal to maintain their Dignity.

But the form of an Aristocracy suffers not such an Exclusion, which would destroy the Equality of the Nobles; and by the poorer sort (who are al∣ways in greater number) be look'd upon as Con∣tempt, a thing absolutely insupportable among Re∣publicans, and which would certainly make the Government odious. For this reason the Seigniory has been forc'd to take other Measures, and pro∣hibit in the Nobility all manner of Commerce either by Letters, or Converse with forreign Mi∣nisters, or any of their Retinue. And this is so ri∣gorously observ'd, that if a Nobleman should be discovered in discourse with any Person in relation to any forreign Agent or Embassador, and it should come to the knowledg of the Inquisitors of State before he discovered it himself, he would not be suffered to live two hours. One day a Senator of the House of Tron finding me at the House of the Curate de Santa Maria Mater Domini, started and ran away as if the Plague had been there. Twice I was met by one of the Procurators, who with an hardiness that would have been fatal to many others, staid some time with me in a Stationer's∣shop; and though I offer'd it, would not let me depart.

This Prohibition beginning to be neglected, was reviv'd in the year 1618, upon the disco∣very of the Conspiracy by the Spanish † Triumvirate against their Commonwealth; from which time they have look'd upon forreign Embassadors as so many conceal'd Enemies; and to make them the more dreadful to the Nobility, the Senat very cunningly gave it out, that the Marquess

de la Fuentes himself had betrayed Cornaro, that the Sum he had consign'd for him might be stop'd.

But though all sort of Communication with forreign Embassadors be forbidden to the Noble∣men, nevertheless there are Priviledg'd places where they may meet in disguise, as at their ordi∣nary Gaming-houses, which they call Ridotti, in Balls, in particular Houses during the Carneval, at Weddings, and several other Feasts and Solemni∣ties: But here they are not suffered to converse, especially at the Ordinaries, where silence is kept as strict as at a Sermon; and men are seen some∣times to lose their whole stock, without loosening their teeth: upon which score the Venetians are counted very good Gamesters.

As to the Rules the State of Venice has pre∣scrib'd for its own Embassadors in the Forreign Courts, they are well worth our knowledg, and I will give you some of them here.

XVIII. The Venetian Embassadors cannot de∣part from the place of their Residence till their Successor be arrived, and by them presented to the Prince; if they do, they are look'd upon as Desertors of their Embassy: which is to be de∣liver'd over by his own hand, and the new Comer put into possession of his Charge, and instructed viva voce in whatever is requisite for him to know towards the discharging himself worthily of his Employment. And this they do with great for∣mality one to the other, not only in obedience to the express Orders of the Senat, but in honour to themselves, by causing their Successors to take the same Measures, and follow the same Methods as they had done before.

They are obliged to Present the Senat with a Relation, in writing, of their Embassies at their re∣turn:

for though 'tis to be suppos'd they gave Ac∣count in retail before, in their weekly Dispatches; yet it is esteem'd for the interest of the Publick to have a Breviate of them, that may save them the labour of rummaging among their Letters and Memorials, to find out a thing that this way may be found in a moment. Besides, all those several pieces, which asunder are like so many shreds, be∣ing stitch'd together, and compacted by the Au∣thor himself, give a better Prospect of the Af∣fairs, and of the Minister who manages them. And by these Relations it is, the Senat understands the whole Strength of their Neighbours, the Condi∣tion of their Territories, their Armies, their Re∣venues, and their Expence: and this Manuscript is a kind of a Journal, like that Augustus made of the Affairs of his Empire; and 'tis according to that Model the Seigniory regulates, and the Noble∣men that go Embassadors do draw their best Les∣sons, and their most refin'd Policies.

They are obliged likewise to produce the com∣mon Presents that are made them, at the end of their Embassaries, to be disposed of as the Senat thinks fit; testifying thereby, that they are content with the Honour of having serv'd their Country faithfully, † and that if they have merited any thing, they will not re∣ceive it from any but the Senat. But yet they are never defeated of those marks of Honour, unless they have done something dishonourable, and contrary to their duty.

If a Nobleman carries his Wife along with him, he is answerable for her faults, according to the practice in Rome with the Gover∣nors, or other Magistrates in their Provin∣ces.

The Sons of the Duke cannot be Embassadors whilst their Fathers are living, not so much to spare their purses, but for fear the Duke should employ them with private Instructions for the par∣ticular interest of their Family.

XIX. No man can be made a Nobleman of Ve∣nice, but he must be a Catholick; not so much to prevent that the body of the Nobility be divided in Religion, but that their Honour might be con∣tinued Eminent and Illustrious to that Common∣wealth, which has the advantage of all States and Princes of Europe, to have been born and conti∣nued constantly in that Church. Upon which score she has been honoured, like France, with the glo∣rious Title of Most Christian by several Popes, and several Councils.

XX. Forreign Gentlemen that are Noble Vene∣tians either by merit or favour, as the Pope's Ne∣phews and others, being personally in Venice, have liberty of coming into the Grand Council, and Ba∣loting as the rest: But they cannot execute any Office in the State, unless their constant Residence be there; and to enter into the Council they must put on the Robe, the Stole, and the Woollen Bonnet. Nevertheless, in my time Prince Borgia was ad∣mitted by particular favour with his Sword, yet not without great difficulty.

I shall not mention the other Laws which relate to the particular Magistrates, because I shall have occasion to touch upon some of them in my Se∣cond Part.

Furthermore, in Venice new Laws are created every day; but being too frequent, they are sel∣dom observ'd: From whence proceeds that say∣ing among them; Parte Venetiana dura una setti∣mana.

But the Seigniory swallows this abuse to cajole the People with a false appearance of liber∣ty, and to render their Government more gentle.

In short, the Grand Council has made all Offices annual, or for sixteen months, to keep their Nobles in expectation, and to enure them to Moderation by the continual vicissitude of Obedience and Command. For if they grow proud and insolent in annual employments, what would they do were they to enjoy them for life? And if those exclu∣ded in the Balotation be discontent, (though they have hopes of succeeding in the next,) how would they be displeased at a refusal that should make them desperate during the whole life of the Pos∣sessor? By this changing it is, the industry of their Nobles is exercised. Plato would have his Officers perpetual, that long use and conversation in their places might make them more dextrous, and be∣get more esteem and respect from the † People. But the Venetians find this change to be a better way of continuing them in their duty, by keeping them in constant decorum, in order to their Election to greater Offices afterward. Besides, thereby their Dependance is greater, and their Authority less, especially among the Provincial Officers; who are but transient, (as I may say) being scarce suffered to settle before they are called back to Venice to give an account of their Administration; and there∣fore the Towns endure their Governors the more patiently, because the advantages of the one does many times recompence the defects of the other; and if any of them be ill, they are not troubled with them long. So much for the Grand Council. We will come next to the Colledg.

Of the Colledg.

THE Colledg is composed of 26 Nobles, that is to say, of the Duke and six Councel∣lors, (called the Most Serene Seigniory, be∣cause when together, they represent the Publick Majesty of the State,) of three Deputies from the Quarantie Criminelle, who are chang'd every two months; of six Sages-Grans, who represent the Senat; of five Sages from the Terra-firma, whose Affairs pass through their hands: and last of all, of five Sages des Orders, who formerly had abso∣lute direction in all things relating to the Sea.

For these reasons this Chamber is called the Colledg, that is to say, an Assembly of all the Prin∣cipal Members of State, whose Hand it may be call'd; because by it all Affairs are handed and di∣stributed to the rest of the Councils, especially to the Senat, to which all disorders are addressed.

In the Colledg it is that all Embassadors of Prin∣ces, all Deputies of Towns, Generals of Armies, and all other Officers have Audience; there it is all Requests, all Memorials are presented that are brought first to the Pregadi; after which the Col∣ledg returns them the Answer of the Senat in Wri∣ting, which Answer is called by them Parte.

At their Audiences Embassadors do use this Apostrophe, Serenissime Prince; Tres Illustres & tres Excellens Seigneurs. Whereas in former times their Addresses was only to the Duke, as they had been speaking to him alone; which Custom, in jealousy, the Senat has reform'd, to shew that their Repub∣lick

depends not upon the Duke, who is but a single Member as the rest: and therefore in his absence Forreign Ministers use the same Title of Serenissime Prince; and, May it please your Serenity; because the Prince is supposed to be where-ever the Seigniory is.

The Colledg rises, and uncovers, for the Pope's Nuntio, and the Embassadors of Crown'd-Heads, as soon as they appear at the door of the Cham∣ber, and make their first Reverence; but the Duke pulls not off his Hat, a thing he never does but to Soveraign Princes, Princes of the Blood in France, or Cardinals. The Embassadors introduced are plac'd on the Duke's right-hand, if they be sent from Kings; and if from a Duke, they have the same place: but the Colledg rises not till their se∣cond Reverence in the middle of the Chamber; neither do they rise at their going out, till their se∣cond Salutation. Forreign Generals are plac'd as the Embassadors, whereas the Generals that are Noble Venetians are set below the Councellors, but the Seigniory rises not either when they come in, or go forth. The Receiver of Malta (who is al∣ways one of the Commanders of the Orders) sits next under the Deputy from the Quarantie Cri∣minelle, by which he is distinguished from all Re∣sidents, without exception to the Emperors; who for that cause negotiates with them by an Agent, with the Character of Secretary, for he is seldom known to have any Embassador there.

The Nuntio, and the Royal Embassadors are re∣ceiv'd at their Publick Entrances by sixty of the Senators, and Complemented by a Knight of the Golden Stool, which is the mark of a Nobleman that has been an Embassador. But for the Embas∣sador of a Duke, the Colledg orders them to be re∣ceived by forty Nobles of the Sous-Pregadi, who

are no better than bare assistants to the Senat; and no person is sent to receive a Resident, but he is of the number of the Publici Representanti.

For the Deputies of Towns and Corporations under the obedience of the Seigniory, they are ne∣ver admitted to Audience from the Colledg but up∣on three Conditions; that they have Credentials from the Governor or Podesta of the place from whence they are sent; that they have a Memorial of their Demands under the hand of their Go∣vernor; and another seal'd Letter from him, in which he gives his judgment of their Affair to the Senat, that the Prince may not be surpriz'd. But if these Deputies come with complaints against their Superiors, (which is but rare) it suffices for their admission, if their Letters be only from the Commonalty, or Corporation.

In a word, it belongs to the Colledg to call the Senat, but by mutual dependance it obeys it when met, and receives and executes its Resolutions and Orders: One proposes, the other disposes, and these two Councils act always by agreement. When the Senat has taken any thing ill from a Prince, and is willing to shew a Resentment, it cau∣ses the Colledg to refuse Audience to his Embas∣sador or Minister. In the time of Ʋrban the VIII, Audience was refus'd to his Nuntio upon the af∣front offered to the Seigniory in exunging the Elogy of the Venetians , relating to the Restau∣ration of Pope Alexander III, the Memory of which his Holiness had a mind to abolish.

In the interregnum no Forreign Minister enters the Colledg, unless with the usual Complements of Condolence upon the Duke's Death: For nothing of business is transacted till another be chosen.

I shall not speak here of the Function of such Magistrates as make up the Colledg, as belonging

more properly to my Second Part: I shall passs therefore to the Senat immediately, as to the chiefest and most important Councils of this State.

Of the Senat.

THE Senat is the Soul of the Commonwealth, as the Grand Council is the Body. It is the Fountain of Peace and War, the Balance that keeps an Harmony and Exactness in all the parts of the State. It is called Pregadi, because that for∣merly there being no set-days for the meeting of the said Council, the principal Members of the City were invited upon extraordinary Emergency, and it therefore retains the Name of Pregadi, or Invited Assembly; though the Custom of calling them together in that manner is laid aside.

At first the Senat consisted only of sixty Sena∣tors, but upon any great occasion they added 25 or 30 more by Commission; but their Commission ceas'd as soon as the Debate was resolv'd. They proceeded in this manner in the time of Johannes Delfinus, in the Treaty of Peace with Lodovic King of Hungary, about the year 1360. Under the Duke Laurence Celsus during the Revolt of Candia 1363, and under Prince Michael Sten, upon occa∣sion of the War in Ferrara against the Marquess Albert of Este in the year 1410. But the War in Lombardy following some years after, the Ve∣netians established in the year 1435 a perpetual Giunta or supply of sixty more Senators, to an∣swer the multitude of Affairs that were then be∣fore

them; and these are they which at this day are called the Pregadi Extraordinare. So that the Body of the Senat consists of 120 Gentlemen, who have deliberative voices, without difference of Se∣nators in Ordinary and Senators of the Giunta, unless in their Name and Quality.

There are in the Pregadi several Magistrates, some with voices by vertue of their Offices, as the Procurators, the Ten, and all the Judges of the Quarenty Criminelle; others are there only to hear, and learn, as the Sous-Pregadi: so that the Vene∣tian Senat consists of three Orders, as that of Rome, Senators in Ordinary, like the hundred Patres created by Romulus; Senators additional, like the Patres conscripti of the Sabins, associated by Ro∣mulus with the former; and simple Assistants, like those in Rome, who were called Pedarii, who had no right of opinion: the whole amounting to 300 Nobles, among whom it is marvellous to consider how secret their Affairs were kept, as if none of them were privy, or as if they had power to for∣get whatever they heard. Non dicam unum sed neminem audisse crederes, quod tam multorum auri∣bus suerat commissum, Valer. l. 2. c. 2.

Titus Livius tells us, that King Eumenes having accused King Persius in a full Senat at Rome, and proposed ways of making War upon him, nothing was known of it more than his introduction to Audience.

Venice affords us Examples not at all inferior. In the year 1495, the Pope, the King of the Ro∣mans, the King of Spain, and the Duke of Milan Treated, and concluded a League with this Re∣publick against Charles VIII so privately, that Phi∣lip de Comines his Embassador, who saw every day the Ministers of the Confederate Princes enter in∣to the Colledg, and conferr'd frequently with them,

discovered nothing of that important Negotia∣tion, which had been transacting several months, till he received the first advice from Duke Au∣gustine Barbarigue. Lewis Sforca Duke of Milan knew nothing of the League Offensive entred into against him by Lewis XII and the Senat, till se∣veral months after it was concluded, though he was the most subtle and sagacious Prince of his time. Not long before their General Carmignole return'd to Venice, without the least foresight or suspition of what the Senat had resolved eight months before, that is, of taking away his Com∣mission as soon as he came back, though it was not unknown to all the friends he had among the Nobility. So that at Venice Silence is in no less ve∣neration than among the Persians, where it was esteemed a Deity.

In the mean time the Venetians might reduce their Senate to a smaller number; and the more easily, because the Pregadi changing every year, all the Nobility might have hopes of being ad∣mitted in their turns. But they alledg, that the body of the Nobles being very great, the prin∣cipal parts ought to bear a proportion, and the number of the Nobles amounting to full 2500, 'tis not too much to admit 300 into the Senat, as well to prevent the falling into an Oligarchy, (which is the first corruption of an Aristocracy) as to content more of them at a time, and to render the Deliberations of the Senat more plau∣sible, and more inviolable to the People, which has always a greater Reverence for what is de∣creed in a greater Assembly. Besides, the publick wisdom has provided sufficiently for their secrets, by the severity of their Laws against their No∣bility, from whom it has taken all ways of Com∣munication and Converse with the Ministers of Forreign Princes .

However, it is certain their Affairs are never the better managed, for having so many privy; at least their Deliberations would not be so tedi∣ous as they are, if there were not so much Coun∣sel to be taken, and so many Speeches to be made.

Some may find fault, that the Senat of Venice changes every year, the rather because the affairs of State, which require long experience, are al∣ways transacted by new Senators, who sometimes mistake the Means and the Consequence for want of due instruction in the beginning. For which cause Lycurgus ordain'd the Senators of Sparta should hold their places for life, which was to be a recompence for the longest of their ser∣vices . Solon of annual, made them perpetual at Athens; conceiving that the Senat of a Com∣monwealth ought to be fix'd, being the Basis, or Pole, upon which their whole Government turn'd. But this defect, if it be one, is neither without cause, nor remedy in Venice. For as the Senators may be continued by new Election, there always remains a good part of the old. Besides, there be so many Magistrates admitted into the Pregadi, that there are constantly some, who having as∣sisted, are well inform'd of the precedent nego∣tiations. And for this reason it is, that so many of the Nobles are received into the Senat, that by hearing what passes, they bring themselves by degrees to a notion of those things which they are to manage in their turns. And if the Emperor Soliman said, that a Prince to be well advis'd ought never to make use of one Mini∣ster above once, because the desire of gaining the esteem and favour of the Prince, is a strong mo∣tive to make him act as he should; as Sejanus did in the beginning of his rise: It is more manifest

and visible in Venice, where the dignity of a Senator being only annual, every man endeavours to sig∣nalize his zeal and his industry, to render him∣self pleasing to the Publick, and facilitate his con∣tinuance in the next Election. In a word, by this yearly change a Gate is always open to desert; those who are found improper, may be rejected at the years end without offence, and more able persons substituted in their stead: Whereas, the Senat being perpetual, the unfit must be continu∣ed as well as the fit, which Aristotle observed as a great defect in the Senat of Sparta, because some there are whose minds are assoon super∣annuated as their bodies, and who by conse∣quence grow incapable of governing.

Let us see now how the Senat proceeds in its Deliberations and Elections: After which I shall treat of their Politicks at home, and their Intel∣ligences abroad; the two main points in which their Civil Government consists.

As to the Order observ'd by the Pregadi, or Senat, in the discussion of their Affairs, I have said before, that nothing is transacted there but what has first pass'd the Colledg, whose office in respect of this Council, is almost the same as the Senat of Rome's was in regard of the People; that is to say, to propose to them such things as were to be debated by them. And because many times the Colledg is divided, one of the Secretaries sets down every mans opinion with his Name by it, and brings his Note to the Pregadi, where being read publickly, every man speaks pro or con as he thinks fit; and afterwards they proceed to Balo∣tation, as follows.

For every recommendation there is a Secretary that gathers the voices, and goes from hand to hand naming the Author; as of old the Rogatores Suf∣fragiorum

did in Rome. These Secretaries have each of them a white Box in their hand, and the Nobles give their Balls to which of them they please. There are two other Secretaries fol∣lowing the first, one of them with a green Box for the Balls of the Dissenters, and the other with a red Box for the Nonsinceri, which an∣swers to the Non liquet among the Romans. And he who hath most Voices (provided they exceed a moiety of the whole Court) is received by an Arrest of the Senat, in the nature of the Senatus-Consultum in Rome. But if none of them amount to the just Number, they begin their Ba∣lotation again, rejecting those who have the few∣est voices, that the others may pass with more ease. Otherwise new men are to be proposed, as when in the first Balotation the Nonsinceri have more than half the Voices, which is a sign they do not agree to any that are recommend∣ed.

But though the Nobles of the Senat have pow∣er to speak for or against any one propos'd, as he thinks fit; yet none of them, unless it be the Duke, the highest Councellours, or the Sage-Grands can propose any to be Baloted in their own name. But if any of the said Coun∣cellors, or Sage-Grands recommends him as one likely to be serviceable to the Commonwealth, he may be admitted to the Balot: Which is very wisely contriv'd by the Senat, to avoid confusion and delay in their Affairs, if it were permitted to each of the 300 Nobles to propose his own man.

As to the Magistrates chosen by the Pregadi, they are not beholding to lot, they are elected upon due knowledg and consideration of their de∣serts, which is a thing not to be found out by

lot . Besides the Senat being the Model and Image of a compleat Aristocracy, ought not to commit any thing to Fortune, that favours for the most part those who are most unfit, and is used no-where so properly as in a Popular State. Sortitio Reip. Democraticae propria est. For which reason Lots are used in the Grand Council, which is as it were the people of the Nobility, and the form of the ancient Democratical Government in Venice.

It remains now that I discourse of the Maxims, the Ends, and the Interests of the Government at this day, as also of the good or ill dispositions of its Subjects; this matter belonging of right to the Senat, as having the full direction of Affairs, and giving what motion it pleases to the whole Ma∣chine of the State.

The Senat cajoles the People by suffering them to live idly and debauch'd, having no better way to debase them, and to render them obedient, than to indulge them their pleasures, and licentiousness of life, which they call Liberty, though in effect it is the greatest occasion of their slavery. So the Persians called Cyrus their Father, because he al∣lowed them in their softness and delicacy, when his design was really to enslave them. The Romans do still make use of this artifice, subjecting the People more by the Spectacles, Plays and Diver∣tisements, than by their Arms. The common Peo∣ple in Venice are astonished at the bounty and good nature of their Masters, when they behold the Doge come every year with the Senat upon the first of February to Santa Maria Formosa, to dis∣charge a Promise made by their Predecessors; and not disdain a poor Straw-hat, and two Bottels of Wine presented him by the Artificers of that Pa∣rish, in consideration of his pains. As also when

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they see the Senat assistant at the killing of a Bull on Holy-Thursday, and several other Festival-days; for nothing takes more with the multitude than to see their Prince accommodate to their Customs, and bear a part in their Recreations; by which method the Emperor Augustus affected to make himself Popular. †

Moreover, the People of Venice are the more pleased with their Government, because the No∣bility of the Terra-firma having no share in it, they have the satisfaction of seeing Men of Parts and Qualification excluded as well as themselves. From whence we may judg the kindness those Gentle∣men must needs have for the Noblemen in Venice; whereas were they under any other Government, their Birth would make them considerable, and their Industry prefer them to the highest Honours; which at Venice is utterly impossible, because there their Merit serves only to expose them to the jealousie of their Superiors, and their Patience produces nothing but ill usage, with greater impu∣nity.

But the common People of the Terra-firma be∣lieve the Seigniory the gentlest and most just Go∣vernment in the World, when they observe the Humanity and Popular Carriage of the Podesta's, whose Houses are as open to them as the Church; and set-days appointed to receive Informations against their Country Nobles, (which the common People do mortally hate;) whilst the Inquisitors of State hear their Complaints with such kindness and candor, that they believe all done out of inclination to do them right; whereas in truth it is for no∣thing, but with some form and appearance of Ju∣stice, to exterminate all the rich Families upon the Continent: so that these poor Gentlemen are be∣twixt the Venetian Nobility, and their own Po∣pulace,

like Fish betwixt the boyling Oil and the Fire. And to help forward with their misfortunes, their own private Animosities contribute much, and makes them oftentimes accuse one another. In the mean time their Governors cry up the felicity of the People, magnifying their Justice, their Plenty, and their Repose, Pane in Piazza, Justitia in Palazzo. After which it is not to be admir'd, if the People who judg always by appearance, have no mind to change their Masters, especially when Kings are describ'd to them as so many Tyrants, and Woolfs, devouring their Subjects. The King of Spain is never mentioned to the Bressians and Bergamesses, but with horrible exaggeration of the Cruelty and Injustice of his Ministers. And the Bressians being naturally mutinous and bold, the Senat treats them gently, avoiding to provoke them, and sending them Governors of such temper and prudence as will invite them by fair remon∣strances to their duty; and when they transgress, reduce them by their Caresses, as People capable of obedience, not of servitude. And this is an artifice used by the Seigniory to render their Do∣minion easy, by comparing it with the Spanish deportment towards the Milanois their Neigh∣bours, and formerly their Companions. In a word, did the Senat take the same measures with the rest of their Subjects, there would not be a better Government in the World: but if they have so much respect for the Bressians, 'tis because they fear them, and dare not command them absolute∣ly. For, on the contrary, the Paduans, the Trevi∣sans and the Vincentins are used with greater se∣verity, because they are in no apprehension of them. The Bressians besiege their Podestates some∣times in their own Palaces, to obtain their de∣mands. They break up their Prisons at Noon-day,

laugh at their Noble Venetians, affront their Courts when summon'd to them, oppose the Exe∣ecution of their Decrees, and hold their Bandis or Meetings publickly; and yet the Senat con∣nives, and pardons all, lest rigour should put their courage into a flame . But if the Paduans or Vin∣centins commit the least fault, or speak the least word that displeases, they are banished immediate∣ly, and their Estates seiz'd: And this is so frequent in those Towns, 'tis obvious to every body the Senat regards not so much Justice as Interest in the condemnation of those unhappy creatures †, who, for the most part, are guilty of nothing but being too rich. 'Tis true, the Nobility upon the Terra∣firma ought to be purg'd now and then to eva∣cuate the peccant humors wherewith many of them do abound: But the Remedy the Senat ap∣plies is worse than the Disease, as may appear by this following Example, which evinces clearly the designs of the Senat, in relation to the Nobility upon the Continent.

Francis Erizza Lieutenant-General to Ʋdina, afterwards Duke; seeing the Nobles of Friul live in Peace and good Correspondence, resolved to put division amongst them, thereby to force them upon imprudencies, that might turn to the advan∣tage of the Senat. To that end he caused Com∣mission to be sent to him, to confer the Titles of Earl and Marquess to such as he thought fit. This begot jealousie and animosity in several Families which pretended to those Honours, against such as had received them; the new Counts and Mar∣quesses taking place of those to whom formerly they had given it: so that these who were reject∣ed, to maintain their ancient Precedence, came fre∣quently to blows with those newly Ennobled, cut∣ting one anothers throats when they met in the

Streets, where they march'd with a guard of twenty or thirty Bravo's well-arm'd, who for their own interest fomented the Quarrel betwixt them. This fury spread it self among the nearest Relati∣ons; many Younger Brothers violating the rights of Nature, and invading their Elder Brothers, who were no Counts like them. In the mean time the Exchequer grew rich by the confiscations of these Gentlemen Murderers, and the Senat extinguished by the continual effusion of Blood, that Fire which they so lately had kindled.

But of all the Subjects of this Commonwealth, none were so ill-treated as the Paduans; for the Senat considering them as the ancient Masters of Venice, supposed their subjection but forc'd; and that looking upon the felicity of the Venetians as their misery, they held them for Tyrants . And indeed in their private Conferences they spake of it with inexpressible resentment: for they had dis∣peopled the Town by substracting the best of their Families, some of which they had constrain'd to settle in Venice to secure their fidelity: and to en∣crease their misery, so much liberty was given to the Students of that University, that the Towns∣men were grown to be their Slaves; which made them incessantly regrate their Lords de l'Escalle, and the Carrares, under whose Authority the said City had flourished.

As to the People in Venice, the Senat apprehend∣ing their Unity and Power, by design have kept the City divided into two contrary Parties, one cal∣led the Castellans, the other the Nicolates; among whom the Emulation was so great, that they apply'd themselves mutually to cross one another; and the Animosity was so high, the very Children of the respective Factions never met in the Streets (if they knew one another) without blows,

nor could they be parted till one had drawn blood, that the conquered might be provoked to revenge himself another time upon the Conqueror. The Youth in Sparta fought in the same sort, if you will believe that Excellent Historian. But the de∣sign of the Lacedemonians was to enure their Youth to the dangers of War, whereas the design of the Venetians was to divide and weaken the People, who would be very formidable, were they sensible of their Number and Power, as Manlius remonstrated to the Senat of Rome; Quous{que} ig∣norabitis vires vestras? Numerate saltem quot ipsi sitis, quot adversarios habeatis: Quot enim Clientes circa singulos fuistis Patronos, tot nunc adversus unum hostes eritis. For this cause it is the Vene∣tians suffer their Citizens to wear the same Vest∣ment with their Nobility, for fear lest the distincti∣on of habit might discover to the People the small number of their Governors; Si separentur liber∣tini, manifestam fore penuriam ingenuorum; for which, new Families are frequently aggregated to the Body of the Nobles, in place of the Ancient, which are daily extinguisht.

So it is not to be imagined the publick and fa∣miliar Conflicts betwixt the Castellans and the Ni∣colates are made for entertainment of the People, or Strangers, but to prevent the cooling of the Heat and Animosity in both Parties, which insen∣sibly fortifies the Authority of the Senat, whom it would be no hard matter to ruine by their Union. And the Nicolates having a Duke of their own, ridiculous to the Castellans, it is a perpetual occa∣sion of Quarrel betwixt them.

But with the Citizens or Burgoise, the Senat proceeds in such a manner, as without that, they are, or at least seem very well contented: It distinguishes them from the Plebs by priviledges,

exemptions, and considerable employments, ma∣king use of them for Residents, and Secretaries of all their Councils and Embassies, by which they seem to be equal in some measure to the Nobles, and superiour to the Gentlemen of the Terra firma, who are utterly excluded. Besides they have their share of the Bishopricks belong∣ing to this State, unless it be of seven or eight reserved only for the Nobility; with whom they have this likewise in common, That they are ne∣ver condemned to the Gallies whatever crime they commit.

The Merchant of Venice (who is also of the Body of Citizens) thinks his condition very hap∣py, in respect the Nobility is contented to asso∣ciate with him in order to Trade: For though all kind of Traffick be prohibited to the Nobles, yet underhand they are many times ingaged in partnership without being known, and the Senat swallows it discreetly, because of the benefit it receives thereby, by sending the said Noblemen on Embassies, where they spend good part of what they gain'd; whereas there would other∣wise be want of rich men to sustain those charge∣able Employments, if their Nobility were re∣strain'd from that way of enriching themselves; and by those ways of entertaining their minds, they are hindered from contriving against the State.

And now one would think the Ecclesiasticks had great subject to complain of this Govern∣ment, in which at this day they have not the least part; which caused Cardinal Zapata to say, that at Venice their condition was much worse than the condition of the Israelites under Pha∣raoh. But the Senat makes them ample amends for their exclusion, by the liberty it gives them

to live as they please without any notice of their irregularities: Insomuch, that they are so far from repining, that they believe themselves in Para∣dise.

As to the Nobility, the Senat takes particular care to maintain them in unity, knowing well that Ani∣mosity is dangerous in a free State; and that division among the Governours has been the ruine of many a Commonwealth; witness the Revolu∣tions at Florence and Verona, which happened only upon the quarrels and factions betwixt their principal Citizens. To prevent these ill consequen∣ces, the Senat takes notice of the least difference betwixt the Nobility, and without expecting till the fire be kindled, it choaks it in its embers, and stops its progress by their vigilance and au∣thority; for the Nobles are obliged to an im∣mediate acquiescence, otherwise they run them∣selves into the displeasure of the Senat, let their provocation be never so great. Some years since, the Vidmans being in suit with the Family of Naue, in which the Vidmans Grandfather had served as a Packer, and being reproached by the means of their Extraction in a full Assembly, the Senat interpos'd, commanded them silence, and ordered the Judges to take up the business, as reflecting upon the whole body of their Nobili∣ty. A Gentleman of the Family Da Ponte threat∣ning another call'd Canale, that he would prove the Pontes were above the Canals; the other replying, but the Canals were before the Pontes, and the Pontes had never been but for the Ca∣nals. The Senat sent them word, That they could choak up the Canals, and pull down the Bridges when they pleas'd; and these sort of reflections are the more odious, because they grate upon their Equality, which is the very Soul of their

Commonwealth. And if in some things the new Nobility seem inferiour to the ancient, as not be∣ing so soon admitted into the great Offices, it is done only to improve them, to experiment their industry in smaller Employments, and, as Sylla says, to enure them to the Oar, before they be trusted with the Helm; without which gradati∣on Preferment would but expose them to the contempt of the People, who commonly despise those who have been formerly their equals .

Moreover the Senat had never permitted the Venetian Ladies to follow the French Modes, but by a new luxury to prevent an old distinction which they affected in their habit; the Ladies of ancient Families dressing their heads a la Guelfe, and the other a la Gibeline, from whence grew a certain emulation that brake out some time into quarrels, and proceeded often to their Hus∣bands, not only to the danger of the Nobility, but to the disturbance of the State. For in all sorts of Governments, nothing is more pernici∣ous than jealousie and misunderstanding betwixt the Governours; the offended party desiring al∣ways innovation and change. So it was, that He∣racleodorus in Eubea taking a pique against his Colleagues, set up a new form of Govern∣ment, by which the Authority that was formerly in the hands of the Nobility, was transferr'd to the People; as on the contrary, Duke Peter Gra∣denique of Venice, transferr'd it from the People to the Nobles, to revenge himself of the Peo∣ple, who had refus'd to make him their Duke.

The Senat governing upon Maxims of Peace, will not endure dissention either among the No∣bility or People; for fear if once they came to Arms, they should take a fancy to alter the Go∣vernment. The Senat is sensible, Ambition and military Gallantry are inseparable, and that great Courage cannot endure the obscurity of a private life; of which we have a fair example in the Roman Commonwealth, who with all her power was not able to master her Generals. And this Maxim is so much the better, because the Ve∣netians not designing to aggrandize themselves by new Acquisition, but only contriving how they may defend what they have got, have no need of Generals among them, whose Ambition would keep them always in alarm; there being but too many of those haughty spirits, who believe all things are lawful that conduce to Dominion, and that it is meer madness to refuse it in a puncti∣lio of Religion .

Besides, the General for a Commonwealth, find∣ing himself adored by his Souldiers, favoured by fortune, and happy in an opportunity, without more than ordinary moderation, can hardly bring himself to depose an Authority that he can so easily keep, and reduce himself to an Equality, when it is in his power to Command. Upon which consideration, the Senat has laid it down for a Maxim of State, Never to put the Command of their Land-Armies into the hands of any of their Nobles; seeing that to arrive at any per∣fection in that Trade, they must pass the best part of their time upon the Terra-firma, and seek their employment among forreign Princes, which would quickly make a breach among their No∣bility, it being most certain, those who had been long absent from their Country, and taken up a

way of living quite contrary to their old, would not accommodate very easily with their Compa∣nions brought up in Idleness and Peace; by which means it would not be long before their Republick would be perplex'd and embroil'd by its own Ci∣tizens.

Therefore when they have War at Land, they invite to their Service some Prince or Forreign Lord, to whom they allow a large Pension, with the Title of Generalissimo at Land: I say the Title, because he has neither Authority nor Power, the Senat appointing constantly as his Councel, or ra∣ther as Spies, two Senators, which they call Pro∣veditors General of the Army; who never suffer him to be out of their sight, nor take any Resolu∣tion, or undertake any Enterprize without them. On the contrary, he is oblig'd to do as they di∣rect; and let his Experience in Military Affairs be what it will, they seldom comply with his Senti∣ment, the Noblemen of Venice being naturally enemies to any Advice that is not their own, as if they design'd their Perversness should shew their Dominion. And therefore they will not entertain Generals more brave, or of better Conduct than themselves; because commonly their Complai∣sance is but small, and that is a Quality with them equivalent to the greatest.

In the absence of the Generalissimo, the General of the Infantry (a Stranger too) has the Com∣mand, by a Custom quite different from other Princes; which is a great trouble to the General of the Horse, as appeared by the Prince of Mo∣dena, who quitted the Venetian Service upon that Score, during the War of Mantua.

The Senat not only entertains Forreign Generals, but all the Forreign Souldiers they can get, al∣ways retaining a special care of putting Arms into

the hands of their Subjects. Not that the Senat is ignorant how inconvenient the service of For∣reigners is, having had such fatal experience many times, and particularly in the famous Battel of Ghiarra d'Adda , where most part of their Troops deserted them; but because they had rather be ill∣serv'd, than have their Liberty endangered.

The pain they find to get Souldiers, by reason of the slavery in which they keep them, (which is such, that many of them have chose rather to revolt desperately to the Turk,) constrains them to have recourse to their Allies for succour; but they never do it but in great extremity, being as fearful of the Troops which they employ in their defence, as of those that invade them; and there∣fore it is they so frequently change the Posts and Quarters of their Auxiliaries, separating them with great care, and incorporating them with their other Troops, to prevent or defeat any de∣sign their Commanders may have. Sometimes they force their Officers to retire, tiring out their patience by a thousand affronts; and if they hap∣pen to be obstinate, and persons that will not easily desert their Party, they make no great scruple to remove them other ways; witness Don Camillo de Gonzague, who died not many years since at Capo d' Istria, of which they discharged themselves by a solemn Service, and a Funeral Oration de∣livered in the Senat. Many times they choose ra∣ther to make a dishonourable Peace, than to con∣tinue or entertain Auxiliaries in their Defence; so much do they abhor that kind of Cattel, which they look upon as little better than Professed Ene∣mies. For 'tis the Custom of those States who have over-reach'd their Neighbours and Allies, to apprehend being circumvented themselves some time or other, judging of their enemies by what

they themselves would do in their places. Where∣fore the Senat never engages in a War but upon necessity, and after they have tried all ways to prevent it, there being no act of Submission that they will refuse to deliver themselves from that Plague; and the rather, because their Affairs are supported more by their Reputation than Arms. Their bare aversion to War, if you will believe Andr. Moccenicus belli Camer, (who was one of their Senators) made them change their old Patron St. Theodore, because he was a Souldier, and re∣sembled St. George too much, who is the Patron of Genoua. The Statue of St. Theodore to be seen upon one of the Pillars in the Place of St. Mark, Arm'd at all Points, but with his Lance in his Left∣hand, and his Shield in his Right, does denote that it is not the Venetians Profession to bear Arms; though it is said, by that Symbol the Senat intended to intimate, that they never made War willingly, and that when they did make it, it was for no o∣ther end but to maintain a good and safe Peace.

And if in thirteen or fourteen Centuries they have grown so Potent in Italy, it is easily imagi∣nable, it was not so much by their Arms, as by their Money and Address, like Philip of Macedon in his Conquests in Greece. For Example, when any difference happened betwixt their Neighbours, the Senat found some way or other of interpo∣sing, under colour of accommodating their Quar∣rel; but in effect it was to embroil them more, by privately fomenting their Animosity, exciting the most Potent to Revenge, and underhand giving Supplies to the weaker to continue the War, and insensibly to ruine them both: so that having tired and exhausted both the one and the other, there was no great difficulty in dispossessing them all, by the necessity that was upon them of putting

the Contested Places into their hands in Deposito, or at least of receiving a Venetian Garrison. In the year 1404 they got possession of Vicenza by means of Supplies, which they sent to the said Town to defend them against the Paduans their mortal enemies. They plundered most of the Great Persons of Romagna, some they cajol'd by fair promises, others they surpriz'd, and others they betrayed under the sacred name of Friend∣ship, and pretended Protection. The same Practice they used with the Nobility of Ravenna, especially of the Family of Polenta, with the Manfredi of Faienza, the Malatestes of Rimini, and several others: for they always esteem'd it more Honou∣rable to vanquish their Enemy by Cunning, than Force of Arms. And what was said of the Ro∣mans, Sedendo Romanus vincit, may be said of them; for many Victories have they obtain'd sitting in their Councils, and in their Closets: Yet when Princes have made War upon them, without troubling themselves to Treat, (in which notwith∣standing their greatest Talent and Felicity lies,) they never fail to bring them to reason. And if Pope Paul V, had done as Sixtus IV, and Julius II did, that is, joyn'd his Spiritual Arms with the Temporal, he had certainly found the Venetians more obedient, though perhaps their Cause was the better. Of late years they no sooner saw the French Army in their Territories, but they betook themselves to such gross and mean submission, that their Confederate Princes were amaz'd to find so little Courage in those persons, who before flatter'd themselves with hopes of chasing Lewis XII out of Milan, and seizing the whole Dutchy for them∣selves, to make their Dominion as absolute all over Italy, as they had made it in Romagna: but the loss of one Battel at Vaila made the Senat cry

peccavi, though before they had defied the Kings, and called them in derision, Sons of St. Mark, as if they had been already overcome.

And here I shall observe by the way, that upon several occasions the Venetians have done them∣selves injury, by discovering their weakness and pusillanimity to their Enemies. Their Prayers and Submissions to Francis Carrare Lord of Padua, during the War with Genoa, giving him in their Letters the Title of High∣ness, which at that time was given only to Kings; and sup∣plicating him to afford Audience to six Embassadors they had sent to him (an Honour they had ne∣ver before done to either Pope or King) these Condescentions, or rather Debasements, I say, serv'd only to make him the more haughty, and desirous of Revenge; insomuch that all the answer they could get, was, That he would not hear their Embassadors, till he had first caused the four Brass Horses in the Portico of St. Mark to be brought away; which are four curious Horses that Marinzen, the first Podestate from that Commonwealth at Constantinople, had sent to Venice in the year 1205.

Noi pregamo l' Altezzo vostra qualmente vi pac∣cia mandar vostre Lettere de salvo Condotto de ve∣nir alla presenza dell' Altezza vostra, audiendo libe∣ramente li nostri Ambassadori Piero Zustignan, Ni∣colo Morosini P. Giacomo Priuli P. e tre alteri del nostro Consiglio de Pregadi, &c. Annales M. S. de Venise. To the Magnisicent and Potent Lord Fran∣cisco da Carrara, the most Wise and Discreet Im∣perial Vicar, General Andreas Contarini, by the Grace of God Duke of Venice, Greeting. We beseech Your Highness, in what manner you please, to send

your Letter of Safe-Conduct, for the admitting into the Presence of Your Highness, and free Audience for our Embassadors, Peter Zustignan Procurator, Nicolo Morosini P. Giacomo Priuli P. and three more of our Senators, &c.

Their Neutrality, which is another of their Fun∣damental Maxims to keep themselves in Peace, has been very prejudicial to them, and sometimes pull'd War upon their Heads; as it happen'd when they endeavoured to have kept themselves Neuter betwixt Lewis XII, and Maximilian the Emperor, at that time engaged in War about the Dutchy of Milan. For these two great Princes being equally incens'd against this Commonwealth, (whose Friend∣ship added nothing to their Affairs) united in spight, and form'd the Project of the League of Cambray, in which all the Princes of Italy were concern'd. In a word, the Juncture was such, that there was a necessity of declaring either for the one or the other: But the Senat having chosen the mid∣way , which in great dangers, and doubtful, is al∣ways the worst; in stead of preserving their Friend∣ship, they disoblig'd both, and made them their Enemies. So that it may be said of the Republick of Venice, what was said by Florus of Marseilles, That desiring Peace, she precipitated her self into the War she apprehended: Or what Alsonso King of Aragon said of the Sienois, comparing them to those who are lodg'd in the second Story of an House, and incommoded with smoke from below, and water from above. And truly, if Neutrality be not very well managed, it not only conciliates no Friendship, nor prevents any Enemies ; but it exposes such States as have made it their Princi∣ple (as the Venetians have done) to the contempt and hatred of the Conquerors, who according to the prudent Remonstrance of the Roman Embas∣sador

to those of Achaia, are accustomed to treat those ill, and, if possible, to ruine them that will not publickly espouse their Interests, and run their Fortune: witness the Republick of Florence, which desir'd to remain Neuter betwixt Pope Julius II, the King of France, and the King of Aragon; and thereby not only disoblig'd the Pope, offended the King of France, who expected Supplies from it as a friend, but depriv'd it self of those advan∣tages which it might have expected before from the King of Aragon upon Honourable Conditions,

But as much aversion as the Senat has to Land-Forces, no less is its inclination to the Forces by Sea, upon which depends absolutely the Conser∣vation of the Government, from whence it has had its rise and encrease. In their Galleys are always dispos'd a certain number of young Noblemen to instruct themselves in Maritime Affairs, and good Pensions are allowed to such as embrace that Pro∣fession.

The Senat likewise obliges the rich Merchants who have Ships at Sea, to entertain at their own Charges two or three decayed Gentlemen per∣mitted to carry a certain quantity of Goods with∣out paying any Duty for Exportation; or if they have not Money to furnish themselves for Traffick during their Voyage, the said Gentlemen have li∣berty to sell their Priviledg to other People, and supply themselves that way, which is a great re∣lief to their misery, and makes them in love with a Profession that is so much to their advantage: besides the hopes they have of arriving one day at the Chief Command of their Fleet, Venice con∣ferring those Commands like the Senat of Sparta, only to the Nobles, that they might not be wholly depriv'd of the Reputation of Military Conduct, the situation of their Town inviting them more∣over

to that kind of Warfare. And in this it must be acknowledged the Venetians have succeeded so well, that they deserve to hold among all the Ita∣lians the Preheminence for Power and Experience at Sea, as the Athenians had formerly among the Greeks. But it must be confess'd likewise, it would have been more flourishing at this day, had their Predecessors contented themselves to be Masters of so many rich Islands in the Archipelago, with∣out setting foot upon the Terra-firma, which has corrupted their ancient Manners, and put them up∣on ways of living quite contrary to what they had, and what was necessary to maintain them in their Grandeur: In which they were the more blamea∣ble, because to regulate them they had the Exam∣ple of the Lacedemonians, who being the most for∣tunate of all the Greeks in their Wars at Land, sub∣verted the Government of their Town, and ruin'd their State by making War by Sea against the Athenians; who by continual Conversation in that Element, were become the ablest and most ex∣perienc'd Nation of Greece. But it seems the Ve∣netians had as much mind to imitate the Faults, as the Maxims and Laws of that famous Common∣wealth.

I shall not enlarge farther upon their Sea-Af∣fairs, because I shall hereafter have occasion to speak of them, when I treat upon their Generals at Sea. I shall only mention in this place the or∣dinary Forces, wherewith the Commonwealth of Venice keeps her Towns and Territories in obedi∣ence.

The Senat has always a body of Infantry call'd Cernida, which is to say, a People selected out of all their Territories, though in truth it be nothing but a Mass of miserable Pesants, and all the Rascality of the Terra-firma: But they cost

them nothing in time of Peace, there being none but the Captains and Serjeants paid; the first at the rate of twenty-five Ducats, the other at ten Ducats a-month; all the rest contenting them∣selves with certain Exemptions, and some slender gratifications at their Musters. Nevertheless this Militia serves to keep the People in their duty, and the neighbouring Princes in awe. This out∣ward appearance of War (the true way to pre∣serve Peace both at home and a-broad) being on∣ly to shew their Forces are always ready to re∣ceive and repulse their Enemies. And because the Bourgevisie or Citizens have rarely good intelli∣gence with their Militia, (their humours and their interests being as opposite as their professions) the Governours of their Towns do always quar∣ter their Souldiers separately by themselves; not so much to ease and secure the People against the insolence of the Souldiers, as to remove their Mi∣litia from the fury of the Populace (who would make their advantage if they were separated) and to secure themselves from all surprizes, by keeping their Land-Armies on foot, and ready to obey the first Orders. Besides, this Militia is not much unlike that which the Romans call'd Milites Subitarii; which being sufficient to stop the first Career of a Sedition or Revolt, gives time to expect succours from the neighbouring Towns, which never fail them, and keeps the people of the said Towns in perpetual fear.

