Aristotles politiques, or Discourses of gouernment. Translated out of Greeke into French, with expositions taken out of the best authours, specially out of Aristotle himselfe, and out of Plato, conferred together where occasion of matter treated of by them both doth offer it selfe: the obseruations and reasons whereof are illustrated and confirmed by innumerable examples, both old and new, gathered out of the most renowmed empires, kingdomes, seignories, and commonweals that euer haue bene, and wherof the knowledge could be had in writing, or by faythfull report, concerning the beginning, proceeding, and excellencie of ciuile gouernment. By Loys Le Roy, called Regius. Translated out of French into English

[ A]

THE FIFTH BOOKE OF ARI∣STOTLES CIVIL GOVERNMENT, TRAN∣SLATED [ B] OVT OF GREEKE, AND FRENCH, INTO ENGLISH. The Argument.

ARistotle hauing spoken of a Citty and the parts there∣of, [ C] and handled all the kinds of gouernment, vvith the manners of their establishing and ordaining, vvhat is the best and of longest continuance, & for vvhat people vvhat kinds of gouernment are fit: in this booke he sets downe the springs of sedition, and the causes of the chan∣ges that proceed thereof: shewing generally and particularly how Com∣monvveales haue ben destroied and preserued. It is certaine, that as all [ D] things hauing a beginning, must likewise haue an end; and hauing growne and increased, must likewise diminish and vvaxe old; some quickly, and some late, according to the nature and disposition of the matter vvhereof they are compounded, and through the influence of the bodies from vvhence this continuall course and turns of generation and corruption do proceed. In like sort publicke states are established, increased, maintained, brought low, changed, destroied, conuerted, and restored, one by another, through the order of Nature: the power of those states being the more as∣sured, [ E] and of longer continuance, vvhich are the better grounded on Reli∣gion and Iustice: yet are they not perpetuall, how good soeuer a forme of gouernment be there established, for vve see that all doe vvast in processe of time, and finally perish by their owne proper and naturall corruptions vvhich do follow and accompany them, in like sort, as diseases come to beasts, blasting to corne, rottennesse to vvood, rust to brasse and yron; each thing hauing his proper and invvard euil, vvhich doth consume it, though it escape all other outward hurts. Now, sith the knowledge of gouernment [ F] consisteth more in practise then in speculation, and is not capable of an exact methode; and sith in mens affaires being so variable, examples doe profite more then precepts: The Philosopher hath cited here among so many exquisite discourses, infinite examples taken out of the Estates and others both of his time and before him, shewing in this booke especially

(wherein the vvhole vveight of the knowledge of gouernment is compri∣zed) [ G] his admirable memory and incredible diligence, more then in any other. But because that since his time there haue risen greater Estates, and more notable changes, I purpose by imitating him, to insert vvhere it shall seeme conuenient, examples taken out of all Countries, ages and sects, vntill these present times: and cheefly those examples that are nea∣rest to vs, and to our knowledge: adding other reasons vvhich haue ben since discouered by long experience, as Nature doth by little and lit∣tle manifest her secrets, correcting the ouersights and failings of aunci∣ent [ H] vvriters, vvho could not see and vnderstand all; but haue left a great part thereof to be searched out by those that should come after them; yet euery one to the vttermost of their power, aduauncing and setting for∣vvard the knowledge of Arts, and discouering of the truth, as vve are likewise bound to doe: not so much for respect of men, vvho doe oft times shew themselues vnthankefull towards those that endeuour to doe them most good, nor for the attaining of credite and reputation amongst [ I] them, or leauing to our posterity the memory of our name, vvhich thing all men that are of great courage and spirit doe desire; not so much I say for these causes, as for the honour of God, vvhose vvill it is, that as vve haue receiued such treasures of our auncestours, so vve doe carefully keepe them, and faithfully deliuer them from hand to hand to our suc∣cessors, endeuouring alwaies to amend them according to our power, and according to the gifts vvhich are bestovved on men in diuerse professions.

[ A]

CHAP. I. Of the changes happening in publicke Estates.

[ B] WE wil consider here which and how many, and what are the causes of these changes which happen in cōmon∣weales: and what are the destructions of euery one, out of what formes into what formes they are changed, and therewithall what their remedies are, both in generall, and in particular, and by what meanes they may bee cheefly preserued.

The Philosophers purpose is to treat in this booke of the changes of Estates, and to shew the [ C] causes thereof: and by what meanes euery forme of Cōmonweale is preserued & destroied. Which changes he will afterward diuide into foure sorts, or thereabout. Plato assayeth to doe the like in the eight and ninth booke of his Com∣monweale.

Our beginning herein shall be, that many formes of Commonweales, haue beene established, [ 1] in which all men confesse, that there should be a certaine right and equality, according to propor∣tion, [ 2] wherein neuerthelesse they erre, as in the Democratie, where all the Citizens being in some [ 3.4] [ D] sort equall, doe thinke themselues absolutely equall: and because they haue all like libertie, they [ 5] thinke themselues altogether like. In the Oligarchie, when they who are vnequall in some things, [ 6] will be vnequall in all things; as if because they are vnequall in riches, they thinke themselues al∣together vnequall. Whereby it happeneth, that some as being equall, repute themselues worthy to [ 7] haue all things in equall manner; others, as being vnequall. [ 8.9]

The most seditions doe happen, because that (as all men confesse) in the distribu∣ting of honours, equality must bee proportionally obserued in euery Commonweale; yet some being equall in one thing only, as the poore men in Democraties are equally [ E] free, will be absolutely equall in all things. Others being vnequall in one thing, will bee vnequall in all things, as the rich men and Noblemen in the Oligarchie feeke to be ab∣solutely preferred before those whom they exceed in riches or Nobility, although they bee inferiour to them in vertue. Wherefore both these sorts of Citizens, hauing that part in gouernment which they thinke doth by right belong vn••o them, raise seditions, whereby Estates are chaunged from one forme into another cleane different•• as from a Democratie into an Oligarchie: or els the same being still kept, are gouerned by other Lords, or made more or lesse Democraticall, Oligarchicall, and Regall: or altered in some part, as in the ordaining or suppressing of some principall Offices touching the [ F] Counsell, the reuenues of the State, of Religion, and Warre. For the auoiding of which inconueniences and preuenting of the grudges and discontents of such persons, it is re∣quisit to entermixe the Arithmeticall and Geometricall equality: the Arithmetical be∣ing of it selfe euill, distributing by Lot the publick honors & commodities to all alike; and the Geometrical impossible to be obserued, though it be good of it selfe, hauing re∣spect alwaies to euery mans desert and worth. Wherefore the Venetians who seeme to haue ordained and established the forme of their Commonweale with great wisdome,

doe vse both lot and election. They vse lot in the creation of the Electors, or chusers [ G] of Magistrates, and herein all the Citizens, euen they that are vicious persons, may par∣ticipate with the better sort, without any hurt to the Commonweale. But in the attai∣ning of honours, all consisteth in the iudgement, and estimation of the Citizens, as it hath ben already noted in the eight chapter of the third book, according to that which Conta••ine hath written thereof in his first booke of the Venetian Commonweale. Ari∣stotle both here and in his third and sixt bookes, ••••••••deth most on the Democraties and Oligarchies, because in his time all Greece was full of these troubles and discords, by reason that there were few other forms of gouernments than Oligarchicall and Demo∣craticall, which are commonly vnquiet, and subiect to enuies, discontents and enmities. [ H]

[ 1] MANY formes of Commonweales haue ben ordained.] As well principall as subalternal; third booke, chap. 5. & fourth booke, chap. 2. 3.

[ 2] WHEREIN all men confesse, that there should bee a certaine right and equalitie.] The end of gouernment is ciuile iustice; and Right is the publlcke good, or common vtility, 3. of the Politickes, chap. 8. Likewise right or iustice is called in the first booke, chap. 2. The order or rule of ciuile society: because that is said to be done by right, which is done conueniently according to the order and institution of ciuile society, and according to the forme of euery Commonweale, as the Democraticall, Oligarchicall, and Aristocra∣ticall [ I] right, which is measured according to their particular ends: 3. of the Politickes, chap. 6. and 6. booke•• chap. 2. All men confesse (saith he) in the fift of the Ethicks, chap. 3. That in distributing to euery man that which belongs vnto him, Right or iustice must be obserued, according to a certain dignity, which is not accounted the same by al men•• for the Democraticall persons doe place it in liberty, the Oligarchicall in riches or in Nobilitie, and the Aristocraticall in vertue. Then all men doe affirme that right is equa∣litie. 3. booke, chap. 8. and that in the distributing thereof, it is requisit to keep a propor∣tion•• not onely in goods and honours, but also in persons, chap. 6. For looke what pro∣portion there is betweene the dignities and deserts of persons, to whom distribution is [ K] made, the same proportion ought to bee betweene the thinges that are distributed, al∣though men doe not agree therein, by reason of the diuersity of gouernements, and of their vnbridled desires, as Plato doth very well discourse in the eight and ninth bookes of his Commonweale.

[ 3] ACCORDING to proportion.] Wee will afterward shew what this proportion and proportionalitie is•• and how many the kinds thereof be Right (saith Aristotle in the fift of his Ethickes, chap. 3.) consisteth in proportion; and proportion is not onely of the number numerant, or that doth number, but also of the number numberable, or that may be numbred. For proportion is the equalitie of reason, and consisteth in four terms [ L] at the least, not onely the diuided proportion, but also the continued, repeating one twice: In like sort Right consisteth in foure tearmes at the least, and there is the same rea∣son And in the same place he saith, Right must consist in foure tearmes at the least, for those in whom right is are two, and the thinges wherein it consisteth, are likewise two. And there must bee the ••ame equality of the persons, as there is of the things, wherein right consisteth; which things are so proportioned one towards another, as they are be∣tweene whom the right is; who shall not haue equall things, if themselues be not equal: whence debates and quar••els doe spring, when they that are equal, do not receiue equal things; or they that are not equall, vnequall things. [ M]

[ 4] WHEREIN neuerthelesse they erre.] In taking that which is in some sort iust, for that which is properly and simply iust: and they iudge ill, because they iudge of them∣selues, and of their owne affaires, 3. of the Politickes, chap. 6. agreeing in the equalitie of things, and not of persons. They erre in speaking of equality, because they adioine not them to the number of equal persons, nor account them equal, who are so in very deed. We haue already touched this point in the said sixt chapter of the third booke.

[ A] As in the Democratie, where all the Citizens being in some sort equall, and because they [ 5] haue all like libertie, they thinke themselues altogether like.] Hee yeeldeth an example of his saying in two corrupt Common-weales somewhat contrarie, viz. in the Democra∣tie and the Oligarchie, wherein Right is euill vnderstood. First in the Democratie, where the Democraticall persons, hauing all like freedome, thinke that they shou••d all equally participate in the gouernement, without any respect to bee had to ••••••ches or nobility; so that in such an estate the poore are superiour in all thinges, a•• attribute to themselues the publicke commodities and honours, which they distri∣bute [ B] equally among themselues: for the end of the Democratie is libertie, and the Democraticall right is that euery one may haue equality according to the number, and not to the dignity, as it hath ben shewed in the third booke, chap. 6. 8. and we will speake thereof againe in the 6. booke, chap. 2. and•• 3. Plato in the eight of his Common∣weale, and the third of his lawes.

IN the Oligarchie, when they who are vnequall in some thinges, will bee vnequall in all [ 6] things, as if because they are vnequall in riches, they thinke themselues altogether vnequall.] The other example of right, ill vnderstoode, is taken from the Oligarchie, whose [ C] end is riches, and wherein publicke commodities and honours are distributed, ac∣cording to the valuation of mens wealth, without hauing respect to the poore, al∣though they bee more vertuous or more learned, and therefore more capable of offi∣ces: so that in such an Estate, rich men and riches, onely are esteemed. Plato in the eight of his Commonweale. Aristotle in the 3. of the Politickes, chap. 8. And 4. booke, chap. 4.5. & 6. And 6. booke, chap. 6.

WHEREBY it happeneth, that some as being equall, repute themselues worthie [ 7] to haue all thinges in equall manner.] Poore men hauing equall freedome in the De∣mocratie, [ D] will be absolutely equall in all things.

OTHERS as being vnequall, seeke to haue more.] In the Oligarchie, the rich & No∣blemen [ 8] will bee absolutely preferred by reason of their riches, although they be infe∣riour in vertue to those whom they exceede in wealth.

WHICH is vnequall.] As more honour is greater reward: for inequality consisteth [ 9] in more or lesse. Aristotle in his booke of the Predicaments.

[ E] Then all these Estates haue in themselues a certaine right, wherein neuerthelesse they doe [ 1] simply erre. Hereupon, when either of them haue not such a part in the gouernement of the [ 2] Common-weale, as they thinke that they ought to haue, they raise sedition. But such as excell in vertue, might haue iuster cause to mutinie, as those which should by reason hee ab∣solutely [ 3] and onely vnequall, and preferred before others; although they doe it not. There are some of higher birth, and in regard of this inequality will bee preferred and aduanced [ 4] aboue the rest: because men doe account those noble who flourish through the vertue and ri∣ches [ 5] of their auncestors.

[ F] THEN all these Estates haue in themselues a certaine right, wherein ••••••erthelesse [ 1] they doe erre.] The Democratie and Oligarchie are grounded on some part of right, or rather some shewe of right. Aristotle in the third of his Politickes, chapter eight. Because they who are equall in some one certaine thing, must not attri∣bute to themselues an equall part of all thinges; nor they a greater part, who doe exceede in one thing. For they that are superiour in richesse, or in Nobilitie,

are not simply superior, neither they that haue like libertie, are absolutely alike: because [ G] no man is absolutely superiour, and to be preferred, saue onely the vertuous; nor anie simply equall, saue only they that are equal in vertue. The reason is, because men assem∣ble themselues into a Citie, not to liue only, but rather to liue well. Whereto, sith the good and vertuous men doe yeeld greatest furtherance, it is meet, that the greatest part of gouernement in the City bee assigned to vertue: the third of the Politickes, Chap. 6.

[ 2] HEREVPON, when either of them haue not such a part in the gouernment of the Commonweale, as they thinke that they ought to haue.] As at Rome the Senate and Nobles in or∣daining the popular Estate and gouernment, after the expulsion of the Kings, assumed [ H] to themselues so much authority, and allowed so little to the common people, that they mutinied and separated themselues from them with great dissention. Whereupon to appease them, the said Senate and Nobles were enforced to graunt them greater au∣thority, then in reason they should haue had: from whence sprang all their discords and ciuile dissentions that happened afterwards. At Venice the Gentlemen who are Lords, haue the whole rule, and diuide among themselues all the offices and charges wherein there is any honour and profite: whereat the other Citizens, among whome there are many both wise, rich, and of great courage, doe meruellously repine, and are mightily discontented. Likewise in the Cities and territories subiect vnto them, those that are [ I] Noblemen and of power, are very much kept downe, by reason of the feare which that Signorie hath alwaies had, least by giuing credite and authority to the people, they should raise any mutinie.

[ 3] BVT such as excell in vertue, might haue iuster cause to mutine, as those which by reason should bee absolutely and onely vnequall.] The vertuous being lesse esteemed, or ill vsed, might haue greater occasion to mutinie: as Cato, being repulsed when he sued for the Praetorship, or rather (as most Authours write) the Consulship: Aristides the iust when he was banished from Athens: Scipio, Rutilius, and Cicero, from Rome. Neuerthelesse, they raise no commotion, because they haue more regard of the publicke good, then [ K] of their owne peculiar commodity.

[ 4] THERE are some of higher birth, & in regard of this inequality will be preferred and ad∣uanced aboue the rest.] As the Princes of the blood in France, and the Lords at Venice, and the Gentlemen of the best houses through all Christian realmes, and in Persia and in India, and wheresoeuer Nobility is respected.

[ 5] BECAVSE men doe account those noble, who flourish through the vertue and riches of their ancestours.] Aristotle in the 3. of the Politickes, chap. 8. Euery mans Nobility (saith he) is honoured in his Countrey, because it is a probable thing, that of the better Parents the better children are borne: for Nobility is vertue by descent. And in the fourth book, [ L] chap. 4. Riches, credite of birth, vertue and learning, & other like, do by the same diffe∣rence constitute the kinds of Noblemen. And in the eight chapter of the same booke, There are three things which striue for equality in the Commonweale, to wit, libertie, riches, and vertue, for the fourth which is called Nobility, followes the two latter, sith Nobility is auncient riches and vertue. Osorius a Portugall hath lately written a booke of Nobility, which is translated into the French tongue. Nowe adaies they are called Gentlemen who liue on their landes without taking any paines, or vsing any Trade, whereby to get their liuing: They haue Castles and fortresses, and a certaine num∣ber of subiects and vassals which yeeld them fealtie and homage, as in France, Spaine, Germany, in the kingdome of Naples, and in Lumbardie. At Venice the Gentlemen [ M] haue not much lands and possessions, but their substance consisteth in moueables and Merchandise, neither haue they any Castle or iurisdiction: so that such manner of Nobility is accounted but a title of preheminence to distinguish them from the peo∣ple, and those of base estate.

[ A] These are, as I may say, the beginnings and fountaines of seditions, which cause the changes [ 1.2] of Estates in two sorts: Sometimes from the present forme into another diuerse, as from a Demo∣cratie [ 3.4] into an Oligarchie; or from an Oligarchie into a Democratie, or into a Commonweale; and from any of those formes into an Aristocratie, or from these formes into those. Sometimes, they [ 5] seeke not to change the present forme of gouernment, but maintaining still the same Estate, they will haue it gouerned by themselues, as the Oligarchie or Monarchie being still continued. [ 6] Moreouer, they contend for the respect of more or lesse, as to augment or diminish the autho∣rity [ 7] of the Oligarchie or the Democratie, and in like sort of other Commonweales, to the end, to [ B] enlarge or restraine them. Besides, in changing some part of the Commonweale, as if they [ 8.9] should ord••ine or put downe some Magistracie, as it is saied that Lysander, attemp••ed to haue [ 10] changed the Kingly state at Lacedemon; and king Pausanias, to haue abolished the state of the [ 11] Ephori. And at Epidamnus the Commonweale was changed in one part, by the ordaining of a [ 12] Senate in stead of the Prou••sts of the Tribes: and in the Court of Athens called Heliae••, when [ 13] they proceed to the election of any one to bee receiued thereinto, they must take him euen out of those that haue authority or imployment in the Commonweale, and that heare other offices. And [ 14] an Archon or President that hath supreme authority in this Commonweale, is a remnant of the old Oligarchie.

[ C]

THESE are the beginnings and fountaines of seditions.) Ciuile commotions are rai∣sed [ 1] in these two sorts of Commonweales, and commonly in all, through the vnequall vsage of men, viz. when such as are equall, are not equally vsed among their equals, and some of them more aduanced; or when such as are vnequall, are vnequally vsed among them who are likewise vnequall; but the superiours are equall to their inferiours, or else lesse set by and despised.

WHICH cause the changes of Estates in two sorts.) Hee doth first set downe two sorts [ 2] or manners of chaunging Estates, whereto hee will afterward adde two other, which [ D] make foure. Estates are changed by seditions, and there is neuer any immutation in the principall parts of a Common-weale without violence and force, as in ci∣uile Gouernement, and in Religion: sith Plato saith, That euen in persuading, there is some violence.

SOMETIMES from the present forme into another diuerse.) The first manner of chan∣ging [ 3] Estates, is when they are altered from one forme of Gouernement into another cleane different, as at Rome there was a change from the Monarchy of Kings to the go∣uernment of ten men, called Decemuiri; and afterward to a popular Estate, wherein the Romanes were long time gouerned by the Consuls and Senate, vnder the authoritie of [ E] the people; then againe to a Monarchie. Not long since the Commonweale of Flo∣rence was changed into a Duchie. And the Switzers, who had at the first beene vnder the Kings of Fraunce, and after that, vnder the Empire of Germanie, by reason of the insolence, crueltie, and auarice of the Gouernours which were set ouer them, re∣belled and confederated themselues cheefely against the Dukes of Austria who annoi∣ed them, and they established this Democratie wherein they liue nowe, diuided by Cantons. Machiauel in the second of his discourses, chap. 9. writeth so of them and of the free Citties of Germany.

When the Romane Empire declined, and the title thereof was reduced into Germa∣ny, [ F] the cheefe Citties of that Countrey did one after another ••edeeme themselues of the Emperors, according to their stubbornesse and necessity, and so became free, allow∣ing to the saied Emperours some yearely tribute. Thus by little and little all the Citties which were immeadiately subiect to the Emperours, acknowledging no dutie to any inferiour Prince, haue in like sort redeemed themselues. It chaun∣ced at the same time that certaine Communalties who were subiect to the Dukes of Austria rebelled against them, amongst whom were they of Friburg, the Switzers,

and others, which prospering from the beginning, did by little and little growe to such [ G] strength, that they haue not onely not returned vnder the yoke of Austria, but doe al∣so keepe all their neighbours in awe; and are they whom wee call by the generall name of Switzers.

[ 4] As from a Democratie into ân Oligarchie, or from an Oligarchie into a Democra••••e, and from those formes into an Aristocratie, or from these into those.] The natural conuersions of Commonweales are very exactly considered and discussed by Plato in the eight booke of his Commonweale, and no lesse diligently set forth by Polibius in the sixt of his Hystorie, which placeth the Monarchie as the first gouernement of all, springing [ H] naturally amongst men without any industrie, whereof the Kingly state is bred, which being turned into a Tyrannie, hee saith that by the suppressiion thereof, the Aristocra∣tie riseth, which chaunging likewise into an Oligarchie, and afterward into a Demo∣cratie, doth in processe of time become an Ochlocratie, that is, a troublesome, and vncertaine Gouernement of an ignorant multitude. Aristotle treateth of the chan∣ges of Commonweales, in the eight of his Ethickes, chapter 10: and fourth of his Politiques.

[ 5] SOMETIMES they seeke not to change the present forme of gouernment, but main∣taining still the same Estate, they will haue it gouerned by themselues.] The second man∣ner [ I] of changing is rather in the Estate, then of the Estate: to wit, when the forme of Gouernement being nothing altered, there is onely a chaunge of Lords. As in England the houses of Lancaster and Yorke, surnamed the white rose, and the red, fought together not to destroy the Kingdome, but to trie whether of them should rule it. Likewise, the controuersie which was betweene Philip de Valoys, and Edward the third King of England, which of them had most right vnto the Crowne of France.

[ 6] As the Oligarchie and Monarchie being still continued.] With their Lawes, or the same forme of Gouernement remaining. For the Oligarchie, wee will cite [ K] that commotion or ciuile tumult which was at Florence in the time of Pope Six∣tus betweene the houses of Medici and Paci, who sought not to alter the forme of their Commonweale, which chaunged euery three months, but either of them to obtaine for themselues the cheefe authoritie in the Cittie, or rather to suppresse the power of the Medici. Touching the Monarchie, it doth oft remaine, chaun∣ging onely from one linage to another, or from one Cittie or Prouince to ano∣ther; and that by marriage, adoption, conquest, force, and vsurpation, wher•• onely the manner which is vsed in obtaining the Estate, is chaunged. Wee haue examples hereof, first of the chaunge from one linage to another, the two chaun∣ges [ L] that happened in Fraunce, the Kingdome still remaining, to wit, from the line of Pharamond, which possessed the saied kingdome three hundred and thirtie yeares, to the line of Pipine, which bare rule two hundred thirtie and three yeares: and from that to the line of Hugh Capet, which hath helde the Crowne since the yeare 984. vntill this present. From one Cittie to another, as the Em∣pire from Rome to Constantinople, the seate of the Turkish Empire, from Bur∣sia to Andrinople and Constantinople: From one Prouince to another, the Kingdome of Assyria into Media, and from Media into Persia. The Romane Empire out of Italie, first into Greece, where it continued vntill the yeare 1453: [ M] Then into Fraunce, when the Eagle began to haue two heads; and into Ger∣manie, where of Hereditarie, it is bacome Electiue: the Electours, who are seuen, must all bee Germanes, and of certaine families, and cheefe Ecclesia∣sticall Estates, in whome onelie this priuiledge resteth. By marriage, as the Dutchie of Burgoine, and Kingdome of Spaine into Austria. By adoption, Augustus adopted Tiberius; and Adrian, Antonius Pius. The kingdomes

[ A] of Norway, Sweathland, and Denmarke, came from Queene Margaret to the D•••••••• Pomerania, whō she adopted. And the kingdome of England was conquered by ••••••liam Duke of Normandy, surnamed in the English Chronicles, the Conqueror, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 progenie doth yet continue.

MOREOVER, they contend for the respect of more or lesse, as to augment or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the authority of the Oligarchie, or of the Democratie, and in like sort of other Common•••••••••• to the end, to enlarge or restraine them.] The third manner of changing Estates, is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the formes are not altered, but doe somewhat varie in regard of more or lesse, as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Oligarchie becomming more Oligarchicall, and the Democratie more Democrat•••••••• [ B] as it hath beene shewed in the 4. of the Politickes: or the Kingly State more absolu•••• as they say of King Lewis the eleuenth, that hee set the Kings of Fraunce out of th•• page; thereby meaning that hee made their authoritie more absolute then it had beene before. And Theopompus diminished the authoritie of the Lacedemonian Kings, as shall afterward bee shewed, ••when as we do come to speake of Monar∣chies.

BESIDES, in changing some part of the Commonweale.) The fourth maner is, when [ 8] the Estate is not wholly changed, but in one part, as in the cheefe Magistracies, or in the maner of Counsell, ordering of the Treasure, Religion, and military Discipline. In an∣cient [ C] time, the holding of a Parliament in Fraunce was nothing els then the assembling of the Estates of the Realme, wherein the King did communicate and conferre with his subiects, or some amongst them deputed for the rest, touching his greatest affaires; taking their aduise and counsell, hearing likewise their complaints and greeuances, and redressing them: the name whereof doth yet continue in England and Scotland. But be∣cause that by this meanes the Kings had knowledge, as well of generall complaints which concerned the whole Estate, as of priuate causes concerning particular persons, the name of Parliament remaineth still in priuate courts or audiences, which are held by a certain number of Presidents & Counsellors, ordained by the king, at Paris, Roan, [ D] Tolouse, and other places. The publicke audiences reserued by the King, haue taken the name of Estates, which haue beene left for the space of eightie yeares, or therea∣bouts. And the Parliament which had beene held once euery yeare, became ordinary; and from being ordinary, to bee held euery halfe yeare; and from that became ordinary again. But the ordaining of the Presidents hath diminished it. In like sort, the charge & ordering of the monies hath had many changes of sundry Offices therein from time to time. In Military discipline the regimēt of the men of armes, instituted by king Charles the seuenth, and the Legions by king Francis the first.

As if they should ordaine or put downe some Magistracie.) The Dictatorship at Rome [ 9] [ E] was ordained with absolute power for a time to take order for the weightie and vrgent affaires of the State. And it was afterward abolished, because first of all Silla had held it aboue the prefixed time, and after him Iulius Caesar had made it perpetuall. Silla did not wholly put downe the Tribuneship, but diminished the authoritie thereof, for∣bidding any appeales to bee made to the Tribunes, or that they should make newe Lawes, and graunting them power onely to oppose themselues, and to assemble the Senate. But Pompey did wholly rest••re this their authoritie. Cice∣ro in the third of his Lawes. And finally, Augustus Caesar abolished it ret••••∣ning the name onely, that by right thereof, hee might when hee would, assemble [ F] the Senate. The Mayor of the palace hath beene altogether suppressed. And in the time of Lewis the eleuenth, the Cons••able had in his ordinarie re••••••ue 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hun∣dred men of Armes, wherof himselfe was Commissary, which number is now brought to an hundreth.

As it is said that Lysander attempted to haue changed the Kingly st•••••• a•• L••ced••••••••.) [ 10] There were two kings at Lacedemon•• who were ouer-awed and bridled by 17. Senators and fiue Ephori, and could not bee of any other stocke then of the Heraclid••e, as Plato

writeth in the fourth of his Lawes, and in Alcibiades the first. But Lysander (as Plutarch [ G] writeth in his life) attempted to bring it so to passe, that the Kingdome should not goe by succession, but that being void, it should bee giuen to the most valiant and vertu∣ous persons.

[ 11] AND King Pausanias to haue abolished the State of the Ephori.] The two principall degrees at Lacedemon, were the Kingdome and the State of the Ephori, opposed each against other, as the Tribuneship and Consulship at Rome. Cicero in his 2. booke of Lawes. Then as Lysander attempted to change the Kingdome, so did Pausanias to abo∣lish the State of the Ephori, because their authority was too Tyrannicall, as Plato wri∣teth in the 4. of his Lawes, and Aristotle in the 2. of his Politickes, chap. 7: and it was [ H] very odious, especially to the Kings, of whome they were controulers. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifi∣eth as it were an ouerseeing or superintendence, and it was a yearely Office, whereto was committed the vnderstanding and ordering of all their principall affaires, and the correction of all other Magistrates, yea euen of the Kings themselues, from whom men might appeale to the said Ephori, who were fiue onely in number.

[ 12] AND in Epidamnus the Cōmonweale was changed in one part, by the ordaining of a Senat instead of the Prouosts of the Tribes.] Epidamnus, otherwise called Dyrrhachiū, Thucidi∣des maketh mention thereof in the first booke of his Hystorie. The Romanes changed the name of it in processe of time. It is scituated in Illyricum, or Sclauonie. At the [ I] first they chose there from time to time a certaine number of Prouosts by the tribes or linages, for the ordering of all affaires, which was afterward changed into a Senate or ordinarie Counsell.

[ 13] AND in the Court of Athens called Heliaea, when they proceed to the election of any one to be receiued thereinto, they must take him euen out of those that haue authority or employment in the Commonweale, or that beare other offices.] The Philosopher speaking of the change which is made in one part of the Cittie, doth beside the former example, alleadge one out of the Estate of Athens, which being chaunged from an Oligarchie into a Demo∣cratie, retained still many Oligarchicall customes: as the election of the Heliastae, [ K] who were not indifferently taken out of all kindes of men by lot, as was ordinari∣lie done in Democraties, but out of the worshipfullest sort, especially out of them that had alreadie other Magistracies: which was an Oligarchicall fashion. Heli••a was in Athens a soueraigne Court, consisting of a thousand Iudges, who were called Heliastae, and were kept at the charges of the Commonweale.

[ 14] AND an Archon or President that hath supreme authoritie in this Commonweale, is a remnant of the old Oligarchie.] The dignitie of the Archon in Athens, was likewise Oligarchicall, and giuen at the first for tearme of life, after for tenne yeares, and at last was yearely. This Archon was called Hegemon, and Prytanis, [ L] and his name was entered in the publicke decrees, as at this day the Dukes name is at Venice.

[ 1] THEREFORE sedition happeneth in all places, because of inequalitie, when [ 2] that is not giuen to them that bee equall, which is due vnto them by proportion, so that the Kingly state it selfe being perpetuall, is found vnequall, if it bee ouer equall persons. [ 3.4] For men, by seeking wholly for eq••••lity, doe enter into sedition. Surely equality is dou∣ble, [ 5.6] the one in number, the other in dignitie: I meane in number, that which is all one and ••quall by multitude or greatnesse: and in dignitie, by proportion. As three exceed two 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in like number, as two exceede one. By proport••on foure, two; and two, one: for [ M] two are an eqall part of foure, and one of two, ••ith each of them is a moitie. And [ 7] whereas men confesse that to bee absolutely right, which is equall according to dignity, they [ 8] fall into dissention, as hath ben before affirmed: The one sort, for that they being in some [ 9] respect equall, account themselues equall in all respe••ts•• The other sort, for that they being vn∣equall [ 10] in somethings, will be vn••quall and superior in all things. From whence proceede two

[ A] chiefe formes of Commonweales; namely; the Democratie, and the Oligarchie, considering that [ 11] vertue and noblenesse are in few men; but these other qualities are ••ound in many men: for there [ 12] are not in any place scene a hundred men together that be noble and good; but there be many poore [ 13] men euery where. [ 14]

THERFORE sedition happeneth in all places, because of inequalitie, when that is not giuen to [ 1] them that be equall, which is due vnto them by proportion.] As Equalitie, when it is well kept in all things and persons, breedeth friendship: so vnequalitie causeth euill will and dissention, chiefly when a due proportion is not kept amongst vnequall persons, by gi∣uing [ B] vnto euery one that which pertaineth vnto him, according to his calling and de∣gree. The vnequall persons which be seene commonly in countries, are Princes, gentle∣men, villains, poore, rich, learned, vnlearned, merchants, soldiors, husbandmen, and ar∣tificers: who in a well ordered State, should and ought to be intreated and handled ac∣cording to their callings, without giuing that to the one which pertaineth to the other. But aboue al things rewards must be yeelded-according to vertue, and punishments ac∣cording to offences: Els cannot publique vnitie and concord be maintained, nor the Commonweale preserued. For as the world is not composed of semblant and like ele∣ments, but of those that are differing one from another, and yet agreeing by proportion [ C] (as Galen sayth in his booke of Mixtures, and Hippocrates in his booke of Mans nature, and Plato in the same Timeus and in his Phoedon, the not naturall excesse and want whereof and changing from one place into another that is not agreeable, breedeth in∣ward sedition and sicknesse) so the citie is not constituted of men equall alike, but diffe∣ring in kind, as is set downe in the second booke of the Politikes the first chapter: and the third booke, the first chapter: who are vnited by proportionall handling, and disuni∣ted by vnequalitie. Wherefore Aristotle saith very wel in his great Morals, that propor∣tion holdeth the Citie together, for that all persons are knit together therein by pro∣portion, which is the cause of mutual concord and good wil amongst them. The breach [ D] of proportion filleth a State with hatreds, dissentions, mislikings, and grudges, whereof seditions and ciuile wars doe grow. In the time of king Lewis the eleuēth, many French princes and lords conspired against him, as malcontent for that he called them not ney∣ther vsed their counsaile in the directing of the great affaires and important matters of the kingdome, but was counselled and gouerned by meane men: and they rose vp in armes together, vnder colour that they would take order in matters concerning the Commonweale: as Philip de Comines reporteth in the first booke of his remembrances.

SO that the kingly state itself being perpetual, is found vnequall, if it be ouer equal persons.] [ 2] Although the kingly state be good and lawful of it selfe, as appeareth in the third booke [ E] of the Politiques, the first chapt. yet for all that if it come to passe that one would make himselfe king amongst his equals, and such as bee as free and noble as himselfe, and take such perpetuall authoritie as Iulius Caesar enterprised at Rome; he should make it vne∣quall, and therefore odious and vnsupportable. For when they are all equall and free by nature, they ought all to haue part in the gouernment, whether it be good or bad, and to gouerne one after another as their turns fall, and for a certaine time, as is set downe in the second booke of Politiques the first chapter: as they doe at Venice, a few States excepted: and Genoa, Noremberg, Ausburgh, Strasburgh, Lubec, and commonly in al Signories & cōmunalties. He meaneth by this word Kingly estate, the whole soueraign [ F] authoritie of one alone, which amongst equals is more tollerable to be yearely, as the Aduowership of Berne, and the Consulship of Rome, diuided betweene two: and the Archon of Athens: or from two months to two months, as the Confalonnier of Lucca: or from 2 years to 2 years, as the duke of Genoa: or during great affairs, as the Dictator. The reason is, because the other Citisens in time may attaine therevnto: And in Magi∣stracies of short continuance lesse may be enterprised: as appeareth in the second and third bookes of the Politiques.

[ 3] FOR men by seeking wholly for equality, doe enter into sedition.] When some intrude [ G] themselues to take too much vpon them, others that seeke to maintaine equality, doe conspire to pull them downe, and reduce them to equality; which agreeth with mens nature, and nourisheth peace amongst them, entertaining friends with friends, Townes with Townes, Kingdomes with Kingdomes, and confederats with confederates, as Eu∣ripides saith. If therefore some enterprise to take it away, it is no maruell, if for the with∣standing of their purpose, men make war against them.

[ 4] SVRELY equality is double.] Because men are often deceiued in the vnderstanding of equality, He sheweth that it is double, to the end men should not be deceiued by ta∣king one for another, and by confounding them, and that they should know the way to [ H] vse the same well, in publicke and priuate affaires, as well in ordering of men, as of their contracts and bargaines.

[ 5] THE one in number.] Arithmeticke, as 321, when there is equalitie in multitude, or greatnesse in quantity, that standeth of seuered parts, or of contuued and ioined parts, as might be said amongst so many hundred crownes, or acres of land.

[ 6] THE other in dignity.] By proportion, as 421, wherein double proportion is found. For as much as the knowledge of this matter is most profitable and necessarie, and not vnderstood by all men, we will stand a little vpon it, and rehearse it more amply for the better interpretation of this place, and the fift booke of manners. First we will presup∣pose [ I] (as is written in the Predicaments, and the sixt chapter of the second booke of Mo∣rall Philosophie) that equalitie or vnequality is the property of quantity, in as much as all thinges comparable in equalnesse, or vnequalnesse, are comprised vnder the ioi∣ned or seuered quantity, and haue betweene them proportion of numbers, or of greatnesse. Therefore Proportion, as Iordane affirmeth in his second booke, is a certaine referrence or comparison of two things, all of one kind betweene themselues: or as saith Euclide in his fift booke, a certaine habitude or comparison of quantities, all of one kind, which in Greeke hee calleth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Boetius in his first booke of Arith∣meticke, the seuenteenth and eighteenth chapter, nameth the proportion of numbers, [ K] Arithmetical proportion; for that the Arithmetritians consider onely the kind of quan∣tity which consisteth of seuered parts, and the proportion of number, which is from equall to equall, as from two to two; or from a bigger to a lesser number, as 4. to 2. or from a lesser to a greater, as from 2. to 4. and extending infinitely, retaineth alwaies the selfesame difference of excesse, as 1.2.3,4.5.6.7.8. where alwaies the next number ex∣ceedeth it, which is next vnto it by an vnity, or 3.6.9.12.15. by three. But the Geometri∣cian doth further consider the habitude or comparison of all bignesses, and therefore the proportion of bignesses, is properly called Geometricall, as hee compareth line to line, outside to outside, and body to body. Nowe, as one number may bee compared to [ L] another, being equall, bigger, or lesser: Such comparison of proportions, is called by Euclide in his fift booke 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: By Boetius in his second booke of Arithmeticke, and by Iordane in his tenth booke, proportionality and proportion of proportions: yet the Geometrician applieth it particularly to equall or semblant proportions, that is to say, such as haue semblant and like denomination, which is named sole, or only propor∣tionality, to wit, similitude or likenesse of proportions, and equality, and mediety. The one of them is called Arithmeticall, and the other Geometricall. Arithmetical propor∣tionality is an habitude or comparison of quantities, surmoūting one another by equal exceedings, as 10,6.8,4. For as tenne exceedeth sixe by foure, so eight exceedeth foure by foure, and so is it of all other numbers, disposed by naturall order; which when they [ M] be infinitely extended, doe alwaies keepe all one, and the selfesame difference. Geome∣tricall proportionality is a comparison of quantities that haue semblant and like Geo∣metricall proportion, as 8,4.6,3. bee: For there is a double proportion of the first to the second, and of the third to the fourth, & as 8. be to 4. so are 6. to 3. And the other way, as 3. are to 6. so be 4. to 8. which is subdouble proportion. Euery of those proportionalties,

[ A] may be of ioined and fastened parts, or of seuered and vncoupled parts. They call it ioi∣ned or fastened, where there is such proportion of the first tearme or bounder to the se∣cond, as there is of the second to the third, and of the third to the fourth, as 8,4.2,1. do declare it in Geometricall proportion, and 8,6,4,2. in Arithmeticall proportion. The which ioined or fastened mediety may be made in foure or moe tearmes, and if there be but three, the middle serueth to both. The seuered or vncoupled mediety, is set and con∣stituted amongst tearmes that haue some interruption or breaking off from their pro∣portion, as 10,5,4,2. and 12,8,6, 2. And it must haue foure tearmes or bounders at the least. Therefore Iordane saith very well, that the meanes of seuered proportionality are [ B] vnioined, and the meanes of fastened proportionality ioined together. Aristotle in the fift booke of his Morall Philosophy, the fourth and fift Chapters, requireth the forme of Arithmeticall equality, in iustice that pertaineth to the communicating and exchaun∣ging of things; wherein the equalnesse of things, and not of persons is necessary: and where one thing must be giuen for another, as price for Merchandise, and recompence for dammage, without any respect of persons. Otherwise, if men take alwaies on the one side, and giue nothing on the other: as out of a Marchaunts shop without paying or exchanging any thing at all, the shop at last will be empty, and the trade of exchaun∣ging will ••ease. Therefore this Arithmeticall equality is required in contracts, as well [ C] voluntary as constrained: To the end, that the communicating of things, may last for euer in the societies of men. It is also vsed in Communalities of people, in the bestow∣ing and distributing of Offices, where euery one will be as high a maister as another, for the keeping of equality amongst them. In the fift booke of his Ethickes hee applieth the Geometricall mediety to the degrees of vocations, and of men, that there may bee equality, not of thinges, but of proportions; and that the degrees may bee kept. As, al∣though the Diuine, the Lawyer, the Captaine, the Senator, and the Treasurer doe dif∣fer, yet for all that they ought to haue necessary correspondence, and to be made equal, not in their vocation, but by semblance and likenesse of proportions, in such sort, that [ D] euery one shall exercise his Office without letting the others. Wherefore Plato affirms the publicke state to bee good, if it be instituted according ••o the Geometrical propor∣tion, and that all the welfare thereof dependeth vpon the same. The King giueth the Office of Chancellorship to a wise and learned man, that loueth vprightnesse and pub∣licke peace: and the Office of the Constableship to a good Captaine, well experienced in matters of state: The gouernement of the Church to a Diuine, that is skilfull in the Ecclesiasticall gouernement: the Office of a Iudge to a Lawyer: the Treas••rorship to one that hath skill in the ordering of the monies. Then euery one keepeth his place, & exerciseth his Office, without incrochment and hinderance one of another, to the end [ E] that the publicke concord bee not troubled. This order causeth equality amongst such as be vnlike and dissemblant. Plato in the sixt booke of his Lawes sayth: The old saying is true and very wel vsed, that equality breedeth friendship: But for as much as the equa∣lity that can worke this, is scarcesly knowne, it troubleth vs. For whereas there bee two equalities, called by all one and the selfesame name, but in effect almost contrary in ma∣ny things, euery City and euery Law giuer may vse the one by lots in the distributing of honours, to wit, the equality in number, weight, and measure. But it is not easie for all men to know the true and good equality, for it is the iudgement of God, and happe∣neth sildome amongst men. But as farre as it happeneth to Cities and to perticuler per∣sons, [ F] it causeth all welfare, it giueth more to men of great calling, and lesse to them that are of lowe degree, ordering all thinges according to their nature. Truly it giueth the most excellent men in vertue, the greatest honours; and to the vnderlings in vertue and skilfulnesse, the lesser preferments: distributing to the one and the other that which by reason appertaineth vnto them. Which is the very politicall right that wee ought to desire, and we should obserue such equality in establishing and ordering this new City, as also whosoeuer buildeth another, ought to doe and frame his Lawes according to

the same, not respecting some small number of Tyrants, or one, or the power of the [ G] people, but alwaies hauing regard to right, which wee lately affirmed to distribute al∣waies that which is equall by nature amongst them that bee vnequall. And in Gorgias hee saith: You are not ignorant that the Geometricall equality is of much effect, both amongst the gods and men: And thinke that the most ought to be had in all things, be∣cause you dispise Geometry. Geometricall proportion is particularly vsed in Oligar∣chies and Aristocraties, in distributing the publicke honours and offices onely to the rich, according to their riches, and to the good according to vertue.

[ 7] AND whereas men confesse that to be absolutely right, which is equall according to dig∣nity, they fall into dissention.] Although all men confesse, that the manner of distributing [ H] honours and offices according to desert and worth, is simply iust (the fift of the Ethicks, chap. 3.) yet commonly they fal to strife and debate, because some men measure worth after one sort, and some after another.

