The Christians bulvvarke, against Satans battery. Or, The doctrine of iustification so plainely and pithily layd out in the severall maine branches of it as the fruits thereof may be to the faithfull, as so many preservatives against the poysonous heresies and prevailing iniquities of these last times. By H.B. pastor of S. Mathevvs Friday-street.

CHAP. II. Wherein the doctrine of Romish preparation is examined.

IT being the maine drift of this Councell, to establish a righ∣teousnesse inherent in a mans selfe; and not finding how to dimme the bright sun-shine of truth against this doctrine, but by an artificiall shadow of the second beames of grace, medled and mingled with blinde, or at the best, bleare-eyed nature: therefore the iudicious Reader may obserue, how while this Councell would seeme in part to ascribe the worke of Iustifi∣cation to Gods grace, it doth in deed, and in the maine, attri∣bute it to mans nature; as may appeare in laying the first stone of this Babylonish building, Of the necessitie of prepara∣tion to Iustification. The whole frame of which preparation, composed according to the modell of their Schoole-diuini∣tie, as Cabriel Biel, one of their chiefe Sententiaries, who liued* 1.1 about fifty yeares before this Councell, hath laid it downe, as, That the Act of the will, presupposeth the Act of the vn∣derstanding; and the Act of faith goes formost to apprehend

the abomination of sinne, and the wages of it: hence a feare of Gods wrath, and of hell fire, hence a dislike and detestati∣on of sinne. And this (saith he) is a disposition of Congruity, neither immediate nor sufficient, but very remote. Then faith turnes it selfe to the consideration of Gods mercy, and resol∣ueth that God is ready to remit sinne, through the infusion of charity, to those that are sufficiently prepared and dispo∣sed. Vpon that consideration followeth the act of hope, whereby a man begins to couet after God, as the soueraigne good; and from this act of hope, he riseth to loue God aboue all things, euen out of pure naturals. From this loue issueth another dislike and detestation of sinne; not for feare of dam∣nation, but for God, finally, aboue all things beloued: And all these acts are followed with a purpose of amendment. And so at length this comes to be a sufficient merit of Congruity, being the immediate and finall disposition to the infusion of grace. And this is such a preparation, as doth necessarily, as by a chaine of so many infolded linkes, draw after it the infu∣sion of grace, whereby a man is iustified. Thus wee see, by what perplexed pathes they would leade men towards their iustification. But note here, what a power they giue to this preparation, as euen to necessitate and inforce the infusion of grace: because, saith Biel, to a man that doth as much as lyes in him, God hath determined infallibly to giue grace. And Aquinas saith, it is a merit of Congruity, that when a man* 1.2 doth wellvse his vertue, God, according to his super-excel∣lent vertue, should worke more excellently in him: Videtur Congruum, saith he: It seemes Congruous, and agreeable to reason, that a man operating according to his vertue, God should recom∣pence him according to the excellencie of his vertue. Yea, such is the force of this merit of Congruity, that according to Tho∣mas,* 1.3 it will merit not onely grace for a mans selfe, but also for another man: for because (saith he) a man in the state of grace doth fulfill the will of God, it is Congruous, or fitting, that according to the proportion of friendship, God should fulfill mans will in the saluation of another man. Such is the nature of their doctrine of Congruitie, of which sort are their workes of preparation,

disposing and fitting a man for grace. And this is the sense and summe of the Trent doctrine, touching preparation.

Now to cut off this Goliahs head, we neede no other than his owne sword. First, concerning the title it selfe, of the ne∣cessity of preparation in the Adulti, or men growne, as we call them; note here the vanity of this doctrine, how therein they confound themselues. For I would aske them, whom they meane by their Adulti, or men of yeares? Those within their* 1.4 owne Church, such as are baptized? or Heathens and Pagans, without the pale of the Church, such as are not yet baptized, as Turkes, Iewes, or Indians? Surely they mention those Adulti that are not yet baptized. But it must needs be, that they in∣clude* 1.5 their owne Adulti: for else what vse is there in their Church of this doctrine of preparation, which they so highly aduance & commend, vnlesse it be among the barbarous Indi∣ans? But their Adulti haue already (according to their do∣ctrine) receiued the grace of Iustification in their Baptisme, conferring grace, as they say, ex opere operato: which grace be∣ing once by any mortall sin afterwards lost, there can be no more merit of Congruitie, to merit a reparation of grace, as it is in the preparation vnto grace, as Thomas teacheth.* 1.6

