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OF beleefe proceeding from our Invention, that part which consi∣steth in proofe, is already spoken of.
The other two parts follow: whereof one ariseth from the manners of the speaker; the other from the passions of the Hearer.
The Principles, Colours, or Common Opinions, upon which a mans beleefe is grounded concer∣ning the manners of him that speakes, are to bee had partly out
of that which hath beene said before concerning Vertue, Booke 1. Chap. 9. partly out of those things which shall be said by and by concerning the Passions. For a man is beleev'd either for his Pru∣dence, or for his Probity, which are Vertues; or for good will: of which among the Passions.
The Principles concerning be∣leefe, arising from the passion of the Hearer, are to bee gather'd from that which shall now bee said of the severall Passions in order.
In every one of which three things are to be considered.
ANger is desire of revenge, joyned with greefe fo•• that He, or some of his, is, or seemes to be neglected.
The object of Anger is al∣wayes some particular, or indi∣viduall thing.
In Anger there is also pleasure proceeding from the imagina••i∣on of revenge to come.
To Neglect, is to esteeme little, or nothing: and is of three kinds.
Contempt, is when a man thinkes another of little worth in comparison to himselfe.
Crossing, is the hinderance of anothers mans will without de∣signe
to profit himselfe.
Contumely, is the disgracing of another for his owne pastime.
The common Opinions con∣cerning Anger are there∣fore such as follow.
REconciliation is the Appea∣sing of Anger.
Those, to whom men are ea∣sily reconciled, are
Reconcilable are,
Men lay downe their An∣ger
for these causes.
TO Love, is to will well to another, for that others, not for ones owne sake.
A Friend is he that loves, and he that is beloved.
Friends one to another, are they that mutually lo••e ••••e an∣other.
A Friend the••efore is he,
We love them,
The severall kinds of friend∣ship, are Society, Familiarity, Consanguinity, Affinity, &c.
The things that beget love are,
THE Colours, or Common Opinions concerning Hatred are to be taken from the contrary of those, which concerne Love and Friendship.
Hatred differs from Anger
In this, that Anger regards onely what is done to ones selfe; but Hatred not.
And in this, that Anger re∣gards particulars onely; the o∣ther universalls also.
And in this, that Anger is cu∣rable, Hatred not.
And in this, that Anger seekes the vexation, Hatred the dam∣mage of ones Adversary.
That with Anger there is al∣wayes joyned Griefe; with Ha∣tred not alwayes.
That Anger may at length be satiated, but Hatred never.
Hence it appeares how the Iudge, or Auditor may be made Friend, or Enemy to us; and how our Adversary may be made ap∣peare Friend or Enemy to the Iudge; and how we may answer to our Adversary, that would make us appeare Enemies to him.
FEare is a trouble, or vexation of the minde, arising from the apprehension of an evill at hand, which may hurt or de∣stroy.
Danger is the nearenesse of the evill feared.
The things to be Feared are
The men that are to be fea∣red are,
And men not passionate, but dissemblers and craftie are more to be feared then those that are hasty and free.
The things especially to be feared are
They that feare not are,
An Orator therefore that would put Feare in to the Audi∣tor,
must let him see that hee is ob••oxious; and that greater than he doe suffer, and have suffer'd from those, and at those times they least thought.
ASsurance is hope, arising from an imagination that the helpe is neare, or the evill a farre off.
The things therefore that beget Assurance are,
Assured, or Confident are
SHame is a perturbation of the Minde arising from the ap∣prehension of Evill, past, present, or to come, to the prejudice of a Mans owne, or his friends repu∣tation.
The things therefore which men are ashamed of are those Actions which proceede from Vice, as
In Actions of In••••mperance, whether willingly, or unwil∣lingly committed, there is shame: in Actions of Force; onely when they are done unwillingly.
The men before whom we are ashamed, are such as wee respect, namely,
And therefore men are most ashamed in the pre••ence
But in the presence of such, whose judgement most men de∣spise, men are not ashamed.
Therefore we are ashamed also in the presence
The Common Opinions con∣cerning Impudence are taken from the contrary of these.