[ 8] THE one sort, for that they being in some respect equall, account themselues equall in all respects.] The poore sort in Democraties haue equall freedome, and because they are equall in libertie onely, they will bee absolutely equall in all things, thinking it to bee against reason, that any one should haue greater priuiledge, or bee preferred for riches or for Nobility, but wil that all doe alike participate in their degrees and turnes, in pub∣licke honors, the 4. of the Politickes, chap. 4. and 6. booke, chap. 2. [ I]

[ 9] THE other sort, for that they being vnequall in some things, will be vn••quall and superior in all things.] The richer and nobler sort in Oligarchies, thinke that the whole gouern∣ment of the State should belong to them by reason of their richesse or Nobilitie, and they diuide among themselues all the publicke offices, not admitting the poore to any part thereof, though many of them be both wise and vertuous.

[ 10] FROM whence proceed two cheefe formes of Commonweale, namely, the Democratie and Oligarchie.] Pouerty and Riches are the differences whereby the Democratie and Oli∣garchie are distinguished. That State wherein publicke Offices are distributed to the rich by reason of their wealth, is of necessity an Oligarchie: and that wherein the poore [ K] doe gouerne, a Democratie: 3. booke of the Politickes, cha. 5. and 6: and 4. booke, cha. 5. Sedition then ariseth in these two Commonweales, namely in the Democratie, when the poore who beare sway, doe assume all vnto themselues; and the rich being despised or outraged, doe conspire: and in the Oligarchie, when the poore, because there is no account made of them. 3. booke of the Politickes, chap. 7. And Plato in the 8. of his Commonvveale.

[ 11] CONSIDERING that vertue and noblenesse are in few men.] Hee sheweth a rea∣son why there are more Democraties and Oligarchies then Aristocraties; wherein all is referred to the goodnesse and vertue of them that beare rule, and to the publick good [ L] of the State. And because that fewe men being both noble and vertuous together, are found in any place, therefore there are few Aristocraties, for as hee writeth in the 3. of the Politickes, chap. 5. One onely, or very few men can excell in vertue, but it is impos∣sible that many can perfectly excell in all vertue.

[ 12] BVT these other qualities are found in many men.] Namely, Pouertie, Liberty, and Riches, which are the differences of the Democratie and Oligarchie.

[ 13] FOR there are not in any place seene an hundred together that be noble and good.] At the least, which may be in sufficient number, and sufficiently qualified for the establishing of an Aristocratie.

[ 14] BVT there be many poore men euery where.] Who if they beare the greatest sway, [ M] they grow insolent, and oppresse the rich, whence spring the seditions in Democraties: or if they bee wholly depriued of all authoritie in the Commonweale, they rebell a∣gainst the rich in Oligarchies, and by such disorders, cause the changes of Estates.

[ A] AND to ordaine a Commonweale simply in all respects, according to the one or the other, [ 1] equality it is not good, as appeareth by the issue thereof, sith no such Commonweale can be of con∣tinuance. [ 2] The reason is, because it is impossible, that from an error committed at the first, & from [ 3] a bad beginning, there proceed not a bad end. Wherefore it behooueth to vse partly the equality [ 4] of number, and partly that equality, which is according to dignity. Yet the Democratie is surer & [ 5] lesse subiect to mutinie, then the Oligarchie: for in Oligarchies there arise two kinds of seditions, [ 6] namely between the gouernors, and with the people. But in Democraties they are with the Oligar∣chie [ 7] only, and not of the people with the people; at the least, whereof any reckoning is to be made. [ 8] [ B] Moreouer, the Commonweale which consisteth of meane men, being the surest or safest of all such [ 9] Commonweales, doth approch neerer to the Democratie then to the Oligarchie. [ 10]

AND to ordaine a Commonweale simply in all respects, according to the one, or the other [ 1] equality, it is not good.] The Arithmeticall equality is of it selfe bad, and the Geometri∣call alone cannot be altogether obserued without mutinies, but they must be mixed for the preuenting of mens discontents. Socrates in his Areopagiticall Oration, This (saith he) did much helpe and profite them in the gouernment of the City, that whereas there are two sorts of equality, of which the one giueth alike to all; the other, that only which [ C] is meet; they were not ignorant whether of the two was most profitable. For they left that equality which giueth alike both to the good and bad, and obserued in their afore∣said gouernement that other equality which distributeth honours and punishments ac∣cording to deserts, not chusing Magistrates indifferently out of the people, but out of the better sort. He doth wholly mislike the Arithmeticall equality, which is sought only by Democraticall persons, & commendeth the Geometricall. Which notwithstanding must not bee obserued alone, euen in those Common-weales that are thereby ordered, viz. in Oligarchies and Aristocraties: For Riches of it selfe, or Nobility, can giue no ab∣solute right or authority to gouerne, in such sort, that none may beare rule saue they [ D] who are rich or Noble: neither can vertue alone doe it, if the good and vertuous man be not in many Estates noble or rich. Likewise in a well ordered Commonweale, all Of∣fices are not to be giuen to good men, but the principall: wherein consisteth the autho∣ritie of the State, which are administred by sole persons, or in small number, to the end, that the rest who are not honoured but excluded from gouernement in the Common∣weale, grow not discontented, or vse practises tending to innouation.

SITH no such Commonweale can be of continuance.] No Democratie which doth [ 2] simply in all points obserue the right before mentioned, according to the Arithmetical equality, is of continuance, by reason of the seditions that spring therein; nor any Oli∣garchie [ E] which hath respect only to the Geometricall equality.

THE reason is, because it is impossible that from an errour committed at the first, and from [ 3] a bad beginning, there proceed not a bad end.] The beginning is of such force in all things, that things well begun, are accounted halfe done; but things ill begunne, haue sildome good euent. Wherefore it is no meruell, if these two formes of Commonweales do not prosper, but soone decay, sith that from their beginning they are not grounded on the true and equall right, but on an outward apparence only.

WHEREFORE it behoueth to vse partly the equality of number, and partly that equa∣lity [ 4] which is according to dignity.) For the well establishing of a Commonweale, and pre∣seruing [ F] it from seditions, it is requisite to mixe and temper these two equalities toge∣ther. Plato in the sixt of his Lawes: It is necessary for euery Citty which would be alto∣gether exempted from sedition, to vse these two equalities, hauing like denomination. For this commendable equity, and equall discerning of that which is perfect and abso∣lute, is violated, if it be not done with right iudgement. Wherefore it is expedient to vse the equality of Lots, thereby to auoid the giuing of offence to many. And in this behalf God and good Fortune are to bee praied vnto, that the lot may bee directed to fall on

the best and iustest. So then both these sorts of equality must bee vsed of necessity, but [ G] that sort the lesse, which hath need of Fortune. For this cause therefore this order must bee thus obserued by that Cittie which desireth continuance & safety. And in another place of the same booke: Amongst the Magistrates which are chosen by the proporti∣on of their wealth or reueuues, the one halfe should bee created by lot, and bee Sena∣tours for a yeare; which kind of creation will bee a middle forme betweene the Mo∣narchicall and Democraticall: of which two formes the Commonweale ought alwaies to keepe the meane. For otherwise the lords and slaues will neuer agree, nor the good and bad Cittizens, if they doe not equally participate in publicke honors. For amongst men that are vnequall, equall things doe become vnequall, if they receaue not a pre∣scribed [ H] measure. It doth therefore hereby appeare, and Experience the Mistresse & tea∣cher of things, doth sufficiently shewe, that these two sorts of equalitie must be mixed in a well ordered Commonweale. For wee see that all humane society, both in priuate and publicke, consisteth in the due communication or commutation of things, and in the order or degrees of persons. The communication of things is made by contracts or bargaines, wherein great equalitie must bee obserued by Arithmeticall proportion, which doth simply retaine an equall difference among many numbers. For this cause the penaltie of like for like called P••ena talionis was in auncient times ordained for the restoring of that equalitie which was before. Touching persons and Offices, they [ I] are ordered and appointed by degrees in Citties and in priuate families. In Cities there are cheefe, meane, and inferiour Magistracies: in families there are diuerse degrees, as of Parents, Children, Brethren and Sisters, Lords and Slaues: which order of persons must bee established by Geometricall proportion, retaining the equalitie of propor∣tions, to wit, in giuing euery man his place, and vsing him according to his quality and desert.

[ 5] YET the Democratie is surer and lesse subiect to mutiny then the Oligarchie.] Although both bee corrupt, yet there is lesse euill and danger in the Democratie then in the Oli∣garchie, and it is lesse troubled with sedition, because it approcheth neerer to the [ K] meane.

[ 6] FOR in Oligarchies there arise two kinds of seditions, namely betweene the Gouernors, & with the people.] The Oligarchicall persons, who are the richest or the noblest, doe not agree well together, but oft times destroy or expulse each other. And because they af∣ford no part or authority of gouernement to the poorer sort, which are many in num∣ber, or doe besides oppresse them, it is necessary that they become enemies vnto them, (the 3. book of the Politickes. chap. 7) and conspire against them, as shall afterward bee shewed. Plato in the eight of his Common-weale, the fourth of his Lawes, and in the Gouernour. [ L]

[ 7] BVT in Democraties they are with the Oligarchie only, not of the people with the people; at the least, whereof any reckoning is to be made.] In the Democratie sedition is raised by the poor only against the rich. But the poor doe neuer or very seldome cōtend amongst themselues, for there is nothing thereby to bee gotten, or if they doe at any time, it is some small sedition, and of no consequence.

[ 8] MOREOVER, the Commonweale which consisteth of mean men.] That is to say, hauing meane substance, who are neither very rich nor very poore.

[ 9] BEING the surest of all such Commonweales.] The fourth booke of the Politickes chap. 11: to wit, of corrupt commonweales, and which haue already swarued from the perfection of a Commonweale. [ M]

[ 10] DOTH approch neerer to the Democratie, then to the Oligarchie.] The meane forme of Commonweale hath more affinity with the Democratie, then with the Oligarchie: for which cause the Democratie is surer or safer, and lesse corrupt. Likewise in the 8. of his Ethickes, chap. 10. he saieth, That the Democratie is not bad, because it doth but little transgresse or exceed the right forme of Commonweale: and in the 4. of the Politicks

[ A] chap. 11. hee saith that Democraties are surer, and of longer continuance, by reason of those of meane estate who are there in greater number, and haue more interest in pub∣licke honours. There are commonly in all Cities three sorts of people, of whom some are very rich, as in Oligarchies: some very poore, as in Democraties: the third sort are meane betweene both, neither very poore, nor very rich. And where manie such haue authoritie of gouernment, without doubt the state of that Cittie is more assured and lesse troubled with sedition. For those Cittizens who are very rich, or very poore, are not fit for the maintaining of humane society. The rich are prowd, disdainefull, and prone to offer iniuries: the poore malicious and enuious, and they cannot long [ B] remaine together without tumults and factions. So that they which are the stronger falling to quarrels, and hauing the aduantage on their enemies, doe alwaies cause the state of the Commonweale to encline on their side. If they bee poore, they establish a Democratie: if they be rich, an Oligarchie. And because the most part of men are such, and there are few of meane estate, this is the reason why we see more Democraties and Oligarchies then other formes of Commonweales. But the meane sort of Cittizens doe neither desire other mens goods as the poore doe, neither are they insolent, as the rich are: and by this meanes they mainetaine publicke amitie, and eschewe seditions. Wherefore that Commonweale which is gouerned by men of meane substance, is the [ C] best and of longest continuance. Neither can there happen any greater good to all Estates for their safetie, then to haue those for their Gouernours, who are meanly rich, otherwise they fall presently into Monarchicall or Popular Tyrannies, or (which is worse) are vtterly destroied.

[ D]

CHAP. II. From vvhence seditions spring, and of their causes.

SIth we are come to consider from whence seditions and chaunges in Com∣monweales doe spring, we will first touch in generall the beginnings and cau∣ses [ 1] thereof, which are about three in number, and wee will breefly discourse them each seuerally by it selfe. First of all we must know howe men are dispo∣sed [ E] or made prone to sedition: next, wherefore they raise it: Thirdly, wh••t are the beginnings of ciuile troubles, and of the mutinies or tumults which arise amongst them. The cause by which they are disposed to the desire of a change, is that in generall, whereof we haue lately spoken, viz. that some in seeking equality doe mutine, if they thinke that they haue lesse, being themselues equall to those that haue more. Others seeking ine∣qualitie and preheminence doe likewise mutine, if being vnequall, they persuade themselues that they haue not more, but alike or lesse. Nowe, these things may sometimes bee iustly desired, and sometimes vniustly. The reason is, because being inferiour, they contend for equality; and be∣ing equall, for superioritie. Hereby it appeareth, how they are disposed to sedition, and desire of [ F] innouation. The thinges for which they contend, are profite, and honour, and their contraries. For in seeking to shunne dishonour, or daunger, either of themselues, or of their friendes, they trouble Cities and Estates with sedition. The causes and beginnings of the motiues which dispose them in the aforesaid manner, and for the thinges by vs men∣tioned, may bee seuen in number, and somewhat more; two whereof are the same that the former are, but not in the same manner. For profite and honour doe prouoke them to quarrell, and contend together, not thereby to purchase them for themselues,

as we said before, but because they see others more aduanced, some iustly and some vniustly. They [ G] are likewise prouoked by reason of iniuries, feare, prepotence, contempt, excessiue encrease, and [ 2] otherwise of shame, negligence, pusillanimity, and vnlikenesse.

In euery sedition there are three points to be considered. The first, how men are dis∣posed or made prone to the raising of it: The second, to what end they mutine: The third, what the motiue cause thereof is. Equality or inequality in Democraties or Oli∣garchies, doe dispose and incline men to discord. The ends or finall causes thereof are profite and honour; and their contraries, dammage and dishonour. The motiues which prouoke them to sedition, are set downe to the number of seuen, namely, honor [ H] and profit, enioyed by some aboue their deserts, for which cause the rest repine at them: iniuries, feare, prepotence, contempt, excessiue and disproportionall encrease of some part of the Cittie, or of some per••on: to which motiues there are added foure other, viz. shame, negligence, pusillanimity, and vnlikenesse.

[ 1] WE will first touch in generall the beginnings and causes thereof.] There are foure kinds of causes set downe by Philosophers, the efficient, materiall, formall, and finall cause. The efficient cause of seditions is double, the one a neere, the other, a remote cause. The neere cause are the Authours thereof, by whose counsell, direction, and aide [ I] they are raised and performed. By the remote cause we vnderstand those things, for, and through which they are prouoked thereunto: and these are set downe by Aristotle to the number of eleuen. The Authors of seditions are either Magistrats, as were at Rome Tiberius, and Caius Gracchus brethren, Sylla, Marius, Apuleius, Caesar, Antonius, Le∣pidus: or priuate men, as Catiline and Manlius. In the Romane Hystories we may find, that certaine slaues haue ben the Authours of seditions, as Herdonius Sabinus, which raised the warre called Bellum seruile; and one named Eunus a Syrian, who gathered a power of more then forty thousand slaues in Sicile, and hauing put on Kingly attire, ranged through the Island, wasting and spoiling it. There was also another borne in Ci∣licia, [ K] who did as much mischeefe. Spartacus a sword-player rising against the State of Rome, fought many times with the Romane Consuls, whom he discomfited in battaile, but afterward was vanquished by L. Crassus. The materiall cause of seditions are they against whome they are raised, of whome some are superiours, as Princes and Magi∣strates; and some inferiours, who are subiect vnto them. The end or finall cause of sediti∣ons, is that thing for which they are raised. Aristotle setteth downe foure ends thereof, namely, profite, and honour; and their contraries, dammage and dishonour: for men are commonly stirred thereunto through hope of profite and honour, or through feare of dammage and infamy, as well of themselues as of their friends, desiring the one, and [ L] shunning the other. To profite, we referre riches: to honour, Magistracies, Offices, and publicke charges: to dammage, pouertie: to dishonour, continuall iniuries, contempt, and such like, which although they are numbred among the motiue and efficient cau∣ses of seditions, because they prouoke men, yet they may likewise bee the ends thereof, because that for the obtaining or shunning of them, men doe conspire. The forme or manner of a sedition, is a commotion of the people, noise, cries, beatings, murthers, ci∣uile warre, surprizing of Townes, burnings, banishments. If it bee of subiects toward their superiours and lords, it is called rebellion: if betweene subiects or men of equall estate, faction. Titus Liuius in the second booke of his first Decade doth elegantly de∣scribe [ M] the forme of a sedition which happened at Rome for debts, in this manner:

Mag∣no natu quidam cum omnium maiorum suorum insignibus se in forum proiecit, obsita erat squa∣lore vestis, foedior corporus habitus pallore ac macie perempti: adhoc promissa barba & capilli es∣fer••••erant speciem oris: noscitabatur tamen in tanta deformitate, & ordines duxisse aiebant, aliáque mititiae decora vulgo miserantes eum, iactabant: ipse testes honestarum aliquot locis pug∣n••rum cicatrices aduersopectore ••stentabat. Sciscitantibus vnde esset ille habitus, vnde defor∣mitas,

[ A] quum circunsusa turba esset propè in concionis modum: Sabino bello ait se mili∣tantem, quta propter populationes agri non fructu modò car••erit, sed villa incensa fuerit, dirrepta omnia, pecora abacta, tributum iniquo suo tempore imperatum, aes alienum se∣cisse: id cum••latum vsuris, primò se agro paterno auitòque exuisse, deinde fortunis alijs, postremò velut tabem peruenisse ad corpus: ductum se ab creditore non in seruitium, sed in ergastulum & carnificinam esse: inde ostentare tergum foedum recentibus ves••igijs ver∣berum. Ad haec visa auditàque clamor ingens oritur: non iam foro se tumultus con∣tinet, sed passim totam vrbem peruadit: nexu vincti, solutíque, se vndique in publi∣cum proripiunt, implorant Quiritium fidem: nullo loco deest seditionis volontarius comes: [ B] multis passim agminibus per omnes viat cum clamore in forum curritur. Magno cum periculo suo, qui fortè patrum in foro erant, in eam turbam inciderunt: nec tempera∣tum manibus foret, ni properè Coss. P. Seruilius & Appius Claudius ad comprimen∣dam seditionem interuenissent. At in eos multitudo versa, ostentare vincula sua, de∣formitatémque aliam: haec se meritos dicere, exprobrantes suam quisque alius alibi mi∣litiam, postulare minaciter magis quàm suppliciter vt Senatum vocarent, curi••mque ipsi futuri arbitri moderatorésque publici consilij circumsistunt.

There is also another description not much vnlike to this, made by the same [ C] Authour in the third booke of the same Decade, of a sedition raised in this manner, for the outrage committed by Appius on the daughter of Virgi∣nius:

Repraesentatur mactaturus iam pater filiam abrepto ab lanio cultro: Hoc te vno quo possum (ait) modofilia inlibertatem vendico. Pectus deinde puellae transfigit, respectánsque ad tribunal: Te (inquit) Appi, tuúmque caput sanguine hoc consecro. Clamore ad tam atrox facinus orto, ex∣citus Appius, comprehendi Virginium iubet: ille ferro quacunque ibat, viam face∣re, donec multitudine etiam prosequentium iuuenum ruente ad portam perrexit. Icilius Numitoriúsque exangue corpus sublatum ostentant populo, scelus Appij, puellae infeli∣cem [ D] fortunam, necessitatem patris deplorant. Sequentes clamitant matronae, eám ne procreandorum liberorum conditionem? ea pudicitiae praemia esse? Concitatur multitudo, clamatur ad arma.

Cicero in his Oration pro T.A. Milone compareth the people being in∣censed, to a tempest: Et quidem, inquit, caeteras tempestates & procellas in illis dun∣taxat fluctibus concionum & seditionum. The same Authour in his first booke De Oratore: Hoc tempus post consulatum obiecimus his fluctibus, qui per nos à communi pest•• depulsi, in nosmetipsos redundarunt.

[ E] So dooth Virgil likewise in the first booke of the AEneide:

Ac veluti magno in populo cum sepe coorta est Seditio, saeuítque animis ignobile vulgus: Iámque face•• & saxa volant, furor arma ministrat. Tum pietate grauem at meritis si fort•• virum quem Conspexere, silent: arrectisque auribus astant. [ F] Ille regit dictis animos, & pectora mulcet. Sic cunctus pelagi cecidit fragor, aequora postquam Prospiciens Genitor, coelóque inuectus aperto Flectit equos, currúque volans dat lora secundo.

[ 2] Vnlikenesse.] Plato in the eight of his Commonweale sayeth, That wheresoeuer [ G] there is vnlikenesse, and discordant inequalitie, there men are alwaies troubled with seditions. Hee did well to adde discordant inequalitie, because all vnlikenesse is not to bee reprooued, but that only which hath in it selfe a discordant inequalitie, and thereby may cause sedition. For the preuenting of which euill this inequali∣tie must bee (so much as is possible) reduced to an equality. So wee see that the world being compounded of contrarie Elements, namely, Earth, Water, Aire, and Fire is maintained and preserued by this Analogie and proportion which they haue together, and that the bodies of creatures consisting of heat, colde, drinesse, [ H] and moisture, are by the same meanes and manner preserued. In the maine bo∣die of Nature, there is matter, forme, priuation, simplicitie, mixture, substance, quantitie, qualitie, action, passion: In mans bodie the head, hands, feete, eyes, nose, and eares: In the Oeconomicall bodie, the Husband, Wife, Children, Lords, Slaues, Seruaunts: In the Politicall or ciuile bodie, Magistrates, Noble∣men, and Plebeians, Husbandmen; Artificers, Merchaunts. Then to preuent the seditions which proceede from vnlikenesse, wee must not remooue the vnlike∣nesses themselues, without which no Commonweale can stand, but rather the disorder growing betweene vnlike persons, and reduce them to a due agreement, [ I] such as the seuerall parts haue, which are seene in the constitution of the world, and of man. That vnlikenesse which breedeth sedition, whereof Aristotle spea∣keth, consisteth in diuersitie of beginning, of place, of birth, offices, professi∣ons, trades, and religions. They are vnlike in beginning and place, who are borne and brought vp in diuerse places, as an Almaigne, a Spaniard, an English∣man, a Frenchman, and an Italian. Philip de Comines writing of the enter∣view which Lewys the eleuenth King of Fraunce, and Henrie King of Castile made, being the neerest allied Princes in Christendome, (for they were aunci∣entlie confederate, not onely King with King, but Realme with Realme, and [ K] bound vpon great and deepe curses to obserue their league) saith that the French∣men and Spaniards by reason of the diuersitie of attire and manners, both in their Princes and themselues, ceased not during the time that they were toge∣ther to mocke, quarrell, and in the end to beate each other throughly, little re∣garding their solemne league. The Noblemen and Plebeians are vnlike in birth: in Offices, they which haue diuerse charges; as Iudges, Treasurors, Souldiours, Priestes, of which point wee haue spoken in the former Chapter. In professions; as a Lawyer, a Phisitian, a Diuine, a Philosopher, and their followers being againe of diuerse sorts, as were amongst the Greeke Philosophers, the Acade∣miques, [ L] the Perepatetiques, the Stoiques, and the Epicureans. In Schoole••di∣uinitie the Thomists and Scotists. Among the Iewes, the Pharisees, Saduces, and Esseys. Lucian dooth in sundrie places facetiouslie shewe the differences and controuersies of the Greeke Philosophers, but cheefely in the banquet of the Ia∣pites. Among Artificers which vse diuerse Trades; as Bakers, Butchers, Shooe∣makers, Painters, Smiths, Carpenters. In religion; as Iewes, Christians, Mahumetists, Caphars, Lutherans, Zuinglians, Caluinists, Anabaptists, Armenians, Greekes, La∣tines, Iacobites, Abissines.

[ M]

BESIDES the causes here alleadged which dispose men to sedition, wee may adde some other, as the nature of the places wherein men are borne: so Ammianus Marcellinus in his eleuenth booke sayeth, That Alexandria in AE∣gypt was fatallie subiect to sedition. And Socrates in his Tripartite Hystorie writeth: That the people of Alexandria were much more enclined to sedition then

[ A] all the other Nations of the world. Many holde opinion, that Rome hath beene seditious euen from the first foundation, this pronenesse to dissention beginning in the quarrell of R••mulus and Rem••s, and descending to their posteritie, where∣of Horace in the seuenth Ode of his Epode complaineth, the people and noble∣men being at perpetuall discord. Machiauel in the first booke of his discourses, chap. 4. 5. and 6. doth assay to prooue that the contrarietie of the Senate and peo∣ple hath caused the libertie and greatnesse of Rome. Wee may say that Genoa and Florence haue had like nature, as it appeareth by the Hystories which haue been written of both those States. Moreouer, men are disposed or made prone to se∣dition [ B] through abundance of wealth, and too much ease. Sallustius in Bello Iugur∣thin••: Caeterum mos partium popularium & Senatus factionum, ac deinde omnium ma∣larum artium, paucis antè annis Romae ortus est, otio atque abundantia earum rerum quae prima mortales ducunt. Likewise extreame pouertie doth much incite men to this euill. Horace in the foure and twentith Ode of his third booke.

Magnum pauperies opprobrium, iubet, Quid vis & facere, & pati, Virtutis{que} viam deserit arduae.

[ C] Plato in his fift booke of Lawes sayeth thus: There must bee neither extreme pouertie, nor excessiue riches among the Citizens of that Cittie which would be exempted from the greeuous disease called dissention, or sedition. Salust in the con∣spiracie of Catiline, speaketh thus of the poore men. Nam semper in ciuitate qui∣bus opes nullae sunt, bonis inuident, males extollunt, vetera odere, noua exoptant: odio suarum rerum mutari omnia student, turba atque seditionibus sine cura aluntur, quoniam egestas facile sine damno habetur. Manie Countries haue beene much troubled with sedition, because they could not indure the excessiue multitude of inhabitants, and [ D] thereon haue growne many transmigrations or remouings of people out of one re∣gion into another. Likewise an Estate is enclined to sedition when it hath no enemie: as Hanniball told the Carthaginians, speaking thus in the tenth booke of the third De∣cade of Liuie. Nulla magna ciuitas quiescere potest: si foris hostem non habet, domi in∣uenit: vt praeualida corpora ab externis causis tuta videntur, sed suis ipsa viribus one∣rantur. That is, No great Citty can remaine quiet; if it haue no enemie abroad, it findeth one at home: euen as great bodies, which seeme to bee safe and assured against all outward dangers, yet are surcharged and ouerladen with their owne force. For this cause Scipio Nasica was of opinion, after the victorie which the Romanes [ E] had of the Carthaginians, that Carthage should not bee raced, least the Ro∣manes hauing no enemies, should turne their weapons against themselues, and so destroy each other; as soone after it happened: Salust in the conspiracie of Catiline. After that through labour and iustice the Commonweale was growne flourishing, great Kings subdued by warre, fierce Nations and mightie people vanquished by force, Carthage the emulous riual of the Roman Empire destroied from the verie ground, all Seas and Countries opened: then Fortune began to shewe her crueltie, and to trouble all: Ease, and Riches, which should bee wi∣shed to others, haue beene a trouble and miserie to those who before did easilie [ F] endure paine, danger, doubtfull and sharpe chaunces. Wherefore God in the booke of Iudges, the third chapter, ordained that the Philistines, Canaanites, Si∣donians and Hiuites should bee left and opposed against the Israelites to trie them, saying: Therefore will I no more cast out before them any of the Nations which Iosua left when hee died. That through them I may prooue Israell, whether they will keepe the way of the Lord to walke therein as their Fathers kept it, or not. Likewise the imposing of newe subsidies dooth mooue men to sedition,

as it hath often happened in France, and late time yet fresh in memorie, in the begin∣ning [ G] of King Henry the seconds raigne, all the Country of Gu••en rose by reason of the excessiue taxes. Likewise, the changing of Princes, Lawes, and Coynes, breede great troubles in Commonweales. Omnes rerum mutationes (saith Salust in his preface on the warre of Iugurth) caedem, ••ugam aliaque hostilia portendunt. Presently vpon Augustus Caesars death, the Romane legions which were in Pannonia and in Germanie, raised strange seditions: described by Cornelius Tacitus in his first booke of the Historie of the Caesars. Immediately after the deceasse of Salomon, the Iewes rebelling against Roboam by reason of the taxes which hee would not moderate, diuided themselues in∣to two Realmes, namely, of Iuda and Israell: the first book of the Kings, chapter twelue. [ H] All Spaine being gouerned by Flemmings, reuolted against them by reason of the ex∣actions that they vsed: which commotion is described by Paulus Iouius in the life of Pope Adrian the fixt. Whensoeuer any king of Fraunce hath beene in his minoritie, there haue sprung vp seditions in the Realme, as hath beene saied. The diuision of lands propounded at Rome in the law called Lex agraria, was the beginning of the seditions among the Romanes, and caused the death of the two Gracchi, brethren, who were the Authors thereof. Besides, the changing of coines being not vsed in due time, and vpon iust cause and vrgent necessitie, is wonderfully dangerous, causing great discontent and occasion of mutinie. So also doth the bad administration of iustice, and impunity pro∣posed [ 1] to offenders, which emboldeneth them to plot and attempt innouations.

CHAP. III. A declaration of the causes of seditions.

[ 1] AMongst which causes we may clearely see what sorce iniurie and profit [ K] haue, and what euils they breed. For if the Gouernours bee iniurious and couetous, they prou••ke the Citizens not onely to growe disconten∣ted, but also to rebell against those Estates, wherein such licence is [ 2] granted them. Auarice is committed sometimes in extorting the goods of particular men, and sometimes in robbing the publicke Trea∣sure.

The beginnings and motiue causes of seditions, which were simply set downe be∣fore, [ L] are nowe declared, with examples answering to each seuerall cause, that the euils which thereby happen, may bee the better knowne, and the remedies fit for them.

[ 1] AMONGST which causes.] The first cause of sedition is the auarice of the Ma∣gistrates and Gouernours of a Commonweale, which thing is very pernicious, and greatly to be shunned. For if Commonweales were therefore ordained at the first, that vnder the protection and gouernement of good Magistrates men might quietly pos∣sesse their owne, then doubtlesse they which rule Estates ought cheefly to haue care, [ M] that not onely the publicke treasure be disposed and employed according to the neces∣sity and profit of the Commonweale, but also that particular men may quietly enioy their goods.

[ 2] AVARICE is committed sometimes in extorting the goods of particular men, & some∣times in robbing the publicke Treasure.] Auarice is the iniurious coueting of that which is anothers: and it is committed publickely or priuately. The publicke Treasure is the

[ A] reuenue of Signories, Kingdomes and Empires; demeines, taxes, confiscations, appropriations of deceassed straungers goods, impositions, subsidies inuented and vsed for publicke necessitie. A•••• Auarice is herein committed, when the money thereby leuied, is conuerted by those that haue the charge thereof, rather to their owne priuate, then to the publicke vse: which crime was by the Romanes called Peculatus, and the iudgement vsed thereon, De repetundis: when such goods are ei∣ther vnprofitably, or wastfully spent, Princes and Magistrates vse immoderate and vnaccustomed exactions on their subiects. Auarice is priuately committed, when the poorer and weaker sort are spoiled of their goods by those that haue power, which [ B] is a very detestable crime, especially in Magistrates and Gouernors of Commonweals: For as continence and abstinence doth purchase them the praise of all men, so auarice doth make them generally hated.

It is likewise manifest, what force Honour hath, and in what sort it is the cause of sedi∣tion. For men which are not honoured, seeing others honoured, doe mutine; which thinges are vniustly deuided, when any are honoured aboue their desert and dignitie: and iustly, when eue∣ry one is honoured, according to his dignity.

[ C] In the distributing of honours it is requisite that especiall ragard bee had to the qualitie and sufficience of the persons, to the end, that publicke charges be com∣mitted to those who are worthie thereof. Next, i•• is expedient that men arise by degrees from small Offices ••o greater, euen as their experience en••reaseth: and that they bee displaced who are vncapable, as bad and infamous persons, and such as are not lawfully borne. Moreouer, that men attaine thereto by vertue and in∣dustrie, not by money and fauours. Else when vnworthie men are aduaunced, or insufficient persons preferred before those that are sufficient; or they who haue done no seruice to the Commonweale, obtaine the reward due to those that haue done [ D] good seruice; or when vicious persons are honoured, then men of worth iud∣ging this to bee done in contempt of them, doe sometimes raise sedition, thereby to auenge themselues.

SEDITION ariseth by reason of Praep••t••nce, when one or manie haue more power then the state of the Commonweale can support or endure: whereof dooth ordina∣rily proceede the Monarchie, or Potentacie. Wherefore there is a custome in some pla∣ces to banish such persons for a time; which kinde of banishment is called an Ostracism••, as at Argos and Athens. But it were better to take order at the first, that they growe [ E] not so great, then to seeke remedies afterward, when they haue suffered them to mount so high.

Excessiue authoritie and power through riches and friendes, is daungerous in euery kind of gouernement: it must therefore bee hindered from the beginning, or abridged and diminished with all possible speede, because that through too much Praepotence in such thinges, Commonweales are changed into Monarchies, and Kingdomes and Empires vsurped by newe Lordes. This matter hath beene discoursed at large in the third booke, and the ninth Chapter, and the manner of [ F] the Ostracisme expounded according to Plutarch. When any men burning with de∣sire of glory and praise, seeke to beare ouer-great sway in an Estate, and others doe resist this their attempt, then spring there seditions betweene them, and oft ciuile warres.

By reason of Feare mutinies are raised, as well by those that haue committed some offences, for which they feare to bee punished, as by those that desire to preuent the iniuries that

are intended against them; •••• at Rhodes the Noblemen conspired against the people, for feare of [ G] the iudgements which they prepared against them.

Feare is a perturbation of the mind for some imminent or future daunger. That also which is done by force or violence, seemeth to bee done by feare. They raise seditions for feare, who dread imminent and future perils, and seeke to auoid them. So Catiline knowing himselfe to bee culpable and guilty of many acts, did for feare of iudgement conspire against his Countrey, being assisted by Lentulus, Antonius, Cethegus, with many sacrilegious persons, murtherers, adulterers, ruffians, men that were farre indeb∣ted, and others which by reason of their vile offences, stood in feare of punishment: He [ H] was likewise assisted by all those whom either the hand or tongue maintained by periu∣ry, or effusion of Cittizens blood; and other like persons who were oppressed with for∣feits, want, or crimes. Salust in the conspiracie of Catiline, and Cicero in his Orations against Catiline.

By reason of contempt likewise seditions are ••aised, and conspiracies made, namely in Oligar∣chies, when they who are excluded from authority of gouernement, are more in number, and doe therefore assure themselues that they are the stronger: and in Democraties, when the rich men doe conte••ne the disorder and negligence of the gouernors, as at Thebes after the battell fought [ I] at Oenophytes, because they gouerned ill, the Democratic was destroied. As also it was at Me∣gar••, when through their disorder and want of gouernement, they were ouerthrowne. And at Syracusa before the Tyranny of Cel••n: and at Rhodes the authority of the people decaied before the insurrection of the Noblemen.

Commonly those men are contemned, who haue neither vertue, courage, nor po∣wer, being therefore vnable to helpe themselues or others, and who haue no industrie nor care. Where contempt is, there can bee no obedience, the sonne disobeyeth his fa∣ther, whom he contemneth, the wife her husband, the scholler his teacher, the seruaunt [ K] his Maister. Euen beastes haue some feeling of the quality of those whome they must serue, as wee may reade of the horses of Alexander the great, and Iulius Caesar, who would not suffer any other to sit on them. Wherefore it is no maruell; that amongst men the opinion of Prudence, Iustice, Constancie, Knowledge, Bounty, Modestie, and other vertues doth nourish and mainetaine obedience towards them, and the contrarie vices prouoke subiects to rebell against their Lords. Then as States doe prosper, being gouerned by wise, iust, constant, valiant, and temperate persons, so they are troubled with seditions through the imprudence, cowardise, and intemperance of their rulers: or when they are too familiar with inferiour persons, or are come from base estate, and [ L] sodainly aduanced, or seeme too young, old, poore, vnfortunate, all which things breed contempt. Cicero doth elegantly and excellently teach in his second booke of Offices howe the honour and dignity of those that gouerne Commonweales, and the obedi∣ence of their subiects, towards them, may be maintained. But sedition doth not spring in Commonweales then onely when inferiours contemne their superiours, but also when one degree contemneth another: as in the Oligarchie, the poore making no ac∣count of the rich, because themselues are more in number, and stronger then they, doe conspire against them. Likewise in the Democratic, the rich contemning the disorder of the poore which gouerne, doe easily attempt to suppresse and put them [ M] downe.

The changes of Commonweales doe happen also by reason of excessiue increase. For as the body consisteth of parts, and must grow by proportion, to the end, that the due measure may still remaine: whereas otherwise it perishe••h, if the foot be foure ••ubit••s long, and the rest of the bo∣dy but two spannes: and it might likewise bee chaunged into the shape of some other liuing crea∣ture,

[ A] if it should grow beyond doe proportion, not onely in quantity, but in qualitie also. Euen so a City consisteth of parts, amongst which oft times some one doth priuily growe vp, as the multi∣tude of poore men in Democraties and Commonweales. Sometimes also this dooth happen by chaunce, as at Tarentum the greater part of the Nobility being vanquished and destroied by the Iapigians not long after the warre of the Medes, that State did of a Commonweale become a Democratie. And at Argos after the slaughter of their people at He••doma by Cleomenes of La∣cedemon, they were constrained to receiue some of the bordering strangers, & make them mem∣bers of their Citie. And at Athens when they had sought vnhappily in the battaile by land against the Lacedemonians, their Noblemen decreased, because they sent them to this warre, ac∣cording [ B] to the catalogue of the city. The like doth happen in Democraties also but more seldome•• For many men growing rich there, or their wealth being encreased, they are chaunged into Oli∣garchies or Potentacies.

Euery Commonweale is composed of degrees or Estates, as it were parts, which Estates must bee kept and held in concord by a due proportion of each to other, euen as the harmony in Musicke consisteth of vnequall voices or sounds, which are equally accorded. For when any of those Estates doth rise too much aboue the other, there doth forwith insue dissention in the City, like a discord in a song, when one tune is too low, [ C] another too high. The Romane Commonweale was composed of three degrees or or∣ders, namely, the Patricians, Knights, and Plebeians; and while these Estates were kept within proportion, all thinges went well, but when one of then rose against the other through enuy, ambition, & auarice, then began diuisions and dangerous factions. The ij. Gracchi to abridge the Senatours authority, tooke from that order the exercise of Iudgements, and gaue it to the Knights, whose power thereby was so encreased, V••fata fortunásque patrum vitásque principum in manu haberent, qui & interceptis vectigalibus iure suo rempublicam peculati sun••. For when both the Romanes, Italians, and Senators them∣selues were of necessity to appeare in iudgement before the Knights, touching what [ D] cause soeuer they had in controuersie, were it for money, honour, or offences; the knights were by this meanes exalted aboue the mas their Princes, and the Senatours made subiect and bound to them; so that they assisting the Tribunes at the creation of Officers, and taking whome themselues listed (by a conspiracie made betweene them) had put the Senate in great feare; and there wanted not much more to change the go∣uernement of the Commonweale, sith the Senate had onely the name, and the knights all the authoritie and power: Appian in his first booke of the ciuile warres, chap. foure. Neither is a Commonweale disturbed by the excessiue encrease onely, of degrees or Estates, but also by the weakening & impouerishing of them. For there can be no pro∣portion [ E] where the stronger haue all, and the weaker little or none; nor any concord, where some are depriued not onely of the common and publicke commodities, but al∣so spoiled of their owne priuate goods, as were the people at Rome: for whom Tiberi∣us Grac••hus spake thus, That the sauage beasts in Italy had at the least their holes, caues and dennes, wherein to shrowd themselues; where as men who fought and died for the defence thereof, enioyed nothing saue onely aire and light, but were constrained to wander vp and downe with their wiues and children, hauing no place nor house wher∣into to put their heads so that (quoth he) the Captaines do commonly lie, when to en∣courage their souldiours, they require and admonish them to fight valiantly for the [ F] graues, the temples, and the altars of themselues, and of their auncestors: For among so many poore Romane Cittizens, there is not any that can shewe one domesticke al∣tar or graue of his auncestours, but the silly wretches fight and die for the effeminate pleasures, richesse and superfluity of others; yet are they falsely called Lords and com∣manders of all the habitable world, whereas they haue not one foot of ground that is their owne. Plutarch in the life of the ij. Gracchi. In Fraunce, the two principall degrees or orders, are the Nobilitie and people: whereto that of the Church, although

it participate of both, was adioined as a third, for the reuerence of religion, and by rea∣son [ G] of the great reuenues of the Cleargie in lands, houses, fees, & other exceeding pro∣fites, amounting yearely to foure millions of pounds; whereto adde the authority that it hath long time had in iudgement both in the Parliaments, and neere the Kings, in Counsell. There is no doubt, that the agreement of these Estates hath caused the Realme to continue and prosper so long amongst all other auncient and moderne king∣domes; the publicke commodities, honours, and charges being ordinarily deuided ac∣cording to the condition of euery Estate, without abridging their rights and prehe∣minences, especially in taking diligent heed, that neither of them doe aboue measure exceede the other, viz. that the Nobility doe not too much oppresse the people, and [ H] thereby driue them to despaire, (the ommitting of which diligent heed, hath oft cau∣sed the people to rise, wherof hath ensued great mischeefe) or that the people by means of Merchandise, iudgements, and disposing of the publicke reuenues, together with the gainefull priuiledges by them possessed, should not ouer-greatly enrich themselues to the preiudice of the Nobilitie, and purchase the Noblemens lands, who being im∣pouerished, could not be able to sustaine the charges of the warre, nor serue the King in his armies, whereto it is most necessary to haue alwaies speciall regard for the saf••ty and quiet of the French dominions.

[ I]

Commonweales are likewise changed by reason of shame, as it happened at Heraea, where the Magistrates which before were chosen by election, were afterwards created by lot, because that while the manner of election was obserued, they bestowed the publick offices on men of no worth.

Heraea was a Citty of Arcadia, whose gouernement was popular, wherein men of no worth were chosen Magistrates by such as were like themselues; for which the He∣raeans being derided, changed their custome of election into the vse of lots, thereby to shunne like derision. There was not long since in the counsell of Fraunce an excessiue number of maisters of requests, extraordinarie; and Secretaries for the Office of the [ K] Treasurie, which were afterward for very shame caused to withdraw themselues, it be∣ing vnseemely and vnmeet to treat of high and weightie affaires, which should be kept secret, in such a multitude.

And by reason of negligence, when they suffer those to attaine to soueraigne Offices, who are not friends to the Commonweale, as at Oreum, the Oligarchie was destroyed by Heracleodorus, who being become a Magistrate, changed the said Oligarchie into a Commonweale, and a Democratie.

[ L]

There is herein double negligence, first of those which doe call, elect, and admit in∣to any great Office vnworthy persons, & such as take no pleasure in the executing ther∣of: or which suffer those men to attaine to soueraigne Magistracies, who dislike the pre∣sent manner of Gouernment. As if the Lords of Berne should chuse an Auoyer, or the Venetians a Duke, whose disposition and desire were contrary to the forme of their Commonweale: or the Cardinals a Pope, who were not of their religion•• or if the king of France should create a Constable or Chauncellour, who affected not the royall and Monarchicall Estate. The second negligence is of those, who being called to any dig∣nitie or office, shewe themselues slacke and carelesse in the administration and exercise [ M] thereof, as we see that the most part of the Bishops and Prelates, regard not the dutie of their Ecclesiasticall charges, that they may more freely follow secular affaires, and for this cause they are contemned: From which disorder there haue risen great scandales and meruellous troubles, which may more easily be lamented then remoued or refor∣med, because abuses haue through long time taken deepe root.

[ A] FVRTHERMORE, the changes of Estates do grow by little and little: I say, by little & little, because many times there happeneth a great change both of manners and lawes, without being perceiued, through the neglecting of some small thing: as in Ambracia where they aduan∣ced to offices men of small reuenues, and in the end they admitted those that had none at all: as if nothing and little were neere in nature, or not any whit different.

