Obseruations vpon the fiue first bookes of Cæsars commentaries setting fourth the practise of the art military in the time of the Roman Empire : wherein are handled all the chiefest point of their discipline, with the true reason of euery part, together with such instructions as may be drawn from their proceedings, for the better direction of our moderne warres / by Clement Edmunds.

CHAP. X.

The battell betweene Caesar and the Neruij.

IN these difficulties, two things were a help to the Romans; the one was, the knowledge and experience of the souldiers: for by reason of their practise in former battels, they could as well prescribe vnto themselues, what was to be done, as any other commander could teach them. The other was, that notwith∣standing Caesar had giuen commandement to euerie Legate, not to leaue the worke or forsake the legions, vntill the fortifi∣cations were perfited; yet when they sawe extremitie of danger, they attended no countermaund from Caesar: but ordered all thinges as it seemed best to their owne discretion. Caesar hauing commanded such thinges as he thought necessarie, ranne ha∣stelie to incourage his souldiers, and by fortune came to the tenth legion, where he v∣sed no further speech, then that they should remember their ancient valour, and vali∣antly withstand the brunt of their enemies. And for as much as the enemie was no further off, then a weapon might be cast to incounter them, he gaue them the signe of battell: and hastening from thence to another quarter, he found them alreadie closed and at the incounter. For the time was so short and the enemie so violent, that they wanted leasure to put on their headpieces, or to vncase their targets: and what part they lighted into from their worke, or what ensigne they first met withall, there they staied; least in seeking out their owne companies, they should loose that time as was to be spent in fighting. The Armie being imbattailed rather according to the nature of the place, the decliuitie of the hill, and the breuitie of time, then according to the rules

of art; as the legions incountered the enemie in diuers places at once, the perfect view of the battell being hindered by those thicke hedges before spoken of, there could no succors be placed any where; neither could any man see what was needful to be done: & therfore in so great vncertainty of things, there happened diuers casualties of fortune.

The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legion, as they stood in the left part of the Ar∣my, casting their piles, with the aduantage of the hil, did driue the Attrebatij, breath∣les with running & wounded in the incounter, down into the riuer; & as they passed ouer the water, slew many of them with their swordes: Neither did they sticke to fol∣low after them ouer the riuer, and aduenture into a place of disaduantage, where the battell being renewed againe by the enemie, they put them to flight the second time. In like maner two other legions, the 11 and the 8, hauing put the Veromandui from the vpper ground, fought with them vpon the bankes of the riuer; and so the front & the left part of the campe was well neere left naked. For in the right cornet were the 12 and the 7 legions, where as all the Neruij, vnder the conduct of Boduognatus, were heaped together; and some of them began to assault the legions on the open side, and other some to possesse themselues of the highest part of the campe.

At the same time the Roman horsemen, and the light armed footmen that were intermingled amongst them, and were at first all put to flight by the enemie, as they were entering into the campe, met with their enemies in the face, and so were driuen to flie out another way. In like manner, the pages and souldiers boies, that from the Decumane port and toppe of the hill, had seene the tenth legion follow their enemies in pursuit ouer the riuer, and were gone out to gather pillage, when they looked be∣hind them, and saw the enemie in their campe; betooke them to their heeles as fast as they could. Which accident so terrified the horsemen of the Treuiri (who for their prowesse were reputed singular amongst the Galles, and were sent thither by their state, to aide the Romans) first when they perceiued the Roman campe to be possest, by a great multitude of the enemie, the legions to be ouercharged and almost inclosed about, the horsemen, slingers, and Numidians to be dispersed and fled, that without anie further expectation they tooke their waie homeward, and reported to their state, that the Romans were vtterly ouerthrowen.

