The booke of Marcus Tullius Cicero entituled Paradoxa Stoicorum Contayninge a precise discourse of diuers poinctes and conclusions of vertue and phylosophie according the traditions and opinions of those philosophers, whiche were called Stoikes. Wherunto is also annexed a philosophicall treatyse of the same authoure called Scipio hys dreame. Anno. 1569.

❀The third Paradoxe vvherin accordyng to the opinion of the Stoikes, he proueth all faultes to bee equall.

THe thinge (will some man saye) is small and of litle value: but y^e offence is great. For offēces and faultes must bee waighed and consi∣dered, not accordinge to the chaunce & happe of the deedes, but according to the vicious intente and naughtye disposition of the parties offendinge. One offence (I graūt) may be greater or lesse in valew, then an other is: but as touchinge the nature of the offen∣ces and respecting them simply which way soeuer thou shiftest and turnest thy selfe, they are all one. A Pylote or chefe Mariner whiche negligentlye drowneth a shippe, whether the same be fraighted with Gold or w^t chaffe, is asmuch to be reprehended & disalo∣wed for the one as for the other. For although ther be some oddes and dif∣ference in the worth and valewe of y^t thinges, yet his ignoraunce and vn∣skilfulnes is all one. If a manne to staunch his inordinate and filthy lust,

do defloure a woman that is both a Strāger & also of pore estate & degre, the griefe of y^t villaine doth not apper¦taine to so many, as if he had lasciui∣ouslye constuprated a noble Damo∣sel, descended of som honorable house and pedagrew. But the offence was of it selfe neuer a whitte the lesse. For sinne or offence is nothinge els but a transgressing and passinge of the ly∣mittes & boundes of vertue. Whiche when thou hast once done, the faulte or trespasse is committed, and thou nedest not to aggrauate y^e same with heaping on any more, for thou hast de¦serued blame by comitting euen one. And whatsoeuer is vnlawful to bee done, is in this one poinct contayned, and expressely proued, in saying that it is not lawfull: Which can neyther be made more or lesse. For if it be not lawfull, it is sinne, which is alwayes one and the same: and therfore the vi∣ces that springe and proceede out of them, muste needes be equall. Also if

vertues be equall one wyth an o∣ther, vices also muste be equall. But it may most playnly and easelie be per∣ceiued and vnderstanded that vertu∣es are all equall one with an other, forasmuch as there can not bee anye man better then a good man, nor any more temperate, then hee that is temperate, neyther anye stowter and valianter then hee that is stoute and valiaunt, nor wyser then he that is wise, wilte thou call him a good man, that whereas he mighte gayne clearly and detaine to himselfe tenne pounds of gold being committed to his keepinge and custodie in secreate without any witnesse, yet faythfully and truly redeliuereth the same to y^e owner therof, if he would not do sem¦blablye in tenne thousande poundes? Or woulde you repute and take him to bee a temperate man, whiche can brydel his affections and refraine frō some one licencious lust, and lettethe go the Reynes of al disordered oute∣rage

in an other? Onely vertue is a∣greable with all reason and perpetu∣all constancie. Nothing can be added therevnto, to make it to bee more a vertue: nothing can be taken awaye from it, but the name of vertue shall strayght wayes, be taken away and ceasse. For if thinges that bee well done, be rightly and vertuously don, and nothing cā be righter then right, verily neither can anything be found that is better then good. It foloweth therfore, that vices are equal. For the naughtynesse of the mind are aptlye termed vyces. But syth vertues are equal, vertuous deedes also, (because they proceede and come of vertue) oughte to be equall Semblably syn∣nes because they sprynge and aryse out of vyces, must nedes be equall. Yea Sir, (wil some say) you take and ground this opinyon vpon the Phy∣losophers doctrine. I was afrayd, least you would haue sayd, I had be rowed and gathered it of Ribauo