Changes, vnlesse they be very violent, doe sildome happē all at once, but are ordina∣rily bred by little and little, euen as the seasons of the yeare doe by degrees passe from [ B] excessiue heat to excessiue cold, and from Winters sharpenesse to Summers extremity. Wherefore it is farre more difficult to remedy or preuent them, because commonly men take no heed to euils and dangers, vntill they be growne great: as Aristotle sayeth in the 6. booke of the Politickes, chap. 4. Whosoeuer will consider the change that hath happened in Fraunce within these thirtie yeares, shall find it to be very great, as well in religion, as in manners and Lawes; yet hath it not chanced all at one time, but by little and little, as it grew on by continuance.

Likewise, when the inhabitants of one place are not all natiue there, this breedeth sedition [ C] among them, vntill they grow to a generall accord. For as a City is not composed of euery mul∣titude, so also it is not constituted in euery time. Wherefore, all they that haue hetherto receiued strangers into their cities to dwell therein with them, haue for the most part beene troubled with seditions. As the Achaians dwelt with the Troezenians in the City of Sybaris, and afterward be∣ing grown stronger then they, draue them out: which thing caused great euill to the Sybarites, who did the like among the Thurians to those that dwelt with them: for seeking to appropriate to themselues the greater part of that territory, as if it had beene their owne, they were discomfi∣ted and exp••lsed. The Byzantines, when the practise and intended enterprise of the strangers against them was discouered, draue them by force of armes out of their Citie. And the Antissae∣ans [ D] hauing receiued the banished Chians, did afterward expulse them likewise by plain force. The Zanchaeans also hauing receiued the Samians, were ouercome by them and driuen out of their Ci∣ty. The Apollonian•• which dwell neere the sea of Pontus, by receiuing strangers, were troubled with seditions. And when the Syracusans being freed from their Tyrans, had made many stran∣gers and hired souldiers, fellow Citizens with them; they were so troubled likewise with seditions, that in the end they fell to fighting. And the Amphipolites by taking into their city the Chal∣cidians were almost all driuen out by them.

It is commonly seene, that the naturall inhabitants of a Citty do seldome agree with [ E] strangers dwelling amongst them: and of such differences there doe oft spring sediti∣ons, as it appeareth by the examples which Aristotle alledgeth, for confirmation wher∣of, we may adde that of Geneua, whether many strangers repairing, as well Frenchmen as others, for religion, they were alwaies maligned and repined at by the naturall Citi∣zens, although they had done great good vnto their Citty, which by reason of their re∣paire thether grew rich and populous, whereas before it was poore and small: & there haue beene many conspiracies made against them, to expulse or kill them, especially that which Perin plotted in the yeare 1556. which was begun to bee effected and exe∣cuted when Caluine thrust himselfe betweene the naked swords to appease the tumult: [ F] as Beza reporteth in his life. But touching this receiuing of strangers, great regard is to bee had to their number, whether it be small or great: for if being fewe, they quarrell with the naturall inhabitants, there is lesse danger; but if they exceede them in number and power, then through confidence in their owne strength, they will soone raise sedi∣tions. Likewise men that are of different manners, doe hardly agree at the beginning, but when they haue long remained and dwelt together, they doe in kind and quiet sort conuerse each with other. Salust speaking of the Troians and Aborigines; that is, the

auncient inhabitants who had not descended from any strange people) writeth thus: [ G] Hi postquam in vna moenia conuenere, dispari genere, aissimili lingua, alius alio more viuen∣tes, incredibile memoratu est quam facile coal••erint. At the first the Gaules and Frenchmen being of a diuerse Nation, Language, and Religion, could not well agree, but after that the Frenchmen were baptised, and had together with the religion accustomed them∣selues vnto the manners and language of the Gaules, these two people were forthwith reduced into one body, and did meruellously prosper. The Lacedemonians permitted no straungers to dwell amongst them. At this day in China and Cathay all accesse and entrance is denied them, for the Merchants remaining in the Hauens, make shewe of those wares that they will sell, and haue such commodities as they aske for brought vn∣to [ H] them, which being done, the inhabitants do presently withdraw themselues without any conference or farther trafficke. But the Romanes were herein more courteous, who did not only receiue strangers into their Citie, graunting them the right and freedome thereof, but did also aduance them to publicke honours and Offices, to which purpose there is an excellent Oration made by the Emperour Claudius to the Senate, recorded by Cornelius Tacitus in the eleuenth booke of his history of the Caesars: Nam cùm (in∣quit Tacitus) de supplendo Senatu ageretur, ac primores Galliae qui foedera & ciuitatem Roma∣nam pridem assecuti•• ius adipiscendorum honorum in vrbe expetissent, ac multus super ea reva∣riúsque rumor, & studijs diuersis apud principem certaretur: asseuerantium non ita aegram Ita∣liam, [ I] vt Senatum vrbi suae suppeditare nequiret, suffecisse olim indigenas consanguineis populis, nec poenitere veteris Reipublicae: Princeps contrà disseruit, & vocato Senatu ita exorsus est. Ma∣iores mei, quorum antiquissimus Clausus origine Sabina, simul in ciuitatem Romanam & in fa∣miliam patritioram ascitus est, hortantur vti paribus consilijs Rempublicam capessam, transfe∣rendo huc quod vsquam egregium fuerit. Neque enim ignoro Iulios Alba, Coruncanos Came∣rio, Porcios Tusculo: & ne vetera scrutemur, Etruria Lucaniáque & omni Italia in Senatum accitos. Postremo ipsam ad Alpes promotam, vt non modò singuli viritim, sed terrae gentésque in nomen nostrū coalescerent. Tunc solida domi quies, & aduersus externa floruimus: cùm Trans∣padani in ciuitatem recepti, cúm specie deductarum per orbem terrae legionum, additis prouinci∣alium [ K] validissimis fesso imperio subuentum est. Num poenitet Balbos ex Hispania, nec minus in∣signes viros è Gallia Narbonensi transiuisse? manent posteri eorum, nec amore in hanc patriam nobis concedunt. Quid aliud exitio Lacedemonijs & Atheniensibus fuit, quanquam armis pol∣lerent, nisi quòd victos pro alienigenis arcebant? At conditur nostri Romulus tantum sapientiae valuit, vt plerosque populus eodem die hostes, dein ciues habuerit. Aduenae in nos regnauerunt: libertinorum filijs magistratus mandati: non vt plerique falluntur, recens, sed priori populo fa∣ctum est. At cum Senonibus pugnauimus: scilicet Volsci & AEqui: nunquam aduersam nobis aci∣em instruxere? Capti à Gallis sumus, sed & Tuscis obsides dedimus, & Samnitum iugum sub∣iuimus: attamen si cuncta bella recenseas, nullum breuiore spacio quàm aduersus Gallos conse∣ctum: [ L] continua inde ac fida pax. I am moribus, artibus, affinitatibus nostris mixti, aurum & opes suas inferant potius, quàm separati habeant. Omnia P.C. quae nunc vetustissima creduntur, noua fuere. Plebeij magistratus post patritios. Latini post plebeios, caeterarum Italiae gentium, post Latinos. Inueterascet hoc quoque: & quod hodie exemplis tuenur, inter exempla erit. Haec Claudius princeps. Quam sententiam secuto Senatu, mox Heduis Senatorum ius in vrbe da∣tum est.

In Oligarchies many men doe raise sedition, as if they were iniured, because being equall, as we said before, they haue not an equall part in gouernement: and in Democraties the Noblemen [ M] grow discontented, when they haue but an equall part, although they bee not equall, but su∣periour.

These quarrels springing from inequality in Democraties and Oligarchies between the Noblemen and the people, haue been at large discoursed of in the third booke, and in the beginning of this fift booke. In euery Estate, they that are not esteemed and vsed

[ A] according to their desert and quality, repute themselues iniuried, and oft times they seeke redresse by raising mutinies.

Sometimes Cities are troubled with seditions, by reason of the places wherein they are scitua∣ted, when the nature of the Countrey is not fit for the constituting of a city: as at Clazomene they that dwelt in Chitrum, bore grudge and hatred against those of the Island; and the Colophonians against the Notians. And at Athens they are not all enclined alike: but they of Piceum are more popular then those of the City. For as in warres the passing of trenches, although they bee small, doth breake the souldiors array, and disorber the battailes, in like sort, euery difference in a [ B] City doth seeme to breed dissension.

The separations which are in Citties, doe oft breede quarrels amongst them that in∣habite diuerse parts thereof: as at Paris during the factions of Orleance and Burgoine, they that dwelt in the Cittie, especially towards the Hals, held stiffely together against those of the Vniuersitie: as Enguerrant of Monstrellet writeth in his first book. At ano∣ther time they were constrained to build in the Citty the Fortresse de petit Po••t, that is, of the little bridge, against the tumults which the schollers made: as Gaguin writeth in his ninth booke. Philip de Comines likewise in his fifth booke, the fifteenth Chapter, [ C] sayth, That in Arras there were wals and trenches betweene the Towne and the Citty, and gates to shut against the saied Cittie while the Burgonians were maisters thereof, but afterward when the Frenchmen held it, the Cittie was shut against the Towne, be∣cause the Cittie tooke part with France, and the Towne with Burgoine. One part of the Cittie of Trent speaketh Italian, and liueth after the Italian manner, the other part spea∣keth the Germane tongue, and liueth after the manner of that Countrey. At Athens they that dwelt in the Hauen Piraeum, which was ioined to the Cittie by a long & thick wall (as we haue noted in the beginning of Platoes Commonweale) did more affect the Democratie. Moreouer, Plutarch in the life of Solon writeth (as wee haue already she∣wed [ D] in the last chapter of the second booke) that in the Countrey of Attica there were as many factions as there were diuerse sorts of the territorie: for the Mountainers were Democraticall; those of the champion countrey, Oligarchical; and they that dwelt neer the sea, desired a middle kind of gouernement, consisting of both formes, whereby wee may know, that Plato in the beginning of Timeus, and in the end of his fift booke of Lawes, hath written most truly, that there is great difference of places for the disposing and fashioning of mens manners, which point is grauely handled by Hippocrates in that little treatise that hee wrote of the aire, of waters, and of places; as also by Galen, shewing that the affections of the mind follow the temperature of the body. We haue [ E] also noted in the former chapter that some places are naturally, and as it were by some destiny, seditious. Likewise, when a place is vnfit for habitation by reason of barren∣nesse or any other like cause, the Citty therein scituated, is prone to sedition.

Peraduenture the greatest dissention is betweene vertue and vice, and next to that, betweene richesse and pouerty; and so of the rest, one more then another.

Sith vice and vertue are contrary, there must needs be dissention betweene them, yet they who excell in vertue (as Aristotle sayth in the beginning of this booke) doe neuer vse to raise sedition when they are repulsed, or others of little or no worth preferred be∣fore [ F] them, as at Rome it happened to Cato: although they haue iust occasion of anger, because that by reason they ought to bee absolutely and onely vnequall, and preferred before all others. Touching the Noble and rich men, this is their common fault, that they are almost all prowd and disdainers of the poore and vulgar sort, so that it is a very difficult matter to keepe these two degrees of people in quiet, in whatsoeuer forme of gouernment they liue: as we haue shewed at large by reasons and examples, as well an∣cient as moderne, in the sixt chapter of the third booke.

[ G]

CHAP. IIII. The issue of the occasions whereby Commonweales are changed.

[ 1] SEditions then are not raised for small matters, but from small they grow to [ H] [ 2] great. And being small, they take exceeding force when they arise betweene the cheefe and principall persons of a Countrey. As in ancient times it hap∣pened at Syracusa by the meanes of two young men, who being Magistrats, sell to dissention about a loue matter: For while one of them was absent, the other who was his companion, enticed a young boy whom he loued, wher∣at hee conceiuing great despight and indignation, at his returne found meanes to haue his pleasure of the others wife: and herevpon each seeking to win on his side the other Gouernors, [ 3] they set the whole City at dissention. Wherefore such euils must bee looked vnto when they begin, [ 4] and the discords that grow betweene the principall lords, presently apyeased; sith this fault is in [ I] [ 5] the beginning, and sith also men say that the beginning is the halfe of all; so that a small ouer∣sight [ 6] chauncing then, doth answer by proportion to all the faults that are afterward committed. [ 7] Bree••ely, the discords of Noblemen diuide the whole City into factions, as it chaunced at Estiae•• after the warre of the Medes by reason of the controuersie betweene two brethren for their por∣tions: for hee that was the poorer, complaining that the other did not shewe him all the goods in the house, and bid from him the treasure which their father had found, drew all the vulgar sort to his side: the other being wealthier, wan the rich men to take part with him. And at Delphos a certaine quarrell being raised about a marriage, was the beginning of all the seditions that rose afterward in that Citie: For the spouse hauing had some signe of ill lucke, at his return to hir [ K] vnto whom hee was betrothed, refused to marry her; Wherupon the maids friends, as being here∣in dispised and wronged, conueyed on him while he was sacrificing, some of the consecrated things of the Temple, and afterward caused him to be slaine, as one guiltie of sacriledge. And at Miti∣lene a certaine controuersie arising about the inheritance of two maidens that were Orphanes, was the occasion of much hurt, and of the warre betweene the Mitilenians and the Athenians, wherein Paches tooke their City. For Timophanes a wealthy man deceasing, left behind him two daughters coheires: Doxander who had demanded them in mariage for his sonnes, being deni∣ed, raised sedition, and incited the Athenians (who comming to Mitilene, were alwaies lodged at his hous••) to make warre on the Citie. Amongst the Phocians likewise there grew dissention about [ L] an inheritance betweene Mnaseas the father of Mneson, and Euthycrates the father of Onomar∣chus, from which dissention the holy warre arose. At Epidamnus also the Estate was changed, by reason of a marriage: For when one who had betrothed his daughter to a young man, was con∣demned in a summe of money by the same young mans father, being then in office, hee to auenge himselfe for this disgrace and iniury, caused al those to rebel that were without the City.

Aristotle hauing rehearsed and declared the causes of seditions, setteth downe the euils and changes that grow thereby. First hee saith that seditions arising betweene the cheefe men of a countrey, are dangerous, and must bee appeased with al possible speed, [ M] without suffering them to take root and to encrease in any wise.

[ 1] SEDITIONS are not raised for small matters.] Seditions doe spring from small beginnings, but if they bee not speedily quenched, they will sodainely grow infinitely, and not onely infect houses, townes, and citties, but also whole prouinces and great estates. They must therefore be looked vnto at the beginning, or rather if it be possible,

[ A] hindered from growing at all, and by cutting off their causes through politicke foresight and wisedome. As in Phisicke, besides the Therapeuticall part, which was inuented for the healing of sicke persons, there is also the Prophylacticall, which doth by exercise and diet, preuent diseases; or by purging, remoue the causes thereof.

AND being small, they take exceeding force, when they arise betweene the cheefe and [ 2] principall persons of a Countrey.] As were those factions and partakings in Fraunce in the raigne of Charles the sixt, betweene the Dukes of Orleance and Burgoine: or [ B] in England in the raigne of Henry the sixt, betweene the houses of Yo••ke and Lanca∣ster: which by reason of their discords, filled both thofe Realmes with dangerous dis∣sensions, and had thereby almost vtterly ruinated them. The quarrell betweene Pom∣pey and Caesar, troubled not Rome and Italy only, but Greece, Asia, AEgipt and Spaine; nor those Countries alone which were subiect to the Romane Empire, but also the bordering Prouinces, and confederate Estates, which followed the one or other part.

WHEREFORE such euils must bee looked vnto when they begin.] Wise Prin∣ces [ 3] or Gouernours of Commonweales haue regard not onely to the present state of [ C] things, but also to that which followeth, prouiding and taking order euen then by wise and good direction for future accidents, because daungers which are a farre o••f foreseene, may bee easily remedied: but by tarrying till they draw neere, the medicines that are then applied, bee out of season, the disease being growne in∣curable. And herein it commeth to passe, euen as Phisitions haue obserued it in the feuer called Febris hectica, which at the first comming thereof, is easilie cu∣red, and hardlie knowne; but if it bee not knowne nor cured at the beginning, it groweth easie to bee knowne, and impossible to bee holpen. Euen so it hap∣peneth in Commonweales and Estates, for the euils and inconueniences which [ D] doe dailie growe, being long foreseene, may bee easilie remedied; but when through want of being knowne, in time they are suffered to growe on till eue∣rie one may clearelie see them, there is not then anie hope of remedie. Plu∣tarch writeth, That Cato alone, as being therein the wiser man and of de••∣per iudgement then anie other in Rome, foresawe and prophesied the destruc∣tion of the Commonweale, which should bee wrought by the practises of Iuli∣us Caesar; and hee did thereof sundrie times aduertise the people, the Senate, and Pompey himselfe apart: but at the first hee was accounted a troublesome and im∣portunate man, vntill the end being such as hee had foretold, prooued him to be [ E] more wise then happie in the counsels. For (as the same Plutarch writeth) Cae∣sar abused and deceaued the whole world, except Cato, in the reconciling of Pompey and Crassus, who were for power the cheefest persons of the Citty; and before, vtter enemies. Nowe, when Caesar had made them friends, and by this meanes gotten to himselfe the whole power of them both, men had not so deepe an insight into his dealings, as to thinke that vnder an act, hauing the goodliest shewe and the most honest pretext that might bee, hee had turned vpside downe, and laid a plot for the vtter ouerthrowe of all the Romane Commonwe••le: for it was not the dissention of Pompey and Caesar which raised the ciuile Warre, as men doe [ F] commonly suppose, but rather their agreement and vnion, ••ecause they did al∣lie and ioine themselues together, first to ouerthrowe the authoritie of the Se∣nate and the Nobilitie, and afterw••••d falling to mortall en••••ie, they ••ought to destroy each other. And in another place the same Authour sayeth, That Cato greatly suspecting this alliance of Caesar and Pompey, as not being made for anie good intent, saied that hee feared not so much this distribution of lands, as hee did the recompence which they would therefore demaund, who by such cunning

deuises allured and fed the common people. And in another place hee sayth, Cato [ G] stepping forth did with a lowd voice before all the assembly foretell (as if hee had beene inspired by some diuine propheticall spirit) all that which would happen through these practises to the Commonweale: a little after hee saith thus; When the edict was pro∣pounded touching the Prouinces and armies which Caesar required, Cato adressed not himselfe vnto the people for the hindering thereof, but to Pompey, denouncing & pro∣testing vnto him that he did put on his owne necke Caesars yoke, which as then hee per∣ceiued not, but that soone after hee would feele the weight thereof, and find himselfe therewith surcharged and taken, and that then when hee could no longer endure it, nor find any meanes to shake it off, he would cast both himself and his burthen on the Com∣monweale, [ H] and too late remember Catoes warnings, which were no lesse profitable to him in particular, then iust and reasonable in themselues. Cato did sundrie times vse like speeches vnto him, but Pompey made no account thereof, for hee could not beleeue that Caesar would change, and besides, hee trusted too much in his owne pros∣peritie, and in the greatnesse of his power. Thus hauing strengthened and aduaunced Caesar against himselfe and the Commonweale, hee did deseruedly feele the smart of his follie therein committed. Caesar on the other side hauing from the beginning ai∣med at Pompeys ouerthrowe, and to make himselfe greater; like a skilfull wrastler, whose onely studie is how to trip and foile his aduersary, got himselfe farre from Rome, [ I] and to exercise himselfe in the warres of Gaule, where hee trained his armie, and did so much augment his own glory by his admirable deeds of armes, that he did equal Pom∣peys explots, so that there rested nothing els for executing & effecting of his purpose, saue onely some coloured occasions, which partly Pompey, and partly the time did afford and offer him: and all this grewe through the bad gouernement which was then in the Commonweale of Rome. Plutarch in the liues of Pompey, Caesar, Crassus, and Cato.

[ 4] SITH this fault is in the beginning.] Aristotle in this same book, chapter eight, Espe∣ciall regard and heed must be had to the euill when it begins, how little soeuer it be, for [ K] men marke not corruption when it groweth by little and little, no more then they doe small charges, which being oft vsed, consume a mans whole substance. This chaunge is ••••t noted, because it happeneth not all together, and the conceit is therein deceaued: as in Sophistrie by inferring, that if each seuerall part bee little, then the whole is little, which is somewhat true, and yet is not so, for the whole and all are not smal, but do con∣sist of small things. And in the seuenth Chapter hee saieth, When men haue neglected some point belonging to gouernment, they doe more lightly and easily change ano∣ther that is somewhat greater, vntill they haue finally corrupted both order and orna∣ment. And in the 6. booke, chap. 4. A small euill is not perceaued, but growing on, it is [ L] better knowne.

[ 5] AND sith also men say that the beginning is the halfe of all.] Hesiodus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Plato in the second of his Commonweale, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

[ 6] So that a small ouersight chauncing then, dooth answere by proportion to all the faults that are afterward committed.] A small fault at the beginning, breedeth a meane euill in the other parts, and a greater fault doth by proportion breed a greater euill; so that the proportion of the euill doth alwaies depend on the occasion and beginning of the fault which breedeth it. [ M]

[ 7] BR••EFELY, the discords of Noblemen 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the whole City into factions.] Ari∣stotle in this same booke, the eight chapter: Great care and endeuour is to bee vsed for the ordaining of such Lawes, whereby the growing of contentions and sedsediti∣ons betweene great persons, may be hindered, and the oth••rs preuented, who haue not yet taken part with either side, before they enter into anie ••action: because euerie

[ A] man cannot know an euill when it begins, but onely the good, which is vnderstood in matters of gouernment.

Moreouer, there doe happen changes both in the Oligarchie and in the Democratie, and in the Commonweale, when any Magistrate or part of the city gets reputation or encreaseth in po∣wer: as the counsell of Areopagus, hauing wonne great estimation in the warre of the Medes, [ 1] seemed to reduce the Commonweale to a more seuere forme of gouernment. Againe, the Mari∣ners [ 2] and those that had fought in the gallies, by whome the victorie was obtained as Salamis, by reason of the soueraignty and power by sea which the City had hereby gotten, did strenghthen [ B] more the Democratie. And at Argos the Noblemen hauing wonne great honour in the batta••le of Mantinea against the Lacedemonians, did thereupon attempt to ouerthrow the Popular estate. At Siracusa also the people being cause of the victory which they had in the warre against [ 3] the Athenians, chaunged the Commonweale into a Democratie. And at Chalcis after that the people had expulsed the Tyran and the Nobility, they did forthwith vndertake to rule the Com∣monweale themselues. Likewise, at Ambracia, hauing driuen out the Tyran Periander, and those of his faction, they tooke on themselues the gouernment of the state. To bee short, we must not bee ignorant, that all they by whose meanes the power of any state hath ben augmented, whether they be priuate men or Magistrates, or some tribe and linage, or some parts of the City, or whatsoeuer [ C] multitude, do raise sedition: For either they who enuy their honor, do mutine, or els themselues by reason of the power which they haue gotten, will not be content with an estate equall to the rest.

Changes doe sometimes happen in Commonweales through the discords between the cheefe men of a Countrey: sometimes also when any priuate men, or Magistrates, or some tribe and linage, or some other part of the City, or whatsoeuer multitude is the occasion of augmenting the Cities strength; and thereby encreaseth in reputation: be∣cause then either they who enuy their honour, doe begin sedition, or els themselues by reason of the power which they haue gotten, will not be content with an estate equall [ D] to the rest, and thereby change the forme of gouernment.

AS the counsell of Areopagus, hauing wonne great estimation in the warre of the Medes.] [ 1] When Xerxes King of Persia inuaded Greece with an incredible army, bending his power cheefly against the Citty of Athens, with full purpose to destroy it vtterly; The∣mistocles counselled the Athenians to leaue their Citty, and commit the fortune of their defence vnto their sea forces: But because the Athenians had not any publicke treasurie, the Senate of the Areopagites allowed to euery souldier eight Drachmae, and was hereby the cheefe cause that the gallies were armed and furnished, whereon follo∣wed [ E] that famous victory which the Grecians won on the Barbarians. The Areopagites by reason of the credit that they had gotten through this liberality, tooke on thē grea∣ter authoritie in gouernement then they had done before, and sought to reduce it to a more seuere forme. Plutarch in the life of Themistocles. Aristotle doth here confound the name of Medes and Persians, vsing one for another, as also in another place spea∣king of this warre, he calleth it the Median warre. Herodotus also doth sometimes vse it in like sence, namely in the seuenth booke, where he saith, that a great part of the Gre∣cians would not feed on the warre, but was ready to follow the Medes.

AGAINE, the Mariners and those that ••ad fought in the gallies, by whom the victory was [ 2] [ F] obtained at Salamis, did strengthen more the Democratie.] The battell was wonne at Sala∣mis, cheefly by the Me••elotes, Galio••es, Pilotes, & others who dwelt neere the sea coast, was the cause that encreased the peoples power against the Nobleman, and made the inferiour multitude more audatious.

AND at Sirucusa.] The warre which the Athenians made against the City of Sira∣cusa [ 3] where they were finally discomfited and destroyed, is described by Thucidides in the sixt, seuenth, and eight bookes of his Hystorie.

Furthermore, Commonweales are changed, when the parts of the City which seeme contra∣ry, [ G] are made equal; as the rich men, and the inferiour multitude; and when the middle or meane part is little or none at all. For if one of the parts doe much exceede, the other part will hazard nothing against that which is manifestly the stronger. Wherefore they who excell in vertue, doe sildome raise sedition, because they are few in number in respect of the rest. Then the beginnings and causes of seditions and chaunges doe happen generally in all sorts of Commonweales, after this manner.

Thirdly, changes doe happen in Commonweales, when the parts of the Citty that seeme contrary, are made equall, and the middle or meane part is little or none at all; as [ H] are the rich and the poore, the Noblemen and the people, of which point wee haue oft spoken in the former discourses, and will handle it againe in the chapters following: wherein Aristotles especiall purpose is to treat of the changes of Democraties & Oli∣garchies.

Besides, they are changed by force, and by subtletie. By force, in constraining the Citizens to such a change, either presently vpon the beginning, or afterward. The subtlety likewise which may be herein vsed, is double: For sometimes they doe craftily induce them to a voluntary change of the Commonweale, and doe afterward continue it by violence, as at Athens in the time of the [ I] foure hundred, they deceiued the people, promising them that the king of Persia would aid them in their war against the Lacedemonians, and by meanes of this lie they attempted to vsurpe the gouernment of the Commonweale. Sometimes they deceiue them at the first with faire words, & keepe them afterward with their owne good wils, in such obedience and subiection as they wil thē∣selues. Then to speake generally, the changes of all Commonweales doe spring from the aforesaid causes.

Fourthly, Commonweales are changed by force, or subtlety. By force, as the Romane Commonweale oppressed by Caesar, was changed into a Monarchy: the realm of Egipt [ K] into a Prouince by Augustus: and not long since, that of Hungary by the Turke: and the States of Florence and Si••••a ••nt•• a Duchy. By subtletie, as that change which hap∣pened at Athens through Alcibiades meanes, mentioned in the text, whereof Iustine in his fift booke writeth thus: While the Athenians and Lacedemonians warred toge∣ther, Alcibiades being banished from Athens, came to Tisfaphernes the King of Persia his lieutenant, who fauoured the Lacedemonians, to whom Alcibiades shewed that it were no good policie to minister ouergreat aid to the Lacedemonians (for their victorie would be nothing to his profite) but only to furnish them so far, that they might not for want of mony be enforced to giue ouer the war: For causing it by this meanes to con∣tinue, [ L] the king of Persia should haue in his choice both peace and warre, and subdue the Grecians with their owne forces, whom hee could neuer vanquish with all his po∣wer. Whereas if the war should bee finished, they who had the victory, would forthwith set on him. That therefore it was necessary that Greece should bee weakened by ciuile dissentions, thereby to keep it from making war abroad; and that hee should so consider the power of both parts, as to aide alwaies the weaker side: for without doubt the Lace∣demonians, if they got the victory, would not rest so, reputing themselues the preferuers & protectors of the liberty of Greece. These speeches did greatly please Tissaphernes, who began to furnish the Lacedemonians very coldly with victuals and other necessa∣ries, [ M] & sent them not all the kings ships, because he would not giue them an absolute vi∣ctory, but keepe them still in warre. Meanewhile Alcibiades aduertised the Athenians what he did for them. Whereupon they sent vnto him their embassadors, to whom hee promised that he would make the King of Persia their friend, if they would take away the authority from the people, and giue it to the Senate and Counsell: thinking that by this meanes, either the Cittie if it grewe to a generall agreement, would chuse

[ A] him captaine, or if it were diuided by sedition, that one of the parts would call him to their aid. But the Athenians seeing the danger whereinto this warre had broght them, had more care of their safety then of their honour, and gaue the whole authoritie of the people to the Senate and the publick Officers, who by reason of their natural pride, began to oppresse the rest: for euery one of thē would vsurpe Tyrannicall power ouer the people, as if he were their Lord. For which cause, the souldiers sent for Alcibiades recalling him from exile, and making him their cheefe commaunder by sea, who went forthwith towards Athens, and being landed, sent to the Gouernours and Senate, wil∣ling them to restore the peoples authority, which if they refused to doe, he threatened [ B] to come vpon them with his souldiours, and enforce them thereunto. The Gouernours were herewith so terrified and astonished, that they resolued to betray the Citty to the Lacedemonians, but failing of their purpose, they went into voluntary banishment.

CHAP. V. [ C] Of the changes that happen in Democraties.

WE will now seuerally and particulerly consider these things in euery kind of Com∣monweale. Democraties then are for the most part changed through the per••idi∣ousnesse [ 1] of those that are the guides and leaders of the people, or (as wee may call [ 2] thē) their fauourits, who by forging false accusations against the rich, enforce thē to conspire together; for a common feare doth reconcile the greatest enemies: or els by incensing the people openly against them, as we see it hath come to passe in many places. In the [ D] Isle of Cos, the Democratie was chaunged through their bad dealing which guided and led the people, at such time as the Nobility conspired. And at Rhodes, because they kept to themselues the mony appointed for the souldiors paiment•• and would not permit that it should be deliuered to the Captaines of the Gallies to whom it was due: Whereupon the Captains being likewise further vr∣ged, and fearing iudgement, were enforced to conspire against the popular estate, which they de∣stroied. At Heraclea likewi••e the Democratie was for the same cause ouerthrowne, for some that had great credit and authority with the people, droue out the Noblemen by the intollerable iniu∣ries which they offered them: but they conspiring and assembling themselues together, returned into the City, and ouercame the people. At Megara also the popular estate was in like sort destroy∣ed; [ E] for these guides and leaders of the people, banished many Noblemen, to the end, that by confis∣cating their goods, they might fill their owne purses: but these banished Noblemen who were ma∣ny in number, ioining together, ouercame the people, and established an Oligarchie. The like hap∣pened at Cumae touching their Democratie, which was destroied by Thrasimachus. And who∣soeuer doth well consider it, shall find, that the changes of Commonweales doe happen in other places almost in the same manner, when those persons to please the people, do vex and oppresse the [ 3] rich men; as by the diuision of lands and goods, thereby to equall the Citizens wealth: or by pay∣ing the Magistrates pensions out of the publicke reuenues•• or in forging false accusations against them, to the end, they may confiscate their goods: so that by such courses they enforce them to con∣spire. [ F] In ancient times when the same person that guided and led the people, was also generall of [ 4] the army, then the Democraties were changed into Tirannies. And ce••t•••• the greater part of an∣cient Tyrans haue by this meanes become so. But the reason why this dooth not happen now so much as it hath done is, because in those times men were not so expert and skilfull in the Art of fine speech. At this day that Rhetoricke is mounted to the top of perfection. The eloquent men [ 5] gouerne the people, but because they are not skilfull in warre, they dare not enterprise against the [ 6] sta••e, or if they doe attempt ought in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 part, their enterprise hath beene to small purpose:

Li••wise, Tyrannicall States haue risen more ofter in times past then nowe: because they gaue to [ G] [ 7] some citizens offices of great authority, as was at Miletum, the Pritany or Pretorship, which hath the ordering and gouernement of great matters: and besides, because then cities were not great, and the people dwelt in the country, busied in following their Husbandry, if the Gouernors were warriors, they vsurped a Tyranny. Their cheefe meanes to attaine therevnto, was the trust which the people reposed in them, proceeding from the hatred they bare to the rich: as at Athens [ 8] Pisistratus taking a quarrell against the Pediaci, and Theagenes at Megara hauing killed all [ 9] the rich mens beasts, as he found them feeding neere the riuer; and Dionisius, by accusing Daph∣neus and the rich men, obtained the Tyranny for the grudge and enmity which he shewed to bear against them, and for that he was accounted one that held on the peoples side. Likewise, the De∣mocratie [ H] is changed from the auncient and accustomed into the last forme: For where the Ma∣gistrates are chosen by the people without respect had to their reuenues, then these guides and fa∣uorites, of whō we spake euen now, desirous to beare rule, bring the State to such a point, that they submit the lawes to the peoples will. The remedy against this thing, either that it happen not all, or not so much as ••ls it would, is that the Magistrates be elected by the tribes or linages, and not by all the people. Then all the changes of Democraties doe happen for these causes.

The Philosopher hauing spoken of the publicke charges in generall, doth now par∣ticularly consider them in euery kind of Commonweale, beginning with the Demo∣cratie, [ I] which he saith is for the most part destroyed or changed in two maners, through the bad dealing of those that are the guiders and leaders of the people. The one is, when they vexe and oppresse the rich men, by equalling the Cittizens wealth, or paying the Magistrates pensions out of the publicke remedies, or by forging false accusations against the nobler and better sort, to the end, to confiscate their goods, so that hereby they incense and inforce them to conspire, by which meanes the Democratie is oft changed into an Oligarchie, or a Tyrannie. The second maner is, when the Magistrats are chosen by the people, without respect had to their wealth. For then these guides & fauourites; desirous to beare rule, reduce the Democratie from a meane or middle form [ K] wherein the Lawes haue greatest force, into an extreame kind, wherein all is done ac∣cording to the peoples pleasure, and by popular decrees, without any respect or regard of the Lawes.

[ 1] THROVGH the bad dealing of those that are the guides & leaders of the people.] 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Aristotle treating in these two chapters of Democraties and Oli∣garchies, doth oft make mention of these 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, whom we following the Etimolo∣gie of the Greeke word, translate guides and leaders of the people. These men in such formes of gouernments did alwaies both doe and say to please the people, all that they [ L] could for a time, thereby to get their fauour, and to encrease their owne authority and wealth. The Democraties and Oligarchies of Greece were commonly ful of such gal∣lants, who did with the people what they listed, and committed infinite euils: as al••o Rome was much giuen to this folly, especially after that it had receiued eloquence, and the custome of making Orations in publicke assemblies after the manner of the Greci∣ans: the two Gracchi were such. Likewise Marius and Caesar shewed themselues very popular, and hereby got great fauour: in like sort as sundry others, who of guides and leaders of the people, as Aristotle saieth, haue made themselues Tyrans, if they were warriors. [ M]

[ 2] WHO by forging false accusations.] After that Eloquence tooke place in Common∣wea••es, th••se guides and leaders of the people were commonly Orators, who took vpon them to accu••e others in Iudgements and assemblies, where they were gladly seene and heard, because they spake things pleasing to the hearers eares•• Diodorus Siculus in his thirteenth booke, the two and thirtieth chapter, speaking of the fiue Athenian Cap∣taines, who had wo••n the most famous battaile by sea that euer had beene fought be∣tweene

[ A] Grecians, and had euery way els behaued themselues well, saith that the people of Athens was so besotted and incensed against them through the smooth speeches of the wicked Oratours, that they wreaked the fury of their wrath on these valiant men, who deserued no punishment at all, but rather great honour and praise. Demosthenes in his Olynthian and Philippicke Orations doth very much complaine of such Orators who disguised the truth of things, and flattered the people.

WHEN these persons to please the people, doe vexe and oppresse the rich men.] So did the [ 3] two Gracchi at Rome, propounding the Law called Lex agraria, whereat the rich men made great complaints, being greeued to giue vnto the poore their houses, woods, and [ B] lands which they had long possessed and manured. Appianus Alexandrinus in his first booke of the ciuile warres, chap. 2. and 3.

IN ancient times, when the same person that guided and led the people, was generall of the [ 4] armie.] When they who were in credite and fauour with the people, attained to the gouernment and conduct of the army, they did easily vsurpe on the Commonweale, & change it into a Tyranny, being skilfull and expert in feats of warre, and hauing in their owne hands the forces of the countrey, as Pisistratus did at Athens, Gelon, Hieron, Dionisius, and Agathocles at Syracusa, and infinite others haue in other places done the like.

[ C] AT this day that Rhetoricke is mounted to the top of perfection.] Rhetoricke, as all other [ 5] Arts, came to great perfection & excellence whilest Aristotle liued, at what time there flourished in Athens tenne Orators together, of the which Demosthenes deserued the cheefe commendation, insomuch, that Cicero himselfe affirmeth, that he was in a ma∣ner perfect, and in whom there wanted but little. Socrates was at the same time a great teacher of Rhetoricke, according to whose example for emulation and enuy, Aristotle began to teach this science, and wrote bookes of the same, as those which he hath dedi∣cated to Theodectus and Alexander the great.

THE eloquent men gouerne the people, but because they are not skil••ull in warfare, they dare [ 6] [ D] not enterprise against the state.] Demosthenes and Cicero most excellent Orators, were in great credite in their Commonweales, but neither of them were warriors. Plutarch writeth of Demosthenes, that he fled most cowardly from the battell of Che••onea•• and performed not so much as any one act of vertue, or that was answerable to his goodly Orations made before the people, for hee forsooke his rancke, and cowardly cast away his armour, that he might with the more ease flie away. The same Authour in the life of Cicero saith, that he was not only fearefull in fight, but also in pleading.

THE Pritany.] 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 among other things signifieth to rule, to gouern, to admi∣nister [ 7] & ordain. Demosthenes in his oration touching the Crown, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, [ E] charge or publicke administration. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Gouernour or Steward. Plato in the Lawes calleth the gods 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, rulers or Gouernours of the world. Thucidides in his sixt book saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Aristotle in his sixt booke of gouernment, putteth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 as Bishops a∣boue other Priests.

AS at Athens Pisistratus taking a quarrell against the Pediaci.] That is to say, against [ 8] the inhabitants of the plaine countrey, who fauoured the Oligarchie: And entring in∣to league with the inhabitants of the mountaines, who fauoured the Democratie (as hath been before affirmed) obtained the Tyranny, of whom Herodotus in his first book [ F] writeth in this manner: Pisistratus perceiuing that the inhabitants of the sea coasts vn∣der the conduction of Megacles sonne of Alcmeon, were at controuersie with the in∣habitants of the plaine country of Athens, whose head Lycurgus the sonne of Aristo∣l••s was•• determined to make himselfe lord, as the others: and to that end deuised a third league, for the guiding whereof•• hee l••uied and assembled men togither, and vnder colour of defending the inhabitants of the high country, vsed this sleight: He•• wounded himselfe, and with his sword hurt certaine mules, which neuerthelesse he••

caused to draw him into Athens into the Towne hou••e, as though he had saued himself [ G] by flying from the enemies that would haue killed him as he went into the field: There∣fore hee required the people to graunt him certaine men for the guard of his person, considering especially that he had been already well thought off in the warres, wherein hee was generall against the Megarians, and that he had taken the Towne of Nise, and performed many other acts of great prowesse. The people hereupon were deceaued, and graunted him to chuse such Cittizens as he liked, vpon condition they should car∣ry neither Iauel••nes, nor Halberts, but only clubs, as they attended him. These chosen men made an insurrection with him against the Citty, insomuch, that they tooke pos∣session of the castle: and from thenceforth Pisistratus began to haue dominion ouer the [ H] Athenians. Yet troubled he not the states and offices there, neither changed the Lawes of the Commonweale, but continued the accustomed statutes and ordinances, gouer∣ning the Citty well and happily. It was not long deferred, but Megacles and Lycurgus with their partakers by common consent set vpon him, and cast him out of his domini∣on. This Pisistratus was the first that tooke vpon him to haue the dominion of the A∣thenians, and that lost his weake and ill setled dominion, as Herodotus affirmeth in his first booke.

[ 9] Dionisivs by accusing the rich men, obtained the Tyranny, for the grudge and enmity which he shewed to beare against them, and for that hee was accounted one that held on the peo∣ples [ 1] side.] Dionisius being before a priuate man and of low degree, obtained the Ty∣ranny of Siracusa by this meanes: whereas the Siracusians sent him to Gelle, he finding the mightiest men of the towne at controuersie with the common people, began to charge them before the high Court or assembly, and so wrought by his reasons, that they were straightway condemned to death, and their lands & goods confiscated; with the benefit of which confiscation he paied the wages of the ordinary Garison of Gelle, and promised them that came with him from Siracusa twice as much wages as the City had appointed for them: whereby he got the good wils, as well of the keepers of Gelle, as of them that hee brought thether with him, and so was commended by the common [ K] people of Gelle, who reported how it was he onely that had set them at libertie: forby reason of the enuy which they bore to the richest and mightiest Cittizens, they called their power Tyrannie. Also at his returne from Gelle to Siracusa, hee came home on a day, wherein by chance there had beene certaine plaies, and entered into the Towne at the same instant that the people came from the Thea••••es, whereupon all the people ran presently about him, with great thrusting, asking him where the Carthaginians were, and what they did. Dionisius gaue them aunswere, that they considered not howe they had greater and more dangerous enemies at home then abroad, which were (saied hee) those that had in thei•• hands the direction and gouernement of the Commonweale, in [ L] whom the Siracusians put their trust, and spent their time at plaies and feastes, while they stole and wasted the mony of the Commonweale, and paied not the souldiors wa∣ges, especially in so dangerous a time, when the Carthaginians made incredible prepa∣ration for warre, and had determined to bring all their power before the City of Syra∣cusa, whereof these goodly Gouernours made not any account, neither tooke any or∣der for the remedying thereof: and the occasion knew I well (saith hee) before, but now I know it more certainely, for Himileo sent me a Trumpeter vnder coulour of parley about certaine pri••oners, and priuily hath giuen me to vnderstand, that he would yeeld me more then to any one of my companions, vpon condition that I would not spie or [ M] inquire what his intent was to doe, and though I would not helpe him, yet at leastwise that I should not hinder him. Therefore (said Dionisius) that hee would no longer haue the office of a Captaine, and that he was purpo••ely come to giue it ouer, because that he thought it not reasonable, that he, whilst others ••old the Commonweale to the ene∣mies, should goe alone with other Cittizens to aduenture his person in all the perill of the warre, and be in danger to make them thinke that hee himselfe was consenting, and

[ A] partaker of their treason. The people were very much moued at these wordes, which were presently spread abroad in the eares of all the common people, and especially of the men of warre. But for the present time euery man went home to his house in great heauinesse. The next day Dionisius assembled the people in counsaile, and openly ac∣cused the other Captaines his companions: And had attentiue audience, with great commendations at all the peoples hands, whome hee had greatly moued, so that at the last there was some one in the company who spake alowd, That it was needfull to chuse him alone Captaine generall, with full authority and soueraigne power: And that it was not exp••dient to stay vntill the enemies should batter the wals of the Towne: and that [ B] the great importance of this warre, required such a Captaine as was a man fit to finde some ready way therein, and to giue good order in their affaires. And as touching the Traitors, they would consider at more leasure what was to be done to them, but as then the time serued not: and that in ti••es past their predecessors had vanquished and ouer∣throwne in battaile before the City of Himera, three hundred thousand fighting Car∣thaginians, vnder the conduct of Gelon their onely cheefe Captaine. At the hearing of these things, the people according to their custome, inclining sooner to euill then to good, made present choise of Dionisius for their Captaine generall, and gaue him full power, and soueraigne authority. Hereupon passing into the fields, and lodging in [ C] his tent, he fained one night that his enemies went about to kill him, and that they were come to assaile him in his tent, and so made a rumour and outcry by his friends and ser∣uants, and withall fled into the Castell of the Leontines Towne, where hee passed the rest of the night, causing fires to bee made in all places, and sent for such men of warre as hee trusted best, as a man that had great cause to doubt of his safetie, and perceaued his life to be laid for by his enemies. The next day in the morning hauing assembled a certaine number of the Syracusans in this Citie of the Leontines, he declared in open assembly many fained matters, carrying some outward shew of truth, howbeit, tending only to induce the people to credite him; that his enemies came and assaulted him trai∣terously [ D] to kill him, and hee tolde his tale so cunningly, that the people by their decree graunted him a guard of sixe hundred persons of his owne nomination and choise. This brought he to passe by the example of Pisistratus the Athenian, who as the report goeth, wounded himselfe in many places of his bodie, and all bloody as he was, ran in∣to the market place, where, vpon the present assembly of the people, hee informed the audience, that his enemies and euill willers came and assaulted him, with intention to murder him, and had thus pitifully mangled him; vpon occasion whereof, the people granted him a guard of souldiours, by which meanes he vsurped Tyranny, and became lord of Athens. In like sort Dionisius by abusing the people of Siracusa by a like de∣ceit [ E] established his tirannous dominion. Diodorus Siculus reporteth this in his 13. booke, chapter 29 and 30. Who also (speaking of Agathocles, that vsed the like craft and subtlety which Pisistratus and Dionisius did, for the abolishing of the De∣mocratie, and vsurping of the Monarchie) discourseth as followeth, in the begin∣ning of his nineteenth booke: It is an old Prouerbe (saith he) that the popular states are not destroyed and abolished by all manner of men, but by those that excell others in vertue; vpon which occasion, many Cities that liued in liberty, vpon suspition of their citizens that haue greatest power, vse their indeuors to restrain & depresse their autho∣rity; because they think the cōtinuance of their authority & preheminence, might easily [ F] bring the state of the city into subiectiō & bondage. And because it is a hard matter for them that excell others, to refraine from aspiring to the Monarchie. For it is a very na∣turall thing to them that desire great matters, to b••e couetous of wealth and honour: which couetousnesse hath neither limits nor bounds. Therefore Solon in his speech condemning the Tyranny of Pisistratus, vttered two verses to this effect: The great ci∣tizens are the occasion of the destruction of the Citty; and the people through their owne ••olly fall into the bondage of the Tyrant. But aboue all other Countries whereof

there is any remembrance or record, the Isle of Sicilly hath beene vnder the dominion [ G] of Tyrants, vntill it came to the obedience of the Romanes, by reason that the Citties thereof being deceaued and abused by liberality and courtesies, gaue so great authori∣ty to inferiour persons, that they made themselues lords. And aboue all others, that of priuate Citizens, and from a low degree haue become Tyrans, Agatho••les who gouer∣ned in the City of Siracusa, is the most notable: for he from a very base estate, attaining thereunto, committed innumerable mischeefes, not only in the Cittie of Siracusa, but also in the whole Isle of Sicilie, and in the countrie of Libia. For from the degree of a potter, hee came to so great authoritie and crueltie through whoredome and wicked∣nesse, that hee brought into his subiection and bondage the largest and goodliest of all [ H] the Grecian Islands, as also for a time the greatest part of Libia, with certaine Countries of Italie, and filled all the Cities of Sicilie with murthers and outrages, for all they that were before him, came nothing neere him in cruelty and insolence, to auenge himselfe on some particular person, he would cause al his kindred to be slain; and for the offence of some few Cittizens, hee would put to death all the inhabitants of a Citty that were of age. The meanes and practises which he vsed, thereby to attaine vnto the Tyranny, are recited by the same Authour in the chapter following•• and examined by Machiauel in his Prince, chap. 8. Plato in the eight and ninth bookes of his Commonweale doth elegantly and learnedly shew in what maner a Tyrannicall state is made of a Democra∣tic, [ I] and how a Democratical person becomes Tyrannicall: which places are cited and set downe at large in the former booke.