Their Cernida is divided into—Companies, amounting in the whole to about 14 or 15000 men, not much worth; so that in their Wars the Venetians use them only as the Lacedemonians did the Helotes their slaves, to keep their baggage ,

and fill up the places of the dead, rather than to fight, which is not at all their business.

Their Infantry, call'd Capelete, is of another Nature. The Senat trusts them with the Guard of their best Towns upon the Continent, having always found them faithful to their Service, and inveterate against the Turk. Nevertheless it is thought convenient to separate them into seve∣ral Garrisons, because together they might be be dangerous. There are constantly two Com∣panies of them in Venice, one to keep the Pa∣lace, the other the Place of St. Mark.

As to their Cavalry, they have always fifteen Companies in pay upon the Terra-firma: some of them (call'd gross Companies) consist of 60 Cu∣riassiers, which are bestow'd partly upon the Itali∣ans, and partly upon the Tramontani, or Forreigners, in recompence of their long or extraordinary Ser∣vice; for their Pay is considerable. The rest are called Capeletes, or Light-horse, made up of Scla∣vonians, Albanians, (which they call Stradiots) Dalmatians, and Morlaiks, all of them subjects to that Commonwealth. The Curiassiers serve principally to sustain and cover the Infantry in time of Battel, the weight of their Arms ma∣king them unfit for Excursions, which is the pro∣per business of the Capeletes. The Morlaiks are a handful of men, who having quitted the Turks Service, submitted freely to the dominion of this State, and have since signalized themselves by their faith and their activity. They infest the Turks with their continual inroads, whatever is portable they carry away, what is not they spoil; and then save themselves in the Mountains, where it is harder to find than overcome them ; so well are they acquainted with all the passages & turnings. Besides their immortal resentment of

the barbarous usage they received of late years from the Bashaw of Bosina; the consideration of a Sequin which the Senat allows them for every Turks head they bring in, has so blooded them against those Infidels, and carried them so far, that they have no hopes left of ever reconci∣ling with the Turks *; which was all the Senat desir'd to fix them in their Service; they look∣ing upon them as fickle, and like birds of pas∣sage, held by the feathers, not the foot, their humour being as uncertain as their residence. They have no fix'd place of abode; they encamp in the Plains, and there set up their Cabanes, to avoid the licentiousness of Towns, and the resort of such Citizens as teaching them delicacy, may * corrupt their Military Discipline.

In short, The Senat entertains a certain num∣ber of Ʋltramontane Officers, with Pensions call'd Conduites. The number of these Officers is com∣monly 50, but they are augmented as occasion requires. These Gentlemen have sometimes Go∣vernments in Dalmatia; sometimes the command of Gross Companies, as their Service recommends them; besides other Priviledges, as not to be arrested for debt, to have a seat in the Colledg when Affairs are in debate, and to take place in the Towns where their Commands lye, imme∣diately next the Podesta and the Captain at Arms.

But the Venetians chief Strength consists in their Naval Force; and their thoughts are most em∣ploy'd upon that, in respect of the Scituation of their Town, which is wholly in the Sea, and for

defence of their Golf, and preservation of those Islands which they hold in the Mediterranean. In my time there were only 25 Galleys, and four Galleasses, with a few Barks and Brigantins Armed, to secure their Coasts; but they were able to set out twice the number, were their Arsenal sup∣plied with Slaves, Sea-men and Souldiers, as well as other necessaries. Their Arsenal is one of the finest things in Europe, and the best kept. It is a place of about three miles in compass, in the form of an Island. at one end of the Town, and on that side next the Main-Sea. It is wall'd about, and en∣closed with Canals that serve for so many Ditches. Within it there are three great Fountains or Re∣servatories which receive the water from the Sea, and communicate one with another upon occasion. About them all three are an infinite number of lit∣tle Houses full of materials for Galleys, some made, some half made, others to be refitted, and all in their particular Magazins. For Example, one is full of Nails, another of all manner of Iron∣work necessary for a Galley. Two are full of Small-shot, and Cannon-bullet; one of Planks, one with Rudders, one with Oars ready made, and two where they make them. There are two places for Cordage of 400 paces long, one for Hemp, another for Sailes, with a large Room full of Women to sow them: one for Masts, one for Pitch, one for Salt-Peter, and several for Powder. There are in it twelve Forges, or Smiths-shops, in which 100 men are continually working. Three Fonderies, or Rooms for running of their Lead. A great Hall for weighing their Cannon: a large Court full of Timber, Anchors, and Artillery, with about 800 Peeces of Cannon of all sizes ranged in several Rooms. In a word, there are always Arms ready for 50000 men. The number of their con∣stant

Workmen is 1200; and all these Artificers have a Superior Officer called Amiraglio, who commands the Bucentaure on Ascension-day, when the Duke goes in State to marry the Sea: And here we cannot but take notice, that by a ridi∣culous Custom this Admiral makes himself Re∣sponsible to the Senat for the inconstancy of the Sea, and engages his Life there shall be no Tem∣pest that day. 'Tis this Admiral who has the Guard of the Palais, St. Mark with his Arsenalotti, du∣ring the interregnum. He carries the Red-Standard before the Prince when he makes his Entry; by virtue of which Office he has his Cloak, and the two Basons (out of which the Duke throws the Money to the People) for his fee.

This Arsenal contains all that is necessary for defence of their State, and had the Spaniard suc∣ceeded in his design to burn it, they had been lost beyond all hopes of recovery. For as to the two Armories in the Palais of St. Mark, they are not considerable, being only to Arm part of the Nobility, if any Tumult should happen during the Session of the Grand Council. 'Tis said the Turk would not be troubled with Venice, if it were not for the Arsenal; that he esteems the Arsenal more than the Town, which, if it were in his Power, he would willingly restore upon payment of a Tribute: and this is reported by an English Author, who affirms he heard it from one of the Principal Ministers in the Grand Signior's Court.

The Charge of this Arsenal amounts to 500000 Ducats. The Workmen are paid every saturday without fail. No man is received to work there under 20 years of age; and no man can be a Ma∣ster till he has serv'd eight years. 'Tis Governed by three Noblemen called Padroni all Arsenale, who are changed every three years; and by three

Proveditors, whose Office it is to choose the Work∣men, and to see them paid.

But because Money is the Nerves of all States, and gives motion to all its Members, it will not be amiss to say something in general of the ordi∣nary Revenue of this Commonwealth, from whence we may better judg of their real Strength.

The Dutchy of Venice, that comprehends the City, and all the Islands and Ports about it, pays yearly three Millions of Ducats, besides the Duty upon Salt, which amounts to more than another Million: all amounting by Computation to little less than a Million Sterling, if you reckon every Ducat at 50 Sols French; but I will not pretend to be too punctual in my Arithmetick.

The Marquisate of Trevisan being a good Country, pays 28000 Ducats.

Padua and the Territory about it pays 40000 Ducats.

Vicenza and the Country about it, 200000 Du∣cats.

Verona and the Veranois 360000 Ducats.

Bergamo and its District, 300000 Ducats at least.

Crema 160000 Ducats, perhaps more.

Bressia, and the Country belonging to it, 1200000 half of which is assign'd to the payment of the Arsenal at Venice.

The Polesin, called il Contado di Rovigo, a misera∣ble Country, pays 140000 Ducats.

Friul, a large Province, pays 400000 Ducats.

The Countreys upon the Sea, as Istria, Dalma∣tia, and part of Albania, with the Isles of Corfu, Zante, Zephalonica, Cerigo, and others, pay by re∣port 800000 Ducats, if not more.

All which amounts to more than two Millions Sterling, besides new Impositions that multiply

every day; the Tythes of the Clergy, the Sale of Offices, Confiscations, and several other Incomes very considerable. So that in time of Peace the Senat lays up vast Sums, their Form of Govern∣ment exempting them from the Expences of Mo∣narchies, where all things are more Noble and Magnificent. 'Tis true, the State of Venice has more reason to lay up in time of Peace than any other Prince; there being none of them to whom their Wars are so Chargeable as to it, who for the most part is serv'd altogether for Money, with lit∣tle or no affection from those they employ. Be∣sides, their ordinary Revenue is not sufficient to maintain their Wars; but when once they are En∣gaged, they find out ways to supply themselves by new Taxes, extraordinary Impositions upon the Nobility, Citizens, Ecclesiasticks, and Mechanicks, by selling Nobility to the Populace, the Vest of Procurator, the Golden-Stole, and all the great Of∣fices to such Lords as are ambitious; which ways, during the Wars of Cambray, brought into the Exchequer 500000 Ducats in eight months time. The Senat sells likewise la Cittadinanza, or the Freedom of their City to Strangers, the Titles of Marquess and Count to the Nobles of the Terra∣firma: Liberty to Prisoners, Mercy to Criminals, Permission to return to Banished Persons. More∣over it takes Money at the rate of two or three per Cent. out of the Banks for Pious Uses, as in that at Trevisan in the year 1669. It constrains the Rich to lend them, but especially the Jews, whom they squeeze like spunges when they please, threatning to send them packing upon the least he∣sitation. During the War of Candia, the Jews in Venice only, furnished the Senat with five or six Millions, and yet some few weeks before Candia was Surrendred, they made bold to draw

Bills upon them for a considerable Sum more.

At the end of that War, if we may believe what was commonly reported in Venice, that Commonwealth was indebted above sixty millions of Livres; and it was true: Yet a few years Peace will easily recover them, and put their affairs again into good condition; there being no Prince that spends less superfluously than they, which Parcimony is to them as good as a reve∣venue . Besides, their Officers who manage the publick Treasure, having so many eyes upon them, and being to give account of their ad∣ministration to as many Judges as there are Nobles, 'tis impossible for them safely to im∣bezzle it; for the Multitude, as they cannot dissemble, so they never forgive; for the in∣tacco di Cassa, or purloining the Publick Money, is unpardonable at Venice.

Furthermore, no payment is made, but it is first baloted, or authorized in the Pregadi; so that nothing passes out of the Coffers of their Exchequer, but upon good terms. When the sum they owe is considerable, they pay it not all at one time, but by parcels and degrees, thereby to keep their Creditors in Venice, that before their second re∣ceipt, their first may be spent among them; and this practice is so frequently observ'd, that many times their Creditors are forced to renounce all and be gone, lest their attendance should consume them. Besides this, all their payments are made in Ducats, a Coin that cannot be trans∣ported, it being of so base an allay, it would scarce give half the value out of that State; For this reason they are glad to change them at great loss for Gold, or lay out their money in Commodities; so that it returns generally from whence it came, or at least a great part of it.

Again, the discovery of the East Indies by the Portugals in the year 1498, has been a great diminution to the Revenue of this Republick; for whereas all the Spices and Drugs from those parts were brought by Aleppo and Alexandria, to which places they were convey'd upon Cam∣mels backs, and from thence to Venice by Sea; as being at that time the Magazine for all Eu∣rope; Vasquez de Gama found a way to bring them at much less charge by the Cape of good Hope; which has prejudiced the Venetians in their revenue to the value of 9 or 10 millions per ann. For then they set what price upon their goods they pleas'd; and they could do it, being the only people who supplied all Europe. And Christopher Columbus did them as much mischief alone, by his discovery of the West Indies, as all the Genois together in their several Wars; for by his Navigations he opened a way to the Spa∣niards and Portugais, who since then have sup∣plied themselves plentifully by Sea with such Merchandize as before they were forc'd to buy of the Venetians at their own rate.

Let us now see what is objected by some peo∣ple against the Conduct and Oeconomy of this State. Some blame their selling of Nobility as a dishonourable thing: Others condemn the extra∣vagant indulgence of the Senat towards their Priests, Monks, and Religious persons: And others de∣claim as much at their Stews, and the publick pro∣tection of Courtisans.

As to the sale of Nobility, 'tis absolutely ne∣cessary, the ancient Families extinguishing every day; and if new ones should not be substituted in their places, the Government would fall into an Oligarchy; by which it would be easie for the People to possess themselves of the power,

and exclude the remainder of the Nobles. Besides, the profit of this Sale is employed to the ease of the People, who would otherwise be over-laden with Impositions to supply the necessities of their Wars, did not the Senat rather choose this as a more mild and plausible way to supply them∣selves out of the Purses of Rich men by a volun∣tary Contribution. Again, hereby the People have the satisfaction to see their Friends and Relations sharers in the Civil Administration, and are there∣by rendred better contented with what passes, and better inclin'd to the interest of their Country. Hence it follows that those few Noblemen who are averse to this new way of Creation, are not to be esteem'd so good Citizens as they ought to be, in that they prefer their Passions and private Punctilios before the real Interest and Advantage of their State.

This was the Case of one of the Priuli, who professed he had never, nor never would give his voice to any of those Pretenders, it being, in his judgment, undecent to sell their Nobility, which was to be conferr'd only upon Merit, and to put into * the Golden-Book the names of Artificers and Mechanicks. And it was wittily said upon that occasion by John Sagrede, That mixing their Silver with such mean Allay, was no less Criminal than Coining.

As to the Senat's Indulgence to the Church-men, 'tis true it is too great, especially to their Monks, who (as was well said by Cardinal Elci during his Nunciature at Venice) had great need to have their Hoods taken shorter.) But by their kindness to them they secure themselves against the effects of the Censures and Excommunications of Rome; for the Monks being sensible that no other Prince would allow them that liberty as they find in Ve∣nice,

where they live happily and contented, they make no great scruple to disobey either his Holi∣ness, or their General; against whose threats they oppose the favour and protection of that State, as the Shield of Achilles. Of this we have seen a fair Example in the Interdiction of Paul V, which was observed by no body but the Jesuites, the Theatins, and a part of the Capuchins: for in spight of all the endeavours of the Pope's Party, who at Ferrara, Bologna, and Mantua, cried out against this Commonwealth as being Lutheran, spreading all over their State Seditious Libels, pro∣nouncing all their Marriages void, their Children illegitimate, and thousand other things of that Na∣ture; yet the People went on, continued Obedi∣ent, and enjoyed their Repose. Whereas had not the Monks been oblig'd to the State by their own proper Interest, at a time when the Pope was sup∣ported by so many Boutefeux, especially by the Spa∣niard, the said Monks might have disposed the People to a Revolt, by declaiming against the Go∣vernment, and seducing timerous Consciences; which was a way whereby they have many times put Italy into a flame. So that the affection of their Ecclesiasticks stands the Senat in good stead, together with their Right, which would other∣wise be preserved by the common Interest of all the Princes in Europe. And it was easily presaged at the beginning of that Affair, that the Issue would not be happy for the Pope; it being a com∣mon saying, (alluding to the Coats of Arms be∣longing to his Holiness, and the State of Venice) That the Borgian Dragon would not be able to over∣power the Venetian Lion; and that though the Dragon fought desperately with its Wings, yet the Lion would find wherewithal to defend it self. To which they applied that Verse of Scripture, Sub umbra alarum

tuarum, which the Venetians used then as their device, Pax tibi Marce, being their device only in time of Peace: and for this reason in time of War, or upon any vigorous preparation thereunto, the Book in their Escutcheon is shut.

The Senat draws another Advantage from the licentiousness of their Clergy, and that is to discre∣dit them with the People, who as blind, and as corrupt as they are, can yet see their ignorance, and abhor their Debauches. So that their ill-hu∣mors are not much to be feared, it being cer∣tain the People would never hearken to them, or willingly follow the perswasion of those for whom they have so little respect, or opinion of their Conduct in any Considerable Enterprizes: besides, the Senat knows so well how to Coax them in time of War, that they Wheedle them out of vast Sums without violence or discontent; for they do not oblige them to Contribution by any Edict or Positive Decree, as they do the rest of their Sub∣jects, but by such Prayers and intimations of their Necessities, as they are not able to resist , as they did in the War in Candia. To which may be ad∣ded, that upon extraordinary Exigence the Senat touches them with the specious pretext of their ill-lives, and the scandal they give, thereby to obtain of the Pope suppression of their Monaste∣ries, and Confiscation of their Goods.

And as to the irregularity of the Nuns, 'tis an Inconvenience must necessarily be dissembled, lest they should make desperate so many young Gen∣tlewomen as the Nobility do daily force into their Covents, where they never would Profess, did they not find themselves better accommodated than at home with their Parents. 'Tis true, none of them ought to be forc'd to that kind of Vocation; but if we consider the inclination most young Women

have to Liberty, their dishonourable intrigues with their Servants, and their other impurities that would stain the Paper to describe; we must ex∣cuse the severity of their Friends, who have not their hundreds of eyes to observe them; and those poor Gentlewomen who never stir abroad, and who are depriv'd, by the Custom of the Coun∣try, of all the Pleasures and Divertisement of their lives, ought in Equity to have some Enter∣tainment in their Cloisters, and at least to be al∣lowed the priviledg of seeing their Lovers at a Grate, when besides what they see there, they see nothing but the walls of their Chamber.

In short, their Protection of Courtesans is an evil from whence the Senat receives great Advan∣tage, delivering themselves thereby from the Care they must otherwise take of keeping their young Noblemen employed, who having nothing to do, would probably entertain themselves in Designs against the State.

The Courtesans are a kind of Leeches applied to such Members as have too much blood. They are Spunges that suck up Forreign Moisture, and are squeezed by the Magistrate when he sees occasion: for if they dress themselves like Persons of Qua∣lity, or if they commit any other fault against the Law, the Officer des Pompes fines them so severely, that they are many times forc'd to sell all, and lie themselves upon the ground. One time when the Signores (for so they call the Courtesans) were re∣tir'd from Venice, they quickly found the incon∣venience, young Gentlewomen being every day stollen, and ravish'd from their Parents; and some∣times the Gates of the most Eminent Monasteries broke open, so as the Seigniory was forc'd to invite the Ladies of Pleasure from all Parts, and to assign them certain Houses, which they called Case-Rampane,

from whence comes that word of Oblo∣quy, Carampana, at Venice. From whence we may gather, that there are some Ills that cannot be con∣veniently remedied; that the Maladies of State are incurable when they are old; and that a Caco∣chimical and ill-affected Body is better let alone in Repose, than to have the Humors stirr'd by Phy∣sick that cannot carry them off. Besides, 'tis Pru∣dence in a Prince to connive at what he cannot suppress, otherwise his Authority would be Ex∣pos'd, and grow Contemptible, when his Com∣mands were not capable of being put in Execu∣tion. It would be more easy to Introduce a new Government, than to Reform Abuses that have past into a Custom . And indeed no Government can be perfect †, because there will be Exorbitances whilst there are men.

Therefore it was that Cato was reckon'd no wise-man, because he knew not how to accommodate to the pro∣pensity of the age. And Tacitus ob∣serves, that ‡ Pompey, who was chosen Censor for the reformation of Manners, was glad to abolish those Laws that he himself had established, because he found them less supportable than the Evils against which they were made. This it was made the Great Cosmo de Medicis say, that the City of Florence had better be Corrupted than Ruined; implying that a Prince has more Ho∣nour by preserving his Country in what condition so∣ever, than in losing it quite.

Having spoken at large of the Policy of the Ve∣netians at home, it remains now that I touch upon their Correspondencies abroad; and I shall do it according to the Information I received when I was resident at Venice. And first

With the Pope.

THE Senat endeavors to entertain good Correspondence with the Popes; the Senat respects, and reverences, and complies with them in every thing, provided they be just, and keep themselves within the bounds of their Jurisdiction, without intrenching upon the Vene∣tian. For if once they encroach, they are sure to meet with nothing but contradiction and resistance. Witness the passages in the times of Paul V, and Ʋrban VIII. When I was in Venice, there were great Disputes betwixt the Court of Rome and that State, about the Priviledges of the Religious, who were oblig'd to assist at Processions; and about a Canal the Senat made upon the Po, on the Con∣fines of Polesin and Ferrara, for the convenient transportation of their Merchants Goods, without carrying them thorough the Lands of the Church; which Cardinal Altieri endeavoured very earnestly to have obstructed, but was not able to prevail.

There is an ancient Emulation betwixt these two States, continued by the pretentions of the one, and the oppositions of the other: there being no Prince in all Italy that stands more upon their Dig∣nity than the Seigniory of Venice. Nor is there any State but that in all Europe, which has exclu∣ded their Clergy from participation of the Civil Government, or neglected to have Pensioners in Rome, they having made it a Maxim to them∣selves not to meddle in the Election of the Popes. To which may be added their detention of the

Polesin, an ancient Member of the Dutchy of Fer∣rara, that is like to be a perpetual occasion of Difference and Contestation betwixt them. In the mean time the Venetian courts and caresses the Pope by the Magnificence of their Embassies, and by conferring their Nobility upon the Nephews, (a Custom introduc'd since the time of Alexander VI Son of Caesar Borgia). In recompence the Pope has granted them Tenths upon the Clergy, and sup∣pression of Abbeys in case of War with the Turk; permits them sometimes to supply themselves with Corn out of the Ecclesiastical Lands, and al∣ways comprehends them in the Promotions made for the Crowns.

In short, the vicinity of their Countries, (which are conterminous both by Land and by Sea,) and their mutual jealousy of the King of Spain in Ita∣ly, unites them by the common ligament of In∣terest: and therefore the Spaniard, who well un∣derstood the importance of that Union, employed all his Cunning with Paul V, to engage him in a War against the State of Venice when he inter∣dicted it, as knowing that they alone should go away with the profit.

With Spain.

AND therefore the Venetian has no rea∣son, and indeed do not heartily bear good-will to the Spaniard, whose ill Offices and Violence they have so often resented. And though they seem to improve their Amity, and render it sincere by continual Embassies one from the other, yet 'tis but a Copy of their Counte∣nance; and nothing is more clear than that the Animosity is immortal, and that the Spaniards can never forgive them the dismembring of Bressia, Bergamo, and Crema, from the Dutchy of Milan, and the Venetians are in continual fear they should attempt to recover them. So that they hate not the Spaniards only by Habit and Custom, (as the Marquess de Castle-Roderiguo told the Venetian Em∣bassador Peter Bazadonne,) but from certain and experimental knowledg of their ill inclinations to∣ward them. Furthermore, the Senat keeps con∣stantly a Resident in Milan, which is the Shop where all the Spanish designs against Italy are for∣ged; and from whence they understand all their Negotiations with the Princes, the Posture of their Affairs, and several other particularities, which being faithfully transmitted, are very Essen∣tial to the benefit and safety of their Common∣wealth: and to succeed the more effectually, they do court and caress the Governor of that Pro∣vince with all possible Industry, in respect that their Amity and good Intelligence with the King of Spain depends much upon the favourable im∣pressions

he receives of them from that Minister, as appeared by the transactions in the time of Don Pedro de Toledo, and the Duke de Feria, both Gover∣nors of Milan, and both holding the State of Ve∣nice in continual Agitation, as being their particu∣lar Enemies. And there wanted but little of fal∣ling into a dangerous War, for a small Pass called Strada dello sticcato, that joyns the Territories of Crema and Bergamo together, by which Pass the Duke de Feria pretended to march his Troops without permission from the Senat. Again, the Venetian hates the Spaniard, as having found them more dangerous Enemies in time of Peace, than in War; as was manifest in the Excommunication of Paul V, and not many years after, in the Con∣spiracy of Don Alonso la Queva their Embassa∣dor: which occasioned that saying of Trajano Bo∣calini, that in time of War it was sufficient only to lock their door; but in time of Peace, he who would be safe against them, must bolt, and double-lock, and barricado, and all little enough to keep them out. And the Venetians had good reason to be alarm'd when the Princess, Mary of Mantua , had thoughts of Marrying the Cardinal Infant of Spain, accord∣ing to a secret Engagement she had given the Em∣peror to that purpose; for if that Match had gone forward, the Commonwealth of Venice had been hedg'd in on all sides by the House of Austria.

With the Emperor.

THE Senat of Venice is the better inclin'd to the Emperor, because it fears nothing from him in Italy, where he has neither Reputation nor Estate. Their greatest pique to him, is only for being descended from a Family whose Eldest Branch is their greatest Enemy. Yet the Emperor has his pretences to Friuli, that his Predecessors engaged formerly to the State of Venice for 400000 Crowns: But there is Prescription now in the case, and the Senat has fortify'd their Title of Forfeiture, by the Right of Conquest, having recovered that Province by their Arms, after they had been explus'd by the Emperor Maximilian I. Ʋdina the capital City having neither ground nor scituation proper to be fortify'd, they have fortify'd Palma Nova ac∣cording to the new way of Fortification, with nine Bulwarks in a Circle, which has made it e∣qually strong on all sides, and capable of resist∣ing any enterprize, either from the House of Austria or the Turk; which last has many times ravaged and over-run the whole Country, the poor Inhabitants being glad to leave all, and re∣tire with their Families into this place, as their only Sanctuary and Asylum.

Upon his pretension to Friuli it is, that the Emperor pretends to the Nomination of the Patriarch of Aquilea; which in truth remain'd in his Predecessors after the said Province was engaged: But to prevent all manner of Contro∣versie,

the Senat has found out a way never to let it be vacant, by giving him who has the Title, power of chusing a Coadjutor, which he never fails to do out of his own Family, and by that means keeping it constantly in being, the Em∣peror is defeated, and becomes utterly excluded from that Nomination.

But the Emperor, as he is King of Hungary, retains a right in Dalmatia, which King Lad s∣laus engaged to the Venetians for 100000 Du∣cats, though the Venetians pretend he sold it out-right: However, that seems nor probable, for King Wincelaus demanded restitution of it during the Wars of Cambray, threatning Peter Pasqualigne their Embassador, to do himself justice with his Sword, if they would not do it without. But he wanted Money, and lost a favourable op∣portunity of entring that Province, whilst the Venetian hands were full in defending themselves against the Emperor and the King of France.

How the Venetians stand with the Electors of the Em∣pire.

THis Commonwealth holds no Correspondence with the Electors of the Empire, either because they have no business with them, or by reason of an old Controversie betwixt them about Precedence; which the Electoral Colledg has always disputed, upon an Arrest of the Gol∣den

Bull in these words, Sacri Rom. Imperii E∣lectores digniores habentur caeteris Principibus prae∣ter Reges; and the Example of one of the Em∣bassadors of the Palatinat, who as they pretend had the precedence of Vincent Grandenigue the Venetian Embassador, in the Ceremonies at the Wedding of the Emperor with the Princess Ma∣ria Anna de Bavaria, celebrated at Gratz in the year 1600. As to the Bull, the Venetian replies, that he is comprehended under the exception praeter Reges, being treated like Kings in all the Courts of Europe. And if the Count d' Ognate, the Spanish Embassador, refused it to Peter Gritti the Venetian Embassador at Vienna *, as was done since at Madrid by the Emperors Embas∣sador the Count de Chesniller, to Leonardo Moro Embassador from that Senat; yet this Novelty which they would introduce, to revenge their quarrel about the Valtoline, could not prejudice the known Right of this Republick, nor strengthen the Right of the Electors. In a word, a Cardi∣nal refusing Letters from the Senat, because they were writ with the Title of Illustrissimo, and not Eminentissimo, Ʋrban VIII declared in the Sacred Colledg, that he comprehended the State of Ve∣nice in the clause Exceptis Regibus, and requir'd all the Cardinals to treat them as formerly. It is clear likewise, if the Duke of Venice should go to Rome, he would be received as a King, as Christopherus Morus was received at Ancona by the Sacred Colledg, during the vacancy of the See. For though he has but the Title of a Duke, that Title being personal would cease by representation of the Body of the Commonwealth, which is a kind of Royalty or King. And this is so true, that in the Pontificat of Clem. VIII. cer∣tain Cardinals advising with the Master of the

Ceremonies, how they should treat Duke Marin Grimani if he came to Ferrara, as his Holiness had invited him, it was told them by the said Master of the Ceremonies, that they must treat him like a King, that Commonwealth having for a long time been possess'd of the Soveraignty.

Their Condition with France.

IF the Senat has an aversion to the Spaniard, it has no great kindness for the French, whose Power they look upon with an evil eye, as fearing their Neighbourhood, and retaining the the memory of their Wars with Lewis XII. The French acquisition of Pignerol, increases their fear, though it be as a Port open'd to the Supplies sent to the Italian Princes, against the oppres∣sion of the Spaniard, who were grown insup∣portable to them, since the Exchange for the Marquisat of Saluzzes.

The Venetian makes it it his business to stand Neuter betwixt the Spaniard and the French, ei∣ther to preserve the Friendship of both, or so to balance their Power, as to keep both in an Equilibrium. And how great soever their jea∣lousie be against the Spaniard, they would never help to drive them out of Italy to bring the French in their places: For which cause the Count de la Roque, Embassador from Spain at Venice, found no great difficulty in gaining his cause a∣gainst Messieurs de Bellieure and de la Tuillerie, the French Embassadors, who solicited the Senat to a League with their King against the King

of Spain, that by a conjunction of their Forces they might wrest the Dutchy of Milan out of his hand. And the Marquis of Fuentes prevail'd as easily with that State, not to suffer the French to pass the River Adda, demanding that liberty for the King his Master; by that artifice to ob∣lige the Senat to a refusal of France that they should not be able to excuse; and by so doing, they sav'd Milan, which otherwise had been cer∣tainly lost, as the Marquis of Caracene confess'd, if the French had gain'd passage there.

Besides, the Spanish humour is more agreeable to the Venetians than the French; and doubt∣less they would love the Spaniards much the bet∣ter of the two, had they no Dominions in Italy; or if those they have were in our possession. But to say truth, the Venetian loves neither the one nor the other; and how great soever their out∣ward appearance and correspondence may be, they will never trust either of them more than of ne∣cessity they are oblig'd. And 'tis a common say∣ing, That the Venetians know how to hate the Spa∣niard without favouring the French.

However it must be confess'd, they are more inclinable to the French than the Spaniard, espe∣cially in what relates to their Embassadors, who are more desir'd there, and are more consider'd than the Spanish. Besides, the Senat upon par∣ticular occasions, sides always with the French; as in the vacancy of the Holy See, at which time they give Orders to such Cardinals as de∣pend upon them, to join with the French Faction in the Conclave; and to their Embassador at Rome, to act in that affair by consent of the French Em∣bassador: Which is a great advantage to the French when the Venetian Embassadors proceeds franckly according to Orders from his Masters, who are

no less concern'd in point of interest to oppose the Spaniards than the French. Yet sometimes they steer quite contrary, as Sorance betray'd the French party in the Conclave, in the year 1621, in hopes he should have got a Cap. Moreover the Venetian Cardinals depend not absolutely up∣on the Senat, which contributes nothing to their promotion, but their single recommendation to the Pope; but they serve in their own way, with∣out considering any thing but their own interest.

Their Condition with the Duke of Savoy.

THE Venetians and Duke of Savoy do not live in the same good intelligence as for∣merly. Charles Emanuel I. began the breach, by sending home their Embassador Vincent Gussoni upon occasion of succours they sent to the Car∣dinal Duke of Mantoua, for the defense of Mont∣ferrat. Victor Amideus offended them likewise, by taking upon him the Title of King of Cyprus: And Duke Charles Emanuel II. has been all his time at a distance, or rather in dispute with them upon the same subject, and the superscription of the Letters from the Senat. The Count de Bigliore the Duke of Savoys Embassador, having caus'd the Arms of Savoy quartered with the Arms of Cyprus to be set up over his Gate, the Senat sent him word, if he caus'd them not immediately to be taken down, he should see them taken down for him, and torn before his face. And the Em∣bassador

was glad to submit. One day Count Phi∣lip d'Aglie, a Knight of the Annonciade, raking too far into that ingrateful Matter, drew upon himself an unhappy Answer from Catarin Belegne the Venetian Embassador; who told him, that his Masters, the State of Venice, would be very glad if the Kingdom of Cyprus were in the Hands of his Highness the Duke of Savoy, and not in the Hands of the Turk; because, if in his Highness's Hands, he was sure his Masters would be able by Force of Arms to recover it in two Months. These alterations, and several others of a later date, by degrees broke all their Correspondence; so that in the year 1670, the Senat called home their Embassador Francis Michieli, with which the Duke was offended, and more particularly with the said Embassadors re∣fusal to send him one of his Pages, who had drawn his Sword against one of the Duke's Pages in his Anti-Chamber; and the said Duke recalling in like manner his Embassador the Count de Bigliore from Venice, he departed the next morning after his Audience of Congy, that he might not receive the usual Presents of that Republick, and thereby sig∣nify his Resentment.

Besides all these Considerations, the Duke of Savoy's intimacy and adherence to the French, dis∣gusts the Venetians exceedingly, who without that could not conceal their displeasure at the delivery of Pignirol. So jealous are they of the King of France's farther Progress in Italy , Temendo ugua∣limente (says Nani) il giogo, e il soccoroso †. Fear∣ing equally their Yoke, and their Assistance.

Their Posture with the Great Duke of Florence.

THis Republick on the other side maintains all possible Correspondence with the Great Duke of Tuscany, whom she looks upon as a Prince of much Reputation in Italy, and one whose Predecessors have always shewed themselves well-Affected to the interest of the Venetians. And their partiality appeared in the business betwixt the Count de Bigliore, and the Marquess Ricardi, both Embassadors of Obedience, one from the Duke of Savoy, the other from the Duke of Flo∣rence, spreading abroad Reports among the People to the advantage of the Florentines, and contriv'd on purpose to debase and tarnish the glory of the Savoyards.

And it troubles the Venetians much to see the said Prince as it were Beleaguer'd on all sides by Spaniards, who are in possession of Piombino, Porto∣longone, Orbitille, and Porto-Hercole, with Garri∣sons in several places in his Territory.

However it is with an ill-eye they behold Li∣gorn enriching the whole Country, to the prejudice of the Venetian Trade; yet that does not hinder them from sending Workmen from their Arsenal to build Galleys for the Great Duke: and the said Duke, in Honour to the said State, has given to the new Town of Ligorn the name of Venetia-Nuova.

The Resident of the Duke of Florence is ad∣mitted to his first Audience by the Colledg, with open doors as an Embassador, whereas the Resi∣dents of all other Princes of Italy are received with the doors shut, and without any Cere∣mony.

With the Duke of Mantua.

THE Dukes of Mantua have always held a strict Correspondence with the Common∣wealth of Venice, whose Councels and As∣sistance have never been wanting to them upon occasion. Ferdinand, Cardinal and Duke of Man∣tua, found the effects of their protection against Duke Charles Emanael of Savoy, who would have seized upon Montiferrat, and against the Marquess of Innoiosa Governor of Milan, who favoured his designs. Vincent II, having succeeded his Brother Ferdinand, the Senat seeing the said Prince with∣out Children, or hopes of having any, or living long, by reason of his indisposition, employed all their interest with him, to cause him to declare in favour of Charles Duke of Nevers set up by the French, but opposed as vigorously by the Spani∣ard, who prompted the interest of Ferdinand de Gonrague Prince of Guastalle, who, as descended from Ferdinand third Son of Francis the last Mar∣quess of Mantua, was farther off in his Alliance from the Reigning Branch than Charles of Nevers, who was descended from Lewis third Son of Fre∣derick, first Duke of Mantua. So that the Branch of Nevers is in a manner indebted for its advance∣ment

to the Venetian, who not only procured them the Dutchy of Milan by their industry, and the Cooperation of the French, but have preserv'd to him the Possession by force of their Arms, in de∣spight of the Emperor, the King of Spain, and the Duke of Savoy. Charles II had so great an inclina∣tion to the Venetians, that he came in person almost every year to keep his Carnival, and Ascension at Venice. And this he did as well for his Interest as Recreation, thereby negotiating his own Affairs with the Principal Senators, who were as his Coun∣cil of State. Yet this good Intelligence had like to have been interrupted under Ferdinand, Charles his Son, upon a Difference that arose betwixt them touching the Propriety of the River Tartare in the Territory of Verona; the Venetians pretend∣ing the said River belonged to them, as being in their Dominions, and that the Duke of Mantua had usurped his Fishing and Toll, which the said Prince as peremptorily denied, affirming that he had been in peaceable possession of it since the year 1404. That his Right had been often acknow∣ledged by the Venetians, particularly in the year 1405, by an Act pass'd betwixt the Doge Michel Sten, and the Marquess Francis de Gonzague: in the year 1517 by Daniel Renier Governor of Ve∣rona for the Venetians: and in the year 1598 the Magistracy of Mantua having caused a Verbal Process to be form'd upon that occasion, the State of Venice remained content with their Reasons, and the Veronois continued to pay their usual Du∣ties at the Fort of Ponte Molino, built for that purpose by the Predecessors of the Marquess of Mantua. But the Senat not enduring this Expostu∣lation from the Duke, threatned him with War in∣stead of a Reply. The Prince unable to contend, submitted to their Force, and sent the Marquess

Horace Canossa incognito to Venice, who in three days time compos'd the difference privately, to the satisfaction of the Venetian, whose Subject he was born.

There are two Fortresses on the Confines of the Territory of Verona, which are as a Bridg to the said Duke. One is call'd Pischicra upon the Menzo, built by the Lords della Scala, and usurp'd by the Venetians from the Marquess of Mautua. It was taken by the French after the Battel of Aignadel, contrary to the opinion of the Senat, who believ'd that single place would have been able to have stop'd the Career of the Conquerour. The other is call'd Legnago, upon the Banks of the River Adige, a place of very great impor∣tance. Two places famous by the Exile of seve∣ral Senatots, sent thither for their Mortification.

The Intelligence betwixt the Dukes of Mantua and the Emperor, is very unpleasing to the Vene∣tians, who had much rather it had been with the French: But that which troubles them more, is to see him environed so close by the Spaniard, without all hopes of extrication, whilst they are Masters of Sabioneda, and have a Garrison in Ca∣sal.

When the Duke of Mantua married, the Se∣nat expected an Embassador, at least an Envoy Extraordinary, according to the Custom of Princes, but none coming, they interpreted it as a dis∣gust.

With the Duke of Modena.

THE Duke of Modena is very solicitous of Friendship with the Venetian, and keeps commonly a Resident in Venice. The Senat being reciprocally well-disposed to the said Prince, would willingly contribute to the restoring him to the Dutchy of Ferrara (so long in the pos∣session of his Ancestors) if occasion offer'd: For the Senat had much rather have the Duke of Modena their Neighbour than the Pope, who some time or other may have a fancy to re∣unite the Polesin with the Demeasns of Ferrara, from which it was dismembred under the Dukes of that Name. And Clement VIII had a great de∣sire to have done it. When the House of Este was in possession of this Dutchy, the Venetians had in Ferrara a Magistrate call'd Bisdomino, or Visdomino, who alone administred Justice to all Subjects of that Republick, with the interposition of any of the Duke's Officers, according to agree∣ment betwixt the said State and Duke.

By the said agreement, the Duke was oblig'd to make no Fortifications upon the River Po, by reason of the Polesin, which being an open Coun∣trey betwixt the Adige and the Po, would be exposed to inroads and devastation. The Pope has many times oppos'd it, and particularly in War of Parma, when he built Forts upon the Confines of this Province. For these reasons the Venetian desires seriously the Dutchy of Ferrara

were again in the hands of the Duke of Mode∣na; and if during the said War, they would not grant him permission to make use of the Troops they had sent him, to stop the Barbarini in their passage into that Country, and to make an irrup∣tion into the Country of Ferrara, to reprize him∣self for the losses of his Family; it was, because they foresaw it would beget a cruel and dange∣rous War in Italy, the blame of which would re∣sult upon them. And therefore the said Duke could not prevail with the Senat, to procure that his pretensions upon Ferrara and Commachio might be comprehended in the Treaty of Peace, be∣cause that proposition being insisted upon, must necessarily have interrupted the whole Negotia∣tion about the business of Parma, upon the ac∣commodation of which depended the quiet and tranquility of all Italy.

Furthermore, though the Venetian is not much troubled to see this Prince in the interests, and under the protection of the King of France, they would have been better content he had stood Neuter; as fearing his Ambition to be great, may some time or other involve all Italy, as it hap∣pen'd in the time of Duke Francis, who join'd his Forces with the King of France for the Con∣quest of the Dutchy of Milan, hoping that Crown would afterwards have given him all necessary assistance for the recovery of Ferrara: And this gives great Umbrage to the Venetians, for fear the French should come to be their Neighbours.

With the Duke of Parma.

THough the Duke of Parma has no particu∣lar Alliance with the Venetians, yet he is well esteemed by the Senat, to whom he professes great obligation for their assistance to his Family in the Barberine War, which ended at length by the restitution of the Dutchy of Castro *. And 'tis thought the Venetians were not at all pleas'd to see that Country fall into the Pope's hands, after they had endeavoured so much to wrest it out of the Clutches of Ʋrban VIII.

With the Republick of Genoa.

IF the Republicks of Rome and Carthage, of Athens and Sparta, made themselves famous by their Emulations and Wars: The Common∣wealths of Venice and Genoa contending for do∣minion 300 years , have made themselves as fa∣mous by their long animosities and conflicts: And though at present they be at Peace, yet they retain still the old heart-burning, which will last as long as the memory of the mischiefs that either of them has brought upon the other. The Ge∣noeses cannot with patience behold the Venetians

Masters of the Adriatick Sea, having disputed it with them so long, and worsted them so often; and the Venetian looks upon Genoa as jealous of his glory and power.

Nine times have they been at Wars together, but the last so cruel, and lasted so long, that the memory of it is still fresh in Venice, and there are a sort of Noblemen call'd Nobili della guerra di Genova, as being taken into the Nobility at that time. Never was Venice so near ruine as then, when Peter Doria the Genoa General look'd upon it so sure, that when the Venetian Envoy presented him certain Genoeses Prisoners from the Senat, he told him, that in a short time he would be in Venice himself, and deliver the rest. Upon which Answer the Senat dispatch'd with all diligence Frier Be∣noist, General of the Cordeliers, to the King of Hungary to beg Peace of him out of pure Com∣miseration, and to beseech him that he would em∣ploy his Interest with the Genoeses in their favour, and with the Lord of Padua. But though the im∣portunity of this Minister was very great, and the humility of his Address had melted the King, de∣livering himself still upon the knee; yet the Em∣bassador from Genoa, Gaspar de l'Orbe, and Balta∣zar Spinola being present at all his Audience, di∣verted the good inclinations of his Majesty, by perswading him the time was now come when he might have all he desired, and that within a Month he would infallibly be Master of Venice. Such was the miserable condition of the Venetian, when be∣ing deserted by all People, there was nothing left to them but a generous resolution to vanquish or die; and this they resolv'd with so good success, that advancing against the Genoa Navy, with the shattered remainders of their own Fleet, under the Conduct of Andreas Contarini their Duke, in

a few days time they retook Chiozza, and return'd to Venice laden with good Prize; and several of the Genoa Nobility, who being Prisoners, paid the best part of the Charge of the War for their liberty: since which famous Victory the Genoese has been quiet, and given over Rivalling the Venetian. So that the Genoese are as much too blame for not ha∣ving made an advantageous Peace when it was begg'd with such submission, as Asilius Regulus was of old, for not having done the same with the Carthaginians after he had defeated them, which omission brought a long chain of inconve∣niences upon the Romans. But the Venetians were brought so low, the Genoeses would have been ra∣ther reproach'd for not knowing how to have con∣quered them, had they made Peace with them at a time when their destruction, in the opinion of the whole World, was inevitable.

At the beginning of their War in Candia, the Genosses offered the Venetians a considerable supply of Men and Money, upon condition they might be treated as Equals, but their Offer was rejected with contempt: which netled the Genoese exceed∣ingly, who cannot easily brook being thought their Inferiors, after they had so long contended for Precedence. Besides, the Venetian frustrated the design the Genoese had upon Sala Regia, which Donna Olimpia had almost perswaded Pope Inno∣cent to grant them. From whence it may be presum'd the Animosity betwixt these two Rival States is not yet extinguished: on the contrary, both one side and the other do many times revive and exasperate them by their Railleries and Sar∣casmes, which being many times true, leave a greater sting upon their spirits.

With the Republick of Luc∣ca.

VEnice has but little Correspondence with the Republick of Lucea, but the Conformity of their Government (being Aristocratical) makes them reciprocally favourable one to the other; so that should the Great Duke of Tuscany design any thing against the liberty of that State, 'tis probable the Venetians would not refuse their assistance.

With the Grisons.

THE Senat of Venice bear an Affection to the Grisons as a People whose Interest it is equally to hinder the Spaniards from en∣tring the Valtolin, and encreasing their Power in Italy, where already they have several Princes under their dependance. And therefore the Gri∣sons no sooner understood the designs of the Duke of Feria, Governor of Milan upon the Valtolin, but they repair'd immediately to the Venetian for relief against the Valtolins, who were Revolted at the instigation of the Spaniard; and indeed that Affair alarm'd the Republick of Venice more than any other Prince of Italy, by reason of the situa∣tion

of that Valley, which bordering on one side upon Tirol, and on the other upon Milan, serv'd as a kind of Gallery to the Spaniards, to join their Dominions with the Emperors, and to stop up the passage for forreign supplies against all Italy, and particularly against their own Countrey, which the Emperor and his Catholick Majesty kept block'd up as in a Circle. This was the design of the Count de Fuentes not long since, when he advised his Master to seize upon Monaco and Final, and the Valtolin; which was the ready way to reduce the Princes of Italy into servitude. But because the execution of his design requir'd time, he laid the first Stone by building the Fort of his Name, at the mouth of the River Adda, which since has produc'd that long and mischievous War to the Grisons. But were it not for their interest the Venetian regards them but little, as looking upon them as poor people, and savage.