Caesar departing from the tenth legion, to the right cornet, found his men excee∣dingly ouercharged, the ensignes crowded together into one place, and the souldiers of the 12 legion so thicke thronged on a heape, that they hindered one another; all the Centurions of the fourth cohort being slaine, the ensigne bearer kild and the ensigne taken, and the Centurions of the other cohorts either slaine, or sore wounded; amongst whom Pub. Sextus Baculus, the Primipile of that legion, a valiant man, so grieuously wounded, that he could scarce stand vpon his feete; the rest not verie forward, but many of the hindmost turning taile and forsaking the field; the enemie on the other side, giuing no respite in front, although he fought against the hill, nor yet sparing the open side, and the matter brought to a narrow issue, without any meanes or succour, to relieue them: he tooke a target from one of the hindmost souldiers (for he himselfe was come thither without one) and pressing to the front of the battell, called the Cen∣turions by name, and incouraging the rest, commanded the ensignes to be aduanced toward the enemie, and the Maniples to be inlarged, that they might with greater facilitie and readinesse vse their swordes.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THis Publius Sextus Baculus was the chiefest Centurion of the 12 legion, being the first Centurion of that Maniple of the Triarij, that was of the first Cohort in that legion; for that place was the greatest dignitie that could happen to a Centurion; and therefore he was called by the name of Centurio primipili, or simplie Primipilus, and some∣times Primopilus, or Primus Centurio. By him were commonly published, the mandates and edicts of the Emperour, and Tribunes: and therefore the rest of the Centurions, at all times had an eie vnto him; and the rather for that the ea∣gle, which was the peculiar ensigne of euerie legion, was committed to his charge and carried in his Maniple. Neither was this dignitie, without speciall commoditie, as may be gathered out of diuers authors. We reade further, that it was no disparagement for a Tribune, after his Tribunality was expired, to be a Primipile in a legion; notwithstanding, there was a law made, I know not vpon what occasion, that no Tribune should afterward be Primipile. But let this suf∣fice concerning the office and title of P. S. Baculus.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

ANd heere I may not omit to giue the Target any honour I may, and therefore I will take occasion to describe it in Caesars hand, as in the place of greatest dignitie, and much honouring the excellencie therof. Polybius maketh the Target to containe two foot and an halfe in breadth, ouer∣thwart the conuexsurface thereof; and the length foure foote, of what forme or fashion soeuer they were of: for the Romans had two sortes of Targets amongst their legionarie, the first caried the proportion of that figure, which the Geo∣metricians call Ouall, a figure of an vnequall latitude, broadest in the midst, and narrow at both the endes, like vnto an egge, described in Plano: the other sorte was of an equall latitude, and resembled the fashion of a guttertile; and there∣upon was called Scutum imbricatum. The matter whereof a target was made, was a double board, one fastened vpon another, with lint and Buls glew; and co∣uered with an Oxe hide, or some other stiffe leather; the vpper and lower part of the target were bound about with a plate of yron, to keepe it from cleauing; and in the middest there was a bosse of yron or brasse, which they called Vmbo. Romulus brought them in first amongst the Romans, taking the vse of them from the Sabines. The wood whereof they were made, was for the most part either sallow, alder, or figtree: whereof Plinie giueth this reason, for as much as these trees are colde and waterish, and therefore any blow or thrust that was made vpon the wood, was presently contracted and shut vp againe. But for as much as the Target was of such reputation amongst the Roman Armes, and challenged such interest in the greatest of their Empire, let vs enter a little into

the consideration of the vse and commoditie thereof; which cannot be better vnderstood, then by that conference, which Polybius hath made betweene the weapons of the Romans and the Macedonians: and therefore I haue thought it good to insert it in these discourses. And thus it followeth.

Of the difference of the Roman and Macedonian Weapons.

I Promised in my sixt book that I would make a comparison, between the weapons of the Romans, and Macedonians. And that I would likewise write of the disposition of either of their armies; how they do differ one from another: & in what regard, the one, or the other, were either inferiour, or superiour: which promise I wil now with diligence endeuour to performe. And for as much as the armies of the Macedonians haue giuen so good testimonies of themselues by their actions, by ouercomming the armies as wel of those of Asia, as of Greece; and that the battailes of the Romans haue conquered, as well those of Africa as all the Easterne countries of Europe: It shall not be amisse, but very profitable, to search out the difference of either; es∣pecially seeing that these our times haue not once, but many times seene triall, both of their battailes and forces; that knowing the reason why, the Romans do ouercome, and in their battailes carie awaie the better: we doe not as vaine men were wont to do, attribute the same to fortune, and esteeme them without reason happy victors; but rather looking into the true causes, we giue them their due praises, according to the direction of reason, and sound iudgment. Con∣cerning the battels betweene Hanniball and the Romans; and concerning the Romans their losses, there is no neede that I speake much. For their losses are neither to be imputed to the defect of their Armes, or disposition of their Ar∣mies; but to the dexteritie and industrie of Hanniball: but wee haue entrea∣ted therof when we made mention of the battels themselues, and the end it selfe of that warre doth especiallie confirme this our opinion. For vvhen they had gotten a captaine equall vvith Hanniball, euen consequentlie vvith all his victories vanished. And hee had no sooner ouercome the Romans, but by and by, reiecting his owne weapons, hee trained his Armie to their wea∣pons, and so taking them vp in the beginning, he continued them on vnto the ende.