GRace, is that Vertue, by which a man is said to doe a good turne, or doe service to a man in neede; not for his owne, but for his cause to whom hee does it.
Great Grace is when the neede is great; or when they are hard, or difficult things that are con∣ferr'd•• or when the time is seaso∣nable, or when he that conferr's the favour is the onely, or first man that did it.
Neede, is a desire joyned with griefe for the absence of the thing desired.
Grace therefore it is not, if it be not done to one that needs.
Whosoever therefore would prove that hee has done a Grace,
or Favour, must shew that hee needed it to whom it was done.
Grace it is not
Which is done by Chance
Nor which is done by Ne∣cessity.
Nor which has beene requi∣••ed.
Nor that which is done to ones Enemy.
Nor that which is a trifle.
Nor that which is naught, if the Giver know the fault.
And in this manner a man may goe over the Praedicaments, and examine a benefit, whether it be a Grace for being This, or for be∣ing so Much, or for being Such, or for being Now, &c.
PItty is a perturbation of the mind, arising from the appre∣hension of ••urt, or trouble to a∣nother that doth not deserve it, and which he thinkes may hap∣pen to himselfe or his.
And because it appertaines to Pitty to thinke that he, or his may fall into the mi••ery he pit∣ties in others, it followes that they be most compassionate
Who have passed through Misery.
And old Men.
And Weake men.
And Timorous men.
And learned men.
And such as have Parents, wife and children.
And such as thinke there bee honest men.
And that they are lesse Com∣passionate
Who are in great despaire.
Who are in great prosperity.
And they that are Angry, for they consider not.
And they that are very Confi∣dent; for they also consider not.
And they that are in the Act of contumely; for neither doe these consider.
And they that are astonished with feare.
And they that thinke no man honest.
The things to be pittied are
Men to be pittied are
And our Equalls in dignity.
Those that have lately suf∣fer'd, or are shortly to suffer in∣jury: and those that have the markes of injury past.
And those that have the words or actions of them that be in present misery.
OPposite in a manner to Pitty in good men, is Indignation, which is griefe for the prosperi∣ty of a man unworthy.
With Indignation there is alwayes joyned a joy for the prosperity of a man worthy, as Pitty is alwayes with content∣ment in the adversitie of them, that deserve it.
In wicked men the opposite of Pitty is
Envy; as also the companion thereof, delight in the harme of others, which the Greekes in one word have called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. But of these in the next Chapter.
Men conceive Indignation a∣gainst others, not for their ver∣tues, as Iustice, &c. For these
make men worthy; and in Indig∣nation wee thinke men unwor∣thy.
But for those goods which men indued with vertue, and noble men, and hansome men are wor∣thy of.
And for newly gotten power & riches, rather than for antient, and especially if by these he has gotten other goods, as by Riches, Command. The reason why we conceive greater Indignation a∣gainst new then antient Riches, is, that the former seeme to pos∣sesse that which is none of theirs, but the antient seeme to have but their owne. For with com∣mon people, to have beene so long, is to be so by Right.
And for the bestowing of goods incongruously: as when the armes of the most valiant A∣chilles, were bestowed upon the most eloquent Vlysses.
And for the comparison of the Inferiour with the Superiour; whether superiour in the same thing, as when one Valiant is compared with a more Valiant; or whether absolutely Superi∣our, as when a good Scholler is compared with a good Man.
Apt to Indignation are,
Least apt to Indignation are
ENvy is griefe, for the pros∣perity of such as our selves, arising not from any hurt, that we, but from the good that they receive.
Such as our selves I call those, that are equall to us in blood, in age, in abilities, in glory, or in meanes.
They are apt to Envy,
And men of poore spirits: for every thing appeares great to them.
The things which men envy in others are,
Obnoxious to Envy are,
From the contraries of these may be derived the Principles concerning Ioy for other mens hurt.
He therefore that would not have his Enemy prevaile, when
he craves pitty, or other favour; must dispose the Iudge to Envy; and make his Adversary appeare such, as are above described, to be subject to the Envy of o∣thers.