But leaue we the title, and let vs come to the thing. Po∣pish preparation vnto grace, hangs vpon two speciall hinges: First, free-will; secondly, that this free-will is moued by grace, which their Schoole-men call the first grace, implyed in this* 1.7 Councell. A free-will they must haue, though they confesse it to be weake and feeble. And such a free-will wee easily grant them; as loth to incurre their Anathema, for say∣ing that free-will is altogether lost, and extinguished by A∣dams fall. The praise which Vega, their Interpreter, giues to Richardus learned saying (as he cals it) of free-will, wee also (with its proper limitation) admit of. a 1.8When thou hearest (saith he) that free-will is a captiue, vnderstand nothing else, but that it is weake, and depriued of the vertue of its natiue power. Be∣ing thus weake then, how should it dispose it selfe to receiue

grace? No, saith the Councell, (as also their Schoole-men) Free-will being weake, it must be stirred vp, moued, and helped by grace, and then it disposeth it selfe freely to receiue the grace of iu∣stification. So free-will, as the God Baal, being asleepe, must bee awakened, and stirred vp by Gods grace. Well, but what grace of God is this, I pray you, that thus moueth mans free-will, as the waight, that sets the wheele a going? Surely I can learne no more from the Councels own mouth, (who knowes full well how to temper her words) but that this mouing grace of God is some sound in the eare, whereby Popish faith is conceiued. Or else, when God toucheth mans heart by the* 1.9 illumination of the Holy Ghost, according to that of Gabriel Biel, who saith, that the will in the acts of it, doth presuppose the acts of the vnderstanding: and the vnderstanding wee know, must be informed by hearing, or by speciall illumina∣tion. But in generall, this grace they call the first grace, or a* 1.10 grace that is freely giuen, differing from the second grace, which they call a grace that makes a man gracious and ac∣ceptable. They say, this first grace is freely giuen, because no merit goes before it: neither is this any sauing grace, because (as they confesse) all men are alike capable of it, and many receiue it, that neuer come to saluation. This is that grace, which Arminius cals his sufficient grace.

But Aquinas saith plainly, that this first grace is not the* 1.11 grace of the Holy Ghost; for to the grace of the Holy Ghost, hee attributeth the merit of Condignity: but to that grace, whereby the will disposeth it selfe, the merit only of Congrui∣tie. But this first grace being once receiued, and entertained by free-wil, cooperating with it, a man disposeth & prepareth himselfe to merit the second grace by way of Congruity. And yet Aquinas, speaking of this grace, saith, Deus non dat gratiam* 1.12 nisi dignis, &c. God giues not grace but to the worthy; yet (saith hee) not so, as being first worthy, but because hee by grace makes them worthy. O miserable perplexity! If God giue grace to none but to the worthy, then they were worthy before hee gaue them grace; but if they were not worthy before he gaue them grace, how doth he giue grace to none but to the wor∣thie?