And Pyrrhus in his war against the Romans, did vse both their weapons and order, and made as it were a medlie both of the cohort, and phalanx: but not∣withstanding it serued him not to get the victory, but alwaies the euent by some meanes or other, made the same doubtfull: concerning whom it were not vnfit, that I should saie something, least in being altogether silent, it might seeme to preiudice this mine opinion. But notwithstanding I will hasten to my purposed comparison.

Now touching the phalanx, if it haue the disposition, and forces proper to it,

nothing is able to oppose it selfe against it, or to sustaine the violence thereof; as maie easily by many documents be approued. For when an armed man doth stand firme in the space of three foote in so thicke an array of battell, and the length of their pikes being according to the first basis, or scantling sixteene foote; but according to the true and right conueniencie of them, 14 cubits, out of which are taken foure allowed for the space betweene the left hand, which supporteth the same, and the butte ende thereof, vvhiles he standes in a readi∣nesse to attend the incounter: being thus ordered, I saie, it is manifest that the length of tenne cubites doth extend it selfe before the bodie of euerie armed man, where with both his handes he doth aduance it readie to charge the ene∣mie: By vvhich meanes it followeth, that some of the pikes doe not onely ex∣tend themselues before the second, third, and fourth ranke, but some before the formost, if the phalanx haue his proper and due thicknesse, according to his naturall disposition, both on the sides and behinde, as Homer maketh mention vvhen he saith, that one target doth enclose and fortifie another; one headpiece is ioyned to another, that they maie stande vnited and close toge∣ther.

These circumstances being rightly and truely set downe, it must follow, that the pikes of euerie former ranke in the phalanx, doe extend themselues two cu∣bites before each other, which proportion of difference they haue betweene themselues: by which maie euidently be seene the assault, and impression of the whole phalanx, what it is, and what force it hath, consisting of 16 rankes in depth, or thicknesse; the excesse of which number of rankes aboue fiue. For as much as they cannot commodiously couch their pikes, without the disturbance of the former, the points of them not being long inough to enlarge themselues beyond the formost rankes, they grow vtterly vnprofitable, and cannot man, by man, make any impression, or assault: but serue onely, by laying their pikes vp∣on the shoulders of those which stand before them, to sustaine and hold vp the swaies and giuing backe of the former rankes, which stand before them to this end, that the front may stand firme and sure; and with the thicknes of their pikes they doe repell all those dartes, which passing ouer the heads of those that stand before, would annoy those rankes which are more backward.

And farther by mouing forward, with the force of their bodies, they doe so presse vpon the former, that they doe make a most violent impression. For it is impossible that the formost rankes should giue backe.

This therefore being the generall and particular disposition of the phalanx: we must now speake on the contrarie part, touching the properties and differen∣ces, as well of the armes, as of the whole disposition of the Roman battell. For euerie Roman soldier for himselfe, and his weapon is allowed three foot to stand in, and in the incounter, are moued man, by man, euery one couering himselfe with his target; and mutually moouing whensoeuer there is occasion offered. But those which vse their swordes, do fight in a more thinne and distinct order; so that it is manifest, that they haue three foote more allowed them to stand in both from shoulder to shoulder, and from backe to bellie, that they maie vse their weapons with the better commoditie. And hence it commeth to passe,

that one Romaine soldiour taketh vp as much ground, as two of those which are to encounter him of the Macedonian Phalanx: so that one Romain is as it were to oppose himselfe against tenne pikes, which pikes the said one soldior can nei∣ther by any agilitie come to offende, or else at handy blowes otherwise annoy: And those which are behinde him, are not onely vnable to repell their force, but also with conueniencie to vse their owne weapons. Whereby it may easily be gathered, that it is impossible, that any battaile being assaulted, by the front of a phalanx, should be able to sustaine the violence thereof, if it haue his due and proper composition.

