QVEST. VI. That Sense is not a simple action.
THat Sensation is not a meere passion, is plaine from that which hath beene said. Now it is to bee considered, whether it ought to bee called an Ac∣tion, * 1.1 that is, whether Sense doe perceiue onely by doing or acting. And that setting aside all digressions, I may come to the matter; I say. Seeing euery Agent in doing and acting doth also suffer againe, it followes ne∣cessarily, that the Sense doth continualle suffer something from the sensible Obiect: for there is no man ignorant that to the effecting of Sensation it is necessary that the * 1.2 Sense be conuerted into the nature of the sensible thing, but it cannot be conuerted but by alteration, because things of an vnlike nature cannot be made of one nature, ex∣cept the one of them be changed, but the Sense and Obiect be of an vnlike condition. And this is it where-vpon Aristotle so oft beateth, that the Sense is potentially that which the sensible thing is actually and really, and except the Sense doe passe into the nature of the organ Sensation cannot be performed. Whence it followeth, that the * 1.3 sensible thing doth alter the Sense and turnes it into it owne nature, and therefore Ari∣stotle often times calls Sense an alteration, for so Sense is made. Now if the Sense be al∣tered and changed by the Obiect, it is necessary that it must suffer, because the sensible thing when it altereth the Sense worketh vpon it. Hence it is more then manifest that Sense is not perfected by a simple Action.