But whatsoeuer this first grace is, wherby the will is first moued, Aquinas tels vs what it is not; namely, that it is not the* 1.13 grace of the Holy Ghost: for the merit that proceedeth of the grace of the Holy Ghost, is of Condignity; but the merit that proceedeth from free-will, moued by the first grace, is onely the merit of Congruity, farre inferiour to that of Condigni∣tie. But that we may not lose our selues in this Maze, let Vega and Soto tell vs the Counsels minde in this point, as being themselues most prinie to it. Onely the worst is, wee finde them two of opposite opinions, in this point of merit by Con∣gruitie. Vega admitteth merit of Congruity after the first* 1.14 grace, disposing a man to the grace of iustification. But it is pretty to note the vafrous and subtile elusion and euasion that he findeth against the streame of Fathers, and especially of St. Augustine in this point: For whereas they (as himselfe con∣fesseth)* 1.15 shut out all kind of merit from iustification, teaching that it is freely giuen to all: Vega turnes the Cat in the pan, and saith, Loquuntur de gratia iustificationis, &c. They speake* 1.16 (saith he) of the grace of iustification, as it comprehends all the gifts of God belonging to our iustification; whereof, in that pro∣position a little before, hee makes the first grace to be one. And so take iustification as it comprehends the first grace in it, it excludes all merit; because no merit goes before the first grace, as the most of them teach: but taking the grace of iu∣stification alone by it selfe, which is the gratia gratum faciens, the grace that makes a man accepted, it may bee questioned (saith he) whether that may not fall vnder the merit at least of Con∣gruitie. Whereupon hee inferreth his fourth proposition, which is, That faith and other good workes, whereby wee are dispo∣sed* 1.17 vnto the second grace, by which wee are formally iustified, and made acceptable to God, doe by Congruitie merit such grace, and our iustification. Yea Vega ibid. saith, Alia sunt merita ex congruo, quae in peccatoribus reperiuntur, quae nullo praemi•• digna sunt, quia fiunt ab hominibus Deo ingratis & exo••is: sed tamen eiusmodi ex se sunt, vt Congruum sit, & diuinam bonitatem condeceat, ea ex libe∣ralitate & benignitate sua acceptare, vt trahat peccatores ad suam

gratiam: Of another sort are those merits of Congruitie found in sinners, which are worthy of no reward, as being done by men not liked nor beloued of God: but yet of themselues they are such, that it is Congruous and meete, and beseeming the diuine goodnesse, out of his liberalitie and bountie to accept them, that hee may draw sinners to his grace. But Soto on the other side, shutteth out all man∣ner of merit of Congruity, going before iustification. Pergi∣mus* 1.18 pro ingenio nostro constituere, &c. Wee proceede (saith Soto) according to our capacitie to define, that before iustification, which is wrought by that grace that makes a man accepted, there is in mans workes no merit, either of Condignitie or of Congruitie. But a little after, hee makes a full amends for it, saying, Cum autem quis, &c. When a man begins once to be in the state of grace, (to wit of iustification) then may hee merit both for himselfe by Condignitie, and for others by Congruitie. Other merit of Congruity, going before the grace of iustification, Soto confesseth he findes no foundation of any, vnlesse that of St. Augustine, alleadged by Thomas; Fides meretur iustificationem; that faith meriteth iustifi∣cation. But Soto would haue this put among St. Augustines re∣tractations: whereas by Merit in that place, is meant, not either any Congruity or Condignity, (termes vnknowne to the ancient Fathers in any such sense) but onely the meanes or instrument to procure or acquire grace. And as Soto him∣selfe a little after, acknowledgeth St. Augustines meaning, ex∣pressed by himselfe, by the word Impetrare iustificationem: That whereas he saith, Faith doth merit iustification, his meaning is, faith obtaineth iustification, sine aliqua ratione meriti; without any respect of merit.

Here let mee insert by the way, a worthy annotation of* 1.19 George Cassander, vpon the word Mereri, or Merit, in his se∣cond Scholia vpon his Ecclesiasticke hymnes, printed at Paris 1616▪ for in other later impressions, haply you shall finde this Scholia is quite purged out by the Index Expurgatorius, composed by the commandement of the Catholike King, Phi∣lip the second, and by the aduice also of the Duke of Albany; the copy whereof was printed at Strasburgh. The words of the Index are these: Scholium incipiens, Vocabulum merendi apud