The changes and troubles vvhich happened in the Athenian Democratie, taken out of Thucidides eight booke of the Peloponesian vvarre.

[ K]

FOr the liuely representing of the changes wherto the Democratie is subiect, it shal suffice to report & set down those which haue happened in the Athenian Democra∣tie, being one of the most famous that euer were. Then the gouernment of Athens was for the most part Democraticall or Popular, as it hath beene said in the end of the second booke, and suffered many changes through the disorder of the Athenian peo∣ple, whom Polybius in his sixt booke compares to shippes wanting Pilots. For when the souldiers fall into an humour of agreement and obedience to the maister of the shippe, either for feare of enemies, or danger of a tempest, they vse extreame endeuor, and performe much: but when through arrogance they beginne to disdaine those that [ L] guide and gouerne the ship, and to quarrell one with another, because they are no lon∣ger all of one mind, but some will put to sea, others inforce the Pilote to strike into the hauen, some againe take the oares in hand•• and make shewe to set saile, there is then an vnseemely sight for those that looke on them, by reason of this mutuall discord. Like∣wise, the Marriners fancies haue neuer anie stay or certaintie, who shunning the vast depth of the maine sea, and the dangerous tempests which are wont to arise there, saile along the shore. And the like in effect hath oft happened to the Athenian cōmon∣weale. For when it hath sometimes by the valure•• as well of the people as of the cheefe commanders auoided many greeuous calamities, it hath neuerthelesse cōmitted mar∣uellous [ M] ouersights through extreame rashnesse, and to no end, hauing (as wee say) the wind in the Poupe, and fortune at wil. At one time the people seeing thēselues in great distresse, did voluntarily surrender their soueraigne authority, and gaue it to twenty cheefe and chosen personages, to whom they committed the charge and administrati∣on of publicke affaires, supposing that the gouernment of a few would be more seemely and expedient, in regard of the extremities whereinto their State was brought, then the

[ A] rule of a whole multitude, as saieth Diodorus Siculus in his 13 booke, chap. 11. and 12. At another time being constrained by the Lacedemonians, they did absolutely submit themselues to thirty, and afterward to foure hundred. Sometimes the Senate, and some∣times the people had most authority there: to be short, there was not any durable form in that Commonweale. But from whence may we haue fuller and more certaine know∣ledge of the affaires of Athens, then from Thucidides, who was himselfe an Athenian, a man of great knowledge, experience, and authority, and the cheefest Grecian Histori∣ographer; who writeth thus thereof in the eight booke of his Hystorie, the fourteenth chapter. The Athenians fell to debate, because the popular estate and gouernement of [ B] their Cittie had beene taken from the people, and giuen to a small number. For Pisan∣der and his fellowes being returned to Samos, wonne the ••••mie that was there to their obedience, and a great part of the Samians exhorted the cheefe of the City to take the gouernment into their owne hands, although there were many others who sought to vphold and continue the popular Estate: from whence there arose great contention & mutinies among them. The Athenians also who were in the army, hauing consulted to∣gether, and seeing that Alcibiades liked not the matter, resolued to leaue him, and not to repeale the sentence of his banishment, because it seemed vnto them, that when hee should returne into the Citty, hee would not be a fit person to bee employed vnder the [ C] command of a small number, but that it was expedient, that they who were of the Estate, whereof there was question, should bethinke themselues how to handle and worke this matter, and neuerthelesse prosecute the warre, whereto each of them did rea∣dily and willingly offer to contribute of his owne money, and whatsoeuer els was ne∣cessary, knowing that they laboured not any more for the publicke seruice of the state, nor for other men, but for themselues. So they sent Pisander, and the one halfe of the Embassadours that should haue gone to Tissaphernes, backe to Athens, to take order there for the eff••cting of their purpose, and gaue them in charge, that as they passed through any city subiect to the Athenians, they should commit the gouernment ther∣of [ D] to some few of the cheefest: and the other halfe of the saied Embassadours departed and went each of them for the same purpose into seuerall places. They did farther de∣cree, that Diatrephes who was then at the siege of Chio, should goe into the Prouince of Thrace, whereof he had ben appointed Gouernour; who at his departure from the said siege, passing by Thassus, abolished the popular estate, and put the gouernment in∣to the hands of a small number of Citizens: but when hee was gone from thence, the most part of the Thassians, hauing enclosed their City with a wall, about a moneth af∣ter his departure, persuaded themselues that they needed no longer bee gouerned by those whom the Athenians had placed in authority, and thereby to bee in their subiec∣tion, [ E] but to the contrary, hoping by the Lacedemonians aide to recouer within small time absolute liberty, because their fellow Citizens who had beene expulsed by the A∣thenians, were gone to Lacedemon, where they made great sute that shippes might be sent to Thassus, and that the City might reuolt. Which thing fell out euen according to their owne desires, for the Cities former liberty was without danger restored, and the people which was bent against the authority and rule of a small number, was with∣out scandale depriued of the gouernment: but they who held with the Athenians, and whom Diotrephes had made Gouernours, found themselues greatly deceiued in the issue of their thoughts and expectations. The like was done in many other Cities sub∣iect [ F] to the state of Athens, which considering (as it seemes to me) that they need no lon∣ger to feare the Athenians, and that this manner of liuing in subiection to them, vnder the colour of gouernment, was nothing els in very deed than a disguised and shadowed kind of bondage, did all seeke for true libertie. Touching Pi••ander, and those that went with him, they did at their owne pleasure commit the gouernement of those Cities through which they passed, to a small number, and out of some of the saied Cities they tooke souldiers, whom they led with them to Athens, where they found that their com∣plices

and friendes had already done many things tending to the accomplishment of [ G] their purpose for the abolishing of the Popular estate. For one Androcles, who was in great authority and credite with the people, and had been one of the cheefe procu∣rers of Alcibiades banishment, was slaine through a priuie conspiracie of certain yong men of the City, for two causes; the one, because he had too great authoritie and cre∣dite with the people, the other, to get hereby the good will and fauour of Alcibiades, who as they thought should returne, and recouer his former authoritie, hoping that he would make Tissaphernes their friend, and for the same causes they had by like meanes slaine some others of whom they doubted: they had also besotted the people with arti∣ficiall and smooth speeches, telling them that it was not meete to giue longer pay, saue [ H] only to those who serued in ••he warre, and that for the administration of publicke af∣faires, there ought not to assemble and be emploied more then fiue hundred, and name∣ly such as were able to serue the Commonweale, both with their persons and purses. Which thing did generally seeme honourable, and euen they who had caused the re∣storing of the Popular estate, hoped by this change to haue authoritie. For as yet the ancient manner continues of assembling the people and the counsell for all causes, and of hearing all mens opinions, and following the greater part. But nothing might bee propounded without the deliberation of the little counsel, whereto this authority was assigned, in which there were some that conferred apart touching al those matters that [ I] were to bee propounded for the furtherance of their intent, and when they had deliue∣red their opinion, none durst contradict it for feare, seeing the great number and au∣thoritie of the said Gouernours. For when any did gainesay them, they found meanes to make him away, not obseruing any forme of iustice, nor making inquisition touching murthers, wherewith the people were so amazed and terrified, that none of them durst speake a word, but thought that he sped well by holding his peace, if hee felt no further hurt nor violence: and their feare was by so much the more, because they doubted that there was a farre greater number in that conspiracie, neither had they any desire to know who they were, as well for the greatnesse of the City and people, as because no [ K] man knew anothers mind, nor durst complaine or reueale his secrets vnto him, or talke of meanes howe to bee auenged: for the feare and mutuall distrust was so great among them, that they stood in doubt euen of their acquaintance and verie friendes, fearing least they were of that conspiracie, because there were some thereof, of whome no man had euer anie such opinion. For which cause, they knewe not whome they might safely trust, so that the conspirators estate was greatly strengthened and assured, & that cheefly by reason of the common diffidence. Pisander therefore and his fellowes being arriued in this trouble, did easily and in small time atchieue their purpose. And first of all hauing assembled the people, they caused them to consent to the election of tenne [ L] Clearkes and Secretaries, who might haue full authority and power to pronounce or read vnto the people whatsoeuer should vpon due aduise be thought meet to bee con∣sulted of for the good of the City, on a certaine day that was nominated. Which day being come, and the people assembled in a great fi••ld, wherein stood the Temple of Neptune tenne furlongs from the City, there was nothing els publickely pronounced by the said Notaries, saue only that it might bee lawfull to relate and report the Atheni∣ans decree in what part they would. And that whosoeuer did charge the relater or re∣porter thereof, that he had therein done against the lawes, or did otherwise outrage & hinder him, should be greeuously punished. Then was the decree pronounced, the te∣nour [ M] whereof was this, That all the Officers then being, who had receiued their charge and authoritie from the people, should be deposed, and that no stipend should bee allo∣wed vnto them; that there should be chosen fiue Presidents, who might afterward no∣minate an hundred persons, and each of them chuse three others, which should be in al foure hundred, who when thy sate in the Court, should haue full and ample authoritie and power to ordaine and execute whatsoeuer they should thinke good and profitable

[ A] for the Commonweale, and besides, to summon and assemble fiue thousand Citizens so oft as should seeme good vnto them. This decree was pronounced by Pisander, who both therein and in all other things did willingly vndertake whatsoeuer hee thought serued to the abrogating and abolishing of the popular Estate. But the saied decree had been before precogitated and deuised by Antiphon, who was in great account and esti∣mation: For to speake the truth, not any man at that time in the whole City did surpasse him in vertue, he was withall very aduised and wise in giuing counsell touching publick affaires, and had besides an excellent grace in declaring and propounding them: not∣withstanding, hee neuer came to the common assemblies, nor to any other contentious [ B] meeting, vnlesse he were sent for: but although he were thus warie, yet the people had him in suspition, for the efficacie and elegance of his speech: and albeit he led a priuate life, nor would not entermeddle in the Estate, yet euery one that had any cause or mat∣ter either in iudgement or to the people, accounted it a great fauour if hee might haue Antiphons counsell. And after that this Tyrannicall Estate of the foure hundred was destroyed, and that they proceeded by forme of lawe against the principall Authours thereof, he being accused with the rest, did in mine opinion farre better defend and an∣swere for himselfe then euer any man within the compasse of my remembrance. Phry∣nichus likewise shewed himselfe a great fauouror of this Estate, for feare of Alcibia∣des, [ C] to whom he was well assured that all his practises were knowne, whereof he had se∣cretly treated with Astiochus, being at Samos. But he thought that he would neuer re∣turne during this gouernment of the foure hundred, for he was generally accounted a man both constant and valiant in extreame distresse and great aduersities, because the high courage of his mind was neuer knowne to faile in whatsoeuer danger. Therame∣nes also the sonne of Agnon, was a principall dealer in the abolishing of the Popular Estate, being a man of knowne sufficiency both in word and deed. It is therfore no mar∣uell that this enterprise which was plotted and prosecuted by so many men of wisdome and authority, had such successe; although it seemed and were indeed a matter of excee∣ding [ D] difficulty to depriue the people of that liberty which they had enioyed and helde about an hundred yeares since the expulsion of the Tyran, and had not onely been ex∣empted from subiection to anie, but had also for more then halfe the same time, com∣manded other Countries. The assemblie of the people being broken vp, when they had approoued the said decree, the foure hundred were afterward brought into the Court in this manner: The Athenians were continually in armes by reason of the ene∣mies that were at Decelea; to wit, some of them guarded the wals, some the gates, and other places, according as they were appointed. And when the day came that was as∣signed for the making of the act, they suffered all those who were not of the conspira∣cie [ E] to goe home to their houses as the custome was, but the rest were commaunded to stay, not in the places wherein they were to watch, and where their weapons lay, but somewhat neere thereto; with charge, that if they saw anie offer to resist or hinder their purpose, they should if neede required, set vpon them. Now, they who were hereunto deputed and appointed, were the Andrians, the Thenians, with three hun∣dred of the Caristians, and those of the Citie of AEgina, whome the Athenians had caused to come and dwell there. When euerie thing was thus ordered, the foure hundred that were chosen to this newe forme of gouernement, carrying each of them a dagger closely vnder his attire, and ••••uing with them sixe score young men [ F] to assist and aide them, as occasion should se•••••• entered all together into the pal∣lace where the Court was kept: and enuironning the Senatours who sate in coun∣sell, and (according to the custome) deliuered their opinions by white and blacke Beanes, they told them that they should take their stipends for the time that they had serued in that Office, and depart: which stipend those foure hundred had brought them, and as they went out of the counsell chamber, they gaue euery man his due: who by this meanes departed without making any resistance, neither did the people

stirre at all. Then the said foure hundred entring, chose out of their own number certain [ G] Treasurers & receiuers: which done, they offered a solemne sacrifice for the creation of the said new offices, & hereby the forme of the Popular gouernment was wholly chan∣ged, & a great part of things that had ben before decreed and done by the people, was reuoked & cancelled, saue only the restoring of the banished men, least by vertue therof Alcibiades should returne. To proceed, these new gouernours did what they listed, and among other things they put to death certaine Citizens, doubting least they should be substituted in their places, because they seemed not agreeable to their Tyrannical hu∣mours; some they imprisoned, others they banished. Hauing thus done, they sent an Herault to Agis king of Lacedemon, who was then at Decelea, signifying vnto him [ H] that they were desirous to reconcile themselues to the Lacedemonians; and that hee might haue greater assurance, and repose more trust in them, then in a wauering and in∣constant multitude of ignorant people. But Agis thinking that the Citie must needes bee full of great discontent and trouble, and that the people would not so easily giue ouer their authoritie, especially if they should see a great armie come before the City, and supposing withall, that the Estate of the foure hundred, could not yet be so establi∣shed, but that it might be shaken; made them no answere touching the agreement that they desired, but within fewe daies after leuied a great number of souldiers in the coun∣try of Peloponesus, whome togither with those that hee had alreadie at Decelea, hee [ I] brought to the very wals of Athens, hoping that the Athenians would yeeld thēselues vnto him, as well in regard of their discontent and trouble both within & without the Citie, as of their feare at the sight of so mightie a power, marching euen to their gates: and although his hope should therein faile him, yet seemed it likely that he might easi∣ly take the great wals by force, both because they were abandoned, & by reason of their exceeding length, could not bee furnished with a sufficient number of defendants. But the euent was cleane contrarie to his expectation, for the Athenians raised no tumult at his approch, but sent out their horsemen, & part of their footmen, both throughly & lightly armed, who did forthwith driue backe those that came nearest to the wals, and [ K] slew part of them, carrying their spoiles into the City. Then Agis seeing that his enter∣prise had not such issue as he expected, returned to Decelea, and within some fewe daies after, sent backe, and discharged the forraine souldiors whom he had leuied for that pur∣pose, keeping onely those whom he had before in pay. But the four hundred sent to him againe to treat of agreement, whereto he seemed in outward shew so far to incline, that he persuaded them to send Embassadours to Lacedemon for the treating of that peace which they desired. On the other side the said foure hundred, sent ten Citizens to them that were at Samos, who besides others things that they had in charge, were commaun∣ded to declare vnto them that whatsoeuer had beene done in changing the Popular E∣state, [ L] tended not to the hurt of the Citie, but to the good and safetie therof; and that the authoritie was not in the hands of the foure hundred onely, but onely of fiue thousand; and that by this meanes the people did gouerne, as well then as before, sith during the Popular state there were neuer present in any assembly so great a number as fiue thou∣sand persons at the deliberating and determining of whatsoeuer cause, whether dome∣sticall or forraine. And this embassage was sent to Samos by the four hundred, presently on the beginning of their vsurpation, because they feared that they of the fleet and ar∣my, would not allow this change, not obey their gouernement, but that the discord & mischeefe arising there, would spread from thence into the city, as indeed it did. For [ M] from the time that the said change was made at Athens, there was for the same cause a mutinie and sedition raised in the said City of Samos in this manner: Certain Samians, who in fauor of the Popular estate which was then in the City, and for defence thereof had risen in armes against the cheefe citizens, who would haue vsurped the gouernmēt, did afterward reuolt & change their opinions, through the persuasiō which Pisander at his comming thither, and other Athenians his sectaries & complices had vsed vnto thē.

[ A] Whereupon they purposing to ouerthrow the Popular Estate assembled themselues to the number of foure hundred or thereabout, fully resoluing to set vpon all those that maintained or fauoured that forme of gouernement, and pretending that they repre∣sented the whole body of the people. At the first brunt they slewe an Athenian named Hiperbolus, a wicked person, and of bad life, who had beene banished from Athens, not for any suspition or feare that they had of his power or authoritie, but for his foule of∣fences, and because he dishonoured the City; they slewe also one of the Athenian Cap∣taines, called Charminus, and certaine other Athenians who were in his company, by whose counsell hee was led. And they determined to proceede farther in fauour of this [ B] newe Oligarchie: but the other Citizens who held with the Popular Estate, hearing of this conspiracie, discouered it, namely to certaine of the captaines, who were vnder the charge of Diomedon and Leon, two Athenian commanders, who because they had re∣ceuied this charge and other honors of the people, were not content that the authority of the State should be in a few mens hands, & therfore did in like sort reueale it to Thra∣sibulus and Thrasillu••, (of whom the one was maister of a shippe, and the other captain o•• the souldiors that were therein) as also to those souldiours whome they knew to bee affectioned to the said Popular estate, earnestly praying and entreating them not to suf∣fer thēselues to be besotted and circumuented by those conspirators, whose purpose was [ C] to kill thē, nor to abandon the Citie of Samos at such an exigent, least by changing that forme of gouernment which the said city had till then obserued, they should loose the good will that it had alwaies born vnto the Athenians. This thing being thus declared to the cheefe persons and captains, they spake seuerally to the souldiers, persuading to hinder this conspiracie from taking effect. And first they vsed these speeches to that band or companie of the Athenians that was called Parali, and afterward to all the free men which were in that Athenianship; who both at that time and alwaies before, had shewed themselues vtter enemies to the rule of a small number, and had so good ••n opi∣nion of Diomedes and Leon, that when they made any voiage by sea, they willingly [ D] gaue them the charge of some ships. These then ioining with those of the Citie who stood for the Poplar estate, discomfited the foure hundred conspirators that had risen in armes; of whom they slew thirty, & banished three of the cheefest authours, pardoning the rest, and restoring from that time forward the same authoritie of gouernement to the Popular estate that it had before. This being done, the Samians and the Athenian souldiers that were there, sent that shippe of the Parali, as also the captaine and maister thereof, named Chereas the sonne of Archestrates, who had been verie forward in that action, to aduertise the Athenians howe all thinges had past at Samos, not knowing as yet that the gouernment of the City of Athens had ben committed to foure hundred: [ E] who being informed of the said shippes arriuall, caused two or three of the saied Parali to bee taken and imprisoned, and the rest they put into sundrie shippes, sending them into seuerall parts of Eubaea to be surely kept there, saue only Chereas, who hauing vn∣derstood what they intended to doe, did hide and saue himselfe, returning with al speed possible to Samos, where he reported to the Athenian army, all that had been done at Athens, making euery thing greater then it was: for hee said that all they who held with the people were oppressed and outraged, not daring to speake one word against the go∣uernors; and that they did not iniure & outrage the men only, but their wiues and chil∣dren also. Besides, they had determined to do the like to all those in the armie at Samos, [ F] which should withstand them, and to take their wi••es, children, and neere kinsfolkes, and put them to death if they would not yeeld obedien••e vnto thē. Sundry other things did the said Chereas report, which were all lies, wherewith the souldiers were so incen∣sed, that they had purposed to kill not onely those that had set vp the Estate of a small number of Gouernours at Samos, but all those also that had consented thereunto. But when they had beene told by some that sought to appease them, that by do∣ing so, they should put the Citie in daunger of falling into the enemies handes,

who were on the sea in great number, comming to assaile, they gaue ouer that bloodie [ G] resolution: yet purposing to restore openly the Popular Estate in that City, Thrasibu∣lus and Thrasillus who were the cheefe dealers herein, constrained all the Athenians in the armie, and euen those also that held with the gouernement of a fewe, to de∣fend to the vttermost of their power the Popular estate, and to followe in that be∣halfe such order as those Captaines should giue, and withall to defend the said Ci∣ty of Samos against the Peloponesians, and to repute as enemies the foure hundred newe Gouernours, nor to make anie agreement with them. The like oath tooke all the Samians that were of age to beare armour, to whome also the souldiours sware, that they would liue and die with them in like fortune; assuring themselues that [ H] there was no other meanes of safetie, neither for them, nor the Samians, but that they were all cast away, if the Estate of the foure hundred should preuaile and continue at Athens, or if the Peloponesians should take the City of Samos by force. Herein was much time employed and spent, while the Athenian souldiours that were in the armie at Samos, sought to restore the Popular Estate at Athens, and they who had the go∣uernment of Athens to constraine the Samians to doe as they had done. But the soul∣diours being assembled for this cause, deposed all the Cap••aines of the said armie, who were suspected to fauour the Estate of the foure hundred, and in their places they chose others, among whō were Thrasibulus and Thrasyllus, who exhorted the souldiours one [ I] with another to be constant in that their resolution for sundry reasons that they shewed them, although the City had yeelded to the gouernement of the said foure hundred. And amongst other things they shewed them that they in the armie were farre more in number then they that remained in the City, and were better furnished with all things then they; because hauing in their hands the ships, and all the sea forces, they might in∣force the subiect and confederate Cities to contribute money. And although they should be vtterly excluded from Athens, yet had they the City of Samos, which was neither small nor weake: and besides, the City of Athens being thus depriued of power by sea, wherein it pretended to exceed all other Cities, they were strong inough to [ K] foile the Peloponesians if they came to assaile them at Samos, as they had done at other times, as also to resist those that were at Athens, and to preuaile against them, hauing the Shippes in their hands: by meanes whereof, they might al∣waies bee stored with victuals, whereas the Athenians should feele great want thereof. For all the victuals that had vntill that time beene brought vnto them, and vnladen in the Hauen of Pyreum, came through the helpe and fauour of the armie at Samos, which would nowe barre them from the same, vnlesse they would restore vnto the people the gouernment of the City: and that by this meanes they of the said armie might better as it were shut vp the sea, and wholly depriue the vse [ L] thereof from tho••e that remained at Athens, than they of Athens could do the like to them. For whatsoeuer that City could affoord or furnish of it selfe, was the least part of that which they were to hope for, thereby to resist the enemies; so that by losing that, they lost nothing: for the said Citie had no more money left, be∣cause the souldiours were enforced to serue on their owne charges: and the Gouer∣nors had no good Counsell, which is the only thing whereby the City might keepe in obedience the armies that were abroad: but they had herein greatly failed, in that they had violated and corrupted their ancient lawes, which they at Samos would maintaine and enforce others to obserue them. Wherefore it was not a thing to be beleeued, that [ M] such among them as had beene the authors of better counsell and opinion herein, then those of the City, should in other things be inferiour, and lesse aduised. And on the o∣ther side, that if they would offer to Alcibiades his restitution and repeale from banish∣ment, he would willingly make alliance and amity betweene them and the king of Per∣sia. But if these and all other things should faile them, yet they hauing so great an army by sea, might goe to whatsoeuer place they would to find Cities and lands wherein to

[ A] inhabite. By such reasons and persuasions they exhorted each other, and notwithstan∣ding vsed great diligence in preparing all things necessary for the war: which when the ten Embassadors, who had ben sent thither by the foure hundred, vnderstood to be pub∣lished and spread abroad among the people, they kept silence, and declared not what they had in charge. And in the twelfth chapter of the same book he writeth thus: Mean¦while the Embassadors whom the foure hundred had sent to S••mos, being returned to Athens, reported what Alcibiades had giuen thē in charge, viz. that they should looke to the keeping of the city, & to the defending of themselues against the enemies, & that he hoped to reconcile them to those that were in the army at Samos; & likewise to van∣quish [ B] the Peloponesians. Which words did greatly incourage many of the said foure hundred, who were already weary of that forme of gouernement, and would willingly haue giuen it ouer, if they had thought that they might haue done it without danger: so that al with one accord vndertook the ordering of these matters, hauing for their guides & leaders therein, the two principall men & of greatest power in the city, namely, The∣ramenes the son of Agnon, & Aristocrates the son of Sicellius, and besides them, sundry other of the most notable persons that were among the foure hundred: who excused themselues touching the sending of Embassadours to the Lacedemonians, saying that they had done it for the fear that they had of Alcibiades and the others that were at Sa∣mos, [ C] to the end, the city might sustaine no harme; & it seemed vnto thē that they might keep the gouernment from comming into the hands of a small number, if they caused the fiue thousand who had ben nominated by the said four hundred to haue authority in very deed, & not in word only, & by this meanes they thonght that the Estate might be in other sort reformed to the good & profit of the city: whereof although they alwaies made mention in all their assemblies & consultations, yet the greatest part of them ay∣med at their owne peculiar profite, & did ambitiously thirst for authority, hoping that if the said gouernment of the four hundred were put down, they should not be not only equal to the rest, but also superior: And besides, in the popular estate euery mā doth bet∣ter [ D] brooke a repulse, because the publick offices are giuē by the election of the people, thē in the estate or gouernment of particular persons, for he thought not that he was re∣iected by his equals, whē it is done by all the people. And to say the truth, the authority which Alcibiades had with those that were at Samos, did greatly encourage these men; who did withall perceiue, that the estate of the 400 could not long continue. Where∣fore each of thē vsed all indeuor possible to win credit & fauour with the people, that by means therof he might haue highest authority. But they who we••e the cheef of the four hundred, did to the vttermost of their power labor to the contrary, and namely Phryni∣cus, who at such time as he was chiefetaine of the army at Samos, had ben enemy to Al∣cibiades; [ E] as also Aristarcus, who had alwaies ben against the popular estate; and likewise Pisander, Antiphon, & the rest which had the greatest power in the city; who from the time that they had taken in hand the gouernment of the state, & also since the reuolt & mutiny at Samos, had sent Embassadors of their own proper body or assembly, to Lace∣demon, doing all that they could to vphold this their Oligarchy, & causing the wall of Etiona to be repaired & raised higher. After the return of their Embassadors whō they had sent to Samos, seeing that many euen of their own faction chāged their minds, whō they had accounted very cōstant & resolute therein, they speedily sent again Antiphon & Phrynichus, with ten others of their company to the Lacedemonians, giuing thē in [ F] charge to appoint & conclude with thē to the least disaduātage & euill that th•••• might, prouided that the appointmēt were tollerable. And this they did for the feare that they had, as well of those that were at Athens, as of those at Samos. And touching the wall that they repaired & raised higher at Etiona, they did it not (as said Theramenes, & they that held with him) so much to hinder thē who were at Samos frō entring into the hauē of Pyreum, as to receiue the enemies army by sea & land whē they would: because Etio∣na stands at the entrance of the hauē of Pyreū, in maner of a cressant. Wherfore the wal that they built on the land side, did so strengthen the place, that they had it in their own

power by placing there a few men; either to permit the shippes that came, to enter, or [ G] keepe them out, because that place ioines to the other Tower that hath entrance very narrow. And besides those reparations which they bestowed at Etiona, they did likewise repaire the old wall that was without Pyreum on the sea side, and raised a new wall within on the land side: and betweene both they made great hals and storehouses, whether they enforced euery Cittizen to bring all his prouision of corne that hee had in his house: and likewise whatsoeuer corne was brought in by sea, was by their com∣mandement vnladen there, and they that wanted corne, were to buy it there. These things (namely, that the foure hundred made the said reparations and prouisions, to the end, to receiue the enemies) were spread abroad by Theramenes a good while before [ H] the last Embassadours were sent by the foure hundred to Lacedemon, but after that they were returned, hauing done nothing in their said Embassage, Theremenes did speake more openly, that the wall which they had made should cause great daunger vnto the City. For at the same time came thither two and forty saile of the enemies, part where∣of were Italians and Sicilians, who came from Peloponesus, to wit, those that were sent into Eubaea, and some of the rest were part of those who had beene left at the Hauen of Ye in the Countrey of Laconia, whose captaine was Agesandridas the sonne of Age∣sander a Lacedemonian. Whereupon Theramenes said that they fell not so much with that coast to prosecute their voyage of Eubaea, as to aid those that made the said wall at [ I] Etiona; and that if good watch were not kept, it were greatly to bee feared that they would surprise Pyreum: and these speeches of Theramenes and of those that helde with him, were not altogether false nor spoken of malice. For in very truth, they that held the Oligarchie at Athens, would faine (if they might haue done it) gouerne the City with liberty, and vnder their authority haue power to commaund the subiects in the Cities name, as representing the body of the Commonweale: but if they could not maintaine and defend their authority, they had resolued, hauing the Hauen, the Ships, and the Fortresse of Pyreum in their hands, to liue in safety: because they feared, that if the people should ••ecouer their former Estate in gouernement, they should be the first [ K] that were destroyed. Be••ides, if they should not be able to defend themselues there, ra∣ther then they would come into the peoples hands, they purposed to receiue the ene∣mies into Pyreum, yet not to deliuer them the ships and fortresses, but to agree with them touching the Estate of the City in the best sort that they could, prouided alwaies that their persons should bee safe. For these causes they kept good watch on the wals and at the gates, and withall vsed great diligence in fortifying the places where the ene∣mies might enter, for they feared to be surprised and preuented: which enterprises and deliberations were made and communicated among few persons. But afterward Phry∣nichus being returned from Lacedemon, was hurt in the middest of the market place [ L] by one of those that warded, whereof he died soone after, as he returned thence to the pallace, and he that had hurt him fled: but one Arginus who had assisted him, was by commandement of the foure hundred taken, and being demanded when he was on the rocke, who had persuaded him thereunto, he could name none, but said that he knew nothing, saue only that in the Captaine of the watch his house, as also in sundry other Citizens houses, there were oft great meetings. By reason of which discouery, Thera∣menes, Aristocrates, and the rest of their faction, as well they who were of the number of the foure hundred, as others, were more incited to their enterprise, and so much the rathe••, because the Fleet that was at Ye hauing arriued that day at Epidaurus, made ma∣••y [ M] excursions, and did much harme in the territority of AEgina. Whereupon Thera∣menes said, that it wa•• not likely, that if the saied Fleet were bound for Eubaea, it would make excursions into the gulfe of AEgina, and returne thence to Epidaurus, if it had not ben sent for by those that held Pyreum, as he had alwaies said before. Vpon occasi∣on hereof, after many informations giuen to the people to rise against them, at last it was determined that Ye should be taken by force. According to which determination,

[ A] the souldiours that were occupied about the fortification of Etiona, whose Captaine was Aristocrates, tooke one of the foure hundred, (that neuerthelesse secretly held of the contrary side) whose name was Alexicles, and committed him to ward in his owne house vnder the custody of a guard, and after apprehended many of them, and amongst others, one of the Captaines that had the keeping of Munichie, whose name was Her∣man. And this was done by the consent of the greatest part of the Souldiours. Vpon the signifying of these things to the foure hundred, who then kept themselues within the pallace of the Towne, (except they whom the gouernment pleased not) they deter∣mined to put themselues in armes, and to set vpon Theramenes, and them that were [ B] with him. Who excusing himselfe, said he was ready to goe to Ye to apprehend them that made these innouations. And in deed he tooke with him one of the Captaines that was of his owne mind, and went to Pyrea, whom Aristarcus and the Horsemen aided, whereupon there rose forthwith a great and horrible tumult. For they that were within the city, said plainly & openly, that Pyrea was taken, & all they slain that were found in it: and on the other side, they that were within Pyrea, supposed that all they that were in the city came against thē: insomuch, that the ancients of the city had much ado to keep the citizens frō putting thēselues in Arms. And herein Thucidides the Pharsalian took great pains with them, who hauing great friendship & acquaintance with many of thē, [ C] went to pacifie thē with gentle speeches, requiring & counselling thē that they should not put their City in danger of destruction, sith they had the enemies so neare at hand, who laie in wait for them. By which counsell the people were pacified, and euery man went home to his owne house. In the meane space Theramenes (who was one of the Gouernours) being arriued at Pyreum, made a shewe in words only, to bee angry with the footmen that were well armed. But Aristarcus, and they of his band, being of the contrarie faction, were indeed much offended with them. Who for all that ceased not to labour in their worke, so farre, that some of them asked Theramenes, whether hee thought it best to finish the wall, or plucke it downe. And when he answered them that [ D] he cared not if they plucked it downe, straightway all they that wrought, and manie of the rest that were in Pyreum, got vpon the wall, and in lesse then an houre laid it flat with the earth. And in the doing hereof, for the exhortating and winning of the people to their purpose, they spake thus alowd to the standers by: Whosoeuer had rather the fiue thousand should gouerne then the foure hundred, ought to yeeld his helpe to doe as we doe. And these speeches vsed they, because they would not haue it knowne that they meant to restore the Popular Estate, but rather they shewed themselues content and willing that the fiue thousand should gouerne: for they feared least some of them that pretended to haue some gouernment in the Popular Estate, would let some speech [ E] thereof escape from him vnawares, as they talked one with another. Whereupon, the foure hundred were greatly amased, as being in no sort content, but vtterly disliking that the fiue thousand should haue the authority, yet meant they not that they should be deposed: For by so doing, the Popular state must needs come vp againe; and on the other side by giuing authority vnto them, it was in a manner all one, sith the power of the state should be in so many mens hands: and therefore this deuise of not declaring the thing, kept men in feare and suspition, as well on the one side, as on the other. The next day the foure hundred (notwithstanding, they were in great trouble) assembled in the pallace. On the other side, they that were in armes at Pyreum, hauing throwne [ F] downe the wall, and released Alexicles, whom they had before apprehended, went to the Theatre of Bacchus, which is before Munichium within the hauen of Pyreum: There held they their counsell, and hauing throughly debated euery point, they con∣cluded to go to the City, and there to set vp their armour in the accustomed place. This accomplished they, and vpon their vnarmings came many Citizens sent secretly from the foure hundred, who addressed themselues to those among them whom they knew to bee most tractable, praying them to demeane themselues peaceably, and make no

trouble or tumult in the City, and also to keepe others from it, telling them that they [ G] might name altogether the fiue thousand that ought to haue the gouernment, and put in this number the foure hundred, with such Office and authoritie as they thought meete, to the intent, that the Citie might not be put in daunger of falling into the ene∣mies hands. By these aduertisements and requests that were made by sundrie men in di∣uerse places, and to seuerall personages, the people that were in armour, were well paci∣fied, fearing least their controuersie would turne to the destruction of the City: inso∣much, that it was agreed vpon by all men, that a generall assembly should at a certaine day be held in the Temple of Bacchus. And in the thirteenth chapter of the same b••ok he writeth thus: The Athenians vpon the vnderstanding of these newes, in what feare [ H] and necessity soeuer they were, armed notwithstanding twentie shippes, and presently assembled in the same place of Pyreum, and then in a place that they call Pycue, wher∣in they had other times accustomed to assemble. In these assemblies it was concluded, that the foure hundred should be deposed, and that the authority should remaine in the hands of the fiue thousand, of the which number all they might bee that could bear ar∣mour, and that would serue in Offices without wages. And whosoeuer should do other∣wise, should be accursed. Many other assemblies followed after, where in diuerse lawes and ordinances were made touching the gouernment of the Gommonweale, & at this beginning in mine opinion they effectually performed many thinges for the direction [ I] of common affaires to the welfare of the city, by reducing the controuersie, that by oc∣casion of the Popular and particular gouernment was amongst them, to a good Medi∣ocritie: which caused both the surceassing of many naughty things that were cōmitted in the city, & also of the maintenance of the said city & commonweale. Thus you may see what Thucidides hath truly & grauely written concerning the troubles and altera∣tions of the gouernmēt of Athens, which I thought good to insert in this place, though it were somewhat long, as well to giue the reader a greater light for the vnderstanding of Aristotles obseruations, which of themselues be short & darke; as to shew the vse of the skil of gouernment, specially by so excellent an Historiographer, & in a Common∣weale, [ K] the glory and renowme whereof of is spred through the whole world; to the intēt also that the readers by considering the truth of old thinges, may thereby iudge those things to be such like, that now are, & hereafter shall be. Which cause hath moued mee likewise breefly to touch the tumults & seditions that haue happened vpon like occasi∣sions in the Commonweales of Florence, Siena, and Genoa, & confer the vnion & tran∣quility of the Venetian Aristocratie, sith those things that be neerest to our coūtry, age, and memory doe moue vs most. And I hope thus to make the worke more perfect, by conferring old things with new in euery kind of gouernment.

Seditions and changes in the gouernment of Florence Genoa, and [ L] of Siena, famous cities, and also the vnion, concord, sta∣biltie, and lasting of the Athenian Aristocratie.

