The arte of logick Plainely taught in the English tongue, according to the best approued authors. Very necessary for all students in any profession, how to defend any argument against all subtill sophisters, and cauelling schismatikes, and how to confute their false syllogismes, and captious arguments. By M. Blundevile.

THE ART OF LOGICKE. THE FOVRTH BOOKE.

CHAP. I.

Of Places.

THough immediately after the Treatise of a Proposition, the old men are wont to deale with the order of reasoning, called Argu∣mentation, and with the formes thereof: yet sith by order of Nature it is meete to finde out matter, before wee goe about to forme, frame or order the same, and that the mat∣ter of prouing any Question is to be fetched from certaine common Places, I thought it best to treat first of those Places, and then to shew the order of reasoning.

What is a place?

A Place is a marke or token, shewing from whence any Argument apt to proue the Question propounded, is to bee taken.

What difference is betwixt Argument and Argumentation?

Argument is the bare proofe or meane terme which is in∣uented by him that disputeth, to proue the truth of the Questi∣on: but Argumentation is the whole reasoning it selfe, of what

forme so euer it be, comprehending both the Question, and al∣so the proofe thereof: whereof we shall speake hereafter in his proper place, and giue you examples of both.

How manifold is Place?

Two-fold, the one of persons, the other of things: the or∣der and distribution of both which, you may plainly see in the Table following.

To what end serueth this manifold diuision?

That the disputers may the more perfectly know the pow∣er and proper nature of euery Argument, according to the great or little force of the Place, from whence such Arguments are fetched.

How is Place diuided according to the Schoolemen?

Into two kindes, the one called Maxim, and the other diffe∣rence of Maxim.

What is Maxim?

It is a generall rule approued and receiued of all Logicians, in such sort as no man will deny the same, as of contrarie things there must needs bee contrarie consequents. Againe, Whatsoeuer agreeth with the thing defined, agreeth also with the Definition of the same: and such like.

What is the difference of Maxims?

It is the proper name of euery Place whereby one Maxim is known from another, and to what place euery Maxim belong∣eth, as from the Contrary, from the Definition, from the thing defined: for by these names and such like, wee know to what Place euery Maxim belongeth.

To what end serueth this diuision?

The Maxims serue as shoote-ankers, and as places of refuge, when the aduersarie shall deny our Conclusion: againe the differences being few in number, doe cause the multitude of Maxims to be the more easily kept in memory.

The Table of Places.

• Of Places, some be
• ...
  • Of Persons, as
  • ...
    • Name, stocke, birth, nation, sex, or kinde, age, education, habite of the body, affections of the mind, state, calling, or condition of life, diet, study, or exercise, acts done, death, wonders chancing before death, or after death, monu∣ments left of things done, or written, and kinde of Fune∣rals shewing how well or euill the person was beloued.
  • and some be of things, which be, either
  • ...
    • Artificiall Places are either
    • ...
      • Inward Places be either
      • ...
        • Of the substance it selfe, which be these.
        • ...
          • The Definition, and the things defined,
          • The Description, & the thing described.
          • The Interpretation, and the thing in∣terpreted.
          • The Matter, and the thing made.
          • The Forme, and the thing formed:
          • The general kind, & his speciall kinde.
          • The Difference and his propertie.
          • The whole, and his parts Integrall.
          • Principall, and not principall.
        • Or, of things accompanying Sub∣stance, as these
        • ...
          • Generation, and the thing ingendred.
          • Corruption, and the thing corrupted.
          • Vse, Abuse.
          • Subiects.
          • Adiacents, and actions.
          • Apposition.
          • Common Accidents.
          • Signes and circumstances, as time, place, and meane, &c.
        • The Cause Efficient, and his effect.
        • The End, and the thing ended▪
        • The foure Opposites, as
        • ...
          • Relatiues.
          • Contraries.
          • Priuatiues.
          • Contradictoric•…•….
        • Things diuers in kind, called in Latine, Disparata.
        • Comparison, as more or lesse▪
        • Like, or vnlike.
        • Example and Comparison.
        • Also to Comparison may be added these places.
        • Proportion.
        • Changed proportion.
        • Disproportion.
        • Changed Disproportion.
        • Translation or Figuratiue speech.
        • ...
          • From the Comparatiue to the Super∣latiue.
          • From the Positiue to the Cōparatiue.
          • From two Positiues to two Compara∣tiues.
          • From two Positiues to two Superla∣tiues, and contrariwise.
      • Outward Places bee these
      • Or meane places bee these three
      • ...
        • Coniugates.
        • Cases.
        • Diuision.
    • or Inartificiall places, which be these sixe
    • ...
      • Fore-iudgements.
      • Rumors.
      • •…•…ormentes.
      • Writings▪
      • Oath.
      • Witnesses.
    • ...All which six places are comprehended vnder the place of Authoritie, as you may see in the Table of Authoritie hereafter following, in which Table are set downe the said inartificiall places, together with the definitions and vses thereof.

CHAP. II.

Of the Places of Persons.

Glue examples of all the Places of persons.

Though the Places of persons may bee very wel applyed to the place of common Accidents hereafter following, because they eyther goe before, accompany, or follow the subiects wherevnto they doe belong: yet because there is a difference betwixt persons and things, and that the Places before mentioned in the Table of persons, doe more properly belong to Persons, then to things, I thought it best to giue you examples of euery Place belonging to the person, before I come to treate of the Places of things, and first of the name, then of the stocke and family, and so forth.

Of the name.

Of this Place you may reason eyther in praise or dispraise more probably then truely, as to say thus: his name is Good∣man: Ergo he ought to be a good man, for that name impor∣teth good. I did once see an euill woman executed at Ty∣borne, whose name was Sweepestake, which name was answer∣able to her propertie, which was to sweepe all her louers pur∣ses so cleane as she could. Cicero did not let to scoffe in like manner with Uerres the Roman extortioner, against whom he made so many inueyghing Orations, saying many times, that he had not his name for nought: for Uerres was as much to say as a sweeping thiefe, deriued of the verbe verro, which in Eng∣lish is to sweepe.

Of the stocke or birth.

Of this Place you may reason thus: Hee had strong parents: Ergo he is strong. Hee came of an euill race: Ergo it is no mar∣uell though he be euill disposed.

Of the nation.

He is of the Iland of Crete or Candy: Ergo he is a lyar. Hee is a Flemming, Ergo a drunkard. He is an Englishman: Ergo a glutton. He is an Italian: Ergo a dissembler.

Of the sex or kinde.

It is the promise of a woman, Ergo not to be performed or trusted.

Of the age.

He is but an Infant, Ergo not malicious. He is young of age, and therefore to be pardoned.

Of education.

He was euill brought vp, and therefore can not be good.

Of the habit of the body.

He is bigge set, Ergo he is strong. He is red headed, Ergo e∣uill conditioned.

Of the affections of the minde.

He is giuen to excesse and ryot, Ergo he is not temperate or modest: to this place may be referred all manner of vertues and vices.

Of the state, calling, or condition of life.

He is a bond man: Ergo he can neither sue nor be sued.

Of dyet.

He loueth to fare delicately, and to lie soft: Ergo hee is las∣ciuious.

Of studie or exercise.

He is very studious and applyeth his booke: Ergo no volup∣tuous man.

Of things done.

Pompey hath had many prosperous and noble victories: Ergo he is most meete to be sent as General of the war against My∣thridates.

Of death.