veteres, &c. deleatur totum. The Scholium of George Cassander, beginning thus, &c. Let it be wholly cancelled▪ But being notwith∣standing preserued from this Purgatory fire, let vs note it. Vocabulum merendi apud veteres Ecclesiasticos Scriptores, ferè idem valet, quod consequi, seu aptum idoneum{que} fieri ad consequendum. Id, quodinter caetera, vel ex vno Cypriani loco apparet. Nam quod Paultu inquit, 1. Tim. 1. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 quod vulgò dicitur, Misericor∣diam consecutus sum: vel vt Erasmus veriit, Misericordiam adep∣tus sum: id Cyprianus ad Iubaianum legit, Misericordiam merui. Et multa loca sunt in Ecclesiasticis officijs, & precibus, vbi hoc vocabu∣lum hoc intellectu accipi debeat. Quae vocis notio si retineatur, multa quae duriùs dici videntur, mitiora & commodiora apparebunt. The word Merit (saith Cassander) among ancient Ecclesiasticall Writers, doth commonly import as much, as to attaine, or to be made apt and fit to attaine, or obtaine. That, which among others, doth appeare out of one place of Cyprian. For that which Paul saith, 1. Tim. 1. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which the vulgar latine rendreth, But I obtained mercie: or as Erasmus rendreth it, I got or receiued mercie. The same doth Cyprian to Iubaianus reade, I merited mercie. And many other places (saith hee) there are in the Ecclesiasticall offices and prayers, where this word (Merit) ought to bee taken in this sense. Which sense of the word, if it bee retained, many things which seeme to be spoken harshly, will appear more gentle and accommodate. Thus Cassander. But this (among sundry other sayings of Cassander) being condemned by the Index to bee purged out of his workes, doth plainly shew what opinion the Pontificians haue of Merit, aduancing it to a sense of a higher straine, than the ancient Fathers of the Church were euer acquainted withall. Or let the Pontificians themselues interpret vnto vs the meaning of this word Merit, vsed by St. Augustine, spea∣king of the sinne of our first Parents, Foelix culpa, quae tale••* 1.20 meruit Redemptorem. Will they say, that Adams sinne merited, either by Congruity or by Condignity, Christ the Redeemer? And againe, where hee saith, Nemo de sui peccati dimissione de∣speret,* 1.21 quando illi veniam meruerunt, qui occiderunt Christum: Let none despaire of the pardon of his sinne, when as they merited pardon which killed Christ. Will they therefore say, that they which

murthered Christ, merited pardon, either Congruously or Condignly? Or what meant Gregory, firnamed the Great, Bi∣shop of Rome, when he vsed the word Merit to Sauls perse∣cuting the Church of Christ, saying * 1.22 Illi dictum est, Quid me persequeris? Iste verò audire meruit, Dimissum est tibi peccatum tuum; To him it was said, Why do est thou persecute me? But he me∣rited to heare, Thy sinne is forgiuen thee. What merit was this trow we? And the same Gregory speaking of the theefe vpon the Crosse, saith, Latro cruentis manibus audire meruit, &c. The theefe with his bloudy hands merited to heare, This day shalt thou be with me in Paradise. What merit was in his bloudy hands? But thus we see the meaning of the word Merit in these purer and ancient times, vsed for to obtaine, or such like.

But to returne whence we digressed; we see Vega and Soto, two grand Captaines in the Trent Councell, one directly op∣posite to the other in the matter of merit of Congruity. But the Councell, through the dexterity of * 1.23 Sancti Crucij, hath so composed the decrees, and namely this of preparation, as that by profound equiuocations, euen flat contradictions are reconciled. But the conclusion is, that merit of Congruitie is ratified by the Councell, in the necessity of preparatorie workes to iustification; but inuolued in such generall termes, that Soto and his side holding the contrary, may not take of∣fence at it, but be made to beleeue, that the Councell is for them. In so much as Soto in his three bookes de Natura & Gratia, which he writes as a Commentary of this Session of the Councell, sets downe all the Decrees and Canons of the same, as the ground and text of his Commentary.