EMulation is griefe arising from that our Equals possesse such goods as are had in honour, and whereof we are capable, but have them not; not because they have them, but because not wee also.
No man therefore Emulates another in things whereof him∣selfe is not capable.
Apt to Emulate are,
Objects of Emulation are, for things,
For Persons,
The contrary of Emulation is Contempt.
And they that Emulate such as have the goods afore mentioned, Contemne such as have them not: and thence it is, that men who live happily enough, unlesse they have the goods which men ho∣nour, are neverthelesse Contem∣ned.
OF Passions we have already spoken. Wee are next to speake of Manners.
Ma••ners are distinguished by mens Passions, Habits, Ages, and Fortunes.
What kind of Manners pro∣ceed
from Passions, and from Ver∣tues & Vices, (which are Habits,) hath beene already shewed.
There remaines to be spoken of the Manners, that are peculiar to severall Ages and Fortunes.
The Ages are Youth, Middle-Age, Old Age.
And first of Youth.
Young men are,
Iesting is witty Contumely.
THe Manners of Old men are in a manner the contra∣ries of those of Youth.
They determine nothing: they doe every thing lesse vehement∣ly then is fit: they never say they know; but to every thing they say perhaps and peradventure; which comes to passe from that having lived long, they have of∣ten mistaken and beene decei∣ved.
They are peevish because
they interpret every thing to the worst.
And suspicious through In∣credulity, and Incredulous by reason of their Experi∣ence.
They Love and Hate, as if they meant to continue in nei∣ther.
Are of poore spirits, as having beene humbled by the chances of life.
And Covetous, as knowing how easie 'tis to lose, and hard to get.
And Timorous, as having been cooled by yeares.
And greedy of life: for good things seeme greater by the want of them.
And Lovers of themselves out of Pusillanimity.
And seeke Profit more than Honor, because they love them∣selves; and Profit is among the
goods that are not simply good, but good for ones selfe.
And without bashfulnesse, be∣cause they despise seeming.
And hope little; knowing by Experience that many times good Counsell has beene fol∣lowed with ill event, and because also they be timorous.
••nd live by Memory rather than Hope; for Memory is of the time past, whereof Old men have good store.
And are full of Talke, because they delight in their Memory.
And Vehement in their An∣ger; but not stout enough to exe∣cute it.
They have weake, or no de∣sires, and thence seeme Tem∣perate.
They are slaves to Gaine.
And live more by reason than Custome; because Reason leads to Profit, as Custome to that
which is Honorable.
And doe Injury to indammage, and not in Contumely.
And are mercifull by Com∣passion, or imagination of the same Evills in themselves; which is a kinde of Infirmity, and not Humanity, as in Young men, pro∣ceeding from a good opinion of those that suffer Evill.
And full of complaint, as thinking themselves not farre from evill, because of their In∣firmity.
Seeing then every man loves such men, and their discourses, which are most agreeable to their owne Manners; 'tis not hard to collect, how the Orator, and his Oration may be made acceptable to the Hearer, whe∣ther Young, or Old.
THe Manners of Middle aged men, are hetweene those of Youth, and Old men: and there∣fore,
They neither dare; nor feare too much: but both as is fit.
They neither beleeve all; nor reject all; but judge.
They seeke not onely what is Honorable, nor only what is Pro∣fitable; but both.
They are neither Covetous, nor Prodigall; but in the meane.
They are neither easily An∣gry; nor yet stupid: but betweene both.
They are Valiant, and with all Temperate.
And in generall, whatsoever is
divided in Youth, and Old men, is compounded in Middle-age.
And whereof the Excesse, or Defect is in Young or Old men; the Mediocrity is in those of Middle age.
Middle age for the Body I call the time from thirty to five and thirty yeares: for the Mind the nine and fortieth, or there a∣bouts.
OF Manners that proceede from the severall Ages wee have already spoken.
Wee are next to speake of those that rise from severall For∣tunes.