The death of Scipio was much lamented of the Romans, Ergo he was dearely beloued of the Romans. Such a one suffered death most constantly for Christs sake, Ergo hee was a good Christian.

Of things chancing after death.

Honourable Monuments were set vp by the people of Rome in the honour of Iulius Caesar after his death, ergo he was hono∣red and beloued of all the people of Rome in his life time. There were great earthquakes, and dead bodies did arise immediatly

after the death of Christ, ergo hee was the Sonne of God, and was vniustly condemned.

CHAP. III.

Of the Places of things, and first of artificiall Places.

〈1 line〉〈1 line〉

_〈1 paragraph〉〈1 paragraph〉

〈1 line〉〈1 line〉

Inward 〈◊◊◊〉〈◊◊◊〉 which veeld Arguments either ap∣pertaining 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 nature and substance of the matter in questi∣on, or else to such things as doe accompany the substance and nature of the thing.

Which be the Places of Substance?

These, Definition and the thing defined, together with the rest rehearsed before in the Table.

Of Definition and the thing defined.

WHat is Definition?

It is that which briefely, plainely and properly de∣clareth the nature of any thing, by shewing the substantiall parts thereof.

How m•…•…y a man reason from this place?

Both 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and negatiuely, aswell from the Subiect as the Predicate of the Question. Affirmatiuely thus, Euery reasonable body is apt to learne letters, Ergo man is apt to learne letters. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thus, No vnreasonable body is apt to learne letters, Ergo no brute beast is apt to learn▪ let∣ters.

What be the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or generall rules of this Place?

The 〈◊◊◊〉〈◊◊◊〉, Whatsoeuer agreeth with the •…•…∣tion, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thing defined: and contrariwise what∣soeuer

agreeth not with the definition, agreeth not with the thing defined.

What is the thing defined?

That, whose nature and propertie is declared in the defini∣tion.

How may a man reason from this place?

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely: affirmatiuely, as Peter is a man: Ergo he is a reasonable body. Negatiuely, as an Ape is no man: Ergo an Ape is no reasonable body.

What be the Maxims of this Place?

Whatsoeuer agreeth with the thing defined, agreeth also with the definition thereof: and whatsoeuer agreeth not with the thing defined, agreeth not with the definition of the same.

Of Description, and the thing described.

WHat is Description?

It is a speech declaring what a thing is, by shewing the properties and accidents whereby it differeth from other things.

How may a man reason from this Place?

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely: affirmatiuely thus, Eue∣rie laudable habite adorneth his possessor: Ergo vertue ador∣neth his possessor: negatiuely thus, no laudable habite shameth his owner or possessor: Ergo no vertue shameth his owner or possessor.

What is the thing described?

It is that, whose properties either naturall or accidentall are declared in the description.

How are arguments to be fetched from this Place?

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely: affirmatiuely thus, This beast is foure footed, hauing long eares and whole feet: ergo it is an Asse: negatiuely thus; This foure footed beast hath no long eares nor whole feete: Ergo it is no Asse.

When are arguments to be confuted, being fetohed frō these places?

When the definition or description is not true or proper to the thing defined or described.

Of Interpretation and the thing interpreted.

WHat is Interpretation?

It is the declaring of a name lesse knowne by ano∣ther that is more knowne, as thus, Iesus is as much to say as a Sauiour, a Philosopher is a louer of wisedome.

What is the thing interpreted?

That which is declared by the Interpretation, as this word Iesus to be a Sauiour, or this word Philosopher to bee a louer of wisedome.

How may a man reason from this place?

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely, if the tearmes bee con∣uertible. Affirmatiuely thus: He is a louer of wisedome: Ergo a Philosopher. Negatiuely thus: He is no louer of Wisdome: Ergo no Philosopher.

What be the maxims of these two places?

The Maxims of these Places are like, for whatsoeuer agree∣eth with the one, agreeth with the other, and contrariwise.

Of the Place of Matter, and of the thing made.

WHat is Matter?

That whereof any thing is made, as Siluer is the mat∣ter of a Siluer Cup, and the Cup is the thing made, called of the Logicians materiatum.

How is Matter diuided?

Into Matter permanent, and Matter transient.

What is Matter permanent?

It is that which remaineth in the thing made, retaining still both nature and name, as stone and timber is the matter of an house.

What is Matter transient?

It is that which being changed, doth not returne againe in∣to his first nature: as flower and water being made bread, will neuer be flower and water againe.

How are arguments to be fetched from Matter permanent?

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely: affirmatiuely thus, Here is timber, lime and stone: Ergo here may be an house: negatiue∣ly

thus, Here is neither timber, lime not s•…•…one: Ergo here is no house.

How are arguments to be fetched from Matter transient?

Affirmatiuely, but not negatiuely, as heere is water and meale: Ergo here may be bread: but you can not say, here is no meale: Ergo here is no bread: for the matter permanent being taken away, the effect thereof is also taken away: but this Maxime taketh no place in matter transient, vnlesse the Argu∣ment be made by the preterperfect Tense or time past, as thus: Here was no meale: Ergo here is no bread.

What be the Maxims of this Place?

The matter being set downe, the effect also may bee accor∣ding to the difference of the matter.

How may we reason from the thing made to the matter?

In matter permanent you may reason from the present Tense to the present Tense, thus: Heere are iron weapons: Ergo heere is iron. But in matter transient wee must reason from the pre∣sent time to the time past, thus; here is bread: Ergo heere hath been meale.

What be the Maxims of this Place?

The thing made of matter permanent being set downe, the matter also must needs be: and the thing made of matter transi∣ent being set downe, the matter therof must needs haue been.

How may you else reason from these two Places?

By adding these two adiectiues (good or euill) as thus: The house is good: Ergo the timber and stone was good: for the goodnes or defect of the matter permanent, sheweth the pre∣sent goodnesse or defect of the thing made: and any good or euill thing made of Matter transient, proueth the Matter to haue been good or euill.

Of the Places of Forme and shape.

WHat is Forme?

Forme is that which giueth shape and being to the thing formed, whereof also the thing taketh his name, as the soule of man is the forme, and man is the thing formed.

How is Forme diuided?

Into

• Forme substantiall, which is the first being or shape of any thing, and that is either
• ...
  • Mortall, as the soule of a bruite beast.
  • Or immortall, as the soule of man.
• And into Forme accidentall, which is a meere ac∣cident, called of the Logicians Abstractum, as whitenesse or blacknesse.

How are arguments to be fetched from the Forme and the thing formed?

Two waies, affirmatiuely from the substantiall forme, thus: Here is the soule of a beast: Ergo here is a beast: from the ac∣cidentall forme thus: Heere is whitenesse: Ergo here is some white thing: from the substantiall thing formed thus: The beast is here: Ergo his soule is heere: of the accidentall thing formed thus: Here is some white thing: Ergo heere is white∣nesse: Negatiuely from the substantiall forme thus: Here is no soule of a beast: Ergo here is no beast: of the accidentall forme thus: Heere is no whitenes: Ergo heere is no white thing: of the substantiall thing formed thus: The beast is not here: Er∣go his soule is not here: of the accidentall thing formed thus: Here is no white thing: Ergo here is no whitenes.

Rehearse the Maxims whereupon these arguments are grounded.