Take one notable instance of their egregious equiuocati∣on, in the first Canon of this Session before alleadged. If any* 1.24 man shall say, that a man may bee iustified before God by his owne workes, which are done either by the power of mans nature, or by the doctrine of the law, without diuine grace by Iesus Christ, let him be accursed. Note here what variety of senses this Canon is full charged withall. Would Vega and his side haue their merit of Congruity decreed? Here is a Canon leueld against all

those that shall say, that a man by his own works may be iusti∣fied before God, without the grace of God; implying, that by, and with the grace of God assisting a man, he may be iustified before God by his owne works, done by the power of nature (as his free-will) or by the doctrine of the law. Yea but thus Soto may feare, that the Anathema, the deadly bullet of this Canon, will hit himselfe, for denying all merit of Congruity, done by the power of nature, assisted by grace, going before iustification. Then let Soto but view ouer the Canon againe, & hee shall see it turned and leuelled against the Pelagians, who taught, that a man by his owne workes, done by the power of nature, may be iustified before God, without diuine grace by Iesus Christ. Or against the vnbeleeuing Iewes, who thought to be iustified before God by the obseruation of Mo∣ses law, sauing onely that the Councell hath cautelously and correctedly expressed this, vnder the name of the letter of Moses law, Chapt. 1. as here, vnder the name of the doctrine of the law, lest (as the History of the Trent-Councell hath well obserued) if it had passed (as at the first draught) in these words, per legem Mosis, by Moses law; then exception might haue beene taken in the behalfe of Circumcision, to which some ascribing remission of sinnes, this Canon or that Decree might haue been a preiudice to their opinion. Thus all par∣ties, euen the contrary factions of that Councell, were well satisfied, while one side conceiued the Decree made expresly for them; and the other side, that it made not against them. The Decrees being not vnlike an artificiall indented picture∣table, which to him that lookes full vpon it, presents one kinde of forme or face; to him that stands on the one side, another forme; and to him on the other side, a third. Or like a plaine picture, which hanging on the wall, although the po∣sture of the face be set one way, yet it seemes to cast equall aspect vpon euery one in the roome. Thus is verified that of Guido Clemens, Priest and Cardinall of St. Potentiana, who saith, that in the Church of Rome there is quaedam radix du∣plicitatis,* 1.25 simplicitati columbae contraria; a certaine roote of dou∣blenesse, which is contrary to the doues simpliciti••. To conclude this

point of Popish preparation; it is so farre from fitting and dis∣posing a man to receiue the grace of iustification (grace of iustification being rightly vnderstood) as it is a maine impe∣diment and stumbling blocke in the way vnto it. For where∣as this preparation of theirs aduanceth mans free-will, and other naturall powers to the attainment of grace; what doth this else but puffe a man vp with a conceit of himselfe, that he is in a better state than indeed he is, as hauing something left in him, which being helped by some motion of common (or I wot not what) grace, is able to leade him to the full pos∣session of grace, and so of glory? Gregory saith well, Hee that* 1.26 knowes not his disease, how doth he seek to the Physitian? for the grea∣ter the fault is, being the sooner acknowledged, it is the more speedily amended; but the lesser sinne, while it is deemed to be as it were none at all, is so much the worse, and more securely kept in vre. If Saint Paul, speaking in the person of a regenerate man, as exercised with the combate betweene the flesh and the spirita 1.27, com∣plaines, that in him, that is, in his flesh dwels no good thing: then what good thing can there be in any vnregenerate man to dispose him to any grace, whose b 1.28 imaginations of his heart are onely euill continually? They are euill, and onely euill; and that continually onely euill. If corrupt Nature haue yet any thing left to brag off, if any free-will to this grace whereof we speake; where is that conuicting power of the Law, that makes sinne out of measure sinfull? That casts a man downe in the sense of his misery, causing him to cry out, c 1.29 Wretched man that I am, who shall deliuer me from this bodie of death? How shall a man come to Christ, wearie and laden, that he may be refreshed? How comes the vngodly to be iustified, if hee bring any merit to dispose him thereunto? How shall the Law then be our School∣master to bring vs to Christ, who came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance? Wee need none other testimony to con∣uince this Pontifician puffe-doctrine of preparatory workes, to bee at the least Cousin-germaine to that of the Pelagians, than the Councell of Trent it selfe.

