The arte of logick Plainely taught in the English tongue, according to the best approued authors. Very necessary for all students in any profession, how to defend any argument against all subtill sophisters, and cauelling schismatikes, and how to confute their false syllogismes, and captious arguments. By M. Blundevile.

Of the Fallaxes in things.

OF these Fallaxes there be seuen kindes (that is to say) Fallacia Accidentis, à dicto secundum quid ad dictum Simpliciter, Ignoratio Elenchi, Petitio principij, Fallacia Consequentis, Cansa pro n•…•…n cansa, Plura interrogata pro vno responsu: which may be Englished thus: The Fallax of the Accident, the Fallax of speech respectiue, in stead of speech absolute, ignorance of the Elench, Petition of the prin∣ciple, a cause that is not the cause indeed, and many questions comprehended in one.

Define what these be, and giue examples.

Fallacia Accidentis, may be diuers wayes: as first, when any thing belonging onely to the substance of some thing, is attri∣buted also to some accident of the said substance, and contra∣riwise, as thus: Whatsoeuer thou hast bought, thou hast eaten, but thou hast bought rawe flesh: Ergo, thou hast eaten rawe flesh: heere the Consequent is to be denied, because the Ma∣ior hath respect to the substance, and the Conclusion to the qualitie. Another example, What I am, thou art not, but I am a man: Ergo, thou art none. Heere in this the Maior hath re∣spect to the qualitie, and the Conclusion to the substance. Se∣condly, when Accidents are not rightly ioyned together, as when the qualities of the bodie are ioyned with the quali∣ties of the minde: as Homer is a Poet, and Homer is blinde: Ergo, Homer is a blinde Poet: heere the Conclusion is to bee denied, because to be blinde, and to be a Poet, are diuers qua∣lities, whereof the one belongeth to the minde, and the other to the bodie, and therefore are not rightly ioyned together. Thirdly, as (Melancthon saith) when an accidentall cause is is made a principall cause, as thus: Elias was an holy Prophet, but Elias was clad with Camels haire: Ergo, I being clad with Camels haire, am a holy Prophet. Heere the Conclusion

is to be denied, because to be clad with Camels haire, was not the cause of Elias holinesse. But me thinkes that this and such like examples doe belong rather to the Fallax of Causa pro non causa (whereof we shall speake hereafter) then to the Fallax of the Accident.

The Fallax A dicto secundum quid ad dictum Simpliciter, chanceth when we goe about to make a thing to seeme abso∣lute, that is spoken in some respect, or to be in all, when it is but in part, as a Moore hath white teeth: Ergo, a Moore is white. Againe, it may be in respect, by reason of time, place, person, comparison, and such like. Of time as thus: I saw Iohn yesterday, but I saw him not to day: Ergo, I did see him, and not see him. Of place thus: It is not good to buy and sell in the Church: Ergo, it is not good to buy and sell. Of person thus: A Magistrate may kill a theefe: Ergo, euery man may kill a theefe. Of comparison, thus: Riches are not good to him that cannot vse them: Ergo, Riches are not good.

Hauing now to speake of the Fallax, called the Ignorance of the Elench: I thinke good to call againe to your remem∣brance the definition of an Elench before briefely set downe, which is a Syllogisme rightly gathering a Conclusion contra∣ry to the assertion of the respondent, which contrarietie con∣sisteth of foure principall points or respects, whereof, if any be wanting, then the contrarietie is not perfect.

Which be those foure points?

First, that it be to one selfe thing. Secondly, in one selfe re∣spect. Thirdly, in one selfe manner. And fourthly, in or at one selfe time: for if you be deceiued at any time by some false Elench, in thinking that it rightly gathereth a Conclusion meere contrarie to your assertion, when it is not so indeed, by reason that it faileth in some part requisite and incident to a true Elench: then it may be rightly said that you are deceiued by ignorance of the Elench, which Fallax, as Aristotle saith, comprehendeth almost all others, and therefore he maketh a long and obscure definition of an Elench, rehearsing all the particularities thereof, nothing apt to be vttered in our Eng∣lish tongue.

Yet I pray you to giue examples of the foure chiefe points before mentioned.

