QVEST. XI. Whence it is that we perceiue that we haue Sense.
IF therefore none of the external Senses do performe this function, what may it be? Is it the worke of our vnderstanding or of our Reason? No: for this a∣ction is common to brute Beasts which be destitute of reason. For they know when they do not See, or Heare, or Smell and so in the rest. And that they know so much may easily bee gathered by their opening of their eies vvhen they be shut, and pricking vp their Eares when they would See or Heare. Neither neede we wonder heereat, for they are enriched with some Functions that come nerer vnto rea∣son it selfe, as I might easily prooue by many instances of diuers creatures out of Aristotle and Pliny and other Historians if I thought it pertinent to this place. Seeing therefore vnreasonable creatures do know when they perceiue, that is haue vse of their Sences, it fol∣loweth necessarilie, that that knowledge is not a worke of Reason.
Neyther is it any worke of the Phantasie, in regard that it worketh after the act of per∣ceiuing when the obiect is not present; but this Sence ought to iudge, at least then when we haue vse of Sense, that we doe vse it, and after Sensation to doe nothing, whence A∣ristotle in the 136 Text of the third Booke de anima handling this matter affirmeth, that this is done continually in the first Sense. And this Sense is the common Sense, so cal∣led because it is proper to no one Sense, but is equally common to all; for Nature hath alwayes endeuoured that shee may bring a multitude into an vnity so much as possibly may be: wherefore she hath ioyned in one common sence al the outward Senses, wher∣into as lines going from the circumference into the center they may determine: & this hath the Philosopher verie elegantly declared in the 30. Text of his third Booke De A∣nima, and calleth this Common Sence the meane or middle betweene the external Sen∣ses, considering them as the Circumference and this as the Center. This is that Sence by which we know that we Heare & See and perform the functions of the other Senses: this is it which being bound in our sleep maketh vs ignorant of our Sensation: this is it which except it be present all the other Senses are vnprofitable: this is it which offereth to the Phansie the species which the outward Senses haue perceiued, and the phantasmes to the vnderstanding. In a word, this is it without which neither the externall nor inter∣nall Senses, nor the principall Faculties of the Soule could consist entire and absolute.