The Maxims bee these, where Forme is either present or wanting, the thing formed also must needs be either present or wanting, and contrariwise. Yet this Maxim faileth in the sorme of man, for the soule intellectiue may bee, and yet no man, vnlesse you reason from the inbeing of the Forme in the Subiect, as, In the body is a reasonable soule: Ergo it is a man: for euerie Subiect hath his name and being in his shape or forme, as hath been said before.

Of the generall kinde.

WHat is generall kinde?

It is that which comprehendeth many things diffe∣ring

in speciall kinde, as hath beene said before.

How are Arguments to be fetched from the generall kinde to the speciall kinde?

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely: affirmatiuely thus, Euery vertue is to be desired: Ergo Iustice is to be desired. Negatiue∣ly thus, No vice is to be praised: Ergo drunkennes is not to be praised.

Rehearse the Maxims belonging to the generall kinde?

To what kinde soeuer agreeth the generall kind being vni∣uersally taken (that is to say) pronounced with some vniuersall signe, a•…•… All, Euery or None, to the same the speciall kind doth also agree: and whatsoeuer agreeth not with the generall kinde 〈◊〉〈◊〉 taken, agreeth not with the speciall kind: sor if no vniuersall signe be added to the generall kinde, you can∣not reason affirmatiuely, but onely negatiuely, thus: It is no sensible body: Ergo it is no man: but you cannot reason so affir∣matiuely, as to say thus, It is a sensible body: Ergo it is a man: because the vniuersal signe All, or Euery, is wanting.

How many Places doth this Place of generall kinde comprehend?

Foure, (that is to say) All or euery in quantitie, All or euery in respect, All or euery in place, All or euery in time.

What is All or euery in quantitie?

It is when an vniuersall signe is added to the generall kind, as euery plant liueth, therefore euery tree liueth.

When is it all or euery 〈◊〉〈◊〉 respect?

When any generall kind is vnderstood in some respect, and that the generall signification thereof is restrained by some word added vnto it, or by some secret meaning limiting the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as a white beast, a good man: for this word white restrai∣neth the general signification of beast, and this word good the g•…•…nerall signification of man.

Giue examples of this place.

God gaue his holy spirit to all faithfull men: Ergo to his A∣postles.

What is all or euery in place?

It is when the generall kinde is an aduerbe of place, sig∣nifying euery where or no where, as Iustice is no where

truly executed: Ergo neither in Frauce nor in England.

What is all or euery in time?

It is when the generall kinde is an aduerbe of time, signify∣ing euer or neuer, as God is alwaies with vs: Ergo now at this present.

What maxims doe belong to these places?

The same that doe belong to the generall kinde vniuersally taken before mentioned, by vertue whereof you may reason both affirmatiuely and negatiuely, as I said before.

Of the speciall kind.

HOw are arguments to be fetched from the speciall kinde to the generall kinde?

Affirmatiuely, but negatiuely thus; It is a man: Ergo it is a sensible body. But now you cannot say, it it no man: Ergo it is no sensible body: for it may be a horse, or some other sensi∣ble thing.

What be the maximes belonging to the speciall kinde?

Where the speciall kind is, there the generall kinde must al∣so needs be: againe, all the speciall kinds being taken away, the generall kinde is also taken away.

Of the place of Difference.

THis place is comprehended vnder the place of definition, for dif∣ference is a good part of the definition, and yet for order sake I haue thought good to place it next to the generall kinde and speciall kinde before taught.

How may a man reason from this place?

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely, as an Oyster hath fee∣ling: Ergo it is a sensible body, a horse hath no reason: Ergo he is no man.

What be the maximes in this place?

Whatsoeuer agreeth with the speciall difference, agreeth with the thing that hath that difference, and whatsoeuer disa∣greeth with the speciall difference, disagreeth with the thing that hath that difference, for they be conuertible.

Of the place of Propertie.

HOw may a man reason from this place?

This place is contained vnder the place of Description before shewed. And from hence you may reason both affirma∣tiuely and negatiuely, as thus; He is apt to speake: Ergo hee is a man; He is not apt to speake: Ergo he is no man.

What be the maxims of this place?

Whatsoeuer agreeth with the propertie, agreeth also with the thing that hath that propertie. And whatsoeuer disagreeth with the property, disagreeth also with the thing whereto such propertie belongeth, for they be conuertible.

Of the place of whole Integrall.

WHat is whole Integrall?

That which consisteth of parts hauing quantitie.

How may we reason from the whole to euery particular part?

Affirmatiuely, but not negatiuely, thus; It is a house: Ergo it hath foundation, walles and roofe: but you cannot reason so negatiuely from the whole to euery particular part, as to say thus; Here is an House: Ergo here is no foundation or walles.

What be the maxims of this place?

If the whole be, euery principall part must needs be: but if the whole be wanting, some principal part must needs be wan∣ting, though not all: for the house might be wanting, and yet the walles and foundation may still remaine.

Of the place of Integrall parts.

WHat is an Integrall part, and how is it diuided?

It is that which certaine other parts make vp the whole, and such Integrall part is either principall, or not prin∣cipall.

Define these two parts?

The principall is that without the which the whole cannot be, as the head or belly of a liuing body, or as the foundation,

walles, or couering of an house. The part not principall is that without the which the whole may stand, as a house without dores or windowes: or the body may liue without hands or feete.

How may we reason from the principall part to the whole?

Negatiuely thus; Heere is no foundation or walles: Ergo here is no house: but you cannot reason so of the part not principall, but onely in hauing respect to the perfection of the whole, as thus; Heere is neither dores nor windowes: Ergo the house is not perfect.

What be the maxims of this place?

If any principall part be wanting, the whole cannot bee. If any part not principall be wanting, the whole is vnperfect.

Of the places of things accompanying Substance.

WHat is the place of things accompanying Substance?

It is that which comprehendeth such arguments as are not fetched from the substance of the thing it selfe, but from that which accompanieth the substance thereof.

Which be those places?

These: Generation, the thing ingendred: Corruption, the thing corrupted: Vse, Subiect, Adiacents, Actions, Opposition, common Accidents, and Circumstances and such like.

Of the place of Generation, and of the thing engendred.

WHat is Generation?

It is the first being or springing of any thing.

How are arguments to be fetched from Generation to the thing engendred?

Affirmatiuely thus: It was good that Christ was borne: Er∣go Christ was good; It was euill for Rome that Catiline was borne: Ergo, Catiline was euill to Rome.

What be the Maxims of this place?

Those things whose generation is good, must needs bee good, and those things whose generation is euill, must needes be euill.

How may we reason from the thing engendred to the Generation?

Affirmatiuely thus: Catiline was euill to Rome: Ergo, the birth of Catiline was euill to Rome.

What be the maxims of this place?

If the thing engendred be either good or euill, the generati∣on thereof must needes be also either good or euill.

Of Corruption, and the thing Corrupted.

WHat is Corruption?

Corruption is contrary to Generation, and is the de∣struction of the thing engendred, and the thing destroyed is said to be corrupted.

How may we reason from Corruption, to the thing Corrupted?

Thus: To execute theeues and murtherers, is profitable to the Common-wealth: Ergo, theeues and murtherers are hurt∣full to the Common-wealth. The death of Uirgil was a great losse to learning: Ergo, Vir. was a great furtherance to learning.

How may we reason from the thing Corrupted, to the Corruption?

Affirmatiuely thus: Uirgil was a great furtherance to lear∣ning: Ergo, the death of Virgil was a great losse to learning.

What be the maxims of these two places?