The Pelagians held, that some men vsing the reason of their owne will, haue or doe liue in this world without any sinne.

To this agreeth that Canon of Trent, If any shall say, that all* 1.30 workes done before iustification, howsoeuer they bee done, are truely sinnes, and deserue the hatred of God; let him be accursed. Compare now the Pelagian and Pontifician doctrine together, and one egge is not liker another.a 1.31 All workes done before iustification are not truely sinnes, say the Trent-Fathers; therefore the workes of the Pelagian heretickes done before, or without iustifica∣tion, whatsoeuer, or howsoeuer done, are no sinnes, as they taught. Shall St. Austine be vmpire in this case? b 1.32 Pelagianorum sententia est, sine vllo peccato, aliquos homines tam ratione propriae voluntatis vtentes, in hoc saeculo vixisse vel viuere. Optandum est vt fiat, conandum est vt fiat, supplicandum est vt fiat, non tamen quasi factum fuerit, confidendum est. Qui seipsum talem putat, ipse se decipit, & veritas in eo non est; non ob aliud, nisi quia falsum putat. It is the opinion of the Pelagians, that some men by vsing the reason of their owne will, haue, and doe liue in this world without sinne. It were to be wished so, it were to be laboured for, it is to be prayed for, yet not to be beleeued, as if it were so. He that thinkes himselfe such a one, deceiueth himselfe, and the truth is not in him; for no other cause, but because he deemeth falsely. And in another place hee saith, Si Gentilis (inquis) nudum operuit, nunquid quia non est ex* 1.33 fide, peccatum est? Prorsus in quantum non est ex fide, peccatum est; non quia per scipsum factum, quod est nudum operire, pecca∣tum est: sod in tali opere non in Domino gloriari, solus impius negat esse peccatum. Nam quamuis bona, malè tamen facit; ideo negare non potes eum peccare, qui malè quodlibet facit. Fructus bonos non facit arbor mala: An dicis hominem infidelem arborem bonam? If a Hea∣then (saist thou) shall couer the naked, is it therefore a sin, because it is not of faith? Certainly, in as much as it is not of faith, it is sinne; not in regard of the worke it selfe, which is to clothe the naked, is it a sin: but in such a worke, not to glory in the Lord, only the wicked man denieth this to be a sin: For although he doth good, yet he doth it ill; therefore thou canst not deny that he sinneth, that doth any thing ill. An euill tree doth not beare good fruit: Do est thou callan vnfaith∣full man a good tree? Note here, St. Augustine condemnes all workes for sinnes, that are not done in the state of grace, but in the state of nature and infidelity. Therefore St. Augustine

is anathematized of the Church of Rome, for saying that all workes done before iustification, are indeede sinns.

But whereas the Pontificians may obiect, that St. Au∣gustine* 1.34 condemnes onely such workes, as are done without faith, and not those Pontifician workes of preparation, wher∣of faith (as they affirme) is the roote:

I answer, St. Augustine speaketh honestly, without equi∣uocation:* 1.35 for hauing to do with the Pelagians, those enemies of the grace of God, hee opposeth the state of grace against the state of nature: shewing that whatsoeuer a man doth in the state of nature before he be in the state of grace, it is sin: stiling euen the best workes of these heathen moralists, but splendida peccata, glittering sinnes. Now whatsoeuer is done be∣fore iustification, is done in the state of nature, & consequent∣ly it is sinne, in St. Augustines sense, because it is the bad fruit of a bad tree. As for that first grace, whereby the Papists teach a man is stirred vp to prepare himselfe for iustification, it doth not set a man, ipso facto, in the state of grace, hee is for all that faith of his, a meere naturall man still. And there∣fore that faith, which they speake of, going before iustifica∣tion, is not freed from the imputation of sin, whereas that sauing faith, whereof St. Augustine speaketh, is that which doth actually not dispose vnto, but possesse a man of, the state of grace, which is the verie state of iustification, as we shall see in the due place hereafter. Therefore Popish preparation vnto iustification, is nothing else but meere Pelagianisme: both Pelagians and Pontificians ioyntly holding, that all workes done without, or before iustification, are no sins.

