Mikrokosmographia a description of the body of man. Together vvith the controuersies thereto belonging. Collected and translated out of all the best authors of anatomy, especially out of Gasper Bauhinus and Andreas Laurentius. By Helkiah Crooke Doctor of Physicke, physitian to His Maiestie, and his Highnesse professor in anatomy and chyrurgerie. Published by the Kings Maiesties especiall direction and warrant according to the first integrity, as it was originally written by the author.

QVEST. V. That Sense is not apure passion.

Eeing therefore that vnto an action there doe necessarily concurre an a∣gent and a patient; the agent for to worke, and the patient to be a fit subiect for the agent and to receiue the action; it may now be demanded whether the action proceede from the Organ vnto the sensible obiect, or from the obiect vnto the Organ, and whether this be to bee accounted an agent the other a patient, or on the contrary. Concerning this poynt there bee diuers opinions of Au∣thours, for some maintaine Sense to bepassiue, others actiue, others both actiue & passiue. Aristotle doth contend for those which would haue Sense to bee passiue, especially in the 118. text of his 2. book de Anima, wherein expresse termes he affirmeth that to perceiue is a kind of suffering, & also calleth the obiect an agent: again in the 51. text of the same booke, he saith, that Sensation hapneth in that which is moued and suffereth. And he seemes most exactly to demonstrate it in the 12. text of his 7. booke of Physicks, saying, That the senses are altered: for they suffer, and their action is a motion througha body which suffers in the Sensa∣tion So that it may be gathered out of these places of Aristotle that Sense is made passiuely, that is, that the act of Sensation is not made by the Sense, but by the sensible obiect, and that the sense doth nothing else but receiue the species from the thing obiected and suffer from it: but this opinion though it be approued of many and be held for Aristotles, yet it is neither agreeable to Aristotle nor to the truth. That the places cited out of Aristotle doe not confirme this we will proue by and by, when as by many reasons we shall haue demon∣strated how farre distant it is from the truth. For first, if the Sense should onely concurre passiuely vnto sensation, that is, if sensation were onely a reception of the sensible species, then we must needes euen when we are asleepe heare, smell, & see, seeing therfore; that al∣though when we are a sleepe some certaine noyses or sounds be carryed to our eares, and some odors do strike the nosthrils and colours (if so be we sleep with our eyes open as some doe) bee presented to our eyes, yet we doe not heare or smell, or see; it will follow necessa∣rily that something else must concurre vnto sensation beside a simple reception of the sensible species. Add further, that though wee receiue a visible thing into our Eyes, and a sound into our Eares, yet we neither see nor heare when wee are intent another way, or haue our vnderstanding exercised in greater matters. Wherefore there must be some part of the mind present in sensation; and hence it is that wee sometimes seeke a very small thing and yet see it not though we be very neare it, and though it be already re∣ceiued

into the eye: Surely this is an argument most euident that the mind must be applied to that thing which we would see, and that something more is required to Sense then the bare reception of the species, for else a glasse might also perceiue in as much as it doth re∣ceiue the images. Moreouer, if onely the reception of species were a sensation, all action should proceede from the sensible species, & that species should be so prompt vnto action that it would worke euery where and vpon euery subiect, and so would make sense; euen as heate doth make hot euery where and euery thing; but this is impossible, for who euer affirmed that sense was made out of his proper Organ.

Sensation is not therefore an action onely of the sensible species, neither was it Aristo∣tles opinion, for in the 37. text of his second booke de Anima, hee teacheth the plaine contrary, and affirmeth manifestly, that the soule is the efficient cause of sensation, and therefore not the sensible thing, and in the ninth chapter of the ninthbooke of his Metaph. he prooues that vision is an action of the sight. And what can be more manifest then that which he expresseth in the second chapter of his book de sensu & sensili where he reproo∣ueth Democritus for saying that vision was an operation of the obiect: and propounding the conformity of the similitude which the sensible thing hath with the Organ, hee saith, the sensible thing causeth the sense to worke, as if he should say, the obiect doth excite and pro∣uoke the sense vnto action. The poynt is as cleare as the light, but yet what shall wee answer to those contrary places, quoted euen now out of Aristotle, for it seemeth by them to bee plainly affirmed that sense is passiue. But I deferre the reconciliation of this contradiction till the seuenth Question, where you shall haue also Placentinus his resolution.

Notes

• Whether the obiect or the organ doe worke in the sense.
• Their reason which say sense doth suffer.
• That opinion disproued. 1. Reason.
• 2. Reason.
• Arist. thought the contrary.