With the Swisses.

THE Senat on the other side, courts the Swiss very much, as knowing their fide∣lity and valour. It raises Soldiers among them in time of War, and takes of their Offi∣cers into their Armies, paying them Pensions for their lives. They have moreover a Resident con∣stantly either at Zurick or Berne; which are two of the best Towns in Switzerland, where all the chiefest of their Affairs are transacted,

With Holland.

THE Commonwealth of Venice and Holland are under a strict obligation of Amity and Interest. They are both at the same de∣fiance with the King of Spain. The Hollander withdrew himself from his obedience to that Crown; and the other favoured the Revolt by Councels, Money, and Solicitations with Queen Elizabeth; to engage her in the defence of their new Companion. And though they be separated by a long tract of Land, yet upon occasion they can easily unite by their communication at Sea, where both of them are very powerful.

With England.

THE Senat maintains a perfect Correspon∣dence with the King of Great Britain, considering him as a Prince whose Amity may much import that State in their necessities, by his great interest and reputation with other Kings. King James had a great respect for the Commonwealth of Venice; and in their difference with Paul V. he no sooner understood the King of Spain had declar'd in favour of the Pope, but

he declared for the Venetian, promising their Em∣bassador George Justiniani, that he would not only assist him with all the force of his Kingdom, but oblige all his Allies in their defence: And if the quarrel had broke out into a War, 'tis believ'd he would have been as good as his word, as well as the Hollander, who upon his recommendation of∣fer'd them a considerable number of Ships and of Men. King Charles I. continued the esteem and affection of his Father; and by a just return, they preserv'd for him in his misfortunes, and even after his death, all the Kindness and Veneration they shew'd to him during his life. For they were the lást that sent Embassadors to the Protector, and their forbearance was look'd upon by him as a silent reproach of his Government, and a con∣tempt of his Authority; so many great Princes having as it were contended who by their Em∣bassadors should honour him first. And Cromwell having complain'd of their backwardness; the Se∣nat (fearing his displeasure at a time when they were at War with the Turk) was oblig'd to cause John Sagrede their Embassador in France, to pass over to London to appease him. At length Charles II. being restor'd, they renewed their ancient Alli∣ance with him, which was answered by his Ma∣jesty in the solemn Embassy of the Lord Falcon∣bridge; who after he had staid two months him∣self in Venice, left Mr. Dorington as Resident for his Majesty of Great Britain. But how great so∣ever the Intelligence is betwixt England and this State, there is no probability that that King will ever send any Ships into the Venetian service a∣gainst the Turk, lest the Grand Seignior should seize upon the Goods and Effects of the Turky-Company of London; which amounts to more than five millions of money: Which would ruine the

best branch of the English Trade, and be a great diminution to his Revenue.

With Denmark.

THE Senat has no Correspondence at all with the King of Denmark, their Coun∣tries lying so remote, that they can neither expect relief from one another upon occasion, nor apprehend any detriment.

With the Swede and the Pole.

IF Resemblance of Government, or Interest be one of the principal causes of Amity, there are no two States in all Europe obliged to stricter Alliance than Venice and Poland, they be∣ing the only two Crown'd Commonwealths; both of them govern'd by a Senat, and an Elective Prince; both Neighbours to the Turk, and both famous for their Wars against that cruel and formidable Enemy. For though Poland carries the name of a Kingdom, 'tis nothing but an Aristocracy mix'd with a Monarchy, according to the old Model of Sparta. Upon these considerations the State of Venice is much concern'd for all accidents in Po∣land, whether they be good or bad: And if the

Progress made by Gustavus Adolphus in the Em∣pire, pleas'd them very well, the Success of Charles Gustavus in Poland afflicted them as much; because the impoverishment of that Kingdom would be an advantage to the Turk, as it prov'd afterward. 'Tis not to be doubted then, but the interest of the Pole is dearer to the Venetian than the interest of the Swede; whose prodigious in∣crease both at Land and at Sea, it began to appre∣hend. That King having taken the Northern Li∣conia from the Pole, and all one side of the Bal∣tick from the King of Denmark.

With the Great Duke of Mus∣covy.

THough the Senat has no particular affair with the Czar of Moscovy, yet it puts a great value upon his friendship; that King being very potent, and of great reputation with the King of Persia, whose Alliance is necessary for the Venetian, thereby to give diversion to the Turk: For whenever the Sophy of Persia invades him on that side, the Venetian finds it no hard matter to repel him on the other; and these Ne∣gotiations with the Persian, are managed by the Mediation of the Czar. So that if upon any in∣terregnum in Poland, the Senat should appear for the Election of any person, their interest would put them upon the Election of the Czar, upon condition he would turn Catholick, because that Prince would be in a posture, not only to op∣pose

the Turk, but to carry the War home into his own Country, and force him to dis∣gorge all that he has swallowed from Poland: and if this should once happen, the Senat might then confederate with the Pole against the Turk, either to attack them openly at the same time, and give them diversion; or to defend one ano∣ther reciprocally by an Auxiliary War, when∣ever either of them should be invaded: After which, if the Sophy should enter into the League, (which he would do, if he saw the Czar his ancient Ally made King of Poland) 'tis not to be doubted, but that Triple Alliance would bring the Turk to reason, or at least keep him closer in the bounds of his Empire: But be∣cause the Election of the Moscovite to the Crown of Poland is like to meet with great difficulty, in respect that the Nobility would fear the subversion of their Liberty by so pow∣erful a Prince, the Senat of Venice desires at least to continue in good intelligence with him, by reason of the great advantages it may re∣ceive from him upon any extraordinary Exi∣gence.

With the Ottoman Court.

TIS no fault in the Republick of Venice, that they are not always at Peace with the Turk, for there is scarce any thing they omit to procure it. They endeavour, or rather purchase his friendship by continual Presents. They dissem∣ble the Injuries and Affronts that they receive, lest they should be oblig'd to revenge them. They suffer his Pyracies in the Adriatick-Sea, and yet pay him more Submission and Ceremony than to the Pope, and all the Princes of Europe; which, if we may believe the testimony of a Venetian Em∣bassador at Constantinople, serves but to enhance the insolence of the Turk, whose nature it is to make advantage of every thing, where he finds himself dreadful. And though at Land he be in∣comparably stronger than the Venetian, yet at Sea the Venetian is too hard for him, in respect that the Grand Signior has neither good Pilots, good Rowers, nor good Mariners: nor is it so easy for him to recruit at Sea as at Land, not for want of Ships or Galleys, but for want of good Sea-men, and good Officers to Command them; for gene∣rally the Ottoman Fleet consists principally of slaves who never were at Sea before, and by consequence are unable to endure its Fatigue: by which dis∣advantage the Turks have been often beaten at Sea by the Venetian, who understands that Trade very well, and makes it their continual Exercise. So that the Turks have a saying, God has given the Sea to the Christians, and the Land to the Turk.

Nevertheless, the Venetian is in such awe of the Turk, that they will renounce their Alliance with all the Princes of Europe to preserve his; and their Complacency is so great, they care not to break with the best of their Friends, when the be∣nefit they are to expect from them may give the least jealousy to the Porte. Upon this Considera∣tion they would not permit the Pope to hold the last Council in Vicenza; and therefore the Italians call the Venetians Semiturchi, and the Spaniards, Venice l'Amancebada del Turco, that is to say, the the Concubine, or Prostitute of the Great Turk, who suffers him to do any thing. And, to speak truth, 'tis but just they should fear him, having suffered his Power to encrease to such a pitch, that they are not able to deal with him with their sin∣gle Force, which at first they could do, at least with as much ease as the four last Paleologi kept Constantinople a whole Age in the middle betwixt two Capital Turkish Cities, Adrianople and Burse, that kept it as it were block'd up: as Huniades raised the Siege of Belgrade in 1442 in spight of Amurath II, and in 1456 in spight of Mahomet II. Or as a poor Prince of Albania defended his chief City called Coja against the Efforts of both those Emperors, Amurath dying of pure indigna∣tion that he could not carry the Town, and the other drawing off with shame, as he did from the Siege of Rhodes, where he lost his time, and a great part of his Army. So that it may be con∣cluded the Venetians lost in that time the Isle of Negropont, Corinth, and the best part of Morea, Albania, (which they had seized after the death of Scanderbeg) only for want of Courage; seeing they alone had more Money and Force than the Kings of Hungary, Albania, and the Knights of Rhodes all together.

The Greatness and ancient Extent of this Com∣monwealth may be estimated by their losses since the Turks established in Europe. Amurath II took from them Salonica, the richest Town in Ma∣cedonia, and demolished that famous Wall called Hexamile, that stop'd the progress of his Con∣quests, and secur'd that Country from his Inva∣sions. In the year 1470 Mahomet invaded Ne∣gropont, and seized upon part of Moria and Albania, after he had a second time ruin'd that Corinthian Wall which the Venetians had re∣paired.

Bajazet II took from them Lepanto, Modon, Co∣ron, and Duras, in the year 1500. Selimus II pos∣sessed himself of the Kingdom of Cyprus 1570. Canea and Retimo in Candia were taken by Ibra∣him, and at length in the year 1669 Candia it self was taken by Ibrahim's Son, Mahomet IV, the present Grand Seignior.

Fifteen months after the loss of Candia, they were in danger of a new War about the limits of Dalmatia, but by good fortune they escaped that; the Bashaw of Bosnia, with whom the Procurator Nani was to treat, being favourable towards them, it being concluded betwixt them, that Salona, Na∣vigrade, St. Daniel, and all betwixt Zebenigo and Spalatro should remain to the Venetian, with Clissa, and the Country five miles about. That Scardona should return to the Turks, not having been con∣quered by force; and as to Pizzano, and other places in dispute, they should be kept in their an∣cient bounds. But this Treaty was not ratified gratis; for the Senat sent his Highness a Present of 12000 Sequins, with a large quantity of Cloth of Gold for the Sultanesses.

So that the Port needs no more than to com∣plain or threaten, to draw Money and Presents

from the Venetian , who by his Gifts renders him∣self rather worthy than secure of the Amity of the Turks; and the reason is, because he knows not how to Comport with a firm generous Resolution.

They have constantly an Embassador at Constan∣tinople, whom they call Bailo: this Embassy re∣compences all their other; for (as they say in Ve∣nice) in three years time they get above 100000 Crowns, all Charges born, the Embassador having considerable Duties upon all Merchants Ships that carry the Standard of St. Mark. They have two other Bailos or Consuls in the Dominion of the Great Turk, one at Al ppo, the Center of all the Asian Trade; the other at Alexandria, the Ma∣gazin of all the richest Goods not only of Aegypt, but Affrica; thereby to preserve their Rights and their Priviledges granted to them by the Empe∣rors of the East, the Kings of Jerusalem, and the Sultans of Aegypt. These two Consulships are commonly conferred upon two of the most indi∣gent of the Nobility, because they are Places of great Profit, and little Expence; and sometimes the Senat permits them all their life long, that they may have more time to enrich themselves. But the Consulships of Cyprus, Chio, Rosetta, An∣cona, and Genoa, are executed always by Citizens of Venice.

The Profit the Venetian draws from their Com∣merce with the Turk is very great; for the Turks alone, as I have heard from several Merchants, do receive more Silks and Cloth of Gold from Ve∣nice than from all Europe besides. And though the English and Hollander have made it their bu∣siness to settle a Trade at Constantinople for Cloth, they could never effect it: the Turks finding them too fine, and of but little service, compare them to painted Ladies, which look very well, but can∣not endure the water.

These are all the Correspondencies the State of Venice holds with the Princes of Europe; I have not mentioned Portugal, because there is nothing of Commerce betwixt them. But the Senat de∣sires their friendship, as being a Balance to the Power of the Spaniard, whose diminution will al∣ways be good News to the Venetian, unless it be with advantage to the French.

As for Malta, their Religion and Government has so great resemblance, by the quality of their No∣bility that administer in both; by their Forces at Sea; by the Conformity of their Interests; by their opposition to the Power of the Turk, that they cannot but love like Sisters, and assist one the other against their common Enemy.

There is always at Venice one of the Comman∣ders of Malta, called Recevitori, because he re∣ceives whatever accrews to the Knights in the Ter∣ritories of the Venetians. The Nobility pretend to Exemption, but the Order would never allow it, because of the new Nobility; and in my time the Son of the Procurator, Cornaro, sirnamed della Casa grande, did his duty in the usual forms.

Venice is one of the seven Priories of Italy, and comprehends 23 Commanderies, viz. Trevisa, and Conillan, (Patronates of the Houses of Cor∣naro and Lippomane,) Rovigue, Barbarana, Verona, Longara, St. Medard, Bologna, Faienza, Regia, Montecchio, San Giovanni in Bosco, St. Simon, St. Jude, Imola, Rimini and Cesene, that are united, Forli, Modena, Parma, Borgo-San-Domina, Cerro di Parma, Capo di Ponte, Ravenna, Pila, and Gra∣disque, united.

The Venetian Correspondencies being maintain'd by their Embassies, it is not amiss in this place to say something of their Custom therein.

The Senat maintains constantly an Embassador in

the Pope's Court, and that place is commonly sup∣plied by one of the Senators, cunning, eloquent, and well-vers'd in the Civil-Law, that in his Ne∣gotiations he may be able to defend himself, and elude all the Artifices of the Court of Rome, espe∣cially when any thing is in Controversy betwixt them. Upon extraordinary occasion they send four Embassadors Extraordinary, either Procurators of St. Mark, or of the Principal Senators. The Se∣nat did the same Honour to Francis I, after the Battel of Marignan, and the four Embassadors were, Anthony Grimani, afterwards Duke, Dominick Trevisan, George Cornaro, and Andrew Gritti, all of them Procurators of St. Mark, and Venerable for their years.

They have their Embassadors likewise in the Courts of France, Vienna, and Spain, which places are never vacant, lest they should prejudice their Affairs; and when any of the said Kings come first to the Crown, they send two Embassadors Ex∣traordinary to Congratulate. But sometimes they are too careless in these sort of Formalities. In the year 1670 it was resolved to send the Cheva∣lier, Catarin Belegne, and another, to the young King of Spain, who was already in the fifth year of his Reign, with Complements of Condolence for the death of his Father, and Complements of Congratu∣lation for his Access to the Crown; so that the said Prince would have had occasion to have laugh'd at so preposterous an Embassy, as Tiberius did at the Embassy of the Trojans, to condole the Death of his Son Drusus. Respondit irridens, quasi jam obli∣terata dolor is memoria, se quo{que} vicem eorum dolere, quod Egregium Virum Hectorem amisissent. Suet. in Tib. At the Election of Michael Wisnioweski to the Crown of Poland, Ange Morosini was named to have gone with their Congratulation, but the King died before the Embassador stirr'd.

To the Duke of Savoy the Seigniory sends no Embassadors but when they have need of him, as in time of War; where it is remarkable by the by, that the Embassador at his Audience gives him the Title of Royal Highness, by which that Re∣publick seems to acknowledg his lawful Right to the Kingdom of Cyprus; which I objecting one day to the Secretary Augustin Bianchi, he told me, the Embassador gave him that Title out of his own civility, without any order from the Se∣nat, who conniv'd at it for the benefit of their Affairs during the War; E per questo, cessante la Guerra, cessa l' Ambasciaria, anzi la Corrispondenza; And therefore, said he, when the War ceases, their Embassies and Correspondence cease with it. And indeed not long after the War at Candia was at an end, there was an end of their Correspondence.

The neighbouring Kings do reciprocally honour this Republick with Embassadors from them, not for any need they have of the Venetians in their Affairs, their Alliance being useless to them, in re∣spect of the Neutrality which they publickly pro∣fess, but to gratify them in a thing they so ardent∣ly desire, because the presence of these Embassa∣dors keeps up their Reputation in Italy, and holds those Princes in respect; besides, their own Sub∣jects bear greater Veneration to their Government, seeing the deference paid them from the Kings.

These Embassies to Venice are commonly of no great importance to the Affairs of those Princes that send them, the Senat applying wholly to Peace; and yet of all their Embassies they are the most difficult, and require the most cunning and sagacity, because they treat as it were with dumb People, and are to understand every thing by signs. Therefore it is that Venice is called the School and Touchstone of Embassadors: for thither do Princes

send them to discover their Parts; and in this Em∣bassy it was that Monsiegnior d' Aligre, the second of that name, and present Chancellor of France, discovered to the late King his prudence and dex∣terity, having executed that Office at a time when things were very intricate and perplex'd, in respect of the differences about the Valtoline, which was then possessed by the French, the Spaniard, the Italians, but particularly by the Venetian, who had the greatest interest therein.

THE SECOND PART

Of the Magistrates of Ve∣nice.

THE Magistrates of Venice are of three sorts, the Domesticks, whose Jurisdiction lies wholly in the Town, as those in Rome, who were called Magistratus Ʋrbani; the Provincial Magistrates, whose administration is abroad; and the Military Officers, as the Generalissimo, the Pro∣veditor General of the Sea, the General of the Gulf, and others.

The first are of two sorts, one manages the Af∣fairs of Government, as the Duke, the six Councel∣lors, the Sage-Grands, and the Senators, like those in Rome, called the Magistratus Majores. The others meddle only in matters of Judicature, and are so numerous, a third part of them are suffici∣ent. But the Seigniory has thought fit it should be so, that all their Nobility may be employed, espe∣cially the young Gentlemen, who are much de∣lighted with the very name of a Magistrate.

I do not pretend to set down the precise number of their Magistrates, which would be troublesome and useless; I shall only speak of those who have the chiefest share in the administration. And be∣cause the Doge or Duke is the most considerable

both for Dignity and Office, I shall begin with him, and his Predecessors, to make their condition the more perspicuous, by comparing it with what they were formerly.

Of the Doge.

THE Isles under the Venetian Jurisdiction were govern'd at first by Consuls, and then by Tribunes annually chosen, as I have hinted before. But the People growing weary of their delays, and particular quarrels, resolution was taken, to create a Head, to whom the Tri∣bunes should be obliged to be accountable.

To this end all the Isles sent their Deputies to Heraclea, to proceed in the Election of a Prince; and it was Lucius Anafestus that was chosen, to whom the People transferr'd their Soveraign power: but the Venetians refused to agree, alledging, that since the Foundation of their Republick they had always preserv'd their Liberty, and never submitted to any Authority, but the Authority of their Laws. Bodni, Jannoti, John Botetus, and some other eminent Writers, have spoken of the old Soveraignty of the Dukes of Venice, as of an unquestionable thing. The Reader may judg of it by the following Argu∣ments, which I have extracted out of their own proper Annals.

1. The Investiture that all the Prelates and Officers chosen by the People, were obliged to

demand of the Duke before they could have possession, seems to me an Argument of the So∣veraign Authority the Dukes exercised at that time. Besides, it belonged to him to call the Clergy and the People together, to proceed to their Elections; and if at any time they assembled without his Convocation, all the Elections were actually void.

2. The Princes who sent Embassadors to Venice, address'd their Letters of Credence to the Duke only, as the King and Patriarch of Jerusalem; and Pope Calixtus did to Duke Dominique Mi∣chieli. So that it was the opinion of all the Princes of that time, that the Dukes of Venice were ab∣solute.

The said Dominick Michieli refus'd the Crown of Sicily that was offered him, only because be∣ing Soveraign of Venice, and of several Provinces in the Levant, he feared to lose the possession of a State at that time more considerable (al∣most as to Title) than Sicily: Whereas had his power been only precarious, and dependant upon the People, 'tis not probable he would have pre∣termitted so fair an occasion of making himself a King. Besides, what he did in Syria is a strong Argument of his Soveraignty; for Money being short, and his Soldiers mutining against him, he caused boiled Leather to be coined, called it by his own Name Michielette, commanded by a pro∣mulged Edict all the Sutlers and Victuallers of his Army to receive it upon pain of death, and promised to pay the value in Silver at his return, and they obey'd. From whence it may be well

presum'd they owned him for their Sovereign, be∣cause they trusted to his promise, which they ne∣ver would have done, had they not thought him able to have kept it; and how could he have been able, had he not been their King?

3. 'Tis a mark of Sovereignty to apply confis∣cated Goods to his own use; but this the Dukes of Venice did, as appears by an Edict of Duke Peter Candian in the year 972, by which he prohibits all the Subjects of that State, to carry or convey un∣to the Turks any sort of Arms offensive or defen∣sive, under penalty of 100 Livres of Gold, to be applied to the use of him and his Successors.

4. The Dukes of Venice have associated in their Dukeship with their Children and Brothers, and by that means keeping it to their Families, have in a manner made it hereditary. Witness the three great Families of the Badoers, Candiens, and Orseoles, who kept the Government successively among them for more than 200 years, as it happens to several Royal Families in Elective Kingdoms. This it was that made Dominick Flabanicus (who in probabili∣ty had neither Children nor Brothers) to publish an Edict, ordaining that the succeeding Dukes should not have any Colleagues in their Dukeship for the future; and thereby declaring the House of Orseole degraded and lapsed from all the Ho∣nours, Rights, Priviledges and Preheminences that formerly they enjoyed, and banished out of that State for ever: and this Flabanicus did, not upon any impulse or necessity from the People, but from an old Pique he bore to the Orseoles, with whom his Family had had great Quarrels.

5. The Doges marry with Forreign Princesses, as Peter Candien, the fourth of that Name, did with the Daughter of Albert, Lord of Ravenna: Otho Orseole with a Daughter of Stephen King of

Hungary; Dominick Silvius with a Sister of Ni∣cephorus, Emperor of Constantinople: Ordelase Fa∣lier with the Princess Matilda, descended from the first Kings of Jerusalem; and Peter Ziani with a Daughter of Tancrede King of Sicily. And in like manner they married their Daughters to So∣vereign Princes, as Peter Orseole married one of his Daughters to Stephen, Eldest Son to the King of Croatia: all which infer that the Doges in those days passed for Sovereign Princes.

Though in the Archives of their Acts the Clergy and People are mentioned with the Doge, as in these, Nos Petrus Candianus, &c. cum Vitale Patriarcha, Clero, & Populo Venetiae; Nos Tribunus Memus, &c. hortantibus & consentientibus nobis D. Vitale Pa∣triarcha simul cum Episcopis nostris, & cum Prima∣tibus Venetiae; Nos Vitalis Michael, &c. cum Ju∣dicibus & sapientibus, at{que} Populi Veneti collauda∣tione & confirmatione concedimus, &c. Nothing can be concluded from thence, but that the Doge of Venice might have a particular Councel composed of persons selected according to his fancy, to de∣liberate with him, as the Kings of Rome did anci∣ently with their Senat: and this is so clear, that those Assemblies in the Annals of Venice are called the Duke's Councel expresly, Dux cum suo Consilio armare decrevit; Ipse cum suo Consilio & suis Judi∣cibus constituit. From whence it follows, that these Councellors, which Vitale Michaeli calls Consiliorum suorum participes, that is properly, his Confidents, depended upon the Doge, and were accomptable only to him. But now since the Doges are no more but Masters, the Stile of their Chancery runs ano∣ther way, and there is not a Secretary of State dares use this ancient form, Dux cum suo Consilio, & suis judicib. For the Magistrates are not now the Doges, but the Commonwealths Officers; nor

will any Doge be so bold either in speaking or wri∣ting, to say, My Council of State, My Magistrates, because it is the language of a Sovereign Prince, that now he cannot pretend. Besides, I do not see that these words, Cum Clero & Populo; cum Ju∣dicibus & Sapientibus; cum Populi Collaudatione & Confirmatione, do at all prove the participation of the three Estates in the Civil Government. For by the same reason it may be argued the Kings of France are not Absolute there, because all Ordon∣nances concluded with this form, By the King and his Council, which only shews that that King takes the advice of his Council before he resolves in any matter of State. As to the words Collaudatione and Confirmatione, they signify nothing but the manner in which the Edicts of their Doges were received by the People, that is to say, with univer∣sal Applause: for if the word Confirmation be ta∣ken literally, and in the same sense it is said, the King has Confirm'd the Priviledges granted by his Predecessors to some Abby or Family: or that the Parliament has Confirm'd the Sentence of a Presidial; it would be no less than to say the Authority of the People was greater than the Au∣thority of either Doge, Clergy, or Nobility, because it belonged to them to confirm all Deliberations, which the Venetians, who pretend their Govern∣ment was never Popular, will never allow.

From whence I conclude the Collaudation and Confirmation of the People was nothing but an outward approbation, and obediential Concurrence to the Edicts of their Dukes. without being re∣quired, or any necessity of them to the Duke, be∣fore he could execute any thing that was resolved: and this is proved by the aforementioned words, hortantibus & Consentientibus nobis, &c. For to ex∣hort, is a kind of Prayer or Remonstrance that

Subjects use towards their Sovereigns: and if the Clergy and Noblemen of Venice gave their consent sometimes, it is not to be said the Doge could not act without them, but rather that the Doge doing them the Honour to communicate with them in some things, their gratitude prompted them to a ready obedience.

If the Doges at any time caused their Orders or Decrees to be subscribed by the Prelats of the Province, and the Judges of the City of Venice, it was one of their Artifices to pass with more ease such Edicts as they thought would be offensive to the People, whom by that means they desired to perswade, that those who sign'd the Edicts, were Authors of them; and by this means the Doges did now and then shift off the Odium upon others.

At this day the Authority of the Duke is so limited, that he can do nothing without the Senat. For this cause, in publick Ceremonies where the Senat marches, there is always following the Doge a Nobleman, who carries a Sword in the Scabbard before the Senat, to signify that the whole Power and Authority of the State is in the hands of the Senat. For as the Connestable, or Grand Escuier carries the Sword before the French King when∣ever he makes his Entry into any considerable Town, to shew the absoluteness of his Power over his Subjects; so, on the contrary, 'tis an evident mark that the Doge is subject both to the Laws and the Senat, that the Sword is carried after him, and hangs as it were over his head, to admonish him that if he transgress his duty in the least, he is not to expect better treatment than was used to∣wards Marin Falier . And for the same reason, at the Ceremonies of his Coronation, this Sword is never put on, nor indeed at any time but his Fu∣neral, with the Golden Spurs the Emperor Basile

sent to Duke Orso Participatio † when he Cteated him Grand Escuier of Constantinople.

When the Forreign Embassadors are received to Audience, the Duke replys only in general terms, that may keep them in hopes, according to the old direction of the Senat, Dentur bona verba Floren∣tinis; and if he speaks too much, he shall not only be disowned, but receive a sharp reprimand, and perhaps threats, as was given one day by the Se∣nator Baradonne, since a Cardinal to Duke Domi∣nick Contarin, in a full Colledg after the Embassa∣dor was gone out: His words were these, Vostra serenita parla da Principe Sovrano, ma si recordi che non chi mancheranno li mezzi di mortificarla quando trascorrera dal dovere. Your Serenity speaks like a Sovereign Prince, but you may remember that we shall not want ways of chastizing you, if you transgress your duty too much. So that it may be said of the Doge , what a Polander said once of his King, that the King was the Mouth of the Commonwealth, but that the Mouth could not speak any thing that the publick Judgment had not first prepared and re∣solved.

If an Embassador makes any undecent proposi∣tion, or speaks dishonourably of the Commonwealth, the Duke is concern'd to reply a little smartly, otherwise he will run himself into the contempt of the Nobility, and perhaps be depos'd, as pu∣sillanimous, and unfit for the Government: and in that case the Proposition passes not to the Pregadi, as a thing not fit to be received.

In the year 1671, the Turks having made a de∣scent in the Coasts of Ancona, not far from Loretto,

and carried several Families away with them, the Nunt io Pompeius Varesus came to the Colledg, com∣plaining in the name of the Pope, that the Seigniory had suffered those Corsairs to pass into the Gulfi without fighting them, notwithstanding their ob∣ligation to do it. The Duke replyed, That he ad∣mired his Holiness should make any complaint of dis∣orders happening in any place under his obedience: for if those Infidels entred so boldly into the Territories of the Church, it was because they found them ill∣guarded (not to say deserted) whilst the Pope's Gal∣leys were employed upon particular service, when they should have been left in his Harbours for security of his Towns, and defence of his Subjects. An answer that stop'd the Nunt io's mouth.

The same Nunt io received another Answer as unpleasing, upon his interposition in behalf of the Jesuits, the Somasques, and the barefooted Carme∣lites, who refused obedience to an Order of the Senat relating to Processions, against which they pretended priviledg from the Pope: for having re∣presented to the Colledg, that it was no less than laying violent hands upon the Sanctuary, and enter∣prizing against the Authority of the Holy See, for them to encroach, or so much as dispute the Privi∣ledges his Holiness had given, by constraining the Re∣ligious to assist at Processions. The same Duke re∣plyed immediately, that So far were the Senat from Enterprizing any thing against the Ecclesiastical Ju∣risdiction, that the Pope invaded theirs, by concern∣ing himself, and disgusting that the said Senat should Command their own Subjects as they pleased. That the Senat could not Revoke what they so justly had Or∣dained; that he did not think it an encroachment up∣on the Priviledges of the Religious (who were as much under the Protection of their Government as the rest) to oblige them to publick Offices, as Proces∣sions,

&c. in which Bishops, Patriarchs, and Cardi∣nals themselves are every day assistant: and at last he told him the Pope's Orders for Priviledg were good in the Lands of the Church, but not at Venice, where his Holiness had no more right to Command, than the Senat had at Rome.

These two Answers were generally lik'd, because they were as they ought to be, and the second seemed approv'd even at Rome, for the Nunt io not being with the Senat in the first Procession of the Religious upon St. Justin's-day, because he would not countenance that Novelty with his presence; not long after he received Orders to be present at all the rest, to the astonishment of all the World, which rather expected from his Holiness some de∣monstration of displeasure and resentment against that State.

As to the Offices performed by Embassadors to the Colledg, to signify the joy or affection of their Masters, the Doge in those cases has liberty to say as he pleases, those sort of Answers being only Complemental, and draw no ill consequence after them.

The Answer of Duke Andreas Gritti to the Em∣bassador of the Emperor Charles the Fifth, upon the taking Francis I. prisoner, is very remarkable. The Embassador coming to the Colledg full mouth with the news of his Master's Victory, just as the Bishop of Baieux, the French Embassor, was gone out; the Duke, who before had to the said Prelate been condoling the misfortune of the King, re∣plyed with excellent temper, and suitable to a Prince who scorn'd to equivocate; That the Re∣publick of Venice being equally in Amity with both the said Crowns, could not have an equal concernment for both their interests; and according to St. Paul's counsel, rejoyce with those who rejoyce; and mourn with those who mourn.

The Doge being chief in all Councils, 'tis his right to propose every thing to all the Principal Magistrates; he proposes all business of importance to the Grand Council, in which he has a double Voice; to the Pregadi; as the Sages-Grans; the Council of Ten; as the three Capi-Dieci; in which he is something more than the President of the Senat among the Romans, who never sate but in the Senat.

The Credentials of all Embassadors sent by this State to Forreign Courts, are writ in his Name , the Senat allowing him that appearance of So∣vereignty to render him the more Venerable abroad. Yet those Letters are not sign'd by his hand, because 'tis not he who sends the Embassa∣dors, but the Senat, which for that reason causes them to be sign'd by one of the Secretaries, and seal'd with the Arms of the State. And though these Embassadors when they are abroad, direct all their Letters and Dispatches to the Duke, he can∣not open them but in presence of the Council, who quite contrary may open them without him.

All Money is coined in his Name, (which seems another token of his Soveraignty) and they are call'd Ducats; as much as to say, Money coined by the Duke. Yet the Money cannot be properly his Coin, as bearing neither his Image nor Arms; which are the essential conditions of Coin. And if there be the picture of the Duke upon his knees before St. Mark, and putting a Standard into his hand; the humility of that posture cannot be in∣terpreted to signifie the Regency of the Duke; but that is not the Duke, only a man in Ducal Ornaments, representing only the chief Magistrate of that Commonwealth in general. 'Tis true, Duke Nicholas Iron caus'd pieces of Silver to be stamp∣ed with his Image, and they were upon that score

called Irons: But this can be no President, for the said Duke did it by consent of the Senat, to stop the current of false Money, which was then too common in Venice; and this appeared by his Epitaph, Fraudatam pecuniam viva illius Effigie (Resp.) resignavit. And the Dukes Nicolas Mar∣cel, and Peter Moccenigo, who next succeeded him, had not that priviledg, though there are pieces of Silver still to be seen, inscrib'd with their Names. And though Cardinal Contarini, and Jannot, seem to affirm the contrary in these words, Nummi luduntur cum facie ac nomine Principis; that may easily be understood a general picture; both the said Authors correcting themselves afterwards, by leaving out the word (facie) in every place else. I say, those Dukes who otherwise have go∣verned Monarchically, have not stamped any Mo∣ney but according to the Coin of that Prince upon whom they depended; as appears by the Medal of Lewis le Debonnaire, that Monsieur Retan, Councellor in Parliament, caus'd to be gra∣ven, where on one side is to be seen H. Ludo∣vicus Imp. and on the reverse, Venecia.

The Name of the Doge is likewise upon all the Medals and Chains of Gold the Senat gives to their Embassadors, or chief Officers at War; but under his Name are always these two Let∣ters, S. C. for Senatus Consulto, importing, that it is not the Duke, but the Senat that gratifies them. Nor is it the Duke, who Publishes the Edicts, though they begin always with this form, Il Se∣renissimo Principe fa sapere; for that belongs not to him; for if the Publication was by his Au∣thority, it would be expresly in his Name, as it is in the Name of all Soveraign Princes.

In short, at his entrance into any of the Courts or Counsels, all the Magistrates rise and salute

him; but he never rises, nor pulls off his Hat to any man: In which he exceeded the Kings of Sparta, for whom the Ephori never stirred. Om∣nes e sedibus suis Regibus assuegunt. Exceptis Epho∣ris, qui e sellis se Ephoricis non levant. Xenoph. de Rep. Laced.

When forreign Embassadors are admitted to Au∣dience, he rises, but does not uncover; because, say the Venetians, the Corne-Ducale upon his head, is a Symbol of Soveraignty, and the abso∣lute Dominion of that State. And the Duke be∣ing no Soveraign, cannot pull it off as he pleases. But when he has nothing on but his Red-Gown, he may do as he thinks fit.

The Duke has under his Ducal Bonnet a Coyfe of white Linnen, in fashion of a Diadem, like the Headband which the Conservators of their Laws wore at Athens during their Office. Because 'tis the Dukes business to look the Laws be put in execution, by doing that first, which all the Nobles are obliged particularly to do. In this quality it is he goes every month to visit the Courts of S. Mark, exhorting the Judges to ad∣minister Justice; and receiving the Complaints of such as have been wrong'd, in which case he rebukes the Judges severely. Formerly this Vi∣sitation was made every Wednesday; and possibly the custom may come from thence, of paying the Duke his 100 Sequins every Wednesday, as an acknowledgment of his care: But now the day is uncertain, the better to surprize the Judges, and prevent their usual preparation.

All the Ecclesiastical Benefices are in the Dukes Nomination; that is to say, 26 Canons, and a Dean; who is always a Noble Venetian, and cal∣led Primocirio di S. Marco. This Dean depends not upon the Patriarch of Venice, and enjoys E∣piscopal

Prerogatives by vertue of a Bull from Pope Innocent IV. granted to Duke Marin Mo∣rosini about the year 1250. This Deanery is worth 5000 Ducats per ann. besides the Abbey of S. Gal, which commonly goes with it, and is valued at 4 or 5000 Livres per ann. more.

The Church of S. Mark acknowledges no Juris∣diction but the Dukes, who takes possession of it, as the Pope does of that at S. John de Latran. The Primicier, or his Grand Vicar, taking a solemn Oath to preserve the dignity of that Church, and the three old Procurators swearing likewise for the good management of the Treasure.

The Duke is Patron and Protector of the Mo∣nastery delle Vergini, built and founded by Duke Peter Ziani and the Dutchess his Wife, for young Gentlemen of Venice. The Abbess calls him Fa∣ther, and has no Judg but him, not so much as the Patriarch of Venice, much less the three Sopra-Proveditori of the Monasteries; so that if any disorder happens among the Nuns, the Duke alone rectifies, as if he were their Bishop.

He disposes of the little Offices about the Pa∣lace, as the Ushers and others, who are call'd Comandadori del Palazo, lodging in the Palace, and being paid by the Publick.

He has jurisdiction over the Gondeliers, a sort of people that ply upon the sides of the Canals for the convenience of Passengers. He makes Knights at his promotion, and commonly they are Deputies of Towns sent to him to congra∣tulate; or Virtuosi and men of Learning.

He has a kind of Introducer of Embassadors, call'd, il Cavalier del Doge, who from him invites them to his Ceremonies, and conducts them to his Apartments in the Palace. This Officer is always in red. The Duke has another Officer called, Il

Gastaldo del Doge, who is always present in a Pur∣ple Robe at the Execution of Criminals; and gives the signal, by shaking his Handkerchief in the Air, which is as much as to say, No mercy is to be ex∣pected.

In short, his Family is not subject to the Ma∣gistrat des Pompes: His Children are suffered to have their Footmen, and Gondeliers in their own Livery, to attend them in the Town, and to wear Girdles with gold Buckles. So the Elder Sons of the Kings of Sparta, as Sons of Lacedemon, were excused from the common Discipline and Edu∣cation .

Thus have I shewn precisely, in what the Gran∣deur of the Duke of Venice consists. Let us now turn the Medal, and see where lies his Inferiority and Subjection. The Duke cannot stir out of Venice, but by permission of the Councel; other∣wise he incurs the displeasure of the Senat, and exposes himself to a thousand insolencies, against which he can look for no reparation; there be∣ing an express Law that gives liberty to any one to throw stones at him in that case. Out of Ve∣nice he is no more than another Senator; he re∣ceives no publick honour; it not being with him as it was with Pompey, who said, Ʋbi Pompeius, ibi Roma; where he was, there was the Common∣wealth of Rome. On the contrary, the Doge is always where the Seigniory is, but the Seigniory is not always with the Doge: If any disorder should happen where he was abroad, he could not take cognizance of it, nor apply any reme∣dy; it would belong to the Podesta, as being a

publick Officer invested with Authority to that purpose: whereas the Duke would be wholly de∣vested, and as a member cut off from the body, quite incapable of any Function or Office. By this means they take from the Duke all desire of ab∣senting from Venice, which being as it were the Helm of that Government, his Presence is always necessary to manage it, and give Example to the rest of the Nobles.

His Children and Brothers are excluded all the principal Offices of State during his life: they can neither be of the Colledg; of the Council of Ten; Chiefs of the Quarenty Criminal, Avogadors, Ge∣nerals, Proveditors General at Sea, thereby making a just counterpoise of his Power, by debasing his Family: they cannot make Addresses for any Bishoprick, Abby, or other Benefice, to the Court of Rome, nor accept them, though freely offered by the Pope.

In the year 1622 Cardinal Matthew Priuli re∣fused the Bishoprick of Bergamo, to which he was named by Gregory XV, because his Father Duke Anthony was living. Cardinal Frederick Cornaro did the same when the rich Bishoprick of Padua was given him by Ʋrban VIII, who was highly disobliged thereby, and would have had him taken it, in spight of the Laws of his Countrey, and op∣position of the Senat. For the Cardinalship there is particular exception, and the Senat declared it was not comprehended under the word Benefices, at the promotion of the said Cornaro. So that the Duke of Venice may say with Antonius Pius, (though in a different sense,) Postquam ad imperium transivimus, etiam quae prius habuimus, perdidimus. Capit. in Anton. Hence it is that many of the Nobility who have had Dukes of their Family, avoid nothing more than that Honour; and yet

they are forced to accept it, unless they have a mind to be banished, and forfeit their Estates. In this manner they forced the Dukeship upon An∣dreas Contarini during their Wars with Genoa, up∣on Marc-Anthony Trevisan in the last age, and up∣on Francis Cornaro since, who died of pure anger eight days after his Election. That which is more strange is, that this Republick after the constant good service of their Dukes, make no scruple to depose them upon any sickness or infirmity, as if their age or indispositions were sufficient to ex∣tinguish the memory of their former deportment, though never so good. With this ingratitude they recompenced the merits of Francis Foscaro, to whom they would not allow him to die, though he was 84 years of age, and in his Dukeship had acquir'd to his Countrey the Towns of Bressia, Bergamo, Crema, and Ravenna, as is to be seen in his Epitaph. Yet this severity has one good effect upon the Dukes, that in stead of pretending them∣selves ill, to avoid the fatigues of their Office, they will assist at all publick Ceremonies, though they be ready to die. And if he fails at certain Feasts, and appears not with the Senat, 'tis immedi∣ately supposed he is dead, and many times they have no news of his death till they hear of his Funeral.

Formerly several Dukes have resign'd, and laid by their Dignity, to die in repose, as John and Orso Participatio; Peter Orseole; Sebastian, and Peter Ziani; one Maliepiere, and James Contarin: but now 'tis not permitted, the Venetians declaring, That a man born in a Commonwealth, and having share in the Affairs, ought never to be wanting to his Countrey, whilst he is in a condition to serve it: that it belongs not to a particular man to quit his Country, but to his Country to quit him, if it finds him un∣serviceable:

that 'tis laziness and poltronery to retire from the Government to spend our age in ease, when either our tongue or our brain is able to assist it. That if it be dishonourable for a General to repose himself whilst his Army is engaged, it is no less for the chief Person in a State, to retire to take his ease whilst the rest of the members are agitated and busy. If the General of an Army , as Vespasian said, was to die standing, a Duke, who Presides in several Councils, and has so many important Affairs to dispatch, ought as little to repose, or die in any posture but sitting in the Senat: In a word, That † the body of a Com∣monwealth was like a great Family, of which the Duke is the Father, and cannot with any Honour relinquish his relation. And in this manner they op∣posed the resignation of Duke John Cornaro in the year 1628.

The Commonwealth belongs not to the Doge, but the Doge to the Commonwealth. The Common∣wealth may disoblige him with impunity, but he cannot in the least transgress against the Common∣wealth, but he is severely rebuk'd. The best of his actions are effac'd by the least of his faults. He has nothing before his eyes but advertisements and memorials of the duty of his Place, and the great danger he incurs, if he does not behave himself as he promised at his Election; Exigis ut sententiam suam mutent, si talis esse desieris, qualis electus es. Pli. de Trajan. Whatever he sees, tell him silently, Memento esse Rempublicam. His Pa∣lace is a gilded Prison, where he is watch'd only by Spies, and Inquisitors of State who never are seen by him. The very Walls have mouths, and those always open to accuse him, The dreadful Council of Ten lies next to his Apartments, that he may never be without the wholsome remembrance of death that environs him on all sides. And per∣haps

'tis for this reason, that in the Session of the Grand Council, the President of the Council of Ten is placed just over against the Duke.

The Duke is subject to the Ten, as the Kings of Sparta were to the Ephori, and the Kings of Ara∣gon of old to the Sovereign Magistrate they called El Justicia, who sitting upon a Throne, delivered himself to the King in the Name of all the Sub∣jects of that Kingdom, in these words, Nos que valemos tanto come vos, y podemos mas que vos, os hazemos nuestro Rey y Sennor, con tal chi guardeis nuestros fueros y libertades: Sino no, intra vos y nos un que manda mas que vos. We, who are considera∣ble, and have more power than you, do make you our King, with condition that you preserve to us our Pri∣viledges and Freedom: If not, we retract what we have done; for betwixt you and us there is a Person who Commands more than you, viz. El Justicia. If the Venetians use not the same words, they use the same way with their Duke, as he finds by the effects. The Ephori being Judges betwixt the Kings of Sparta and the People, El Justicia betwixt the Kings of Aragon and his People, and the Coun∣cil of Ten betwixt the Doge and the Nobles.

The Lacedemonians allowed their Kings no Guards, not thinking just and well-resolved men as they supposed them to be, should have need of those kind of People, when by observing the Laws, they would be sure of the hearts of their Sub∣jects, who whilst they feared nothing of servitude, would be always solicitous for them . The Re∣publick of Venice takes the same course with their Dukes, as knowing well enough their Persons will be sase, whilst their Administration is honest, and that it is the Interest of the Nobles to look to their preservation, seeing with them they make but one body Politick, that consists chiefly of Noblemen.

In short, the Dukes having no Sovereignty, and the Laws at Venice having the same Force as for∣merly in Lacedemon, (where they were of more value than the King,) there is no necessity they should be attended by Guards, for fear they should use them, upon occasion, to subvert the Government, and change it into a Monarchy, as Pisistrates did at Athens, and Timophanes at Corinth.

The Kings of Sparta had nothing more than the Spartiates, but Title, Precedence, and a double share of their Repasts. The Dukes of Venice have the Title of Serenissimo, Preside in all Councels; and have a moderate Revenue, but such as ex∣ceeds the allowance of any of the other Magi∣strates. The Kings of Sparta eat frequently in publick with the Spartiates, who were the Nobles of that City. The Dukes of Venice retain some∣thing of their Customs, making four Feasts a year, to which all the Nobles are invited, without di∣stinction of poor or rich, ancient or new: for the Duke is the Father of the Family, and caresses all his Children alike, to keep them in a constant and brotherly Amity. These Feasts are made the next day after Christmas-day, on St. Mark's-day, on Ascension-day, and on the fifteenth of June, upon which day a great Conspiracy was discovered in the year 1310.