The Manners of the Nobili∣ty are
For as in Plants; so in the Ra∣ces of Men, there is a certaine progresse; and they grow better and better to a certaine point; then change, viz. ••ubtle wits in∣to Madnesse; and stayed wits into Stupidity and Blockishnesse.
RIch men are Contumelious and Proud. This they have
from their Riches. For seeing e∣very thing may bee had for Mo∣ny, having Mony, they thinke they have all, that is good.
And Effeminate; because they have wherewithall to submini∣ster to their Lust.
And Boafters of their Wealth: and speak in high termes foolish∣ly. For men willingly talke of what they love and admire; and thinke others affect the same that they doe: and the truth is all sorts of men submit to the Rich.
And thinke themselves wor∣thy to command, having that, by which men attaine Com∣mand.
And in generall they have the Manners of Fortunate Fooles.
They doe Injury with inten∣tion not to hurt, but to disgrace; and partly also through Inconti∣nence.
There is a difference betweene
New and Antient Riches: for they that are newly come to Wealth have the same faults in a greater degree: for new Riches are a kind of rudenesse and ap∣prentiship of Riches.
THe Manners of Men in Pow∣er, are the same, or better then those of the Rich.
They have a greater sense of Honor then the Rich; and their Manners are more Manly.
They are more Industrious then the Rich: for Power is su∣stained by Industry.
They are Grave, but with∣out Austerenesse: for being in place conspicuous, they carry
themselves the more Modestly; and have a kind of gentle and comely Gravity, which the Greekes call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
When they doe Injuries, they doe great ones.
The Manners of Men that prosper, are compounded of the Manners of the Nobility, the Rich, and those that are in Power; for to some of these all Prosperi∣ty appertaines.
Prosperity in Children, and goods of the Body, make men desire to exceede others in the goods of Fortune.
Men that Prosper have this ill, to be more proud, and Inconsi∣derate then others.
And this good; that they wor∣ship God; trusting in him, for that they finde themselves to re∣ceive more good then proceeds from their owne Industry.
The Mann••rs of Poore men,
Obscure men, Men with out Power, and Men in Adversity, may bee collected from the Contrary of what has beene said.
VVEe have hitherto set downe such Principles as are peculiar to severall kindes of Orations.
Now we are to speake of such Places as are Common to them all as these, Possible, Done, or Past, Future, Great, Small.
Possible is that
The Principles concerning Im∣possible are the Contraries of these
That Has beene Done.
Then which a harder thing Has beene Done.
And the Consequent whereof Has beene Done.
And that, which being Possi∣ble he had a will to, and nothing hindred.
And that, which was Possible to him in his Anger.
And that, which he longed to Doe.
And that, which was before upon the point of Doing.
And whose Antecedent Has beene Done; or that, for which it uses to be Done.
And if that, for whose cause we doe this, then This.
The Principles concerning Not done, are the Contraries of these.
That Shall be Done.
Which some man can, and meanes to Doe.
And which some man can, and desires to Doe.
And which is in the way, and upon the point to be Done.
And the Antecedents where∣of are Past.
And the Motive whereof is past.
Of Great and Small, More and Lesse, see Chap. 7. Booke 1.
OF the Principles both gene∣rall, & speciall from whence
Proofes are to bee drawne, has beene already spoken.
Now follow the Proofes themselves, which are Examples, or Enthymemes.
An Example is either an Ex∣ample properly so called (as some Action past:) or a Simili∣tude (which also is called a Para∣ble:) or a Fable (which containes some Action fained.)
An Example properly so called is this, Darius came not into Greece, till he had first subdued AEgypt. Xerxes also conquered AEgypt first; then afterwards crossed the Hellespont. We ought therefore to hinder the King of Persia from conquering AEgypt.
A Similitude, or Parable, is such as followeth. They who choose their Magistrates by Lot, are like them that choose for their Cham∣pions those on whom the Lot shall fall, rather then those,
who have the greatest strength; and for their Pilot, not him that hath skill; but him whose name is drawne out of the Vrne.
