The workes of Geffray Chaucer newlye printed, wyth dyuers workes whych were neuer in print before: as in the table more playnly doth appere. Cum priuilegio ad imprimendum solum.

Quoniam igitur, q̄ sit imperfecti que etiam perfecti boni forma vidisti nunc demonstrandum reor. &c.

FOr as moche than, as thou hast sene which is the fourm of good, that nys not parfyt and the forme of good which that is parfyte, nowe trowe I that it were good to shewe in what this perfection of blysfulnesse is set And in this thynge I trowe that we shall fyrst enquyre for to weten, yf that any suche maner good as thylke good as thou hast d••¦fynyshed a lytle here beforne, that is to sayn soueraygne good, may be founden in the na¦ture of thinges. For that vayne ymaginaci∣on of thought ne disceiue vs not, and put vs out of the sothfastnesse of thilke thynge that is submytted to vs. But it maye not be de∣nyed that thylke ne is, and that is ryght as a well of all goodes. For al thyng that is cle¦ped imparfyte, is proued imparfyte, by the amenusynge of perfection of thynge that is parfyte. And herof cōmeth it, that in euerye thyng generall, yf that men sene any thyng that is vnparfyte: certes thilke thyng gene∣rall,

there mote be some thynge that is per∣fyte. For yf so be that perfection is done a∣waye, menne maye not thynke ne saye from whence thylke thynge is, that is cleped im∣perfyte. For the nature ne toke nother begin¦nyng of thynges amenused and imperfyte, but it procedeth of thynges that ben al hole absolute, and discendeth so downe into the vttrest thynges, & in to thynges empty and without frute. But as I haue shewed a ly∣tell here beforne, that yf there be a blysful∣nesse that be freyle and vayne, & imparfyte, there maye no man dout, that there nis som¦blysfulnesse, that there is sadde, stedfast and parfyte.

B.

This is concluded ({quod} I) fermely and sothfastly.

P.

But consydre also ({quod} she) in whome this blisfulnesse inhabyteth. The cōmune accorde and conceyte of the courage of men proueth and graunteth, y^e god prince of all thynges is good. For so as nothynge may be ••houʒt better than good, it may not be douted than, that he that nothing nis bet¦ter thā he nis good. Certes, reason sheweth that god is so good, that it proueth by very force, that parfyte good is in hym. For yf God nis suche, he ne maye not ben prince of all thyng. For certes, somthyng possessynge in it selfe parfyte good, shulde be more wor∣thy than God: and it shulde semen that thilk thynge were fyrst and older than God. For we haue shewed apertly, that all thynges y^t bene parfyte, ben fyrst, or thinges that bene imparfyte. And for thy, for as moch as that my reason or my processe ne goo not awaye without an ende, we owē to graunten that the souerayne good is ryghtfull of souerayn parfyte good. And we haue establysshed, y^t the souerayne good is very blysfulnesse, thā mote it nedes be, that verye blysfulnesse is set in souerayne good.

B.

This take I well (quod I) ne this ne maye not be withsayde in no maner.

P.

But I praye the (quod she) se now how thou mayest prouen holily, and without corruption, this that we haue said that the souerayne God is full of ryght so∣uerayne good.

B.

In which maner ({quod} I)

P.

wenest thou ought ({quod} the) that the father of al thinges hath taken thilke souerayn good any where out of hym selfe? Of which soue¦rayne good, men proueth that he is full. Ryght as thou mightest thinkē, that god y^t hath blysfulnesse in hym selfe, and thilk blis∣fulnesse that is in hym were dyuers in sub∣staunce. For yf thou wene, y^t God hath recey¦ued thylke good out of hym self, thou mayst wene, that he that yaue thilke good to God be more worthye than God. But I am be∣knowe and confesse, and that ryght dignly, that God is right worthy aboue al thinges And yf so be, y^t this good be in him by nature but that is dyuers from hym by wenynge reason, syns we speken of God prynce of all thynges. Fayne who so fayne maye, who was he that conioyned these thynges togy∣ther. And eke at the last se well, that a thing that is dyuers fro anye thynge, that thylke thynge nys not that same thyng, for which it is vnderstonden to ben dyuers. Than folo¦weth it wel, that thylke thynge y^t by his na∣ture is dyuers from souerayne good, that thynge is not souerayne good. But certes, it were a felonous cursednesse to thynken, y^t of hym that nothynge nis more worth. For alwaye of all thynges the name of hem ne maye not ben better than her begynner. For which I maye concluden by ryght very rea¦son, that thylke that is begynnyng of al thin¦ges, thilke same thyng is souerayne God in his substaunce.

B.

Thou hast sayd ryghtful¦ly (quod I)

Philoso.

But we haue graūted (quod she) that the souerayne good is blys∣fulnesse.

Boece.

That is soth (quod I)

Phi∣losophye.

Than (quod she) we moten nedes graunten and confessen, that thilke same so∣uerayne good be God.

Boece.

Certes (quod I) I ne maye not denye ne withstande the reasons purposed: and I se well that it fo∣loweth by strength of the premisses.

Phylo.

Loke nowe (quod she) yf this be proued yet more fermely thus, that there ne mowē not ben to souerayne goodes that bene dyuers amonge hem selfe. For certes, the goodes that ben dyuers amonge hem selfe, that one is not that the other is. Than ne mowen nei¦ther of hem be parfyte, so as eyther of hem lacketh to other, but that that nys not par∣fyte, men maye sene apertly that it nys not souerayne. The thynges than that ben soue¦raynly good, ne mowen by no waye be dy∣uers. But I haue well concluded, that blys∣fulnesse and God bene the souerayne good, for whyche it mote neades bene that soue∣rayne blysfulnesse is souerayne dignitie.