THerfore wheras in laying of the foundation of the popular authority at Florence at the beginning, those mixtures and temperatures were not vsed therein, that should warrant and settle their liberty; with gentle and reasonable meanes, and keepe the gouernment from falling into disorder through the ignorance and licenti∣ousnesse of the multitude: The Commonweale hath alwaies been full of confusion, & out of order, because on the one side the citizens of greatest calling, thought thēselues [ M] lesse esteemed thē they supposed was meet, & on the other side, their ambition was sus∣pected to the people, & withal because diuers came oftē to counsels of importance that were very vnfit for it, & for that the soueraigne Magistrate, vnto whom the cheefe and hardest matters were referred, was changed euery two months. When the Noblemen intruded themselues into the authoritie of Gouernement, the people by rea∣son they could not endure their great pride, did soone take armes against them,

[ A] and tooke the gouernment out of their hands, which they made altogether Popular, so that sometimes, in such a broile, a wollecarder, wearing the cognisance of iustice, was created Confalonier and Prince of the City: So great was the hatred betweene the people and the nobilitie, that that part which got the victorie, did alwaies thrust the other that was ouercome out of the gouernment, with ransacking, burning, banishing, and murders, and made lawes and iudgements for their owne aduantage, not regarding the publicke benefite of the state. In the assemblies of the City, they were most com∣monly one against another, and made it no matter of conscience to hinder the Com∣monweale, to the intent, to gainesay or resist their aduersaries. And the people did not [ B] resist the Nobility only, but also the Popular sort were deuided from the commoners. They called the Noblemen by an odious name, Mightie fellowes: and had deuided the people into two orders, placing in the one the rich men that might attaine to the Ma∣gistracies; and in the other, the poore, that exercised base occupations and were exclu∣ded from the gouernment. The distributing of the people, consisted of two and twen∣tie companies of occupations, whereof seuen were called the greater, and might bee admitted to the gouernment, as being the most honest and worshipfull: the other fif∣teene stood for a ciphre in the publicke gouernment, who notwithstanding for that they were the greatest number, & sorrie to see themselues depriued of honour, attemp∣ted [ C] oft to obtaine that by force of armes, which was denied vnto them by the lawes and statutes of the Commonweale. And ioining themselues with the Popular sort, as nee∣rest to their order, were for the most part superiours and maisters in the creation and election of the publicke offices, whereto they aduanced their partakers, and thrust out the Noblemen, many of whom to attaine thereunto, put themselues in the rancke of the Popular sort, changing the armes and titles of their families. By meanes whereof, the citie was deuided into Neri, and Bianchi, and into Guelphes, and Gibelines. There was a congregation called the Parliament, that was held by all the Citizens in the mar∣ket place before the Townehouse, where euery man consulted of those matters that [ D] the cheefe Magistrate propounded. In this Parliament there was established a kinde of gouernment, that vnder the name of popular gouernement, tended more to the power of a few persons, then of all men in generall. And though there came not anie great number of Citizens to the same, yet the aduise and counsell that enclined to a forme of gouernment not so large and Popular; had taken effect, had it not beene for Frier Ierome Sauonarola, a Iacobite, who hauing gottē the name & authority of a Prophet, openly detested and found fault with that forme of deliberating in the parliament; and affirmed that it was the will of God that there should be ordained a gouernement alto∣gethes Popular, so as it should not rest in the power of a few Citizens to change the li∣bertie [ E] and safetie of others. Therefore when the matter had been often debated, it was at last determined, that a counsell should be created of all the Citizens, whereinto the scumme of the people should not be receiued, but onely they that by the ancient lawes of the City, might be admitted to the gouernment. In which counsell nothing should bee treated off or disposed, sauing the election of all the Magistrates for the City, and the possessions and reuenues, and the confirmation and prouision of money, and all lawes aforetime ordained by the Magistrates, and other straighter counsels. Nowe, as consultation was had one day about the forme of the said gouernement betweene the cheefe Magistrates and persons of greatest reputation, two contrary Orations were [ F] made, the one by Paule Anthony Soderin, who spake for the Democratie; the other by Guy Anthonie Vespucci, who vpheld the Oligarchie: which because they are most fit for the vnderstanding of the present matter, shall bee here set downe. Therefore Paule Anthonie Soderin began in this maner: Although the Popular state be lesse esteemed then that wherein all matters bee referred to one alone, or gouerned according to the aduise of vpright and honest men, yet notwithstanding for that the desire of libertie is an auncient thing, and welneere naturall in this City, and for that the condition of our

Citizens is proportioned to equalitie, which is a verie necessary foundation of popular [ G] gouernments, I could easily shew, that without any manner of doubt, we ought to pre∣ferre it before al others, were it not that such kind of disputation should be superfluous, forasmuch as in all the latter assemblies it hath alwaies ben determined by general con∣sent that the Citie should be gouerned in the name, and by the authority of the people. But hence came the diuersitie of opinions, that some in the matters ordained by the parliament haue voluntarily condiscended to that forme of Commonweale, whereby this Citie was gouerned, before the libertie of the same was oppressed by the house of Medici. And others (of whose number I confesse my selfe to bee one) by reason they iudge that kind of gouernment thus ordained to containe in many matters, rather the [ H] name then the effect of a Popular gouernment, and are afeard by knowing the acci∣dents which haue often growne of such kinds of gouernement, doe desire a perfecter forme, whereby the concord and safetie of the Citizens may be preserued: a thing that cannot be hoped for in this Citie by anie reason or experience of the time past, except it be vnder a gouernment, wholly depending on the peoples authority, so that it be wel and duly ordained and ruled, which cheefely is grounded on two foundations: The first whereof is, that all the Magistracies and Offices as well in the Citie, as in all the territo∣rie, be giuen for a certaine time, by an vniuersal counsell of all them that by our lawes may be gouernours: without the allowance of which counsell, it shall not be lawfull to [ I] make new lawes. By meanes hereof, when it shall not rest in the power of priuate Citi∣zens, nor of any particular conspiracie or confederacie to distribute the dignities and authorities, no man shall bee barred from the same for another mans fancie, but they shall be distributed according to mens vertues and deserts: & therfore euery man must endeuour to prepare his way to honour with vertues and good manners, by aiding the publicke state, and all men priuately. It shall then be necessary for euery man to abstaine from vice, from hurting other men, and finally from all things that be hatefull in a well ordered citie. Neither shall it lie in the power of one or a few, to bring in any other go∣uernment, by new lawes, or by the authoritie of a Magistrate, when as this gouernment [ K] cannot be altered without the consent of an vniuersall counsel. The second foundation is, that consultations and determinations touching matters of importance, namely, those that concerne peace and warres, the examining of newe lawes, and generally all things necessarie for the gouernment of such a Citie and dominion as this is, be orde∣red and directed by Magistrates, especially authorised to that charge and office, and by a priu••er counsell of wise and experienced Citizens that shall be appointed by the coū∣sell of the people, because euery man is not fit for the hearing and determining of those matters, but they that are capable of the same ought to haue the gouerning thereof; and sith they often require diligence or secrecie, they may not be consulted of, nor determi∣ned [ L] with the multitude•• For it is not necessary for the preseruation of libertie, that such matters should be treated of in a verie great companie, it being sufficient for the assu∣ring of the Cities libertie, that the distributing of the Magistracies, and the determi∣ning of newe lawes depend on vniuersal consent. When these matters be prouided for, the gouernment which is perfectly Popular, remaineth ordained; the libertie of the ci∣tie founded, and a commendable and durable forme of Commonweale confirmed. Di∣uerse other matters to the bettering of this gouernment (whereof wee speake) shall bee reserued for a fitter time, because at this beginning we will not trouble the minds of mē who are suspitious and doubtfull, through remembrance of the Tyrannie past, who be∣cause [ M] they are not acquainted with the ordering of free gouernments, cannot perfectly perceiue what is necessarie to be ordained for the preseruation of libertie: which mat∣ters because they are not of so great importance, may without danger be referred till a a fitter time and better occasion. Our Citizens will daily grow more in liking with this forme of gouernment, and when through practise they are become more capable, they wil be desirous continually to amend, and bring it to full perfection which in the mean

[ A] time shalbe vpheld by the ij. foundations before mentioned, which are easie to be ordai∣ned, by shewing the fruits that wil come therof, not only by reasons, but also by exāples. For though the gouernment of the Venetians belong to the gentlemē, yet are they but priuat citizens, in such number, & of so diuerse degrees, that it cannot be denied, but it contains a great part of the Popular gouernment, & cannot be imitated in many things. Notwithstanding, it is cheefly laid on these ij. foundations, on the which the same Com∣monweale leaning & staying, hath by the space of so many ages, maintained her liberty with vnity and ciuile concord, and is mounted to such glory & high estate. This vnity of the Venetians hath not proceeded frō the scituation of their city (as many men suppose) [ B] because there may be; & haue ben sometimes discords amongst thē; but rather frō a form of gouernment, so wel ordained and proportioned to it selfe, that of necessitie it yeelds so excellent and wonderful effects. For we must consider to the contrary, that by reason our Citie had neuer a like forme of gouernment, therefore our affaires haue euermore been subiect to ordinarie alterations, being one while as it were oppressed by the vio∣lence of Tyrans, another while rent asunder through the ambitious and couetous dis∣cord of certaine persons, and as quickly broken in peeces through the vnbridled licen∣tiousnesse of the Comminaltie: and whereas Cities were builded for the tranquilitie and happie life of the inhabitants; the confiscations of our lands and goods, the banish∣ments [ C] and beheadings of our vnhappie Citizens, haue beene the hap and tranquilitie that we haue had. The gouernment brought in by the Parliament, doth not differ from those kinds of gouernment, which at other times haue ben in this Citie, that haue ben full of discords and calamities, and after endlesse broiles both publicke and priuat, haue at last engendred Tyrannies. For the Duke of Athens in the time of our ancestors, op∣pressed not the libertie for any other occasion, nor Cosmus de Medici in the times fol∣lowing, whereat we need not to meruel. For whē the bestowing of the Magistracies, & the determining of laws need not the cōmon consent, but depend on the will of the les∣••er number, then the citizens being intentiue & careful, not of the common welfare, but [ D] of their priuat desires & purposes, do follow particular factions & conspiracies: where∣unto the diuisions of al cities are ioined, being the most certain pestilence & death of al cōmonweales & empires: how much more thē standeth it with wisdome, to shun these formes of gouernment, which both by reasons and others examples, we may know to be pernicious & dangerous; & to take those forms that be behoofeful & happy? For this speech wil I freely vtter, that the gouernment alwaies ordained in our city in such sort, that a few Citizens therein haue vnmeasurable authority, is a gouernment of a few Ty∣rans, who are so much the more dangerous then one Tyran alone, as the euil is so much the worse, by how much the more it is cōmitted & multiplied. And though there were [ E] no other inconuenience in it, yet at least, by reason of the diuersity of opinions, of ambi∣tion, & variable desires of mē, no long agreement could therein be hoped for. And dis∣cord, which at al times is most dangerous, should at this time be more perillous, wherin you haue sent so mighty a lord into exile, wherein you are depriued of a good part of your state, & wherin Italy hauing strange armies within her bowels, is fully laid open to most great dangers. Very sildome, yea it may be neuer, hath it laine absolutely in the po∣wer of the whole city to take order for it self, according to hir own good pleasure: Now therfore sith the benignity and goodnesse of God hath deliuered that power into your hands, lose not you the oportunity of founding a free gouernement, and so well ordai∣ned, [ F] that not only during your own liues, it may make you happy, but also that you may promise the euerlasting continuance of the same, & so leaue for an inheritance to your childrē & successors such a treasure & felicity, as neither your selues nor your ancestors euer had or knew. These were the speeches of Paule Anthonie. But to the cōtrary, Guy Anthonie Vespucci spake thus, If the gouernement established in that forme which Paule Anthonie Soderin hath propounded, would so easily bring forth the desir••d fruits, as they are rehearsed, doubtlesse hee should haue a wonderfull euill tast, that in

our countrey would wish for any other gouernment: and he should be a very bad Citi∣zen, [ G] that would not be greatly in loue with a forme of Commonweale, wherein mens vertues, deserts, and valour, should aboue all other things bee respected and honoured. Howbeit, I see not how wee may hope that a gouernement resting wholly in the peo∣ples power, should be fraught with so manie commodities. For this knowe I well, that reason teacheth, experience proueth, and the authoritie of great men confirmeth, that in so great a multitude, there is not such wisedome, such experience, nor such order to be found, as that the wise should be preferred before the ignorant; the good before the bad; and men of experience before them that neuer had the gouernement of anie af∣faires: For as vpright iudgements cannot bee hoped for at the hands of an vnfit and ig∣norant [ H] iudge, euen so should there not any wise or reasonable election or determina∣tion be hoped for at the hands of a people that is full of disorder and ignorance. And, what wise men can scantly descerne, which spend their time about nothing else; shall wee beleeue that a multitude being rude, ignorant, consisting of so great diuersities of minds, conditions, and manners, and wholly regarding that which concerneth it selfe particularly, can distinguish and perceiue it? I omit to speake of the immoderate per∣suasion that euerie one will haue of himselfe, which will cause in all men a greedie de∣sire of honour. Neither will it suffice men in a popular gouernement to enioy the ho∣nest fruits of libertie, but they will all aspire to the principall degrees, and haue place in [ I] deliberations of most important and hard matters. For the modestie of giuing place to the skilfullest and best deseruing persons reigneth lesse in this Citie then in any other. And so entring into this persuasion that of right we ought all to be equall in all things, the rowmes of vertue and valour, being in the power of the multitude, shall bee con∣founded. And this greedie desire extending to the most part, will bee an occasion, that they who knowe least, or least deserue it, shall bee able to doe most; for by reason they are the greatest number, they wil haue the most power in the state where opinions shal be accounted, and not weighed. This being considered, what warrant or assurance can you haue, that they holding themselues content with such a forme, which you would [ K] haue now ordained, will not straightway fall to the troubling of that state of the Com∣monweale, which hath beene wisely brought in; by new inuentions, and imprudent lawes, which wise men shall not be able to withstand? Which things being at all times dangerous in such a kind of Commonweale, are more to be feared at this present, sith the nature of men is such, that when they passe from one extremitie, wherein they haue been forcibly kept, they leape wilfully into another, without staying in a meane. So hee that commeth out of Tyrannie, vnlesse he be held backe, falleth headlong into all man∣ner of excessiue licentiousnesse, which may also iustly be called Tyrannie. For the peo∣ple are like vnto a Tyran, when they giue to him that deserueth not, take from him that [ L] deserueth, and confound the degrees and differences of persons. And it may bee, that the Tyrannie thereof is more hurtful, then the ignorance daungerous; forasmuch as it hath neither weight, measure, nor law, but disordered naughtinesse. Neither ought the example of the Venetians to moue vs: For the scituation of their Citie worketh some∣what in their behalfe, the forme of gouernment receiued there a great while since, may doe much; & matters there are so ordained, that deliberations of importance, are more in the hands of a few then of manie; and their wits peraduenture being not naturally so fine and subtile as ours, they are more easily contented. And yet the Venetian gouerne∣ment standeth not onely vpon those two foundations that haue beene alledged, but it [ M] greatly auaileth to the perfection and stabilitie thereof, that there is euermore a Duke, together with diuerse other ordinances; which whosoeuer intended to bring into this Commonweale, should find many gainsayers, by reason our Citie dooth not at this in∣stant, take her being nor her institution and establishment with lawes. And therefore old customes, oft contrary to the common welfare, and men suspecting that vnder co∣lour of the preseruation of libertie, a new Tyranny would be raised, do not giue place

[ A] to wholesome counsels, euen as in a body full of euill humours, medicines serue not to so good purpose as they doe in a body that is purged. For these reasons, and for as much as worldly matters commonly waxe worse and worse, it is more to bee feared, that whatsoeuer shall at this beginning bee vnperfectly ordained, will in time grow to vtter disorder, then to be hoped, that with time or oportunity it should be brought to perfection. But what need we seeke for examples abroad, sith we haue sufficient at home? When did the people euer absolutely gouerne this City, but it was full of discord•• or rent asunder, and at last the Estate sodainely changed? And if we will seeke for examples in other places, why remember wee not that the go∣uernment [ B] in all respects Popular, was the occasion of so many tumults in Rome, in∣somuch, that had it not been for martiall skill and diligence, the life of the same Commonweale had been short? Why call not we to remembrance, that Athens a most flourishing and most mighty City, lost her Empire, and then fell into the bondage of her owne Citizens and of strangers, for no other cause, but for that the greatest affaires there were ordained by the consultation and determination of the Communaltie? I see not vpon what occasion it may bee affirmed, that in the forme which the Parliament hath inuented, there is not perfect libertie to bee found; sith euerie matter is referred to the disposition of the Magistrates, who [ C] remaine not in Office continuallie, but are chaunged; neither are they chosen by a fewe, but allowed and confirmed by a great mainie; neither by the olde cu∣stome of the Cittie ought they to bee put againe to lotting: Howe then can they bee distributed by practises, or according to the fantasies of particular Cit∣tizens? Wee shall haue a farre greater warrant of our safetie, when the most weightie affaires shall bee vnder the examination and direction of the wisest men, and of them that bee of best experience, and the grauest, who will gouerne the same after another order, with another manner of secresie, and with ano∣ther fashion of iudgement then the people would doe; who are vnfit for such [ D] matters, and sometimes are verie liberall in spending, when no neede requi∣reth, and other whiles in time of neede so sparing and niggardlie, that of∣tentimes for the sauing of a small charge, they fall afterwards into verie great expences and daungers. Nowe euen as Paule Anthonie Soderin hath affirmed, most great and most important is the weakenesse of Italie, and speciallie of our owne Countrey. Therefore what want of wisedome should it bee, in such a time as the skilfullest and best experienced Phisitions are needefull, to commit our selues into the hands of them that haue least skill and experience? Finally, it is to bee considered, that you shall mainetaine your people in greater tran∣quilitie, [ E] and shall more ea••ilie direct them to such deliberations as are behoofe∣full and conuenient for themselues and the welfare of euerie man, by commit∣ting into their hands a moderate part and authoritie in the Commonweale. For if you referre all matters to their arbitrement, it is greatly to bee feared, that they will become ouerlustie, and whollie disagreeing from the counsels of your wise and well affectioned Cittizens.

Nowe, as concerning the house of Medici, mentioned in these former Ora∣tions, it obtained at Florence (vnder the name and shewe of a Gouenement, well neere Cittie-like) verie great power and authoritie for the space of three∣score [ F] yeares together, beginning at the sayed Cosmus de Medici, a Cittizen of singular wisedome, and wonderfull richesse, and for those respects hee was greatlie renowmed, and was had in great reputation in all parts of Eu∣rope. Peter succeeeded Cosmus, and after Peter succeeded Lawrence, a man of great wit and excellent counsell, no lesse noble and valiant then his grandfa∣ther, howbeit, vsing more absolute authoritie in the gouernment of the Common∣weale, yet gently and friendly, and such as was needfull in a towne of liberty, as Philip

de Comines sayth, He tooke twentie men for the guard of his person, by the comman∣dement [ G] and license of the Senate, which commanded what he listed. Notwithstanding, he gouerned moderately in this high authority, and was one of the wisest men of his time, and in great reputation through all Italie, and with many forraine Princes. But the other Peter his yong and vnwise sonne supposing the same authority to be due vnto him of right, vndertooke to gouerne like a lord, making himselfe fearfull to other men by meanes of that guard, by committing many violences, frayes, and lauishly spending the common treasure: Whereby hee fell into the hatred of the Citizens, and was bani∣shed by the Senate, with Iohn the Cardinall, and Iulian, his brethren. And when hee had fled and abandoned that high estate, the people in a tumult put themselues in ar∣mour, [ H] and spoiled all the moueables of his house, which were worth aboue a hundred thousand crownes. This befell in the time of king Charles the eight his passage, when he went to Naples. Afterwards, when this Cardinall Iohn was chosen Pope, and called Leo the tenth, he caused the proclamation and sentence of banishment to be repealed, and restored the house of Medici to the former highnesse, authority, and reputation. Howbeit, the Florentines recouering their libertie, set vp the Popular gouernement againe, and after the taking of Rome, and the captiuity of Pope Clement, defaced and pulled down in all places of the Citie the armes of the house of Medici, specially those that were fixed on the publicke buildings which they had erected, brake downe the [ I] Images of Leo and Clement that stond in the temple of the Annuntiation, made sale of the Popes goods, and employed them in paying the debts of the Commonweale. By which doings they so angred the Pope, that hee stirred vp the forces of the Emperour Charles against them, and after a long siege subdued them, and made them yeelde to such conditions as liked himselfe: obtaining not onely the returne of the Medici, but also causing the Commonweale to bee chaunged into a Dukedome, and that to bee for euer possessed by them. The first Duke was Alexander the Popes nephew, and the Em∣perours sonne in lawe, who was slaine by Lawrence his owne neere kinsman. In whose place succeeded Cosmus, who for a long time gouerned this estate, ioining Sienna to [ K] it, and after yeelded it vp to his eldest sonne, for the better setling of him therein before his owne death: as is reported by Guichardine in his first, second, third, sixteenth, nine∣teenth, and twentieth books, Paulus Iouius in his first, fiue & twentieth, seuen & twen∣tieth, eight and twentieth, nine and twentieth, and eight and thirtieth books. Machiauel in his second book of the hystorie of Florence. Iohn Michel Brut in his first book of the same history, written in Latine: & Philip de Comines in king Charles the eight his voi∣age to Naples the ninth and thirteenth chapters. The City of Genoa being builded in a place fit to gouern & command vpon the sea, if great oportunity were not hindered by the pestiferous poyson of ciuile discord, is not like other Cities of Italie, subiect to one [ L] diuision alone, but diuided into many parts; for the remnants of the old contentions of the Guelphes and Gibelines are there still; and there raigneth the disagreement be∣tweene the Gentlemen and the people, whereby many Cities haue beene destroyed in Italie, and specially in Tuscane: For the people because they would not indure the pride of the Nobilitie, restrained their power with many most seuere and rigorous lawes; and amongst others, suffering them in some respect to participate of all other Magistracies and honours, they barred them specially from the dignitie of Duke; which soueraigne Magistracie is giuen for tearme of life, though by reason of the inconstancie of the same City, there be but a few men that haue enioyed so high [ M] honour vntill their deaths. But the diuision betweene the Adorni and the Fre∣gosi, is as great: Who being come from lowe degree to great authoritie, doe striue together for the dignitie of Duke, which for the space of manie yeares hath continued alwaies in the one or the other of these families. For the Gen∣tlemen of the Guelphes and Gibellines, because they were barred from it by Lawe, would willingly haue procured it to fall into the handes of such of the

[ A] people as were of their faction. And the Gibellines fauouring the Adorni, and the Guelphes the Fregos••, these two families in processe of time are become more no∣ble and mightie then those houses whose name and authoritie they followed before. Sometimes these diuisions are confounded, so as often they that are of one selfsame side against the contrary side, are also amongst their owne selues diuided into diuerse sides; and contrariwise, marched togither in one side with thē that follow another side. F. Gui∣chardine in his 7. and 10. bookes, rehearseth a new kind of gouernment, brought vp at Genoa vnder the name of libertie, the summe whereof was thus, That by a counsell of foure hundred Citizens all the Magistracies and dignities of their Cittie, and cheefely [ B] the Duke and the soueraigne Magistrate should bee created for the space of two yeares: and the law abrogated, whereby the Gentlemen were afore barred from them. And for∣asmuch as it was a most expedient foundation for the preseruation of libertie, that re∣medy should be prouided for the appeasing of the Citizens dissensions, which had ben for a long space greater and more dangerous there then in any other City of Italie, the names of all the families were put downe, and only eight and twenty of the same Citie kept still, and the most famous and most notable families retained they, sauing those of the Adorni and Fregosi, which were fully extinguished, vnder the name and number of which families, they assembled all these gentlemen, and the people remained namelesse. [ C] And the more to confound the memory of the factions, they put the families of the Gentlemen with the families of the people, and those of the people with the families of the Gentlemen, and those houses which had ben partakers with the Adoni, into the houses which had followed the Fregosi, and so contrariwise, some of the Fregosi into the houses that had followed the Adorni. And a law was made, that there should bee no difference betweene them, that might bee a greater impediment to the one then to the other for the attainement of the honours and Magistracies: by which mingling of men and names together, their hope was, that in short time the pestiferous remembrance of factions, would bee cleerely extinguished. Paulus Io••ius hath like speeches of the go∣uernment [ D] of Genoa in his sixe and ••ventieth booke. Sienna for a long time hath beene the cheefe and mightiest city of Tuscane, next after the city of Florence, & was gouer∣ned by it self, howbeit in such sort, as it rather knew the name than the effects of liberty: For that it being drawne and diuided into many factions or members of Citizens, that amongst themselues were called states or orders, obeied that side which as time fel out, and through the fauor of strange potentates, was stronger then the rest; as F. Guicchiar∣dine reporteth in his first booke. But the Commonweale of Venice, which is Aristocra∣ticall, cheefely in respect of the Senat and the colledge of the sages, hath the parts ther∣of so wel tempered together and proportioned (as wee haue touched in many places of [ E] this worke) that it hath ben very long preserued at home from sedition and alterations, at least from such as haue beene of anie great importance: and abroad hath defended it selfe against the forces of many strange Princes, hauing already lasted welneere twelue hundred yeares without the violence of warres at home, and without falling into the yoke of forraine gouernement, or changing the first religion wherein it was founded. Many old Commonweales haue passed it in greatnesse of Empire, in chiualrie, and in renowne of haughtie enterprises, but there can none of them bee compared vnto it in goodnesse of gouernement and lawes, to liue well and happily; neither can any bee found that hath so long reigned. And in truth wee may well affirme, that of states go∣uerned [ F] by communalties, it is the perfectest that hath beene euer read off, or seene. Notwithstanding, as in worldly thinges there is none so perfect, but there is some∣what in it blameworthie, so bee there some imperfections in this state, which often haue beene the cause of casting it into great toile and daunger. First of all, the Gen∣tlemen that there haue the whole dominion, hauing vtterly excluded the people from the gouernment, doe diuide amongst themselues all charges and offices, or the most part of them, wherein there is either honour or profite, whereat the other Citizens,

(amongst the which there is a great number of wise, rich, and courageous men) won∣derfully [ G] repine, and conceiue great disliking, & specially for that the number of the said gentlemē is so increased in tract of time, that now it is very excessiue•• And contrariwise, in the cities and countries vnder their subiection, the noblemen & mighty men are kept verie low, by reason of the fearefulnesse that the same state hath alwaies beene in, least by getting credite and authoritie at the peoples hands, they might stirre them vp to re∣bellion and sedition. Neither haue the same cheefe Citizens anie hope of obtaining any office or benefice of importance: For there hee not halfe ynow for the Lords. Another inconuenience is there in the same Estate, and that no small one, namely, that for feare least anie amongst them should attempt to vsurpe the dominion of the state, if [ H] hee were in credite and authority with the people and souldiours, they serue not their turne with any generall or particular Captaine of their owne Nation, specially in their armies by land, but giue the charge of their armie most often to strangers: Therefore when their Captaines, and a great part of their souldiours bee strangers, they beare not that affection and zeale to the state and Commonweale, which they doe that are members thereof. And although they ioine in commission with the generals and cheef∣taines of the warre, certaine assistants whom they call Proueditors, without whome the said cheefetaines can neither execute nor determine any thing of importance, euen in those matters that concerne the warre, yet is not this a sufficient remedie: for sith those [ I] Proueditors are no warriors, they may easily commit great errors; and the Cheefetains seeing themselues subiect to such persons, and constrained to obey them in that where∣in they haue no knowledge nor vnderstanding, do verie oft conceaue great indignation thereat, and serue not with such good will and forwardnesse as they would if they had the whole authority: sometimes also they are content to see those things haue bad suc∣cesse which are done against their minds, after the pleasures and humors of the said Pro∣ueditors, as wee may finde that it hath oftentimes happened. There is also betweene the said Gentleman and Lords great partiality, namely betweene those who are descen∣ded from the ancient founders of that Citie, and those who since in processe of time [ K] haue ben created; who are now more in number then those of the ancient houses: For either of these said factions seekes to haue cheefe authority, as well in gouerning the Commonweale, as in offices, and in other honours and profites; whereby it oft happe∣neth, that in matters concerning the Estate, they doe dissent, and as it were seuerally band themselues in taking parts, regarding more their particular passions, then the pub∣licke good of the Signorie; to which passions, they are subiect as well as other men. And although that by the prudent and good gouernement of the wiser sort, there hath not ben bred as yet through occasion thereof anie sinister effect of great importance, yet by con••inuance it is to bee feared, that when the euill humours of this mysticall bo∣die, [ L] shall be too much multiplied and corrupted, the disease wil shew it selfe, being then so sharpe and dangerous, that there will hardly bee found a remedy in time. Claudius Syessell in his first booke of the Monarchie of France, the third chapter: Contarine in his first and fift bookes of the Venetian Commonweale: Iouianus Pontanus in his first booke of the Neapolitane warre, Paulus Iouius in the first booke of the Sabellian histo∣ries: and Bembus in the history of Venice: Philip de Comines in the voiage of Charles the eig•••• to Naples, chap. 21.

[ M]

CHAP. VI. Of the changes happening in Oligarchies.

[ A] OLigarchies are changed in two most plaine and euident manners: The one is, if the Gouernours doe vniustly oppresse the common people; For then the first that ••hey light on seemes sufficient and fit ynough to be their patrone and protector, es∣pecially if any of those that gouerne, do vndertake this charge, as did Lygdamus in ••he Isle of Naxus, who afterward vsurped Tyrannie ouer the Naxians. The other maner o•• changing the Oligarchie hath not his beginning from the sedition of the people, but i•• caused by the rich men, and that in many sorts. For sometimes the Oligarchie is destroied by the rich men who do not participate in the gouernment, especially when the number of those that go∣uern is very small, as it happened at Marsilia, Istrum, and Heraclea, and in other cities, where [ 1] [ B] they who were not admitted to the Magistracies, did neuer cease from mutining, vntil they had changed the forme of the Estate, and made it lawfull first that the eldest brethren, and then the yonger might be admitted to the authority of gouernment. Certes, in some places the father and the sonne, and in others, the elder and yonger brethren cannot beare office together, but that is where the Oligarchie is more ciuilly ordained. At Istrum it became in the end a Democratie. At Heraclea from a smaller number, it rose to sixe hundred: and at Gnidus the Oligarchie was changed through the dissension which grew betweene the noblemen, because few persons were ad∣mitted to the gouernment of the Commonweale: and (as it hath beene said) if the father gouer∣ned, the son was by that meanes excluded; and if there were many brethren, the eldest only was [ C] thereto admitted. So that the people rising likewise by reason of their discord, and chusing one of the Noblemen for their head and leader, assailed the rest and ouercame them, for euery factious cause is weake. And long since at Erythrae, during the Oligarchie of the Basilidae, although other∣wise they demeaned themselues well, yet the people disliking to be subiect to a few persons, changed the forme of the gouernment. Oligarchies are likewise changed of themselues through the facti∣ons of those that lead and flatter the people, and that in two sorts: The one, when there is a flatte∣rer among the Oligarchicall persons themselues, although they bee very few in number: as at A∣thens [ 2] in the time of the thirty Tyrans, Chares got himselfe power by flattering them, and Phry∣nichus after the same sort, in the time of the foure hundred. The other is, when the lords who are [ 3] [ D] of the Oligarchie doe flatter the people; as at Larissa they who were called the Cities guard, flatte∣red the people, because they were chosen by them: as also it happens in all the Oligarchies, wherein the Magistrats are not chosen by the gouernors, but are thereto aduanced for their large reuenues, or by companies, & chosen by the souldiors or the people: as it came to passe at Abidus. In like sort, where the administration of iustice is not executed by those that gouern: for then the iudges seeke to please the people, that they may thereby obtain the soueraigne authority of iudgement, and they change the cōmonweale, as it happened at Heraclea neere the sea of Pontus. They are besides chā∣ged, whē men attempt to reduce the Oligarchy to a smaller number, for seeking equality they are constrained to cal their people to their aid. The Oligarchies are also changed when they that go∣uern, [ E] haue prodigally spent their goods, by leading a voluptuous & dishonest life; because thē they do altogither seeke innouation, & that so far, that they themselues vsurpe the Tyranny, or stir vp others therunto, as Hiparinus incited Dionisius at Siracusa; & one called Cleotimus at Amphi∣polis, who brought in the Chalcidians to inhabite there, and after that they were receiued, he set thē at dissension with the rich men: And at Egina he that labored for Chares, practised to chang•• the cōmonweale by such a means. These men therfore do sometimes attempt an innouation in the cōmonweale, sometimes they rob the state, & thereby fal to discord either with their own associat•• or with those that would withstād this their thefts: as it happened at Apollonia on the sea of P••n∣tus. But whē there is no dissension, it cannot be easily destroied by it self, wherof there is an euident [ F] sign in the cōmonweale of Pharsalius, where few men cōmand ouer many, because they do honestly & quietly demeane thēselues one towards another. Likewise, such estates are destroied, when they [ 4] bring into the Oligarchy another form of Oligarchie, which thing cōmeth to passe, whē the prin∣••••pal charges & dignities are not cōmunicated to al the gouernors, although they be few in num∣ber: as hath sometimes happened at Elis, where the cōmonweal was gouerned by a few senators, & was yet brought to a smaller nūber, because they held their places during life, & were but 90 in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & because their election resēbled a Potentacy, & was like the election of the Lacedem•••• senators.

Moreouer, there are many changes made in Oligarchies, as well in time of warre, as of peace: Of [ G] warre, because they not daring to trust the people, are enforced to wage forraine souldiers; and he to whom they commit the charge and conduct of them, doth oft become a Tyran, as did Timo∣phanes at Corinth: or i•• many be ioined in this charge, they vsurpe a Potentacie: and sometimes they of the Oligarchie ••earing to fal into such danger, admit the people into a part of the gouern∣ment, b••••ause they are constrained to vse them in their warres. And changes happen in time of peace, when for the doubt and suspition that one hath of another, they commit the guard & kee∣ping of the citie to forraine souldiors, or to some captaine that is a Neuter, who doe sometimes be∣come lords of two parts, as it happened at Larissa during the rule of the Aleuadians who were of Samos; and at Abidus during the factions, whereof one was the faction of Iphiadus. Further∣more, [ H] seditions arise through the mutuall offences which the Oligarchical persons do offer among themselues, persecuting each other for causes of mariages, or sentences of iudgement: of mariages, as may appeare by the examples before alledged; and Diagoras likewise being offended about a mariage, subuerted the Eretrian Oligarchie, which was held by the Horsemen•• For causes of iudgement, as the sedition which was raised at Heraclea for a sentence giuen in iudgement; and at Thebes, by reason of adultery, where they did iustly proceed to the punishment of the crime committed, but seditiously and scandalously, as well they of Heraclea against Eurytion, as they of Thebes against Archius, whome their enmies bare so great hatred, that they caused them to bee bound by the neckes to the pillory with chaines of yron. Likewise many Oligarchies are destroied [ I] because they are too imperious, and that by some who haue part in the same gouernment, and are offended with the insolence vsed by the rest: as the Oligarchie of Gnidus, and that of Chio. There doe yet further happen changes, as well in the Comonweale so generally called, as in Oligarchies, where••he counsellors of Estates, the iudges and other officers are chosen for their reuenues: For it doth oft come to passe, that the proportion of reuenues, which is at the first ordained, to the end that few men in the Oligarchies, and men of meane substance in the Commonweale, may attaine to publicke offices, is for a time obserued; but if through the prosperitie, caused by peace or by anie other meanes the same possessions amount to a greater value, then all the Citizens become capa∣ble of al dignities, which change doth happen sometimes by little and little and secretly, & some∣times [ K] sooner. Such are the causes whereby Oligarchies are changed and trouble with seditions. Likewise, both Democraties and Oligarchies are sometimes changed not into contrary formes of Commonweales, but also into others of the same kind: as the lawfull Democraties & Oligarchies into those that vse absolute power, and they againe into those that are lawfull.

Oligarchies are troubled with seditions in two manners, the one, when the multi∣tude of poore men are at variance with the rich; the other, when the rich men agree not among themselues. And this happeneth through many occasions, whereby the said Oligarchies are changed not onely into contrarie formes of Commonweales, [ L] but also into others of the same kind, more gentle or more seuere. But when the Oli∣garchie is not troubled with dissension, it cannot be easily destroied.

[ 1] AT Marsil••a.] Strabo in his fourth booke of Cosmographie writeth thus: The Massilians being gouerned by an Aristocratie, doe surpasse all men in equity of Lawes; Their counsell consisteth of sixe hundred, who enioy this honor for tearme of life, and are called Timouchi: Of whom there are fifteene being cheefe of the Senate, who dis∣patch all common occurrence: and of these fifteene there are three Presidents, who haue the soueraigne authority of gouernment. But none is receiued into the number [ M] of the Timouchi, vnlesse he haue children, and be issued from the stocke of a Burgesse, at the least three descents: their lawes are publickely propounded after the manner of Ionia.

[ 2] As at Athens in the time of the thirtie Tyrans.] The Athenians being vanquished by the Lacedemonians, were for a time constrained to abolish the Popular Estate, and receiue the gouernment of a small number, chusing thirtie men, who should haue the

[ A] whole authoritie and iurisdiction of all matters: These thirtie Gouernors were by their general name, Reformers, but in effect plaine Tyrans. They were to ordaine a Senat, and the other officers of the Commonweale, and besides to make lawes and statutes, accor∣ding to which, the said officers should iudge and order themselues in their seueral char∣ges. And touching the lawes and statutes which they were to establish, they vsed conti∣nuall delaies, wanting thereto no colours of vaine occasions. And meane while they chose a Senate and the other officers out of their owne friends and sectaries, who had the name of Senators and Magistrates, but were in very deed ministers of these thirtie Tyrans wickednesse: yet at the beginning, they condemned in open iudgement, & put [ B] to death some of the most notable caitifes that were in the Citie, so that for that time euen the better sort liked well their gouernment. But eftsoones seeking by little and lit∣tle to doe things by force that were vniust, they sent to the Lacedemonians to demand of them a guard for the suretie of their persons, promising them to establish in Athens such a gouernment, as should tend greatly to their profite: which guard when they had obtained, they apprehended a great number of the wealthiest Citizens, such as they thought to be the fittest prey for them, whom they put al to death, and confiscated their goods, hauing falsely charged them that they had attempted and conspired some inno∣uation. But when they proceeded in this Tyrannicall manner, banishing some, and put∣ting [ C] others to death, they became so deepely hated of all men, that they were deposed and expulsed. In whose places the Athenians chose ten other men, to whō they gaue so∣ueraigne power and authority to see if they could without trouble or tumult pacifie all things: But they in stead of seeking to establish peace and concord betweene their Ci∣tizens, attempted likewise to make themselues Lords and Tyrans, as the others had done. But Pausanians King of the Lacedemonians comming to Athens with an army, made agreement betweene them that were in the citie, and the banished men that were without: And from that time forward the Athenians began to gouerne themselues af∣ter their ancient manner. Diodorus Siculus in his 14. booke, chap. 1.2, and 14. Plutarch [ D] in the life of Lisander.

IN the time of the foure hundred.] The Oligarchy of these foure hundred is already [ 3] knowne by the places alledged out of Thucidides. Plu••arch in the life of Alcibiades; speaking of the change of the gouernment at Athens, which was put into the hands of a small number of the Nobility sayth, That although they were but foure hundred, yet they would be called and accounted fiue thousand: who were ouerthrowne and expul∣sed by meanes of the aid & succour which Alcibiades and his friends ministred to those that tooke part with the people.

WHEN they bring into the Oligarchie another forme of Oligarchie.] That is, when an [ 4] [ E] Estate is gouerned by a small number of Noblemen and rich men, and two or three of them hauing secret intelligence each with other, doe purchase to themselues the chee∣fest emploiments in the Commonweale. Salust speaking of the Romane Senate, sayeth thus: Paucorum arbitrio belli domíque respublica agitabatur, penes eosdem aerarium, Prouin∣ciae, Magistratus, gloriae triumphique erant. Caesar, Pompey, & Crassus, allying themselues together, brought in another Oligarchie, sharing among themselues the Romane Em∣pire, in causing to be giuen each to other gouernements of Prouinces and charges of great armies. Which Monopoly of so great mightie Lords, caused the ruine of the Commonweale. For the force which was before diuided in two parts, did as it w•••••• [ F] equally ballance the Commonweale, (euen as a boat which is on both sides laden ali••••, so that it cannot tilt on either hand) but being afterward ioined in one bodie, and be∣comming but one, did incline or bend so mightily, that there was none able to counter∣peise it, so that in the end it turned it selfe vpside downe: as saith Plutarch in the life of Pompey, which Authour writeth also to the same effect this which followes, in the life of M. Crassus: The City of Rome being diuided into three factions, viz. of Caesar, and Pompey, & Crassus, the grauer and wiser sort held with Pompey, they that were lighter

and more forward to attempt things with desperate rashnesse, followed Caesars hopes. [ G] Crassus swumme in the middest, making his vse of both, and oft changing parts in the administration of the Commonweale, being neither a constant friend, nor a dangerous and deadly enemie, but did easily dissolue both friendship and enmitie, as hee saw it for his profit, so that very oft within small distance of time hee would praise and blame, de∣fend and accuse the same lawes and persons. Then these three personages ioining their factions together, did for a time gouerne the whole state of Rome, according to their owne wils with generall consent, which was the ouerthrow of the people and Senate. And afterward he saith, When Caesar was come from his Prouince of Gaule, so farre as Lucca, many Romanes came to see him, and amongst the rest, Pompey and Crassus, [ H] who hauing conferred with him in secret, concluded to goe throughly forward with their purpose, to the end, that they might haue in their owne hand all the power of the Romane Empire. And that for that cause Caesar should hold still the forces that he had, and that Crassus and Pompey should take other Prouinces and armies. Long before that time the Decemuiri, who had ben created and appointed at Rome for the reuiew∣ing and establishing of lawes, sought meanes like newe Tyrans to establish an Oligar∣chie by making their authoririe perpetuall, which was but for a time; so that the other Citizens were constrained to depose them by force, as writeth Titus Liuius in the third booke of his first Decade: and Osorius in his second booke, the thirteenth chapter. [ I]

CHAP. VII. Of the changes happening in Aristocraties.

[ K]

BVt seditions are raised in Aristocraties, because fewe men haue any part in publicke honors: which we haue affirmed to bee the cause of troubles in Oli∣garchies also, and indeed the Aristocratie is an Oligarchie. For in either state there are few Gouernours, howbeit not in one selfesame manner, and therefore seemeth the Aristocratie to bee all one with the Oligarchie. This necessarily happeneth where there is a m••lsitude of high minded men, that [ 1] thinke themselues equall in vertue, as they were in Lacedemon, that were called Parthenians (for of such were they begotten:) these vpon the disclosing of the enterprise which they practised a∣gainst [ L] the state, were sent to dwell at Tarentum. Or els seditions are raised when any of them that be of high calling, and not inferior in vertue, are vnworthily and spightfully handled by them [ 2] which are in more honor, as Lisander was by the kings. When some valiant man is not admitted [ 3] to office and honour, as Cynadon, who in the time of king Agesilaus, was author of the conspi∣racie against the Lacedemonians. Againe, when some are very needy, and others rich, which hap∣pe••eth cheesly by meanes of the warres, and befell at Lacedemon in the time of the wars of Mes∣sina, according to the Poet Tirteus his opinion, as appeareth in his booke intituled the Eunomie: At what time many being impouerished by meanes of the long continuance of those warres, re∣quired an equall partition of the territory. Also if any one be mighty, and haue the meanes to [ M] make himselfe more mighty, so farre, that he indeuor to rule alone; as Pausanias seemeth to haue beene at Lacedemon, who was Captaine generall in their warres against the Medes; and Han∣non at Carthage. But cheefly as well the Commonweale as the Aristocratie is destroied, when the law is not obser••ed. The gro••nd of which mischeefe lyeth in this, that the Democratie and the Oligarchie are not well mixed in the Commonweale; nor these two states in the Aristocraties with vertue, to wit, the Popular state and the rule of a few, which require a mixture with Com∣monweales,

[ A] and many of those states that are called Aristocraties, wherein the Aristocraties doe differ from those that are named Commonweales, and therefore some of them last the lesse time, and some longer. For those are called Aristo••raties which bend most to the Oligarchie, and those are named Commonweales which bend most to the multitude. Therefore such kinds of states are more safe and sure then others. For they to whom the Commonweale is imparted and communi∣cated, are the greater number and more strong; and when they enioy equality, they are the easier to be contented: but where they that abound in richesse, are of most authority in the state, they seeke for nothing else but to iniure and excell others too much. To conclude, towards which part soeuer of the two the Commonweale inclineth, it is changed, by reason either of them goe about [ B] to augment their owne side. As for example, the Commonweale is changed into a Democratie, and the Aristocratie into an Oligarchie, or into contraries, as the Aristocratie into a Democra∣tie, because the poorest sort, as men iniuried, draw the Commonweale cleane to the contrary. And Commonweales are changed into Oligarchies. For equality alone according to worthinesse, ma∣keth the state stable, when euery one enioieth that which pertaines vnto him. This my saying was verified amongst the Thurians, who at the first chose their Magistrats in respect of the greatest reuenues, and after came to a lesse stint, and had a greater number of them. And when the No∣blemen had gotten all the land into their hands, contrary to the law in that behalfe prouided (by reason the forme of gouernment was most Oligarchicall, and authorised them greatly) then the [ C] people being exercised in armes, and of experience in wars, ouermaistred the guards, and compel∣led those which held too great possessions to yeeld them vp. Further, for asmuch as all Common∣weales that are Aristocraticall do incline to the rule of a few, the Noblemen may doe more there: as at Lacedemon the wealth is in a few mens hands, and the Noblemen haue the most liberty to do what they wil, and to bestow their children in mariage, as best liketh themselues: which thing caused the destruction of the Commonweale of Locres, by the alliance und affinity which they en∣tred into with Dionisius, which could not haue befallen in a Democratie or Aristocratie, well mixed and tempered. But then is there a secret change in Popular states, when they are marred by little and little, as it happeneth in all Commonweales, as hath beene before shewed, in speaking [ D] generally of their alterations, when we said, that the neglecting of smal matters is one of the cau∣ses thereof. For when men haue first omitted some matter appertaining to the go••ernment, then they do more lightly and easily change some other thing of greater importance, vntill at last they haue lost all the order and ornament of the Commonweale: as befell in the Commonweale of the Thurians, where for asmuch as it was forbidden by law that no man sh••••ld be lieutenant general of the armie aboue the space of fiue yeares, certain yong men skilfull in the warres, and of good re∣putation amongst the souldiors of the guard, despising the gouernours, and thinking easily to ob∣taine what they pretended, vndertooke the abolishing and repealing of that law, to the end it might be lawfull for the selfesame persons to remaine continually in this charge, cheefly, for that [ E] they perceiued the people would willingly assent thereto: Whereupon the Magistrats called coun∣sellors, who being appointed to consider of this matter, were against it at the beginning, but after∣ward consented therunto, thinking that whē this law was changed, the rest of the Commonweale should not be touched: but after when they would haue resisted other alterations which were like∣wise attempted to be made, they could doe no good, but all the order of the Commonweale was changed into a Potentacie by the authors of this innouation. Moreouer, all Commonweales are dissolued sometimes of themselues, sometimes outwardly, when there is some contrary Common∣weale either neere to it, or far from it, that is of might and power; as happ••ned to the Athenian•• and Lacedemonians: For the Athenians in all places destroied the Oligarchies, and the Lacede∣monians [ F] the Democraties. Thus ha••e we almost declared from whence the changes a••d seditions of Commonweales doe spring.