Those things whereof the end and destruction is laudable, must needs of themselues be pernitious and hurtfull. And con∣trariwise, those things whose ende and destruction is hurtfull, must needs of themselues be good and profitable. Againe, of good things, the losse is euill, and of euill things, the losse is good: but in reasoning from these places, you must take heede that as well the Corruption, as the thing corrupted, bee abso∣lutely good, or euill of it selfe, and not by Accident: for it were no good argument to reason thus; The death of Christ was good: Ergo, Christ was euill: for his death was good by acci∣dent for our saluation, and not for any crime that was in him. Moreouer, you must beware that you vse not one self predicate both in your antecedent, & in your consequent: for if good be the predicate in the antecedēt, euill must be the predicate in the consequent, and if euil be the predicate in the antecedent, good

must be the predicate in the consequent: for this kinde of rea∣soning consisteth of contraries.

Of Vse.

WHat is vse?

Vse is the apt applying of euery thing to his proper ende, as the vse of wine to comfort the stomack, and to reioyce the heart of man.

How may we reason from this place?

Affirmatiuely thus: the vse of wine is good: Ergo, wine is good: the vse of art Magick is euill: Ergo, the art it selfe is euill.

What be the maxims of this place?

That thing is good or euill, whereof the vse is good or euill.

What is to be obserued in this kind of reasoning?

Two things: first, that the thing whereof wee speake, haue some good or euill vse of it selfe absolutely, and not by acci∣dent: secondly, that we take not the abuse in stead of the right vse, as to say, Wine will make men drunke: Ergo, wine is not good.

Whereto serue most chiefly these three places last mentioned (that is to say) the place of Generation, of Corruption, and of Use?

They chiefly serue to proue the naturall goodnesse or euil∣nesse of any thing.

Of the Subiect.

HOw is this word Subiect here taken?

For that whereunto accidents and actions do belong: and hauing to speake here of common accidents, I thought it good to speake first of the Subiects, because all manner of Ac∣cidents must needes cleaue to one Subiect or other.

How may we reason from this place?

Affirmatiuely, and Negatiuely: Affirmatiuely thus; It is fire: Ergo, it is hot and apt to burne. He is a man: Ergo, apt to laugh or to weepe. Negatiuely thus, Dead men haue no being at all: Ergo, dead men are not miserable. He hath no gall: Ergo, hee

cannot be angrie. There be no Pigmeans: Ergo, they fight not with Cranes.

Which be the Maxims of this place?

If the Subiect be, the naturall accidents and actions belon∣ging to the Subiect must also needs be: and the Subiect being taken away, all the accidents and actions thereof must also be taken away.

How may such arguments as are fetched out of this place be con∣futed;

When the Accidents doe not of necessity belong to the Sub∣iect, as thus, He is a man: Ergo, he is a good Poet, for this ac∣cident belongeth not of necessitie to euery man.

Of Adiacents and Actions.

FOr so much as Adiacents, otherwise called perpetuall Accidents, and also naturall and proper Actions belonging to any Subiect be either contained vnder the place of Propertie, of Difference, or else of common Accidents, and haue like kind of reasoning, I thought good therefore to referre you to those places, whereof some are taught be∣fore, and some doe follow hereafter.

Of Apposition.

WHat is Apposition?

Apposition is, when a thing sheweth what his owne qualitie or operation is, by being put or added to another thing, as, white Chalke being put to a wall, will make the wall white, and thereby Chalke sheweth it selfe to bee white: so likewise Inke being put to paper, or such like thing, will make it black.

How may a man reason from this place?

Affirmatiuely thus: Chalke being put to a wall, will make it white: Ergo, Chalke is white. Fire being put vnder a Caul∣dron of water, will make the water hot: Ergo, fire is hot. By this place also a man may prooue conuersation or company with others to be good or euill in this sort. This young man

keeping company with that old man is made vertuous: Ergo, the old man is vertuous. Hee is become a theefe by keeping company with such a person: Ergo, that person is a theefe. And therefore the Scripture saith, cum bonis bonuser•…•…s, & cum peruer∣sis peruerteris (that is to say) with the good thou shalt be good, and with the froward thou shalt learne frowardnesse.

What bee the Maxims of this place?

If one thing being put to another, endueth the same with any quality, that thing must needes haue the same qualitie it selfe. I doe place this place next to action, because it seemeth to me that it appertaineth to action.

Of common Accidents.

WHat cast yee common Accidents?

I call those common Accidents, such things as are ei∣ther alwaies, or for the most part so knit together, as the one goeth before or after the other, or els accompany each one the other: whereof some are necessarie, and some probable.

How may we reason from the Necessarie?

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely, and first affirmatiuely, by the latter part thus. This Appletree hath flowers: Ergo, it hath budded. It hath fruit: Ergo, it hath both budded and flowred. This woman is brought to bed of a childe: Ergo, she hath conceiued. Negatiuely by the former part thus. This woman neuer conceiued: Ergo, she can bring forth no childe. This man neuer studied: Ergo he is not learned.

What be the maxims of this place?

If the latter be, the former must needs goe before, and if the former were not, the latter cannot be.

Of Probable Accidents, Coniectures, Presumptions, Signes, and Circumstances.

HOw may we reason from Probable Accidents?

From Probable Accidents you may reason Affirma∣tiuely thus: The feast of Bacehus is this day celebrated: Ergo,

there will bee many drunken this day. The generall Sessions are holden this day: Ergo, there will be some hanged.

What be the maxims of this place?

If the latter be, it is likely that the former went before, and if the former bee, it is like enough the latter may sollow: but you must beware in reasoning from this place, that you fetch not your argument from such Accidents as chance but sel∣dome, or be indifferent, for such be neither necessarie nor pro∣bable, but sophisticall and fallible, as to reason thus. Shee is a faire woman: Ergo, she is vnchast.

Whereto serueth the place of common Accidents?

In the Iudiciall kinde it helpeth greatly to proue the fact. In the Demonstratiue kinde to praise or dispraise. In the Delibe∣ratiue kinde to perswade or disswade, and to gather together all Coniectures meete for the purpose and therefore this place is much vsed of natural Philosophers to proue things by natu∣rall signes, or by Physiognomie: also of Astrologers •…•…o proue dearth, mortalitie, and such like, by wonders, and monsters, as by blazing starres, and such like impressions. Also it is much vsed of Chiromancers, Southsayers, and such as vse to iudge by Coniectures, and therefore this place extendeth very farre, and serueth to many vses. Hitherto also are referred the places of circumstances, and chiefely of time and place, from whence good arguments may be fetched.

Of Time.

HOw are arguments fetched from time?

Negatiuely thus: Pythag was not borne in Numa Pom∣pilius time: Ergo, Numa was not Pythagoras scholler. The ce∣remoniall lawes of Moses were made for a certaine time: Er∣go, after that time they doe not bind.

What be the Maxims of this place?

Nothing can bee without time, for if time bee taken away, the thing also must needs faile.

Of Place.

HOw are arguments fetched from place?

Negatiuely thus: Cicero was not at Rome, when Iulius Caesar was slaine: Ergo, Cicero slew him not.

What is the maxime of this place?

No certain body or thing is without a place, neither is one bodie at one time in diuers places: and thus much touching inward places.

Of outward Places, and first of Causes.

WHich be outward Places?

Outward places bee those which appertaine to the thing, and yet doe not cleaue thereunto: of which places the first is of Causes and Effects.

What is a Cause?

A Cause is that by vertue wherof another thing followeth.

How many chiefe kindes of Causes be there?