A Fable is in this manner. The Horse desiring to drive out the Stagge from their common pa∣sture, tooke a man to assist him; and having received into his mouth a bridle, and a rider upon his backe, obtained his intent, but became subject to the Man. So you of Himaera, having (in hope to be revenged of yonr Ene∣mies) given unto Phalaris so∣veraine authority, that is to say, taken a bridle into your mouthes; if you shall also give him a guard to his person, that is, let him get up upon your backes, you become his slaves presently past reco∣very.
To finde out Examples, that is, Actions done that may serve our purpose, is therefore hard, be∣cause
not in our power.
But to find Fables and Simili∣tudes, is easier; because by con∣versing in Philosophy a man may faine somewhat in nature like to the case in hand.
Examples, Similitudes and Fa∣bles, where Enthymemes are wanting, may serve us in the be∣ginning of an Oration for Indu∣ctions; otherwise are to be allea∣ged after Enthymemes for Testi∣monies.
A Sentence is an universall Proposition concerning those things which are to be de∣sired or avoided, in the Actions, or Passions of common life. As
A wise man will not suffer
his Children to bee over-lear∣ned.
And is to an Enthymeme in Rhetorique as any Proposition is to a Syllogisme in Logicke.
And therefore a Sentence, if the reason be rendred, becomes a Conclusion; and both together make an Enthymeme.
As for Example.
To bee overlearned, besides that it begets effeminacy, pro∣cures envy. Therefore hee thats wise will not suffer his Children to be overlearned.
Of Sentences there be foure sorts.
For they either require Proofes, or not: that is, are manifest, or not.
Such as are manifest, are ei∣ther so assoone as they are utte∣red; as
Health is a great Good.
Or as soone as they are con∣sidered;
as
Men use to hate, whom they have ••urt.
Such as are not manifest are either Conclusions of Enthy∣memes; as
He thats wise, will not suffer his Children, &c.
Or else are Enthymematicall; that is, have in themselves the force of an Enthymeme; as
Mortall men ought not to carry immortall anger.
A Sentence not Manifest ought to be either Inferr'd, or Con∣firm'd.
Inferr'd thus.
Tis not good to be effeminately minded, nor to be envyed by ones fellow Citizens. A wise man there∣fore will not have his Children o∣verlearned.
Confirm'd thus.
A wise man will not have his Children overlearned, Seeing
too much learning both softens a Mans mind, and procures him envie among his fellow Citi∣zens.
If a reason be added to a ma∣nifest Sentence, let it be short.
Sentences become not every man; but onely Old men, and such as be well versed in busi∣nesse. For to heare a young man speake Sentences, is ridiculous; and to heare an ignorant man speake Sentences is absurd.
Sentences generally received, when they are for our purpose, ought not to be neglected, be∣cause they passe for truthes. And yet they may be denyed, when any laudable custome, or humour may thereby be made appeare in the Denier.
The commodities of Sentences are two.
Thus much of Sentences; what they be; of how many sorts; how to be used; whom they be∣come; and what is their profit.
SEeing an Enthymeme differs from a Logicall Syllogisme, in
that it neither concludes out of every thing, nor out of remote Principles; the Places of it, from whence a man may argue ought to be certaine, and determinate.
And because whosoever makes a Syllogisme Rhetoricall, or other, should know all, or the most part of that which is in his question; as whosoever is to advise the A∣thenians in the question, whether they are to make warre or no, must know what their revenues be; what, and what kinde of power they have: and hee that will praise them, much know their actes at Salamis, Marathon, &c. it will be necessary for a good speaker to have in readinesse the choicest particulars of whatsoe∣ver he foresees hee may speake of
He that is to speake extem∣pore, must comprehend in his speech as much as hee can of
what is most proper in the mat∣ter in hand.
Proper I call those things which are least common to others; as, He that will praise Achilles, is not to declare such things as are common both to him and Dio∣medes; as that he was a Prince, and warred against the Trojans; but such things as are proper on∣ly to Achilles; as that he killed Hector and Cygnus; went to the warre young, and voluntary.