Seditions neuer arise in right Aristocraties, but in those that are mixed. First, because a few men haue the gouernement there, and specially when there are others that thinke themselues nothing inferior to them in vertue. Next of all, when the vertuous men are either vnworthily and spightfully dealt with by those that are more honoured, or not

admitted to beare office and honour. Againe, when some are verie rich, and others ex∣treamely [ G] poore: also if some one excell aboue all others, and bee able to vsurpe Tyran∣ny. But cheefely, as well that which is called a Commonweale as the Aristocratie, is dissolued, when the law is broken; which disorder is bred, by reason that the Democra∣tie and Oligarchie are not well mixed in the Commonweale nor in the Aristocratie, with vertue: For which cause such kinds of states are changed, one while into Demo∣craties, another while into Oligarchies, according to the power of the factions. As for example, the Commonweale is changed into a Democratie, and the Aristocratie into an Oligarchie; or the Aristocratie into a Democratie, and the Commonweale into an Oligarchie. Also these Commonweales are marred by little and little, as the others are, [ H] by letting slippe some small mischeefe at the beginning, and after by suffering a greater mischeefe, till at last all the whole order and state bee there changed. Moreouer, euery kind of Commonweale is dissolued, either through an inward disease and mischeefe at home, or by another contrarie and mightie Commonweale, either neere to it, or farre from it.

[ 1] AS they at Lacedemon, that were called Parthenians.] When the Lacedemonians moued warres against the Messenians, because they had rauished and defiled their vir∣gines that went to their feast, they bound themselues by great oaths, neuer to depart [ I] from Messina, till they had subdued it: at the siege whereof they obstinately continued by the space of tenne yeares By meanes whereof considering, their wiues as wearie of such long widdowhead sent for them to come home, and fearing least if they continued any longer, the warres would bee more hurtf••ll to themselues then to the enemies, by reason that if their enemies lost any of their men, they had others borne in their stead; but they themselues, besides the expences and detriment of the wars, dispeopled their Citie by the barrennesse of their wiues: Therefore determined they to chuse in all the armie the young souldiours that were come after the making of these oaths, and were not bound by the same, whom they sent home to their Citie, with leaue and license to [ K] vse all their wiues indifferently according to their will, in hope that by meanes hereof they might more easily haue children, if they changed to their liking. Nowe those chil∣dren that were thus begotten and borne, were named Parthenians, to couer the spot of their mothers. And when they came to the age of thirtie yeares, perceiuing themselues vnprouided of any manner of lands, or goods, because they had no certaine fathers whom they might succeed, they made choise of one Phalantus for their Captaine (who had beene the authour of sending the yong men from the armie) and conspired against their countrey. Vpon which occasion they were banished, and after long trauell by sea, arriued by chance in Italie, and took the city of Tarentum, wherein they staied, & draue [ L] out the inhabitants thereof.

[ 2] AS Lysander was by the Kings.] Lysander was one of the greatest captaines of his time, who hauing ended the warres which the Lacedemonians long time had against the Athenians, wonne to his Countrey the principalitie and superioritie of Greece, as well by sea as by land, wherefore he was much esteemed and honoured; but afterwards seeing himselfe debased and euill intreated by king Agesilaus, hee attempted for spight to take from the two royall houses their priuiledge of the kingly estate, to the intent, to deliuer it in common to all the families of the Spartanes: and about this controuersie, had raised a great trouble in the Citie of Sparta, if hee had not died so soone as hee did. [ M] Behold how great ambitious minds that cannot hold a meane, and refraine from excee∣ding too much in the gouernment of Commonweales, are oftentimes the occasion of more mischeefe then goodnesse: as Plutarch affirmeth in the liues of Lysander and Agesilaus: and Diodorus Siculus in the fourth chapter of his foureteenth booke.

[ 3] OR when some valiant man is not admitted to beare office and honor, as Cynadon.] Ze∣nophon writeth, that this Cynadon was a mightie and hardie young man, who in the

[ A] first yeare of the raigne of Agesilaus, conspired with other Lacedemonians against the king and the cheefe of the Citie: Vpon the disclosing of which conspiracie, hee was committed to prison, and then being demanded wherfore he had enterprised such kind of wickednesse, he made no other answere, but to this end, that hee would not bee the most vnderling of the Lacedemonians. Therefore hee and his complices with their hands bound behind them, were ledde through the Citty, and whipped and put to death.

AS Pausanias in Lacedemon seemeth to haue been.] The Lacedemonians for the not [ 4] diminishing of their forces with idlenesse, and for the reuenging of the outrage and [ B] cruelties shewed vnto them by the Persians, made warre against them, inuading & spoi∣ling the countrey that bordered next to theirs, and made Pausanias generall captaine, as well of themselues, as of the other Cities of Greece. This Pausanias minding of a captaine to make himselfe a king, conspired with Xerxes to bring Greece vnder his sub∣iection, and for his reward couenanted with him to take his daughter in marriage: and to the end, that Xerxes should giue credite vnto him, hee deliuered into his hands, the prisoners that he had of his. And for the better keeping of the matter secret, he wrote vn∣to him to kil al the messengers which he should send vnto him, as soon as they had done their message. But Aristides captaine of the Athenians, who was ioined in commission [ C] with him, resisted his enterprises, and wisely disclosed his treason; and within a while af∣ter Pausanias was accused and condemned: as Iustine affirmeth in his second booke, and Thucidides in his first booke and fifteenth chapter: Plutarch in the liues of Themisto∣cles and Aristides. Diodorus Siculus in his eleuenth booke, and tenth chapter, which reasoneth in this sort concerning the matter of Pausanias: Whereas wee haue accusto∣med in all places of our hystorie to enlarge and exalt the glory of vertuous men, by commendations ioined to the end of the declaration of their doings, and contrariwise to accompanie the death of the wicked with the reproches and shames that are due vn∣to them, it is not reasonable that we should let passe the wickednesse & treason of Pau∣sanias, [ D] without condemning and blaming it: For who is it that would not wonder at his folly, sith after he had done so much good seruice to Greece, after he had wonne the battaile of Platea, and after hee had executed so many other goodly and great thinges, could not keepe his authoritie, but through too much loue and desire of the riches and delights of Persia, defamed and lost all the glory which hee had won before; for by too much pride and selfewening in his prosperity, he began to disdaine and hate the plaine manner of liuing, according to the Laconian fashion, and inclined to the f••llowing of the Persian superfluities and delights; where as himselfe was the man that least of all others ought to imitate the manners and factions of strangers, as one that knew not by [ E] hearesay, but had himselfe tried by effect, howe much more the order and manner of li∣uing vsed in his owne countrey, was better and more agreeable to vertue, then the fashi∣ons of the barbarous people; and through his owne wickednesse alone was not he on∣ly punished, as he had deserued, but also was the cause that his Citizens and Countrey∣men lost the dominion and principality of the sea.

AND Hannon of Carthage.] Iustine in his one and twentieth booke, writeth, That [ 5] Hannon Prince of Carthage, seeing how his riches did excell the power of the City, attempted to make himselfe King and Lord, and to kill all the Senatours. For the accom∣plishment whereof, he inuited them all on a solemne day to the marriage of his daugh∣ter, [ F] entending vnder colour of religion to commit this treason, to the end also that hee might the more easily bring to passe this his complotted intention and malice. There∣fore caused he preparation to bee made for the people to dine in the porches and pub∣licke places, but the Senate he inuited to his owne house, to the end, that hee might the more secretly and without witnesses cause them to eat the poisoned meates, and so kill them, and then bee maister of the Commonweale, when it should bee depriued of the gouernement. This treason being disclosed by the seruants to the Officers, was by them

auoided, but not regarded, for they feared least in reuealing the matter, there would be [ G] more danger by reason of the Princes power, then in dissembling it. And therefore fai∣ning as though they would make a law for expences, and for refraining from banquets; they made a generall statute, whereby they gaue a certaine limitation to all marriages generally, without any mention of Hannon, to the end, that it should not seeme that they meant him specially. But when he saw how he had missed of his purpose, he deter∣mined againe at a certaine day to procure them to be slaine by his souldiours; howbeit, he was againe bewrayed. Therefore fearing least he should be arrested of high treason, and arrained thereof, hee betooke himselfe to a strong Towne, with twentie thousand armed men of his familie: At which place whilest he solicited the Affricans & Mores [ H] for aid, he was apprehended and taken: And after that hee had been beaten with rods, his eie•• put out, and his armes and legs broken, to the end, he might receiue punishment in all the members of his bodie, he was put to death in the presence of all the people, and his bodie thus mangled, was hanged vpon a Gibbet. And further, all his children and others of his linage, though they were innocent in the matter, were likewise put to death, to the end, there should not any remaine of that so detestable stock, which might follow the example of so hainous an offence, or reuenge his death: as Paulus Orosus af∣firmeth in his fourth and sixt chapter.

[ 6] THE Athenians in all places destroied the Oligarchies, and the Lacedemonians the De∣mocraties.] [ I] Aristotle in the fourth booke of the Politiques the eleuenth chapter, spea∣king of these two people, sayeth thus: They that haue obtained the principality of Greece, respecting each of them the forme of their owne Commonweales, haue founded and stablished in Cities, some of them Democraties, and othersome Oligar∣chies; not regarding the welfare of the same Cities, but their owne priuate commodity. Diodorus Siculus in the seuenteenth chapter of his thirteenth booke writeth thus: These two cheefe cities striuing either of them for the principalitie of Greece, demea∣ned themselues diuersly, and vsed cleane contrary proceedings: For the Lacedemoni∣ans did alwaies accustome to deliuer the gouernement and authority of directing the [ K] affaires of the cities, which they reduced to their league, into the hands of the noblest & worship fullest of the same: And the Athenians cleane contrary, established therein a popular gouernement, and deliuered the soueraigne authority into the hands of the multitude. And in the fifteenth booke, the twelfth chapter, he sayth: But in Greece the Ci••ies we••e in trouble and broile by meanes of the alterations of the gouernement, which were the occasion that many rose vp in the same, attempting innouations, by rea∣son that in the most places there was not any manner of Magistrate that had authoritie to command; and for that the Lacedemonians supported & fauoured them that would establish a gouernment of a small number of honest men; and contrariwise, the Athe∣nians [ L] leaned to them that would maintaine the soueraine authority of the people, and establish the forme of a popular gouernment. Plutarch in the life of Lisander saith, In all the Cities tha•• Lysander passed by, if they were gouerned by the authority of the people, or that there were any other kind of gouernement, hee left in euery of them a Lacedemonian captaine or gouernour, with a counsell of tenne officers of them that before had ben in amitie and secret confederacie with him. Thus did he also as well in the Townes, which had beene alwaies in league with the Lacedemonians, as in those which lately had ben their enemies. And lower he saith: In mine opinion Theopompus the Poet was deceiued, when he compared the Lacedemonians to vinteners, saying, [ M] that they offered a tast to the Grecians of the sweet drinke of liberty, and after mingled it with vineger; for euen from the beginning, the tasting of their gouernement, and the digesting thereof by the Grecians, was very sower, by occasion that Lisander in all pla∣ces, tooke the gouernment out of the peoples hands, and deliuered it into the hands of a small number of the most violent, most audatious, and most seditious persons that were in euery City.

[ A]

CHAP. VIII. Of the perticular preseruation of states.

NOw wil we treat of the preseruation of all states in general, & of euery one perticu∣larly. First it is certaine, that if we perceiue by what meanes states are destroyed; wee shall also vnderstand those whereby they are preserued. Forasmuch as of con∣trary causes spring contrary effects, and for that perishing or destruction is contra∣ry to preseruation. Therefore in well tempered Commonweales, heed should bee ta∣ken [ B] aboue all things; that nothing be done contrary to the laws and customes, and specially that an inconuenience & mischeefe should be looked vnto at the first budding; how small soeuer it be. For the corruption that creepeth in by little & little, is no more perceiued, then small expences be, the often dibursing whereof consumeth the substance of a house. This change is not noted, by reason it commeth not altogether, for mans vnderstanding is therein deceiued, as by a sophistical and cap∣tious reason, inferring that if euery part be smal, the whole must needs be small: The which is in some respect true, yet is not so: For the whole & all are not a smal thing, but are composed of small things. Therefore the cheefe point of all consisteth in taking diligent heed of this beginning, and the next in not crediting those subtleties which are craftily and captiously inuented to deceiue the [ C] people. For why, they are sufficiently reproued and refelled of themselues by their owne workes. We haue set downe before what we call wiles and crafts of Commonweales. Againe, we are to consid•••• that some Aristocraties and Oligarchies continue, not for that they be safe and sure formes of go∣uernment, but because they that are placed in the Magistracie, demean themselues modestly ther∣in, as wel towards them that haue no authority in matters of state, as also towards the others tha•• haue authority therein: to wit, by doing no manner of iniury to them vnto whom the Common∣weale is not imparted & communicated, & by admitting the cheefe of the country vnto the pub∣lick gouernment. Also by not defrauding thē of honor that be ambitious and desirous therof, nor depriuing the multitude of profit, & by liuing popularly & courteously with their fellows. For the [ D] equality that the popular sort do seek for in the multitude, is not only iust, but also requisit to be ob∣serued amongst such as are of like estate. Therfore if there be many in the gouernment, it is expe∣dient for them to obserue many popular fashions: as to create the Magistrates for the space of sixe months, to the end, that all they that be in such sort like, may be p••rtakers of the same. Because such men amongst thē are already as it were some people. And therfore there often arise amongst them leaders & flatterers of the people, as hath ben before declared. Again, by this meane the Oligar∣chies & Aristocraties fal lesse into Potentacies, for it is not so easie a matter to enterprise any wic∣kednesse; by remaining a short time in the Magistracie, as by continuing a long space in the same: which breedeth Tirannies in Oligarchies and Democraties, for they exercise Tyranny that be of [ E] most power in each state; as the captaines of the people, and the Potentates; or els they that possesse greatest Magistracies, if they continue long in the same. Also Commonweales are preserued, not only by being farre from those things that may marre & dissolue them, but also by being neer thereto, for feare maketh men more heedy and circumspect about affaires concerning the state. Therfore they that are careful of the welfare of the commonweale, ought oftētimes to propound & fain certain fears, to the end, that the citizens should be alwaies ready to make defence, as the soul∣di••rs be in the nightwatch whē it is set, by making as great reckoning of the danger that is far off as though it were at hand. Further, great care is to be had by prouision and penalty of laws, for the withstanding of seditions between mē of great calling, and to preuent others before they fal into it. [ F] For euery man cannot discern a mischeefe whē it first buds, but only he that is very skilful in go∣uernmēt. And for the remedying of the alteration which growes in the Oligarchie & in the cō∣monweale, vpon occasion of reuenues when it happeneth, the reuenues continuing all one and the selfesame that they were before, & the m••ny being augmented, in that case it is expedient to c••••∣ferre the quantity of the common or publick reuenue, with the reuenue in times past: To wit, in ci∣ties where the examinations & surueiors of it are made from yeere to yeere in that space. And in those that are greater, from three yeeres to three yeeres, or from fiue yeeres to fiue yeeres. And if the

wealth and substance be augmented or increased beyond the first stint & value ordained, concer∣ning [ G] the attainment to the gouernment of the Commonweale, then to augment or diminish that stint according to the tenor of the law, as the wealth encreaseth or decreaseth. For in Oligarchies & Commonweales, where the contrary is vsed, the Oligarchie and the Potentacie come too much aloft; or the Commonweale is changed into a Democratie, & the Oligarchie into a Commonweal or a Democratie. It is a cōmon rule in the Democratie, Oligarchie, Monarchie, and in euery form of Commonweale, not to make any too mighty, but rather to endeuour the directing and distribu∣ting of promotions & honors, in such sort as they may be but small, and enioyed a long time by thē that are admitted and preferred vnto them; than for to order & dispose of thē, as that they should be very great, and enioied but a short time by thē that should be placed there: for men was naught [ H] & cannot all abide the prosperity of fortune: or els when they haue committed all the honors into the hands of any, that in such case, they take them not away again altogether, but by little & little. And cheefly to prouide by law, that no man so rise & grow vp, that he excell all others in power of friends, or of riches; if it befal otherwise, then to cause such personages to absent thēselues frō the ci∣ty. Also because they seek innouations in the priuat life, it is expediēt to establish a Magistrat, to haue an eie to thē that frame not thēselues to liue according to the form of the state; as in the Democra∣ty, according to the Democraty; & in the Oligarchy according to the Oligarchy, & likewise of all other cōmonweals. And if any part of the city through prosperity become too insolent, or rise much, it is to be specially remedied for the same causes. The remedy herof is, to commit alwais the charges [ I] & offices into the hands of those parts that be directly contrary to that part which wexeth insolēt; I meane that the good & vpright men be opposed to the multitude; & the poor to the rich; & that there be endeuor vsed for the mingling of the poor together with the rich; or that the part that is in a mean between both, be increased & preferred. For that preuēteth the seditions which might rise by means of inequality. But there is no greater rule to be obserued in euery cōmōweal, thē to prouide by the laws, that the publick offices be not gainfull, & specially this ought to be obserued in the Oli∣garchie: for the cōmon people take it not in so euil part, that they are barred frō the gouernmēt (but rather reioice that they may spend their time about their own busines) as whē they think the Magi∣strats rob the cōmōweale, for thē cōceiue they a twofold spight that they are depriued both of honors [ K] & profit. And by this only meanes may the Democratie and Aristocratie stand, & be together by yeelding to the noblemen & to the common people what they demand: which is a thing that may be done. For the admitting of all men indifferently into the gouernment, is Democratical: And that the Noblemen should be Magistrats, is Aristocraticall: which wil befal whē the officers shall be stripped of all means to draw profit out of the same. In which case the needy will not bee hasty to haue it, because they shal get nothing by it, but wil be willinger to apply their own businesse: & the rich may better exercise the Magistracies, because they haue no need to gain by the commonweal: insomuch, that the poore wil become rich by hauing leisure to ply their work, & the noblemen shal not be subiect to the rascal people. But to the end the common treasure be not robbed, let payment [ L] be made of the mony of the cōmonweale in presence of al the citizens, & the rols or bils of account deliuered into the custody of the fraternities, companies, & tribes of the city. And to the end the Magistrats may execute their offices without gain, it is reason that honors be set down by law for thē that wel & orderly shal execute the same. Now in Democraties it is reason the rich should be spared, & their possessions and fruits not diuided & made equal with other mens, as is priuily cō∣passed in some commonweals. And it is better to forbid them the making of great & vnprofitable expences, as at open shewes, & in the lanes with torchlight and such like. So also in the Oligarchie it behoueth to haue great care of the poore, and distribute vnto them those Magistracies wherein there is some profit to be had, & where any rich man doth thē iniury to punish him more greeuou∣sly [ M] then one poor man should be for hurting another. Also that inheritances descēd not by way of gift, but by right of kindred & consanguinity: & that no mā may haue aboue one inheritance. By means hereof, the goods & possessions shal be the equaller, & many needy persons shal become rich Also it is expedient in the Democratie & Oligarchie, to giue to them that haue least preferment and part in the gouernmēt, either an equal part or the cheef parts in al other things; as in the De∣mocratie to the rich, & Oligarchie to the poore: except those offices wherein the authority of the

[ A] Commonweale consisteth, which ought to be committed to them onely, or to many of them that haue the gouernment.

Although the meanes requisite for the conseruation of states, may be vnderstood by the causes of their destructions already declared, yet for the clearer vnderstanding of the present matter a great mainie of them are set downe. And first, that nothing bee committed contrary to the lawes and customes, and that specially by remedying of in∣conueniencies at the beginning, how small soeuer they be; that credite be not giuen to the guilefulnesse and craft deuised for the deceauing of the Commonweales, whereof [ B] we haue spoken in the foureteenth chapter of the former booke; that they that be pla∣ced in the Magistracies, behaue themselues modestly, as well towards them that haue the managing of publicke affaires, as towards those that haue not, in doing no wrong to the one sort, and liuing popularly and courteously with the others; that they who haue care of the welfare of the state, be watchfull alwaies, and ready to their defence, in propounding and faining feares often, to make the Citizens the more diligent in their matters; that contentions and debates arise not amongst the great personages, and that the others be preuented before they fall out; that a law bee made that no man shall vn∣measurablie grow into honour and credit, & become very rich, or get too many friends, [ C] vpon paine of banishing them out of the countrey, that are found so to exceed; that priuate persons frame their manner of liuing, according to the forme of euery Com∣monweale whereto they are subiects, and that therefore Magistrates be ordained to looke vnto it; that no part of the City become too insolent by meanes of prosperity; that the Magistrates be not addicted to gaine, and that they draw no profite out of the offices by robbing th•• Commonweale, and that in like sort they be forbidden by law to make great and vnprofitable expences. It doth particularly auaile the Oligarchies for auoiding of alteration, happening there by the stint of reuenues, to make from time to time surueyes of their wealth, and to augment or deminish the reuenue, according to [ D] the tenor of the law, as wealth encreaseth or decreaseth. It is also behoofeful to Demo∣craties and Oligarchies, to treat them in the best sort that is possible, that enioy least part in the state, as the rich in Democraties, and the poor in Oligarchies; except in such cases as concerne the cheefe Magistracies, wherein consisteth the soueraine authority of the Commonweale, which ought to be administred only by them of the gouerne∣ment.

IT is requisite and behoofefull in the Democraties to spare the rich, and in the Oligarchie [ 1] to haue great care of the needie.] As Cicero affirmeth in the second booke of his offices. [ E] In primis autem videndum erit ei qui rempublicam administrabit, vt suum quisque teneat, ne∣que de bonis priuatorum publiè diminutio fiat. Perniciose enim Philippus in tribunatu cùm l••∣gem Agrariam ferret, quam tamen antiquari facile passus est, & in eo vehementer se modera∣tum praebuit: sed cùm in agendo multa populariter, tum illud malè. non esse in ciuitate duo mil∣lia hominum qui rem haberent. Capitalis omnino oratio est ad aequationem ••onorum pertinens: qua peste quae potest esse maior? Hanc enim ob causam maximè vt sua tenerentur Respublicae ci∣uitatésque costitutae sunt. Nam & si duce naturae congregabantur homines: tamen spe custodia rerum suarum, vrbium presidia quaerebant. Et subdit: Qui verò esse populares volunt, ob cám∣que causam aut agrariam rem tentant, vt possessores suis sedibus pellantur, a••t pecunias creditas [ F] debitoribus condonandas putant, labefactant fundamenta Reipublicae. Concordiam primùm tol∣lunt, quae esse non potest cùm alijs adimuntur, alijs condonantur pecuniae: deinde equitatem, qua tollitur omnis, si habere suum cuique non licet. Id est enim proprium (vt suprà dixi) ciuitatis at{que} vrbis, vt sit libera, & non sollicita suae rei cuinsque custodia. Ergo in primis opera danda, vt iuris & iudiciorum aequitate suum quisque teneat: & neque ten••iores propter imbecillitatem circum∣ueniantur, neque locupletibus ad sua veltenenda vel recuper anda obsit inuidia.

[ G]

CHAP. IX. Of the qualities that are to be required in the cheefe gouer∣nors of a state.

THey which are to exercise the cheefe Magistracies, ought to haue three thinges: First, a loue to the present state: next of all, great [ H] sufficiencie to execute those functions and charges that are required in the office: Thirdly, Vertue and Iustice, fit for euery Commonweale. For if the Lawe bee not all one, and the selfesame in euery Com∣monweale, it followeth that there must needes bee many differences of iustice. But there is a doubt, when all these thinges are not to bee found in one selfesame person, howe men shall proceed to the election, I meane if any one bee sufficient to guide an armie, but in other respects a bad man, and not a friend to the State; and another iust and a friend thereto; In what manner shall the election bee made? In mine opinion it is needfull to haue respect to two points, to wit, to that where∣in [ I] all men doe most participate, and are most endued withall; and to that wherein they least participate, and are least endued withall. Therefore in the choise and election of a generall captaine, wee must rather haue an eye to experience in martiall affaires, then to vertue; for there be fewer expert captaines then good and honest men. Contrariwise, in the keeping and disposing of the mony and treasure of the Commonweale, greater vertue is to bee required, then men for the most part are endued withall, although the science and skill be common to all men. Also a doubt may be mooued, if a man haue sufficiencie in him to gouerne, and beare good will to the state, what need he shall haue of vertue, if with those two things he may be able to perform as much as is expedient; or whether vertue be requisit also: because it may so fall out, that those men [ K] that be indued with these two things, may bee vicious and incontinent liuers, who though they know they offend and loue themselues, yet can they not helpe themselues by gouerning their owne affections. So may it befall, that some men may thus demeane themselues toward the Common∣weale. Generally, whatsoeuer we affirme to be enacted by law, to the benefit of Commonweals, doth preserue and vphold Commonweales. But the cheefe groundworke (as we haue already often tou∣ched) lyeth in procuring that party and side which is content with the present state, to be stronger then the other that is malecontent therewith. Besides all this, we are not to bee ignorant of those things whereof those commonweales are ignorant at this day, that haue transgressed and swarued from the meane. For many things that are supposed to be ordained for the auaile of the people, do [ L] dissolue the popular states. And diuers other things that seem apt and fit for the state and gouern∣ment of a few, do marre and destroy the same. They who suppose any such thing to be a vertue and perfection, do draw the Cōmonweale to excessiuenesse, not knowing that as a mans nose that som∣what goes out of that straight & right forme which is cheefly cōmended, so as it yeelds somewhat toward crookednesse or fatnesse, is notwithstanding faire & comely to the eie, howbeit, if any man stretch it further to excessiuenesse and too much, first he takes away the proportion and due mea∣sure of the member, & at last brings it to that passe, that it will seeme no more a nose, by reason of the excessiuenesse or want of contraries. And so fares it with other parts of the body. The very like doth come to passe in Commonweales. For the Oligarchie and Democratie may be borne withall, [ M] though they be far frō their good order: But if either of them be farther and more stretched out, first the Comonweale shall be impaired, and at last they will proceed so far, that it shal no longer be a Commonweale. Therfore the lawmaker and man fit to gouerne, must haue skill & discretion to know what popular means vphold or destroy the Democraties, & what things fit for Oligarchies do preserue the Oligarchy, sith neither of these two states can stand without rich men & the mul∣titude; for if goods should be equal, thē must the cōmonweale needs change hir form. Therfore the

[ A] destroying of the rich, or of the poore, by vnreasonable lawes, is the ruine of Commonweales. Some doe offend and stray from the right way, both in Democraties and Oligarchies; namely, the ringleaders of the people in Democraties (where the multitude is maister of the lawes) by keeping the city alwaies diuided into two sects or parts, striuing against the rich, though to the contrary they seeme euermore to speake in the behalfe of the rich: and in Oligarchies, the gentle∣men and fautors of the same, who ought euermore to shew themselues fauourers and furtherers of the peoples benefit, and to take other maner of oaths then they do at this time. For now adaies in some Oligarchies they sweare in this manner: I will bee the peoples enemie, and practise as much mischeefe against them as lyeth in my power. Yet were it conuenient that they should shewe [ B] and dissemble the contrary, and promise vpon their oaths to doe the people no wrong. The readi∣est way and greatest meanes that hath yet ben spoken off, for the vpholding and maintaining of Commonweales (which at this day is neglected in all places) is that the bringing vp & training of children and youth, bee fitted according to the Commonweales. For most behoofefull laws and decrees ratified by the consent of all the gouernours, doe no good at all, except the subiects bee accustomed and trained to frame their liues and manners, according to the pattern of the Com∣monweale: as for example, if the lawes bee popular, let them bee trained and brought vp popu∣larly; But if the lawes be fit for the Oligarchie, then let them be brought vp Oligarchically. For if there be incontinence in any one, it is also in the Citie. Now conuenient training and bringing [ C] vp according to the patterne of the Commonweale, is not to accomplish matters for the pleasing of the Gouernours in Oligarchies or Popular states, but rather such kind of things, whereby the one sort may be maintained in the Oligarchie, and the other in the Democratie. Now in Oli∣garchies the children of the Gouernours bee nicely and daintily brought vp, and poore folkes children are exercised and hardened with labour, so as they haue the more will and power to practise innouation. And in those Democraties that seeme most popular, there is no such kind of order as there ought to bee, because libertie is there not right; but euill defined and vnder∣stood. For two things there bee, whereby the Democratie seemeth to bee defined and rightly taken, to wit, by the authoritie which is in the hands of the greatest part of the people; and [ D] by libertie: For that which is iust and rightfull, seemeth to bee equall: and this seemeth to bee equall, that those thinges bee ratified which please the multitude: and liberty and equa∣litie seeme to consist in this, that euery man doe what hee list. Therefore in such Democra∣ties euerie man liueth according to his owne pleasure and desire, as Euripides sayeth: But that is starke naught. For the manner of liuing and demeaning of men according to the forme and patterne of the Commonweale, is, not to bee iudged a bondage, but a welfare and safetie. These be the meanes whereby Commonweales are changed and ouerturned, and whereby they are vpheld and maintained.

[ E] Sith it is a thing most requisite for the vpholding of states, that the soueraigne Magistracies bee in the hands of fit and sufficient persons: Therefore are the qualities hereof declared, that bee necessary for the cheefe Gouernouts of a state, which bee three. First they must loue the present state; secondly, they must haue sufficiencie, skilfulnesse, and experience in gouernement; thirdly, they must bee indued with that kind of vertue and vprightnesse which is fit for the Commonweale wherein they are. If all these things bee not to bee found in one man, that kinde of qualitie is cheefelie to bee considered in the election of the Magistrate, which most sildome is found in men. But nothing is fitter for the vpholding of a State, then the ma∣king [ F] of that side (which is content with the present State) stronger then the other side that is not content therewith. Further, discretion is to bee vsed, that there bee no excessiuenesse and vnmeasurablenesse in those meanes that vphold Common∣weales, as in the meanes that are fit for Democraties and Oligarchies. Because that by stretching them out too farre, such Commonweales are impaired, and at last ruinated, when the rich in the one are destroied, and the poore in the other driuen out. Also it is requisit for the preseruation of cōmonweales to fit the bringing vp of citizens

according to the patterne of the same. As, if the lawes be popular, that they be brought [ G] vp popularly: And if the Lawes be fit for Oligarchies, that then they be brought vp Oli∣garchically: and that the one sort may be maintained in Democraties, and the other in Oligarchies.

CHAP. X. Of the changing, marring, and ouerturning of Monarchies. [ H]

IT resteth that we discourse of the Monarchie, and consider what things may destroy and preserue it. Almost the same accidents doe gro•• in King∣domes and Tyrannies, as wee said, did chaunce in Commonweales: For the Kingly State doth imitate the Aristocratie, and the Tyranny is made of the extreamest sort of the Oligarchie, & of the Democratie, & is ther∣fore very hurtfull to the subiects, for it is compounded of two corrupt com∣monweales, retaining the transgressions and blemishes of thē both. Moreo∣uer, it will easily appeare, that the beginning of Monarchies hath proceeded of contraries, for the [ I] Kingly state was first ordained for the defence of good men against the multitude: and the King was created out of the number of good men, according to the excellency of his vertue, or vertu∣ous deeds, or of the stock from whence he came. The Tyran was created by the multitude, against the Noblemen, to the end, that they should not oppresse them, as is manifest by the euents and is∣sues of things. For almost all Tyrans haue become so, through being Captaines and leaders of the people, hauing gotten credite by forging accusations against the Nobilitie. Then one sort of Ty∣rannies hath sprung vp in this manner, the Cities being already growne great. Others, of those that hauing been Kings before, haue violated the ancient customes of the Countrey, desiring to command more absolutely. Others, of such as haue been chosen to the cheefest Cities: for in anci∣ent [ K] times the people allowed long time to Magistracies and publick charges. And others of Oli∣garchies, where they had chosen and preferred some one to great offices, for to hold them in man∣ner of soueraignety: for in all these manners they might easily vsurpe a Tyrannie, if they were but willing thereunto, because some had alreadie the power of a Kingly estate, and others the ho∣nor, as Phidon in Argos, and others which made themselues Tyrans, hauing before Kingly au∣thority; and those of Ionia and Phalaris, the honour. Panecius among the Leontines, and Cyp∣selus at Corinth, and Pisistratus at Athens, and Dionisius at Syracusa, and others in the same sort, of Captaines of the people haue become Tyrans. So the Kingly state doth resemble the Aristo∣cratie, in that it is giuen according to the persons dignity, or through his vertue, or birth, or ho∣nourable [ L] [ 1] deeds, or through all these things together, and through power. For all those that haue [ 2] well deserued, or might well deserue of Cities and Countries, haue attained to this honour; some [ 3] in defending them from bondage, as Codrus; others in setting them at libertie, as Cyrus; some for building a City, or conquering a Country, as the Kings of the Lacedemonians and Molossi∣ans. [ 4] The office of a King, is to see that the rich be no way iniuried, nor the multitude outraged. The Tyrannical State (as hath been often said) hath no respect to the publicke commodity, vnlesse it be for his owne peculiar profit: and the only end end or aime of a Tyran, is pleasure; of a king, honesty. Wherefore the desire to exceed in mony, is Tyrannicall; and to excell in honour, more [ 5] kingly. The kings guard is of Citizens, the Tyrans of strangers. That the Tyrannie hath the vi∣ces [ M] and corruptions of the Democratie and Oligarchie, it is manifest: of the Oligarchie, in that it chuseth riches for the only end whereat it aimeth; otherwise the guard and magnificence ther∣to requisite, could not be maintained: likewise, in that it doth in no sort trust the multitude, and therefore takes their weapons from them. Item, the oppression of the people, the driuing them out of the Citadell, and forcing them to disperse themselues, is common to them both, as well to the Oligarchie, as to the Tyrannie. It taketh likewise of the Democratie, the making of war against

[ A] the Nobles, the destroying of them by couert, or open meanes, and banishing them as aduersaries and enemies to that state, because they are the Authours of conspiracies: when some will seeke to rule themselues, others refuse to endure subiection. For which cause, Periander counselled Thrasibulus to loppe off the highest eares of corne; as if it were necessary alwaies to make away the cheefest Citizens.

The Philosopher, after hee hath declared the meanes whereby Commonweales are altered and destroyed, hee reasoneth likewise touching Monarchies, whereof there are two sorts, to wit, the Kingdome, and the Tyrannnie; shewing the beginning of ei∣ther [ B] of them, together with the difference of their ends, and causes which marre and destroy them: affirming them to be the very same that be in other Commonweales; the Kingdome following the steps of the Aristocratie, and Tyrannie imitating the Oligar∣chie and the Democraties. The end and scope of the king is the profit of the Common∣weale, whereunto he referreth all things. The end and scope of the Tyran is pleasure. The office of the King is to prouide, that the rich be not in any wise iniuried, nor the common people outragiously and reprochfully dealt withall. The Tyran regardeth not the Commonweale, except it be for his own priuate profite, hauing all the faults of the Oligarchie, and of the Democratie. The King excelleth in honour, the Tyran in mo∣ney. [ C] The kings guard is of Citizens, the Tyrans guard is of strangers.

FOR all they which had deserued well.] Aristotle in the third booke of the Politicks, [ 1] the tenth chapter sayth: Forasmuch as the first were benefactors of the multitude, ei∣ther by inuenting of arts, or by warres, or by gathering them into companies, or in gi∣uing them lands, they were voluntarily created Kings, and transferred the same King∣domes by succession to their posterity. As Cicero affirmeth in the second booke of his Offices. Subijciunt se homines imperio alterius & potestati pluribus de causis. Ducuntur enim aut beneuolentia, aut beneficiorum magnitudine, aut dignitatis praestantia, aut spe id sibi vtile [ D] futurum, &c.

SOME by keeping them from falling into bondage, as Codrus.] There were manie olde [ 2] quarrels and grudges betweene the Athenians and the Dorians, which the Dorians minded to end by warres. And therefore sought they to learne of their gods what the successe of the warre should be: It was answered them that they should haue the victo∣ry, so they killed not the king of the Athenians. For this cause they assembled them∣selues against them, and comming to the battaile, before and aboue all thinges they commanded their men to take heed that they slew not the King of the Athenians, cal∣led Codrus: who being aduertised of the answere giuen by the gods, and of the com∣mandement [ E] of the Dorians, clothed himselfe in base apparrell, and tooke a burthen of boughes vpon his backe, which he carried into the Dorians campe. And because there was a great throng, he of set purpose with a bill which he carried about him, stroke and hurt a souldior, who presently slue him. And after he was dead, the Dorians perceiuing it was Codrus King of the Athenians, went their waies without fighting any battaile. By which meane, and through the vertue of their king, the Athenians were deliuered from this warre: as Iustine reporteth in his second booke.

OTHERS by setting them at libertie, as Cyrus.] The Persians before his time, obey∣ed [ 3] the Medes, out of which bondage they were not onely deliuered by Cyrus, but [ F] obtained also the Empire of all Asia, transferring the Monarchie of Medea into Per∣sia, as Herodotus and Iustine affirme in the first booke, and Diodorus Siculus in his second booke. Therefore Cyrus in the eight booke of his Pedia or institution, written by Xenophon, reioyceth when he made his last will, that he left his Country in noble state, and honoured aboue all other countries in the world, whereas before it had neither fame nor renowme in Asia.

THE office of the king is to keepe the rich that they bee not in any wise iniuried, nor the [ 4]

common people outragiously or reprochfully dealt withall.] Cicero in the second booke of [ G] his Offices sayth: Mihi quidem on apud Medes solùm (vt ait Herodotus) sed apud etiam ma∣iores nostros fruende iustitia causa, videntur olim b••ne morati reges constituti. Nam cùm pre∣meretur multitud•• ab his qui maiores opes habebant, ad vnum aliquem consugiebant virtute praestantem: qui cum prohiberet iniuria tenuiores, aequitate constituenda, summos cum infimis pari iure retinebat. Ergo hoc quidem perspicuum est, eos ad imperandum deligi solitos, quorum de iustitia magna esset opinio multitudinis. Adiuncto vero hoc, vt ijdem etiam prudentes habe∣rentur, nihilerat quod homines his authoribus non posse consequi se arbitrarentur. Therefore a good king ought to preserue the Noble and rich men, and not to displease his peo∣ple; to resist the ambition of the mighty, and to represse the insolence of the common [ H] people. Besides these two Offices, the Romane Emperours had one difficultie, which lay in fitting themselues to the crueltie and couetousnesse of the men of warre, a thing of such toile and loathsomenesse, that it wrought the destruction of the most of them. For it was altogether vnpossible to satisfie both the people and the souldiours together. For the people loue quietnesse and peace, and so doth the Prince that is of a mild and modest nature: whereas contrariwise, the souldious desire a Prince that is warlike, insolent, cruell, and giuen to spoile, wherein their desire was to traine the Empe∣rours to the hinderance of the people, for the encreasing of their owne paies and pensi∣ons, and for the satisfying of their couetousnesse and cruelty: which was the cause that [ I] some Emperours hauing neither by cunning nor by nature the dexterity and skill to keepe both the one and the other in aw, did commonly continue small times their Mo∣narchies. The great Turke is brought to the like inconuenience, who by keeping al∣waies neare about him for his guard a great number of footmen, called Ianissaries, and of horsemen, must needs seeke their fauor and good will (without all respect of the peo∣ple) as Machiauel affirmeth in the nineteenth chapter of his Prince.

[ 5] AND the kings guard is of Citizens, and the Tyrans of strangers.] Aristotle in the third booke of the Politickes, the tenth chapter sayth, The Kings are guarded by the power of Citizens, the Tyrans by strangers. And the Kings gouerne according to [ K] the law, and exercise dominion ouer such as are voluntarily subiect: The Tyrans rule by constraint: insomuch, that the one sort are garded by the Citizens, the other against the Citizens.

We must therefore deeme, that the beginnings of alterations in Monarchies, are almost all one with those that happen in Commonweales, as hath been already declared: for many subiects are prouoked to conspire against the Monarchies by reason of iniustice, and for feare, and for [ 1] contempt. Iniustice is cheefly committed by occasion of reproch and iniury, and sometimes also by occasion of spoiling men of their goods. And they tend to the same ends in Tyrannies, & king∣domes, [ L] as they doe in the aforementioned Commonweales: for asmuch as Monarchs abound in [ 2] riches and honours, to which things all men aspire. Some conspiracies bee made against the per∣sons of Princes, othersome against their state. Those that are done for reproch and iniurie, are against the person. And as there be many sorts of iniuries, euery of them is cause of despight and wrath. The most of them that be incensed to wrath, doe conspire, to the end to bee auenged, and [ 3] not to excell others. As the conspiracie against the children of Pisistratus was caused through the iniury done to Harmodus his sister, and by reason that he himselfe had ben prouoked, and di∣spightfully handled: For Harmodus became their enemie for his sisters sake, and Aristogiton for Harmodus his sake. Also there grew a conspiracie against Periander the Tyran of Ambracia, [ M] for that as he sat at a banquet he had asked a yong boy that he loued, whether he were with child [ 4] by him. Pausanias slew King Philip, because he neglected the iniury that was done vnto him by Attalus. Derdas conspired against Amintas, surnamed the small, because hee boasted of the abusing of his youth. Euagoras the Cyprian conspired against Eunucus, whose sonne he slew, for the iniury which he thought he had receiue at his hands, in that he forsooke his wife, who was the said Euagoras his kinswoman. Also many rebellions haue been made against Monarchs, for

[ A] the villanous and shamefull acts that some of them haue committed against the bodies of other folke: as the rebellion of Crates against Archelas, who was alwaies greeuous and irkesome vnto him, because he had his vnlawfull company; insomuch, that this occasion, and also a lesse, sufficed him: or because he gaue not him any of his daughters in marriage, as he had promised. But when he was intangled in the warres with Sirria and Arrabia, hee married the eldest to the King of Elibee, and the youngest to the sonne of Amintas, supposing therby to haue lesse controuersie with him that was borne of Cleopatra. Notwithstanding, the ground and true cause of the hatred and turning of Crates his mind against Archelas, was for that hee tooke it in euill part that hee was procured and compelled to serue his filthy lust. Hellanocrates of Larissa conspired vpon the [ B] very like occasion: For when Archelas had abused his youth, because he restored him not into his country according to his promise. This Hellanocrates imagined that Archelas had desired & vsed his company to iniury and reproch him, and not for loue. Paron, Heraclides, and Enian, slew Cotis to bee reuenged for the iniury done to their father. And Adamas forsooke Cotis and went from him, because he had caused him to be gelded in despight & reproch, while he was a boy. Also many in anger because they had ben beaten and wounded in their bodies, haue ••laine or enterpri∣sed to kill princes and kings: as at Mitilene, Megacles conspired with his friends, slew the Penta∣lides gouernors of the towne, who in all places as they walked vp and down, vse with yron clubs to beat those that passed by them: and afterwards Smerdes slew Pentilas for that he had ben beaten [ C] by him, and drawne about by his wife. Decamnicus was the author and director of the conspira∣cie against Archelas, and the first that stirred vp the other rebels. The occasion of his anger was, for that Archelas had deliuered him to the Po••t Euripides to bee beaten, who bare a grudge, be∣cause he had vsed some speech of the stinking of his breath. And many other haue for like causes ben slaine or laid in wait for to that end.

Three things prouoke subiects to conspire against Monarchs, namely, iniustice, fear and contempt: & conspiracie is made either against the person of the Prince, or against his state. That conspiracie which proceedeth of iniury, whereof there are many sorts, is [ D] against the person of the king for reuenge of outrage, dishonor, or domage receaued. Touching the which Aristotle alledgeth many examples fetched from the manners & customes of Greece, whereto it is easie to adde an innumerable others, both ancient & moderne, wherwith we may be furnished by the licentious life of princes in their great authority. For the abusing whereof, many of them haue ben greatly despised, and either killed or shamefully driuen out of their states.

INIVSTICE is cheefly committed by occasion of reproch and iniury, and sometimes also vpon [ 1] occasion of spoiling men of their goods.] Aristotle in the chap. folowing saith, The Monarch ought to abstaine from all kinds of iniury, and specially from two sorts; the one, from [ E] beating of folke, the other from dishonouring youth by filthy lust. Therefore iniuries concerne goods, bloud, or honour. Of those that concerne blood, the threatnings are more dangerous then the execution, yea they are most dangerous, and the execution without all perill; for he that is dead, cannot thinke of reuenge, and they that be aliue, for the most part, care very little or nothing at all for it: but hee that hath been threate∣ned, and seeth himselfe of necessitie constrained to doe, or suffer, becommeth a dan∣gerous person, and one greatly to be feared by the Prince. Next to this necessity, goods and honour are the two thinges which most offend men, and whereof the Prince is to take heed, for he cannot strip a man so naked, but he shall leaue him a knife to worke re∣uenge [ F] withall, nor so much dishonour him, but he wil yet retaine a stedfast mind to seek for redresse. Now amongst those honours which are taken away, the honour of gentle∣women is of greatest weight & importance. And next to it the dispising and disdaining of a mans person.