Foure, (that is to say) the Cause Efficient, the end, matter, and shape, of the two last whereof we haue spoken before, be∣cause they be inward places, and doe belong to the Substance of the thing, and therefore we haue to deale onely here, with the cause Efficient and end.

Of the Cause Efficient.

WHat is that cause Efficient, and how is it deuided?

Cause Efficient is that from whence proceedeth the first beginning of any thing that is made or done, and is the maker thereof. As for example, the Carpenter is the Cause Ef∣ficient of the house which he maketh, and so is euery Artificer of his owne worke. Causes Efficient are deuided into two kinds (that is to say) Cause Absolute, and Cause Adiuuant. Cause Absolute worketh by his owne force and vertue, as the fire that burneth. Cause Adiuuant worketh not by himselfe, but is a helper, and such cause is sometime principall, as ver∣tue

is a Principall Cause of blessed life, and sometime not Principal, as the gifts of the body and of fortune be helpers to the happy life: but not Principall Causes thereof. Againe of Causes, some are of Necessitie, without which the thing can∣not be made, as the Instrument or matter, and some are said not to be of Necessitie, as when we say, The speaking of truth causeth hatred, and yet not of Necessitie. Also of Causes Effi∣cient, some be Vniuersall, and some Particular, as the Eclipse or euill Coniunction of certaine Planets is the Vniuersal cause of Pestilence: but the corruption of humours in mans body is the particular cause thereof. Againe, of causes some bee called of the Latins Propinquae (that is to say) nigh vnto the Effect, as the father and mother be the nighest Causes of Generation of Children. And some be called Remotae, (that is to say) re∣moued causes, which be further of, as the Grands•…•…rs, and Gran∣dames of the said children. Moreouer of Causes Efficient some work by a certaine naturall Necessity, as those that lack choise and iudgement, as fire that burneth, and the Sun that shineth, and all other naturall things that doe work by their own force and vertue. Some againe do work by counsell, reason, and free∣will, as men, Angels, and most chiefely God himselfe.

How may we reason from the Efficient Cause to the Effect?

From the necessarie Efficient Cause you may reason both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely. Affirmatiuely thus: The Sun is lately gone downe: Ergo, it is twilight. Negatiuely thus: The Sunne was not vp when Troy was destroyed: Ergo, Troy was not destroyed in the day time: but from the Efficient not Necessarie, you can reason but onely Affirmatiuely thus: He is slaine: Ergo, he is dead: but you cannot say; he is not slaine: Ergo, he is not dead.

What be the maxims of this Place?

The Necessarie Cause Efficient not letted, the Effect must needs follow: as if he hath drunken poison, he must needs die. But if such Cause faileth, the effect also must needs faile: as the Sunne is not vp: Ergo, it is not day. He neuer studied: Ergo, he is not learned, to which place may be referred the places of occasion, Instrument, Meane, and Generation.

How may we reason from the Effect, to the Cause Efficient?

From the Necessarie Effect, both Affirmatiuely and Nega∣tiuely thus, it is day: Ergo, the Sun is vp, it is not day: Ergo, the Sunne is not vp. From the Effect not Necessarie you may only reason Negatiuely, thus: He is not dead: Ergo, He is not slaine, but you cannot reason so Affirmatiuely, as to say, He is dead: Ergo, He is slaine.

What be the Maximes of this place?

The Effect being put, the necessary Cause must needes be, and the Effect being taken away, the necessary Cause is also taken away.

When doe Arguments fetched from this place faile?

When the Cause is not necessary or proper.

Of the End.

WHat is End, and how is it diuided?

The End is that for whose sake any thing is done, and of ends some be chiefe and last, and some not chiefe, but helping: The chiefe is that which is desired for it selfe sake, and such is the best state of euery thing in his kinde, as blessed life to Man: courage and fiercenesse to a Horse of seruice: heate and drynesse to Fire: coldnesse and moistnesse to Wa∣ter, &c. The helping end is that which is desired not for it selfe sake, but for that it helpeth to attayne the chiefest end, and of such helping ends one may be better then another, as when we desire money to buy a house, and the house to dwell in, &c.

How may we reason from this place?

Both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely, affirmatiuely thus, Ver∣tue is good, because blessed Life is good: negatiuely thus, If Adulterie be not good to allure another mans wife, To breake wedlock is not good.

What be the Maximes of this place?

That thing whereof the end is good or euill, is also of it selfe good or euill.

Tell the vse of these places of Causes, and whereto they serue?

The vse thereof is diuers and manifold: for sith that in the

Deliberatiue kinde two principall questions are to be discus∣sed; first, whether the thing be profitable; and secondly, whether it may be possible and conueniently done or not. Ar∣guments to proue the first, are to be fetched out of the End and Effect. And to proue the second out of the Cause Effici∣ent. Also in the kinde Demonstratiue to praise or dispraise. Arguments are to be fetched out of the End and Effect. Third∣ly, in the Iudiciall kinde, wherein doubt riseth of the fact, and will of the doer. Arguments are to be fetched from the End, to proue or disproue the same. Finally, these places, together with the other two Causes, Matter and Forme before taught, doe serue to make those kindes of Definitions which we cal Causall.

Of Opposites.

WHat be Opposites?

Things contrary one to another.

How many kindes of Opposites be there?

Foure (that is to say) Relatiues, Contraries, Priuatiues, and Contradictories.

And first of Relatiues.

WHen are things said to be Opposites by Relation?

When according to their owne significations they haue mutuall Relation one to another, as the Father and the Sonne.

How may we reason from this place?

You may reason from the Affirmation of the one to the de∣nyall of the other, thus Augustus was Octa•…•…s his sonne: Ergo, He was not his Father.

What be the Maximes of this place?

Sith Relatiues be alwayes together by nature, if the one be, the other must needes be, and if the one be taken away, the o∣ther is also taken away.

What is to be obserued in fetching Arguments from this place?

You must beware that you haue one selfe respect, and not diuers, for to reason thus is no good Consequent, This man is

a Father: Ergo, He is no Sonne: or thus, This man is his Su∣perior: Ergo, Not his Inferior, for in diuers respects he may be both a Father and a Sonne; a Superior and Inferior; a Supe∣rior in one respect, and Inferior in another.

Of Contraries.

WHat be Contraries, and how are they diuided?

They be two Extremes Repugnant one to another, whereof some are called Mediate (that is to say) hauing a meane, and some Immediate hauing no meane at all.

How may we reason from these two kindes?

From the first kinde you may conclude negatiuely, thus, He is prodigall: Ergo, He is not couetous: from the second kinde you may reason both Affirmatiuely & Negatiuely, thus, This man is whole: Ergo, He is not sicke; This man is not whole: Ergo, He is sicke.

What be the Maximes of this place?

The Maxime of the Affirmatiue to the Negatiue is the ge∣nerall Maxime to all Opposites, thus: Whatsoeuer agreeth with the one Opposite, must needes disagree with the other Opposite: but the Maxime of the Immediate is thus: If one of the Contraries Immediate be not, the other must needes be, as the former examples doe plainely shew.

Of Priuatiues.

WHat be Priuatiues?

Priuatiues are two Contraries, belonging to one selfe Subiect, apt to receiue the same, in the which Subiect, when the one is wanting (at such time as Nature doth appoint) the other must needes be.

How may we reason from this place?