Let this therefore be one ge∣nerall Place, From that which is Proper.
FOrasmuch as Enthymemes ei∣ther inferre truely, or seeme
onely so to doe; and they which doe inferre indeed, bee either Ostensive; or such as bring a man to some impossibility; wee will first set downe the Places of En∣thymemes Ostensive.
An Ostensive Enthymeme is, wherein a man concludes the question from somewhat gran∣ted.
That Enthymeme which brings a man to an impossibility is an En∣thymeme wherein from that which the Adversary maintain∣eth, wee conclude that which is manifestly impossible.
All Places have beene already set downe in a manner in the pre∣cedent Propositions of Good, E∣vill, Iust, Vnjust, Honorable and Dishonorable: namely they have beene set downe as applied to particular Subjects, or in Con∣crete.
Here they are to be set downe
in another manner; namely in the Abstract, or Vniversall.
The first Place then let be from Contraries, which in the Concrete or Particulars is exemplified thus. If Intemperance be hurtfull, Temperance is profitable: and if Intemperance be not hurtfull; n••i∣ther is Temperance profitable.
Another Place may bee from Cognomination or affinity of words: as in this Particular. If what is Iust be Good; then what is Iustly is well: but Iustly to die is not well: therefore not all that is Iust is Good.
A third from Relatives; as This man has Iustly Done, there••ore the other has Iustly suffered. But this Place sometimes deceives: for a man may suffer justly yet not from him.
A fourth from Comparison, three wayes.
From the Greater to the Lesse;
as, He has stricken his father; and therefore this man.
From the Lesse to the Greater: as, The Gods know not all things; much lesse man.
From Equality: as, If Cap∣taines be not alwayes the worse e∣steemed for losing a victory; why should Sophisters?
Another from the Time: as, Philip to the Thebans: If I had required to passe through your Country with my Army before I had ayded you against the Phocae∣ans, there is no doubt but you would have promised it me. It is absurd therefore to deny it me now after I have trusted you.
A Sixth from what the Adver∣sary sayes of himselfe: as, I phicra∣tes asked Aristophon, whether he would take a bribe to betray the Army: and he answering no; What (sayes he) is it likely that Iphicra∣tes would betray the Army; and Aristophon not?
This Place would be ridiculous, where the Defendant were not in much more estimation then the Accuser.
A seventh from the Definition; as that of Socrates; A Spirit is ei∣ther God, or the Creature of God: and therefore hee denies not that there is a God, that confesses there are Spirits.
An eighth from the distinction of an ambiguous word.
A ninth from Division: as, If all men do what they doe for one of three causes, whereof two are im∣possible; and the Accuser charge not the Defendant with the third; it followes that hee has not done it.
A tenth from Induction: as, at Athens, at Thebes, at Sparta, &c. and therefore every where.
An eleventh from Authority, or precedent sentence, as that of Sappho that Death is evill, for that
the Gods have judged it so, in ex∣empting themselves from morta∣lity.
A twelfth from the Conse∣quence: as, 'Tis not good to be en∣vied; Therefore neither to be lear∣ned. 'Tis good to be wise; therefore also to be instructed.
A thirteenth from two contra∣ry Consequences; as, 'Tis not good to be an Orator, because if he speake the truth, he shall displease men: if he speak falsely, he shall displease God.
Here is to be noted that some∣times this argument may be re∣torted: as thus, If you speake truth you shall please God; if you speake untruth you shall please men; therefore by all meanes be an Ora∣tor.
A foureteenth from the quality that men have to praise one thing, and approve another: as, We ought not to warre against the Atheni∣ans
upon no precedent injury; for all men discommend injustice. Againe, We ought to warre against the Athenians; for otherwise our Liberty is at their mercy, that is, is no liberty: but the preservation of liberty is a thing that all men will approve.
A fifteenth from Proportion: as, seeing we naturalize strangers for their vertues, why should wee not banish this stranger for his vices?
A sixteenth from the similitude of Consequents: as, He that denies the immortality of the Gods, is no worse then he that has written the generation of the Gods. For the same Consequence followes of both, that sometimes there are none.