The Wives of the Kings of Sparta were not treated as Queens, nor allowed any thing for their support from the Publick. The Senat of Venice at this day takes no notice of their Dutchess, and if a Duke be married at the time of his Election, at his own peril, no Revenue is allowed for his Wife, she is only treated as the first Lady, but not as Prin∣cess. 'Tis true, not long since the Venetians Crown'd some of them, that is to say, Julia Dandole Wife to Laurence Priuli, in the year 1557; and N. Mo∣rosini

Wife to Marin Grimani in the year 1595; for whose publick Entry they were at vast expence. But in the next Interregnum, the Inquisitors and Correctors finding the necessity of moderating the Honours of their Women, especially in a Republick where ambition and luxury are very dangerous, by Decree abolished the Custom of Crowning them, that they might not so much as fancy they could ever be Queens.

In the mean time the difference is very great betwixt the Dukes of Venice and the Kings of Sparta. The Kings of Sparta had two sorts of Command, one at home, which indeed was very streight; the other abroad in their Wars, which was more large. The Senat of Venice clip'd the wings of their Dukes in the second point in the year 1645 after the death of Duke Francis Erizza, ordaining that no Duke should be chosen General at Land nor at Sea, nor any of their Brothers or Chil∣dren during their Dukeship. Which serv'd to con∣firm the report at that time, that the Senat ha∣ving found the danger they had pulled upon them∣selves by the large Power they had given to Duke Erizza, had poisoned him as he was ready to de∣part.

The Kings of Sparta had power to dismiss the Embassadors of their Enemies or Allies with po∣sitive Answers. The Doges cannot resolve any thing upon their own heads, nor answer any of the Propositions or Demands of Forreign Mini∣sters, as I have said before. The Kings of Sparta could by their own Authority commence, con∣tinue, or determine a War, reserving to themselves the Soveraign Command whilst it lasted. The Doges can neither begin, protract, nor conclude it. The Kings of Sparta could abrogate old Laws, and establish new; but the Doge of Venice cannot

alter a syllable of what is decreed by the Grand Council and the Senat.

In a word, the Republick of Venice not only de∣tains their Dukes Prisoners in their Palace, en∣compass'd with Spies and Informers, destitute of common divertisements, and divested of all the Authority of Princes; but it daily retrenches their Priviledges, to vilifie them the more. Formerly, the Presents sent them from the Levant, or other Countries where it was the Custom to send them by their Embassadors, belong'd to the Dukes. In the 1668, the Muscovite Embassadors in their return from France, passing by Venice, where they had something to negotiate for the interest of their Master, presented the Doge to the value of Ten or Twelve Thousand Crowns in Sables and other Furrs. The Procurator Andreas Contarin, a Sage-Grand, nearly related to the Duke of that Name, but a mortal Enemy to the Procurator his Son, who had made himself odious to all the Nobles by his abominable avarice; remon∣strated to the Grand Council, That the Presents of the Muscovites ought not to be appropriated to the Doge; for he being no Soveraign, neither the Em∣bassadors nor Presents were sent to him, any more than he sent their Embassadors: Adding, That when their Embassadors carried Presents to Con∣stantinople, it was not at the charge of the Doge, and therefore it was not reasonable that he should have the profit of what belong'd in Justice to the Publick, which defrayed the charge of the Embassa∣dors. And the business coming to a debate, it was solemnly decreed, that for the future the Doge and his Successors should be deprived of that ancient advantage.

When the Doge appears in any publick Proces∣sion or Ceremony, he is magnificently cloathed,

sometimes in Cloth of Gold, sometimes in Cloth of Silver, and sometimes in Scarlet, with the Ducal-Corne. upon his head, the ushers of his houshold marching before him, and two of them carrying his Train: The Captain-Grand marches likewise before him with his Officers, the Secre∣taries of the Pregadi, and Grand-Chancellor with the Golden-Stole, and after him follows the Senat. In this Equipage he draws the Eyes, and forces Veneration from the People, who are always taken with the outward tokens of Grandure. But it is to be observed, the Senat follows not in addition to his Honor, but to participate of what is given him where-ever he goes; believing that if the Duke should receive it alone, he would appear a Soveraign to the People, and to such strangers as were present.

The Venetians like not that their Duke should have too much parts, they believe that would make him less tractable, and give him a Confi∣dence in himself. They had rather have a per∣son of moderate qualifications , who is capable of their affairs, but governable by them, and easily held to his duty. Besides, the Senat (where he has but a single voice like another Noble∣man) † supplies the defects of his understanding. And therefore Duke John Pesaro was no proper man for them, because he knew too much him∣self, to be perswaded by other people, whom for the most part he drew to his opinion by the strength of his arguments: as in the business for the reestablishment of the Jesuites. Nor in∣deed is it necessary a Prince in a Republick, having nothing but the bare name, and being but the shadow of the Senat, should have too large and capacious an Intellect, seeing he is to do nothing of himself; and therefore it was the

Thebans pictured their Prince with his Ears open and his Eyes shut, to signifie it was not his Office to see or determine what was to be done, but to hear, and execute blindly what was con∣cluded by the Senat.

They make him Duke for his life, to render him more Majestick, and like to the Crowned Heads, among whom they are willing he should be reckoned; as also to coax him for the little Power he has, by the Duration of his Dignity: but they choose him always antient, that other pretenders may have hopes to succeed. Besides, old age wanting the Vigor of youth, is not so bold and undertaking.

They are very glad when their Dukes are rich, that they may adorn their dignity, and be an or∣nament to the Publick, which allows them not above 12000 Crowns per annum, half of which is spent in his four annual Feasts: To which may be added the charge of his entrance, which is never well celebrated but by large Gifts to the people thrown among them in Silver in the Pa∣lace of St. Mark; a Custom first introduced by Duke Sebastian Ziani. So that if they have any touch of Generosity and Magnificence, they do often incommode, if not ruine their Families: And that is it the Senat desires, having perhaps no other design in exempting their Children from the penalty of their Sumptuary Laws.

The Administration of their Dukes is looked into after their deaths by three Inquisitors, and five Correctors created on purpose, who always find that either the Duke has abused his Au∣thority, some more some less; or neglected the Publick affairs for the advancement of his Pri∣vate; or else that he has not lived according to his quality. And this canvasing of his Con∣duct

is commonly followed by the condemna∣tion of his Heir in some Pecuniary Mulct; so that their Children cannot enjoy their Inheritance, till they have obliged themselves by Oath to pay what Imposition shall be laid upon them. Thus was the Family of the Duke Peter Loredan charged with a Fine of 1500 Sequins, because the Father had lived too narrowly in his Dukeship. In my time they found the like fault with their Duke, who besides his own parsimony, had a Son who took what-ever he could lay his hands upon, as if to make amends for the old age of his Fa∣ther; which appeared the worse, because the people had been accustomed to the Magnificence of his Predecessors, the Dukes Valier and Pesaro. In a word, the fear of this Inspection into their Management, makes the Dukes and their Chil∣dren cautions what they do, and shuts the door against all their oppression and violence.

And yet this Custom hinders not, but that great Honors are paid to them after their death. Their Funerals are solemnized with great Pomp at the charge of the State. Their Funeral Orati∣ons pronounced formally in the Church of St. Mark; an Honor the Law did not formerly allow, and which began but since the death of Andreas Contarin. They fix upon their Vaults a Scutcheon with their Armes, in memory of their Dukeship, which was introduced at the Obsequies of Duke Marin Morosini. And last of all it is permitted to set up noble and rich Tombes for them. But that which is singular in their Funerals, is, that the Senat attends the Corps in their Robes of Scarlet, a colour far enough from mourning; but they do it to shew, that though their Duke be Mortal their Commonwealth is not: That the perpetuity of their Empire consists in the Body

of the Senat, upon which only depends the Safety of the People. Aeternitas rerum, & mea¦cum vestra salus, incolumitate Senatus firmatur. Tac. Hist. 1. And that it belongs to private, not publick persons to lament, in which they choose rather to satisfy a punctilio of Honour, than to discharge the common duties of Piety and Compassion for the Dead.

And here it is remarkable, that the Hall where the Dukes Corps is exposed, is the same where he receives his first Complements of Congratu∣lation from the Forreign Ambassadors the day he was Crown'd; that the joy of his Advance∣ment, might be tempered by considerations of Death; and that he might look upon the Mag∣nificence and Ornaments of his Dukeship, as the beginning of his Funeral Pomp, and as if like a Victim he was Crown'd but for a Sacrifice. To this end the Grand Chancellor alwayes reflects upon Death, in his Complement when he is put the first day into possession of the Palace of St. Mark: Admonishing, That his Government is not over Subjects, but Fellow-Citizens and † Com∣panions, to be Commanded only by his Example. That the Nobility have made him Duke, not to do as he pleases, but to labour, and charge himself with all the Cares and Troubles of the State. That his Dignity is but an Honourable Servitude ‡, as Antigonus said formerly to his Son. And that his Crown was not a thing of Parade, and Autho∣rity, but of Obligation to his Countrey, and Obedi∣ence to their Laws.

When the Doge is sick, or absent, he is re∣presented by one of the Council called the Vice-Doge, that the Council might never be without a Head. But this Vice-Doge sits not in the Du∣cal Chair, wears not the Bonnet, nor is treated

with the Title of Serenissimo: yet Embassadors di∣recting their speech to him in the Colledg, do give him that Title, but 'tis interpreted to the Table. This Representative replies, like the Duke, to For∣reign Ministers; but puts not off his Bonnet, and keeps the middle-place when he walks.

The Grand Council in the year 1553 made a De∣cree, that in the Audience of Embassadors the Vice-Doge should take his place betwixt the Dean of the Council and the Embassador, who accor∣dingly was removed from the first place on the right hand of the Throne, to a third; which was an injury to the Embassadors, it being clear that the Representative of a Prince ought in Justice to pay them more respects than the Prince himself. But this Decree was rectified the next year, gave the Embassadors their ancient place, and put the Vice-Doge beneath them; yet he was not allowed to salute them with his Bonnet.

The Councellors of the Seig∣niory.

THE present Councellors of State in Venice, are those who formerly were Tribunes of the Isles: and as every Isle had then its Tribune to administer Justice, so now the six Quar∣ters of the City , called Contrade or Sestieri, have each their Councellor, who, according to an Or∣dinance of Duke Orie Malipierre, is to reside per∣sonally in his Quarter. So that a Nobleman whose common Residence is in the Country of St. Mark.

cannot be chosen Councellor of the Castle, St. Paul, &c.

These Lords are called Councellors of the Seig∣niory, because with the Doge they represent the Body of the Commonwealth. They are called like∣wise Consiglieri di Sopra, to distinguish them from the Consiglieri d' Abasso, who Preside in the Qua∣ranty Criminel, in stead of the Seigniory which sate formerly there. And here it is to be understood, that the Office of Councellor that is annual, is dif∣ferently exercised during that time, the Councellors sitting only eight months in the Colledg; the other four, they go down into the Quaranty Criminel, and Preside there: whereas, if they begin in the Chamber, as Consiglieri d' Abasso, they are advanc'd alla Banca di Sopra, or the Colledg.

The Councellors of the Seigniory have two Of∣fices, one publick, the other private. The last is, to Consult with the Duke and three Heads of the Quaranty Criminel such matters as are to be pro∣posed in the Councils. And this they do in the presence of a Secretary called alle Voci, who marks their Votes. To open all Letters directed to the Seigniory, whether the Duke be present or not. To receive all Petitions Cognoscible in the Grand Council; to examine them among themselves, and to tear them in pieces if they do not like them. To grant Priviledges and Exemptions. To appoint Judges to both Parties, when the Controversy is about Jurisdiction: and, in short to resolve when the Council is to be called extraordinarily. The first, that is to say, their Publick Office, is to Pre∣side in all Councils; to dispatch all necessary Or∣ders (during the Interregnum) to the Podestats, General of their Armies, Proveditors at Land or at Sea; and, in a word, to all the Officers of State.

When Relations have any Contest among them, and desire extraordinary Judges, 'tis in the power of the Duke and the Councellors of the Seigniory to appoint them; and the said deputed Judges, by vertue of a Commission confirmed by the Grand Council, determine definitively. This in Venice is called dellegar una Causa: but this favour that prevents a great deal of Charge, especially li Ca∣ratti, or Fees, is not vouchsafed but to Persons of principal Quality, and upon Causes of great im∣portance to the Publick, such remissions giving just occasion to the Magistrates to complain. These Delegates are commonly chosen out of the Senat for the better Authority of their Judgment, and are called Savii del Corpo del Senato.

The Councellors both di Sapra and d' Abasso are always habited in red, both sitting in Council, and walking in the Streets, under penalty of 25 Ducats of Gold for every time they offend. In Winter they wear a Scarlet-Robe with Ducal-Sleeves; and in Summer a Red Watered-Camlet, with a Cloth-bonnet of the same colour, unless their Fa∣thers or Brothers be lately dead, in which case they are permitted to mourn for a month, and du∣ring the Holy-week they are in Black also.

It is forbidden to the Councellors, Heads of the Quaranty Criminel, Sages of the Colledg, and Avo∣gadors, to be present at any Weddings, unless it be of their Children, Brothers. Nephews, Unckles, Fathers in Law, &c. And this Law is founded up∣on two Reasons, one is, lest those Magistrates should seem to encourage by their presence the luxury of the Table and Habits, which are expresly forbidden by the Laws. The other is, because these Lords having direction of the principal Affairs, and the whole care of the Government upon them, the publick Service would be retarded or neglected by

such kind of Festivities, and they hindred in their attendance at the Palace, which might be of dan∣gerous consequence.

When one of these Councellors time is expiring, he swears his Successor (a month before he enters into his Charge) to the observation of his Capitu∣lair, which he reads over to him for his instruction in the duties of his place, shewing him that all De∣crees revokable since five years, or that past only for a certain time, are of no obligation: and if by any impediment the new Councellor has not taken his Oath from his Predecessor, he takes it before the Seigniory, in this form.

J. N. . . . . . Councellor of Venice, of the Quarter of N. . . . do swear and engage in the presence of God, that during the time of my Office, I shall councel and advise sincerely, and without fraud, whatever I think, for the Honour and Interest of the Commonwealth. That I shall not be guilty of jugling or collusion, either to revenge my self upon my Enemies, or advantage my Friend. That when-ever it shall please the most Screne Doge to call me to the Palace, I shall obey him immediately, unless some lawful impediment hin∣ders! and lastly, that I shall observe punctually and faithfully all the Articles contained in my Capitulair, which I shall read, or cause to be read to me every month.

In the Election of Councellors (who are chosen but three at a time) there are two sort of Com∣petitors; one proposed by the Senat, the other by the Mains Electoral of the Grand Council. The first do commonly carry it against the second, either out of the esteem the Nobles have for the choice of the Senat, who do always recommend Persons of worth; or else because of the great num∣ber of Senators, who in the Balotation of the Grand Council do always maintain by their

suffrages, those whom they have Elected in the Scrutiny.

The three Heads of the Qua∣rantie Criminel.

THese three Gentlemen are present in the Col∣ledg to see what is past, as the three Coun∣cellors d'Abasso are in the Quarantie Crimi∣nel to observe what is done in that Chamber. And this Order is kept, to keep the Colledg and Quaran∣tie within the bounds prescribed them by the Laws.

These Heads are in the Office but two months, during which time they are called Excellence, and are habited in Purple.

The Authority of the Councellors is much great∣er than the Authority of these Heads. For any one Councellor may propose any thing to be deba∣ted by the Grand Council or Senat, which the Heads of the Quarantie cannot do, but all three together; so that if two of them be disposed to present any business to the Council, and the third dissents, it cannot be proposed. These Heads are obliged to accuse and prosecute the Avogadoxs, if they find them negligent in holding the Councellors of the Colledg to the observation of their Capi∣tulair, and the Decrees of the Grand Council.

If at the meeting of the Council these three Heads be all of them absent, the business is to be put off till another day; for all the Deliberations and Elections of that day would be void, the Law

requiring that nothing pass in the Grand Council, but with the participation and presence of one of those Heads.

When the three Chiefs of the Council of Ten en∣ter into the Colledg, the Heads of the Quarantie retire, by reason of the Emulation betwixt those two Criminal Chambers.

In the Grand Council these three Counsellors have their place above the Knights of the Golden-Stole, upon another Bench.

Of the Sage-Grans.

THere are six Sages called Grans, because they manage the grand Affairs of the State, of which they are properly the Ministers, and as so ought to have more sagacity and ex∣perience than the common sort of the Nobility. Besides, these Sages being much above those of the Terra-firma, or Sea, (who together with these do make up the Colledg) are called Grans by way of Excellence, and not without reason.

These six Noblemen do meet among themselves to consult and prepare such things as are to be presented to the Senat, which are delivered to the Senat when the Sages have framed and digested them. In this they resemble the Councellors cal∣led by Aristotle, Praeconsultores †. But though they sit, and consult promiscuously together, there is one of them appointed every week, and called for that reason Savio di Settimana, who receives all the Memorials, Addresses and Requests presented to the Colledg, to be carried to the Senat.

'Tis to this Savio di Settimana it belongs to pro∣pose to his Colleagues what is to be debated, and to be determined afterward by the Senat: to an∣swer the Letters of Princes, and the Offices of all Embassadors and Forreign Ministers, but not of his own head, but according as is resolved in the Pre∣gadi.

When an Embassador desires a favour for him∣self or any of his friends, he addresses to these Sages either by his Secretary, or the Consul of his Nation, without troubling himself to go in Person, which he never does, but about his Masters Af∣fairs; if these Sages approve his demand, they present it to the Senat, who commonly encline much to their opinion: but if the Sages think it unreasonable, they excuse themselves for propo∣sing it to the Senat, in the best terms they can. Thus they proceeded with the French Embassador in favour of Count Pirro Gratiani Resident of Mo∣dena, who had a Boat of Wine seized as it entred into the Town.

Though the opinion of these Sages is of as great weight in the Senat, as the opinion of the Coun∣cellors of the Colledg is in the Grand Council; yet 'tis very lawful not only for every Senator, but for every Nobleman present in the Senat, to speak against their advice; for 'tis Reason, not Person, that is of Authority there.

These Sages are in Office but six months, in which time each of them is four times Savio di Settimana, the Law not suffering them to hold it a month together, to moderate their Power by continual change, which interrupts all the measures they might take, if the Office di Settimana was continued for a month.

When their time is expired, they cannot be con∣tinued for the next six months; but after the next

six months they may be chosen again, and come in by a new Election, that is to say, a Nobleman may be a Sage-Grand once every year: yet that happens but seldom, though Duke Francis Dona∣tus and John Pesaro have been Sage-Grans 24 times.

No man can be admitted to this Office till he be compleat 38 years of age, the importance of that Charge, upon which the whole Civil Admini∣stration depends, requiring that the Members be men of more than ordinary accomplishment, and well-vers'd in the Mysteries of Government.

The Procurators of St. Mark desire this Prefer∣ment with much earnestness, thereby adding Au∣thority to their Dignity, which has more of Title than Power.

Formerly the Sage-Grans managed and repor∣ted the Affairs of the Terra-firma as well as the Sages of the Terra-firma, but of late that Order has been changed, to lessen the Authority of the first, and to advance the latter.

The Ordinary Embassadors sent by this State to the Emperor, are always stiled Sage-Grans in their Credentials, though perhaps they have not gone thorough that Office, nor cannot before their re∣turn. And this is a distinction the Senat puts be∣twixt their Embassadors to the Emperor, and their Embassadors to Kings, which Embassadors have only the Title of Sage-Grans de Terra-firma.

The Sage-Grans are not chosen like the rest of the Magistrates, by the Grand Council, but by the Pregadi, who elect three at a time, every three months. To these it belongs to con∣voke the Senat, as it does to the Councellors of the Colledg to assemble the Grand Coun∣cil. In Winter their Habit is a Purple-Robe of Cloth: in Summer, a Watered-Camlet of the same colour, with Ducal-sleeves.

The Sages de Terra firma.

THere are five Sages called Sages de terra firma, created first about the year 1340, after this Republick had acquir'd la Marca Trevigiana. One of them is call'd Sanio alla Scrit∣tura; whose business it is to List Soldiers, to Mu∣ster them, and to Continue or Cashier them. He is treated with upon all Levies of Men: He reports to his Colleagues, and with them deli∣berates what is to be proposed to the Colledg: He is Judge in Appeal of all Sentences passed, either within the City of Venice, or without, against any Souldier belonging to that Common∣wealth, and determines definitively both Civil and Criminal Matters relating to the Souldier.

There is another of these Sages called Savio Cassiere, who orders the payment of the Soul∣diers, and all others who have money to re∣ceive of the Commonwealth, and nothing is paid without an Order signed by this Sage.

The three other have neither Title nor Business peculiar, only they consult jointly with the said two, whose places they supply in case of absence or sickness, but with the Title of Vice-Sage Cas∣siere, Vice-Sage Scrittura: Their Office continues only for six months like the Sages-Grans. In Winter they wear their Robe of Purple Cloth, and in Summer a Black watered-Camlet, with wide Sleeves: They are chosen likewise by the Pregadi, but without deliberative voices, in which they are much inferior to the Sages-Grans, and yet they have the Title of Excellence given them:

The Sages des Orders.

THere are likewise Five Sages commonly called Sages des Orders, who are young Noblemen of Principal Quality; admitted into the Colledg, not to deliberate for they have no voices, but to hear, and adapt themselves to the Government by the example of the other Sages, whom they respect as their Masters; and therefore when they speak to the Colledg, they are obliged to be standing and uncovered. 'Tis probable upon that account they are called Sa∣ges des Orders, because they are to obey the Orders of the Sages Grans, and Sages de Terra Firma, who have Power to exclude them from their respective Assemblies, when any affair of im∣portance is before them that requires their Mi∣nistry: Whereas the Sages des Orders have no pri∣viledg to exclude the other Sages from their Consultations, nor to exclude them from their Maritime transactions which are all under their Cognizance, and therefore they are called most properly Sages de Mer.

When present at the Consultations of the Sa∣ges Grans, and Sages de Terra firma, they may modestly give their advice; but their advice not being deliberative, nor proposable to the Senat, the Secretary does not enter it, unless one of the Sages-Grans or Terra firma approving their motion, ownes it for his own, and then it is Registred in the Secretaries Roll under the name of the said Sage, to be Baloted in the Pregadi; according to the Custom of the Lacedemonians;

where the Ephori caused to be pronounced by some person of authority and desert, the Advice that another Citizen of less quality proposed, when they thought the proposition was for the advantage of their State, thereby preventing the rejection of good Counsel upon prejudice to the Author. But when Affairs of Sea are before them, these Sages have deliberative Voices, as the other Sages have.

This Office was formerly one of the highest and most important in the Commonwealth: But since the Venetians extended in Lombardy, and be∣gan to relish the delights of the Terra firma, they neglected their Sea-Affairs so much that the Sa∣ges de Mer, who before were respected according to the greatness of their Imployment, lost all their Credit in a moment †: In so much that they put into those Places only young Gentlemen, who ha∣ving little experience are received into the Col∣ledg to be indoctrinated; and therefore they wil∣lingly give place to the Sages de Terra firma, whose share in the Government is so great.

These Sages are chosen likewise for six Moneths by the Senat, in which they have their places du∣ring their Office. Their Robe is Purple with streight Sleeves.

Though this Office be of no great Power, it is mightily sought after by the young Nobility, it being a step to greater Preferment, if they know how to Conduct: Otherwise it is a Rock

upon which many miscarry that have not that Aptitude, or Propensity to Business, for there they are exposed to the Observation of wise and penetrating people, who do them good or hurt afterwards, according to the Impressions they re∣ceiv'd of them: One Alexander Contarin a Sage des Orders, would needs speak in the Colledg with∣out standing up, contrary to common practice in that case; desiring to see the Part, or Law by which standing was required; But he under∣stood afterwards to his cost, the Obedience he ought to his Superiours. And here let me add by the by, That in Venice, as well as antiently in Lacedemon, there are many Laws unwritten, unless it be in the Hearts and Memories of the Citizens, upon whom the example of their An∣cestors have more effect and influence than all the Writings in the World, good Manners being much better than good Laws . Besides, it is indecency and too much forwardness in young Men to enquire into the Institution of their Laws †, and demand Reasons for them. And in Sparta this Curiosity was expresly forbid, lest it should be used as a pretence to their Dis∣obedience, Si quaerere singulis liceat, pereunte ob∣sequio, etiam imperium intercidit. Tac. Hist. 1.

Thus have I shewn all the Magistrates of which the Colledg subsists, and I have treated of them together, for that reason, without consi∣dering their respective Ranks in the Common∣wealth. Let us now pass to the Procurators of St. Mark, which is the second Dignity in that State.

The Procurators of St. Mark.

THere was antiently but one Procurator of St. Mark, called Procurator Operis B. Marci, because he had inspection over the building of that Church; and this seems to sup∣port the opinion of those who believe that Of∣fice to have been Created by Duke Peter Orseole, the first of that name, by reason he began to rebuild the Ducal Chappel, which had been burned under Peter Candien his Predecessor. Be it as it will, Bartelemi Fiepole Elected 1049, under Prince Dominick Contarin is the first to be found in the Archives, where it appears that there was but one Procurator, till the year 1231; at which time Philip Memme being sent Embassador to the Emperor Baldwin II. at Constantinople, Peter Dandole was chosen, that the City might not be left without a Procurator: so that at the return of the said Memme was the first time two Pro∣curators are mentioned to be together: Some will have it, that Duke Sebastian Ziani having ordered by his Will, that the Revenue of the Lands he left to the Church of St. Mark should be annually distributed to the Poor by the Pro∣curator, it was thought unfit the disposition of so much Money should be intrusted to one man, lest thereby he should insinuate with the people, and use them in some dangerous Designe; and therefore to prevent that inconvenience, the Ve∣netians had chosen another Procurator to see the Will of Ziani executed: But it appears by se∣veral Manuscripts in the Library of St. Mark,

that under the three Dukes who succeeded after Sebastian Ziani, there was but one Procurator, and that it was upon occasion of the absence of Phi∣lip Memme, a second was created, as is men∣tioned before,

The Riches of St. Mark being well increased since that time, the Councel chose in the year 1258, Mark Sorance for a third. Procurator, and divided the Business and Advantages betwixt them; charging the First with the Care and Government of the Ducal Church: The Second with the disposal of such Legacies as were left to it by such as lived on that side the Grand Canal: And the Third, with whatever was left to it by such as lived on the other side of the said Canal: which two Persons were called like∣wise Commissaries di qua, e di la. And in the year 1261, a Fourth Procurator was made in the Person of James Molin who was Colleague to the First, and writ thus, Ego N. Procurator Ope∣rum B. Marci, not Operis, for the building was grown too great and Magnificent.

But the Republick finding this Dignity much sought after, and that it would furnish them with a way of gratifying their Subjects without any Expence; In the year 1319 they Created Ni∣cholas Tailer, and Marin Foscarin a Fifth, and a Sixth Procurator, associating them with the Se∣cond and Third, who had no Colleagues, and giving them the keeping of all their Charters and Re∣cords. These Six Procurators were divided into three Chambers, called commonly Ridotti di Su∣pra, di Citra, and di Ʋltra.

In the year 1442, Three more were made, viz. Lewis Loredan, Paul Tron, and Francis Bar∣barigue, assigning to the First the Chamber di Supra, to the Second the Chamber di Citra, and

to the Third the Chamber di Ʋltra: so that each Chamber had three Procurators, all of them reteining the Title of Procurators of St. Mark, though only those di Sopra were intrusted with the administration about the Ducal-Chappel.

This last Creation was attended with a Decree by which the Grand Council ascertain'd the Num∣ber of Procurators, and confined them to Nine, declaring that no Person whatever should be pro∣posed, nor admitted into that Order, till after the Death of some one of those Nine who were at that time in possession of the said Dignity. That is to say,

James Trevisan	Di Sopra,
Mark Mobin
Lewis Loredan
Mark Foscare	Di Citra.
Andrew Contarin
Paul Tron
Stephen Contarin	Di Ʋltra,
Paul Correr
Fran. Barbarigue

In those dayes the Procurators were made on∣ly for their Merits, but the affairs of the Com∣monwealth changing their Face afterwards by the War of Cambray which exhausted it, and cost them Five Millions of Gold, the Council of Ten made two Decrees, one of the ninth of May, the other of the first of June 1516: by virtue of which, Six Noblemen, viz. Lewis Pisani, George Eme, Franc. Fossare, Laurence Loredan, Lewis Molin, and Jerome Justinian were for a

Sum of Money added to the rest of the Pro∣curators . But with condition that no more should be Created till the said Company should be reduced to the determinate number of Nine; from which notwithstanding the said Council thought fit to digress by another Decree of the 26 of March 1522, which Decree was presently followed by the Election of Three other Procu∣rators for their Money: so that the number of Extraordinaries was equal to the Ordinaries un∣der Anthony Grimani, and under Andrew Grima∣ni who succeeded him, they were increased to six or seven more.

This exorbitant number of Procurators was af∣terwards by the death of several of them re∣duced to Nine, whom the Council declared Pro∣curators in Ordinary, though of the Nine Six were Extraordinary. But in the year 1570, the Republick being at Wars with the Turk, was forced for want of Money to sell that Dignity again to Six several Gentlemen, which since they have continued to do in all necessities of their State, and particularly in their last War in Candia, which continued 25 years, for never was there seen so many Procurators as then. Du∣ring the Siege of Candia there were no less than Forty, some of them being of the New Nobility paid 70000 Ducats for their Places, whereas the Antient paid not above 30000 at most: The Commonwealth making it a Maxim to favour the Antient Nobility, and to squeeze the New, as having more juice for the generality than the other.

But of all these Procurators there are only Nine in Ordinary, called by the People Procu∣rators par meriti, whose Places are filled up af∣ter their Deaths, according to the Decree in the

year 1572. For when any of these Nine are dead, the Bell called la Trottiere (designed only to assemble the Grand Council) is rung, and the Defunct is not Buried till his Successor be cho∣sen; to prevent Disorders that may be caused by multitude of Competitors.

The new Procurator appoints a day for the Solemnity of his Entry, according to antient Cu∣stom, and all his Relations and Friends come home to his House to attend him, first to the Church of St. Mark, where he hears Mass, accompanied by the antient Procurator, who in Honour to him, gives him the Right-hand that day: He is followed by the rest, as also by the Senators, and other Gentlemen invited, who march two and two in their Scarlet Robes.

Mass being done, he swears upon the Evan∣gelists to observe exactly his Capitulaire, to pro∣mote with all his power the Worship of God, and the Advancement of the Publick interest; after which he enters into the Colledg, where having saluted the Seigniory three times, he goes up to the Councellors Seat, and places him∣self next under the last of the three Chiefs of the Quarantie Criminel. The rest of the Procu∣rators place themselves above the Sages-Grans; and the rest of the Nobility without Order, as they please themselves. There it is he acknow∣ledges the great Honour done him by the State, in whose name the Doge replies, commending modestly his Parts, or his Services, wishing him long enjoyment of his new Dignity. After this, he receives the Keys of the Chamber designed for him, which are presented to him in a Purse of Crimson-Velvet by one of the Gastaldes, or Farmers of the Company: Then he takes another Oath upon an old Record the Grand Chancellor,

holds in his hand to that purpose, and so departing from the Colledg, he takes possession of his Charge.

Formerly these Procurators were in so great esteem quite thorow Italy, that from all parts they sent their young Gentlemen to Venice, to be brought up in pusillage under them: and several Princes and great Persons falling suddenly ill in their passage that way, committed all that was most precious and valuable about them, to their custody, as Persons above all covetousness or de∣ceit. So that this Magistrate was instituted partly to undertake the tuition of Orphans; to settle the Affairs of those who had no Guardians; to regulate the Estates of those who died Intestate, or with∣out Issue; to see the Wills of other Persons per∣formed; and, in short, to keep good Order and Decorum betwixt Family and Family.

Upon this score it was that all the Procurators were excommunicated by the two Nuntio's sent on purpose to Venice by Pope John XXII, in the year 1322, to recover such Moneys as had been left to the Apostolick Chamber by certain Mer∣chants Trading into the Levant; to the most part of whose Wills, the said Procurators being left Executors, they had refused to pay the said Mo∣ney to the said Prelats, upon pretence that they would keep it for the Children, whose Fathers had never left it to the Pope, but in fear of being damn'd if they restored not as much as the prin∣cipal amounted to of all the Goods they had car∣ried of their own into the Levant. For the Monks and the Friers had put it into their heads when they were dying, without so doing they were not capable of Absolution. And if this Restitution should accrew to the profit of the Pope, as by a Bull of Clem. V. 1307, it would manifestly re∣dound

to the destruction of their Families, and the ruine of the Venetian Trade, had not the Senat interposed for the prevention of so great an evil.

These Procurators have the care and direction of the publick Alms, and can dispose of them as they please, either to Hospitals, Monasteries un∣endowed, poor Criminals, discharge of Debtors, or Redemption of such as are Subjects of that Commonwealth, and in captivity to the Turk. So as properly these Procurators are the common Fa∣thers of all People in distress.

The Procurators are never sent Embassadors in Ordinary; in whick thing the Republick receives considerable prejudice by the multitude of Pro∣curators advanced to that Dignity for their Money, who might otherwise be useful to their Country, and appear with lustre in the Courts of Forreign Princes, were they not adorned with a Robe that exempts them: for the Senat wanting many times Persons that are rich and powerful (like the Pro∣curators) to supply those Embassies, are constrain'd to serve themselves with such Noblemen as being low in their Fortunes, would ruine themselves ab∣solutely in the very necessary Expence, and dis∣honour their Character if they should not.

They have their Palace, as I said before, in the Place of St. Mark; but because there is room only for six, (their old Houses being inhabited only by Citizens) the Commonwealth allows the rest a Pension of 60 Sequins, till there be a place vacant, to which each of them comes in his turn, as well the Procurator created for his Money, as he that is preferr'd for his merit, according to the Order of their reception.

They have likewise their Council-Chamber in St. Mark, where they meet every Tuesday, Thursday

and Saturday. And because the Library is near those Chambers, they have the direction thereof, and the nomination of the Ducal-Chairs, as they call them, established for the publick teaching of Philosophy, Law, and Physick. The first is always supplied by a Nobleman, with a Pension of 500 Ducats; and in my time it was John Babtisto Con∣tarini a Senator. The other two are supplied by Citizens of Venice, with Pensions likewise from the Publick.

The University of Padua is under the direction of two Procurators, called Reformatori dello studio di Padua, and their Office resembles the Office of the Provost of Sorbon. It belongs to these Refor∣matori to take notice of all Books Printed in that State, and to take care they be not exposed to sale, till the Stationers have given such Copies as are to be put into the publick Libraries.

The Dignity of Procurator is for life, yet some∣times the Senat presumes to degrade them: the last Age furnishes us with two Examples, the one in Anthony Grimani, who was restored after∣wards, and created Doge: the other two in James Sorance, who was deprived of that Honour, and banished into Istria. And of late years Francis Morosini was in a fair way of being treated in that manner, though the Grand Council had given him the Robe with excessive testimony of the satisfa∣ction they received in his Services, creating in par∣ticular favour for him, a tenth place for the Pro∣curators by Merit; which had never been known before.

The Procurators are habited in Black or Violet, with Ducal-sleeves, and the Stole black: but if they be Sages-Grans, they wear them of Purple. Upon their grand Ceremonies, as on the day of their Entry, the Feast of St. Mark, and some

others, they put on a Robe of Crimson-Velvet, and their Stole of Gold, if they be Knights.

Next to the Procurators are the Decemviri, cal∣led commonly the Council of Ten.

Of the Council of Ten.

THis dreadful Council was at first only a Cham∣ber of Justice erected for finding out the accomplices in the famous Conspiracy of Bajamont Fiepole, but not many years after it was continued and made perpetual to avoid the cla∣mours of the People, who murmured, and were ready to Mutiny every time it was renewed.

In the first age of its establishment, its Autho∣rity extended not far; for the Quarantie Criminel which is much ancienter, judged in all Criminal matters, and in several other things. But by de∣grees the Ten rendred themselves so considerable, that by their address they got the cognisance of all Crimes against the States, as Seditions, ill-Admi∣nistrations, Coining of false Money, Assassinations committed by Noblemen, Sodomy, and sometimes of Heresy it self. Nay, they stretched their Au∣thority so far as to revoke and null the Decrees of the Grand Council; and to negotiate Leagues Of∣fensive and Defensive with Forreign Princes un∣known to the Senat, which they did upon certain Emergencies, and in a juncture of time properer for Execution than Deliberation. And in this they resembled the Roman Dictator, who in time of publick calamity, had all the Power of the State in his hand, with Suspension to the Power of the Senat.

Nor do we want Instances of several Nego∣tiations undertaken and perfected by the Council of Ten, in defiance of the whole Pregadi. Witness the Peace they concluded with Antonio Soderini, and John Baptista Rodolfi, Florence Embassadors, who could make no advance with the Senat of Ve∣nice. And this Peace was a Coup d'Et at, Bajazet the Second declared War against them not long after; which if the Florentines could have fore∣seen, or if the Conclusion had been protracted but for some few weeks, 'tis most certain the Floren∣tines would never have complied, unless upon bet∣ter Conditions, as knowing the Venetians would have been forced to their own terms, lest other∣wise they should have been engaged in two Wars at one time.

But at present the Authority of the Ten is re∣strained to Criminal Causes, and as there is no Court in the World where the Judges proceed with more severity against Persons accused, it will not be amiss to say something of their Methods in this place.

After the three Capi-Dieci, who are the month∣ly Presidents, have received the Depositions of the Witnesses in Writing; and have perfectly instructed themselves in all the circumstances of the Fact, they cause the accused Person to be secured pri∣vately, and examined by the Chief for that Week; whose Answers are taken by a Clerk or Register, and by him communicated with his two Col∣leagues, and their advice taken thereupon; after which, the Cause is carried by them to the Coun∣cil, where they all three do manage the Accusation against the Malefactor, urging his Confession against him; and this they do, whilst the poor Criminal is not allowed to plead his own Cause, nor to retain Counsel, nor to see any of his Friends or Relations,

or so much as to receive a Letter from them. He has only one remedy, and that is, one of his Judges sometimes, touched with compassion for the Per∣son accused, or perhaps convinced of his Innocence, will take his Cause into his protection, and defend it against the Accusers, but though these kind of good Offices happen now and then, they are sel∣dom effectual. For this Council is so inclinable to severity, the least offence in matter of State is un∣pardonable, and very appearance passes for a crime.

'Tis said that in Athens, Draco writ all his Laws in Blood; the same may be said as justly of this Council, in which Clemency and Mercy are Virtues unknown; where jealousy is incurable, distrust eternal; where great reputation is dangerous; great services odious, and commonly requited with either banishment, or death. The Maxims of this Council are these.

That not only Crimes against the State are never to be pardoned, but even appearances are to be punish∣ed, and that they must proceed to punishment before they examine the offence. That in those things sha∣dow is to be taken for substance, and possibility for matter of fact; that humane Prudence is not to be contented that things are not yet hapned, but must or∣der things so as they never may happen; that the Publick is to prevent what it fears, at their Cost who gave the apprehension, without expecting till the mis∣chief occur, there being no greater crime than to be suspicious to ones Prince, and to disturb his Tranquili∣ty. That if in other Affairs it be discretion to ima∣gine the ill-consequences less than they will be, in mat∣ters of State, and things relating to its quiet and re∣pose, 'tis not only prudent but necessary to imagine them greater: that injustice to private Persons is not to be considered where advantage accrews to the Pub∣lick;

because, say they, 'tis impossible to Govern without injury to somebody. To which we may add another of their Maxims no less pernicious, and that is; That 'tis wisdom to rid themselves of any body they have disobliged by their wrongful suspicions, lest his resentment puts him upon revenge, and the fear of a second injury tempts him to secure himself, though by the subversion of the Government.

By these Principles this Council is become so odi∣ous to the Nobles, that they have tried all ways imaginable to supplant them. In the year 1628 the Family of the Cornari and their Party push'd it so far in revenge of the Quarrel of George Cor∣naro the then Duke's Son, who had been proscribed and degraded by the Ten, that their Court would have been certainly suppressed, had it not been prevented by an old Seignior; who in the Grand Council remonstrated, That the safety of the State depended upon the continuation of that Council, which kept the Nobility in their duty, by fear of Cor∣rection, and the People in obedience by the goodness of their Example. That to suppress that Tribunal, which was the svpport of their Laws; the knot of their Concord; the foundation of their Equality; their defence against Tyranny; and the true balance that kept all Parties in a poise, would be no less than to introduce Confusion, Licentiousness, and Impunity. That nothing rendred their Government more Ex∣cellent and Conspicuous, than to see their Nobility obnoxious to the severest of their Courts, and their Authority check'd by their fear, whilst those in greater Power were in greatest Awe, seeing them exposed to the rigour of the Laws as well, if not more, than particular Persons. That those who endeavoured to abolish them, were People who designed to be Crimi∣nal, if they were not so already. That they were to be separated frrm the body of the State, if they

could not submit to a civil life, or subject themselves to the Laws, which put them upon a happy necessity of doing well; and, in short, That it would be dis∣honourable to suffer the clamours of a few Citizens to prevail for a Change so much to the prejudice of the State.

But however the said Council is continued to this day, 'tis very displeasing to the Nobility; who cannot hear it mentioned without tremb∣ling.

In the year 1670 the Grand Council proceeding to the Election of the Ten, (who are renewed eve∣ry year in the Month of August) all those that were proposed, were rejected two Sundays to∣gether, and in the third there was only Seignior Angelo Emo who passed in the Balotation: nay the ill-humour was carried on so far, that some of the Electors named either in contempt or despight, some of the new Nobility, and among the rest a Portugal called Fonseca, of Jewish Extraction, knowing well those kind of People would never get their just number of Voices. For that Court, which is as it were the Parliament and la Fournelle of the Nobles, has been always supplied by the worthiest and best qualified Gentlemen.

Nevertheless this Council is it, upon which de∣pends the whole Oeconomy of that Government: this Council is the Corner-stone of the State, not to be stirred without destruction to the whole Fa∣brick. It is the Copy of the famous Temple the Ephori of Sparta erected to Fear, as the only Deity, was able to restrain men, and keep them to their duty: In a word, 'tis a Virgin full of eyes, and all of them incessantly watching for preserva∣tion of the common Liberty, insomuch that it is obvious when-ever the Council of Ten is dissolved, confusion and disorder will quickly follow in the

State, as hapned to the Commonwealth of Sparta upon suppression of the Ephori, who, as Aristotle tell us, were the very Nerves of that flourishing Aristocracy.

The Quarantie Criminel labours upon all occa∣sion for suppression of the Council of Ten, as those who have robbed them of their principal Autho∣rity; for before the Creation of these Decemviri, 'tis manifest the cognisance of all Crimes belonged to that Chamber, and after that dissolution it would return into the former Channel. For this reason Francis Contarini one of the Heads in the year 1628 spake with such heat against them, that most of the Nobility cried out, Via via li Dieci, away with the Dieci, and others spared not to salute them with Vaga in mal' hora quel Consiglio de Dieci, li ven∣ga la rabbia. May the Council of Ten never prosper: the Devil them, and many other imprecations, that shew well enough what kindness the Nobility had for that Court. In effect, the Rigour of the Coun∣cil of Ten has been so great, there is scarce a No∣ble Family but produces instances of it, and many of them written in Blood. And if there be not often seen Noble Persons hanging by the heels be∣twixt the Pillars of St. Mark , 'tis not that they are grown more humane or compassionate, but they have found out new and more private ways, that the Nobility may not lose their Veneration with the People, nor they think themselves go∣verned by Profligates, as they would do if they should see those objects too oft. These ways are by drowning them in the night in the Canal Or∣fano, and others already too well known in the World.

These secret Executions are too frequent at Ve∣nice, and if People vanish in a moment, 'tis by the Conjuring of the Council of Ten: this is the silent

way they take to prevent the Murmurs of the Nobles, who alwayes judg amiss of the Decrees of the said Court, from a constant aversion they bear to their Jurisdiction. This is the way they take to sweeten and cajole the Parents and Re∣lations of the Defunct, as if they did it to pre∣vent the infamy that would adhere to the Fa∣mily, if the Execution should be publick: And yet for all their tenderness, this Caution is never used but where the business is doubtful, for if the Evidence be clear, and the Person accused, palpably Guilty, no such Complement is used; but he runs through all the formes of Justice, and is attended to the Gibbet with all manner of Solemnity. There is no Appeal from the Judg∣ment of the Council of Ten, no more than of old from the Roman Decemviri; nor can their Arrest be modified, or altered, but by themselves, or their Successors: Only sometimes the Avogadors might suspend the Execution, provided it was not in matter of State, for in that Case no suspen∣sion was endured.

'Tis a dangerous matter in this Council to in∣tercede for any one questioned for practising a∣gainst the State, 'tis no less than to bring a man into suspition, and exposing him to the Malefactors misfortunes. And therefore the Nobility are ma∣ny times seen to forsake their nearest Relations upon those occasions, and to Prosecute them se∣verely, to clear themselves of being accompli∣ces. Fear overpowers their humanity , and the stronger the Accusations are, and the more dan∣gerous the Condition of the Party, the weaker

is their Compassion, and the fainter their Inter∣cession. Every Mans Tears, and Sighs are ob∣served, and 'tis little less than being Criminal, to bewail the Condemnation of another.

All Magistrates imployed abroad, as Generals, Proveditors, General at Sea, Podestates, Governours, and all other Officers are responsible for their Conduct to this Council, where all Complaints are received readily against them. There it is their Actions are canvased, and controlled: There their Pride is humbled, their Extortion punish∣ed, and their Misdemeanors inevitably chastised. There Generals of Armies are handled like Slaves, and Banishment, Imprisonment, Degradation, and Death, common Rewards. For if they lose but an handful of Ground, though they resisted ne∣ver so well, they are sure to be guilty, Inno∣cence being never to be pleaded, where the State has received a loss. And I remember I was told by a wise Man of that Countrey, that the Bragadin might as well have been Flea'd by the Turks, after the Surrender of Famagosta, as by the Council of Ten, who would be sure to Hang him,

No man's Conduct is so exact and regular, but these severe and scrutinous Judges will pick a hole in it, though it be but for faults of omis∣sion: And those Persons who escape out of their clutches, and come off with a bare reprimand, pass in the world for men of exemplary Pro∣bity, and incomparable Wisdom. No mans Inno∣cence is doubted that is acquitted by that bloody Tribunal: where Parents have been known to condemn their own Children to Death; and a∣mong the rest, the Doge Anthony Venier , who with great difficulty was prevailed upon to change the Sentence of Death that he had gi∣ven

against his Son, into perpetual Imprisonment.