Two wayes: first, from Affirmation of the one to the deny∣all of the other, which is common to all Opposites, as thus, He is blind: Ergo, He seeth not. Secondly, you may reason from the denyall of the one to the affirmation of the other, thus: He cannot speake: Ergo, He is dumbe. But this kinde of Ar∣gument is not strong, vnlesse the thing required be applyed to

his proper Subiect, and in such time as nature hath appointed, for it were no good argument to say thus: a sucking child can∣not speake: Ergo, he is dumbe; or thus, a whelpe of two daies old cannot see: Ergo, he is blinde: for nature commonly suf∣fereth not the childe to speake before it be two yeeres old, nor the whelpe to see before it be nine daies olde.

What be the maxims of this place?

If the one bee not in the Subiect apt to receiue the same at such time as nature hath appointed, the other must needs be.

Of Contradictories.

WHat be Contradictories?

They be Contraries hauing no meane, whereof the one denieth the other.

How may we reason from this place?

Both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely thus: he is wife: Ergo, he is no foole: he is a foole: Ergo, he is not wise.

What is the Maxime of this place?

If the one be, the other cannot be: for two Contradictories cannot be together at one selfe time, in one selfe Subiect, and in one selfe respect.

Of things differing in kinde, called of the La∣tines Disparata.

WHat be they?

They are those things that doe differ in nature and kinde, as a Man, a Horse, a Stone, a Tree, whereof euery one differeth from another in kinde and nature.

How may we reason from this place?

From the Affirmation of the one, to the Deniall of the o∣ther, as thus: Peter is a Man, Ergo, he is no Horse.

What be the Maximes of this place?

Whatsoeuer agreeth with the one, agreeth not with the o∣ther.

What is to be obserued in reasoning from all these kindes of Op∣posites?

That the Repugnancy consist in the Predicat, and not in the

Subiect: for it were no good Consequent to say thus: what∣soeuer seeth is a sensible bodie: Ergo, that which is blinde is no sensible bodie: for heere the Contrarietie consisteth in the Subiect, and not in the Predicate.

Of Comparison.

HOw may we reason from the place of Comparison?

Three manner of wayes, that is, eyther from the More to the Lesse, or from the Lesse to the More, or from Like to Like.

Of the More.

THese two words, More or lesse, how are they to be taken?

We vnderstand heere by More, that which hath more probabilitie, and by the Lesse, that which hath lesse probabi∣litie.

How may we reason from the More to the Lesse?

Onely Negatiuely, and that three manner of wayes: first, from the Subiect, as thus: Cicero was not able to defend this cause, much lesse any other common Orator: secondly, from the Predicate thus: If this man be not able to beare one hun∣dred weight, much lesse two hundred weight: thirdly, from the Subiect, and Predicate both together thus: A strong man is not able to beare a hundred weight: Ergo, much lesse a weake childe is able to beare two hundred weight.

What is the Maxime of this place?

If it preuaileth not in the More, it cannot preuaile in the Lesse.

Of the Lesse.

HOw may we reason from the Lesse to the More?

Affirmatiuely, three manner of wayes, as before from the Subiect thus: A little childe was able to beare ten pound weight: Ergo, much more a strong man: From the Predicate thus: If Martyrs were readie to lose their liues for Christs sake, much more their temporall goods: From the Subiect, and the Predicate both together thus: Christ suffered most

grieuous torments for our sakes: Ergo, wee ought to suffer a little paine for his sake.

What is the Maxime of this place?

If the Lesse preuaile, the More must needs auaile.

What is to be obserued in reasoning from these two places?

You must beware that you take not the More for the Lesse, nor the Lesse for the More, for many times that which seemeth to be the More in number or quantitie, is the Lesse in purpose, and contrariwise, as for example: to beare a hundred weight, is more in quantitie, then to beare halfe a hundred weight, and yet in purpose it is lesse, for it is lesse probable, and lesse likely to beare a hundred weight, then to beare halfe a hundred weight.

Of Like and Unlike.

HOw may we reason from Like to Like?

When the thing which we bring to proue, is like or e∣quall to the thing that is to be proued: from which place wee may reason both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely, thus: Peter is mortall: Ergo, Paul is mortall. The day Labourer is wor∣thy of his hyre: Ergo, the Preacher or Teacher: A man ought to be drowned in the sea for killing his Father: Ergo, he ought to be executed with the like death for killing his Mother.

What is the Maxime of this place?

Of things like, like iudgement is to be made: but note that this kinde of reasoning of Like, is more apt to teach and to print in the hearers minde a liuely representation of the thing, then to vrge him by any necessitie of due proofe to beleeue the same, because it is vnpossible, that the two things which are to be compared can be like in all points, and therefore this is the weakest kinde of argument that is, and yet necessarie to such end as is before declared, and specially for Lawyers, to proue one ruled case, or for iudgement by another Like. To this place also is referred the place of Example.

Of Example.

How may we reason from this place?

Affirmatiuely thus: Peter slew Ananias for lying: Ergo, with∣out all doubt God will punish those that vse to lye: the Maxime whereof is all one, with that of like before set downe.

Of Unlike.

HOw may we reason from this place?

Negatiuely thus: God is not as man is, for man is a lyer: Ergo, God is true and no lyer.

What is the Maxime of this place?

Of things Vnlike, vnlike iudgement is to be made.

Of the degrees of Comparison.

TO the place of Comparison, me thinkes it were not amisse to re∣ferre all those places which Aristotle reciteth, and are taken out of the three degrees of Comparison, which children learne in their Accidents, (that is to say) the Positiue, the Comparatiue, and the Superlatiue.

From the Comparatiue to the Positiues.

HOw may we reason from the Comparatiue to the Positiue?

Affirmatiuely thus: Uirgil was a more learned Poet then Horace: Ergo, Virgil was a learned Poet: Honey is swee∣ter then Milke: Ergo, Honey is sweete.

What is the Maxime of this place?

If the Comparatiue degree be truly and properly applyed to any thing: the Positiue must needes be also rightly applyed to the same. I say, heere properly to auoid Ambiguitie, for it were no good Consequent to say thus: the sea of Caspia is more sweete then any other sea: Ergo, it is sweete and not salt: for this word Sweet hath not in this speech his proper significati∣on, but is rather taken, for that which is lesse bitter or salt.

From the Positiue to the Comparatiue.

HOw may we reason from the Positiue to the Comparatiue?

Onely Negatiuely thus: Zoilus was no learned Poet: Er∣go, he was not better learned then Homer.

What is the Maxime of this place?

If the Positiue be denied, the Comparatiue also must needs be denied.

From two Positiues to two Comparatiues and two Superlatiues.

HOw may we reason from two Positiues, to two Comparatiues, and to two Superlatiues at once, and contrarily?

In this manner: that which is good, deserueth iustly to bee beloued: Ergo, that which is better, ought more iustly to bee beloued, and that which is best, ought most iustly to be be∣loued. And much after this manner you may reason from a double Comparatiue, to a double Positiue thus: that which is more honest; is more laudable: Ergo, that which is honest is laudable.

What is to be obserued in reasoning from these degrees of Compa∣rison?

You must take heed that the Predicate bee spoken of the Subiect naturally and necessarily, and not by Accident, for it were no good Consequent to reason thus: he that is learned, is honest, therefore he that is more learned, is more honest: for a man may haue much learning, and yet small honestie.

Of Proportion.

WHen are we said to reason from the place of Proportion?