SOME conspiracies are made against the persons of Princes, others against their state.] [ 2] Brutus and Cassius with their complices conspired against Iulius Caesar to kill him, desiring to deliuer their Countrey whereon he signorized, keeping it in thraldome.

Henry Earle of Derby conspired against his owne kinsman Richard King of England, [ G] to take the crowne from him. Richard and Edward Dukes of Yorke, against Henry the ••ixt to the same end. Pepin & Lotarius conspired against Lewys the Pitiful, their father, Emperour and King of Fraunce, to compell him to leaue and resigne the imperiall dig∣nity, and to lead the rest of his life in the solitarinesse of religion. Gaguin writeth in his fourth booke, and Paulus AEmilius in his third booke, Catiline and Hanno, of whome we haue spoken before, conspired against their countries, the one against the Romane, the other against the Carthaginian state.

[ 3] THE conspiracie against the children of Pisistratus was caused through the iniury done to Harmodus his sister.] Pisistratus the Tyran of Athens at the time of his death left three [ H] sonnes, Diocles, Hipparcus, and Hippias, against whome a conspiracie was made vpon this occasion: Diocles the eldest sonne, hauing forced a young Damosell, sister to Har∣modus, was by him slaine. Hippias minding to reuenge his brothers death, caused Har∣modus to be apprehended, and diligently to bee examined vpon the racke concerning them that were guiltie and consenting to the death of his brother, and Harmodus na∣med all the Tyrans cheefe friends, who caused them presently to be all slaine. And af∣terwards when the murtherer was asked againe whether he had any more complices in this matter, he answered, There be no more that I desire to see slaine, sauing thy selfe. By which speech he gaue him to vnderstand, that he had ouercome him and his Tyrannie, [ I] euen as he had reuenged the shame done to his sister. Whē this came to the knowledge of the Athenians, they draue Hippias out of the Citie, and sent him into exile: as Iu∣stine writeth in his second booke. Plinie declareth, that the Athenians erected Images for them. But Thucidides speaketh otherwise concerning this matter in his first booke: The Athenians (sayth he) beleeue and say commonly that Hipparcus was slaine by Har∣modus and by Aristogiton, because he was a Tyran; and consider not howe at the same time that he was slaine, Hippias that was the eldest sonne of Pisistratus, reigned in the City of Athens, whose brethren Hipparcus, and Thessalus were, and that one day Har∣modus and Aristogiron (who had vndertaken to kill them all three) imagining that the [ K] matter had ben disclosed to Hippias by some of their complices, durst not execute their enterprise against him, doubting least he were aduertised of it. But neuerthelesse they determined to doe some act worthy of memory before they were taken. So they came and found Hipparcus, who was busie in offering sacrifice at the Temple, which was called Leocorion, and there slew him. As Plato writeth in his second Dialogue of the Symposes.

[ 4] PAVSANIAS slew king Philip, because he neglected the iniury done vnto him by Atta∣lus.] Plutarch in the life of Alexander the great, declareth that murther in this manner: When Pausanias had been villainously outraged in his body by the knowledge & com∣maundement [ L] of Attalus and Cleopatra, and could not obtaine redresse nor iustice at the hands of king Philip, he turned his wrath against him, and slew him for despight. The fault of which murther was for the most part imputed to Olimpias, for shee (as the report went) prouoke and incensed this young man boiling in anger, so to doe: but there was some suspition also that touched Alexander. Iustine in his ninth book setteth downe this matter more plainely. While King Philip expected the aid of Greece, hee determined to celebrate the marriage betweene Alexander, whom hee had made king of Epyrus, and Cleopatra his daughter. So the day was appointed whereon the marri∣age should bee solemnised in great triumph, as the dignity of the two Kings required: [ M] whereat there were many playes and pastimes. And as king Philip was comming to be∣hold them being betweene the two Alexanders, the one his owne naturall sonne, and the other his sonne in law, without any of his guard about him. Pausanias a yong Gen∣tleman, whome no man suspected, espied Philip in a narrow place, and passing by, slewe him. By this meanes the day which had ben appointed for great triumph, was turned in∣to great mourning. This Pausanias had ben in his youth violently abused in his body

[ A] by Attalus, who besides the reproch & outrage he had done vnto him, committed ano∣ther thing against him that was more villainous: For hee caused him to come to a ban∣quet, and when hee was drunken, was not content to abuse his body, but exposed it to other of the gests, as a common strumpet, whereupon euery body after derided & moc∣ked him: of which reproch and outrage hee had often made complaint to king Philip, who fed him with words, and laughed him to scorne. Therefore when hee saw that hee who had committed this reproch and outrage, was honoured, and made Captaine and lieutenant to the king, he turned his anger against the king himselfe. Thus reuenged he his iniury vpon the iudge, because he could not reuenge it vpon the partie. Many were [ B] of opinion, that Olimpias (Alexanders mother) had procured him to this deed, and that Alexander was priuy to it, because he was no lesse angry and displeased that Philip had forsaken Olimpias his mother, to marry Cleopatra, then that Pausanias had ben so vile∣ly abused, and specially for that hee doubted least Philip would leaue the kingdome to the sonne which he had by Cleopatra: Diodorus Siculus in the six and twentieth chap∣ter of his sixteenth booke, declareth all the matter at large, concluding in this manner: Behold how Philip who was the greatest king of his time that was in all Europe, and who for the greatnesse of his power placed himselfe in the ranke of the twelue gods, pi∣tifully ended his daies, after he had reigned the space of foure and twenty yeares. This [ C] Prince had at the beginning of his reigne very small power, but he encreased it greatly afterwards, not so much by force of armes, as by his gentle speech and by his good be∣hauiour, and the good countenance he shewed all the world. And it is said, that himself gloried more in his martiall wisedome, and the exploits he had done through good skil to deale wisely in matters, then in those that he had executed by prowesse and force of armes. For in victories (said he) all they which fight in the battaile, haue part; but in the exploits, which I haue done by skill of handling of matters wisely, the honour is due to none but to my selfe alone.

[ D] The like happeneth through feare, which we haue reckoned as one of the causes that work the destructions of Monarchies, aswell as of other states. As Artabanus wrought a trech••rous practise against Xerxes, fearing the accusation made by his enemies concerning Darius, whome he had caused to be hanged without the commandement of Xerxes: and supposed that Xerxes would pardon him, and not remember it for the good cheare which he had made him at supper.

Conspiracie riseth vpon occasion of feare, when a man is threatened by the Prince, and will preuent it by practising to execute that first which he supposeth to be preten∣ded against him. These threatnings are very hurtfull to Princes, and the cause of more [ E] vehement conspiracies, then wrongs and offences be. Therefore they ought to refraine from threatning. For it is expedient to deale friendly with men, or to prouide sufficient security against them, and neuer to bring them into such tearmes, as to giue them occa∣sion to thinke that they must needs die, or deliuer themselues from death. The Emperor Commodus had two Captaines of Pretorian souldiers, whose names were Letus and Electus, whom he accounted two of his cheefe and most familiar friend; so had he Mar∣tia for the best beloued of his concubines: but because they often blamed him for those acts which he committed contrary to the dignity of his person, and of the Empire, hee determined their death, and wrote in a bill, Martia, Letus, Electus, & some other names [ F] of men that the next night he intended to put to death. This bill hee laid vnder the pil∣low of his bed, and when hee was gone to the hot house, a young man that was highlie in his fauour, playing about the chamber, and vpon his bed, found the bill, and as hee went out of the chamber with this paper in his hand met Martia, who took it from him and read it, and seeing the contents, sent immediately for Letus and Electus, who per∣ceiuing the danger they stood in, determined to preuent it, and without delay the night following slew Commodus. The Emperour Anthonius Caracalla warred in Mesopo∣tamia,

and had for his lieutenant Macrinus, a man more ciuile then warlike. And as it [ G] falleth out, that bad Princes stand alwaies in feare least that bee executed against them which they thinke they haue deserued, Antonius wrote to Maternianus his friend, be∣ing then at Rome, appointing him to inquire of the Astrologers, if there were any that aspired to the Empire, and to aduertise him thereof. Maternianus wrote backe vnto him that Macrinus aspired to it. This letter fell first into Macrinus hands, and perceauing that he must needs kill the Emperour, before any new letter came to him from Rome, or else be killed himselfe, hee committed the matter to Martiall a Centurion his faithfull friend (whose brother Antonius a few daies before had slaine) who executed this com∣mission. [ H]

[ 1] ARTAEANVS wrought a trecherous practise against Xerxes.] Diodorus Siculus in the 15. chapter of his eleuenth booke, setteth downe that conspiracie in this sort: Ar∣tabanus of the countrey of Hyrcan, a man in great credit with his master king Xerxes, and Captaine of his guard, enterprised to kill him, and to make himselfe King: hee ac∣quainted another with his enterprise, whose name was Mythridates, an Eunuch, who lay in the kings chamber, in whome the king put more confidence then in any other. This man was Artabanus kinsman and old friend, by reason wherof he easily consented to his treason. Therefore Artabanus comming secretly by night into the kings cham∣ber [ I] by the meanes of his Eunuch, slew him in his bed: & then went straight towards his children, who were three in number, to wit, Darius the eldest, the second Artaxerxes, and the third Histaspes, who at that time was absent from the court, for he had the go∣uernment of the countrey of the Bactrians. Nowe then after the killing of Xerxes, Ar∣tabanus went to Artaxerxes, for it was night still, and gaue him to vnderstand, that his brother Darius had slaine their father, to the intent to vsurpe the kingdome: And coun∣selled him so to deale (before his brother had got all into his possession) that through his owne slouthfulnesse and want of courage, hee were not compelled to serue, where hee might be lord, make himselfe king, and bee auenged vpon him that had slaine his father; [ K] promising him withall (if he would enterprise the matter) to giue him the guards of his fathers body. Artaxerxes beleeued it, and presently went with the guards of his father, to kill Darius his elder brother. Therefore Artabanus perceiuing his enterprise in such forwardnesse, tooke his owne children with him, telling them that nowe was a fit time to get the kingdome, and bending himselfe against Artaxerxes, stroke him with a sword: Artaxerxes feeling himselfe wounded, but not to death, quickly tooke his sword to de∣fend himselfe, and stroke Artabanus so right, that he fell dead to the ground. Thus Ar∣taxerxes being almost wonderfully saued, and hauing withall reuenged the death of his father, succeeded him in the kingdome and in the Empire of Persia. Reade Iustine also [ L] touching this matter in the beginning of his third booke.

[ 1] Other conspiracies are caused through contempt; as a certaine man seeing Sardanapalus spin amongst Gentlewomen, if it bee true that is reported thereof. And although it happened not so [ 2] to him, it may neuerthelesse happen indeed vnto some other. Dion rose against Dionisius the lat∣ter, through contempt, chee••ly because he perceiued the other Citizens bore him euill wil, and be∣cause [ 3] he was alwaies drunke. And some friends conspire against Monarchs, through con∣tempt, whom they despise for the trust that is reposed in them, as men that can execute their en∣terprise before they be disclosed. Moreouer, they that thinke they can obtaine the state, conspire [ M] in some respects through contempt: For as men that perceiue themselues of sufficient power to at∣taine their purposes, and making no account of danger, by reason of their power they easily enter∣prise: [ 4] As the generals of armies against the Monarchs. As Cyrus did against Astiages, des∣pising his life and power, because his army was corrupted, & because he himselfe wallowed in de∣lights [ 5] and pleasure. And Senthis the Thracian against Amadoceus, being Maister of his armie.

[ A] The Prince is despised when he sheweth himselfe variable, light, e••feminat, cowardly, and not well staied, from which imperfections he should more carefully keepe himselfe than from a rocke in the sea, and should so carrie himselfe; that men may acknowledge in all his actions a certaine maiestie, noblenesse of heart, grauitie and constancie; causing that in those things specially which concerne the perticular matters of his subiects, his sentence may stand for an irreuocable decree: and he should maintaine himselfe in such reputation, that men should feare to go about to deceaue him. The prince that procu∣reth such estimation of himselfe, cannot faile to be greatly feared and redoubted, and be∣ing so, hardly will any man attempt to conspire against him: neither shall he bee easily [ B] assailed of any that knoweth him to be a lord that is valiaunt, and both honoured and o∣beied by his people. It is therefore necessarie for him to cause the feare of his name in two places; the one within his owne countrie, in regard of his subiects; the other in for∣raine countries, in regard of strange Potentates, from whome hee shall defend himselfe with good munition and good friends that are his allies and confederats, who wil neuer faile him, so he vse good order and gouernment in his owne forces: and when forraigne matters go well forward, domesticall causes will remaine in good state, vnlesse some se∣crete conspiracie at home disturbe them: Wherein he cannot prouide a better remedie then by not making himselfe to be dispised and grudged at by his subiects, but conten∣ting [ C] them by honest means. For hatred and contempt, are the two chiefe causes of con∣spiracies: for the conspirator thinketh he doth greatly-gratifie the common people by the death of the lord that hath their euill will and is despised. And where he should ima∣gine to hurt him, he would scarce execute the enterpri••e, by reason of the infinite diffi∣culties which are in the directing and performance of such attempts: for ther is nothing but all kind of dreadfulnesse, iealousie, distrust, and feare of punishment, before the con∣spirators eies, to dismay and make them slacke in their purposes, wheras the Prince hath on his side, the maiestie of his crowne, the lawes, the helpe of his friends, and his Guard; whereto if the good will of the common people be added, there shall not bee found so [ D] rash and foole hardie a man that dare take such follie in hand.

As a certain man seeing Sardanapalus spin with gentlewomen.] Sardanapalus king of the [ 1] Assyrians, who was far corrupter in all kind of lewdnesse then a light woman: And al∣though his Lieutenants were not permitted to come to the sight of him, yet Arbactus his lieutenant in Media, through great ambition and means, obtained with much adoe to see him, and found him amongst a companie of his concubines, spinning of Purple, in womans apparell, lighter in countenance, in apparell, and wanton toies, than any of the rest, appointing the damsels to their tasks and worke: Whereat Arbactus was so offended, that so great a number of men wearing armour, obeied a woman which dealt [ E] about a wooll, that he disclosed what he had seene, to his fellowes the lieutenants of o∣ther Prouinces: to whome he declared how he would neuer obey such a kind of man as had rather be a woman than a man: And he did hereby so stirre them vp, that all with one accord made warres against him. When knowledge hereof came to Sardanapalus, he sought not (as a man should doe) how to defend his kingdome, but (as women doe) a place where he might hide his head. Notwithstanding within a short time after, when he perceaued himselfe driuen to it, he came foorth with a few men without order to the battel: where being immediatly ouercome, withdrew himselfe to his roial palace, wherin he caused a pile of wood to be made, then did he set himself & his riches vpon it, causing [ F] fire to be put vnder it, performing in that thing only, a mās act. After his death, Arbactus was made king in his stead, who transferred the empire of the Assyrians to the Medes: as Iustine writeth lib. 1. But Diodorus Siculus lib. 2. cap. 107. wrote thus concerning that matter: Sardanapalus the 30 king of the line of Ninus, and last king of the Assyrians, went beyond all his predecessors in slouthfulnesse and idlenesse: for besides that he was neuer seene abroad by any man liuing, hee lead an effeminate life with his concubines, wearing one while a crimosen coat, another while a coat of fine wooll, another while a

womans cloake. Hee painted his face, and all his body, according to the manner of a [ G] strumpet, shewing himselfe more lasciuious then women themselues, and counterfei∣ted his speech according to the imitation and likenesse of theirs: He desired not only to haue daily such food both in meat and drinke, as might prouoke him to lightnesse, but also gaue himselfe wholly to lust, abused one while the office of a man, another while the office of a woman, besides all honesty, without regard of kind, & without all shame. While Sardanapalus continued his manner of liuing in this dissolution and wicked∣nesse, Arbaces of Medea, a man full of great vertue, and of a good stomacke, captain of the army that was yearely sent by the Medes before the city of Nine, subuerted & whol∣ly destroied the state and kingdome of Assyria, which had so long lasted Budeus sayth, [ H] That when Sardanapalus departed out of the world, he carried away with him and as it were spoiled the earth of goods, very neere worth fifty millions of gold.

[ 2] DION rose vp against Dionisius the last, through contempt.] Dion, son of Hippias, ouer∣threw the Tyranny of Dionisius, and with lesse meanes then euer man had, that before him tooke such matters in hand, ouerthrewe the greatest and mightiest state that then was in all Europe, contrary to the opinion and hope of all the world. For who would euer haue beleeued that he that arriued in Sicilia only with two ships of burthen, could haue ouercome a lord that had at his disposing 400 vessels with oares, an 100000 foot∣mē, 10000 horsemen, with such prouision and munition of armour, corne, and money, [ I] as was needfull to furnish the maintenance of so great a power, and that besides al these things, had in his obedience one of the greatest and mightiest cities that then was in al Greece, that had so many hauens, so many goodly storehouses, so many strong castles that could not be taken by siege, and besides all that, was in league with many great and mighty confederates? but the thing that gaue Dion the victory in this enterprise, was cheefly his noble heart and valiant mind, with the loue & good wil that they bare him, whom he came to set at liberty. And that which more auailed him then all this, was the slouthfuln••sse and cowardlinesse of the Tyran, with the hate and euil wil that they bare him, whom he vniustly kept in bondage. All which causes concurring together in one [ K] selfesame time, brought those matters to effect, which otherwise were altogether incre∣dible. The history appeareth in Diodorus Siculus his sixt booke, and in Plutarch in the life of Dion. George Gemist in his first booke of the acts of the Grecians, declareth al∣so the enterprise of Dion, and what followed thereon.

[ 3] AND some friends do conspire against the Monarchs through contempt.] Cōmonly, they that conspire against Monarchs, are familiar with them, and men of great credite about them, and there bee some that are prouoked to conspire sooner, by reason of too many benefits & good turns which they haue receiued, then by occasion of too much wrong and outrage: as Perennius did against Commodus, Plautian against Seuerus, and Seian [ L] against Tyberius, who had ben aduanced to great riches by the Emperors, & to so great degree of honor, that they thought they wanted nothing to the perfection of their au∣thority & power, but the Empire, whereof not minding to misse, they conspired against their masters, whose conspiracies had all such ends, as their vnthankefulnesse deserued. Therfore the Prince that will keep himself frō conspiracie, ought more to fear thē whō he hath raised to great preferment, then them whom he hath hardly dealt withall. For these of the latter sort want cōmodities wherwith the others abound, and their wils be all alike: for the desire of reigning, is as great or greater, thē the desire of reuenge. Ther∣fore Princes ought not to giue so great authority to their friends, as that there should [ M] not remain some ods and space betweene it & their owne soueraigne dignity; and that there should not be betweene both, something to bee wished for by them: otherwise, it shalbe a strange and rare case, if it fal not out with them, as it did with those Emperors.

[ 4] As Cirus did against Asti••ges, dispising his life & authority.] Cyrus was son of Maridane, Astiages his daughter, that was married to Cambises a Persian lord. Zenophon in the first booke of the institution bringeth in Cirus a young child, flouting at the delights

[ A] and superfluities of Astyages his grandfather, the which in sum may bee referred to the saying of Aristotle-Neuerthelesse Herodotus in his •• book writeth, that the cruelty and hard dealing of Astyages, was the occasion that he lost his empire, and the Medes their libertie.

And Senthis the Thracian, against Amadoceus.] Zenophon maketh mention of their [ 4] strife, in the fourth booke of the Greeke affaires.

Some conspire for many such things together, as for the contempt which they haue of Mo∣narkes: and for the gaine which they seeke for, as Mithridates did against Ariobarzanes: & [ 1] [ B] for this cause make they inuasions, specially they that be hardie of nature and couragious, and are preferred to honour by the Monarks, in martiall offices; for manhood possessing power, wexeth audacious: and by means of each of the same, rise they against their princes, as men that may ea∣sily attaine to their purpose.

The bould and couragious of nature, being aduanced by the monarks, and preferred to the guiding of the armies, conspire against them through contempt of their persons, and for the hope they haue to get their state, or some grear Prouince depending on the same. So the last kings of the race of Clouys, being grown very slothfull, and so subiect to their pleasure, that no account was made of them, enioied no more for a certain time [ C] but the bare and only name of king, and left the whole gouernment of the kingdome to the Maiors of the Palace, and Constables: who hauing the forces in their hands, and disposing of al affairs concerning peace and and war according to their own discretion, tooke so much boldnes vpon them as to driue them away and place themselues in their steads. Charles Martel with such power kept foure kings vnder his tuition, & by means thereof gaue an entrance to Pepin his sonne to obtaine the crowne, which caused Chil∣deriks haires to be clipped (who was the last king of that race, without children & with∣out wit) and put him in a Monasterie, and after practised to procure himselfe to be cho∣sen king, as one that could well performe the dutie of a king, and to be placed instead of [ D] him that was vnfit for it, by the Nobilitie of Fraunce: who to that end were by Pope Za∣charie dispensed withall for the oath of fidelitie that they had taken to the other. And after came Stephan his successor into France, of very purpose to consecrate Pepin, and to settle Pepin in his vsurpation, vnder the cloke and authoritie of Religion: as Gaguin writeth in his 4 booke, and Paulus AEmilius in his 2 booke. Likewise Hugh Capet, a man of mightie courage, when there was none to withstand his practises and enterpri∣ses, so handled his matters with force and violence, that hee obtained the kingdome, and procured himselfe to be crowned king of France; saying he was admonished to doe so as he was asleepe, by S. Valerie and S. Richard, because hee had worshipped their bodies [ E] with great honour and reuerence, and was carefull to lay them againe in their own pla∣ces, when they had bene transported out of their graues by the Normans: To which myracle he added the lawfull succession of his linage; for he boasted that hee was issued of Odo the Angeuyn, whom the Nobilitie of France by reason of the cowardlinesse of Charles the Simple, had placed in the kingdome: as Paulus Emilius writeth in his third booke, and Gaguyn in his sixt booke.

As Mithridates conspired against Ariobarzanes.] Zenophon in the 7 booke of the ex∣pedition [ 1] of Cyrus the yonger, speaketh of one Mithridates gouernour of Lycaonia and Cappadocia.

[ F]

But in them that conspire for ambition, there is another maner of cause besides those that are before recited: for they assault not the tyrans as some doe, to the end to possesse the great profits and honours which they see in them, but determine to hazard themselues in doing some act worthy of remembrance, therby to purchase reputation and renowne: they (I say) assault not tyrans to the end to get their state, but glorie. Notwithstanding there be few that attempt to conspire for this cause; for they must be resolued to make no accoūt of their liues, so they may attaine their purpose.

And it is needful for thē to haue the like mind that Dion had, for he assaulted Dionisius the tyran [ G] with a few soldiors, saying, that he was so minded that it should suffise him in what place soeuer he came, to haue set this enterprise so farre forward, though after he had entred neuer so little into the Tyrans countrey, hee should presently die, and that this death should bee honourable vnto him.

In old time great honors were set down in Greece for them that killed the Tyrans. Therefore many were pushed forwards by this ambition, to conspire against them, to get glory and reputation: such a one was Dion amongst the Grecians, who inuaded Dionisius the younger: and Brutus amongst the Romanes, who slew Iulius Caesar, to [ H] free the Commonweale from Tyranny, and to purchase the renowme and reputation of a good Citizen. Plutarch in their liues compareth them together. Now when there are such ambitious conspiratours, which haue no care nor feare of death, so that they may effect their purposes, it is very hard for a Prince to beware of them: but the best meanes for the auoiding of such danger, is that he get the generall loue of his subiects, for when hee hath obtained that, there will not bee any man, how desperate soeuer he be that will attempt any thing against them. Nam (vt ait Cicero libro secundo Officio∣rum) rerum omnium nec aptius est quicquam ad opes tuendas, quam diligi, nec alienius, quam timeri. Praeclarè Ennius. [ I]

Quem metuunt, oderunt: Quem quisque odit, periisse expetit.

Multorum autem odijs nullas opes posse obsistere, si antea suit ignotum, nuper est cognitum. Nec verò huius Tyranni solùm, quem armis oppressa pertulit ciuitas, interitus declarat, quantū odium hominum valet ad pestem; sed reliquorum similes exitus Tyrannorum, quorum haud ferè qui••quam interitum similem effugit. Malus enim custos diuturnitatis metus: contràque beneuolèntia fidelis est vel ad perpetuitatem. Nec verò vlla vis imperij tanta est, quae pre∣mente metu possit esse diut••rna. Testis est Phalaris, cuius est praeter cateros nobilitata crude∣litas, qui non ex insidijs interijt, nec à paucis, sed in quem vniuersa Agrigentinorum multitudo [ K] impetum fecit.

The Tyranny is likewise destroyed by an exterior manner, as euery other Commonweale, to wit, if there be any contrary estate of greater power. For doubtlesse there wants no readinesse thereunto by reason of the diuersitie of gouernement; and that which all men desire, if they can, they will execute. The contrarie formes of Commonweales, are as the Democratie to the Tyrannie: in like sort, as one potter is contrary to another, according to Hesiodus: sith the last kind of Democratie is a Tyrannie. Likewise, the Kingly state and the Aristocratie, by rea∣son of the contrarietie of gouernement. Wherefore the Lacedemonians destroyed manie [ L] Tyrannies, and the Siracusans also while they were well gouerned. Sometimes the Tyran∣nie is destroyed by it selfe, when there ariseth a faction betweene those that participate there∣in, as it did long since come to passe in the Tyrannie of Gelon, it was ouerthrowne by the meanes of Thrasibulus, Gelons brother; who flattered Gelons sonne, and brought him vp in e••seminate delicatenesse, that hee himselfe might raigne: wherewith the young Princes friends being offended, gathered power and made resistance, to the end, that the Tyrannie might not be destroyed, but rather Thrasibulus: but their complices seeing this opportunitie, expulsed them all. And Dion hauing by force of armes, and with the helpe of the people expulsed Dionisius, whose kinsman he was, was slaine. [ M]

The Tyrannie is destroyed in two manners, the one outward, the other in∣ward. Outwardly, as euery other kind of Commonweale, when there is any con∣trarie Estate of greater power, as the Romane Commonweale, hauing at∣tained wonderfull great force and might, destroyed all the Kingdomes that it could, and made them small Prouinces. The Venetian Signorie extending her

[ A] dominion into the firme land of Italie, hath destroyed many petty Lords and Tyrans, at Padoa, Verona, and other places which it hath conquered. Contrariwise, the Tyranny is enemy to Commonweales, and doth euery where destroy them, if it haue power and meanes to doe so: as in ancient times the Macedonian Tyranny, destroyed the cheefe Commonweales of Greece: and that of Persia, the Popular sta••es of Ionia Demosthe∣nes in his first Oration in fauour of the Olinthians, sayeth thus: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Tyrannies are likewise destroyed by inward meanes, when the Lords of the Tyrans blood, and such as p••r∣ticipate in the Tyranny, doe band themselues each against other: as the quarrell that [ B] grew betweene Dionisius and Dion his wiues brother: and betweene Gelons kinsmen after his death. Gelon and Dionisius were both of them Tyrans at Syracusa, where their Tyrannies continued not long. Tamberlan or Themirlan the great Tiran of the Tartars established the seat of his Tyranny at Samarcand, where it presently failed through the dissension of his sons. In like sort the estate of Cyrus lasted not long in his progeny, but decaied through the enuy which Cambises bare to his brother Smerdis; and through his insolence. Neither did the estate of the Emperor Seuerus endure long, by reason by like dissension, growing betweene his sons. The Empire of Greece being possessed by the Paleologi, was brought to ruine through their mutuall discords.

[ C]

As it did long since come to passe in the Tyrannie of Gelon.] Herodotus in the seuenth [ 1] booke of his hystory sheweth how Gelon attained to the Tyranny at Siracula, which as Aristotle saith here, was destroied through the discord of his kinsmen.

Now sith there are two principal causes for which men conspire against the Tyrannical states, to wit, hatred, and contempt: it is necessary that this hatred be against the Tyrans, yet their ruins and destructions doe for the most part proceed from contempt. There is an euident signe of this in that many who haue vsurped estates, haue likewise held them during their owne liues, but almost [ D] all their successors haue presently l••st them: for by leading voluptuous liues, they grow into Con∣tempt, and minister sundry occasions for the working of their owne destructions. Likewise, anger is to be accounted a part of hatred, sith it doth in some sort cause the same effects; and it is oft of greater force then hatred, because men being angry, cannot admit nor vse reason in that per∣turbation of their minds. And men doe cheefly vpon the receiuing of iniuries, suffer themselues to be carried away by the impetuous passion of anger. By which meanes the Tyranny of Pisistra∣tus his children was destroyed, as also sundry others. But hatred do••th greater hurt: for an∣ger is with greefe, so that a man cannot easily vse reason therein: but hatred is without gree••e.

[ E]

A Prince must aboue all thinges preserue his estate, which thing doth no lesse consist in doing nothing that is vnmeet and vnseemely for him, then in doing all that doth beseeme him. But he that doth fashion himselfe to austerity or affability, more or lesse then he ought, is no longer a King or a Prince, but becommeth either a popu∣lar flatterer, or a prowd Maister, and procureth to himselfe either the contempt or hatred of his subiects: yet it seemeth that the one is an error, committed through too great bounty and humanity, the other through arrogance and fiercenesse. It is so difficult a thing for a Prince to carry himselfe well in the gouernement of a [ F] great Estate, that many haue beene as much hated or ••espised for being too gentle, or too seuere, as for being couetous, cruell, spoilers of the State, or cowards, effeminate and slothfull persons. Pertinax was created Emperour of Rome against the Souldiours wils, who hauing learned to liue licentiously vnder Commodus, could not endure the discipline and reasonable order where∣unto Pertinax would haue brought them: Who hauing by this meanes pur∣chased their hatred, and there being hereunto adioyned a certaine Contempt,

by reason of his great age, hee was slaine presently after his aduancement to the Em∣pire. [ G] Alexander was of so great bountie and clemencie, that among other praises which his eternall renowme doth giue him, the hystories record, that for the space of foureteene yeares that he had raigned, there was neuer any man put to death but by sentence and order of iudgement: Notwithstanding, because he was accounted a man of small courage, and one that suffered himselfe to bee ruled by his mother, hee fell in the end into such contempt, that his army conspired against him, and bereaued him of his life. Contrariwise, if we consider the qualities of Commodus, Seuerus, Anthonius Caraculla, and Maximinus, we shall find that they haue all ben cruell and extreame ex∣actors on the people, and that to please and satisfie their souldiors, exercised all the out∣rages, [ H] wrongs, and violences, that might possibly bee committed on their subiects: but each of them had a miserable and shamefull end, saue only the Emperour Seuerus, who was indued with such magnanimitie and prowesse, that by keeping still the loue of his souldiors, although he did greatly tyrannize ouer his subiects, yet it was easie for him to enioy an happy raigne, because his vertues made him so admirable both to his people and souldiors, that the one were astonished, and the other content and full of obedi∣ence. Antonius Caracalla his sonne was likewise very valiant, and garnished with ex∣cellent parts and vertues, which caused him to be feared of the people, & well thought of by the souldiors: For he was a warlike man, hardened to the enduring of all trauaile [ I] and paines, a despiser of delicate fare, and all other pleasures, whereby hee woon the good will and loue of the souldiors: But his insolence and cruelty were so immoderate and excessiue (for he had put to death vpon particular and priuate occasions, the grea∣test part of the Romane people, and all those of Alexandria wholly) that in the end hee was hated by all the world, & became dreadfull to his neerest and most familiar friends, and finally was slaine by a Centurion in the middest of his armie. Commodus being of a cruell and beastly nature, that he might the better exercise his greedie and extorting Tyranny against his subiects, did exceedingly fauour the souldiours, whom hee nouri∣shed and maintained in an vnbridled and immoderate libertie: on the other side not ob∣seruing [ K] the degree of his high dignitie, hee would descend into the open Theatre to fight before all the Romane people with skirmishers and sword-players, and commit∣ted sundry other base acts, and vnworthy of the imperiall Maiestie, whereby hee grewe by little and little to lose the good will of his souldiors, and so consequently being ha∣ted on the one side, and despised on the other, it is no meruell that conspiracies were wrought against him, and that they of his owne traine, and of greatest account about him, caused his death. Maximinus was a great warriour, and for that cause was chosen Emperour through the disliking which the army conceiued of the saied Alexanders peaceable gouernement, but he held not the Empire long, by reason of two foule ble∣mishes [ L] that were in him; the one because he had been of base and abiect estate, hauing kept beasts in the countrey of Thrace, which was a thing notorious to eueryone, and bred a meruellous disdaine and contempt of him; the other, because at the begin∣ning of his raigne, he deferring his returne to Rome, there to take possession of the im∣periall seat, caused men to conceiue a generall opinion of his cruelty, by reason of the rigorous in humanities which his lieutenants did by his order and commandement vse both in the City of Rome, & in sundry places of the Romane Empire: So that the world disdaining him for the basenesse of his birth, and on the other side hating him for his cruell nature, which th•• feared, first Affricke reuolted from him, then the Senate, with [ M] all the people of Rome, afterwards Italy, and lastly his owne army which lay at the siege of Aquilea. But finding the City not to be woon, and hating his fellonious nature, and withall fearing him the lesse, because they sawe him bearded on all sides by many ene∣mies, they slew him. The Emperor Nero was abominable for prodigality, whoredome, and cruelty, through which vices, he became contemptible to all the armes which rose against him, and hated by the Senate, which condemned him to haue his necke put in a

[ A] furke, as theeues were vsed, and to be whipped to death with rods: Whereof he hauing•• intelligence, fled by night out of Rome, and lamenting that none offered to rid him of his life, he said, Haue I then neither friend nor enemy? Finally, as hee slew himselfe, hee cried out that he had liued filthily, and died more vilely. The whole City of Rome did so reioice at his death, that all the people wearing such hats as slaues doe when they are made free, triumphed as being deliuerd from a cruell raigne and Tyranny. Seneca won∣dring at the dissolute and excessiue prodigality of Caligula, sayth thus, It seemeth to me that Nature brought forth this Prince, to shew what extreame vices can doe when they light on supreme and soueraigne fortune. He was so horribly depraued, and so in∣comparably [ B] vicious, that he would spend at one banquet one hundred thousand ••ester∣tians. But although he sought to further his insatiable humour with the wits and deui∣ses of all the gluttonous and prodigall persons that hee could heare of, yet could hee scarse find meanes to wa••t in the charges of one supper the tribute of three Prouinces. He caused himselfe to bee called Lord and God, hee did carnally abuse his three sisters, made his Pallace a Brothel house, prostituting therein the Romane ladies, slew cruelly many Senators and others, for which wicked acts, hee was himselfe slaine by a Tribune of the souldiours. The Emperour Galien for his dishonest life, for the thinges that hee had impudently committed, and for his disloialty, was not only despised of men, but al∣so [ C] of women: Therefore in his reigne rose vp thirty rebellious Tyrans, among whome there was a Marshall, whose name was Marius that was called Emperour, and Xenobia and Victorina reigned. Iustine in the beginning of his third booke writeth, That Xerxes King of Persia, who had ben the terror of the world, began to bee despised by his owne men after he had ben so vnfortunate in the warres of Greece, insomuch, that one of his Captaines and most familiar Chamberlains seeing his Maiesty to decline and decrease from day to day, enterprised to kill him, and by that meanes to make himselfe King. I will passe ouer Domitian, Heliogabalus, Iulian, and others innumerable in all Monar∣chies both ancient and moderne, as Heathens, Christians, and Mahometians, which [ D] for their wickednesse and cowardise, haue had miserable ends, and come all to no∣thing.

To knit vp the matter in few words, all those causes which wee haue affirmed to destroy the immoderate and last Oligarchie, and the vnreasonable and extreme kind of Democratie, may be applied to the Tyranny: for these formes of Commonweales distinct and seuered, are kinds of Tyrannies.

The latter kinds of the Oligarchie and Democratie, are a Tyranny, not of one man, [ E] but of many together; when a certaine number of the richest play the Tyrans in the Oligarchie, and the people in the Democratie: as Aristotle sayth in his fourth booke of Politickes, the sixt chapter.

The Kingdome is least of all destroyed by outward causes, and therefore lasteth longest, but is commonly ouerthrowne of it selfe in two manner of waies. The one, when the cheefe lords of the [ 1] kingdome are diuided, and at variance amongst themselues. The other, if the Kings goe about to [ 2] reigne too Tyrannically, and will accomplish most matters according to their owne plea∣sure, and contrary to the lawes. At this day there bee but few kingdomes, but are rather M••∣narchies [ F] and Tyrannies, than Kingdomes: For the Kingdome is a voluntary state or g••∣uernment, giuen by mens owne accord, and the king hath power ouer the greatest matters: And whereas there are many like vnto him, & none so excellent, a•• that he can be equall to the high∣nesse and dignity of this estate, therefore men doe not voluntarily obey the same. If any men at∣tempt [ 3] to raigne through deceit, or by violent force, this seeweth already to be Tyrannie. As fo•• [ 4] kingdomes that descend by inheritance, there is another cause of their destruction, (besides these that we haue declared) namely for that many persons indued with no vertue nor valour, but

iustly had in contempt, doe succeed in the same, and that they not hauing Tyrannicall power, but [ G] kingly honour, do liue more dissolutely, and therefore are easily destroyed. For hee is no longer a king, when his subiects will not obey him. But the Tyran exerciseth dominion also ouer them that are not voluntary subiects. Therefore the Monarchies are ouerthrowne for these causes and s••ch like.

Although of all publicke states, the kingdome lasteth best; and of kingdomes, that which passeth by inheritance is lesser subiect to sedition then that which goeth by ele∣ction, and of those kingdomes that passe by inheritance, that which goeth by successi∣on to the heire male only, not so subiect to sedition as that which may fall to the heire [ H] female, by reason it may come to a man of a straunge Nation, hauing other manners, other language, and another fashion of liuing, whereby many troubles may happen, yet notwithstanding there is no kind of kingdome, whatsoeuer it bee, that lasteth for euer. For after they be established by the vertue and prowesse of the first founders, they grow a certaine space, then remaine they in their state another space, after that begin they to decay, and at last perish two manner of wayes, as all other Commonweales do: to wit, by outward and inward meanes; but sildome outwardly, and by forraine causes when they be well gouerned, and able to defend themselues with their owne forces, against the inuasions of strangers. By this mean did the Romanes, whilest their gouern∣ment [ I] was a Commonweale, destroy many kingdomes, as Macedonia, Numidia, Mau∣ritania, Pontus, Bythinia, Cappadocia, and Suria, whereof they made prouinces. In∣wardly, and by domesticall causes, are kingdomes ouerturned, when the cheefe lords of the same, be at diuision and discord; and when the Kings seeke to raigne by violence, doing most thinges according to their owne pleasures, and contrary to the auncient lawes of the countrey. So kingdomes that passe by inheritance, are sometimes ouer∣turned by reason of Contempt and disobedience, when children or other imperfect and vicious persons vnworthy of that honour, succeed in the same.

[ K]

[ 1] WHEN the principall sorts of the kingdome are diuided, and at variance amongst them∣selues.] As of late yeares, the greatest part of the kingdome of Hungary hath been oc∣cupied by the Turke, by occasion of the diuisions that were betweene the cheefe lords of the countrey, taking part one while with one side, and otherwhiles with another side, as it came in their heads, or as present aduantage procured them. In old time the di∣uisions and discords in France betweene the houses of Orleance and Burgoigne, inter∣mixed with the Englishmen, were like to haue subuerted the kingdome, at such time a•• king Charles the sixt was fallen into a phrensie.

[ 2] IF the kings go about to raign too Tyrannically.] Aristotle in the chapter following saith, [ L] As the kingdome is destroied through becōming more Tyrannical thē it should, so the Tyranny is preserued by approching neerer to the maners and fashions of a kingdome. Therefore the more moderate the authority of kings is, the more and the better it is settled, loued, and honoured. Contrariwise, if they will gouern too absolutely, they los•• straightway the good will of their subiects, and hasten their owne decay.

[ 3] IF any attempt to reigne by deceitor by ••orce, it seemeth to be Tyrannie.] The Magician in Persia that vsurped the kingdome after the decease of Cambises, faining himselfe to be Smerdis, Cambises his brother, reigned a while by deceit; vpon the disclosing wher∣of, he was slaine by the conspiracy of the seuen Persian Lords: The Hystory is recited [ M] by Herodotus in his third booke. Christierne, King of Denmarke, who would raigne by force and rigour in Sweathland; for the cruelty which he vsed, was expulsed out of all his dominions, and after cast into prison, where he led the rest of his life: Munster in the fourth booke of his Cosmography. Therefore according to Aristotles opinion, A king is properly a personage excellent in noblenesse of blood, or in vertue, or in po∣wer, or in beauty of body, and quicknesse of wit: the third of the Politiques, the

[ A] eleuenth and twelfth chapter, and in the seuenth booke, the foureteenth chapter, that gouerneth a State alone for tearme of his life, according to the Lawes, not regar∣ding his owne perticular commodity, but the welfare of the Commonweale, as ouerseer of the same, and gouerneth voluntary subiects, being himselfe, religious, courteous, fauourable to the good, and full of industry and diligence, and dreadfull to the bad.

AS for kingdomes that descend by inheritance, there is another cause of their ruine.] [ 4] Siessell in his first booke of the French Monarchy, and the eight chapter: I presuppose (sayth he) that the greatest daunger of bringing those states that are gouerned by Mo∣narchs [ B] to confusion, and into the hands of the commons, consisteth in the chaun∣ging of the Princes, and cheefly when they goe by naturall succession from father to ••onne, or from one cousin to the next of the kindred, as the Monarchie of Fraunce vseth to doe. For it chanceth often, that to a good and valiant king succeedeth a wretch spotted with many vices and imperfections, or else a young child, whereupon ensue many disordered and wilfull things by occasion of the misgouernment of the same vi∣cious king, or of them that haue the gouernement of the king that is a child, or alto∣gether blockish; which may cause great desolation and destruction to a state, as hath beene seene by many examples in this our owne kingdome. And without all faile, [ C] when vengeance is to fall vpon the same by the decree and will of God, it shall come by these or other like meanes, ordained aforehand by the wisdome & prouidence of God, which mans reason and wit shall not be able to withstand: and it may be, that it will hap∣pen at such a time as there shall bee most likelihood of prosperity, and least doubt of change and aduersity; to the end, that men being deceaued in worldly matters, may know the frailety and instability thereof, and the power and prouidence of God; as hath been sufficiently seene to fall out in our time, and red off in many ancient Hysto∣ries. Which God grant either neuer to come to passe, or at least not while there shall be a king of this most noble and ancient race. But to speake according to mans reason, I [ D] affirme that all such remedies as can well be deuised and imagined for the withstanding of those inconueniences when they happen, are more ready and certaine in this Mo∣narchy, then in any other. For to speake of the disorder that may happen through the imperfection of the heads and Monarchs, there be many remedies that may bridle their absolute authority, if they bee depraued and wilfull. And greater meanes to restraine them that might haue the Gouernment of the Realme, if they be imperfect and weake in all respects, through want of age, or otherwise. And yet notwithstanding euermore remaineth the royall dignity and authority in his perfection, not wholly absolute, nor too much restrained, but ruled and bridled with good lawes, statutes, and customes, [ E] which be so established, that they can hardly bee broken and frustrated, though some∣times, and in some places, there doe some breach and violating of the same happen. Af∣ter he saith, there be three cheefe re••traints whereby the absolute power of the French kings is bridled, to wit, Religion, Law, and Gouernment; and declareth them in order, throughout the same third booke. Wee haue oftspoken of the same in our discourses, as occasion was offered.

CHAP. XI. [ F] Of the maintaining and vpholding of Monarchies.