and verletts. Socrates his vse and ma∣ner was to dispute after such a sorte. I am well apayde thereof: for aunci∣ent and autenticke hystoryes doe re∣corde and witnesse that hee was a profoundly learned and also a righte wyse man. But yet I demaund this question of you (seing we do quietlye reason the matter wyth gentle wor∣des and not with sturdye buffettes) whether when wee dispute of good thynges, we ought rather to seeke y^e mynd and opynion of rude and igno∣raunt Tankerd bearers & drudging labourers, or els of the approued lear¦ned and famous Phylosophers? espe∣cially sith ther is no sentence and opi∣nion eyther truer or more availeable to mans lyfe then this. What power or force doth more terrefye men from committing any kind of sinful actes, then when they knowe that there is no difference in offences, and that they do offende asmuche and as hey∣nously

in laying violent handes vpō priuate persons, as they should if they did the same to Magistrates and thē that be set in high authorytie? And what house soeuer they do polute w^t baudry and whoredome, that the dy∣shonestie and shame of the lecherous fact is equall and al one. What? is there no difference (wyll some saye) whether a man kyll his owne father, or els some common Seruaunt? If you meane these twoe comparisons barely and symplye, not addyng the cause or the kyllers intente, it is hard to be iudged of what sort they be. For if it be a horrible offēce of it self & sim∣ply for one to kyl his father, y^t Sagunti∣nes, who had leifer that their Paren∣tes should dye being free and vnuan∣quyshed, then to lyue in seruitude & slauerye, were Parricides. Therfore in some case the sonne may berefe his father of his lyfe wythoute offence, and manye times a poore drudge or

slaue maye be brought to his deathe, without great wronge and iniurye, And therfore the dyfference is in the cause, and not in the nature of the deede. Which being not sought for of the party actyue, but vpon vrgent cō¦sideration & respect of the other party done, it is done more redely and pro∣pēsiuely: but if the cause be a like and all one in both, the faultes also muste needes be equal. Notwithstandinge herein they do differ, that in killinge a Slaue. if it be done iniuriously, ther is but one single offence committed, but in killing and takinge awaye the life of a father, there are many fautes. for therein is an vnnaturall dealinge shewed to him that begat thee, that fostered and brought thee vp, that in structed and taught thee, that placed thee in good state to liue in the com∣mon wealth, and furnished thee with houses and necessaries. He is notori∣ous for his offences, which taketh a∣way

from his father, that which he himselfe receyued of him, and therfore deserueth a great deale more punish∣mente. But in the race and course of our life we ought not to waigh and consider what punishment is mete & due for euery faulte, but to looke and perpend what is lawfull and permit∣ted for euery man to do. To do that whiche behoueth not to be done we oughte to thinke to be an offence: but to do any thing which is prohibited & vnlawfull, we ought to iudge and ac∣compte a detestable and cursed deede. Is this to be so precisely taken for e∣uery light matter and small trespasse? Yea truelye, for we cannot imagine a meane of the thynges, but we maye bridle oure affections and keepe oure mindes in a modest measure. If a Stage player do neuer so little in his gesture misse & transgresse the notes of mesure or erre in pronouncing one sillable in a verse long which shoulde

be shorte or contrarywise that shorte which should be long, he is hissed at, derided, and with clapping of handes driuen away: and wilt thou say, that thou shouldest erre and offende so∣muche as in one syllable, in thy lyfe which ought to be more moderat thē any gesture & more inculpable then a¦ny verse? I cannot abide to heare a Poet make a fault in his verse thogh it be but in a trifeling matter, & shall I heare a citizen skanne vpon his fin∣gers his faultes which in the societye of his life he hath committed? Whiche if they seme to be shorter, yet how can they seme to be lighter sithens euery offence and sinne commeth by the per∣turbation of reason and order? For reason and order being once broken & perturbed, there can nothinge be ad∣ded, wherebye it maye seeme that the offence maye anye whitte more bee encreased.