Two of the three Inquisitors of State are ta∣ken out of this Council, and the third out of the Councellors of the Colledg. The Lords of this Council are so absolute in their Power, they can cause the Duke himself to be drowned, or strang∣led without the knowledg of the Senat, that is to say, if all Three of the Capi-Dieci agree to the Execution; Otherwise all the Ten are to be cal∣led. They have Persons in pay, who are obliged to keep a Register of all the Words and Actions of the considerable Noblemen and Citizens, as was practised in the time of the Emperor Ti∣berius. And so far are they from discouraging Informers, that they invite them by Rewards. Many times honest men are treated at that rate, who are not sensible of their own guilt by a∣ny thing but their Imprisonment or Exile †. So that with them every thing is to be feared, e∣very thing is to be suspected: Silence, Discourse, Company, Solitude, even the Walls themselves. Congressus, Coiloquia, notae, ignotaeque aures vitari, etiam tectum & parietes circumspectantur. Ann. 4.

If any man, speaks ill of the Government, he is pack'd away in the night, and drowned in the Canal Orfano. If it be a Forreign Nobleman, or Gentleman, he is commanded out of the State within 24 hours upon pain of Death. This they practised upon a French Officer for charging them publickly with Ingratitude. Tiberius was of Opinion that People were not to be restrained in their Converse at the Table, and moved the Senat upon several occasions, that they would not be severe in matter of Words . But in

Venice (though a Republick) they are not so favourable to the People; the Council of Ten ha∣ving stretched their Law against Treason, to Ver∣bal Expressions, betwixt which and matter of Fact they make very little difference.

The Inquisitors of State have their Nocturnal accesses to the Palace of St. Mark, into which they enter as they please by private ways, to which they only have Keys; and the Duke is more afraid to see them, than to be seen by them: They can pass if they please to the ve∣ry Bed of the Duke; They can enter his Clos∣set, open his Cabinets, read his Letters, and take an Inventory of what they think fit, whilst nei∣ther himself, nor any of his family, dare pretend to observe them: And his Children, Brothers, and Nephews are excluded the Council of Ten, only to give more liberty of Complaints and Infor∣mation against him.

When a Gentleman is suspected, and proof is wanting for his Condemnation in the usual formes, to charge him with Treason, supplies all defects, and stops the mouths of his Relations . (For Treason is always the Crime of those that have no other †.) They dispatched the Senator Anto∣nio Foscarini ‡, in half a days time, and his Death was sooner known than his Imprisonment.

A remarkable instance of the jealousy of Common∣wealths, where extraordinary reputation, is extraor∣dinary danger: For that was all his Offence, though he was accused of Treason, which after his Death was known to be false. They do sometimes

make use of a mans own Servants to rid them∣selves of his Master; and afterwards to keep it the more secret, the Instrument comes to be drown'd, or stab'd , whose presence would seem to reproach them by what they had done. A fit recompence for a Treacherous Servant. And when an eminent Informer comes to be discover'd to the World, they not only use him no farther, but they Sacrifice him presently to the publick discontent, as Tiberius did †, to shew that he was the cause of all their Injustice; by which means they pacify the indignation of the irritated Fa∣milies.

Thus did they proceed against Foscarini's Ac∣cusers, though they decreed extraordinary Ho∣nours to his Memory, as willingly consenting he should be reckoned among the gods, whom they cannot endure among men: Sit Deus modo non sit vivus. They have likewise another Maxim a∣mong them, to connive at many faults they might easily prevent, to render them more in∣famous whom they design to destroy.

All those who are taken with Fire-Arms a∣bout them, are punished with Death by the Coun∣cil of Ten, without Mercy. In the year 1671, the fourth of January, John Moccenigue, a Noble∣man, having fired two Pocket-Pistols upon Ni∣colas, and Sebastian Foscarini, two other Noble∣men, at that time in a Lodging in the Opera of St. Saviour, was degraded of his Nobility, pro∣scribed, and condemned to have his Head chopped off betwixt two Pillars of St. Mark, when-ever he should be taken, the said Council Promising

2000 Ducats to those who should should take him alive, or kill him within the Territory of that State, and 4000 if he were taken, or killed out of the State: Granting him moreover who should either kill, or apprehend him, Pardon for any Nobleman or Citizen that should be Guilty of Trea∣son (though it was never done before in Venice, where Crimes of that nature were always un∣pardonable) all the Goods of the said Mocceni∣gue, movable and immovable, present and to come, (not excepting his Fiefs, nor what was commit∣ted to him in trust) were Confiscated: All Con∣tracts passed by him six Months before his Condem∣nation, were Cancelled and declared void; with strict charge to the Avogadors to make exact Inquisiti∣on according to their Consciences, that the Goods of the said Criminal might not be diverted nor im∣bezled, with prejudice to the Publick. Command was given to the Commonalty of all Villages, Towns, and Cities under the Jurisdiction of that Commonwealth, to sound the Toxin to take him living or dead, under penalty of the Gallies or Dunge∣on to such Officers as should be wanting in their du∣ties. Forbidding likewise all Noblemen, his Rela∣tions, or Friends, to hold correspondence, or com∣merce with him by Letters or Discourse, or to give him any assistance either at home or abroad, upon pain of Confiscation of their Estates. Moreover, all Offenders against this Decree, who were not Noblemen, nor Citizens of Venice, should serve ten years together in the Gallies, with Irons on their Legs; and if they were incapable of working, they should lye as long in the Dungeon. Nay the Ar∣rest went farther, and declared, That the said John Moccenigue should never be indemnifyed, not by discovering things of never so great importance to the State; not by ingaging to bear Armes per∣petually

in the States service. Not by promising to take or kill any other Offender, equal, or supe∣riour to himself. That he should never obtain any favour, suspention, alteration, modification, compen∣sation, or other diminution of the Tenor of this De∣cree, though Forreign Princes should intercede with never so much earnestness in his behalf. That no General either at Land or Sea, nor any other Ma∣gistrate whatever, vested with priviledg of Indem∣nifying Banished, or Proscribed persons, should ex∣tend that Priviledg to him. That whoever should but propose any thing in his favour, should pay 2000 Ducats for his Offence, which should be strictly ex∣acted by the Councellors, and Avogadors, to be put into the Coffers of the Council of Ten. And finally, the said Malefactor was Condemned to all other Pains expressed and specified in any other Arrest whatever. By which the Council of Ten designed to give an eminent example of their Justice a∣gainst the Person of a Nobleman, who reckoned in his Family four Doges, an infinite number of Procurators, Senators, and Generals of Armies, and allied to all the most considerable Families in Venice. Bearing no respect to his age (which was not above 22): To the Merit and Services of his Glorious Ancestors: To the Tears and Sighs of his Wife; To the Innocence of his Son, at that time hanging at the Breasts of his Mother; Nor even to the Pardon of the Foscarini them∣selves; the Elder of which begged it generously of the Senat some days before his Death: and the Younger, who was wounded letting the Pro∣secution fall. And to shew the efficacy and force of these sort of Proclamations, it is to be con∣sidered that the said Moccenigue having fled to Rome, where he hoped to have been Protected in the house of the Venetian Embassador Michael

Morosini his Father in Law; that prudent Mini∣ster understanding the duty of his Charge, and having been formerly of the Council of Ten, would not receive him into his Palace, nor vio∣late the publick Majesty wherewith his Character Invested him.

And here I shall take notice, that at Venice their Opera's, Comedies, and Gaming-houses are in∣violable places, Consecrated (if I may so say) to publick Pleasure, insomuch as Banished Persons and Criminals resort to them as safely as to the Sanctuaries of old, the Council of Ten not reser∣ving to themselves the Cognizance of such Of∣fences as are committed there, and all to recom∣mend their frankness to their Subjects, and their hospitality to Strangers,

Coining of False Money is an unpardonable Of∣fence, and the rather because Italy is full of little Princes, who make use of that way to inrich themselves to the prejudice of their Subjects, and Neighbours: But as to Sodomy, they seem either willing to connive at it, as a thing rather contrary to good Manners, than inconsistant with the Government; or else knowing the nature of the Sin, and their propensity to it, they think it not convenient to attempt a Remedy, lest they should discover their own Shame and Impo∣tency, wherefore, when-ever this Sin is punished, 'tis in the person of some poor Creature, who has neither Money nor Friends.

This Council is likewise very severe with Sta∣tioners who sell Books reflecting upon the Go∣vernment; and when any is found offending in

that kind, they are at least condemned to the Gal∣lies, and their Estates Confiscated. Hence it is, that not one of them dares sell Guichardin's Hi∣story of the Geneva Impression, nor the Squitirio della liberta Veneta, which proves the subjection of the Venetians to the Roman and Greek Empe∣rours.

The Ten do proceed likewise against such Ec∣clesiasticks as procure Bishopricks, Abbeys or any other Benefices from Rome, by means contrary to the Laws of their Countrey; and when they have got Grants of them, the Council of Ten op∣poses their Possession: thus they served Charles Quirini who had obtained from Pope Ʋrban VIII. the Bishoprick of Zebenigo in Dalmatia, by the mediation of Forreign Embassadors in his Holi∣ness his Court.

The Noblemen composing the Council of Ten, ought to be of Ten several Families, without any Kindred or Proximity of Relation; that there may be no prejudice nor partiality in their Votes: For if two or three Gentlemen allied either by Birth or Marriage, should be admitted into the said Council, it might be the occasion of a thou∣sand Iujustices, whilst the corrupting of one Mem∣ber would indanger the corruption of all his Re∣lations: Besides, three or four Families might easier unite in any enterprize against the State. In the mean time the Venetians think it not fit to have more than Ten of that Council, lest it should render their Authority less dreadful to have it divided among a greater number of Persons: And yet their Court consists commonly of seven∣teen, the Duke presiding these, and the Six Coun∣cellors of the Colledg assisting. Sometimes there is a Giunta, or accession of certain Senators, who have equal suffrage in the said Council, as the rest,

in which case the Procurators, the Sage-Grans, and the three Avogadors have right to sit a∣mong them by virtue of their Places, not as Judges, but Assistants, without any Votes

Every Month three Capi-Dieci are chosen by Lots; These Capi-Dieci have Power to open all Letters addressed to the Council, and to report them when they have done: They receive pri∣vately the Depositions of Informers, and give out Orders for the seizure of the Person accused: They visit the Prisons, examine what Prisoners they please, and discharge what they think In∣nocent. They assemble the Council, not only e∣very eight days according to Custom, but as oft as they think fit, provided two of them con∣cur in it. Each of these three Capi-Dieci has his Week, during which, he that is chief re∣ceives the Letters, Interrogates parties, and having communicated with his two Colleagues, concerts with them what is to be done: And he that is in Authority, is in the Grand Council with the Avo∣gador de Semaine, placed right over against the Doge.

In short, the Dieci of Venice have the same Power as the Ephori had in Sparta. The Dieci can Depose, Imprison, and Condemn to Death all the Magistrates in the City, even the Duke him∣self: But the Ephori could not judg either of the Kings of Sparta without concurrence of the Senat and the other King (for in that State there were always Two Contemporary Kings ) and if the Ephori had Power to put all sorts of People to Death without formal Process (which

gave Plato occasion to call their Authority Ty∣ranical); The Council of Ten have often made it appear that they are absolute, in Condemning their Fellow-Citizens upon bare suspitions, yet in reality they are more moderate than the E∣phori.

The Ephori had Cognizance of all affairs belong∣ing to their Commonwealth, and a superinspection upon the Conduct of all Persons who manage it, and therefore they were called Ephori. The Di∣eci of Venice have the same Power. The Ephori were instituted as a Balance to their Kings, and to keep them within the bounds of their Duty; the Dieci were instituted to curb and withstand the ambition and insolence of the Nobles: and as Theopompus rendered Kingship agreeable to the Lacedemonians, by the Creation of this Magi∣strate to restrain it from extravagance, so have the Venetians made their Government more plau∣sible to the People, by setting up the Council of Ten, as a check to the exorbitance of their Com∣manders; so that these Ten are the defenders of the People, as well as the Ephori, though their Government be not Popular. The Ephori had a care and superintendency over their Sports, and publick Combats invented for the exercise of their Youth; The Ten have the ordering of pub∣lick Feasts, and solemn Combats betwixt the Ca∣stellans and the Nicolates; and the direction of their Regates or Sea-fights. The Ephori had the disposing of the Publick Revenue; the Dieci have their Treasury, where a third of the Publick Mo∣neys is entred, with a superintendency of all the Schools and Fraternities of the City, which are

taxed upon any publick necessity, as the Dieci think fit. In a word, the Dieci are annual like the Ephori, and cannot no more than they, be continued in their Office; but they may be cho∣sen again two years after: And this is so exactly observed, that a Nobleman who has been but one day in Office, if the year be out, deposits his Decemviral Robe, and is excluded the Council for two years, as much as if he had executed the Office his full time.

The new Nobility cannot pretend to this Charge, but after long and considerable service, for they must be so many intermediate Offices, and gain the friendship of the Ancient Nobility, who will otherwise oppose their Elections: Be∣sides, the ancient Nobility will not equal them so soon by those Honours, lest having great Estates generally, the addition of such great Dignity should advance them above them.

The Dieci have place, and deliberative Voice in the Senat, wearing a Purple-Robe with Du∣cal-Sleeves.

This Council in their Orders and Proclamati∣ons do assume the Title of Eccelso, to shew the Grandure and Puissance of their Dignity.

Of the Quaranties.

THere are Three Courts in Venice called Quaranties, because each of them consists of Forty Members. The first is the New Quarentie-Civil, to which an Appeal lies in all

Civil Causes, from the Sentence of all Magistrates abroad. The Second is the old Quarantie-Civil, that Judges in all Appeals from the inferiour Magistrates in the City. The Third is the Qua∣rantie-Criminel, which Judges in all Criminal matters except Treason, which belongs properly to the Council of Ten. These Three Courts are each of them considerable, but the last is of great∣er reputation than the other two, because all its Members have deliberative Voices in the Senat. Because their Capi have place in the Colledg a∣mong the Councellors di Sopra, and because it is called the Serenissimo Seignoria, like the Assem∣bly of the Colledg, their three Councellors presiding there in the name of the Seigniory. Besides, this Court is the Parliament of all the Subjects of that State; as the Council of Ten is of the No∣bles.

Eight Months is the time they remain in either of these Quaranties, and the first step being to the New Quarantie, the next is to the Old, and the third to the Criminel.

The two Quaranties-Civil consist only of the poorer Nobility, for the richer sort will not have patience to attend sixteen Months to gain a Du∣cat by their Place, and therefore they aspire to enter at first into the Quarantie-Criminel, at least into the Old Quarantie, one, or perhaps two Months before it concludes, to the end they may pass presently to the Quarantie-Criminel, and have Voices in the Pregadi.

To each of these Courts there being two Con∣tradictors or Advocates, who undertake the Causes of the Defendants, and manage them against the Avogadors, especially in Criminal matters, where all their Art and Rhetorick is shewn in the behalf of the Person accused.

And here it is to be observed, that inferior Judges cannot be called to the Old Quarantie-Civil, without the advice and consent of three Auditori Vecchi, nor to the New Quarantie-Civil but by permission of the Auditori Novi: For if these Auditors confirm the Sentence of the inferi∣our Magistrate, the business cannot be carried up into a higher Court, without deposing a certain Sum of Money, besides paying the Fees.

There have been admitted into the Senat forty of the Judges-Criminel, (who are commonly Gentlemen of the second and third Form) to balance the ancient Nobility, against whom they usually unite, by reason of the animosity they bear them. But many times that is an impedi∣ment to their affairs.

The Chiefs of these Quaranties change every two Months: It belongs to them to appoint the time for hearing a Cause, which they call dar il pendere, or dar il Consiglio alle Cause. But in the two Quaranties-Civil, Priviledg'd Causes are first to be dispatched, and those next who are brought in by the Auditors in order, according to the Roll. Those Causes are called Priviledg'd which are betwixt Father and Son, Mother and Daugh∣ter, or Brother and Brother; as also the Causes of the Avogadori, which are called Cause Avo∣gadoresche: The Causes of Prisoners, and Pu∣pils under the Tutilage of the Procurators of St. Mark.

'Tis not lawful to solicit these Judges either in Person, or by Proxy: All that can lawfully be done in the Quaranties-Civil, is to Petition those Chiefs to bring the business to a speedy Hearing. But in the Quarantie-Criminel it is lawful to employ all the interest, and importunity of ones Friends. Let us now pass to the inferior Magistrates of the City.

Of the three Avogadors.

THE Avogadors were instituted under Duke Orie Malipierre about the year 1180, and are in France called Avocats General, but with this difference; in France they speak finally after the Counsel for the Plaintiff has spoken; and at Venice the Avogadors speak first, and open the Accusation , after which the Counsel for the De∣fendant replies.

The principal duty of an Avogador is to see the Laws observed, and to proceed rigorously against those who transgress them; as also to oppose the Deliberations of all the other Magistrates. In which they resemble the ancient Tribunes of the People in Rome, who, as Aulus Gellius reports †, had not the power of Judging, but of interposing their Authority in defence of the Rights and Pri∣viledges of the People against the Authority of the Magistrates, not excepting even the Dictators. Gaspar Contarin tells us they may be called Tri∣bunes of the Law, because they are the Conserva∣tors of that, as the Roman Tribunes were of the Liberties of the People.

The difference betwixt the Tribunes and the Avogadors is this, that the Tribunes were Creatures

only of the People; the Avogadors of the Com∣monwealth in general, and are therefore called Avogadori di Commune . They remove all Process whether they please, those which are of no great consequence, to the Quarantie Criminel; others to the Senat or Grand Council, according to the qua∣lity of the Cause.

The Quarantie Criminel cannot refuse them when they desire to be heard, by reason of a pe∣culiar Priviledg; and therefore when an Avoga∣dor presses, all other business must be laid aside. Sometimes they carry their Civil Affairs before the Colledg, as when Controversy is about Fiefs, or Lands depending upon any Manor, which they would reunite to the Demeasns, as it hapned in the year 1670 about Lands which the Avogadors of Brescia alledged belonged in Propriety to them.

In all Debates and Deliberations either of the Grand Council or Senat, it is necessary at least one Avogador be present; if not, their Resolutions are void, and of none effect.

The good or ill Administration of Justice de∣pends upon these Avogadors, it being their work to frame and prepare all Processes brought into Court, and if they be ill men, as happens too oft, 'tis in their power to do a great deal of mis∣chief.

There are always grave and austere men chosen into these Offices, to give the People greater awe and veneration for the Laws, and to oblige them to greater severity, the Law gives these Avoga∣dors a considerable share in all Confiscations. One Theodore Balbi, who had narrowly escaped the Ac∣cusations of his enemies in the Council of Ten, was made an Avogador not long after his discharge, meerly out of an opinion that he would use the

same severity towards other People, that he had experimented himself; and he answered their ex∣pectation.

When the Quarantie-Criminel judges a Person, the Avogador who brings in the Process has no deliberative Voice, in respect that he is the Accu∣ser; but he has power to propose the ridgest pu∣nishment he pleases, after which, the three Presi∣dents of the Assembly propose another more mo∣derate, and both opinions being put to the Balot, plurality of Voices carry it.

When the Grand Council makes any new Order that the Avogadors judg prejudicial to the Pub∣lick, or any ways incompatible with the Laws of the State; they can hinder the Registring and pub∣lication of it till it be more deliberately debated in another Assembly, like the Roman Tribunes, who could stop the Decrees of all other Magistrates; and this is called in Venice, Intromittero, answering to Intercederi in Latin, which is as much as to Withstand, or to Oppose, in English Upon this Consideration it was that Don Innego de Gardenas, Embassador in Ordinary at Venice from the Court of Spain, endeavoured at the time of the Jurisdicti∣on to have been made Avogador, though but for two hours, promising (without farther explaining himself) that in time he would accommodate the difference betwixt his Holiness and that Common∣wealth; which, in my judgment, he proposed only for the suspension of two Decrees of the Senat, which were then in dispute: a thing the Pope did passionately desire, that he might have honourable pretence for the revoking his Censures. But the Seigniory discerning the drift of his Proposition, and of what consequence it would be to suffer Suspen∣sion of the Laws, they returned no Answer to the Embassadors motion, that they might not disgust him by a refusal.

They have Power likewise to hinder their Pos∣session of those places, or the Execution of them, if in, till they purge themselves of the Accusations against them. Thus the Avogador Corrare would have suspended the Vest of the Procuratorship from Francis Morosini, who had been in possession of the said Dignity 14 months, which doubtless would have had its effect, had not Corrare abandoned his Accusation.

'Tis the Office of the Avogadors to exact and receive all Fines and Mulcts charged upon any Magistrate for transgressing the Laws: and out of every Fine they have a certain allowance, which with their other Fees, and ordinary Assignments upon confiscated Goods, amounts, and makes their Revenue very considerable.

Being Guardians of the Laws, they are obliged at certain times to read in the Grand Council the ancient Laws, to rub up the memory of the Noble∣men, and keep them to a stricter observation of them. For good Laws are not sufficient, without good Men to assert them, and see them put in exe∣cution

And as the Nomophylaces of the Athenians kept the Register of their publick Deliberations, to which they had recourse, when it was in question what was to be done, or what had been formerly done in that case: in like manner the Venetian Avogadors keep the Originals of all Orders of the Grand Council, and all the Decrees of the Senat, as also a Register of all Noble Families, in which they set down daily the Birth, Estate, Name, and Sur∣name of every Gentleman and Gentlewoman, that

no false Nobility might be foisted in among the true; which would be easily discerned by com∣paring their Notes with those who present them∣selves for Entrance into the Council, when their age requires.

Their Authority formerly was much greater, for they had the management of all sorts of Af∣fairs: but since the Power of the Council of Ten has been established, the Power of the Avogadors has been lessened: and yet they can suspend the Decrees of the Grand Council, by producing new matter in favour of the Criminal, unless his Crime be against the Government, for in that Case there is no suspension. It is always one of these Avo∣gadors who pronounces Sentence in that Court against the Persons condemned. They are Elected by the Senat, and Grand Council; the first proposes, and the second almost constantly accepts, but they may reject if they please: yet that falls out but seldom, by reason of the respect is born to the Se∣nat, whose Judgment is reckoned as their Touch∣stone for Vertue and Esteem.

During the life of the Doge, neither his Children nor Brothers can be Avogadors, lest they should encline more to him than the Commonwealth, and relax something of the severity of the Laws, in favour to him.

The Avogadors are habited like the three Capi-Dieci in Purple-Robes with Ducal-Sleeves, and the Red-Bonnet in Winter: but in Summer their Robe is of Black Watered-Camlet, with a Bonnet of the same. Every Grand Council-day they are clothed in Scarlet; and their Office continues for 16 months.

The two Censors.

THE Jurisdiction of the Censors extends prin∣cipally to the Manners of particular Per∣sons: to the Designs and Contrivances of the Nobles in the Broglio to obtain Preferment; to the Condemnation or Fining of those who vio∣late the Statutes of the Grand Council. To the payment of Wages; the pilfering of Servants; and lastly, to the correction of the Gondoliers when they stop up the passage upon the Canal, towards the Palace of St. Mark, for which offence they have many times given them the Estrapade in some publick place.

When a Malefactor is interrogated by order of the Quarantie Criminel, one of these Censors, one of the Judges of the Night al Criminal are pre∣sent, but always with the Avogador who brings in the Process, and these three Noblemen assem∣bled, are called Il Colleggietto Criminale.

These Censors are 16 months in Office, during which time they have deliberative Voices in the Pregadi, and are habited in Purple-Cloth with Ducal-Sleeves in Winter, and in Summer with black Watered-Camlet, and Chaperons of the same.

The three Syndics.

THis Magistrate has Authority over all the in∣ferior Justices of St. Mark, and the Rialte, with power to revise their Acts, and vacate their Decrees: He punishes the Notaries, Pro∣ctors, Serjeants, and Copistes or Clerks, who ex∣act more than is required by the Tax. But this is not over-strictly observed, for the Syndics do ma∣ny times dissemble and connive, in consideration of the profit accrewing thereby.

But as the Syndics can null or reform the Sen∣tences delle Corti di San-Marco e Rialto, so the Avogadors can correct or vacate the Decrees of the Syndics, and when they have done, carry the business before one of the Quaranties, or the Colledg of XX Sages, according to the quality of the Cause. There are three Syndics in Extraordinary, to ease the other, and supply their places when any of them are absent.

The six Seigniors Criminal de Nuit.

THese Gentlemen have the Cognizance of all Thefts and Robberies by night. Receivers of stollen Goods; Incendiaries, such as have two Wives, Ravishers of Women, and Jews taken lying with Christian Women, fall under their Juris∣diction; the Jews are many times condemned to death for that Crime, and if their Sentence be confirmed by the Magistrate dell' Proprio, (who notwithstanding is but a Civil Officer) there lies no appeal, otherwise 'tis removable to one of the Quaranties-Civil.

These Lords Criminal of the Night were insti∣tuted at first but two by Duke Marin Morosini, one of them with Jurisdiction beyond the Rialto, and another on the other side: but in the Dogeship of Renier Zen his successor, the Grand Council ad∣ded four more to them. Their Office is like the Office of the Chevalier du Guet among the Ro∣mans. They are annual, and their Fee a Ducat every morning they sit, and half a Ducat every Afternoon.

The six Lords-Civil of the Night.

THey are Judges in certain Nocturnal Affairs that are not altogether Criminal, as also in cheats and frauds betwixt private persons; they lay the Damages, appoint the Costs, and exe∣cute the Sentences of the Magistrate called al Foristerio, for regulating and letting of Houses.

They were instituted under Duke Peter Lando with the Auditori Novissimi, and created for the ease of the said Auditori, who had too much bu∣siness upon their hands; their judgment goes no higher than fifty Ducats.

The three Proveditors du Commun.

THE Office of this Magistrate (not unlike the Aedils in Rome) is to keep up the neat∣ness and uniformity of the City; to see the Pavements and Bridges kept in repair: to look to the Ships, and see they be not over-laden: to pre∣serve the Priviledges of the Citizens; to set a Plate upon new-Printed Books; to inspect the several Companies of Artists; and the Gondoliers. They have Vote in the Pregadi, and continue in Office sixteen months.

The three Proveditori alle Ra∣gione Vecchie.

THeir Office is in the name of the Senat to send the accustomed Presents to Princes, Embassadors, or other great Lords as come to Venice, and to keep an account of all those kind of expences. They are Judges of all damage done to the Demeasns of the Seigniory without the Town, with Power to inspect the Accounts of the Proveditors all Biave. This Magistrate re∣sembles the Questors in Rome, who had the care of lodging such Princes and Embassadors as came suddenly to Town, and to furnish them with ne∣cessary conveniences in the Name of the Publick: they continue likewise 16 months, and have voice in the Pregadi.

There are also three Proveditori alle Ragione nuove, young Gentlemen appointed to look to the payment of such as are concerned in the Publick Forms, and to seize their Estates upon any defect. It belongs to them likewise to cause to be coined several little pieces of Silver called Oselle, which pieces the Doge presents to all the Noblemen of the Grand Council, in lieu of certain River-fowl which were sent them formerly to their Houses, from whence the Medals are called Oselle.

The four Proveditori alla Gi∣ustitia Vecchia.

THeir Office is to judg in cases of false weights or measures, and they commonly punish those Offenders severely. They set the prises upon Fruit, and Sea-fish, which the Fishermen are obliged to sell standing, with their Hats in their hands, by that inconvenience to hum∣ble them, and take from them the confidence of bartering too sawcily with the Citizens. All Me∣channicks are under the Jurisdiction of these Pro∣veditors, so that if a Citizen has any controversy with an Artificer, it belongs to these Proveditors to decide it.

These kind of Tradesmen cannot change their Signs for their Shops, but with permission from them; nor take an Apprentice or other Person to work, without acquainting them with the Con∣ditions, which they cause to be entred into a Re∣gister, otherwise their Contracts are void.

There are three other Proveditors called della Giustitia Nuova, whose Authority is over Inns and Cabaritts; to prevent selling of sophisticated Wines. They take care likewise that Taxes be well paid, and they continue 16 months in their Office.

The three Sopra Proveditori¦alle Biave.

THese Seigniors like the Aediles Coreris insti∣tuted by Julius Caesar, have care of provi∣ding the City with Corn and all sorts of Grain, that by keeping the People in plenty, they might keep them obedient and well-affected to the Government: upon apprehension of Famine, these Officers advise with the Doge and Sages of the Colledg how they may supply themselves from the Neighbouring Provinces, and to this purpose they contract with certain wealthy Merchants who engage to bring them in, and deliver them at Ve∣nice the quantity agreed for, at a precise day upon certain Conditions, which are always made good by the Seigniory, and if the Merchant fails, he is condemned in a considerable penalty.

There are subservient to these Magistrates three other Nobles called Proveditori alle Biave who do the same, and two Seigniori al Formento, who visit the publick Magazins; see them filled up again every year, and when any thing wasts, or grows un∣fit to keep them, they see it sold, and other bought in its place, by which means they are continually full.

The four Sopra Proveditori del Sal.

THese Officers see the Salt brought from the Publick Salt-houses, into the Granaries of the City, where 'tis disposed and sold by their direction; they have Power to punish such as imbezle it, or sell it without permission. This Office is of considerable profit, but it lasts but ten Months. The Senat Creates sometimes three Revisori al Sal, to look into the abuses committed in the Gabelle, after which, their Of∣fice ceases.

The three Sopra Proveditori alla Sanita.

'TIS their Office to see that nothing contagi∣ous be brought into the City, and that no∣thing putrified or stinking be sold in the Market. 'Tis their Office to send out of the Town all such as are ill of any Pestilential Disease; to hinder any Persons, or Commodities from Land∣ing till they know from whence they come, and the Captain of the Ship produces a formal Certifi∣cate

from the Magistrates of the place where he Laded. Otherwise they are sent three miles off from Venice to the Lazant to make their Quarantine. And these Proveditori are assisisted with three more of the same Name.

There is no Town in the World where they are more careful of their health than this: and not without reason, for indeed the Plague has raged strangely among them, and continues com∣monly a long time because of the streightness of the Streets, and driness of a great part of their Canals, in Summer, which sends forth most unfufferable stinks: and therefore there are two Offices created expresly for the Water, the one called Savii alla Acque, consisting of Senators or Procurators; the other, Esecutori alle Acque, com∣posed of three young Noblemen, whose business is to see the Regulations and Orders of the first duly executed; both of them have Power to punish such as cast any nastiness into the Canals, which the Laws require to be cleansed every year to prevent their filling up. But the constant clean∣sing them according to that Law, having been neglected during the War in Candia, produce great Inconvenience in many places, not only for stinks, but by making the passage difficult by the heaps of Mud and Sand; insomuch that to clear their Canals and their Ponds, the Undertakers have asked no less than two Millions, whereas had it been taken in time, it could not have cost above 100000 Crowns.

The three Sopra Proveditori¦alle Pompe.

THis Officer in Venice, is the same the Gine∣conomo were in Athens; The Harmosins in Sparta; and the Censors in Rome. For like theirs, it is the business of these to reform extravagance both in Cloaths and Diet, which in the judgement of Seneca is the sign of a decli∣ning State . And indeed Feasting is so rare a thing in Venice (where the Nobility live gene∣rally sordidly) that were it not for some Per∣sons who have brought from their Embassies a∣broad, a neater way of eating, the Proveditori alle Pompe would not have much trouble to bring them to Obedience: so as they might omit their frequently reiterated Proclamations against eating of Flesh and Fish at the same Meal, seeing most of the Nobility content themselves with Pilchards, and Musles, and such cheap stuff, so that the Scan∣dal of an Ichliophagos would agree with them more properly than with the Greeks, who eat Fish for Luxury, whereas the Venetian does it for Nearness.

The outward Robe of the Nobility (which is commonly a Cloath-Vest, with a Bonnet of the same) has no difference, nor does at all distin∣guish the the poverty and richness of the Wearer, unless it be by the neatness of the making up; for their Robes are to be all of a certain Cloath made at Padua, and if any of them be so hardy

as to make it of Spanish, English, or Dutch Cloth, they must pay dear for the fashion. But the young Noblemen that are rich, distinguish themselves usually by their under-Garments, which is for the most part of some rich flowered Silk, trim'd very thick with broad Lace. Sometimes their Doublet is of Cloth of Gold or Silver, which they shew at the opening of their Gowns. And when they go upon the Water, they pull off their Gowns on purpose: an abuse that is suffered by the Magistrate des Pompes, as not knowing whether his Authority would be able to remedy it , any more than several other fashi∣ons which Licentiousness and Ambition have in∣troduced among the Women: which diverted Lycurgus from making Laws against the extrava∣gance of the Spartan Ladies. So that these Seig∣niors chose rather to let those inconveniences rest, than to make new Laws against them, which be∣ing despised as the former, would serve only to give more Head and Authority to their Luxury, and load the Reformers with the displeasure of the most Illustrious Families †. For in Venice there are People of that Roman Tribunes opinion, who cried, Quid opus Libertate, si voluntibus luxu perire, non licet? To what purpose is Liberty, if those who have a mind to ruin themselves by their Luxury, may not have leave. Those young Noblemen who have some 40, some 50000 Ducats a year, would think themselves very unhappy to be obliged to live like their first Ancestors, whose Dominion was only over one Town, and whose Pastime and Subsistance was nothing but Fishing, and might argue as a Senator did formerly, That the Grandure of a rich Citizen ought to be suitable to the Grandure of the State, and that no mans

Expence is extravagant that exceeds not his Re∣venue .

All that the Laws can do, is to hinder the growth of that mischief by chastising those who presume too far: or by chargeable imployments, or fines: and to this end the Venitian Ladies are much restrained in their ordinary Gallantry of their Sex; they are not allowed to wear Neck∣laces of Pearl, Roses, Crosses, Bracelets or Loc∣kets of Diamonds. They have not their Gondo∣liers in Livery, but the first year of their Mar∣riage. Nor in all my time at Venice did I see above one Lady that transgressed these Laws, who being the Daughter of a Gondolier, and mar∣rying with a Procurator of St. Mark, could not hold, but must needs be shewing her Jewels, as if she thought by their lustre to dazle the eyes of the People, and keep them from reflecting upon her Birth: or that she might be as remark∣able for the richness of her dress, as for the ad∣ventures of her life.

As to the Courtesans, the Magistrate des Pompes has such authority over them, that in Fees, and in Fines he goes away with the greatest part of their gains, they being unable to contain them∣selves within the rules prescribed by the Law. They must have rich Clothes at any rate, to in∣vite their Gallants, but 'tis not enough they pay for them in the Shops, they must pay for them again a second, and perhaps a third time to these Proveditori. The Courtesans are not allowed to wear the White Veil, to divert themselves upon the Grand-Canal; to meet in any assembly of

great Ladies, or to pass in a Gondole with two Oars: but their humours could not be subjected to these rules; and were they not maintained or protected by persons of authority, they would rot most of them in Prison, or dye in an Hospital. The Laws of this nature relating to the regulation of exorbitancy in young Noble∣men, are observed rigorously at first, but they are neglected by degrees . This Court is com∣monly supplied with Procurators of St. Mark, or at least by Senators of the Principal Rank.

All these Sopra Proveditori are named by the Senat, as also the Three annual Superintendants of the Tenths of the Clergy, who receive the Ec∣clesiastical Contributions; the Six Proveditors sent upon the Terra firma in Harvest time, to collect what is due to the Publick. The Three Proveditors of the Arsenal, whose business is to see it furnished with every thing that is neces∣sary. The Three Sopra Proveditori l'Armamento, who give direction for equipping of the Gal∣lies and Galleasses; and the Proveditors of the Forts, who have all of them Voices in the Pre∣gadi.

The three Governadori dell' Entrate

ARE properly the Sur-Intendans de Tinan∣ces, for they have the management of all the Publick Revenue: they lett all the Farms, and the Farmers are responsible to them. This Magistracy is always executed by ancient Senators, eminent for Incorruption and good Oeco∣nomie. They have under them three Officers called Camerlenghi di Commune or Receivers Ge∣neral, to whom the particular Receivers pay in what they receive.

The ten Sages

ARE like a little Colledg that taxes the E∣states of particular Persons when the Pub∣lick is in distress for Moneys, as happens in time of War very often, the ordinary Revenue of the State being unable to defray the whole Charge. The Tax is paid exactly by the Nobles, and if any are in Arrear, they are put inter Aera∣rios, and as such excluded the Grand Council, and all other Publick Office till they have paid it.

The four Judges della Meso∣ettaria.

ALL Notaries in the Commonwealth are ob∣liged under penalty of Imprisonment and a Fine, to give these Judges Copies of all Bargains or Contracts passing through their hands, and relating to the buying of Houses, Lands, or Ships (Ships being accounted immo∣vables in Venice by reason of its scituation) that the purchasers may not be put into possession, till they have paid a Duty to the State of three or four per Cent. otherwise the Bargain is void: Messetto in the Language of Lombards signifying an interposer, from whence this Magistrate takes his name, there being no Bargains nor Sales made, but one of these four interposes.

The three Judges al Fore∣stier.

THE Jurisdiction of these Judges, like that of the Praetor Peregrinus in Rome, extends to all Controversies betwixt their Subjects and Strangers, betwixt Stranger and Stranger:

as also to the letting of Houses, Ships, or Boats to hire.

The three Cattaveri.

THey judg of all goods found either at Land or at Sea, determining to whom they be∣long. The word Cattaveri, is as much as Searcher of the truth, Cattar in the Lombard Language signifying to Search. They appropri∣ate to the Publick, and put it in possession of all the Goods of such as dye Intestate, or with∣out Heirs. They punish such of the Jews as wear the Black Cap without permission from them; a liberty they sell for Money, but ne∣ver for above a Month, that they may have always a way of squeezing those People, who would not be distinguished by a Red Cap.

The three Seigniori alli Banchi.

THeir Jurisdiction extends only to three pla∣ces where the Jews are obliged to lend their Money upon Security; a way the Publick has found out to supply the poor People, who had rather pawn their Goods to them, and redeem them again at moderate Interest, that

to sell them for half the worth, as they would be constrained by their necessities. These Banks are not unlike those in Italy called Monti di Pieta.

Not to trouble my Reader with an unneces∣sary ennumeration of particulars, I pass by an Hundred other Judges: But must not (as I con∣ceive) leave Venice, and make a visit to the Provincial Magistrates, till I have said some∣thing of their Chancellor and Secretaries, as bear∣ing part in the Government: as also of the Pa∣triarch of that City, and the Venetian Cardinals, a matter that carries great connection with the Subject I intend.

Of the Chancellor and Se∣cretaries.

THE Grand Chancellor is Head of the se∣cond Order, that is of Citizens, amongst whom he is a kind of a Doge: Cancella∣rius Ducem quasi ex populo refert. He is present at all Councils without exception. He is privy to all Intrigues and Secrets of the Commonwealth, which writes, nor receives no Letters of which he has not a sight. He has the keeping of the Seal, and it cannot be taken from him without deposing him quite. He is as it were a Cheva∣lier born, by virtue of his Place, which gives him the title of Excellence, and precedence be∣fore all the Senators and Magistrates of the City, except the Councellors of the Seigniory, and the

Procurators of St. Mark. He is chief of all the Secretaries, who with him represent the Body of the Citizens, as the Doge and Councellors of the Colledg do the Body of the Nobles; and therefore in Latine Instruments he is called Magnus-Scriba, & Scribarum Princeps. And it is to be observed the Office of Grand Chancellor is affected by all the Secretaries, as the end of their hopes and desires, to which when they ar∣rive, they will have no cause to lament any pains they have taken, or any Service they have done to the Commonwealth; there being no Noble∣man (with proportion) so well recompenced as they, no not the Doge himself, nor the Procura∣tors par merite. The Chancellors Office is for life; he wears Purple like the Duke, and the six Councellors of the Colledg; enjoys all the privi∣ledges of a Nobleman, and has some peculiar to himself.

The State allows him a Pension of 3000 Du∣cats, besides the common Perquisits of his place, which amount to 9 or 10000 Ducats more, with∣out obliging him to any expence. In short, he wants nothing but a deliberative Voice in the Councils, where he sits only as an Instrument, and in that he is inferior to the meanest of the Nobility.

When the Seigniory marches upon any publick occasion, the Chancellor is preceded by the Se∣cretaries; the Doge by the Chancellor, and the Senat by the Doge; where we may take notice of two different Customs, one of the Nobles, which is preceded by their Chief; the otber of the Cit∣tadinance, or Body of Citizens, which proceds their Chief: the first to shew that the Nobility and the Citizens are not to take equal measures, the other to intimate that the Chancellor, is not

the Creature of the People, but the Agent and Officer of the Nobles, by whom he is chosen, and of whom by consequence he holds his Charge and Authority: and last of all to sig∣nify the concord and harmony of all parts in the Government.

The Chancellor after his election, makes a publick entry, and passes to the Colledg accom∣panied by several Procurators, the ancientest of whom (assisting commonly that day) gives him the upper hand, as the Senators and the rest of the Nobles do to the Citizens, who in that Ce∣remony march like Noblemen in their Red Gowns: so that it is not altogether unlike the Saturnals of old, where the Servants were attended by their Masters. In Publick Ceremonies, if it be Winter the Chancellor appears in a Crimson-Velvet Robe; if Summer, in Red Damask, with his Stole of Gold: but his common habit is Scarlet or Purple Cloth.

In a word, when the Chancellor dyes, he has the same Honours as the Doge when he dies: his Funerals are kept in the Church of St Mark; and his Elogy pronounced in presence of the Se∣nat, who upon that occasion are in Mourning, thereby shewing greater regrate for the loss of their Chancellor, than for the loss of their Duke, whose Obsequies are Celebrated by them in Scar∣let Robes, as I observed before.

Having so many Priviledges, 'tis no wonder that the Chancellor Augustin Vianole bought No∣bility for his Sons, without mentioning himself; the reason is plain, not being like to be Chan∣cellor and Noble Venetian together, (a thing that never happened but once, in favour to Mark Ottobon Father to the Cardinal of that name) he chose rather to keep his place, and continue in

the Populatc, than to quit it, and make himself Noble.

The Chancellor Ballarin was of the same mind, and preferred his Chancellorship before the Honour of being Noble par Merite, that is to say gratis, which the Seigniory put to his choice.

The Chancellor is chosen by the Grand Council, as all the Magistrates of the City are.

As to the Secretaries there are three sorts. The first are called Secretaries of the Council of Ten, and are most considerable because of the Preheminence of that Court. The second are cal∣led Secretaries of the Senat: and the third No∣taries, or Ducal Clerks: from Ducal Clerks they rise to be Secretaries of the Senat, and from thence they are preferred to the First, according to their respective Capacities. The Secretaries of the Council of Ten are but four, and their places are much sought after, and very hard to be got. The Secretaries of the Senat are twenty four, of which five or six are imployed as Residents in Naples, Milan, Florence, and Zurich in Switzer∣land, with Pensions of 2000 Ducats: five or six others are imployed as Secretaries to their Em∣bassies in the Courts of Kings, where the Se∣nat continues them for several years, that at their leisure they may imbibe all that is neces∣sary for the instruction of those who succeed them; and therefore they are seldom recalled, till they have served under two or three Em∣bassadors. And these are the Secretaries who as∣sist in the Colledg at the Audience of Forreign Embassadors, that they may briefly expose to the Seigniory what are the Proposals of the said Em∣bassadors, which sometimes are understood by none of the said Lords, nor by the Secretary himself. But this inconvenience is prevented by a

Copy the Embassador gives in of his business, which is translated and presented before he be admitted by the Senat, to whom it belongs to give an Answer.

The Secretaries of these two formes are pri∣vy to all affairs, it being their Office to read in the Colledg, and in the Pregadi, all the Letters writ to that State; and to prepare all those which are sent from the Senat.

When they carry an Answer to the Embassa∣dors, they read it before them, and afterwards they impart it to their Secretaries: but if they be from home, the Secretaries carry back their Copy, for 'tis death to leave it behind them.

These Secretaries have each of them a Salary of 400 Ducats per annum, besides other Profits and considerable Priviledges.

In Ceremonies they are clad in Violet-coloured Cloth, with Velvet Bonnets of the same co∣lour.

The Secretaries of the third Classis, are not any precise number, and their Office is like our Re∣gisters: For they enter all Judgments given in the Courts of St. Mark, and the Rialte, to deliver them to the Parties. They draw up the Contracts of Marriage, and pass all Wills, and other Acts relating to the Tabellionage. So that properly they are no more than Notaries or Registers, without any Cognizance in matters of Govern∣ment,

These three Orders of Secretaries depend wholly upon the Council of Ten, by whom they are cho∣sen, and when any of them is defective, he is responsible to that terrible Court.

Of the Patriarch of Venice.

VEnice is Governed in Spiritualibus by a Patriarch always a Noble Venetian, and elected by the Senat. In his Decrees and Orders he stiles himself Patriarch Divina Mi∣seratione only, not adding as the rest of the Bishops, & sanctae sedis Apostolicae Gratia. He is Primate of Dalmatia, and Metropolitan over the Archbishops of Candia and Corfu.