What then is the cause that the Romaines do ouercome, and that those that doe vse the phalanx are voyde of the hope of victorie? (Euen from hence) that the Romaine armies haue infinite commodities, both of places, and of times, to fight in. But the the phalanx hath only one time, one place, and one kinde, whereto it may profitablie applie it selfe: so that if it were of necessitie, that their enemy shoulde incounter them at that instant, especiallie with their whole forces, it were questionlesse not only, not without danger, but in al pro∣babilitie likelie, that the phalanx should euer carrie away the better. But if that may be auoided, which is easily done: shal not that disposition then, be vtterlie vnprofitable, and free from all terror? And it is farther euident, that the phalanx must necessarily haue plaine & champion places, without any hinderances, or impediments; as ditches, vneuen places, vallies, little hils and riuers: for al these may hinder & disioine it. And it is almost impossible to haue a plaine of the ca∣pacity of 20. stadia, much lesse more, where there shall bee found none of these impediments. But suppose there bee found such places, as are proper for the phalanx: If the enemy refuse to come vnto them, and in the meane time, spoile, and sacke the cities, and countrie round about; what commodity, or profit shal arise by an army so ordered? for if it remaine in such places, as hath beene be∣fore spoken of; it can neither relieue their friends, nor preserue themselues. For the Conuoies which they expect from their friends, are easily cut off by the ene∣my, whiles they remaine in those open places.

And if it happen at any time, that they leaue them vpon any enterprise, they are then exposed to the enemy. But suppose, that the Romaine army should find the phalanx in such places, yet would it not aduēture it selfe in grosse at one instant; but would by little & little retire it selfe, as doth plainly appeare by their vsual practise. For there must not bee a coniecture of these things by my words only, but especially by that which they do. For they do not so equally frame their battaile, that they doe assault the enemy altogether, making as it were but one front: but part make a stande, and parte charge the enemie, that if at any time the Phalanx doe presse them, that come to assault them and bee repelled; the force of their order is dissolued. For whether they pursue those that retire, or flie from those that do assault them, these doe disioyne themselues from part of their armie; by which meanes there is a gap opened to their enemies, stauding and attending their opportunitie: so that nowe they neede not anie more to charge them in the front, where the force of the phalanx consisteth: but to as∣sault where the breach is made, both behind, and vpon the sides. But if at any

time the Romaine armie may keepe his due proprietie, and disposition, the phalanx by the disaduantage of the place, being not able to doe the like: doth it not then manifestlie demonstrate the difference to be great, betweene the good∣nes of their disposition, and the disposition of the phalanx?

To this may bee added the necessities imposed vppon an army, which is to march through places of all natures, to encampe themselues, to possesse places of aduantage, to besiege, and to be besieged; and also contrary to expectation sometimes to come in viewe of the enemie: For all these occasions necessarilie accompanie an armie; and oftentimes are the especial causes of victory, to which the Macedonian phalanx is no way fit, or conuenient: Forasmuch as neither in their generall order, nor in their particular disposition, without a conuenient place, are able to effect any thing of moment: but the Romaine army is apt for all these purposes. For euerie soldiour amongst them, beeing once armed and ready to fight, refuseth no place, time, nor occasion; keeping alwaies the same order, whether he fight togither with the whole body of the army, or particular∣lie by himselfe, man to man.

And hence it happeneth, that as the commodity of their disposition is aduan∣tagious: so the end doth answere the expectation.

These things I thought to speake of at large, because many of the Grecians are of an opinion, that the Macedonians are not to bee ouercome. And againe, many wondered, how the Macedonian phalanx should bee put to the worst by the Romaine army, considering the nature of their weapons.

Thus far goeth Polibyus, in comparing the weapons and imbattailing of the Romaines, with the vse of armes amongst the Macedonians: wherein we see the Pike trulie, and exactlie ordered, according as the wise Grecians could best proportion it with that forme of battell, which might giue most aduan∣tage to the vse thereof: so that if our squadrons of Pikes iumpe not with the perfect manner of a phalanx, (as wee see they doe not) they fall so much shorte of that strength, which the wisedome of the Grecians and the experi∣ence of other nations, imputed vnto it. But suppose wee could allow it that dis∣position, in the course of our wars, which the nature of the weapon doth require; yet forasmuch as by the authority of Polybius, the said maner of imbattailing is tied to such dangerous circumstances of one time, one place, and one kinde of fight: I hold it not so profitable a weapon, as the practise of our times doth seem to make it, especially in woody countries, such as Ireland is; where the vse is cut off by such inconueniences, as are noted to hinder the managing thereof. And doubtles, if our commanders did but consider of the incongruity of the Pike & Ireland, they would not proportion so great a number of thē in euery company, as there is; for commonly halfe the company are pikes, which is as much to saie in the practise of our wars, that halfe the army hath neither offensiue nor defen∣siue weapōs, but only against a troupe of horse. For they seldom or neuer come to the push of pike, with the foot cōpanies, where they may charge & offende the enemy: & for defence, if the enemy think it not safe to buckle with thē at hād, but maketh more aduantage to play vpon thē a far off with short; it affordeth smal safe¦ty to shake a long pike at them, and stand faire in the meane time, to entertaine

a volleie of shot with the body of their battailion. As I make no question, but the pike in some seruices is profitable, as behind a rampier, or at a breach; so I assure my selfe, there are weapons if they were put to triall, that would counter∣uaile the pike euen in those seruices, wherein it is thought most profitable.