Boce.

Nothynge (quod I) is more sothe∣fast

than this, ne more ferme by reason, ne a more worthye thynge than god may not be concluded.

Philosophy.

Vpon these thinges than (quod she) ryght as these geometriciēs whan they haue shewed theyr propositions ben wonte to bryngen in thynges that they clepen porrismes or declaracions of forsaid thynges, ryght so woll I yeue the here as a corallarye, or a mede of crowne. For why, for as moche as by the gettynge of blysful∣nesse, men bene maked blysfull: and blysful∣nesse is dignitie. Than is it manifest and o∣pen, that by the gettynge of dignitie men bē maked blysfull, ryght as by the gettynge of iustyce. And by the gettyng of sapyence they be maked wyse, ryghte so nedes by the sem∣blable reason, whan they haue gotten dyui∣nitie, they be made goddes. Than is euerye blysfull man a god. But certes, by nature there nys but one god, but by the participa∣cion of the diuynitie, there ne letteth, ne dy∣stourbeth nothynge, that there ne be manye goddes.

Boece.

This is (quod I) a fayre thynge and a precious, clepe it as thou wilt be it Corollarye, or Porrisme, or Mede of crowne, or declarynge.

Philosophy.

Certes (quod she) nothynge nys fayrer than is the thynge that by reason shoulde be added to these forsayde thynges.

Boece.

what thyng (quod I)

Phylosoph.

So (quod she) as it se∣meth, that blysfulnesse contayneth manye thynges, it were for to weten whether that all these thynges maken or conioynen as a maner bodye of blysfulnesse, by the diuersite of partyes, of membres, or els yf anye of all these thynges be suche that it accomplysshe by hym selfe the substaunce of blysfulnesse. So all these other thinges ben referred and brought to blysfulnesse, that is to say, as to the chefe of hem.

Boece.

I wolde (quod I) that thou madest me clerely to vnderstande what thou sayest, and what thou recordeste me the forsayde thynge.

Philosophye.

Haue I not iudged (quod she) that blysfulnesse is good?

Boece.

Yes forsoth (quod I) and that soueraigne good.

Philoso.

Adde than (quod she) thylke good that is made blysfulnesse to all the forsayde thynges. For thylke same blysfulnesse, that is demed to be soueraygne suffysaunce, thylke selfe is souerayne power souerayne reuerence, souerayne clerenesse or noblesse, and souerayne delyte. what sayest thou than of al these thynges, that is to say suffysaunce, power, and these other thyn∣ges? Ben they than as membres of blysful∣nesse, or ben they referred and brought to so¦uerayne good, ryght as al thynges that ben brought to the chefe of hem?

Boece.

I vnder¦stonde well (quod I) what thou purposeste to seke: but I desyre for to herken, that thou shewe it to me.

Philoso.

Take now thus the discretion of this question (quod she.) Yf all these thynges (quod she) weren membres to felicitie, than weren they dyuers that one from that other: and suche is the nature of partyes or of membres, that dyuers mem∣bres compownen a bodye.

Boece.

Certes ({quod} I) it hath well be shewed here beforne, that all these thynges ben all one thinge.

Philo.

Than ben they mo membres (quod she.) For els it shulde seme, that blisfulnesse were conioyned all of o membre aloone, but that is a thynge that maye not be done.

Boece.

This thyng (quod I than) ••••s not doutous but I abyde to hearken the remnaunt of thy questyon.

Philo.

This is open and clere ({quod} she) that all other thynges ben referred and brought to good. For therfore is suffysaūce requyred, for it is demed to be good, and for thy is power requyred, for men trowen al∣so that it be good. And this same thynge mowen we thynken and coniecten of reue∣rence, of noblesse and of delyte. Than is soue¦rayne good, the summe and the cause of all that ought to ben desyred. For why, thylke thyng that withholdeth no good in it sell, ne semblaunce of good, it ne maye nor well in no maner be desyred ne requyred. And con¦trarye: For though that thynges by her na∣ture ne ben not good, algates yf men wenen that they ben good, yet ben they desyred as though they were verelye good. And there∣fore it is sayde, that men ought to wene by ryght, that bountie bene the souerayne fyne and the cause of all the thynges that bene to requyren. But certes, thilke that is cause for which mē requiren any thing, it semeth that thilke same thyng be most desyred, as thus: Yf that a wyghte wolde ryden for cause of heale, he ne desyreth not so moch y^e mouinge to ryden as the effecte of his heale. Nowe than syns that al thynges ben requyred for the grace of good, they ben not desyred of al folke more than the same good.

But we haue graunted that blysfulnesse is that same thynge, for whyche that all these other thynges bene desyred. Than is it thus that certes only blysfulnesse is required and desyred. By whych thynge it sheweth clere∣lye, that of good and blysfulnesse is all one & the same substaunce.

Boece.

I se not (quod I) wherfore that men myghte discorden in thys.

Philosoph.

And we haue shewed, that God and very blysfulnesse is all one thynge.

Boe.

That is soth ({quod} I).

Phi.

Than mowe we conclude sykerly, that the substaunce of God is set in thylke same good, and in none other place