The Ducal Church of St. Mark acknowledges him not, because it has a private Officer of its own called Primicirio who performs all the Episco∣pal Functions, giving Benediction to the People, with Indulgences for forty days: conferring the Quatre-Mineurs to all who present themselves. And if at any time the Patriarch officiates in his Pontificalibus in presence of the Seignioria, 'tis upon request to the Primicier who consents per∣haps to do him that Honour, but without ma∣king it a President.

When the Primicier becomes Patriarch, he ceases to be Primicier, lest the Deanery of St. Mark should be reunited to the Patriarchal.

The Patriarch has the nomination only of two Benefices in the City, the Theologate of his own Church, and the Cure of St. Bartholomews, whose Curate is his Vicar by course: for the Pope hath the Collation of the Archdeaconry; the Chapter disposes of the Prebendaries, and the Parishians Citizens as well as Nobles have the choice of their Curates.

But that which is strange is the small Authority this Prelat has over the Priests and Monks, whose lives are very scandalous. An effect of the jealou∣sy of this Republick, which is to depress the cre∣dit of Episcopal Jurisdiction, opposes it self daily by its Magistrates against the execution of the Sen∣tences given by the Ecclesiastical Judges, and pro∣tects the Priests publickly, though they be con∣vict of most abominable crimes . They are often to implore the interposition of the secular Ma∣gistrate, (though the business nothing concerns them) in hopes they may escape without punish∣ment. Which occasioned that common saying of Matthew Zanes, That Venice was become a second Babylon.

A great Prelat of Venice told me one day in Discourse, That 'twas impossible for the Venetian Bishops to reform the manners of their Clergy, be∣cause the secular Magistrate held their hands, and made their Censures contemptible; and to annihilate their whole Ecclesiastical Power, hindred the holding of Synods, which are the best and most effectual means of correcting the enormities of the Priests. At the end of which I remember he added an Elogy up∣on the Church of France, whither, as he said, the sanctity of the whole Primitive Church was re∣tired, concluding with these words, Piacesse a Dio che tutta la Chiesa si Governasse a Guisa del Clero Francese. And would to God our Church was go∣verned according to the French model.

There is another thing also, a great diminution to his Authority, and that is, That the Body of the Secular Clergy in Venice, which contains 70 Parishes, is divided into nine Congregations, each of which has a separate Jurisdiction, where all Causes of the Priests and Friers in their several Wards, are first judged; and if there be occasion

for an Appeal, it lies before the Colledg Pleba••••••l, composed of Deputies from all the Congrega∣tions; which Deputies do either Null or Confirm the Sentences the private Judges have given be∣fore: and this Colledg does it so well, that their Affairs are seldom or never brought before the Patriarch, from whose Jurisdiction 'tis their whole care to substract: if at any time any thing of that nature is brought to him, 'tis Tanquam ad Judicem Compromissarium, says the Statute, Non vero Or∣dinarium. By which it appears that the Secular Clergy in Venice is in a manner separate from its Prelat, to whom, in other respects, great Ceremo∣ny is paid when he visits their Churches; a Ca∣nopy being prepared for him, as for the Doge, or a Cardinal.

Venice anciently was but a small Bishoprick, whose Bishops were called only Sanctae Olivolensis Ecclesiae Episcopi, by reason of the situation of their Church in the Isle of Olivole; and for their whole Revenue, had only the fees of Burials, wherefore they were surnamed Vescovi de Morti.

In the year 1091 Henry Contarin, the 23d. Bishop of Olivole, took upon him the Title of Bishop of Castel, which is the name of one of the six Quar∣ters of the Town; and that continued till the year 1451, when the Patriarchship laps'd to B. H. Law∣rence, Justinian Bishop of Castil, according to a Bull of Nicolas V, or Eugenius IV his Predecessor, who to end the Controversy betwixt the Bishops and the Patriarchs of Grade their Metropolitans, Ordered, that when one of the Competitors died, both Churches should devolve to the Survivor, with all their Titles and Rights; and Dominick Michieli the Patriarch dying first, the Bishop of Castel was in the Patriarchal Dignity, and left it to his Successors.

A Noble Venetian cannot pretend to any Cure in Venice, the State choosing to leave those Bene∣fices to the Populace to oblige them; as also to prevent the disorders of Competition, which would probably happen betwixt the Nobles and them; for in all likelihood the suffrages of the People (which have greatest share in those Electi∣ons) would be more inclinable to the Popular Per∣son than to the Nobleman. For the same reason they have granted the Offices and Governments of their Monasteries to the Citizens, who think∣ing themselves much honoured thereby, are bet∣ter affected to the Government. In which, the No∣bles imitated the Romans, Apud quos jus imperii valet, inania transmittuntur. Who having the Dominion in their hands, despise every thing else as superfluous.

The Commonwealth of Venice has under it ano∣ther Patriarch called the Patriarch of Aquileia, which Town was anciently the Metropolis of the Province of Venice, and of all Istria: but 'tis now much fallen from its pristine Grandure, and much inferior to the Patriarchship of Venice. However the Patriarch of Aquileia is still Primate of Istria, and 'tis said, that in all Councils he pretends to Pre∣cedence over all the Arch-Bishops and Primates of Christendom. He chooses his own Coadjutor, (as is said before) who being afterwards confirmed by the Senat with the Title of Eletto d' Aquileia, keeps his Residence at Ʋdina in Friul.

The Commonwealth and the ancient Patriarchs of Aquileia had great Contests about the Patriarchs of Grade, whom the Popes had invested with the spoils of the Patriarchs of Aquileia, (for which reason, in History, Grade is called Aquileia Nova.) Mandy-Thursday was made a Festival originally by one Ʋlrick Patriarch of Aquileia, who coming to

Grade to surprize his Competitor, was himself made a Prisoner with 12 Canons, and after set at liberty, upon condition he should send every year to Venice one Bull, 12 Hogs, and 12 Loaves.

The Senat anciently had, or pretended to have the nomination of all the Bishops and Abbots in their Dominions; but they wholly renounced it by their Treaty of Peace in the year 1510 with his Holiness Pope Julius 2, to take him off from the League of Cambray.

Under the Papacy of Ʋrban VIII there was great Controversy betwixt the Court of Rome and the Senat, about the proposition of the Bishop∣ricks belonging to the State of Venice, in the Con∣fistory; the Senat insisting that that Function should be performed by the Venetian Cardinals: but it was accommodated at length, and agreed that the proposition about the said Bishopricks should be made by a Venetian Cardinal, but the Cardinal Patron was always to be by.

The Senat never names any particular Noble∣man for a Cap, lest it should give offence to the rest: but the Venetian Embassador at Rome pro∣poses to the Pope several who are worthy of that Honour, and they are afterwards recommended by the Senat. The Embassador may propose himself if he thinks fit; however he employs all his in∣terest with the Pope for his friends.

Ʋrban VI was the first Pope who honoured the Noble Venetians with this Cardinalitial Dignity, and he did it, because that Commonwealth was the only State almost that stuck to him against Clement VII Pope of Avignion. Those Cardinals were, Lewis Donat General of the Cordeliers, and John Amedeus Arch-Bishop of Corfu: the first with the Title of St. Mark, the other of St. Sabina; since which time there have been always Venetians

in the sacred Colledg, and three of them were Popes. Ange Corraro under the name of Gregory XII, who notwithstanding was but the Depository of the Papacy: Gabriel Condolmier, his Nephew called Eugenius IV: and Peter Barbo Nephew to Eugenius, with the name of Paul II; to whom we might add Alexander V that succeeded Gregory, who being a Candiot, was born in the Territory of the Venetian.

Paul V was wont to say the Popes ought not to admit any of the Noble Venetians into the sacred Colledg, because the Venetians excluded their Ec∣clesiasticks out of all Councils and secular Offices in that State.

But 'tis now time we proceed to the Magistrates of the Provinces.

The Podestats.

THE Name of Podesta answers to Praetor among the Romans, as appears by Latin In∣scriptions upon the publick Buildings, where the Podesta is called Praetor; and the Venetian Po∣destats administer Justice in their respective Juris∣dictions, as the Praetors did formerly in Rome, and in the Provinces.

When these Magistrates keep their Court, they are assisted by certain Lawyers chosen by them, to give their advice: which the Lawyers esteem as a more than ordinary Honour. An Appeal lies from these Podestats, to the Auditori nuovi, or to the new Quarantie-Civil.

The Province of Venice, which is called Il De∣gado di Venetia, contains several Podestaries or Re∣gencies. The chief is Chiozza, an Episcopal City built like Venice upon piles, in which great store of Salt is made. The others are Malamocco, the Port of Venice; Murano, a small Town famous for making of Glasses; Torcella, Grade, and Ca∣orle.

Their Territory upon the Terra-firma compre∣hends seven considerable Governments, viz. Tre∣vigiana, Padua, Vicenza, Verona, Brescia, Bergamo, and Crema, upon which depends many little Towns, Chastellanies, and Forts, of which every one has a Gentleman for its Governor; but all these Go∣vernments last but sixteen months, that those who are in possession might not have time by making an interest, to make themselves Masters. For the State of Venice differs much from the judgment of Tiberius, who seldom changed his Governors, pre∣tending that being satiated with the Blood of the People, they would grow honester men. In short, the threats of Lentulus Getulicus to the said Em∣peror, to raise his whole Province, if he sent ano∣ther over his head, is a good arguement how dan∣gerous it is to continue Governors too long, be∣cause the People will look upon them as their only Masters, and 'twill be no little difficulty to resume an Authority that has been left too long in their hands.

The Cities of Padua and Brescia are always go∣verned by ancient Senators; Verona and Bergamo by Noble Venetians betwixt 35 and 40 years of age, who before had passed thorow many Offices in Venice: the rest are commanded by young Gen∣tlemen of the best Families of the Nobility.

Every 4th year is sent a poor Noble Venetian to Vicenza, by reason of a Present of Silver which

that City makes every fifth year to their Gover∣nor before his departure.

The City of Vicenza is stil'd the Senat's Eldest Daughter, because she was the first upon the Terra∣firma that surrendred to the Commonwealth of Ve∣nice in the year 1404.

'Tis a long time since the Podestats were per∣mitted to carry their Wives with them to their Governments, lest the Governors themselves should be governed by them. But the Senat ob∣serving the disorders that hapned in several Fa∣milies by the absence of the Husbands, the Chastity of their Wives being many times assaulted, and often overcome by solicitations of their Gallants, (as hapned to the Wife of the Chevalier Lewis Molin, and others of later date) they released the severity of that Law, in compassion to those per∣sons who served abroad. But then it imports the Husband to have an eye over the Conduct of his Wife, that at their return from their Command, they be not reproached as several Pro-Consuls were at Rome, for having under their Administration duo Praetoria, duo Tribunalia; for though the fault may be in the Wife, the scandal lies wholly upon the Husband, and 'tis he must answer for it. In these Commands it is that the Nobles are allowed to exceed in all manner of magnificence, because thereby they signify the extraordinary Grandure of the Publick Majesty, and imprint love and ve∣neration in the minds of the People.

The Captains at Arms.

THE Office of a Captain at Arms upon the Terra-firma, answers to the Military Tri∣bune in Rome; and in all Inscriptions upon publick Buildings, he is called Praefectus Armorum, or Tribunus Militum.

His Office is to Command the Souldiers of the City, and all the Garrisons under his Jurisdiction: he judges in all differences betwixt Officer and Souldier, without application to the Podesta. All the Chastellains of the Town, and quite thorow his Territory, receive his Orders, and submit to his Jurisdiction, as well Noble Venetians as others: It is his care to look to the reparation of the Walls, Gates, Ports, and Fortifications, as he plea∣ses. He has the disposing of all the Revenue and Imposts in his Government, and in all places be∣longing to it, the Camerlingues who receive it, giving an account to him, and not daring to dis∣burse a farthing without his Authority; to the end the publick Money should be disposed to the pub∣lick Use, and that those who keep it may not have power to purloin. The Roman Praetors had the disposing of their Treasure; but the Venetians will not allow that liberty to the Podesta's, that by parting equally they might moderate their Autho∣rity, and bring them to some balance and propor∣tion with the Captains at Arms, which are the two Officers that represent the Majesty of their Masters, and are therefore called by one com∣mon

name Rectores, like the Provincial Harmo∣stae of the Lacedemonians, in their smaller Towns there is only one Rector, who is Podesta and Captain at Armes both.

The Captains at Armes at Padua and Bres∣cia, are always Illustrious Senators, who for their Services may challenge the Robe of Procura∣tor par Merite, when any of those places are vacant.

The Captain of Bergamo has a deliberative Voice in the Pregadi at his return, as also the Chastelaine of Brescia, by peculiar Priviledg above all the rest of the Governours of Castles or Forts.

When great Officers in a Town differ about Jurisdiction, which happens very oft, they are not allowed to defend their Cause with any thing but the Pen, that is to say, by humble Remon∣strances to the Senat; and if they come to Blows, both parties are judged Criminal, as well he that receives, as he that offers the Injury.

In Friul.

THE Proveditor General of Palma Nova is the chief Officer of the whole Province; and this Office (always in the nomination of the Senat) is biennial, and supplied by a Sena∣tor of the first Rank.

The Governour or Lieutenant of Ʋdina is the second Officer in the said Province, and at his re∣turn may be proposed for admission into the Council of Ten. There are under him two Offi∣cers, one called the Marschal d'Ʋdina, who is a kind of Chastelaine; and the other a Treasu∣rer.

The City of Ʋdina in the year 1415, came un∣der the Dominion of the Venetians, with the whole Province of Friul, which before was un∣der the Patriarchs of Aquileia, to which, the Counts Savorgnanes contributed much, and were made Noble Venetians for their pains.

In Istria.

CApo d'Istria the chief Town in that Pro∣vince, and a Bishoprick, is Governed by a Podestat and three Councellors of the poor∣er sort of the Nobility.

Cita-Nuova, Parenzo, and Pola, all three Epis∣copal Towns, have each of them their Podestats, as also Piran, Rovigno, Cherso, Osero, and Raspo, which last has the Priviledg of having a Senator, because 'tis a place where much is gained with little expence, and therefore some of the poorer sort of Senators are sent thither.

In Dalmatia.

THE Proveditor General holds the first Rank, and Commands all the Governours Prove∣ditors, and Chastelanies of Towns and For∣tresses in that Province; and therefore that Charge is always executed by an Illustrious Senator, or Procurator; for besides the Authority, 'tis a place of great Profit.

He has under him a Forreigner who Commands the Forces as General, but can do nothing but by his consent; not so much as gratify a Souldier with a Peny, nor order him a loaf of bread more than his Comerade.

The Cities of Zara, and Spalatra, two Arch∣bishopricks in Dalmatia, are Governed each of them by a Count, and a Chamberlaine, who per∣forms likewise the Office of a Chastelaine. These Officers are two years in Office, as is the Proveditor of Clessa, a Fortress upon an inacces∣sible Mountain. The Chastelains of Traeo and Ze∣benigo are biennial likewise.

Cattaro, an Episcopal Town, has two Magi∣strates, one a Proveditor, and the other a Camer∣tingue, each of them changed every two years.

Budoa, the last place of the Venetians upon the Coast of Dalmatia, has its Podesta, whose autho∣rity continues but two years. 'Tis not many years since Dolcingo was under their Dominion, but they lost it to Selymus II.

In the Isles upon the Mediter∣ranean Sea.

THE Commonwealth has always a Provedi∣tor, and two Councellors at Corfeu, which she has possessed ever since the year 1382, in de∣spight of all the efforts of the Turks; it being one of the Keys of the Golf. Corfeu is an Archbishoprick worth 4000 Ducats per annum, always supplied by a Noble Venetian, and furnishes Venice with 200000 Minots of Salt every year; 'tis guarded by Sant Ange, a Fort thought to be impregnable.

The Isles of Zephalonia and Zante are Go∣verned each by a Proveditor, and three Councellors, renewed every two years.

These three Islands have a General to whom the respective Proveditors are subservient and accountable. He is always a Person of eminent Quality, and continues in his Command sixteen Months.

And to the end all these Officers may be kept in their Duty by the fear of a scrutiny, the Senat creats every five years three Syndics to visit all the Towns and Forts depending upon the State, to hear the Complaints of their Subjects against the Podestats, Captains and Proveditors, and to inspect their several Administrations, like the Inquisitors of Sparta, called Thucydides 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and the Persons sent by the Romans in∣cognito into the Provinces, to inquire into the Conduct of their Officers: whereby the poorer sort who are not able to come with their Com∣plaints to Venice, have a way open to revenge themselves at their ease, if their Governours have done them any injury.

It remains now that I speak something of their Principal Military Commands at Sea; all of which are executed by Noble Venetians, whereas those at Land are given to Strangers for the reasons above-said

The Generalissimo, or Cap∣tain-General at Sea.

THis General is always a Noble Venetian, and Created by the Senat, in time of War to Command the Fleet of the Commonwealth. His Power is so absolute over all other Generals, and Captains, that he seems a Dictator, and ra∣ther a Sovereign than a Subject, for the three years of his Command. His Authority extends not only to the Fleet, but to all the Ports, Isles, and Fortresses, where his Orders are received without dispute: and if he goes to any of them in person, the Clergy are obliged to meet him, and the Keys are presented him by the Gover∣nours and Rectors, as if all the Senat came with him ; and indeed all their Power is in him; so that it is no less than Treason to disobey him, or contest his Orders. Formerly the Senat allowed him not to enterprise any thing, without advice of them; but the distance many times retarding their affairs, and the Resolution of the Senat not arriving till the opportunity was lost †, it leaves him now to his own liberty to act as he sees oc∣casion, only recommending this Caution to him, to manage things so that the Commonwealth may receive no detriment thereby ‡. And this they do with more Confidence, because he has the pos∣session

of no Town or Port to which he may re∣tire if he be false, and therefore is obliged to keep always at Sea, exposed to the mercy of the Wind and the Waves.

Moreover there is no Prince whatever who at their return uses their Generals worse than the Venetians. If any of them have lost a Battle or a Town, they are plagued by the Inquisitors of State, or rather by as many Judges as there are Nobles in the City: the Commonwealth having given them the Conduct of their Armies, and the Govern∣ment of their Towns, upon the same condition the famous Lady of Sparta gave the Buckler to her Son, Aut in hoc, aut cum hoc: intending there∣by, that he should either dye, or return with what she had given him. If they obtain a Victo∣ry, they must render an account to those who emulate their success, and will be sure, if not to procure, to encourage their accusers. In time of Peace they always debase them, and the meanest Nobleman will not only think himself his equal, but beard him in the competition of any new Command, which renders the Yoak of their O∣bedience very heavy to the Subject. But if a new War be begun, and the timidity and in∣capacity of the others be compared with the Experience, and Courage of these , then it is that Envy gives place to Desert, and their Rivals in time of Peace, do Homage to their Valour during the War.

When the Genoeses were at Chiozza, and thought of nothing but Plundering of Venice; the Senat was obliged to discharge honourably their Gene∣ral

Victor Pisani who was then in Prison for the loss of Pola*, a Town in Istria, and to joyn him in the Sovereign Command of the Army with Andreas Contarini, to the dishonour of all his ca∣lumniators. Antonio Grimani after he had Con∣quered the Towns of Monopoli, Mola, Pulignan, Trani, Brunduscium, and Otranto in Pouelle, was degraded from his Procuratorship, and Banished into Istria, for unhappily losing the Battle of Modon to the Turks. But after he had been Banished ten years, he was called back again upon an exigence, restored to his Dignity, and at last Created Duke.

In the year 1670, the difference betwixt them and the Port about Confines in Dalmatia, having caused the Venetians to apprehend a new Rup∣ture, the whole World immediately cast their eyes upon Francis Morosini, though he was in disgrace, and at that time actually under a Charge: and not without cause, for there was none but he capable of the Command which he had in Can∣dia, and had the War gone on, the Senat would have been constrained to have begged him to have taken upon him the Generalship again.

The awe the Captains have of the Council of Ten, does not deter them from applying their utmost industry to raise their own fortunes though to the prejudice of the Publick, not doubting but to find an Asylum, if they have where withall to purchase it ; providing against the worst, out of an opinion they shall certainly be questi∣oned at their return, how moderately soever they have behaved themselves; and therefore the fear of an inevitable suspition, incourages them the more boldly to pillage, that they may revenge themselves beforehand for such injury as they are like to meet afterwards. And yet

they use all imaginable Artifice to conceal the defects of their Administration, being desirous to appear as innocent as Gracchus who assured the People of Rome that he went rich to Sardena, but returned poor .

A General of Candia would have perswaded the Venetians to the same thing by borrowing 4000 Ducats of a Merchant to defray the Ex∣pence of his entry into his Procuratorship, though he had brought back several Barrels of Silver which stood him in good stead. For there are but few such persons as the Procurator Nani, who imployed all the Money he had received as a Gratuity from the Senat, in presents to the Commissioners from the Port, by which means the Contest about Limits was brought to a happy accommodation. Whereas many others would have applied it to their own proper use, as their Comerades do at Constantinople.

The habit of these Generals is always Scarlet, with a Bonnet of the same Colour, like the Mer∣tier of the Presidents of Parliament. They never lay aside their long Cloak, made in the fashion of that which the antients called Chlamys no not even in Fight.

The Proveditor-General at Sea.

THis Officer, called in their Ducals Classis Le∣gatus, as the other is called Classis Imperator, is perpetual, not as to person (who never holds the Command above two years) but as to the Office which is constantly supplied, contrary to the former which expires with the War. His Authority extends to the whole Fleet, which he manages as he pleases in the absence of the Captain-General. He has Power to Cashier, or punish, even with Death, such Officers as are defective in their Duties, as well Noble Venetians as others. He disposes of their Commands. He pays the Souldiers and Seamen, disposes of the Money belonging to the Fleet, and is accountable to the Senat at his return.

The Generalissimo and the Proveditor having served their time, lay down their Dictatorship at Capo d'Istria, and return to Venice, and their former condition of life, retaining nothing of all their Grandure, but the honour of what is past and the hopes of what is to come.

They are obliged by a certain Law to deli∣ver themselves up into Custody before they give an account of their administration, especially if they have been overcome, which is a great cause of Persecution at Venice, where nothing but success is considered. General Francis Mo∣rosini not complying with the said Law, incensed

the Nobility exceedingly against him, insomuch that after he had happily withstood one Attack, he was over-powered by a second, and forced to do that dishonourably, and by necessity, that he might have done before with reputation, by giving his enemies an example of Modesty and Obedi∣ence.

The Captain-General and the Proveditor are em∣ployed as Spies one upon another, which produ∣cing a reciprocal distrust, keeps both to an exact∣ness in their duty; and though the Proveditor be inferior, the Power is divided in such sort, that the second has Authority without Force, and the first Force without Authority. That is to say, one has Power to propose what is to be done, and the other to do or not do it, as he pleases, not much unlike the practice in Rome, where the Senat pro∣posed, and the People resolved. The ordinary Re∣sidence of the Proveditor is at Corfeu.

The General or Governor of the Golf.

THE State of Venice keeps constantly in the Golf a Squadron of six Galleys, and some few Foists to defend the Mouth of it against Pyrats, and all Men of War; as also to exact the duties upon all Goods that pass that way.

This General is the ancientest Officer belonging to this State, and in that respect has always the Van upon any Engagement at Sea, with this pre∣rogative, that when-ever it happens there is no

Generalissimo, he supplies the place before any other Officer, till the Senat orders another, so that neither the indisposition nor death of the Genera∣lissimo brings any distraction or delay to their Na∣val Affairs.

The Office is perpetual, but the Officer conti∣nues but three years, and is always a Gentleman of principal Quality.

The General of the Galeas∣ses.

THE Galeasses are a sort of Castles and For∣tresses in the Sea, in which are commonly 1000 Men, and 1000 peeces of Canon. The Captains are called Governors, always Noble Ve∣netians, and Strangers always excluded.

These Governors own no body but their Gene∣ral; but their General receives orders from the Generalissimo. And because Victory depends much upon the Conduct and Courage of this Person, his Office is always supplied by a man of more than ordinary Experience and Valour.

There is also a General of the Galions, who super∣intends all the Stores and Ammunition of the Fleet. These two Generals are created only in time of War, as is a third Stranger General called General da Debarc, who Commands all Souldiers detach'd from the Fleet to make a descent upon Land: and after his Commission is executed, he brings them back again on Board, where nothing remains to him but the Titles of General and Ex∣cellence.

Besides these Generals, the Senat entertains two Captains, each of them with the Command of four Galleys, one Squadron free, and called di Buone-Voglie; the other of Slaves, and called Condem∣nati.

All the Galleys are Commanded by young Noble∣men of Venice, called Sopra Comiti, who have full Power over their Souldiers and Seamen, but only of death, disposing of all inferior Places as they please: and this is allowed them to recompence their Levies of Men, which they do com∣monly at their own charge; the Commonwealth providing nothing but the Hulk of the Galleys, and the Provisions of War, and paying the Souldiers no longer than from their coming on Board.

These are the principal Sea-Officers the Ve∣netians have in pay, and they are always cho∣sen out of the Body of their Noblemen: but because the chief Care and Charge of these Generals is to defend their Dominion in the Adriatick-Sea, known by the name of the Gulf of Venice, the Venetian being Master there, it will not be amiss if in this place I speak some∣thing of that Sea.

Of the Soveraignty of the Ve∣netians upon the Adria∣tick-Sea.

THE State of Venice has been so long Ma∣sters of this Sea, it would be ridiculous to question their Title. They have had posses∣sion of it from the very birth of their State, whose very Cradle was in the Lakes of this Sea, whilst Fishing was their nourishment, and the Isles about them their Demesnes. Not that the whole Gulf belonged to them from their infancy, for they possessed only a small part of the Sea be∣twixt Ravenna and Aquileia; but as they encrea∣sed in age, and the Emperors quitted their pro∣priety in the Gulf, the Venetians began by little and little to extend their Dominion, and having droven out the Corsairs who infested it much, and disturbed their Navigation, the possession became entirely theirs, and has belonged to them ever since.

First, by the Law of Nations, which gives the propriety of Derelicts (that is to say, Lands or Goods forsaken, and belonging to no body) to the first that can occupy them.

Secondly, by the Right of War, which the State of Venice maintained 170 years together against the Narantins, who disputed their Title, and at last submitted in the year 996. Against the Nor∣mans, with whom they had several Battels in the

Pouille; against the Genoeses and Pisans, who were their Competitors for more than 300 years; to which may be added the consent of the Greek Em∣perors, who were so far from complaining at the Venetians pretence, that they were very well pleased to see the Narantins (their ancient ene∣mies, who infested that Sea, and had put it often under Contribution) so happily subdued by their ancient friends. For by that means the Emperors continued in their obedience Istria, Dalmatia, Al∣bania, Pouille, Abrazzo, with part of Romania, which places being before exposed to the pyra∣cies and depredations of the Narantins, as lying upon the Adriatick-Sea, mutinied, and com∣plained of the weakness or negligence of their Emperors, remonstrating that without better pro∣tection, they would find out other Masters, who should be more careful of them: and doubtless they had done it, had not the Venetians undertaken the Guard of the Gulf, and chased away the Cor∣sairs, who threatned Italy, Hungary, and several other Provinces in Germany with universal ruine: so that the justice of their possession has for seve∣ral ages been allowed by all the Princes of Europe, whose Embassadors are every year accompanying the States at the Ceremony upon Ascension-day, when the Doge marries the Sea, by throwing into it a Gold-Ring with these words, Desponsamus te Mare, in signum veri & perpetui Dominii. Which is never, contradicted by any of the Embassa∣dors.

Some Historians will have it that Pope Alexan-III gave them their first Jurisdiction, in recom∣pence of their services done him during the per∣secutions of Frederick Barbaroussa, and in memo∣ry of the Victory obtained at Sea against Otho his Son: but it is a vulgar mistake confounding the

Ceremony of their marrying the Sea (first insti∣tuted by the Pope) with the donation of their Do∣minion: the People taking a solemn declaration of the Venetian Right, and a formal recognition of their Title In re jam de facto possessa, for an act of Concession, by which the said Pope put them into possession of the Gulf. Which could not be, for the Pope neither having nor pretending to any Right in the Adriatick-Sea, could not transfer to another a thing in which he had no interest him∣self. And this truth is much confirmed by the words of a Pope to Duke Sebastian Ziani, Hunc annulum accipe, &, me autore, ipsum Mare obnoxium tibi reddito, quod tu, tui{que} successores quotannis sta∣tuto die servabitis, and he goes on in the institu∣tion, Ʋt omnis posteritas intelligat Maris possessionem Victoriae jure vestram suisse. 'Tis not therefore by Donation from the Pope, who himself allows them a precedent Title, (Jure Victoriae,) adding, At{que} uti uxorem viro, ita illud Imperio Reip. Venetae subjectum. And therefore it follows the Pope can no more take away this Right from the Venetian, than he can take away a Wife from her Husband, because the States hold not from him, but from the success of their Arms; as is asserted more po∣sitively in another Author, reporting the words of Alexander to be these, Ʋt omnes intelligant Maris possessionem jure belli Vestro deberi Imperio. And this their Embassador Jeronimo Donato intimated to Pope Julius II, who in raillery demanding where the Titles and Justifications of their Soveraignty in the Gulf were, the Embassador as pleasantly re∣plied, If your Holiness pleases to produce the Origi∣nal of Constantine's donation to Pope Silvester, you will find the Concession of the Adriatick-Sea to the Venetians indorsed upon the back of it. For it ap∣pears manifestly by this Answer, that State of Ve∣nice

founded not their Dominion upon any preten∣ded Donation from Alexander III: and that their Title was not writ with ink, but with the blood of the Narantins, Normans, and Genoeses, that they forced out of the Gulf; as also with the blood of their own Citizens, which was freely shed in de∣fence of the common Cause of all Italy against the Barbarians.

The Venetians alledg moreover, that they possess the Adriatick-Sea upon the same account as they pos∣sess Venice it self; and that the possession of the said City having never been disputed by the Emperors, be∣cause the Venetians built it in an abandoned place; so their Dominion in the Gulf has never been contested, as being forsaken by the Emperors of the East, the ancient Proprietors of it. And last of all, that if their Arguments or Writings be too weak, they have Galleys, and Sea-men, and Cannon enough to prove themselves lawful and true Lords of that Sea. And it was answered to a Spanish Embassador, who signified to the States the design of the Infanta Maria Sister to the King his Master, and lately married to Ferdinand King of Hungary, to pass with the Spanish-Fleet that was to attend her thorough the Gulf of Venice to Triest, That the Republick of Venice having indisputably the Domi∣nion in those Seas, could not admit any Men of War but her own. That nevertheless, if his Catholick Majesty would accept the offer they made him of their Galleys, her most Serene Highness should be received and conducted with such Honour as was due to her Extraction, and to the Grandure of the House of Austria: but if his Majesty should refuse their offer, and choose rather to be take himself to force, they would defend themselves and their Jurisdiction to the last. And the Senat caused it to be told to the Viceroy of Naples by their Re∣sident

Mark Anthony Padavin, That if the Court of Spain declined the generosity of their offer, and be∣took themselves to Arms, the new Queen must be content to run the hazard of a Battel, and expose her self to their Cannon before her Nuptials could be celebrated.

The Duke of Ossune had some years before ex∣perimented their resistance, by the loss of several Ships sent into the Levant under his Banner to in∣tercept the Venetian Traffick; in which he was assisted by the City of Ragusa, that received his said Ships into their Ports of Calamotte, and Sancte Croix.

The Popes every nine years send new Bulls to the Senat, by which they continue to them the Tenths of the Clergy for the defence of the Gulf, which imports the Popes very much in respect of the Marche d'Ancona, where the Corsairs made fre∣quent devastations, and never landed but with rich plunder, they carried away considerable num∣bers of the Inhabitants into slavery.

THE THIRD PART.

The Holy Office of the Inquisi∣tion of Venice.

SUch is the coherence and connexion betwixt the Inquisition, and Government of Venice, that one is not well comprehended with∣out the other: wherefore to render my work more compleat, I have made an abridgement of the Treatise of Fra. Paolo about the Inquisition, in which we may see the Measures the Senat took with the Court of Rome, and the Ecclesi∣asticks. But because my design is to give you an extract, not a translation of those passages, it cannot be thought strange that I have not fol∣lowed the order of the Original, nor pinned my self up to the words of the Author, his sentiments be∣ing sufficient. And to give more light to the mat∣ter, in two or three places I have added some∣thing of his History of the Council of Trent, and of the Excommunication of the Venetians; a me∣thod which I suppose will not be displeasing to the Reader.

When the Inquisition was first introduced in Venice, it was not by Command of the Pope, nor

by any Papal Bull; seeing the Bulls of Innocent IV, Alexander IV, Element IV, and of seven other Popes, could not oblige the Venetians to receive it, as the rest of the Principal Towns in Italy did: But it was brought in by Decree of the Grand Council, to which Nicholas IV consented; framing to that end his Bull of the 28 of August 1289, in which he inserted the Decree of the Coun∣cil, with all its Clauses; one of which ran thus, That the Senat should assign a Fond for the necessary ex∣pences of that Sacred Office, and should likewise re∣ceive all the Money issuing from Amerciaments, or otherwise, to which end the said Senat should name an Officer to be accountable to them. Which is a thing quite different from the Custom of other Inquisi∣tions, where the Money goes to the Inquisitors.

The Inquisition at Venice is mixed, partly of Ecclesiasticks, partly of Seculars. The Ecclesia∣sticks are Judges, the Seculars are Assistants, whereas formerly the Seculars were Judges in Cases of Heresy, upon information from the Ec∣clesiasticks, whose Office was only to examine the Opinions of those who were accused of He∣resy; after which if the Ecclesiasticks found them guilty, the Duke and the Council condemned them to be Burned. And this Secular Inquisi∣tion continued from the year 1249, (at which time it was established upon occasion of the Wars betwixt Pope Innocent IV, and Frederick the Emperour) till the year 1289, when the Eccle∣siastical Inquisition was admitted by the Senat. So that there having been in Venice Secular In∣quisitors against Heresy, before the erection of this Sacred Office, occasion was given to take in Ecclesiasticks among the Seculars; it being unrea∣sonable that the new Inquisitors admitted only by favour, should exclude the antient, who in reality were their Masters.

There are therefore three Senators always as∣sisting in the Prince's name to all Transactions and Decrees of that Court, in which nothing pas∣ses whereof the Prince is not thorowly adver∣tised. The Ecclesiastick cannot bear Witness, nor Cite, nor Examine a Delinquent, but with the participation and assistance of these three Sena∣tors: For which reason the Secretary begins all Acts with this form, Cum assistentia & praesentia Illustriss. & Excellentiss. D. D. N. according to the agreement of Pope Julius III, with the Re∣publick of Venice. And if the Inquisitors presume to do the least thing without the knowledg of the Assistants, 'tis actually void: so that if in their absence, process be framed, it suffices not that the Articles, or particularities, were commu∣nicated to them before Judgment, nor that they were present when Sentence was pronounced, for the Senat will not trust to the integrity of the Ecclesiasticks: but new Process must be made from the beginning to the ending, otherwise they can∣not proceed to execution: by which means the Senat prevents disputes with the Court of Rome, which turnes every thing into President though but once done.

And if the Inquisitors should desire of the As∣sistants permission to make any Process without them, it is expresly forbidden them to grant it, because condescension belongs to the Prince, not to the persons who represent him. Besides this permission is not equivalent to the presence of the Magistrate, who knows not afterwards whe∣ther the Inquisitors have done well or ill: a thing of no little importance to the service of the Publick.

There are also Assistants in all places under the Dominion of the Venetians, where there are In∣quisitors;

it being convenient, if not necessary that all inferiour Cities should be subject to the Laws and Customs of the Metropolis, with safety to their Immunities and particular Priviledges; and therefore the Rectors assist in the Sacred Of∣fice, and perform all the Functions of the Assist∣ants in Venice. But because the other Duties of their imployments, may sometimes hinder the Rectors from being present, the Vicar of the Po∣destat, or some other Curial Officer, is permit∣ted to go in their stead. And here it may be ob∣served that the Curial Assistant is not to serve as a Councellor to the Inquisitor, though he be so to the Podestat, the Office of a Councellor and an Assistant being incompatible; because the Councellor is an Officer of the Inquisition, and by consequence depends upon it, but the Assistants de∣pendance is only upon the Prince whom he re∣presents: so that if the Curial should become a Councellor, the Assistance, which is a thing of Superiority, would degenerate into Counsel, and render the Person subject to the Inquisitor; which would be a great prejudice to the Secular As∣sistances that the Court of Rome would willingly abolish.

This Assistance was an infinite trouble to Pope Paul V, who had an inconceivable desire to in∣crease the power of the Ecclesiasticks. For the Inquisition being the principal Nerve, and chief Prerogative of the Papacy, as was pretended by Paul IV; it was very unpleasant to Paul V (who boasted, That God had made him Pope to mortify the presumption of the Seculars) to see the Ve∣netians humble the Pride of the Ecclesiasticks, and hold the Inquisitor in dependance upon the Assistants. Pope Julius III thought he had gained a great point, when in his agreement with the

Republick he hedged in this Clause, Cum assisten∣tia & praesentia, imagining it would evidently appear that the three Deputies from the Senat were not Judges in matters relating to the In∣quisition, but only Assistants. Nevertheless the Court have since owned how much that Assistance is prejudicial to their Authority: and that which before they interpreted a Victory upon the Ve∣netians, they have since found to be a conside∣rable loss. Wherefore they have applied the ut∣most of their endeavours to abolish that Custom, as injurious to their Authority; but the Senat has so well defended it, that the Popes have gi∣ven over all further thoughts of contesting. The care the Assistants took to suffer no Act to pass without the form Cum assistentia, &c. which pleased the Romans so well, has proved an ad∣vantage to the Venetians, who have since made use of that Clause, to shew the Custom of their Assistance. The Popes would willingly deny it, notwithstanding their Agreement in 1551, pre∣tending that they were ignorant of the nature of an Agreement, which implying the consent of both parties concerned, could not be revoked or cancelled by one: It being little less than a con∣tradiction to affirm, that a thing concluded be∣twixt two Princes under reciprocal Obligations, should notwithstanding remain at the disposition of one of them.

These Assistants take no Oath of Fidelity to the Inquisitors, seeing they are neither Officers of the Inquisition, nor called thither by the Ec∣clesiasticks. On the contrary they are sent thither by the Doge to observe the proceedings of the Inquisitors, and inform the Senat of what passes, in persuance of an Oath they take to conceal nothing from him, nor to do any thing without

his Order. And by this it is the Inquisition at Venice seems to be mixed, both of Ecclesiasticks and Seculars. For where it is purely Ecclesiastical, all the Seculars swear Secrecy and Fidelity to the Inquisitors. But here the Assistants have power to suspend the Decrees of the Inquisitors, and to stop the Execution of their Sentences, not only when they are contrary to the Laws and Customs of their Countrey, but when they in∣terfere with their private Instructions from the Senat, or the particular Rules of their Govern∣ment.

And if anciently the Dukes of Venice swore at their Election to punish Hereticks, it was to God and the Commonwealth (as the Kings of Spain do at this day) not to the Inquisitors. But there is great difference betwixt swearing indefinitely, and swearing to another person: the first Oath being an Act that binds him only to himself and his own Conscience, whereas the other ownes a Subjection and Obligation to him to whom he swears. And to prove that the Doges never took any such Oath, we need no more than the De∣claration of Duke Peter Gradenique given in Wri∣ting to Frier Anthony an Inquisitor, who would have had the said Duke sworn to have preser∣ved the Papal and Imperial Constitutions against Hereticks: To which the Duke replied, that af∣ter the Oath he had taken at his Election by the Contract betwixt the State of Venice and Pope Nicholas IV, he the said Duke was not to take another, or oblige himself to other Eccle∣siastical or Imperial Orders than what were spe∣cified in the said Contract. In the mean time the Inquisitors despairing to bring the Assistants to any such Oath, they endeavoured to oblige them to Secrecy in some things relating to Cen∣sures

and Excommunications: but the Assistants were inflexible, being satisfied they were under no Ob∣ligation to the Inquisitors, because they were none of their Ministers; and that the Doge ought to be acquainted with all passages among them, for the convenience of his Government; it be∣ing more his interest to maintain Religion, than it is the interest of the Ecclesiasticks, who respect only the service of God, whereas the Prince does it both for Gods sake, and the Subjects, whose repose is alwayes interrupted by Heresy. In short, if the Senat meddles in matters of Re∣ligion, it only imitates Constantine, Theodosius, Charlemain and others, who did the same, and were so far from being thought Usurpers, that they were applauded, and had thanks both from the Popes and the Bi∣shops; the Popes having many times exhorted them to undertake that Care: And if at this day Ecclesiasticks, are sole Judges in Cases of Heresy, 'tis by the Concession of Prin∣ces, who are not thereby stript or devested of their Right, which is inalienable; nor of their Power, for which they are equally responsible to God, whether they execute it themselves or by Deputy. And by consequence 'tis their Du∣ty to have an eye over the Conduct of those, to whom they commit so great a share of their Power, and to remove them if they abuse it.

The Inquisitors pretend that at least the Secu∣lars have no right to Assist at the Process of an Ecclesiastick; supposing erroneously that the Secu∣lar Assistance was introduced only for what re∣garded the Laity. The Venetians reply, that their Assistance is not appropriate to the Per∣son, but to the Crime; and that therefore He∣resy

being a Secular, as well as an Ecclesiastical Of∣fence (it being on the one side an Invasion of the Faith, and on the other an Invasion of the Peace of the Publick) it follows that all Heretical Causes are to be Judged by the Ecclesiasticks, with interventi∣on of Seculars, which is contrary to the practice in other Countries, where if the Cause be Spiritual, the Secular person is Judged by the Ecelesia∣stick; if Temperal, the Ecclesiastick is judged by the Secular. Besides, by a pretension of the Inquisitors the Cause of a Priest or Monk turned Heretick, (though his accomplices are Secular) ought to be judged only by Ecclesiasticks as be∣ing Ecclesiastick, which is to open a door for the Inquisitors to drive out the Assistants,

In the year 1610, the Inquisitor of Brescia u∣pon occasion of a Capuchin of that City's being accused at Rome, made an Essay to take from the Assistants the Cognizance of such Processes as were begun at Rome: By which the Secular Assistance would have been abolished; for the Inquisitors of the State of Venice would have found means to have ingaged the Accusers either by promises, or pretences of Religion, to send their Depositions in Writing to Rome: upon which that Court having examined the Informa∣tion, would have returned their Process to the places where the Inquisitors would have been Masters. But the Wisdom of the Senat defeated that artifice; and order was sent to the Rectors of all their Towns to have a strict eye upon the Conduct of the Inquisitors, and to see they exactly observed all the Statutes and Formes of the Venetian Inquisition, without receding one jot for any thing the Monks could alledge. For the same reason the Senat ordered their As∣sistants to take care the Inquisitors did not insert

in their Processes any Forreign Statute, that the Court of Rome (which makes advantage of every thing indulged to them) might not innovate in the Venetian Inquisition, which ought to be regulated by her own, and not by the Customs of the Inquisition of Rome, upon which it had no dependance being not of Papal Institution. In effect, if the Congregation of Inquisitors General at Rome should take the Priviledg to derive Or∣ders to the particular Inquisitors of Towns under the Jurisdiction of the Venetian, as they do to several places in Italy, it would be the same thing, as if the whole Process was perfected at Rome, because the other Tribunals could act no∣thing but according to their Instruction from thence. Moreover, if the Acts made by the Inquisitors without Assistants be Null in Venice, a fortiore, the Acts made out of their Terri∣tories, and by consequence without any partici∣pation of the Assistants, are vain and invalid. Not but if the Congregation at Rome send any Directions or Rule that is convenient to be ob∣served, and does not clash with the Temporal Jurisdiction, the Inquisitors, ought to receive it with respect, and put it in execution; provided it be done according to the Stile and Custom of their Countrey, the form of the new Decree running in the name of the Inquisition of the Place, and passing in presence of the publick As∣sistants, without mentioning that the Decree came from Rome, lest the Venetian Inquisition should seem subject to the Inquisition of Rome, upon which it has no dependance: for it imports not much though the Direction comes from Rome, if in the publication no Authority be ac∣knowledged but the Authority of the Senat; for 'tis that Authority which animates the Decree,

because if the Duke admits it not (as it happens many times in Venice) the Decree is void and and of none effect. Again when the Inquisitors execute any Command from Rome, they examine not whence it comes, but whether it be use∣ful to the Publick, and conformable to the Cu∣stom of their Countrey, not enquiring whether it was done by their own motion, or instigation from other People, so no other name be mentioned in it, than the name of the Inquisition of Venice.

The Assistants are likewise to hinder the In∣quisitors from publishing any Bull old or new, without permission from the Duke; and this is founded upon the following Reasons.

1. First, Because a compact cannot naturally be, but by consent of the parties contracting, and therefore is not to be changed but by common accord. Thus the Inquisition being established in Venice by Agreement, no new Law ought to be admitted, but by consent of both parties con∣cerned; and therefore the Bulls and Decrees of the Court of Rome made since this Agreement, have no obligation upon the Commonwealth of Venice.