When two like Propositions being compared toge∣ther, we conclude in this or such like manner: looke what pro∣portion is betwixt 6. and 4. the same proportion is betwixt 12. and 8. but betwixt 6. and 4. is Proportio Sesquialtera: Ergo, betwixt 12. and 8. the like proportion is: for when one num∣ber or measure doth comprehend another once, and one halfe thereof, that is called proportio sesquialtera, as 12. and 8. and if it containe it once, and one third part thereof, then it is called proportio sesquitertia, as 8. and 6. for 8. containeth 6. once and two ouer, which is the third part of 6.

What is the Maxime of this place?

Of things hauing like proportion, like iudgement is to be made.

Whereto serueth this place?

This place is necessary for Iudges and Magistrates that haue to consider of equitie in cases of Iustice, and in rewarding vertue, or in punishing vice, in which the Geometricall pro∣portion would be alwayes vsed. Some doe giue such exam∣ples of this place, as in my opinion doe rather belong to the place of Like then to this place, for the arguments of this place ought properly to be fetched out of the Predicament of quantitie, and not out of qualitie, or out of any other Predi∣cament.

Of Changed Proportion.

WHat is changed Proportion?

Changed Proportion is when the Foundations, and Termes of two like Proportions are answerable in proportion aswell amongst themselues, as one to another.

What meane you by these two words, Foundation and Termes?

The Foundation is that from whence the Comparison first proceedeth, as the Father, and the Terme, Bound or end is that whereunto the said Comparison is applyed, and endeth in the same, as the Sonne and therefore the Son is called the Terme, Bound or end: whereof wee haue spoken before in the Predi∣cament of Relation.

Giue Examples of reasoning from this place.

Looke as 8. is to 4. so is 12. to 6. (that is to say) in double proportion one to the other: Ergo, as 12. is to 8. so is 6. to 4. for each other containeth the other once and a halfe, which is called proportio sesquialtera. The manifest Demonstration wher∣of you may see in this Figure heere following.

[illustration]

Why is this Proportion said to be changed or transposed?

Because the order of numbers that are compared, is altered in the conclusion: for in the Antecedent the first is compared to the second, and the third to the fourth: but in the Con∣clusion the third is compared to the first, and the fourth to the second.

Of Disproportion.

HOw may we reason from this place?

Negatiuely thus: 12. is not to 6. as 8. to 6. but 12. to 6. is double in proportion: Ergo, 8. to 6. is not double in proportion.

What is the Maxime of this place?

Of things hauing vnlike proportion, vnlike iudgement is to be made.

From Disproportion changed or transposed.

HOw may we reason from this place?

Negatiuely thus: 12. is not to 6. as 4. to 3. for be∣twixt the two first is a double proportion, and betwixt the two last Sesquitertia: Ergo, 12. is not to 4. as 6. to 3. for the

one is a tripla, and the other double.

What be the Maximes of this place?

If the first bee not to the second, as the third to the fourth, then the first shall not be to the third, as the second is to the fourth.

To whom are these places most familiar?

To those that are exercised in the Mathematicall Sciences.

Of Translation.

WHat is Translation?

Translation, otherwise called a Metaphor, is a figure of speech, whereby the proper signification of a word is chan∣ged into another vnproper, for some likenesse that is betwixt the thing signified, and being generally taken, it is rather a Trope, or Figure of Rhetorick, more meete to adorne speech, then to proue any thing thereby: notwithstanding being ta∣ken heere as a place of Logick, you may reason both Affirma∣tiuely and Negatiuely, in this sort: A roring Lion that seeketh to deuoure, is to be feared: Ergo, the Diuell is to be feared: Loue is blinde: Ergo, they that be in loue, are not able rightly to iudge.

What be the Maximes of this place?

Whatsoeuer agreeth with the Metaphoricall name, agreeth also with the proper name, and contrariwise.

Of Meane places.

WHat be meane Places?

Meane Places are those from whence such Argu∣ments are to be fetched, as doe partly agree with the nature of the things to be proued, and doe partly differ from the same.

How are Meane Places diuided?

Into Coniugates, Cases, and Diuision.

And first of Coniugates and Cases.

WHat be Coniugates or Cases?

Coniugates or Cases, be like words deriued all of one selfe word, differing onely in termination or end, as wis∣dome, wise, and wisely: notwithstanding some vse Coniugates and Cases as seuerall places.

Why, wherein doe they differ?

Their Difference is very small, sauing that in Arguments fetched from Coniugates, the Abstract is mentioned, but not in those that are fetched from Cases.

How may we reason from these two places?

Both affirmatiuely and Negatiuely, from the Coniugates thus: A iust man is to be praised, ergo Iustice is to be praised: a vicious man is not to be praised, ergo viciousnesse is not to be praised. From cases thus: He doth all things wisely, ergo he is wise: He doth nothing wisely, ergo he is not wise: for in these two last examples the abstract which is wisedome, is not once mentioned: what abstract is, looke before in the Chapter of predication lib. 1. cap. 5. but you must beware in reasoning from this place, that your phrase of speach be natural and pro∣per, and not vnproper: for it were no good argument to say thus: white is sweete: Ergo, whitenesse is sweetnesse.

What is the maxim of these two places?

Whatsoeuer agreeth with one of the Coniugates or cases, must needes also agree with the other.

Of Diuision.

WHat is Diuision?

What Diuision is, and how many kindes there be, and what is to be obserued in euery kinde hath been declared before, lib. 2. cap. 4. when we shewed the order of defining and diuiding.

How may we reason from diuision?

Two manner of wayes: first, from the denying of one part or more of the diuision, to affirme another part therof, as thus: Euery sensible body is whole or sicke, but Peter is a sensible body and not sicke: Ergo, hee is whole: or thus. Of sensible bodies there be some whole, some sicke. Peter is a sensible bo∣die and not sicke: Ergo, he is whole. In these two kindes of examples the diuision consisteth onely of two parts, wherein it sufficeth to denie the one for affirming the other. But if the di∣uision consist of many parts, then you must denie all the parts sauing that which you would affirme, as in this example fol∣lowing:

Plato disputeth, is a proposition, but it is neither vni∣uersall, particular, nor indefinite: Ergo, it is a singular proposi∣tion: in which kind of reasoning if you leaue out or omit any part that is to be denied, then the conclusion is naught, for it is no good consequent to say thus: this proposition Plato dis∣puteth, is neither vniuersal nor particular: Ergo, it is indefinite. Notwithstanding, if you ioyne the part omitted in your Ante∣cedent with a coniunction disiunctiue, the argument may be made good; as to say thus: this proposition Plato disputeth, is neither vniuersall nor particular: Ergo, it is either indefinite or singular.

What is the Maxim of this first way of reasoning?

The Maxim is thus: whatsouer agreeth with the thing di∣uided, must needs agree with some one of the parts thereof.

What is the second way of reasoning from Diuision?

The second way is to proceede from the affirming of one of the parts to the denying of the other, if it consist but of two, or to the denying of all the rest, if it consist of many. Of two parts let this bee your example: Of sensible bodies some bee whole, some sicke, but this sensible body is whole: Ergo, he is not sicke. Of many parts thus: of propositions one is vniuer∣sall, another particular; one indefinite, another singular: but this proposition Plato disputeth▪ is singular: Ergo, it is neither vniuersall, particular, nor indefinite.

What is the Maxim of this way of reasoning?