Notes

• * 1.1

  ••••el ••ist. 14. lib. ••▪ quaest▪ 2.
• * 1.2

  Aqu. 12. qu. 114 art. 3. c. & ••. c.
• * 1.3

  Aqu. 12 qu. 1••4 a. 6. c. quian, homo &c.
• * 1.4

  The vanity and incongru∣itie of Popish preparation.
• * 1.5

  Concil. Trid. Ses. 6. cap. 6.
• * 1.6

  Aqu. 12. quaest. •• 14. art. 7. c.
• * 1.7

  This Coun∣cell speakes of a former and later grace, but names them not. Ses. 4. cap. 5. Concil. Trin. Ses. 6. Can. 5.
• a 1.8

  Doctè Richar∣dus (de statu inter hom. cap. ••2.) Cum audis liberum arbi∣trium esse captiuum, nihil aliud intellige, quàm infirmum, & natiuae potestatis virtute priua∣tum. Andr. Vega lib. 15. de vera & sicta iusti••. cap. ••.
• * 1.9

  Concil. Trin. Ses. 6. cap. 5.
• * 1.10

  Prima gratia, seu gratia gra∣tis data: se∣cunda gratia, seu gratia gra∣tum saciens. Romes first and second grace.
• * 1.11

  Aqu. 12. qu. 114 art. 3. 6.
• * 1.12

  Aqu. 12. qu. 114 art. 5. ad 2.
• * 1.13

  Aqu. 12. qu. 114 art. 3. c.
• * 1.14

  Vega de meri∣tis ex Congruo iustif. cap. 7.
• * 1.15

  Ibid. propos. 3.
• * 1.16

  A notable Pontifician shift.
• * 1.17

  Ibid propos. 4. Fides & alia bona opera, quil us disponi∣mur ad grati∣am gratum fa∣cientem, qua ••or•• aliter iu∣stificamur, & simus accepti Deo, meritoria sunt ex Congruo eiusmodi gratiae, & nostra iustificationis.
• * 1.18

  Soto de nat. & grat. lib. 2. cap. 4 de merito ex congruo.
• * 1.19

  What the an∣cient Fathers vnderstood by the word Me∣rit.
• * 1.20

  August.
• * 1.21

  Aug de tempore ser. 35.
• * 1.22

  Greg. in F∣uang. hom. 34.
• * 1.23

  See Histor. Concil. Trid. lib. 2. Pontificians can with faci∣lity reconcile flat contradic∣tions.
• * 1.24

  Si quis dixerit, hominem suis operibus, quae vel per humanae naturae vires, vel per legis doctrinam si∣ant, absque di∣••ina per Iesum Christum gratia, possè iustificari coram Deo, Anathema sit. Can. 1.
• * 1.25

  Ioh. Sarisbury▪ in Polychron. lib. 6 cap. 4.
• * 1.26

  Greg. Past. Curae pars 3. admon. 33. Qui mor∣bum suum ne∣scit, quomodo medicum quae∣rit? maior enim, quò ci∣tius, quia sit culpa, agnosci∣tur, co etiam celeriùs emen∣datur: minor verò, dum quasi nulla creditur, cò peiùs & securiùs in vsu retinetur.
• a 1.27

  Rom. 7. 18.
• b 1.28

  Gen. 6.
• c 1.29

  Rom. 7. 13.
• * 1.30

  Se••. 6. Ca••. 7. Si quis dixerit, opera omnia, quae ante iusti∣ficationem fi∣unt, quacunque ratione facta sunt, verè esse peccata, vel odium Dei me∣reri, &c. Ana∣thema sit.
• a 1.31

  Pelagians & Pontificians compared to∣gether.
• b 1.32

  Aug. contra Pelagianos. lib. 3. in fine. tom. 7.
• * 1.33

  Aug. contra Iul. Pelag. lib. 4. cap. 3. tom. 7.
• * 1.34

  Obiection.
• * 1.35

  Answer.