2. Again, If the Court of Rome makes Orders and Laws according to their own sentiments and designs, it is not equitable that the Repub∣lick of Venice receive his new Decretals with∣out examining first, whether or no they be con∣sistent with their affairs. Every Prince knows the Interest of his own State, the Popes do not con∣cern themselves for the interest of Secular Prin∣ces, 'tis therefore the Princes duty to watch that nothing new, or dangerous to their affairs be foisted upon them by the Papal Order; for that which the Popes propose of running to them in case of disorder is a remedy worse than the disease, seeing by that means they would make

themselves Arbiters in all Civil Controversy what∣ever. Wherefore the State of Venice has been always very shie and cautious in that case; no Prince in Europe having pried more narrowly, seen farther into the designs of Rome, nor op∣posed them with more vigor and success: and her caution is continued to this day, the Pub∣lication of no Bull being permitted but after long and mature deliberation. And if it so hap∣pens, his Holiness sends a Common Bull to se∣veral Princes, the Venetians are always the last who receive it; not that they may Regulate by the example of the rest, but to have time to sift and discover the subtilties of that Court, which are always introduced with pretences of Religi∣on. In fine, as the Popes apply themselves in∣dústriously to the augmentation of the Ecclesi∣astical Power, and the subjection of the Secular; the Senat on their side are as solicitous against it, using all possible care at the reception of any Bull, that nothing may surprize them: and to this end they cannot be presented to the Colledg, till they have been canvased and subscribed by two Doctors, entertained on purpose by the State to give the Doge notice if they contain any thing of Mystery or Innovation. And this diffi∣culty in the Senat at the reception of their Bulls, makes the Court of Rome as cautious how they offend them.

Thus much for the Assistance; let us now exa∣mine how far the Jurisdiction of the Inquisitors in the State of Venice extends.

First, The Jews living in the Territory of this State, are not punishable by the Inquisition for any Crime they commit; and this Rule is founded u∣pon St. Paul's Doctrine , that Ecclesiastical Autho∣rity

extends not to those who are not, nor ne∣ver were of the same Church: and by a deci∣sion of Pope Innocent III, it has been Declared, that the Jews not being subject to the same Law, should not be Judged by the Law: and there∣fore in Poland they are judged by Palatins, and not by Ecclesiasticks. Moreover, it is well known that Sixtus V, and Clement VIII, granted Safe∣conduct to the Maranes, to remain, and traf∣fick in the Town of Ancona, without being mo∣lested or disturbed by the Inquisitors, contra∣dicting the Bull of Gregory XIII, of the year 1581, which subjected Jews, and all other Infidels to that Sacred Office. Besides the Inquisition being erected only against Hereticks, Judaisme being no Heresy, falls not under their Jurisdiction.

If a Jew speaks irreverently of our Religion, if he blasphemes our Mysteries, prophanes our Sacred things, debauches any body to his Religion, the Ecclesiasticks, and other persons concerned, bring their complaints to the Officer on pur∣pose for Blasphemy, who fails not to punish him severely according to ancient Custom in the Church, by which the Ecclesiasticks concerned themselves no farther than to judg whether the Opinion complained of as Heresy was contrary to our Faith; which having determined, they committed them to the Secular to be Judged. And this was the Practice of the Church under the Roman Empire, till the Division in the year 800; and in the Eastern Empire to the last.

2. The Inquisition Judges not the Greeks, for these following Reasons.

First, Because 'tis unreasonable the Ministers of Rome should Judge the Greeks in their own proper Cause, the Greeks insisting upon the ob∣servation of the Canons which submit every Na∣tion

to its own proper Prelats; and the Romans pretending to be above the Canons, do challenge a right of changing and vacating the ancient Constitutions and Laws of the Councils and Fa∣thers. This Doctrine has caused the separation of those two Churches, which lived in unity and Christian Charity the space of 800 years before; the Greeks acknowledging the Pope to be St. Pe∣ters Successor, and first of all the Catholick Bi∣shops, whilest he contented himself with the Power the Canons allowed him, and kept him∣self within the bounds of his Primacy; without pretending to Sovereignty over the rest of the Bishops.

Secondly, Because the Doge permitting the In∣quisition to meddle with the Greeks, would les∣sen his own Authority over them, and leave it to such as could not exercise it without great trouble and confusion. The Power of punishing Offences in matters of Religion, has been always invested in the Civil Magistrate quite through the Grecian Church, as the Greeks of this age do readily confess, as desiring that Custom might be continued: and thus Justice is administred to the Greeks by the Civil Power with general sa∣tisfaction; whereas if the Inquisitors interposed in their affairs, the whole Nation would oppose themselves against their Judgments, and mutiny against their Soveraignty.

Thirdly, Because the State of Venice receiving the Greeks under the Venetian Protection, permit∣ted them to live secondo il Rito loro: But their Customs and Statutes would subject them to Princes for punishment of all Temporal Crimes, and to Prelates of the Church for Spititual Of∣fences. From whence it follows, that it belongs not to the Inquisitors, either to Judg or Examine

what the Greeks do, or believe privately, but only to inform the Civil Magistrate of such as are scandalous, either in their actions or words. Besides, the Republick of Venice does no preju∣dice to the Church, by permitting the Greeks to live according to the general Custom of their Countrey, because that permission was the prin∣cipal Condition of their Obedience to that State: and for the Senat to subject them to the In∣quisition, would be no less than of good and faithful Subjects, to make them Rebels, and im∣placable Enemies; from whence no advantage could accrue to the Inquisition.

For these Reasons the Commonwealth of Venice (that Governs its Subjects by peaceable Principles more than any other Prince in Europe) have been unwilling to consent that the Greeks should be liable to the Judgment of the Inquisitors, let the nature of their Charge be what it would.

Thirdly, The Inquisition of Venice hath no Cog∣nizance of such as have two Wives, though they pretend to it, alledging that Crime to be an a∣buse of the Sacrament of Marriage. To which it is answered, that the first Marriage (which is good) rendering the second void, there is no a∣buse of the Sacrament, and by consequence it be∣longs not to the Inquisitors to rectify, but to the Civil Magistrate, who is obliged to punish the injury the Husband does to his Wife; because 'tis an offence against Civil society as much as Adultery, which every body knows is not sub∣ject to the Inquisition. Bigamy is Judged by the Lords Criminal of the Night, as also the Jews who live in Adultery with the Wives of Christians.

Fourthly, The Inquisition meddles not with Blas∣phemy, because it belongs to the Secular Ma∣gistrate according to the Civil and Canon Law,

and Custom of all Christendom. But if the Blas∣phemer gives any suspition of Heresy against the Informer, the Inquisition Judges of the suspition, and with him the Magistrate for Blasphemy, so by that means the accused person is never un∣punished, there being two sentences against an Offender, one of the Sacred Office, for Spiritual chastisement, the other of the Civil Magistrate, for Corporal correction.

As to what the Inquisitors say, that 'tis too great severity for a man to have two Sentences, alledging an old Aphorisme, That one Judg is suf∣ficient for one Offence; the Venetians reply, It is no inconvenience to have two Judges in the same Cause, when the punishments inflicted are of se∣veral kinds, and the ends of those Judgments are different. So in the case of Blasphemy (which savours of Heresy) the natural end of the In∣quisitor is to convince the Blasphemer of the truth, and to absolve him from the Censures in∣curred by his Blasphemy; whereas the end of the Civil Magistrate is to punish the injury to the Divine Majesty, whose Service and Ho∣nour all Princes and Magistrates are obliged to regard, because it is he who has put the Sword of Justice into their hands, to be the Ministers of his Indignation and Vengeance.

From whence it must be concluded that Prin∣ces, being charged with the care of Religion, which God has recommended to them so oft both in the Old and New Testament, are bound in Conscience to imploy their Authority against Blasphemers, for whose punishment the Inquisition

has no Pains suitable to the greatness of their Of∣fence, because the pains they inflict are Spiritual, and not being so sensible, the Blasphemers and Swearers do frequently relapse into the same Im∣pieties; so that 'tis absolutely necessary for the service of God, and the good of the Common∣wealth, that the Secular Mastistrate has Jurisdicti∣on in these Cases, to retain people in their Du∣ties by fear of Corporal punishment.

For the same Reasons, Sorcerers, and such kind of Delinquents are not judged at Venice by the Inquisition, which notwithstanding has Cognizance of Heresy, when indicated by abuse of the Sacra∣ments.

Fifthly, The Senat suffers not the Inquisition to take notice of Usurers, Victuallers, Innekeepers, nor Butchers who sell flesh in Lent; The Magi∣strate being qualified for the punishment of such offenders when accused by the Ecclesiasticks, be∣cause in appearance the exorbitance of those kind of people proceed only from Covetousness: for to imagine a Butcher that sells Flesh in Lent does it, because he thinks Abstinence at that time un∣necessary, is a fancy that may make all sorts of whimsies Heresy.

Sixthly, It is not allowed the Inquisitors to make Information against either the People or Magistrates for any thing relating to the admi∣nistration of Justice. The reason is this, Because Heresy being a personal fault, the people can∣not be accused of Heresy, though every one were Hereticks: and by consequence the Inquisition ought not to proceed but against particulars, the Commnoalty being under the Protection and Au∣thority of the Prince. So the Magistrate con∣sidered as a private person, may render himself suspected of Heresy by his words or his actions;

but considered in his Office, he cannot either for the one or the other be subject to the cen∣sure of Inquisitors, because as such, he is invested with Publick Authority, and can be responsible only to his Prince.

If the Magistrate gives impediment to the proceedings of the Inquisition, either by hinder∣ing the appearance of a person accused, or sum∣moned in as a Witness, the Inquisition is not to proceed but only by remonstrating to the Magi∣strate or Prince, by means of the Assistants.

And forasmuch as the Inquisitors have often endeavoured to insert new orders in the Edict of Justice, which by Custom they publish at the entrance into their Office, some of them have reiterated the said publication five or six times, to foist in such Commands and Inhibitions as are suitable to such occasions as they think ought to be favourable to them. To prevent this inconveni∣ence, the State has wisely limited the form and or∣dinary tenor of the said Proclamation to six Heads, to which nothing can be added by the Inquisi∣tor.

The First is against such as are Hereticks them∣selves, or knowing others to be so, do not disco∣ver them.

The Second against those who hold meetings or discourses to the prejudice of the true Re∣ligion.

The Third, against those who Celebrate Mass, or Confess Sinners, without being Priests.

The Fourth, against Blasphemers, whose Faith is suspected.

The Fifth, against those who obstruct the Of∣fice of the Inquisition; who offend its Ministers, and threaten to abuse the Informers or Witnesses per causa del Officio, that is to say, by reason of

their Office, or out of animosity to the persons concerned. For if it be upon other occasion, he who did the injury to the Officer of the Inquisition ought to be Judged by the ordinary Magistrate: otherwise it would be a great abuse, by which the Ecclesiasticks would quickly esta∣blish a right of punishing all sorts of Offences, and bring all Causes before them, and therefore the Senat has wisely added this restriction, Per opere spectanti ad esso Officio.

The Sixth against those who have, Print, or cause to be-Printed Heretical Books tending to the subversion of Religion. In these cases the Assistants have power to stop the proceedings of the Inquisitors.

There was a good Law made by the Council of Ten in the year 1568, by which the Confisca∣ted Estate of a person condemned for Heresy went to the right Heirs, upon condition no part of it was applied to the use of the Condemned person. So that the Ecclesiasticks were wiped of the advantages they formerly made of those they condemned, the Seigniory of Venice-holding it cruelty to deprive the Son (who perhaps is a good Christian) of his Estate, for the Heresy of his Father. Against this Law the Court of Rome continually mumurs, but with little suc∣cess

As to the Books forbidden by the Court of Rome, the Commonwealth of Venice will not al∣low the Inquisitors to publish in their Dommions any other Catalogue of prohibited Books, than that which they received by agreement with Clement VIII, 1596. And as this Catalogue has been Printed several times since, and the Inqui∣sitors have used all imaginable Artifice to foist in new prohibited Books, and by that means elude

the agreement, so the Senat has doubled their vi∣gilance, and put themselves in a condition not to be imposed upon by the Ecclesiasticks: and when the publication of any new prohibited Book that treats not of Faith, is in question, before the Senat consents, the Tenor and Doctrine of the Book is thoroughly by their Order examined, and the Rea∣sons soberly considered that moved the Court of Rome to condemn it; after which, if the Book be prohibited, the prohibition runs in the Doges name, and not in the name of the Inquisitors.

But because the Inquisitors have caused the Catalogue of 1595 to be Printed very oft, all out of ostentation, and to let the World see that the licensing of Books belongs wholly to the Eccle∣siasticks; the Senat has given Order that the said Catalogue should not be Printed for the future, but with the Articicles of Agreement at the end of it: by which the Ecclesiasticks have lost much of their heat and desire of Printing the Catalogue again, because they would have no Copies of the Articles, that contain in them many checks and re∣strictions of their Power in those Affairs.

As to defamatory Libels writ against the repu∣tation of their Neighbours, though by Ecclesi∣asticks themselves, the Venetian affirms that the Inquisition ought not to take Cognizance of them, because their Office was established for the extir∣pation of Heresy, not the castigation of Calumny; that Function belonging more properly to the Ci∣vil Magistrate, to whom God has recommended it.

If the Ecclesiasticks be sufferers in it, they must apply themselves to the Magistrate, and he will do them Justice. If any man writes against their Immunities, the Prince only has Right to punish it, because 'tis from his Grace and Liberality they

hold them, and 'tis he only can preserve them: nor indeed is it agreeable that priviledg'd Persons should have the defence of their own Priviledges, or be Judges in their own Cases. But there are few such Libels in Italy to be seen, though new ones are dispersed every day by the Romans against the Power of the Seculars, for zealous are they in the diminution of the secular Authority, and so furious in augmentation of their own.

Moreover the Ecclesiasticks are not competent Judges of Books relating to Civil Government: it belongs to Princes who have States to govern, to approve or reject the Maxims contained in such Books, seeing such matters fall not under the cog∣nizance of Ecclesiasticks, to whom God has for∣bid the medling in secular Affairs. Neither are they to be admitted Judges in Causes where they con∣cern themselves with so much passion, as to call Tyranny and humane Invention the power which God has given to secular Magistrates, and Heresy and Blasphemy that Doctrine which impugns their Opinions. Thus Cardinal Bellarmin in one of his Books has the confidence to pronounce those He∣reticks who affirm Kings and Soveraign Princes to have no Superior in Temporal things but God. Insomuch that to follow his Doctrine, and the Do∣ctrine of the Romans, we must believe there is no Soveraign Power but in the Pope.

Again, the Venetian suffers not the Inquisitors to censure Books of Love or Gallantry, though they contain many things of Honour, and good Man∣ners; First, because the Inquisitors are instituted to judg of Heresy, but not to censure Manners. Secondly, according to St. Paul's Doctrine, the publick Honour and Tranquility are entrusted with the Civil Magistrate. Thirdly, because offences committed either by word or deed against the

reputation of another man, or against civil decen∣cy or decorum, or things indisputably belonging to the secular Judg, and by consequence the same offences in writing belong to the same Judges. And here it is worth observation, that the Court of Rome pretends not to Jurisdiction over Books that treat not of matter of Faith, but since the year 1550, and that this Usurpation is turned into Custom and Right by the negligence of the Prin∣ces of Italy, and their Ministers, who shifting that care upon the Monks, insensibly devested them∣selves of that part of their Authority, which they never perceived till it was too late to recover.

There has been no State, but the Republick of Venice, that has always discerned the importance of this caution, and by consequence not suffered di∣minution in their ancient Rights: but the Venetian Ministers continue to peruse all the Books that are Printed, to the end that nothing may slip in of erroneous Doctrine, hindering likewise such Books as have been Printed formerly, from being Re∣printed or exposed to sale, to prevent the increase of that mischief which otherwise they might do.

Again, the Cardinal Baronius magnifies exceed∣ingly the Enterprizes of Jurisdiction made for∣merly by the Court of Rome, affirming boldly in a Letter of the 13th of June 1605 to the King of Spain, to complain of his Ministers for stopping the sale of the Eleventh Tome of his Annals in the States of Naples and Milan, That the Pope was the sole lawful Judg of Books, and that therefore neither Princes nor any of their Ministers could con∣demn such Works as his Holiness had approved. To which the King replying, not by words, but deeds, and suffering the Prohibitions published by his Mi∣nisters to proceed, the said Cardinal in his 12th

Tome printed 1607, added a Discourse to this pur∣pose, That it was an horrid and impious thing for Kings or their Ministers to censure such Books as had been approved by the Pope, or to forbid the Sta∣tioners to sell them. That it was to rob St. Peter of one of the Keys that Jesus Christ had given him, that is to say, the knowledg that is to discern betwixt good and evil. And at length, that the Ministers of Spain had prohibited his Book, because it reprehended the injustice of their Masters. Which evidently dis∣covers the passion of the Romanists, who think it lawful to speak irreverently of Kings, and to de∣cry their Government by invectives under the Cloke of Religion, whilst Princes are not allowed Power to hinder the reading of such Books in their own proper Dominions. What disorder would it produce in the World, if the approbation that Popes for their own interest have given to Books written against the Secular Power, should oblige all Princes to receive them? What could be more unreasonable than to require a Book wherein the King is called Tyrant and Usurper, his Ancestors defamed, and his Subjects excited to Rebellion, should be printed, read, and sold publickly even in the Territory of the said Prince? And yet this is no more than Baronius preten∣ded to, who after he had spake dishonourably of several Kings of Aragon, and particularly of Fer∣dinand in his Discourse of the Sicilian Monarchy, believed that Philip III had done him great injury not to permit the sale of his Book, though full of acrimony, and invective against his Predecessors and Parents.

As it is undoubtedly true, a Book treating of matter of Faith, and licensed by the Pope, cannot be condemned by any secular Power; so 'tis as cer∣tain, a Book treating of History or Civil Govern∣ment,

may as justly be prohibited by Princes, or their Ministers, though licensed by all the Prelats in Europe.

For the Expedient Baronius proposes of repair∣ing with humility to the Bishops for suppression of such Books as the secular Magistrate shall judg pernicious or scandalous, I have said already the Remedy is worse than the Disease, seeing thereby the Ecclesiasticks would make themselves in a thousand things that belong not to their Juris∣diction. Besides, that Government would be very imperfect that had not in it self power to provide what was necessary for its subsistance, but must at∣tend till remedy be applied by those whose interest it is to have the mischief continued, and who will never address themselves to reform it, but as their own interest prompts them.

And therefore, in my judgment, Princes are not to rely upon the diligence of other People in things that concern the good of their State, God Almighty having given them Authority to secure themselves. In short, 'tis only the Prince under∣stands what is proper for his State, and therefore no reason he should be beholding to the Pope for what he has of his own, which made John de Mon∣luc Bishop of Valentia say, upon occasion, That it would be madness to see Paris on fire, and to expect till water could be fetch'd from the Tyber to quench it, when the Seine was so near. The Venetian Policy is quite contrary to the Policy of the Pope: What is good for the Ecclesiastical State, is otherwise for the Civil: and if it were not, nothing could oblige the Civil State to conform; and therefore a Doctrine may be good at Rome, that may be per∣nicious at Venice, Vienna, Madrid, and every where else. Wherefore the Pope's approbation cannot devest Princes of their Authority to condemn such

Books as are likely (if not intended) to breed disturbance in their States.

But the truth is, so far are Popes from being law∣ful Judges of all manner of Books, that they have usurped upon Seculars in the very power of sup∣pressing of Heretical Books. In the eight first Centuries all Books were examined, and censured by the Councils, but prohibited by Princes for reason of State. The Council of Nice declared the Doctrine of Arius heretical, and then Con∣stantine by an Imperial Proclamation prohibited his Books.

The second Council of Constantinople pronounc'd Eunomius an Heretick, and Arcudius the Emperor published an Edict against his Works.

The third Council of Ephesus condemned Ne∣storius, and the Emperor Theodosius commanded his Books to be burned.

The fourth Council of Calcedon having con∣demned the Eutycheans, the Emperor Martianus published a Decree against their Books. Which shews that the prohibition even of heretical Books belongs not so properly to the Ecclesiastical, as to the Secular Power: for though the Ecclesiasticks may judge whether there be Heresy in a Book, it follows not but a Secular Prince may, by his Edict, forbid that Book that is censured by the Eccle∣siasticks, and they have no reason to complain that one of St. Peter's Keys is taken from them; seeing the prohibition of a Prince gives more force and vigor to their censure.

As to the Stationer, the Senat consents that those who keep or sell Heretical Books, be punished by the Inquisition: but it suffers not an Inventory of their Books be taken by the Inquisitors; that they receive permission to sell them from the Inquisi∣tors, nor that they give them an Oath; which

the Inquisitors have endeavoured many times to obtain, as also to insert into their Edicts Commands beyond their power, alledging that they pretend not to give an Oath to a Stationer, but for things to which their conscience obliges them, that is to say, not to sell prohibited Books; and that by their Edicts they only intend them advertisement of what they ought not to do: but these are but cunning pretences, for to give an Oath, and ad∣vertise by Edict, (though in things that are just to be done) are acts of Superiority and Jurisdiction. Besides, the Edict and Oath are things of that na∣ture, that he who transgresses either against the one or the other, is worthy of punishment.

To these the Inquisitors add another reason, that seeing they are Judges of Heresy, they ought (in consequence) to judg every thing that relates to it, and therefore they have a right to command the Stationers, because Heresies are no way more dangerously disseminated than by Books.

To this the Venetian answers, That for Books which contain Heresy, the Inquisitors have right to prohibit them, and punish the Stationer who sells them; but for all other sort of Books, the Stationer is not accountable to the Inquisitors, nor to bring their Inventories before them. For 'tis but ill Logick to infer the Inquisition may extend its Authority to all Books, because Heresy is often taught in Books, for all Books treat not of Faith, which is the only subject belonging to that sacred Office, and therefore those that treat not in that way, fall not under the Jurisdiction of that Court. If the Inquisitors were Judges of all that had re∣ference to Heresy, though never so remotely, there would not be any Crime nor Error but might become matter for the Inquisition; there would be no need of Civil Magistrates, and by degrees

the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction would worm out the Secular.

There is but one point in which the Republick of Venice seems to have over-shot her self, and that is in having suffered the Popes to send forreign Inquisitors among them, when their own Subjects might execute that Office with as much charity and discretion, as they who know nothing of the customs and practices of their Country. In Spain the Inquisitors are all Spaniards: in the Dutchy of Milan the Natives are not excluded; and there∣fore the Venetian, in other things so jealous of their Authority, in this seems to be in worse con∣dition than the King of Spain.

Nevertheless, if it be considered that the In∣quisitors cannot be received into the Towns to which they are sent, unless they first present them∣selves before the Prince for his Letters Patents directed to the Rectors of the place, it will be found the danger is not great, seeing that if an Inquisitor be not liked, the Prince has the remedy in his hands, and that is by delaying (if not deny∣ing) his Patent, without which, his Patent from the Pope is ineffectual. Which is a good way of discouraging forreign Monks, by making difficulty to receive them; and this is a true secret (when they please) to oblige the Court of Rome to name their Inquisitors, out of the Subjects of that State.

The Inquisitors of Venice hold their Court in the Palace of St. Mark, where they meet twice a week.

Such of the Assistants as have business with the Court of Rome, cannot remain in the sacred Of∣fice, their intelligence there rendring their fidelity suspicious to the State, which puts others into their places. So the Inquisitors have no capacity to

corrupt any of the Assistants, because the Office of these Gentlemen ceases that very moment in which they address for any favour from the Pope.

This is all I have judged necessary to be known relating to the Inquisition at Venice; I shall pass now to the true Causes of the decay of this Mag∣nificent Commonwealth.

A Discourse containing the Chief Causes of the decay of the Venetian Common-Wealth.

IT has hapned to the Common-wealth of Venice as it hapned anciently to the Commonwealth of Sparta; both the one and the other flourished whilst they contented themselves with the little latitude of their own Countries, and both began to decline when they had acquired more than they could manage.

Sparta was Mistress of all the chief Provinces in Greece, and no sooner had two Theban Captains rescued their Country from the Dominion of the Lacedemonians, but all the other Towns they had conquered, followed the Example, and revolted. The State of Venice, grown to be great and for∣midable in Italy by its prodigious increase, and the detriment of the Princes she had over-reach'd, lost by one single Battel as she had usurped upon

the Terra-firma, because her foundations were not sufficient for the weight of so vast an Edifice. Which makes it evident, that as the health of the Body proceeds not so much from the meat it takes in, as from the digestion that is made; so the strength of a State consists not in what it gains, but what it is able to keep. And if it be true that a State can never maintain it self, but by means conformable to its principle, no wonder if the Republick of Venice conceived in Fear, brought forth in the Waters, brought up in Poverty, and elevated in Peace, began to decline from its great∣ness, by engaging in a War with the Dukes of Mi∣lan and Ferrara, without considering the nature of their Forces, or the difficulty of maintaining their Conquests . Had the Venetians followed the wise counsel of their Doge Thomas Moccineguo which he gave them upon his death-bed, to content themselves with their Conquests at Sea, where they had acquired so many fair and rich Islands, the delights of the Terra-firma would not have debauched them, nor provoked the emulation and jealousy of all the Princes of Italy who were ob∣liged to unite in a War against them, to curb their extravagant ambition. They might better have resisted the Turk, who finding them otherwise employed, began from that time to invade Greece, and infest their Maritime Provinces. And Politi∣tians have observed, that the recovery of their Lands upon the Continent, was the first cause of the loss of Cyprus and Candia, places of much more importance than their Towns upon the Terra∣firma. And therefore P. Scipio had reason, when to the Officer who cried about the Streets in Rome, Jupiter auge Rempublicam, he told him he had much better pray to Jupiter to preserve, than to encrease it, Satis esse auctam, dicens, dummodo

Conservaretur. Though the Lacedemonians were all professed Souldiers, they punished not those who lost their Swords in the Battel, but those who lost their Bucklers, it being then an infamy among them, as since among the Germans : to shew that they esteemed it less Glorious to Con∣quer than to Defend, the Sword serving for In∣vasion, the Buckler for Defence. With much more reason, the Venetian being a People of the Robe, and for Councel, ought to have imployed their Buckler against their Neighbours, and ap∣plied themselves more diligently to their Interest in the Levant, where Fortune had been so fa∣vorable to them.

A Second Cause of their decay is the slowness of their Councels. 'Tis true, this fault is common in all Commonwealths, but with them it may be said to be in extremity, their Senat seeming sometimes to be asleep, with so much heaviness and inactivity it moves upon several occasions. They had seasonable advertisement of the vast∣ness of the Ottoman preparation for the Invasion of Candia, and yet they thought no more of putting themselves into a posture of defence, than if they had had no former experience of the Turkish perfidy, or had been assured, by Revelation that that great Force was not intended against-them. This Confidence was founded upon the Promises of an Infidel who deceived them, by making them believe that the Designes of the Port were against Malta, though Hungary and Poland might have given them wholsom instances of fear, and distrust. And John Sorance, their Embassador at Constantinople admonished them of their danger, and exhorted them constantly to provide; but apprehending to disgust the Grand-Seignior if they should discover any open suspition;

and fearing to precipitate themselves by false Measures, into a War against which they thought themselves safe by virtue of their Alliance, which they had lately renewed, they saw the Fortress of St. Theodore surprized; and the City of Canea besieged, before they would believe their Coun∣trey was to be the Theatre of the War, and the whole Charges to be defraied by them. Which shews there is a certain Fatality that governs all things, and blinds the wisest persons living when misfortune is at hand .

The loss of Canea drew after it the loss of Retimo, and the Field. And when there was no∣thing remaining to them but the chief City and some few Villages and Forts, they began to de∣liberate in despair: The greatest part were for delivering it up freely for Peace; and it had been certainly done, had not John Pesaro, since Doge, bravely Remonstrated to the Senat, That if they gave up that place to the Turk, it would be the way to make him more insolent; to increase his Contempt of them, and raise in him an insatiable desire to Invade them, by the easiness of his Con∣quests; and therefore it was his Judgment better by a vigorous resistance to discourage him. That if he were once master of Canea, he would quickly demand the three Isles, and the rest of Dalmatia. That to be Conquered and Submit to their Force would be no scandal; but to submit for fear would be dishonourable and base; that though an Enemy be never so formidable, we are not to publish our apprehension; That States are not maintained by Pusilanimity and Trusting . That if it be almost

imposible to preserve a Countrey already more than half lost, it would be the more honourable to defend it Courageously, the less likelihood there was of success. That the Commonwealth of Venice like a Corpu∣lent man, had need to Exercise to dissipate the gross Humours it had contracted by too long repose. That the War in Candia was like a Wound, to be kept open, to prevent a Gangrene: That the Eyes of all Christendom were upon them to observe how they followed the steps of their Glorious Ancestors, and what expression they made of their Constancy and Courage. And that if their Forces were not strong enough for the Turks, yet they were strong enough in such a desperate juncture, where their Honour and Safety was at stake. This Discourse turned the Scale, and put the Senat upon a resolution to maintain the War to the utmost extremity, which they did a long time with prodigious ex∣pence.

And here it is to be observed, the Venetians who are naturally very fearful and superstitious, were not so when they should have been. Some Months before the Turks landed in Candia, a Nobleman of that Countrey, being present at Mass with the Senat, in the Chappel of the Col∣ledg, stole the Pax which is usually given about to be kissed; and not many days after, in the Court of the Palace of St. Mark, the word Pax out of the Verse, Justitia & Pax osculatae sunt, fell down out of the hands of Justice in the sight of several persons; which was taken as a certain presage of the War † wherewith that Republick was threatned, in the opinion of all People: and the Omen was much more intelligible than that whereby Ceditius Prognosticated the coming of the Gauls to Rome. But the Senat made no use of these Prodigies, either willing to conceal

its distress, according to the Custom of Prin∣ces ‡, or else insensible of its danger.

Thus the Venetians lost the Kingdom of Cyprus by their irresolution, though the Procurator Hie∣ronimo Zane, and Pascal Cicogne, their Generals in Dalmatia and Candia, remonstrated to the Se∣nat, that they were not to expect till Selymus declared, but to look upon it as certain, and provide to meet him with a good Fleet at Sea, to hinder his descent in that Kingdom. The Se∣nat understood the importance of their Councel, when it was too late to make use of it , for Selymus gave them no leisure to repent †, so ill it is to comply too much with an ill Neighbour, or to discover a fear.

By the same irresolution the State of Venice lost her interest upon the Terra firma not ma∣ny years since; because they came not to a de∣termination before the Consederate Princes inva∣ded their Territories. They might easily have judged their Power too weak to have resisted the united strength of the Pope, the Emperour, the French, and the Spaniard, and therefore it had been their interest to have divided them, as they might easily have done by giving up part for the safety of the whole: But ambition to grasp what they could not hold, dazled them for discerning their true Advantages, and made them lose what they were unwilling to leave. They gave the Enemy time to joyn their Forces, and never o∣pened their Eyes till they were beaten at Vaila

by the French, after which they began to think of peace, and having surrendered to the Pope, Rimini, Faienza, Ravenna, and Cervia, they beg∣ged his Mercy, as if they had been his Rebel∣lious Subjects, promising never to intermeddle in Ecclesiastick affairs, nor to tax their Lands with∣out permission from the Pope: They offered the Emperour, Verona, Vicenca, Padua, and several places in Friul, of which they owned them∣selves Usurpers:

They proffered him an Annual Tribute of 50000 Ducats, protesting that if he would pitty their Condition, they would Record him in their Annals for their Father, their Redeemer, their Founder, obey his Com∣mands, and for the future never separate from his Interest.

So poor Spirited and abject does Adversity make many People, and those especially who before the danger are most huffy and high, as were the Venetians .

In short, to the King of Spain they restored Frani, Otranto, Brindes, Monopoli, Mola, and Pulignan, all which they held in Pouille. To the Duke of Ferrara they delivered up the Polesin; and this they did rather in despair and a fright, than upon good deliberation, as is franckly con∣fessed by Andrew Moccineguo who writ in the heat of the War †. Whereas had they thought in time of satisfying the King of France, or of dividing the Pope from the League, they might have been able to have defended against the rest of the Princes, as appeared afterward; for Julius II. con∣ceiving a jealousy against the French (whose pro∣gress he feared) and retiring from the League,

the face of the Venetian affairs quickly changed, and several of their Towns returned to their o∣bedience.

The same thing almost happened before in the League that Pope Sixtus XII made against them with the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan; and the Florentines, for Ferrara. For if Lodo∣wick Sforza Governour of Milan had not left the League, the Venrtians (who had lost their Fleet upon the Po, and all the Territory of Bergamo, Brescia and Verona, that the Duke of Calabria Son to the King of Naples had taken from them) had without doubt been deprived of all their possessions in Lombardy. But upon Capitulation with Sforza, whose Quarrel they Espoused against the Calabrians, who would turn him out of his Government of Milan, all was restored, without being obliged reciprocally to the restitution of the Polesin to the Marquess of Ferrara: so that they who were vanquished in the Field, were Victors in Council, and recovered all by their management of the Treaty. To which I shall add my Reflexions upon one thing the Senat of Venice did after the loss of Candia; by which the truth of what I have said may be judged.

It was resolved an extraordinary Council should be held every Week for the carrying on of the War, which could hot be obtained at the begin∣ing by all the Remonstrances of the Chevalier Molin, who very well understood the condition of their affairs; and yet most ridiculously, at an un∣seasonable time, two Months after the Peace was concluded, this Council was set up, like a Phisitian, who prescribes after the Patient is dead, or like the Phrygeans, who assembled their Coun∣cil after the mischief was happened, to consider how they might have prevented it. The proposi∣tion

made by the Senat, at the same time to the Emperour, to purchase the Towns of Friest Gra∣disque, and Goretz, to repair their losses in the Levant, was as much out of time; For if they had Money to purchase more, it might as well have been laid out to keep what they had.

The Third cause of the disorder of their affairs, is, because the Senat consisting of so great a num∣ber, and their Affairs determined by plurality of Voices, ill Councels (provided they be covered with plausible appearances) are oftner followed than good, which most commonly displease, either from the difficulty of Execution; or because the good or ill Consequences are not generally fore∣seen by several of the Members, who discern not what is True from what is False, nor what is Convenient from what is Destructive: So that it is sometimes at Venice, as Anacharsis said it was formerly at Athens, where the Wise Consulted, and the Weak Resolved; for Voices are counted, not Reasons conside∣red ; for the Vote of a Fool is e∣quivalent to the Vote of the wisest, and they being always fewest, no wonder if their Councel miscary. Thus did they conclude to League themselves with Lewis XII, against Sforza Duke of Milan, to have in Recompence the Town of Cremona, and the Countrey de la Ghiara d'Adda, because the advantage was present; whereas the Graver of the Senators advised the contrary, ac∣cording to Principles of true Policy, not to drive out a Neighbouring Prince, to let in a more Po∣tent into his place: and this occasioned after∣wards the League of Cambrey, which Melchior Trevisan had Prognosticated before, telling them in full Senat, That the King of the Romans would

joyn more readily with the King of France against them, than with them against so powerful a King; because united with France it would be easy for him to Conquer the Venetians, whereas with them, it would be very hard to prevail against France; and by consequence, the Republick of Venice having al∣ready so many Enemies upon their hands, they must either beat all the Princes of Europe, or be beaten by them.

Besides, there are those in Venice, who to flat∣ter the Genius of the People, and shew them∣selves zealous for their Countrey, accomodate their Councels to the depraved Palats of others. For Example, If it be in debate to render some Town that has been unjustly usurped from some great Prince who threatens by force of Arms to revenge himself, 'Tis most certain, the Sena∣tor who would perswade Restitution, should not willingly be heard; and he who should advise to keep it, would haye a Torrent of voices on his side, and be esteemed a good Citizen, though he betraied his own Conscience and Countrey by a Councel he knows must be the detriment of the State. In this manner it was that the Pro∣curator Dominick Trevisan prevailed against the just Demands of Julius II, who contented him∣self with the restitution of Rimini, and Faenza (Usurped under his Papacy) to refuse his Rati∣fication of the League of Cambray. An effect of the feebleness and ignorance of the generality of Mankind, who not regarding the future, chose rather to lose all afterward, than at present to part with any thing, though for the safety of the rest: like the Merchants that perish in the Sea, because they will not suffer any part of their Goods to be thrown over-board. Or like those obstinate People, who will rather run the hazard

of a Gangreen, than endure the pain of an incon∣siderable Incision: so that whatever Exprience the Venetians have had, they will not change their Method, and thereby verifying the saying of the Italians, That the State of Venice never releases any thing willingly, that she has once got in∣to her clutches.

But we are not to admire such ill Councels are given in the Pregadi, seeing ill Counsels are most acceptable, and good, not only rejected, but heard with indignation. The Councel that Bartholomew Alviani gave, them to carry on the War into the Enemies Countrey, according to the old Rule of the Romans, and to invade the Dutchy of Milan, before Lewis XII. passed in∣to Italy, was looked upon as rash, though no more than their affairs required, and in appear∣ance that rashness would have 'been happy; but it seems the Senat wanted both Courage and Providence . Besides, the wisest of the Senators do many times forbear giving their advice, as knowing the danger of exposing themselves to the Capriccio of the weaker sort, who are as much their Judges as the greatest of the Sages. For the Proposers of great Enterprises, like those who throw up great Stones into the Air, are in great danger of having them fall upon their heads: and again, if they succeed, every one will pretend to the Glory, as Tiberius told the Senat †: but if they miscary, the Blame redounds to the Author, though the fault be in the ill management of all. Those who at Rome advised that the Consulary Tribunes should be indiffe∣rently chosen out of the Nobility and People, were generally blamed both by the People and the Nobility (though the People had Espoused the Interest of the Nobility against the Senat)

when they understood that the first Popular Con∣sul who Commanded the Army, was defeated by the Enemy: and almost the same thing happened at Venice during the War; They condemned at last what they approved in the beginning, and they judged of the Actions of their Generals only by the success of their Arms, which many times is a wrong and irrational Argument. They have another ill Custom likewise, and that is, How good soever the Resolution is, that their General takes in any dangerous exigence; how advantageous soever the terms they make with the Enemy, they always find fault and account it the worst . And therefore after they had received with satisfaction and great applause the News of the Peace which General Morosini had made in Candia, and had ratified it with all expressions of extraordinary approbation, in a few Months time they changed their note, and made the deliverer of their Countrey (as they called him before) a Criminal, and a Traitor.

Moreover, the State of Venice is much subject upon any ill-conjuncture of their Affairs, to take the middle-way, which is commonly the worst . That is to say, of two Counsels proposed, one ge∣nerous and brave, the other poor and pusilani∣mous; they frame a third out of both, without examining their incompatibility or danger.

Nor is their parsimony less pernicious to the Venetians; for the want of keeping a forreign Militia in time of Peace, when-ever War is de∣clared, they are sure to be surprized. No sooner were they delivered from the War in Candia, but they disbanded their Forces, as if they had been sure never to have had occasion for them more: and yet within a year they engaging in a new Quarrel about limits in Dalmatia, and were in

danger of losing that whole Province, before they could have reinforc'd it with 2000 men, had the Port been willing, or known how to have made use of the opportunity. The Author of disband∣ing their Army, was the Procurator Nani, and his advice was preferr'd, because it pretended fruga∣lity. So that it may be said of this State, as it was of Perseus King of Macedon †, that he knew better how to keep his Money than his Country. The Kingdom of Cyprus was lost partly by their Avarice, refusing to pay the 50000 Crowns (owing to Selymus, as Successor to the Sultan of Egypt) according to agreement with the said Sultan, and King James, whose Heirs they were; which drew upon them the displeasure and Arms of that Em∣peror ‡. Historians have likewise observed that their Avarice was the chief cause of the ruine of their Trade in the Persian Gulf; for 〈…〉〈…〉 willing to allow the Portugals should be their companions in so profitable a Commerce, they contented not themselves to excite the King of Calecut, and the Sultan of Egypt against them, and to send them Gunners and Engineers to assist them, but they called in the Hollanders, who after they had set∣led their Correspondencies and Magazins, in re∣quital, they supplanted the Venetians. In the same manner they were handled by the Turks after they had brought them out of the Black-Sea into Eu∣rope, at the rate of 25000 Crowns; for those In∣fidels having invaded Servia, Bulgaria, and Bosnia, advanced at length against Greece. God permit∣ting by a just Judgment, that those who for their base interest had sacrificed their Neighbours to those miscreants, should at length in their turn be buried in the common ruine.

And to these may be added another reason of their decay, and that is the ill-Education of their

Youth. For in Venice 'tis a common thing to see the Father courting his Concubine, and treating the other instruments of his Debauchery in the presence of his Son, who perhaps learns the act, before he understands the evil ; involving himself farther as he advances in years, being corrupted by an example he thinks himself bound to follow: so that these young Gentlemen entring into publick affairs with so wicked dispositions, 'tis impossible but the Administration must be infected. And therefore Sixtus V in a Letter to the Archbishop Matteuzzi his Nuntio at Venice, had these words, J am venit hora eorum, Their time is coming. And truly, if we consider the loss this Commonwealth has sustained within these hundred years, and what they are like to do more, unless God Almighty prevents it, it is in danger of being reduced to its Primitive Patrimony, that is to say, the bare Dominion of their Lakes and their Marshes, and which is worse, do Homage to the Grand Seignior, as Ra∣gusa does at this day.

Let us now take a Prospect of their Gover∣nours, I mean, consider the Manners and Max∣ims of their Nobility †: For as Tacitus observes, to discover the Nature and Qualities of a Go∣vernment, we must inform our selves of the ge∣nius and humour of the Prince, who is the Soul that informs it. Which occasioned an ancient Au∣thor to say, That Nature would sooner be defective in her Operations, than a State in imitating their Prince ‡.

The Manners and general Maxims of the Veneti∣ans.

IT being natural to Republicks to dread Ambi∣tious and Popular Servants. The Venetians are no less suspitious than other Nations. They love great Exploits, but many times they hate those that perform them ; believing that those who have been able to preserve their Coun∣try, may be as able to destroy it; and that therefore 'tis more danger to advance such, than dishonourable to debase them. For this cause it is they often crush those persons who have de∣livered their State; because they fear lest those tutelar Angels should out of Ambition or Re∣venge become Domestick Enemies, and Carve out their own Recompence with their Swords: thus they rid themselves of a Gentleman of the House of Loredano, who by his presence had ap∣peased a Commotion of the People, when all the Magistrates of the Town with their promi∣ses and their threats could do nothing; suppo∣sing the said Loredano might some time or other set up for the Government, having had so great success in working upon the People, like Tibe∣rius , who conceived an implacable hatred a∣gainst the Wife of Germanicus, for having stopped a Sedition which himself could not appease.

In the same manner they caused the person to

be put to death who discovered the Conspiracy of Duke Martin Falier; first making him a No∣ble Venetian, and then taking away his Life when they had done. But 'tis no small part of their care to conceal this procedure to Strangers; whose Assistance they cannot want in their Wars; and to draw whom into their service, they have caused several Statues and Monuments to be e∣rected in their Churches and Publick places in Venice and Padua, for Strangers that have ser∣ved the State, thereby to allure others with hopes of the same Honour.

They bear a hatred to any that are great with the People; the common inconvenience of an Aristocracie, where the Nobility living in constant Jealousy and distrust, every man fancies that his Companion designs by insinuating with the People, to enslave the Commonwealth; and this imaginati∣on has caused the death of many a brave Person. One Cornaro, who in time of Famine had distri∣buted Corn among the Poor, was Poisoned for his Charity, upon suspition that it was not inno∣cent; but that like Andrew Sforzi in Florence, he aimed to make himself Prince. For in such States 'tis the Custom to apprehend those very actions which they admire †, and to make away the Authors of them. How far this was the case of Antonio Foscarini the Senator, I cannot deter∣mine, for the Senate afterwards put to death those persons by whom he had been charged with sup∣positious Letters from the Spanish Embassador. By all which we may see how fatal the favour of the People proves to particular Persons ‡, especially in an Aristocracie. No wonder then if at Venice we see Gentlemen odious to the Commons, for their Extortions, and Excess. Nor is there any thing more safe, than to avoid Popularity. Thus was one Priuli called Taglia-braccia not only tolerated,

but preferred to great imployment; because ha∣ving no interest with the People, they thought there could be no danger of his designing against the Nobility. Besides, these kind of Extravagants are useful many times in Seditions and Tumults, to asswage the fury of the People, who wreaking their indignation upon such hated persons, all the rest are left free: whereas those who are Popular can∣not be touched, but it increases the Flame, and hazards a general Conflagration. Hence it is that sometimes in Venice it may be dangerous to have too great a reputation , because it may create a man as many Enemies as there are Noble-men whom he excells. And this perhaps was the cause of the Banishment of Ange Badoer the Senator, who was by some thought more Popular than was con∣venient for the Government: For some stick not to make it an Aphorism of State, That great Wits be kept under, lest elated by the applause of the Peo∣ple, they should be encouraged to aspire. Moreover, they seem not to approve of Persons above their † business and employment; and therefore they do not much countenance Learning, because they think it fills the mind with Notions, and hinders that gravity of Judgment which ought to be brought to Publick Debates, where good sense with experience suffices; whereas your Scholars many times spoil all with their Criticisms and sub∣tilties, and rather intangle and perplex Councils than clear them. But ‡ though they are not Per∣sons that do generally apply themselves to pro∣found Learning, yet they are content that Stran∣gers should think otherwise of them. And there∣fore they were offended at the expression of an Embassador of theirs, who pretending to give a rea∣son why his Superiors had in their Banner put the Book of St. Mark open, and not shut, which had been more proper, in respect of the War, said,

It was to shew that the City of Venice was re∣calling good Letters, which had been Banished from them so long. Which expression caused such Com∣motion among the Senators, that some of them cried out aloud to have the Book shut, and in anger returned to their Houses.

The knowledg of the Venetians lies general∣ly in understanding their own affairs: they trouble not their heads much with Books, beyond their own Histories and Customs, and except some few Gentlemen who have been Em∣bassadors abroad, or gone along in their Equi∣page, they are generally very little curious of forreign transactions. There goes a Story that a Se∣nator finding his Son reading the History of France, snatched it away with this Reprimend, Balordo, leggi le cose della sua Republica, e non altero. You Block∣head, if you must be reading, read your own Hi∣story, and no other.