Concerning the Target, we see it take the hand, in the iudgement of Polybi∣us, of all other weapons whatsoeuer, aswell in regard of the diuers and sundrie sortes of imbattailing, as the qualitie of the place whersoeuer: for their vse was as effectuall in small bodies and centuries, as in grosse troupes and great com∣panies; in thinne and spacious imbattailing, as in thicke thronged Testudines. Neither could the nature of the place make them vnseruiceable; for whether it were plaine or couert; leuel or vnequall; narrow or large, if there were any com∣modity to fight, the Target was as necessarie to defend, as the sword to offend: besides the conueniency, which accompanieth the Target in any necessitie im∣posed vpon an armie, whether it bee to march through places of all natures, to make a fast march, or a speedie retraite, to incampe themselues, to possesse places of aduantage, to besiege and to be besieged, as Polybius saith, with ma∣nie other occasions which necessarilie accompanie an armie. The vse of this weapon hath beene too much neglected in these latter ages, but may be happi∣lie renued againe in our nation, if the industrie of such as haue laboured to pre∣sent it vnto these times, in the best fashion, shall finde anie fauour in the opini∣on of our commaunders. Concerning which Target, I must needes saie this much, that the light Target will proue the Target of seruice, whensoeuer they shall happen to be put in execution: for those which are made proofe, are so heauie and vnwieldie, (although it be somewhat qualified with such helpes as are annexed to the vse thereof,) that they ouercharge a man, with an vnsup∣portable burthen, and hinder his agilitie and execution in fight, with a waight disproportionable to his strēgth. For our offensiue weapons, as namely the Har∣gebusiers and musketiers, are stronger in the offensiue part, then any armes of defence, which may be made manageable and fit for seruice. Neither did the Romains regard the proofe of their Target further, then was thought fit for the readie vse of them in time of battel, as it appeareth in many places, both in the ciuill warres and in these Commentaries: for a Romaine pile hath often times darted through the Target, and the bodie of the man that bare it, and fastened them both to the ground, which is more then a musket can wel do; for the bul∣let commonly resteth in the bodie. And although it may be said that this was not cōmon, but rather y^e effect of an extraordinary arme; yet it serueth to proue, that their Targets were not proofe to their offensiue weapons, when they were well deliuered and with good direction. For I make no doubt, but in their bat∣tailes there were oftentimes some hinderances, which woulde not suffer so vio∣lent an effect, as this which I speake of: for in a volley of shotte, wee must not thinke that all the bullets flie with the same force, and fall with the like hurt; but as armour of good proofe will hardly hold out some of them; so slender armes and of no proofe, will make good resistance against others. And to conclude, in a battell or incounter at hand, a man shall meete with more occasions, suting the nature and commoditie of this light Target, then such as will aduantage

the heauie Target of proofe, or counteruaile the surplus of waight, which it earieth with it.

Some men will vrge, that there is vse of this Target of proofe, in some pla∣ces and in some seruices: which I deny not to those, that desire to bee secured from the extremity of peril: but this falleth out in some places and in some particular seruices, and hindereth not but that the vniuersal benefit of this wea∣pon consisteth in the multitude of light Targetiers, who are to manage the most important occasions of a warre.

This much I am further to note, concerning the sworde of the Targetiers, that according to the practise of the Romaines, it must alwaies hang on the right side; for carying the Target vpon the left arme, it cannot be that the sword should hang on the left side, but with great trouble and annoiance: And if any man say, that if it hang on the right side, it must bee verie short, otherwise it will neuer bee readilie drawne out. I saie that the sworde of the Targetiers, in regard of the vse of that weapon, ought to be of a very short scantling, when as the Targetier is to command the point of his sword within the compasse of his Target, as such as looke into the true vse of this weapon, wil easily discouer. But let this suffice concerning the vse of the pike and the Target.

Notes

• Caesar.
• And there∣fore I rather take it to bee something els then a word.
• The place and office of a primipile.
• The Target described.
• Lib. 16. c. 40.