Of the first, let this bee your example: foure is double to two, but not to three: Ergo, foure is double and not double; this is not to one selfe thing. Of the second thus: This peece of timber is double in length to that peece, but it is not dou∣ble to the same in breadth: Ergo, it is to one selfe thing, both double, and not double to one selfe thing, but not in one selfe respect. Of the third thus: This Prince ruleth mightily, but not mercifully: Ergo, he ruleth, and not ruleth; this is not in like manner. Of the fourth thus: I saw Iohn yesterday, but not this day: Ergo, I saw him, and saw him not; this is not in one selfe time. And all these foure wayes in mine opinion are comprehended in the second point; which is when any thing is spoken not absolutely, but in diuers respects: wherefore, it differeth not much from the Fallax of speech respectiue before declared, sauing that this Fallax is more generall, and com∣prehendeth more kindes of Fallaxes then that doth.

Petition of the Principle is, when the Antecedent doth not proue the consequent, which chanceth most commonly three manner of wayes: that is, eyther when the proofe is as little knowne, as the thing that is to be proued. Secondly, when the proofe is lesse knowne then the thing to be proued. Thirdly, when the proofe, and the thing to be proued, doe not differ, but is all one speech, signifying one selfe thing, called of the Greekes Tautologia.

Giue example of these three wayes.

Of the first thus: The Sunne moueth not, but standeth still in the middest of heauen, giuing light to all the world: Ergo, the earth is moueable; or thus: The Heauens are not made of Elementall matter, subiect to corruption: Ergo, the Heauens are incorruptible. Heere in both these examples the Antece∣dent is as doubtfull as the Consequent, and therefore proo∣ueth nothing. Of the second way thus: Euery sensible bodie sometime sleepeth: Ergo, Man sometime sleepeth. Heere it is more to be doubted whether all sensible Bodies, all Beastes, Fowles and Fishes, doe sometimes sleepe or not, then whe∣ther

man doth sometime sleepe: for it is an easier matter to knowe the nature and propertie of one speciall kinde, then of all, or many kindes. Of the third way, thus: Iohn is learned: Ergo, Iohn is learned. The soule doth liue euer: Ergo, it is im∣mortall.

The Fallax of the Consequent chanceth two manner of wayes, that is, either when wee thinke the Consequent to be conuertible with the Antecedent, but it is not so in deede, or else when we thinke, that vpon the contrary of the Ante∣cedent, the contrary of the Consequent must needes also follow.

Giue examples of both these wayes.

This is a man: Ergo, it is a sensible body: now if I would hereof by conuersion conclude thus: it is a sensible bodie: Er∣go, it is a man: this were no good Consequent; for euery sensi∣ble bodie is not a man. Likewise when it raineth, the ground is wette: Ergo, when the ground is wette, it rayneth; for these speaches are not conuertible. Of the second way thus: It is a man: Ergo, it is a sensible body. It is no man: Ergo, it is no sensible body. Here you see that this Proposition, it is no man, is the contrary of the first Antecedent, which saith, It is a man. Of which contrary, the contrary of the Consequent doeth not necessarily sollowe: for though it bee no man, yet it may be some other sensible bodie. This Fallax compre∣hendeth all such false Arguments, as do not obserue the Rules of right and true Consequents before giuen.

The Fallax of non causa pro causa, is, when that thing is made to bee the cause of the Conclusion, which is not the cause in deede; as Wine is naught, because it will make a man drunke. Of which drunkennesse, Wine is not the cause, but the intemperance of the man, and his immoderate vse thereof, for many things that be good of themselues may bee abused, yea, euen the libertie of the Gospell, and yet the do∣ctrine of the Gospell is not cause thereof, but the malice of man abusing the same.

The seuenth and last Fallax, is when vnaduisedly, and without vsing any distinction, you make an answere to manie

questions, as though they were but one; as for example, The Sophister, seeing two men standing together, whereof the one is blinde, and the other hath his fight, will aske you perhaps whether they see, or not; whereunto if you answere di∣rectly, either yea, or no, you are by and by taken: for if you say that they see, then you grant that the blind man also seeth, and if you say, that they doe not see, then you grant, that he which seeth, is blinde; but if you answere, that the one seeth, and the other not, you shall by such distinction easily auoid the Sophisters cauillation: for diuers questions hudled vp in one, doe alwayes require diuers answeres. And thus I ende, with the order of confuting all false Elenches, and Fal∣laxes; the knowledge whereof is very necessary, for the maintenance of the trueth, which God loueth, who is the fountaine of all trueth, yea, and very trueth it selfe; to whom be all honour, glo∣rie and prayse, world without end,

Amen.

Notes

• 1 Fallacia acci∣dentis.
• 2 Dictum secun∣dum quid.
• 3 Ignoratio Elen∣chi.
• 4 Petitio prin∣cipij.
• 5 Fallacia Conse∣quentis.
• 6 Causa pro non causa.
• 7 Plura interroga∣ta pro vno re∣sponsu.