A seventeenth from that, that men change their minde: as, If when we were in banishment, wee fought to recover our ••ountry, why should wee not sight now to retaine it?
An eighteenth from a fayned end: as, that Diomedes chose Vlysses to goe with him, not as more valliant then another; but as one that would partake lesse of the glory.
A nineteenth from the Cause: as if hee would inferre hee did it from this, that hee had Cause to doe it.
A twentieth from that which is Incredible, but True: as, that Lawes may neede a Law to mend them; as well as Fish bred in the salt water, may neede salting.
LEt the first Place be from in∣spection of Times, Actions, or Words, either of the Adversary,
or of the speaker, or Both. Of the Adversarie; as, Hee sayes hee loves the People, and yet he was in the conspiracy of the Thirty. Of the speaker; as, He sayes I am contentious; and yet I never be∣gan sute. Of Both; as, He never conferr'd any thing to the benefit of the Common-wealth, whereas I have ransomed divers Cittizens with my owne money.
A second from shewing the cause of that which seemed amisse, and serves for men of good re∣putation that are accused; as, The Mother that was accused of Incest for being seene imbracing her Sonne, was absolved as soone as she made appeare; that shee imbraced him upon his arrivall from farre, by way of Saluta∣tion.
A third, from rendring of the cause, as, Leodamas, to whom it was objected, that he had under
the thirty Tyrants, defaced the Inscription (which the People had set up in a Pillar) of his Ig∣nominy; answered, He had not done it; because it would have beene more to his commodity to let it stand; thereby to indeere him∣selfe to the Tyrants, by the testi∣mony of the Peoples hatred.
A fou••th from better Counsell; as, He might have done better for himselfe; therefore he did not this. But this Place deceives, when the better Counsell comes to minde after the Fact.
A fifth, from the Incompatibili∣ty of the things to be done; as, they that did deliberate whether they should both mourne and sacrifice at the funerall of Leuco∣thea, were told, that if they thought her a Goddesse, they ought not to mourne•• and if they thought her a Mortall, they ought not to sacrifice.
A sixth (which is proper to Iudiciall Orations) from an In∣ference of Error; as, if he did it not, he was not wise, therefore hee did it.
Enthymemes that leade to Im∣possibility please more than Osten∣sive: for they compare, and put contraries together, whereby they are the better set off, and more conspicuous to the Au∣ditor.
Of all Enthymemes, they be best, which we assent to as soone as heare. For such consent plea∣seth us; and makes us favoura∣ble to the speaker.
OF seeming Enthymemes, one Place may be from the forme of speaking; as when a man has repeated divers Sentences, he brings in his conclusion, as if it follow'd necessarily, though it doe not.
A second from an ambiguous word.
A third from that which is true divided to that which is false joy∣ned; as that of Orestes, It was justice that I should revenge my Fathers death; and it was justice my Mother should die for killing my Father, therefore I justly kil∣led my Mother. Or from that which is true joyned to that which is false divided; as; one cup of
Wine, and one cup of Wine, are hurtfull; therefore one cup of Wine is hurtfull.
A fourth from amplification of the Crime. For neither is the De∣fendant likely to have commit∣ted the Crime he amplifies; nor does the Accuser seeme, when he is Passionate, to want ground for his Accusation.
A fifth from signes; as, when a man concludes the doing of the Fact from the manner of his life.
A sixth from that which comes by Chance, as if from this that the Tyranny of Hipparchus came to be overthrowne from the love of Aristogeiton to Harmodi∣us, a man should conclude, that in a free Common-wealth loving of Boyes were profitable.
A seventh from the Consequence, as, Banishment is to bee desired because a banisht man has choice
of places to dwell in.
An eight from making that the cause which is not; as, In Demo∣sthenes his governement, the war began; therefore Demosthenes governed well. With the Pelo∣ponnesian warre beganne the Plague, therefore Pericles that perswaded that warre, did ill.
