Boecius de consolacione philosophie

About this Item

Title
Boecius de consolacione philosophie
Author
Boethius, d. 524.
Publication
[Westminster :: Printed by William Caxton,
1478]
Rights/Permissions

To the extent possible under law, the Text Creation Partnership has waived all copyright and related or neighboring rights to this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above, according to the terms of the CC0 1.0 Public Domain Dedication (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). This waiver does not extend to any page images or other supplementary files associated with this work, which may be protected by copyright or other license restrictions. Please go to http://www.textcreationpartnership.org/ for more information.

Subject terms
Philosophy, Ancient.
Cite this Item
"Boecius de consolacione philosophie." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A16284.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 1, 2024.

Pages

Quod si in corporibus senciendis quamuis fliciant instrumenta sensuum forinsecus obiecte qualitates. Animi{que} agentis vigorem passio corporis antecedat.

BVt what is that in bodies to be feled. that is to seye in the taking & in the knowleching of bodily thinges And al be it so that the qualitees of bodies that be obecte fro withoute forth meouen̄ & entalenten the instrumentes of the wittes / And albe it so that the passion of the body. That is to seyn̄ the witte / or the suffraūce goth beforn̄ the strength or the worchyng corage / the whiche passion̄ or suf∣fran̄ce clepeth forth the dede of the thoughte in it self. and meoueth & exciteth in this meane while the fourmes that resten within forth / and if that insensble bodies as I ha∣ue seyd oure corages nys not taughte or emprynted by passion to knowe these thinges but demeth and knoweth of his owne strength the passion or suffrannce subiecte to the body moche more than thoo thinges / that ben absolute & quyte fro alle talentes or affeccions of bodies / as God or hys Angeles ne folowen not in decernyng thynges obiecte. fro wyth oute forth. But they accomplisshen

Page [unnumbered]

and speden the dede of her thoughte. By this reson thenne ther comyn many maner of knowinges to dyuers and to differing substances. For the witte of the body / the whiche witte is maked & dispoyled of all other knowing. thilk witte cometh to beestes / the whiche ne mowen not meouen hem self here & there. as oystres & muskels & other such shel∣fissh of the see / that leuen & ben norisshed to roches. But the ymagynacion cometh of remuable bestes tht semen to han talent to fleen or to desiren ony thing. but reson is all only. the lignage of mankinde right as intelligēce is al on∣ly the diuyne nature of which it foloweth / that thilk kno∣wing is mre worth than is other / syn it knoweth by hys {pro}pre nature / not only his subiect / as who seith it ne knoweth not al only that apteyneth {pro}prely to his knowing. ut i knoweth the subiectes of al other knowinges. but how shall it then̄e be. if that wite & ymagynacion striuen ayein re∣sonyng & sayne that of thilk vniuersal thing that reason weneth to seen that it nys right nought / for witte & yma∣gynacion seyne. that. that is sensible or ymagynable. it ne may not ben vniuersal. then̄e is there eyther the Iuggemēt of reson soth / ne that ther ny nothing sensble. or els for that reson wote wel that many thinghes ben subiecte to witt & to ymagynacion. then̄e is the concepōn of reson̄ vayne & ••••ls. which that loketh & comphendeth that / that is sensible & singuler as vniuersal. & if that the reson̄ wolde answere ayeinst these two. that is to seye to witte & ymagynacion / & seye. that sothly she her self that is to seyne reson̄. loketh & cōprehendeth by reson̄ of vniusalite both that. that is snsi∣ble / & that that is ymaginable / & thilk two that is to seyne

Page [unnumbered]

witte and ymagynacion / ne mowen not stretchen hem self to the knowyng of vniuersalite / for that the knowyng of hem ne may not exceden ne furmoūten the bodily figures. Certes of the knowing of thinges men oughten rather ye∣uen more credence to the more sedfaste & to the more {pro}fyte Iuggement / In this manere striuyng then̄e we that han strength of resonyng & of ymagynyng & of witte. That is to seye by reson & by ymaginacion / we wolde rather preyse the cause of reson. as who seith than the cause of witte & of ymagynacion / semlable thing is it. that the reson of mā∣kinde ne wneth not that the dyuine intelligēce beholdeth or knoweth thinges to come. but right as the reson of mākinde knoweth hem / for thou arguest thus / that if that it ne seme not to men that som thinges han certein betidinges. they ne may not be wist before certeinly to betiden. & then is ther no pscience of thilk thīgis. & if we trow that psciēce be in these thīgis. then is ther nothing that betideth by necessite. but if we might han the iugemēt of the dyuine thought as we ben {per}oners of reson. right so as we han demed that it behoueth bi ymaginacōn & witt & bineth reson. right so wold we demen that it were rightful thing that man̄es reson ought to sub∣mitte it self to be byneth the dyuine thought / for whiche yf we may / as who seith that if we may I coūsaile that we en∣haūce vs in the heighte of thilk souain intelligēce. for there shal reson wel seen that that it ne may not beholde in it self. & certes that is thus / in what maner the psciēce of god seeth al thingis & diffinissheth al thaugh they han no certein biti∣dingis / ne this is non opinion̄ / but rather the simp••••cite of the souain sciēce. that is not shett within no maner of boūdes

Do you have questions about this content? Need to report a problem? Please contact us.