TO speake generally, they are preserued by such meanes as are contrary to those that de∣stroy them: but to speake particulerly, kingdomes are maintained by reducing them to a more moderate form. For of how much the fewer things, the Princes be absolute lords,

so much the longer must euery Princely state last, by reason they be lesse violent, and in manners [ G] more equall to others, and consequently lesse enuied of their subiects. For this cause the kingdome of the Molossians lasted a great while, and so did the Kingdome of the Lacedemonians, by rea∣son the state at the beginning was diuided into two parts, and afterwards king Theopompus mo∣derated it, as well in other things, as by adding thereunto the Magistracie of the Ephori, or Tribunes. For by cutting away some part of the Kings power, hee augmented the Kingdome in continuance of time. Insomuch, that in a certaine manner, he made it not lesser, but greater, as it is reported that he answered his wife when she did chide, and demanded if it were not a great shame for him to leaue the Kingdome lesse to his children then hee had receiued it from his fa∣ther: No (sayd he) because I leaue it them in such plight, as it shall last the longer. Now, Ty∣rannies [ H] are vpholden and preserued two manner of waies, very contrary each to other: The one is deliuered from hand to hand, and obserued by many Tyrans in their gouernements. It is re∣ported, that the most part of those things which concerne this way, were inuented by Periander the Corinthian: and many like may be drawne out of the gouernment of the Persians. Therefore the meanes in old time inuented for the preseruation of Tyrannies, are these, as to abase and pull downe as much as is possible, the most excellent men, and rid away those persons that haue the no∣blest minds, and not to permit vnto the subiects, feasts, assemblies, learning, nor any other like thing; but to beware of all things which haue accustomed to breed these two things, haughtinesse of stomacke, and mutuall confidence; to forbid them schooles and all other idle companies; and to [ I] prouide by all meanes, that all the subiects shal not know one another, because this knowledge cau∣seth greater trust and faithfulnesse betweene them. That alwaies the yeomen of the guard, and strange people, shew themselues in the streets, and walke before the citizens. So whatsoeuer the sub∣iects goe about, shall not be kept secret, and they will grow by custome to haue lesse courage, by ser∣uing continually: hereto may be added many other waies, according to the Persian and Barbari∣an fashions, which are Tyrannicall, & of the same effect. Likewise, to seeke the disclosing of what∣soeuer the subiects say and doe, and to haue spies; as they that at Siracusa were called reporters: & Ieron sent hearkeners wheresoeuer there were any companies and meetings of people. For they are the lesse bould to speake their minds freely when they stand in feare of such kind of men, and [ K] if they should be bold to speake freely, then wil they vse the lesse secrecie. That they accuse one ano∣ther, and fall at variance, friends with friends, the common people with the Noblemen, and the rich with the rich: and to impouerish the subiects, is Tyrannicall; to the end, there should be no guard kept, and that they being driuen continually to worke for their liuings, may haue no leisure to conspire. For example hereof, we haue those high towers of AEgypt, called Pyramides, the tem∣ples dedicated to the gods by the Cypselides, the building of Olimpus by the children of Pisistra∣tus, and the munitions of Policrates about Samos: which things tend all to one end, namely, to hinder aud impouerish the subiects: and so doth the exacting of tributes and money, such as hap∣pened at Siracusa, where in the time of Dionisius the Tyran, the citizens in fiue yeares space were [ L] constrained to contribute all their goods. Againe, the Tyran maketh warres, to the intent, to occupie the subiects, and that they shall alwaies haue need of a head or captaine. Surely, the king∣dome is preserued by friends, but the propertie of a Tyran, is to mistrust friends; as though all mē would, and friends cheefly could destroy him. Also all those things are tyrannical, which are done in the last and worst kind of Democratie, as the liberty of women in houses, who disclose their husbands secrets; and the infranchising of bondslaues for the same cause; for slaues and women attempt nothing against tyrans: it is rather needfull for them, in respect of the good vsage which they recei••e, to wish well to tyrannies and Democraties: For the people desireth to be a Monarch. Therefore the flatterer is in estimation with both of them; namely, with the people, the Popular [ M] captaine, who is a flatterer of the people: and with the tyrans, they that behaue themselues lowly to them, which is a worke of flatterie. And therefore tyranny fauoureth the wicked, in as much as tyrans take a pleasure to be flattered, which neuer would any man of free and noble heart doe. But the good doe loue, or flatter not: also the wicked are profitable for them in wickednesse, for one naile driueth out another, as the Prouerbe is. Also it is a point of tyranny, not to take pleasure in a graue and free person, for the tyran himselfe will needs seeme alone to bee such a kinde of man.

[ A] And whosoeuer on the contrary side vseth grauity and freenesse, he taketh away the excellencie and maisterlike authority of the Tyranny. Therefore Tyrans hate such manner of men, as the destroyers of their estate. Likewise•• to feast and banquet more with strangers then with the Citi∣zeens, it is a point of Tyranny, as if the one were enemies, and the other not aduersaries. These and other like things are Tyrannicall, and doe preserue the Tyranny, being neuerthelesse full of wickednesse. But all these meanes may in a maner be comprised in three•• sith the Tyran doth aime cheefly at three things, The first is, that his subiects haue neither courage nor knowledge, because cowardly and ignorant men do neuer conspire. The second, that there be a mutual distrust among them, for the Tyranny is not destroyed, vnlesse some doe before repose confidence each in other. [ B] And for this cause Tyrans are enemies to good and vertuous men, as to those that may endam∣mage their estate, not only because they will not be vsed like slaues, but also because they are loyall and faithfull betweene themselues and to others, and doe not accuse either any of themselues, or any other. The third point is, that their subiects haue no power or meanes to execute any thing: For sith commonly men doe not vndertake things impossible, none will seeke to destroy the Ty∣ranny, when they haue no power to doe it. These are the three ends whereto the Tyrans purposes do tend, and al the Tyrans enterprises may be reduced to these suppositions, that their subiects di∣strust each other, that they haue no power, and that they be cowards and ignorant. And this is the first manner of preseruing Tyrannicall states. The other manner hath a contrary consideration [ C] in the things aforesaid, and may bee gathered from the destructions of kingdomes. For as the kingly state is destroyed through becomming more tyrannicall then it should, so the tyranny is preserued by approching neare to the manners and fashions of a kingdome, retaining still force and power to command not only those that do willingly obey, but those also that doe it vnwilling∣ly, sith by loosing this force, he looseth both the name and state of a tyran. This foundation being presupposed and assured, he must partly vse those other manners and fashions also, and partly seeme to vse them, making thus a fayre outward shew of a good kingly gouernement. First and cheefly he must faine himselfe to be very carefull of the publicke good of the state, and vse no such expences as may offend the people, as to wast prodigally the reuenues and treasure of the Citie, on [ D] strumpets, strangers and players, but giue account of the money receiued and employed by him, as some tyrans in former times haue done. By doing so, he shall bee accounted a good husband for the Commonweale, and not a tyran. And he needs not feare want of mony at any time, being lord of the City: but it is good and profitable for tyrans when they goe abroad in any expedition, or other vrgent affaires, rather to want then to leaue treasure hoorded vp. For by this meanes, they that are deputed and appointed by them for the guard and keeping of the countrey in their ab∣sence, will attempt the lesse against them. Now it is certaine, that these are more to be feared then the citizens, for the citizens goe with the tyrans, but the other remaine at home. Moreouer, tou∣ching the imposition of taxes and subsidies, he must so carry himselfe therein, that hee seeme to [ E] leuie them for the maintenance of the state, and to employ the money that is therby gathered, in the preparing and prosecuting of the warre when neede shall require: and hee must make such an outward shew, that men may esteeme him as a keeper and treasurer of the pablicke mony, and not as of his owne. He must also not seeme austere, but graue, and of such behauior, as that they who shall haue occasion to speake vnto him, may not feare, but rather reuerence him: which thing hee can hardly doe, that is contemptible. Therefore although the Tyran should make no account of other vertues, yet at the least he ought to haue that which is requisite for a Gouernour, and cause such an opinion to be con••••••ued of him, that not he only, but also his whole traine and seruants of∣fer no iniury to any of his subiects, neither boy nor girle. And that his women doe in like sort de∣meane [ F] themsel••es towards other women, because many Tyrannies haue beene destroyed by reason of the iniuries which women haue offered. Touching bodily pleasures, hee must order himselfe cleane otherwise then the Tyrans that are now adaies doe, whom it sufficeth not to follow their delights from the morning to night, and to continue them for many daies and nights together, but they will also haue men knowe that they liue so, that they may haue them in admirati••••, as fortunate and happy men: but let him moderately vse such pleasures, or at the least let him see••e to others, as one that makes no account of them, and sh••••s them. For he that is sober cannot easily

be surprised or contemned, but the drunkard may; neither he that is watchfull, but the sleepy per∣son. [ G] And he must doe cleane contrary to the things before mentioned, in beautifying and ador∣ning the City•• as if he were a guardian and procurer of the good therof, and not a Tyran. He must further more make a shew to loue aboue all things God and religion, for the subiects stand in lesse feare of sustaining any wrong or oppression by Princes, if they thinke them to be religious, and that they feare the gods, and likewise they will lesse conspire against him whom they suppose that the gods doe loue and fauor. Now he must seeme such a manner of person without any suspition of wickednesse. Moreouer, he must honour and aduance good men that excell in any thing, so that they may not haue cause to thinke, that they might receiue greater honor or aduancement of their owne Citizens, if they liued in liberty. Besides, let the Tyran himselfe bestow honor on such men, [ H] and inflict punishments by others, as officers and iudges. There is yet farther a common precept for the maintaining and preseruing of euery kind of Monarchie; that is, to make no man ouer-great, or at the least to aduance more then one, because they will watch, and haue an eye on each other: but if it so fall out, that he must raise some one, let him not chuse one that is haughty & au∣datious, for such persons will boldly attempt what thing soeuer. Likewise, if he find it requisite to depriue any one of credite and authority; he must doe it by little and little, and not take from him all his power at once. Besides, hee must abstaine from all kind of iniury, and especially from two sorts, the one from beating folke, the other, from dishonouring youth by filthy lust; wherof he must take great heed towards those that are ambitious: For couetous persons doe take greeuously the in∣iury [ I] that is offered them in taking away their goods; and those that are either ambitious, or good men, doe the like for the losse of their honour. Wherefore such punishments are not to bee vsed, or els to be inflicted according to the law and custome of the country, and not in contempt or reproch. And if it chance that he so conuerse with the youth, as before was said, let him doe it for loue, and not through tyrannicall liberty; at the least, if he doe them any dishonour, let him recompence it with greater honour. But amongst all them that conspire against the Tyrans person, which pur∣pose to kill him, he must feare and take great heed of those who care not for their owne liues, so as they may rid him of his life, and he must cheefly dread those who thinke that any iniury hath ben offered, either to themselues, or to such persons as they hold dearest: for they that through despight [ K] and anger attempt such things, haue neither feare nor carewhat becomes of themselues, accor∣ding to Heraclitus his saying, That it is an hard thing to fight against anger, which costs a man life. And whereas Cities consist of two parts, namely of poore men and rich men, it must be so pro∣uided, that both parts thinke their safety and preseruation to depend on the estate, & there must great heed be taken, that they do not wrong or hurt each other in any thing. Only, let him haue the stronger on his side, that if any stirre arise, he bee not enforced to enfranchise the slaues, or to take the Citizens armour and weapons from them: for one of the two parts being ioined with his owne power, will be sufficient to resist the other part, if it should assaile him. But it were superflu∣ous to prosecute such thinges particularly, sith the intention or aime thereof is manifest: for hee [ L] must referre all his actions to this end, that his subiects may not esteeme him to be a Tyran, but a steward and a king, and not as one that applieth all to his owne peculiar profit, but to the publicke good of the state, as guardian thereof. And that he obserue a meane in his life, and be not giuen to excesse; vsing familiarity with the Noblemen, and gratifying the people. By these meanes he shall doubtlesse make his state and gouernment not only fairer and more desirable, in that he raigneth ouer better subiects, and not seruile or abiect persons, and in that himselfe shall not be either ha∣ted or feared, but also of longer continuance. Finally, he must so fram•• ••••d fashion his manners, that he be halfe vertuous or good; and not bad, but halfe bad.

[ M]

The causes which destroy Kingdomes and Tyrannies, being declared; according to the former methode those causes also are set downe, which doe preserue and maintaine them: and first they are generally vpheld by those meanes that are contrary to the cau∣ses of their ruines: as the Kingdome if it be lesse Tyrannicall and absolute, and the Ty∣ranny, if it approch neerer to the Kingly state, which said Tyranny also is preserued and maintained in two manners, the one very rigorous, the other more moderate. To the

[ A] rigorous manner are referred all the seuere, or rather cruell acts which Tyrans are wont to doe, respecting onelie their owne safetie and profite, as to suppresse so much as may bee, the most notable persons, and to make away such as haue stout courages, to forbid their subiects the vse of banquets, schooles for studie, idle mee∣tings, and all other things that breed haughtinesse of heart, and mutuall confidence, to keepe them from knowing each other throughly; (for this knowledge causeth grea∣ter trust and faithfulnesse betweene them) to haue forraine souldiours, shewing them∣selues in the streets, and walking vp and downe before the Citti••ens houses, thereby to strike the more terror into them, and to keepe them in continuall feare, to haue spies & [ B] priuie hearkeners in euery corner of the Cittie, who may discouer and report to him whatsoeuer shall be therein done or said. Likewise to vse such meanes, that friends may falsely accuse and liue in discord each with other, the vulgar sort with the Noblemen, and the rich men betweene themselues; to impouerish them, and haue them alwaies busied, to the end, that through wealth or idlenesse they may not conspire; and that be∣ing troubled with any warre, they may alwaies haue need of him to be their leader and cheefetaine. The kingdome is preserued and vpheld by friends, the Tyrannie doth al∣together distrust friends, and therefore giueth great libertie to women and to slaues against their Lords. Tyrans must in no wise haue neere them graue and freeminded [ C] men, because such persons doe diminish the Lordly excellence and authority of the Tyran, who will himselfe alone seeme and bee accounted such a kinde of man. Like∣wise, when hee will banquet, let him doe it with strangers more then with Citizens: all which meanes being very Tyranncall, are reduced to three points. The first, that their subiects bee both cowardly and ignorant: the second, that they distrust each other: the third, that they haue no power nor meanes to conspire. Which three things being very pernicious, are not gathered by Aristotle to allow them, or instruct men in them, but rather that they may beware of them, by knowing the miserie of Tyrans, who are constrained to serue their turnes with such euils, thereby to assure [ D] their persons and Estates. Machiauel of Florence writing of a Prince, hath taken from this place the most part of his precepts, adding thereunto Romane and Itali∣an examples. Nowe almost all these meanes haue relation to the first manner of preseruing and vpholding Tyrannies, which is full of seueritie and rigour. The other manner contrarie to the former, as being more gentle and moderate, is, that the Tyran imitate the gouernement of the Kingly state; prouided that hee haue alwayes power, wherby he may command, not only ouer those that are voluntarily sub∣iect (which thing a King doth) but also ouer those that doe vnwillingly obey. Hee must feine to haue great care of the publicke good of the State, and vse no prodigality, ther∣by [ E] to offend the people; not seeme a Tyran, but a steward; nor as Lord of the common treasure, but as bestower and keeper thereof; nor austere and haughtie, but graue and ciuile: hee must likewise beware that none of his traine doe iniurie any one, and especially that his women vse no outragious nor insolent demeanure toward other wo∣men. He must moderately vse his pleasures, and aboue all things make shew of louing God and Religion. Hee must honour and aduance good men, and such as excell in any thing; and himselfe bestow rewards, but inflict punishments by others, as Officers and Iudges. The Tyran hath this common with the King, to make no man ouergreat, or els to aduaunce many, to the end, that they may haue an eye each to other: not to raise [ F] haughty & audacious men, who are vsually prompt and forward to attempt any thing; and when hee hath raised them, if hee find it requisite to pull them downe, he must doe it by little and little, not taking from them all their credite and power at once: hee must abstaine from all outrage, especially from beating any, and from dishonouring youth by filthy lust, or if he doe so, he must seem to do it rather for loue then through ty∣rannical liberty. And whereas cities consist of rich & poore, who do not commonly wel agree; that he maintaine thē friendly togither, hauing the strongest alwaies on his own

side, that through their helpe hee may bee able to resist others that assault him. [ G] That he be familiar with Noblemen, and gratifie the people, so framing his manners, that hee bee good or halfe good, and not bad, but halfe bad. Aristotle seemeth to haue beene too curious in the setting downe of these Tyrannicall meanes, sith euill Princes are sufficiently inclined of themselues, to inuent what will serue for the maintaining of their high estate and safety, so as it is not needful to instruct them by bookes. Machiauel fashioning his Prince, hath fetched from hence (as I haue alleadged) the principall grounds of that institution, which must bee red with great discretion, because it is written by an Authour without conscience, and without religion, respecting onely worldly power and glorie, which deceiueth many men. But we that purpose to set forth [ H] nothing, which wee thought would not serue to the honour of God, and the com∣mon welfare of mankind, will passe ouer these discourses, concluding with Cornelius Tacitus, That men are to honour things that be past, and to obey those that be present, and that they ought to loue good Princes: And whatsoeuer they bee, to tollerate and bear them, for the withstanding as much as is possible, of disorders that happen by alte∣rations. And as touching the decaies and vpholding of Monarchies, we will say with Salust. Si Regum atque Imperatorum animi virtus, in pace, ita vt in bello, valeret: aequa∣bilius atque constantius res humanae sese haberent, neque aliud aliò ferri, neque mutari ac misceri omnia cerneres. Nam imperium facile his artibus retinetur, quibus initio par∣tum [ I] est. Verum vbi pro labore desidia, pro continentia & aequitate libido atque super∣bia inuasere, fortuna simul cum moribus immutatur: ita imperium semper ad opti∣mum quemque à minus bono transfertur. Idem alibi, Sepè ego cum animo meo repu∣tans, quibus quisque rebus clarissimi viri magnitudinem inuenissent: quae res populos, nation••sve magnis authoribus auxissent: ac deinde quibus causis amplissima regna & im∣peria corruissent, eadem semper bona atque mala reperiebam: omnesque victores diui∣tias contempsisse, & victos cupiuisse. Et subdit: Saepè iam audiui qui reges, quae ciui∣tates & nationes per opulentiam magna imperia amiserunt, quae per virtutem inopes coe∣perant. Idem in Oratione ad Caesarem de Republica ordinanda: Postquam mihi aetas in∣geniùmque [ K] adoleuit, haud ferme armis atque equis corpus exercui, sed animum in li∣teris quòd natura firmus erat, in laboribus habui. Itaque ego in ea vita multa legen∣do atque audiendo ita comperi, omnia regna, ciuitates, nationes, vsque eo prosperum imperium habuisse, dum apud eos vero consilia valuerunt, vbicunque gratia, timor, vo••luptas, ea corrupere: pòst paulò, imminutae opes, deinde ademptum imperium, postrem•• seruitus imposita est. Particularlie, As touching the preseruation and destruction of the Romane Empire, which for any thing that is found in writing, and that euer was seene by experience, hath beene the mightiest and greatest Kingdome that euer was: I finde, that those wayes which the wisest Emperours inuented [ L] for the assurance and preseruation of the same Empire, turned to the decay and destruction thereof. First the ordinarie armies that Augustus had ordained, as well about the Cittie of Rome, as in the borders of his State, did vndoe ma∣nie of his successours, and brought to ruine the Romane Empire it selfe, which sometimes they put to sale, to deliuer it into his handes that would giue them most for it. Secondly, the transporting and remouing of the Romane Empire, which Constantine the great made from Rome to Byzantium (which since by his owne name hath beene called Constantinople) thereby to make it more sure and strong against the Persians, and other people of Asia: For by transferring vnto [ M] this place the forces and cheefe richesse of the Romanes, and by deuiding the Empire into the Easterne and Westerne, hee did greatly weaken it, so as the Romane Empire was first destroyed, and then the Easterne: which if they had continued vnited, had beene able long, and almost for euer to withstand all in∣uasions. Thirdlie, whereas the Emperours supposed to strengthen themselues by strange souldiours that were hirelings and helpers, whom they called to their succors,

[ A] and specially the Gothes, they by weakening the proper and naturall forces of the Em∣pire, at vnawares put Rome and Italy, and consequently the other prouinces into the hands of the barbarous people whereof shall be spoken more at large in the hystory of goue••nement, wherein wee declare the beginnings, proceedings, continuances, fa∣dings, and destructions of the great states that haue been hitherto. One rare thing amongst others, hath been obserued in the Romane Monarchie, That whereas it began in Augustus, it ended the foure hundred seuentie and one yeare after, in Augustus; who was expelled from Rome after the discomfiture and death of his father Orestes, by Odo∣acer king of the Herules•• who occupied all Italie: whereof hee changed the name, [ B] calling it Odoacria, after his owne name. So failed this Monarchie, being wholly oppressed and destroyed.

CHAP. XII. That of all States the Oligarchie and Tyranny doe [ C] least continue.

OF all Commonweales, the Oligarchie and Tyrannie continue the least space. For the Tyranny that hath lasted longest, was that of Orthagoras and his children at Sicione, which lasted 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hundred years. [ 1] The cause of this lasting was, for that they dealt mode••ately with their subiects, and in the mos•• part of their affaires, they submitted them∣selues to the lawes: and for that Clisth••ne•• being very skilfull in the [ D] warres, shewed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 himselfe conte••ptible: and because also in ma∣ny things they endeuoured to vse the people fa••••••rably. Likewise, it is said, that Clisthenes crow∣ned the iudge that had spoken against 〈◊〉〈◊〉 victory. Some men hold opinion that the image of him that so iudged, is it that standeth in the market place•• ••t is affirmed also, that Pisistratus being ci∣ted into the court of the Areopage, stood to iudgement there: The second Tyranny was in Co∣rinth, which the children of Cypselus exercised, and that lasted threescore and thirteene yeares, and sixe months. For Cypselus raigned thirty yeares, Periander ••••••re and thirty, and Psam••••••∣•••••• sonne of Gordus three yeares. The cause of this so long continuance thereof, was the same, for Cypselus dealt gently with the people•• and neuer in all the time of his reigne [ E] vsed any guard•• Periander was a Tyrann••us man, howbeit warlike. The third Tyrannie was held by the children of Pisistratus at Athens, which was not contin••all: because Pi∣sistratus who played the Tyr••n was twice exp••••sed, insomuch, that in three and thirtie [ 2] yeares hee 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and seuenteene of them, and his children eighteene•• and so all the time of their rule m••••••fi••e and thirtie yeares. Amongst other Tyrann••es, that of Hieron and Ge∣lon at Siracusa lasted not long, but onely eighteene yeares: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 after Gelon had reigned seuen yeares, hee died in the eight, and Hieron reigned 〈◊〉〈◊〉 yeare••. Thrasibu•••••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 expulsed in the eleuenth moneth. Many other 〈◊〉〈◊〉 h••••e beene all of sl•••••• con••••••∣ance. Thus 〈…〉〈…〉 shewed wel••eere all the meanes whereby 〈◊〉〈◊〉 also and ••••••••∣chies [ F] are destroyed and preserued. Now 〈…〉〈…〉 Commonweale treateth of the ••••••••∣gings [ 3] of sla••es, howbeit, 〈…〉〈…〉 of them 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hee assigneth 〈◊〉〈◊〉 any pr••••er chaunge of the best and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Commonweale•• saying, how Nature hath so ordained, that [ 4] nothing la••teth for euer, and that all thinges 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a certaine c••mpasse of time, or per••••••; [ 5] are chaunged. And that they begin to change by those things, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, [ 6] or third number and an halfe, which being ioined to a q••inary or fift number, maketh two har∣monies, [ 7] that is to say, when the number of this description becomes ful and whole: a•• if nature did [ 8]

sometimes bring forth bad persons, whose malice could not be amended by instruction, it may be [ G] he saith not altogether amisse, for that certaine men may bee borne altogether vnapt to receaue any manner of teaching or vertue whatsoeuer. But wherfore should this change be more proper to that best Commonweale of his framing, then to other Commonweales, and all things that come into the world? And as for the time wherein he sayth all things are changed, those same that be∣gan together, are changed together, as if they be made ••••e day before the longest or shortest day of the year, they shal therfore change together. Further, wherefore shall this Commonweale bee changed into the Lacedemonian Commonweale, sith the most Commonweales are of••ener chan∣ged into a contrary forme, then into that which is next vnto them•• There is the very like reason in all other sorts of changes. For he saith that the Lacedemonian Commonweale changeth into [ H] an Oligarchie, and the Oligarchie into a Democratie, and the Democratie into a Tyranny, al∣though they also change cleane contrary, as the Democratie into the Oligarchie, yea rather then into a Monarchie. Againe, he speaketh not of the Tyranny whether it recei••e alteration or not, neither if it change, what is the cause thereof, nor into what kind of Commo••weale it chan∣geth. Neither was it an easie matter for him to tell it, by reason it is vncertaine and vndeter∣mined, for in his opinion the change ought to be mad•• into the first and best forme of Common∣weale, insomuch, that there should bee a continuall course or going round about. But one Ty∣ranny is sometimes chaunged into another, as at Syeiene the Tyranny of Miro•• into the Ty∣ranny of Clisthenes: and into an Oligarchie, as at Calchis the Tyranny of Antileon: and into [ I] a Democratie, as the Tyranny of Gelon at Siracusa: and into an Aristocratie, as the Tyran∣ny of Charilas at Lacedemon, and likewise at Carthage. Also the Oligarchie is chaunged into a Tyran••y, as in S••cily w••lne••re all the old Oligarchies were, as that of the L••ontines into the Tyrannie of Pa••••••ius: and that at Gele into the Tyranny of Cleand••r: that at Rhegium into the Tyranny of •• Anaxilas, and likewise in many other Cities. It is also absurd to imagine, tha•• the Tyran•••• i•• changed into an Oligarchie, because th••y that are authorised in the offi∣c••s of the Commonweale, bee 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and greedy of gaine, and the rather beca••se ••here be ma∣ny exceedingly wealthy, who thinke it not iust and reasonable that the p••ore should haue an equall part in the Citie with the rich. And i•• many Oligarchies it is not lawfull to exer∣cise [ K] gainefull occupations, but there bee la•••••• that forbid the same: howbeit, at Carthage, which is gouerned by a Democratie, they may lawfully apply the same, and yet neuerthe∣lesse hath not their Comm••nweale vpon that occasion beene hitherto chaunged. Euen so is it impertinent to say, that in the Oligarchie there bee two Cities, the one of the rich, the other of the poore: For wherefore should there bee so in this kind of Commonweale more then in the Lacedemonian Commonweale•• or in some other, where all men possesse not equall goods, neither are all alike good? And admit now that none wexe poorer then be∣••ore, yet when the multitude of the poore encreaseth, the Oligarchie is neuerthelesse chan∣ged into a Demo••ratie: and the Democratie into an Oligarchie, when the rich be migh∣tier [ L] then the people, and the people shewe themselues negligent, and the rich vse more diligence and warinesse in their affaires•• B••t whereas there bee many ••••••ses of the chaun∣ging, hee toucheth one onely, namely, that by liuing prodigally, and bei••g vtterly vn∣done by vs••rie, men ••ull into pouertie; as though they had beene all, or th•• most of them rich at the beginning, which is false: For when any of the cheefe sort haue wasted their wealth, then attempt they in••••••••tions; but not the others: for at their hands there is not any trouble to bee feared•• neither cha••nge they therefore rather into a Democratie then into another kind of Commonweale•• Againe, if they bee barred from p••blicke ho∣no••rs, or when some ini••stice or wrong i•• d•••••• vnto them, they raise seditions, and [ M] chaunge Commonweales (though they h•••••• an spent their substance) by reason of the li∣bertie which they haue ••o doe what they ••s•••• The cause whereof bee sayeth, is too much libertie. And whereas there be many s•••••••• of Oligarchies and Democraties, Socrates reciteth the cha••••ges thereof, as though either of them were but one.

[ A] Of all Commonweales the Tyrannies and Oligarchies doe least continue, because they are full of violence and iniustice. And if any of them last somewhat long, it is by reason of the moderation thereof, and the vertue of the Gouernors. Further, the opini∣on of Plato in the eight book of his Commonweale touching the short or long lasting of Commonweales, is found fault withall: The which opinion, though it bee iudged most obscure by Iamblicus and Ficinus, and such, as left by Theon, who had specially vndertaken the exposition of the mathematicall places in Plato; yet we haue assayed to enlighten it in some kind of sort, in translating his Commonweale, and here will touch the necessariest points thereof, for the vnderstanding of Aristotle.

[ B] WHICH lasted an hundred yeares.] The longest Tyranny that is spoken of here, hath [ 1] not lasted aboue a hundred yeares. Kingdomes last very long, as we see the kingdome of France hath lasted aboue eleuen hundred yeares: the kingdome of Castile eight hun∣dred: the kingdome of England in the race of William the Conquerour, fiue hundred yeares: the kingdome of Hungary seuen hundred: that of Poland four hundred: the Mo∣narchy of Assyria lasted twelue hundred and nine and thirty years, which is the longest age of a Monarchy that is found: That of the Medes continued three hundred: that of Persia two hundred and thirty, when the naturall Persians reigned first there, who were bereaued thereof by the Macedonians; then the Parthians gouerned there, and after [ C] that the Saracens, then the Tartarians, and after it returned againe to the Persians. The Monarchie of Alexander continued three hundred yeares, that of Rome foure hun∣dred threescore and tenne. The Empire of Constantinople eleuen hundred and three∣score. The reigne of the Turke hath already lasted neere three hundred yeares, descen∣ding alwaies from father to sonne, euen to the twelfth heire now reigning, which was neuer seene elsewhere. The kingdome of Tunis lasted nine hundred years: the Empire of Almaine aboue sixe hundred.

BECAVSE Pisistratus playing the Tyran, was twice expulsed.] Herodotus in his first booke, also Plato in Hipparcus, declareth how the said Hipparcus sonne of Pisistratus [ D] was slaine by Hermodus and Aristogiton••

NOVV Socrates in Platoes Commonweale, treateth of the changes of states.] Plato [ 3] in the eight book of his Commonweale bringeth in the Muses reasoning of the chan∣ges of Commonweales in this manner: It is hard to chaunge the Citie that is thus constituted; But for as much as all things that haue beginning, are subiect to pe∣rishing, so this kind of constitution shall not last for euer, but shall bee dissolued. This dissolution happeneth not only to plants, but also to earthly liuing creatures, with the fruitfulnesse and barrennesse of the soule and bodies, when the reuolutions of euery circuite of the circles, do fall shorter to them that bee shortliued, and contrary to them [ E] that be contrary. They whom you haue trained and brought vp to be Gouernors of ci∣ties, though they be wise, shall not for all that know by reason together with vnderstan∣ding, the fruitfulnesse or barrennesse of your kind, but shall be ignorant of the oportu∣nity to engender, and now and then shall beget children out of season. Nowe the peri∣ode or circuit of the diuine generation, is it that containeth the perfect number; and of the humane generation, in the which, first the increasings that surmount and excel; and three distances that be surmounted and taking the foure tearmes or bounds of likes and vnlikes, and of encreasing and decreasing, haue made all things answerable and compa∣rable together, of which tearmes the sesquitercian root ioined to the quinary, being [ F] thrice augmented, doth make two harmonies; the one equall equally, an hundred ti••es an hundred; the other odde, and longer by an hundred numbers of Diameters, compa∣rable to the Quinarie, one and ones, and two vncomparable, and of a hundred cubes of the Ternarie. All this Geometricall number in sooth hath great vertue and efficacie touching good and bad generations, which being vnknowne by the keepers of your Cittie, if they match the Husbands with the Wiues out of season, the children that shall bee borne of them, will bee neither wittie nor happie.

And though their elders appoint them to bee Princes that are found to bee the better, [ G] yet because they are vnworthy to succeed their fathers, they will begin to neglect their subiects, and will not haue such care is requisite, of musicke, or religion, and of exer∣cise of the body, which shall be the occasion of making your children also more igno∣rant of good learning: and the Magistrates that shall be so appointed, shall bee the lesse apt to discerne the kinds of men, recited by Hesiodus: and being amongst you, to wit, the Golden, the Iron, and the copper kinds, and because the yron shall bee mingled with the siluer, and the copper with gold, there shall arise therein vnlikenesse, and discordant inequality. And where such things happen, they breed alwaies warres and enmity, so that in all places where there are such kind of men, there is continual trouble through [ H] seditions and tumults. Thus may you see what the muses sing in very darke tearmes tou∣ching the changes of Commonweales.

[ 4] SAYING it is so ordained by Nature, that nothing lasteth for euer.] There is nothing vnder Heauen that lasteth alwaies. But all things that haue beginning, must come to an end, and whatsoeuer groweth, must likewise deminish, being subiect to corruption and change, according to the time appointed vnto it by the course of Nature, as is seene by experience in plants, and in wights, which haue their ages and lastings certaine and de∣termined. This instabilitie is also found in Prouinces, Nations, Cities, Maners, Lawes, Sects, Empires, Realmes, Commonweales, Potentacies, States, Families, Sciences, and [ I] Languages. We look for nothing but for the destruction of the world, and the day that shall consume this whole frame, containing all things both diuine and humane; and re∣duce it to that old Chaos, and first darkenesse. Plato in Timeus, and in his Dialogue of the Gouernour. Aristotle in his Meteores, and Seneca in his natural questions, suppose this to happen by the fatall law of the world, as well according to the mouing of the first heauen, whereof the other inferiour or lower mouings, and all natures, do depend: As by the coniunctions and separations of the plannets, whereunto the elements, and all things that are composed of them, doe obey. Whereas then mens materiall bodies being created and composed of the foure elements and humors that bee contrary, are [ K] maintained and preserued in life, so long as the said humours do agree, yet is it vnpossi∣ble but at the last one will exceed the others, and thereby the masse or lumpe, returne to his first matter by the dissoluing of the same combined mixture. Euen so falleth it out with the mysticall bodies of the societie of mankind, which being ioined by a ciuile and politicke vnion, do begin to decay by the diuersity of wils disagreeing, and at last come to nothing. And as mortall men liue so much the longer, and in better health, as they be of better complexion, and vse better gouernment; so are those cities and states that are best established and gouerned, maintained longer and in better sort: notwithstan∣ding, there neuer hath ben nor can be any that endeth not quickly or slowly, how good [ L] order soeuer be vsed therein: Such is the instability and course of all things that are here below, especially of states. Whereunto the most renowmed Astrologians doe agree, and that so farre, that they will determine not only the liues and fortunes of men, but also the prosperities and aduersities of Nations, as after the old Chaldeans and AEgyp∣tians, Ptolome hath done in his Quadripertite, and sithence the Arabians and some Christians adding thereto the lasting of sects Plutarch in the life of Romulus, speaking of Astrologers sayth, They will say that a Towne hath the reuolution and the time of the continuance thereof, prefixed, as well as the life of man; and that it may be knowne by the scituation of the star••es in the day of his birth. [ M]

[ 5] AND that all things in a certaine circuite of time, or period, are altered.] Plutarch in the life of Silla. The skilfull Southsayers of Tuscane being demanded, answered, That this so strange signe declared the change of the world, and the passage from the same into another age: for that they hold opinion how there must be some ages cleerely differing one from another in manners and fashions of liuing. To euery of the which God hath prefixed a certaine time of continuance, howbeit, that all come to the ending of their

[ A] course within the space of the reuolution of the great yeere. And that when one is fini∣shed, and another ready to begin, there happeneth some meruellous and strange signe in the earth, and in heauen: so as they which haue studied in that science, doe straight∣way cleerely know how there be men borne, wholly differing from them that were be∣fore, in their liues and manners; and that be more or lesse acceptable to the gods, then they that were before. For they say, that amongst the great changes that happen at these passages from one age into another, the skill of foretelling things to come, groweth in reputation, and doth foretell aright when it pleaseth God to send more fit and more certaine signes, whereby it may be able to know and foreshew thinges to come. And [ B] contrariwise, in another age it falleth into contempt, and groweth out of credite, be∣cause it is rash, and faileth in the most part of her Prognostications, by reason it hath but darke meanes, and deformed instruments, to know what shal come to passe. Cicero is Scipios dreame, thus describeth this great yeare. Homines populariter annum tantum∣modo Solis, id est vnius astri reditu metiuntur. Cùm autem ad idem, vnde semel pròfecta sunt, cuncta astra redierint, eandémque totius caeli descriptionem longis interuallis retulerint, tum ille verè vertens annus appellari potest, in quo vix dicere audeo quam multa se∣cula hominum teneantur. Namque, vt olim deficere sol hominibus, extinguíque visus est, cùm Romuli animus haec ipsa in templa penetrauit: quandocumque eadem parte sol, eodé∣que [ C] tempore iterum defecerit, tum signis omnibus ad idem principium, stellísque reuocatis, ex∣pletum annum habeto. Cuius quidem anni nondum vigesimam partem scito esse counuersam. Plato in Timeus sayth thus, From thence is proceeded the virietie of the night, and of the day, and therefore hath ben brought in the reuolution of the circuit, alone & wise: the moneth, after that the Moone hath gone about her circle, and ouertaken the sunne: The yeare, when the sunne hath accomplished his course. As for the reuolutions of others, there be few men that vnderstand them, know their names, measure and distin∣guish them by number; insomuch, that they know not the times, and that their reuolu∣tions are infinite in multitude, and wonderfull in varietie. They may notwithstanding [ D] easily vnderstand, how the perfect number of time doth then make vs the yeare perfect when the eight reuolutions that are measured by the circuite of one, and the same na∣ture and alwaies like, shall be all returned to their head and first beginning. In the tran∣slation of Timeus, which was published a good while agoe, we haue declared that Pla∣to meant by the perfect number of time, when the seuen plannets, and other fixed stars come backe againe to their first places, and represent vnto vs the same nature that was in the beginning of the world, which time containeth an infinity of years, and renueth the world, giuing newe motion vnto it: Some say this great yeare containeth 15000 yeares of the sunne, others 36000: the firmament, on the which it is ruled, passing one [ E] degree in euery hundred yeares: and because there be 365 degrees, therfore the course thereof cannot bee accomplished in lesse then 36000 yeares. Others reckon as farre as 49000, and that the neather world, from seuen thousand to seuen thousand yeares: and the heauenly, with al things generally, from fifty thousand to fifty thousand successiue∣ly, are infinitely renued: which proceedeth of the variable mouing of the eight sphere, one while from the East, another while from the West, sometimes from the South, and sometimes from the North, which the Astrologians call a mouing of Trepidation. This sphere from seuen thousand to seuen thousand yeares, maketh his said mouing, to wit, seuen times in all his secular reuolution: euery of which times causeth the dissol∣uing [ F] and renuing of this neather world: and when it is come to the seuenth after 49000 yeares, which are seuen times seuen, the heauenly world commeth to be entirely dissol∣ued, to the end, that it may be thereupon renued, and take againe a communicating of forme and matter. The Chaldeans, Persians, AEgyptians, and old Grecians considered and iudged the cheefe euents of the world by the eclipses of the sunne and the moone, and by the starres, whose aspects are toward the places of the eclipses, or which ascend together, or are in the middest of the skie. Afterwards the Arabians, and specially A••∣bumasar,

haue deuided the space of time whereof we spake, by the great coniunctions [ G] of the plannets, specially of the three vppermost, to wit, Saturne, Iupiter, and Mars, whom they affirme to haue wonderfull power in the alterations of this neather world, & the changes of kingdomes, laws, sects, & other notable things, according to the qua∣litie of the Triplicities wherein they happen, firy, airy, watery, and earthly: & that there haue been seuen of them since the beginning of the world, according to the Hebrewes and their computation, and that the eight shall be in the yeare of the world 7040, and of the incarnation of Christ, 1593. P.d'Ally Cardinal in the concord of Astrologie and Theologie, and of the hystorie, and in the booke of laws and sects: Roger Bacon in the Epistle to Pope Clement: Sepulueda of the mouing of the sunne: Leon an Hebrew in [ H] the third Dialogue of loue: Ptolomy in the the Quadripartite: But Picus Mirandula hath taken great pains in the confuting of those opinions and fantasies in twelue books written by him against Astrologers.

[ 6] BY those things whose root is the sesquitertian, or third number, and an halfe.] The Sep∣tenary or number of seuen, is made of foure and three, wherein is found a sesquitercian proportion, because foure conteineth three, and a third part. And the septenary ioined to a quinary maketh twelue. So the quinary is composed of two and three, in which there is a sesquialteran proportion, for that three containeth two and a halfe, and there∣in is found the consonancie, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The third consonancie is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in double [ I] proportion, whereas then the septenary and quinary put together, make vp the twelfth: certainely the twelfth containeth two harmonies, to wit, dia tessaron, and dia pente, and is as dia pason, for as much as dia pason is a sound composed of dia tessaron and dia pente. Now Plato hath written this according to the opinion of Pythagoras & his Disciples, who did account numbers, proportions, and mathematicall figures for the first causes of all effects of the world, which Aristotle controlleth in the thirteenth and fourteenth bookes of his Metaphisicke.

[ 7] SOLIDE number.] Solide numbers are those which adde depth to length & bredth, as cubes, piramides, and pillers, &c.

[ 8] AS if nature sometimes brought forth euill people, whose naughtinesse cannot be remedied [ K] by instruction.] The cause wherefore the Commonweale, yea the best Commonweale may be marred is, that some men in a certaine period or reuolution of time, are borne with so naughty a nature and disposition, that it is not possible to reforme them by in∣struction; and when they meet in such a Commonweale, they marre it: Certainely, in considering the records of things passed till this age, it seemeth that there hath beene alwaies in the world some good mingled amongst euill, and that vertue and vice goe by turnes, passing from countrey to countrey, and reigning more at one time, then at ano∣ther. For sith mens matters are in perpetuall mouing, they goe vp and downe incessant∣ly, [ L] mending or empairing anterchangeably. It is seene how a Prouince or Cittie foun∣ded by some exeelent personage, prospereth a while through the vertue of his gouern∣ment, and wexeth better and better, aiming right toward the middest or the top of his perfect course of gouernement: and after declineth from height to lownesse, or from the middest to the vttermost part. Vertue had her first seat in Assyria, from whence shee remoued into Media, then passed shee into Persia, and at last walked so farre, that shee came to dwell at Rome. And if sithence the destruction of the Romane Empire, there hath not ben any that hath lasted long, nor wherein the world hath holden his vertue assembled and vnited; in recompence thereof, it hath spread the same into diuerse pla∣ces, [ M] as into France, Castile, Portugall, Almaine, England, Poland, Muscouie, into the Empire of the Turkes and of the Souldan, and a good while since into the lands of the Saracens, whose kings accomplished so great conquests, subdued so many countries to their obedience, and at last destroyed the Eastern Empire of Rome. At this day Greece may serue for an example, which in times past hauing florished in riches, feats of armes, and learning, aboue all other countries, is nowe brought into miserable slauery, being

[ A] full of pouertie and ignorance: Italy which had bene dreadfull through all the world, was afterwards occupied by the Gothes, Hunnes, and Lombards, & at this day is come asunder, being without Religion, without law, without mar•••••• and ciuile discipline, full of vncleannesse, loosenesse, and beastlinesse, if we credit M••chia••ell, who dooth so em∣blason it in the second booke of his discourses. Behold how vertue and vice, knowledge and ignorance, prowesse and cowardlinesse, doe follow one another, honouring and de∣faming countries and nations in diuers seasons, through the prouidence of God: who will haue euery of them as his turne falleth, to take part of good and bad, to the end they should not forget themselues, of wex too prowd and insolent by remaining in perpe∣tuall [ B] prosperitie.

For he sayth the Lacedemonian state changeth into the Oligarchie, and the Oligarchie into [ 9] a Democratie, and the Democrati•• into the Tyrannie.] Such kinds of change•• are layd foorth in the eight and ninth bookes of Platoes Commonweale, and by vs tran∣slated in the fourth of these bookes of Politiques, or touching Go∣uernment, as they were found to haue correspon∣dence to Aristotles discourses.

Here endeth the Fift Booke of Aristotles Gouernment.

Notes

• The house of Medici.
• The City of Genoa.
• Sienna.
• Venice and the Com∣monweale thereof.
• The Gen∣tlemen of Venice.
• The Romane E••pire.