They believe the Government of Venice a Mo∣del for all the World, and no Nation under Heaven so happy as themselves, though herhaps they are (as Tacitus saith) Magis sine Domino, quam in libertate; Rather without a Master than at Liberty. The Florentines call them Grossolum. And yet they laugh at the Florentines, who with all their exactness and delicacy of breeding have not been able to keep themselves in liberty †. So true it is, that the finest and subtilest wits are not always fittest to Govern, and that men of moderate parts, so they be setled and stayed, are more useful than sublime and exalted heads, which commonly are unquiet and unsteady, and subject to suddain and temerarius attempts. Which made that Noble Florentine say, The Venetians were much more capable of Discipline and Reason than the Florentines, whose wit was too sharp. In

effect, the Thebans who were dull, and the Spar∣tans who understood nothing but Obedience, and the Mysteries of War, were better Governours than the Athenians with all their Eloquence and Learning: The Athenians studied nothing but fine speeches, and plausible Orations, without bringing any thing to Action, as if their Senat had been only a School for Orators or Sceptick Philosophers: But the Thebans and Spartans exe∣cuted what they debated; and when they had bandied Arguments at home, they went to fight their Enemies abroad: But the Venetians are not arrived at this perfection, they are slow in Councel, and slow in in execution; and we see that many times that is taken for wisdom, and great caution, which is nothing but heaviness or diffidence.

And though they are not so fine and polite as the Romans and Florentines, yet they know their own Interest, and can manage it as well as the best. All Treaties and transactions with them are fair and smooth ar first, but their end is not always so: as the Comoedian said of the Lacede∣monians, That they did, like Vintners, bring good Wine at first, and then dash it with Vinegar. And indeed we see men are apt to promise any thing in danger, and to perform nothing when out of it, according to the Proverb of their Countrey, Scampato 'l pericolo, gabbato il Santo: When the danger's past, the Saint may go whistle. Possibly Commonwealths are the more inclined to equivocate and falsify in Treaties, because eve∣ry man may hide himself in the throng, and can be no more discovered than the Elements in the Body of a man; a shelter which Princes have not. To which may be added, that the Vene∣tians having no Commerce or Conversation with

Forreign Embassadors, they do not fear disco∣very from their Companions, nor by consequence the Clamours of Embassadors, nor the Malice of their Masters, which is an advantage they have above all other Commonwealths; And indeed, if the Historians of the last age do not wrong them, their manner of observing Treaties with Sixtus IV. the Pisans, Hercules d'Este Duke of Ferrara, and some other States, is not much to the com∣mendation of their fidelity. They are general∣ly very frank and open in their Countenances; gay and complasant outwardly, but close and re∣served at the heart. This was manifest in their Carriage to Francis Morosini; on the day of his entrance into the Procuratorship, all the Nobi∣lity flocked to him in throngs, contending with one another who should Caress and flatter him most ; and three Months after, the same persons who magnified him so extravagantly before, cried out bitterly against him, upbrading him for his Conduct as General, and promoted his Process with such fury, that one would not have thought it had been the same Senat †, or the same Nobility. And indeed in Venice any trouble∣som Person may raise a tempest among the No∣bility, among whom every one waits for an opportunity till his partner declares, for 'tis the Custom there to follow the motion of other People in things where they are unwilling to be reckoned the first Author ‡ themselves.

They are accounted Enemies of those whom they have offended, as if there could be no such

thing as a hearty reconciliation ; and usually fear of revenge begets perpetual distrust, which is the source of eternal Enmity.

On the contrary, In Commonwealths good deeds or benefits make little impression, especially what are received on the publick score, in which to the ordinary Estimate in such Governments Pri∣vate Persons are but little concerned. Revenge is natural to the Climate of Italy, and there∣fore it is no wonder if this State hath afforded Examples of it as well as others; and the less needful to mention any.

I shall only adde by way of advice to those who are concerned with the People of these Parts, That their silence is much to be appre∣hended when they are offended, because their Anger is the more irreconcilable, as it is more concealed and secret; for they conceal it, to re∣venge themselves upon occasion with more vio∣lence. 'Tis to no purpose to think to mitigate them by submission; their humour perverts all applications, and time it self cannot heal up the Wounds of an Injury, though sometimes it may moderate the smart; for as the Proverb of that Country says, they keep la Memoria in Cuore.

They visit one another but seldom, even those who are related; but they meet every day in the Broglio, where they discourse of their affairs publickly before all the World; by which means 'tis hard for any to Cabal, or Plot against the State. They suffer themselves to be rarely visited by Strangers, and they think thereby to keep up their Majesty and Grandeur, as also to avoid the expence of their Table; and therefore, if they treat any of their Friends by accident, 'tis always out of their Houses, as if it were to

let them know at what charge they do it, and to oblige them to come no more.

They are sober, whether out of Conscience or Frugality let others judg, and do eat well at a good Meal, when it is at another man's cost. At the Duke's four great Feasts, not one man invited will be absent, no more than the Pregadi at the Anniversary Treat of Cardinal Zell, and all is because there is a distribution of a Ducat a Head. So that Embassadors would al∣ways have the Barnabotes at their Tables if it were lawful to hold Conversation with them. In short, Strangers that keep Tables have al∣ways, as in other Places, some of the indigent Gentlemen to keep them company, under pre∣tence of shewing the curiosity of their Town, and explaining their Antiquities, Feasts, and the Mysterious Symbols of Abbot Joachim to be seen in the Church of St. Mark, which they shew with most magnificent Paraphrases, (most of them of their own invention,) to make the things more wonderful. Thus they tell, us the Foundation of their City was laid the same day the World was Created, that it might appear more august and venerable to Strangers †. Thus they shew Relicks and Monuments of several Victories, which many people believe they never obtained: among the rest the Canal Orphano, which they call by that name instead of del Arco, upon pretence of a defeat they gave the French there, in which those who were present left all their Children Orphans; though all ‡ Histori∣ans Ancient and Modern agree that Pepin was Victor, and received Tribute and Homage of the Venetians as King of Italy.

The account they give likewise of their Victo∣ry at Sea gained against the Mareschal Bou∣cicaut in the Levant, is of the same nature; as also the great advantage that Melchior Trevisan got over Charles VIII, at the Battle of Fornoué ; to which they might have added the defeat of the French at the Battle of Aignadel, to triumph at least over the Credulity of the ignorant.

They are much given to their pleasures; and their Mistresses are much more chargeable to them than their Wives, whom they use as their Servants. There are a sort of People among them, who make so little reckoning of Marriage, that they say, It is nothing but a civil Ceremony that binds the Opinion, but not the Conscience; and that a Courtesan that is to be hired for money, is in no worse condition than a Wife, saving for Po∣litick reasons. One thing is strange, and peculi∣ar to them, and that is, that they frequently keep Mistresses in common, viz. two, three, or four men to a Miss, and yet agree very well: Nay that which in other places occasions Quar∣rels and Murder, is an indearment among them, and makes their intimacy the greater. In their Amours, they talk freely, and will discourse of their Alliances, Designes, what Persons they in∣tend to recommend to such a charge, and who shall be excluded, as the † Germans did of old in their Feasts.

But how indifferent soever they are for their Wives, they are so jealous of them, that in Car∣neval-time they dog them wherever they go;

some have gone so far as to stab them upon bare suspition, and have been thought brave Gentlemen for their pains. Strangers have felt the Effects of this humour, as Don Dominick de Gusman, Brother to the late Duke de Me∣dina de las Torres can testify, who was Cudgelled by the appointment of Julius Justinianus, to whose Wife he had presented a Spanish Catho∣licon. But they may well be jealous, for as wise as they are, or think themselves to be, there will be stealing into their Quarters, and the Senat must keep Guards upon their Ladies, as the Spartans did upon the Wives of their Kings, unless they can be contented with a Con∣treband Nobility.

The natural timidity of the Populace is such, and renders them so Superstitious, that they take many things as Judgments from Heaven, that are but Accidents, and perhaps natural ef∣fects. A Fire happening in a Magistrates House, a Steeple blown down by the Wind, the pittiful Prediction of any trifling Astrologer, are Sub∣jects enough to set their Brains on work, espe∣cially in time of War, when every thing puts them into an apprehension, and staggers their Prudence; the † voice of the Vulgar going as far with them, as the judgment of the Sages. From whence it happens, that upon any mis∣fortune in their Army, instead of stopping it's course, the Remedy is deferred; and because they will hazard nothing, they many times lose all: Being of the mind of that Roman General, who never thought of Conquering till he had

secured himself against being Conquered ; and he who would please the Venetians must do the same. Upon this score it was, that they had a greater esteem for Count Petillan who was slow and cautious, and seldom to be drawn to a Battle, than for Seignior d'Alviano who was always for fighting, and held it as † Cowardly to decline, as Courageous to attack an Enemy. This con∣sideration has likewise lost them several oppor∣tunities, of which their Enemies have made good advantage. So when they recovered Padua from the Emperour Maximilian, they let Vicenza and Verona escape, for not accepting at first the of∣fers which these two Towns made them to sur∣render*. When, not long after, they reduced Vicenza, they let Verona slip again; which, as Moccenigo confesses, was ready to have received them. Thus did they stand in their own light, when they refused to joyn with the King of Poland, Ladislaus IV. against the Grand Seignior, Amurath IV. from whom they had received se∣veral injuries, and were at that time in danger of a War; which War was undertaken and in∣ferred afterwards by Ibrahim Brother to the said Amurath, in Confidence that the Poles be∣ing offended that the Venetians had refused them, would not be tempted to give the Turks any diversion.

'Tis reported of them, that in the choice of their Generals they differ from all other Go∣vernments in Europe, who generally make choice of Commanders that are Valiant and wise; but when any such happens to be chosen, they ma∣ny times give them such rubs and mortifications, that they are quickly taken down, or else re∣nounce their Command, to save their reputation. For 'tis said, that the great reason why Stran∣gers

are entertained in those Commands, is only to bear the blame, and that all miscarriages of the War may be shifted upon them; which made Count Pettilano Complain, That the City of Venice was readier to find sault, than to furnish him with necessaries for their service, &c. To this may be added, That the young Noblemen put upon these Generals as Companions, under the Title of Proveditors-General, are so jealous of their Authority, that they do often choose rather to ruin and spoil all by following their own heads, than to succeed never so well by the Wisdom and good Conduct of a Stranger. Pia tosto (said one of those Nobles in a Council of War) vog∣lio errare da me, che far bene con il parere de gle alteri: and where this has been their practice, they have thriven accordingly.

They easily believe whatever they desire, and good News, though false, is always welcom to them; and therefore they gave more credit to the Reports given out by the Turks, that they would besiege Malta, than to their Advice from Constantinople, to look to the defence of Candia: Nay the Senat forbad the Nobility to speak of that War, under the penalty of Banishment; which Order, and the Imprisonment of some Persons for the same, did but the more frighten the People , who are easy to believe any thing they apprehend. During the Siege of Candia they made them believe sometimes that the Grand Seignior, sometimes the Grand Visior was dead, and sometimes that Constantinople was revolted, Credula samà inter Gaudentes, & incuriosos. For they must be flattered in their distresses, and many times the vanity of their hopes make them neglect the application of seasonable Re∣medies.

The Ministers of Princes are always suspected by them, especially if they find them wise and close, as People harder to be managed or de∣luded than the rest. At their first coming, the Senat causes all their Discourse and all their Actions to be strictly observed, in order to discover their parts and dispositions; and the better to suc∣ceed in this design, they sound them sometimes by affronts offered to their Retinue, sometimes by cunning and insidious propositions; sometimes one way, sometimes another, and all to perplex and experiment his Prudence.

Thus they tried the Count d'Argenson, causing it to be asked him at his Entry, whether he would be received at the Abby of St. George not far from the Town, pretending to save him the labour of going to the Saint Esprit , in re∣spect of the badness of the Weather that day: But the cunning Embassador replied, That he was not come thither to lose any of the Rights, or lessen any thing of the Honours of his Em∣bassage; and that if he were to go as far as Chi∣ozza, or farther, neither Rain nor Snow should hinder him. At the beginning of the President de St. Andrew's Embassy, four of his Gondo∣lieres carrying certain Merchants Goods out of the Town in the night, were intercepted by the Saffs or Guards at the Town's end, without re∣gard to their Livery, or the name of their Ma∣ster, which they often repeated, though other∣wise there is no place where Embassadors are used with more formality than in Venice: which makes wisemen imagine, it was done by pri∣vate Orders from the Senat, to take off the mind of that Minister from enquiring after their af∣fairs in Candia, (which at that time were in a very ill posture) by imploying it about re∣pairing

this affront. And I remember that being in discourse one day with a Gentleman of parts, who had much access to the chief Senators, and speaking of that business, he let fall this Expression, after several other Reasons that he had given, E•• sorse che l' Senato cosi l'haben voluto? And who knows but the Senat would have it so? And indeed the little regard the Captain Grand, and the Captain of the Council of Ten took of the business, makes it more than probable; notwith∣standing by Decree of the said Council the Of∣fenders were put out of their places nel solo dubbio (as the Decree ran) that is, only upon suspicion, to Cajole the French King, and let him see how tender and sensible they were of any injury to him, whilest they themselves were the Authors of it. But 'tis not only hard, but unlawful to dive too far into the Secrets of Princes .

Again, the Venetians are apt to be jealous of all Embassadors, and to interpret all their Actions as Mysteries tending to Conspiracy. They de∣fcant upon his walking abroad upon his stay∣ing at home; upon his absence from Chappel, upon any word that falls suddenly from him, and a Thousand other things, from whence they make great conjectures, and draw mighty con∣sequences of State. One single Vive la France by some Italian Foot-men in the French Em∣bassador's Equipage, as he was going home from a Ball at the Secretary of Mantua's Lodgings, was enough to put the whole Town in an up∣roar, as if it had been a new Conspiracy of la Queva, when-as it was indeed nothing but the Hectoring of Foot-men in revenge of an

affront which they had received during the Ball. A little journey of that Embassadors to the Lady of Lauretto, was interpreted a calling back into France, and a silent Rupture with that King, though the night before his departure, the said Embassador gave notice of it to the Colledg. And whilest he was absent all the World could not disabuse them, though otherwise they think them∣selves too cunning to be imposed upon by any other.

They have a great vanity to be thought good Justiciaries, and to that end, upon Holy-days they give publick Audience in the Galleries of St. Mark, whilst the Courts are sitting, to shew that no day can hinder them from doing Justice, and that the Temple thereof is as constantly open as that of the Romans was of old. But there are two things generally complained of in their Judicature; One is, that few of them are versed in their Laws, and what they do, is only in a common road that is beaten by every body; The other, that upon any Offence they con∣demn People to the Galleys, as well for trifles as for the greatest Crimes, according to their interest, that is, to their Necessity for Rowers: and this is the reason why so few People are Executed, neither are they more scrupulous for Banishment, and Confiscation of Estates. For there needs not much reason of State against those who are rich, especially if of the Nobility upon the Terra-firma. And I remember when the French Embassador visited the Countrey-Houses betwixt Vicenza and Verona, he never enquired for the Masters of the Houses, lest they should have been answered, he is Banished, or Proscribed. Some of them are so puffed up with their Nobility,

that they think themselves equal with the great∣est Princes: witness that Nobleman who at Paris had the Confidence to say, he was as good a man as Monsieur the Kings only Brother. And one of an eminent Family, who thought all People were to give him place, because he was a Nobleman of Venice; which made him be trea∣ted so ill, that he carries the marks thereof to this day: For which reason he refused an Embassy into France.

For their better justification they make them∣selves Princes, and will not think themselves mistaken, when they find a descent of Roman Consuls, Kings, and Emperours in their Pedegrees; for of all the Italians they are the most car∣ried away with Chimera's concerning their Ex∣traction. The Contarini deduce themselves in a direct line from Cotta Governour, or Count Palatin of the Rhine. The Morosini bring their Original out of Hungary from a City of that name. The Justiniani derive them from the Em∣perour of that name; and disclaim their relation to the Justiniani of Genoa, who were Popular before the Reformation of that Government. The Cornari derive themselves from the Cornelii in Rome. The Quirini claim descent from the Illustrious Roman Family of the Sulpitii, and as such they reckon the Emperour Galba for one of their Ancestors. The Loredani bring their de∣scent from the Schevolae: the Pisani from the Pisosi of Rome. The Venieri, from Valerius Em∣perour of Constantinople, &c.

Though all their Nobility make but one Body, yet there is no necessity they should all have the same principle and humour. The ancient Nobility have a strong aversion to the new,

whom they despise, and on the other side are as much hated by them in revenge. The first desire War, to have the Honour and Profit of it, because the chief Commands belong solely to them: The other are consequently for Peace, as that which keeps up their Equality, where∣as War makes their Companions more haughty and proud. The Ancient Nobility decline all Em∣bassies as chargeable and troublesom; the New are ambitious of them, as a true way to make themselves known in the World; aspiring more∣over to the Dogeship, to Illustrate their Families by the supremacy of that Office, whilst the Ancient Nobility reject it as a Clog, and a de∣gree of Servitude. The Ancient love to have their residence in Venice, where they have all the great Offices; the New affect imployment abroad, to rid themselves of the Contempts and Contradictions of the Ancients, who pervert e∣very thing they do, and turn it into Ridicule; For in the Provinces where there is nothing but Subjects, the New Nobility are chief, and must be honoured as they please. In a word, whilst these are delighted with Equality. which the Ancients cannot bear, both parties live in ani∣mosity like the Castelans and Nicolotes among the Common People. And perhaps this division contributes to the safety of the Government, the Ancient Nobility and the New watching one anothers Actions perpetually, so that neither can do amiss. For which cause, whenever the Inqui∣sitors of State, or Council of ten are inquiring into the Administrations of the one, the other will be sure to put to their Shoulder to tumble them down: and the Faction of the New were very near ruining General Morosini when he was

accused by the Avogador Corraro. And upon these advantages the Nobility do frequently ex∣press their private aversions.

The Nobles of the Colony of Candia are con∣temptible to both; their hatred is without any other cause than an old animosity which the Ve∣netians have retained against the Greeks, with whom they have had several Wars: and there∣fore it is reckoned a great injury to a Nobleman of Venice to say he is a Greek, and they'l take it more kindly to be called by a worse name. Upon this score a Gentleman of the House of Dandolo thought himself highly abused in a Health which one of the Contarini began to him in Candian Wine, with these words, Seignior Dan∣dolo, Brindesi in Greco, which the said Dandolo took as a reflexion upon the place of his birth. And here I must hint by the by, that a Noble Venetian does not love Raillery, and that the me∣mory of a Jest never goes out of their Heads, especially if it has any thing in it of truth. In my time two of the Illustrious Senators, look∣ing upon one anothers Gloves, one told the other, Caro Seignior, i vostri guanti hanno le dita ben corte, Eli mei hanno ben lunge. Sir, the Fin∣gers of your Gloves are very short, and mine are as long. To which the other replied, And with good reason Sir, because my Nails are not so long as your Lordships. Mi sta bene Cosi, per che non ho l'unghie come lei. Which words as he thought reflecting upon his Extortion, of good Friends before, they became immortal and implacable Euemies.

But 'tis time now we turn our Medal, and in the Revers give you a view of their Virtues and Perfections, as a ballance to their Vices; and

this I intend as the last stroke of my Pencil at this time.

The Venetians are Grave and Prudent, uni∣form in their Actions, at least visibly, constant in their Friendships, firm in their Resolutions, because long in their Debates, always quiet with∣out whatever their agitations be within: Patient in difficult and tedious affairs, gentle and tractable to those who know how to manage them, inso∣much that with little Complaisance they may be made very good Friends, especially if we have their Government in Admiration, and look upon them as Princes. Though at home they live frugally and nearly, in their forreign Im∣polyments they are splendid enough, and par∣ticularly in their Embassies, where they will spare nothing that is for the service or honour of their Countrey, whose Face and Authority they may be said to carry along with them .

'Tis with marvellous ease and facility that they discern the Methods of all Courts to which they are sent; and there are but few People so quick and well disposed for Negotiation; there being seldom any thing so knotty and intricate, but they will find some expedient or another to weather it. In Paris, they are French, at Madrid, Spanish, and Natural Dutch at Vienna, as if they were born only for that place where their Residence is appointed, or had stript themselves of their Countrey-Fashions, to put on the humour of Strangers: and therefore they seldom fail of one thing that is not easily lear∣ned, and that is of ingratiating with the Prince

to whom they are sent, which a great States∣man pronounced to be a great sign of their Wisdom who can do it .

Though they are naturally ambitious, yet with great quietness they lay down the Command of their Armies, and return as contentedly to their private affairs, as if they never had had the whole Power of their Countrey in their hands, or at least were very glad to be discharged of the burthen. So that we may say of the Com∣monwealth of Venice, as Theopompus said of Spar∣ta, That the great reason why they had lasted so long under one Government, was their Citi∣zens knowing so well how to obey. They are very secret and close, not only in their State∣affairs, but in every thing wherewith they are intrusted, which they will never discover, though afterwards they fall out and become Enemies. They are People of great Order, Providence, and Judgment, and if compared with the rest of the Italians, they will be considerable as well for their own Virtues as for the Vices of their Neighbours. And Lastly, amongst their Moral and Civil qualifications, they have much of Christianity. The multitude and Magnificence of their Churches, prove their Piety and Reli∣gion, whatever their Calumniators say to the contrary, as that they are generally Marsilians, and deny the Immortality of the Soul: but 'tis without any reason that they asperse them, un∣less it be from the defamatory Libels published against them by the Court of Rome, whilst they were under Paul V. Excommunication. Their

Hospitals, the best endowed in all Italy, speak their Liberality and Alms, especially that which they call La Pieta, in which all exposed Chil∣dren are provided for with great Care, though sometimes their number has been so great as to amount to 6000. In which thing they have expressed great Gratitude to God, and Mercy to Mankind, by saving or rather giving new life to thousands of poor innocent Babes, thrown daily by the Courtesans into the Canals of the Town, where without this provision they would certainly perish. In a word the State of Venice having had many Friends, and Historians that have wirt their Praises more Copiously, and more Elegantly than I, I shall add no more; what I have already said being in my opinion fully sufficient.

Notes

• Cum Tri∣buni insu∣larum sibi ad invi∣cem de∣ferre nol∣ent, Lon∣gobardi abs{que} re∣sistentia eorum fi∣nes pluries invase∣runt. Dandol. Ann.
• Ab unius domina∣tione ad omnes. Bodin.
• †

  Principi orbum po∣tentiae no∣men relin∣quitur. J. B. Con∣tarin Hist. Venet. l. 7.
• See Qua∣renty in the Re∣marks.
• See Ari∣stocracy in the Re∣marks.
• The form of their Election of Magi∣strates.
• See the Remarks.
• Ante ex∣ortum so∣lem, aut post ejus occasum, Senatus∣consultum irritum est. Varro.
• The form of Ele∣cting their Doge.
• Duces primum populi ac∣clamati∣onibus de∣ligebantur. Bern. Justin.
• †

  Primus Sebast. Zianus ab xi Electo∣ribus est creatus. Idem.
• See the Remarks.
• Ante hoc domus pars vi∣dentur, mox Rei∣publicae. Tac. Ger.
• Jannot. de Rep. Ven. & Sansor in deser. di Ven.
• See the Remarks.
• See the Remarks.
• Quaestus omnis pa∣tribus in∣decorus vi∣sus est. Livius.
• No quis mobiles adoleseen∣tium ani∣mos, prae∣maturis honoribus ad super∣biam ex∣tolleret. Tacit. An. 4.
• See the Remarks.
• Privatus illis Cen∣sus erat brevis, Commune magnum. Hor.
• Costus u∣nus ex Le∣gatis no∣tae facun∣diae, sed di∣cendi ar∣tem apta trepida∣tione oc∣cultavit. Tac. Hist.
• Cum e∣nim mul∣titudo in∣opum est in Civitate, eadem{que}ab honoribus exclusa, necesse est eam Civi∣tatem esse plenam ho∣stium Reip. Arist. 3. Pol. 7.
• †

  The Duke of Os∣suna, Viceroy of Naples, Don Pedro de Toledo Gover∣nor of Milan, and Don Alf. de la Que∣va the Spanish Em∣bassador at Venice.
• Redire praepro∣pere, est legationem deserere.
• Quae cun∣cta sua manu per∣scripser at Augustus. Tac. Ann. 1.
• †

  Ne quicquam ex publico Ministerio praeter laudem bene administrati officii ad ipsos accederet. Zonar.
• P. Cavendum Senatus-consulto ut quanquam insontes Magistratus Pro∣vincialibus uxorum criminibus perinde quam suis plecterentur. Tac. Ann. 4.
• See the Remarks.
• Superbiro homines etiam an∣num desig∣natione, quid si ho∣norem per quinquen∣ni unum tenerent? Tac. en. 2.
• †

  Quo ma∣jor pru∣dentia ip∣sis, major Reveren∣tia popula∣ribus sit.
• See the Remarks.
• The Ce∣remonies of the Colledg.
• Set up by Pius IV in the Royal Hall of the Va∣tican.
• 1535.
• Bemb. Hist. Ven.
• Guiccar∣din lib. 4.
• Adempto per inqui∣sitiones & loquendi audiendi{que} commer∣cio, Tac. Ag.
• Hic Ma∣gistratus praemium virtutis. Arist. Pol. 2.
• Sejanus incipiente adhuc po∣tentia bo∣nis consi∣liis notes∣cere vole∣bat. Tac. An. 4.
• Est enim sua sicut corpori, sic & menti senectus. Pol. 2.
• Sorte & urna mo∣res non discerni. Tac. Hist. 4.
• Sors deer∣rat ad pa∣rum ido∣neos, Ann. 13.
• The Po∣licy of the Senat.
• Volupta∣tibus qui∣bus Ro∣mani plus adversus subjectos quam ar∣mis va∣lent. Tac. Hist. 4.
• †

  Civile rebatur misceri vo∣luptatibus vulgi. Ann. 1.
• Domiti ut pareant nondum ut servi∣ant. In Agricola.
• Ne subla∣ta spe ve∣niae, perti∣nacia ac∣cenderen∣tur. Hist. 4.
• †

  Ne dubi∣um habe∣retur mag∣nitudinem pecuniae malo ver∣tisse. Ann. 5.
• Pari do∣lore com∣moda alie∣ena ac suas injurias metiun∣tur. Hist. 1.
• The Ca∣stellans and Nico∣lates in Venice.
• Pugilata inter se ex¦aemulati∣one con∣tendunt. Xenoph.
• An Arti∣ficer of the Quar∣ter of St. Nicolas.
• Periculo∣siores sunt inimicitiae juxta li∣bertatem. Tacit. Germ.
• Insita mortali∣bus Natura, recentem aliorum felicitatem agris Oculis introspicer quos in aequo videre. Hist. 2.
• Si violan∣dum est jus, reg∣nandi cau∣sa violan∣dum est. Eurip.
• See the Remarks.
• Magis fa∣ma quam vi stare res suas. Tac. Ann. 5.
• See the Remarks.
• The Letter from the Se∣nat was written in Italian, in these terms: Magnifico e Potente Signore Francisco da Carrara, discreto Impe∣rial Vicario General Andrea Contarini per Dio Gratia Dose di Venegia.
• Quod in∣ter anci∣pitia te∣terrimum est. Tac. Hist. 3.
• Neutra∣latis ne{que} amicos pa∣ri••, re{que} immicos tol it. Poly. 6.
• The Vene∣tian Mili∣tia.
• Ʋt simul imperia acciperent, numero{que} & robore, fiducia ip∣sis, in cae∣teros me∣tus crede∣retur—si quid subi∣tumingru∣at, majore auxilio subvenire. Tac. An. 4
• Ne hosti∣bus vide∣rentur ad paucos redacti in quodlibet stratum demortuorum Helotas restituerunt. Athenaeus.
• Quos dif∣ficilius in∣venire quam de∣cellare.
• Quo mino∣re spe ve∣niae, cres∣ceret vin∣culum sce∣leris. Tac. Hist. 4.
• Inter Pa∣ganos cor∣ruptior miles. Hist. 1. Severius acturos si vallum statuatur procul urbis illecebris.
• A De∣scription of the Ar∣senal.
• See the Remarks.
• Ricault. Hist.
• Parcimo∣nia mag∣num est Vectigal.
• 1490.
• The Book in which the names of all the Venetian Noble∣men are writ.
• See the Remarks.
• Preces erant, sed quibus contradi∣cere non posset. Tac. Hist. 4.
• Non minus negotii est Remp. emendare, quam ab initio con∣statrere. Arist. 4. Pol. c. 1.
• †

  Vitia erunt donec homines. Tac. Hist. 4.
• ‡

  Cn. Pompeius cor∣rige. dis moribus de∣lectus, & gravior re∣medus quam delicta erant, suarum legum autor idem, ac subver∣sor. Ann. 3.
• Nani Hist. Ʋen. l. 4.
• 1618
• See the Remarks.
• 1622.
• See the Remarks.
• Hist. Ven: l. 8.
• †

  See the Remarks in Victor. Amedeus.
• 1669.
• The Title of the Duke of Mantua sent to the French Embassa∣dor at Ve∣nice.
• 1447.
• Nani Hist. Ven. l. 12.
• 1644.
• Certa∣tum utrin∣que de do∣minationi est. Salust.
• 1379.
• Annal. M. S. of Venice.
• See the Remarks.
• Asperis facetiis, ubi mul∣tum ex ve∣ro traxere, acrem sui memoriam relinquunt Tac. Ann. 15.
• Scander∣beg, 1451, & 1457.
• 1480.
• A Wall 6000 pa∣ces long in the Streights of Corinth.
• Amiciti∣am dum magnitu∣dine mu∣nerum, non constantia morum continere put at, me∣ruit magis quam ha∣buit. Tac. Hist. 3.
• With Malta.
• Ducis jussione Electiones Praelaturarum a Clero & Populo debeant inclavare, & Electi ab eo in∣vestitionem accipere & ejus mandato inthronizari. Just. Duc.
• Ad du∣cem Vene∣tiae Antio∣chenus, & Hieroso∣lymitanus Patriarcha, & Balduinus 11 Rex Jerusalem Legatos miserunt—Calixtus etiam per suos Nuntios Ducem ad hoc inducit. Ann. Ven: M. S.
• See the Remarks.
• †

  See the Remarks.
• Rex Po∣loniae ni∣hil aliud est quam os quod∣dam Regni vobiscum conjunctum libero ac legitimo vestro suffragio, ut is prorsus nihil agat, ac ne loquatur quidem, nisi id quod ex intimo sensu vestro publice sit profe∣ctum. Cromer.
• Reflect∣ing upon the Car∣dinal Al∣tieri, who employed the Gal∣leys in convey∣ing Mer∣chants Goods from place to place.
• Gaudete cum gau∣dentious, flete cum flentibus, Rom. 12.
• Ejus no∣men Epi∣stolit Edi∣ctis{que} pro∣ponebatur. Tac. Hist. 4.
• See the Remarks.
• Hac ne∣cessitate soluit lex pueros qui ad regnum Educabantur. Flut in Agisil.
• Oportet Imperato∣rem stan∣tem mori. Suet. in Vest.
• †

  Regia potestas est gentis uni∣us quasi domestica quaedam guberna∣tio. Arist. 3. Pol. 11. Nec Rem. tuam esse, sed te Rei∣pub. Sen. de Clem.
• See the Remarks.
• Qui ma∣gis pro me metuunt quam me. Alf. Arag. l.
• Apud La∣cedaemo∣nios plus veteret le∣ges quam Reges. He∣rodot.
• Compa∣rison be∣twixt the Kings of Sparta, and Dukes of Venice. Herodot. li. 6. Thu∣cyd. lib. 5. Xenoph.
• Moderan∣dos faemi∣narum ho∣nores dicti∣tans. Tac. Ann. 1. de Tiber.
• Legatio∣nes dimit∣tere tum amicas, tum hosti∣les, id Re∣gis est. Zenoph. de Rep. Laced.
• Par nego∣tiis, neque supra. Tac. Ann. 5.
• †

  Quod uni dee••••••, sup∣pl••tur ex aliis, & quod ab uno pecca∣tur, ab aliis emen∣datur.
• Manus a∣vidae & tanquam apud se∣nem festi∣nantes. Tac. Hist. 1.
• Principes mortales, Rempubl. aeternam esse. Tac. Ann. 3.
• Consula∣res fasces, Curulem∣que sellam, nihil aliud quam Pompam Funeris putent. claris in∣signibus velut in∣sules vota∣tos ad mortem destinari. Liv. Hist. 2.
• †

  Ʋt non dominati∣onem, & Servos, sed Rectorem, & Cives cogitaret. Ann. 12.
• ‡

  Esse No∣bilem ser∣vitutem. Trog.
• Castello San Mar∣co Lana Regio. San-Pao∣lo. Santa-Croce. Dorso du∣ro.
• Quos vul∣gus, propte∣rea quod maxime omnium sapere vi∣dentur, sa∣pientes ap∣pellant. Contarin. Reip. Ven. 1. 3.
• †

  Quia praecon∣sultant illa de quibus consulen∣dus est Se∣natus.
• Lacede∣mone qui∣dam De∣mosthenes homo im∣purus Au∣tor fuit sententiae idoneae: Ad quam repudian∣dam pro¦indignitate Authoris populus visus est propensior. Proinde Ephori al∣terum ex senioribus forte legere, cui negotium ejusdem sententiae dicen∣dae demandaverunt. Plutar.
• †

  Re Ma∣ritima di∣minuta, nostrorum∣que studiis ad Conti∣nentis Im∣perium conversis, coepit hic Magistratus in parvo precio haveri. Cantar. 3. Reipub. Ven.
• Plus ibi boni mo∣res, quam alibi bonae Leges va∣lent. Tac. Ger.
• †

  Haec una inter cae∣ter as prae∣stantissima Lex, ne juvenum cuiquam fas sit in Leges inquirere. Plat. 1. de Leg.
• Donat. Jannot. Fra. Ful∣gent.
• 977.
• Ʋnder Duke James Fiepoli.
• Ʋnder Leonard Loredan.
• Frederic Contarin, Octavian Grimani, Lew. and Franc. Priuli, Lew. Tie∣poli, and Alexand. Bon.
• Ardenaro Largo & Falcone Cesaraei.
• Trat. dell. Inquisit. di Ven. di Paolo ser∣vita.
• Ʋbi facto magis quam con∣sulto opus est. Tac. Ann. 1.
• Jannot de Rep. Ven. Guichar∣din. Hist. l. 4.
• See the Remarks.
• Interci∣derat sortis humanae commer∣cium, vis metus; quantumque sevitia liceret, miseratio arcebatur. Tac. Ann. 3.
• See the Remarks.
• Reos fu∣isse se, tan∣tum poena experti. Ann. 15.
• Depreca∣batur tam praecipites verborum poenas. ann. 3.

  Ne Convivalium fabularum simplicitas, in Crimen duceretur, postu∣lavit. Ann. 5.
• Majesta∣tis Crimi∣na subde∣bantur u∣niculum & necessi∣tas silendi. Ann. 3.
• †

  Majestatis singulare & unicum Crimen eorum qui Crimine vaca∣rent. Plin. Pan.
• ‡

  See the Remarks.
• Malc∣rumfaci∣norum Ministri quasi ex∣probrantis aspiciun∣tur. Tac. Ann. 14.
• †

  Scelerum Ministros veteres, & praegra∣nes afflixit. Ann. Piaculares publici cdii victimas. Plin.
• The te∣nor of the Procla∣mation published by the Council of Ten a∣gainst John Mocceni∣gue-
• Omittere potius praevalida & adulta vitia, quam hoc assequi ut palam fieret quibus flagitiis impares essemus. Tac. Ann. 3.
• Jus suf∣fragii non habent, etsi omnibus negotiis, &c. G. Contr. Ven. Reipub. Is. 3.
• See the Remarks.
• Ephoris licet in∣dicta causa tot occide∣re quot li∣bitum est. Isocr. Ephiro∣rum impe∣rium mirum in modum ibi Tyrannicum. l, 4. de leg.
• Ephoros vocarunt quod Reip∣negotia inspice∣rent. Suid.
• See the Remarks
• Consilio coacto ma∣gistratus Advocato∣rius accusatoris vice fungitur. G. Contarin. Ven. Reip. l. 3.
• †

  Tribuni pl. anti∣quitus creati vi∣dentur, non juri dicundo, nec causis, querelis{que} de absenti∣bus noscen∣dis, sed in∣tercessionibus faciendis. C. 12. l. 13.
• Advoca∣tores Com∣munis di∣cuntur, quasi om∣nium ad∣vocati, & Intercesso∣res. Con∣tarin. Ven. Reip. l. 3.
• Erat in∣tercedere id quod vulgo dici∣mus se op∣ponere. N. Gr. Com. Rom. l. 1.
• 1. Touch∣ing build∣ing of Churches. 2. About Alienati∣on of Se∣cular E∣states to the Cler∣gy.
• Non satis visum est bonas leges habere, nisi Custodes earum diligentissimos Cives Creassent quos Graeci 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 appellant.
• Convivi∣orum lux∣uria, & vestium, egrae Civi∣tatis indi∣cia sunt. Ep. 115.
• Indeco∣rum est attrectare quod non obtinere∣tur. Tac. Ann. 3.
• †

  Tot leges contemptu abolitae sc∣curiorem luxum fe∣cere. ibid.
• Post∣quam eo magnificentiae venerit, discere singulos, neque in Familia Nimirum aliquid, aut modicum, nisi ex fortuna possidentis. Ann. 2.
• Acribus initiis, in curioso fi∣ne. Ann. 5.
• G. Con∣tarin l. 5. Reip. Ven.
• Principe & Senatu autoribus, qui non modo li∣centiam vitiis per∣miserint, sed vim adhibeant. Tac. Ann. 14.
• The Pa∣triarch of Aquileia.
• Guiccar∣din. l. 8.
• Divites satietas in melius mutat. Tac. Ann. 3.
• Sexum na∣tura inva∣lidum de∣seri, & exponi suo luxu, cu∣pidinibus alienis. Ann. 3.
• Harmostae sunt qui ad sub∣jectas Ci∣vitates e Lacede∣moniis mittebantur Magistratus.
• Privati etiam mit∣tebantur, qui Pro∣vincias viserent, & quid de cujusque obsequio videretur referrent: trepidabantque gentes de aestimatione singulorum. Tac. Ann. 15.
• Senatus Nobiscum est. Tac. Hist. 1.
• †

  Ex di∣stantibus terrarum spatiis Consilia post res af∣fereban∣tur. Hist. 3.
• ‡

  Videat ne Resp. quid detrimenti capiat.
• In Pace durius est servitium.
• Posceba∣tur ore vulgi dux Agricola, compa∣rantibus cunctis vigorem, constantiam, & expertum Bellis animum, cum iner∣tia, & formidine eorum. In Agricola.
• Pecunia, quae bonis malisque temporibus juxta va∣let. Hist. 1.
• Cum Ro∣ma pro∣fectus sum, Zonas quas plenas argenti exulti, eas ex Provincia in∣anes retuli. Aul. Gell. l. 15. c. 12.
• Autoritas in Senatu, Potestas in Populo.
• Si enim Ʋrbs in Mari sumpsit exordia, & Ʋrbis fuerunt Veneti domini, Veneti quo{que} fue∣runt domi∣ni ejus in∣quo erat Ʋrbs, igi∣tur domini Maris. Anon.
• Nemo plus juris in ali∣um trans∣ferre po∣test, quam ipse habe∣at. Ex. Cod.
• Morisot l. 2. c. 25. & Petr. Justinian Hist. Ve∣net.
• Cyril. Mi∣chael.
• Nani Hist.
• Nan. l. 3. 4.
• Nan. l. 11.
• Vicario Praetorio.
• Debes incunctanter ad∣vertere Regiam Potesta∣tem tibi non solum ad Mundi Regimen, sed maxime ad Ecclesiae praesidium esse collatum. Leo I. ad Imperat. Le∣on.
• Quid mihi de iis qui foris sunt judicare? 1 Cor. 15.
• Non enim sine causa Gladium portat; Dei enim Minister est Vindex in iram ei qui malum agit. Ep. ad Rom. c. 13.
• Baron. Tome 11. Ann. Eccl.
• Pelopidas and Epa∣minondas.
• Facilius est quae∣dam vin∣cere quam tueri. Cart. l. 4.
• Valer. Maxim. l. 4. c. 1.
• Scutum reliquisse precipuum flagitium. Tac. Ger.
• Adeo ob∣caecat ani∣mos for∣tuna cum vim suam ingruentem refringi non vult. Liv.
• Non ig∣navia magna imperia contineri. Tac. Ann. 15.
• †

  In Pro∣digium & Omen im∣minenti∣am Clau∣deum ver∣tebatur. Hist. 1.
• ‡

  Tristis∣sima quae∣que occultantem Tiberium. Ann. 1.
• Optima viderentur quorum tempus effugerat. Hist. 1.
• †

  Sed non Senatui libertas ad poenitendum. Ann. 3.
• Guichard. lib. 8.
• Sunt mol∣les in Ca∣lamitate Mortali∣um animi. Tacitus.
• Ante discrimen feroces in periculo pavidi. Hist. 1.
• †

  Patres turbati a∣nimis, tre∣pidabant magis quam Con∣sulerent.
• 1483.
• Numerantur senten∣tiae, non ponderantur; nam cum sit impar Prudentia, par omnium jus est. Plin. l. 2. c. 12.
• Guichar. lib. 8.
• Fuit pro∣priam Po∣puli Ro∣mani lon∣gè á domo Bellare. Cicero.
• Nec ausus est satis, nec provi∣dit. Hist. 3.
• †

  Cum recte facto∣rum sibi quisque gratiam trahet, u∣nius invi∣dia; ab omnibus peccatur: Ann. 3:
• Quae Na∣tura manis timoribus, deterius credebant quodunque evenerat, Ann. 15.
• Media se∣quitur quod inter ancipitia teterri∣mum est. Ibid.
• †

  Pecuniae¦quam Regni me∣lior custos. Liv.
• ‡

  Zurit∣ann. Arra∣gon. Mari∣an. Hist. Hisp. l. 28. Suavedra Emp. Pol. 75.
• Nostras amicas, nostros concabinos vident. Discunt haec ante∣quam sci∣ant vitia esse. Quin.
• †

  Ʋt olim plebe vali∣da, vel cum Patres pollerent noscenda vulgi na∣tura. Se∣natúsque & opti∣matium ingenia, qui maxime perdidicerant, callidi temporum, & sapientes cre∣debantur, Ann. 4.
• ‡

  Facilius errare naturam, quam Principem formare Rempublieam dissimilem sui.
• Oderunt merita regnantes; quibus tum une∣randis im∣pares exi∣stimantur:
• Machia: lib. 3. dise: 122.
• Tac. An. 1.
• Non enim simplicis eas Curas. Tac. Ann. 1.
• †

  Manib at admiratio viri, sed O∣derant. Hist. 1.
• ‡

  Breves & infau∣sto; Po∣puli Ro∣mani amo∣res. An. 2.
• Princi∣pibus gra∣tum est domi aliquem esse ei quem odia Dominis debita ex∣onorentur. Strada.
• †

  Sinistra erga imi∣nentes in∣terpreta∣tio, nec minus pe∣riculum ex magna fama quam ex mala. Tac. in Agric.
• ‡

  Novan∣dis quam Geren∣dis rebus aptiora illa ingenia. Curtius.
• †

  Hebetio∣res quam acutiores ut pluri∣mum meli∣us Remp. admini∣strant Thucyd. Hist. 3.
• Guid. Ant. Ve∣spicui.
• Ʋt quod segnitia pro erat, sapientia vacaretur. Hist. 1.
• Certant adulatio∣nibus cae∣teri Magi∣stratus.
• †

  Alium Crederes Senatum, alium po∣pulum. Ib.
• ‡

  Proximi cujusque audaciam expectantes, insita mortalibus natura, propere sequi quo piget inchoare. Ibid.
• Proprium est humani ingenii e∣disse quem laeseris. In Agric.
• Quo obscu∣rior ita, eo irrevo∣cabilior: Tac. in Agricoia.
• See the Remarks.
• †

  Ʋt mi∣scendo hu∣mana di∣vinis, pri∣mordia Ʋrbis au∣gustiora faciat. Livius.
• ‡

  Aimon. l. 4. c. 94, 96. Adel. Ann. Re∣gin. Ado. Baronius Tom. 12. Leand. Albert. descript. Ven.
• See the Remarks.
• †

  De jun∣gendis af∣finitati∣bus, & ad sciscendis Principibus; de Bello ac Pace, in Conviviis consultant. Tac. Germ.
• Regum Ʋxores ab Ephor is custodiun∣tur, uti provideatur ne ex alio genere Rex clam fiat, quàm ex Heraclidis. Plat.
• †

  Inmetu consilia Prudenti∣um, & vulgi Ru∣mor juxta audiun∣tur. Tac. Hist. 3.
• Satis citò incipi vi∣ctoriam ratus, ubi provisus ne vincere∣tur. Hist. 2.
• †

  Cuncta∣tio servitii statim ex∣equi, Re∣gium, vi∣detur. An. 5.
• Andr: Moccen. Bell. Ca∣mdr. l. 2.
• Facili Civitate ad creden∣dà omnia nova, cum tristia sunt.
• An Ab∣bey three miles from Ve∣nice, where the Embassa∣dors from Crowned Heads are received.
• Abditos Principis sensus exquirere, illicitum, anceps. Ann. 5.
• An Elogy of the Ve∣netians.
• Secum peregre affert fa∣ciem & authoritatem Reipublicae. Cicero,
• Non est majus meritum, quam gratiam invenisse Regnantium. Cassiodor.
• Ex ungue Leonem.