A ninth from the omission of some Circumstance, as, Helen did what was lawfull, when shee ran a∣w••y with Paris, because shee had her Fathers consent to choose her owne Husband; which was true onely during the time that shee had not chosen.
A tenth from that which is pro∣bable in some case, to that which is probable simply; as, Tis probable hee foresaw, that if hee did it hee should be suspected; therefore tis probable he did it not.
From this Place one may in∣serre both wayes, that he did it
not. For if he be not likely to doe it, it may be thought hee did it not: againe, if he were likely to doe it, it may be thought he did it not, for this, that he knew he should be suspected
Vpon this Place was grounded the Art, which was so much de∣tested in Protagoras, of making the better cause seeme the worse; and the worse the bet∣ter.
AN Argument is answered by an opposite Syllogisme, or by an Objection.
The Places of opposite Syllo∣gismes, are the same with the Places of Syllogismes, or Enthy∣memes:
for a Rhetoricall Syllogisme is an Enthymeme.
The Places, of Objections are foure.
From the same, as, To the Ad∣versary that proves Love to be good by an Enthymeme, may be objected, that no want is good, and yet love is want; or particularly thus; The Love of Myrrhato her Father was not good.
The second from Contraries; as, if the Adversary say A good man does good to his friends, an Objection might bee made that then, an evill man will doe also e∣vill to his friends.
From Similitude, as thus, if the Adversary say all men that are injured, doe hate those that have injured them, it may be Ob∣jected, that then, all men that had received benefits should love their benefactors, that is to say, be grate∣full.
The fourth from the authority of famous men; as when a man shall say, that drunken men ought to be pardoned those acts they do in their drunkennesse, because they know not what they doe, the Objection may be, that Pitta∣cus was of another mind, that ap∣pointed for such acts a double pu∣nishment; one for the Act, a••o∣ther for the Drunkennesse.
And forasmuch as all Enthy∣memes are drawne from Probabi∣lity, or Example, or from a Signe fallible, or from a signe infallible: an Enthymeme from Probability, may be confuted Really, by shew∣ing that for the most part it falls out otherwise: but Apparently or Sophistically, by shewing one∣ly that it does not fall out so al∣waies; whereupon the Iudge thinkes the Probability not suffi∣cient to ground his sentence up∣on.
[The Reason whereof is this. That the Iudge, while hee heares the fact prooved Probable, conceives it as true. For the Vnderstanding has no Object but Truth. And there∣fore by and by, when hee shall heare an Instance to the Contrary; and thereby find that hee had no necessity to thinke it true, presently chan∣ges his opinion, and thinkes it false, and consequently not so much as Probable. For hee cannot at one time thinke the same thing both Probable and False: and hee that saies a thing is Probable, the meaning is, hee thinkes it True, but finds not arguments enough to prove it.]
An Enthymeme from a fallible signe, is answered, by shewing the signe to be fallible.
An Enthymeme from an Exam∣ple,
is a••swered, as an Enthy∣meme from Probability; Really, by shewing more Examples to the contrary; Apparently, if hee bring Examples enough to make it seeme not necessary.
If the Adversary have more Ex••mples then wee, wee must make appeare, that they are not applicable to the Case.
An Enthymeme from an infal∣lible signe, if the Proposition be true, is unanswerable.
THe first, that Amplification and Extenuation are not Common Places, appeares by this, that Amplification, and Extenua∣tion doe prove a fact to be great, or little; and are therefore En∣thymemes, to be drawne from Common Places; and therefore are not the Places themselves.
The second, that Enthymemes, by which Arguments are answe∣red, are of the same kind with those, by which the matter in
question is proved, is manifest by this, that these inferre the op∣posite, of what was proved by the other.
The third, that an Objection is no Enthymeme, is apparent by this, that an Objection is no more, but an Opin••on, ••xample, or o∣ther Instance, produced to make appeare, that the Adversaries Argument does not conclude.
Thus much of Examples, Sen∣tences, Enthymemes, and gene∣rally of all things, that belong to Argumentation; from what Places they may be drawne, or answered.
There remaines Elocution, and Disposition to be spoken of in the next Booke.