Whatsoeuer agreeth with one of the parts, must needs dis∣agree with all the rest, for euery good diuision would be made of parts meere repugnant, or at the least diuers in kinde one from another: for it is a principall condition requisite to diui∣sion, whereupon the second way of reasoning is grounded euen as the first way is grounded vpon another good conditi∣on belonging also to diuision, which is that the thing diuided may not containe more or lesse then his proper parts.

Of inartisiciall places.

HAuing sufficiently spoken of places, inward, outward, and meane, which as I said before are places artificiall, it

is meet now that we speake of the places inartificiall, which according to Quintilian be these sixe; Foreiudgements, Ru∣mors, Torture, Writings or Euidences, Oath, and Witnesses: All which are briefly and plainely set forth in the Table of Au∣thoritie here following, because they are all contained vnder the place of Authority.

Of Authoritie.

HOw is Authority here to be taken?

Authoritie is here to be taken for any testimony worthy of credite.

How may we reason from this place?

Affirmatiuely thus: the learned Philosophers say that there bee foure elements, whereof all other things are mixt and compounded: Ergo, it is true. Christ saith that whosoeuer is baptized, and beleeueth in him, shall be saued: Ergo, it is true.

What be the Maxims of this place?

Whatsoeuer is allowed by the most part of the wise and learned, is to bee beleeued as a thing probable, neither ought we rashly to discent from their opinion and iudgement. A∣gaine, euery man is to be beleeued in his owne Art: but for so much as Authority is two-fold (that is to say) diuine and hu∣mane, and that all arguments fetched from this place be not of like value, for some be true and infallible, some probable, and some Sophisticall: this Table therefore here following shall plainely set foorth euery kinde by it selfe, whereby you shall easily discerne the one from the other.

The Table of Authority here following.

• ...
  • Authoritie is two-fold,
  • ...
    • Diuine which is twofold:
    • ...
      • Written,
      • ...
        • Of the written which we cal holy Scriptures, sound arguments are made, so long as the words are truly expounded according to the meaning if the holy Ghost. But they be weake and càptious if the au∣thority be corrupted either by addition, subtracti∣on, or alteration of any word, sillable, or letter, or by wresling the senseotherwise then the holy Ghost meant it.
      • or vnwrit∣ten tradi∣tion:
      • ...
        • As for tradition or vnwritten verity of what va∣lue it is & what credit it hath, I leaue to the iudge∣ment of the learned Diuines, amongst whom is no small strife and contention in these dayes for the same. The Painims were wont to referre to diuine Authority the Oracles and answeres of their false Gods, Priests, Prophets, and Southsayers, which true Christians ought vtterly to reiect, and to ab∣horre: notwithstanding Lactantius letteth not to proue the birth, death and passion of Christ against the Painims by Sybils prophesies, because he knew they would giue more credit to them then to the holy Scriptures.
      • or Humane which is three-fold:
      • ...
        • Writings, as
        • ...
          • Histories, Lawes, Statutes, Decrees, Iudgements, ruled Cases, Maxim•…•…, Prouerbs, generall Rules, Patents, Warrants, Lycenses, Commissions from the Prince, Charters, Deedes, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Court∣Rolles, Extents, Accounts, Obligations, Indent•…•…es, Wills and Testaments, and such like.
        • Things vt∣tered by mouth.
        • ...
          • If it be by mouth, it is either free and voluntary, as voluntary Confession, or Testimony, Rumor, Opini∣on, and the speach of the Wise.
          • Or else forced by Oath or Torture.
        • And the third kinde of Humane Authority, is that which is allew∣ed by vse and custome of the people.

As for such Arguments as are fetched from humane Autho∣ritie, the lawes doe teach 〈◊〉〈◊〉 large, which bee sound, and which bee weake: notwithstanding, for so much as Quintilian affir∣meth, that the inartificial places, are the six places aboue-men∣tioned, I haue thought good to set downe according to Vale∣rius, the definition of euery place, and briefly to shew how e∣uery such place may be confirmed or impugned.

And first of Fore-iudgements or Ruled Cases.

VVHat call you Fore-iudgements or Ruled Cases?

They be Iudgments or sentences heretofore pro∣nounced, whereby Iudges take example to giue like iudge∣ment in like Cases.

How may a man confirme or impugne Fore-iudgements?

You shall confirme them by aggrauating the authoritie of those that first pronounced them, and by the likenesse of the Cases: but you shal impugne or confute them by extenuating or diminishing the authority of the first pronouncers, and by the vnlikenes of the Cases.

Of Rumor and Fame.

VVHat difference is betwixt Rumor and Fame?

Rumor is a particular assertion or affirmation proceeding of some suspition, without any certaine Author. But Fame is a common affirmation, hauing some certaine Au∣thor: either of which whosoeuer will impugne, must call it an vncertaine brute or clamor, taking his beginning first of ma∣lice, and his increase through credulitie and lightnesse of be∣leefe, and that the same may chance to the most innocent man, that is, through the Fraud of his enemies, publishing a∣broad false surmises against him. Contrarily, he that will de∣fend Fame or Rumor, must say that it riseth not of nought, nor is spred abroad without some iust cause, and that it is ac∣counted as a publike Testimony, according to the old Pro∣uerbe; which saith; vox populi, vex Dei, the voyce of the people is the voice of God.

Of Torture.

VVHat is Torture?

Torture is a painefull kind of punishment, inuen∣ted for the inquisition of trueth, and violently to wrest or wring the same out of such as would not otherwise confesse it.

How is this place to be confirmed or impugned?

It is to be confirmed by aggrauating the necessary vse of tor∣ture for the finding out of the truth; but whoso will impugne it, must say, that such Torture causeth many times more lies then true tales to be told: for those that be strong and able to endure paine, and of a resolute minde, will neuer yeeld for any torment to say otherwise then they list themselues. Againe, if they be weake and not able to suffer paine, it maketh them to say whatsoeuer you will haue them, be it neuer so false.

Of Writings and Euidences.

VVHat is meant by Writings?

Deedes, Indentures, Releases, Obligations, and such like other Euidences before rehearsed.

How is this place to be impugned?

You may impugne Euidences or Writings, if ye can prooue them to be vnperfect any maner of way, as to be forged, to bee made by some collusion or fraude, or to bee extorted by force from some that was put in feare, and such like.

Of Oathes.

VVHat is an Oath?

It is a religious affirming or denying some thing, by calling God to witnesse, which is the strongest bond that may be, to binde mans faith and conscience.

How is this place to be confirmed or impugned?

He that will proue by this place, must aggrauate the inte∣gritie, honesty and holinesse of the parties that are sworne, say∣ing, that the Oath of an honest, holy, and religious man is of great importance: And hee that will impugne it, must doe cleane contrary, saying, That they are naughty men that are

sworne, and common Iurors, which by reason of wicked cu∣stome of swearing will easily bee forsworne: or hee must say that the partie sweareth for feare, loue, hatred, for hope of gaine, reward, and such like.

Of Witnesses.

VVHat be Witnesses?

Witnesses be proofes of things done or not done, whose office is to speake what they haue heard or knowne: the confirmation or confutation of which proofe dependeth vpon the goodnesse or euilnesse of the persons.

To what end serueth the knowledge of places?

He that wil write or speake of any matter probably, wisely, or copiously: or will vnderstand the effect, tenor, arguments, and proofes of other mens speaches, and writings, hath as much need to be practised in these places, as a Huntsman is in knowing the haunts of his game which hee hunteth, for with∣out that, he shall wander long time in vaine, and hardly find that which he seeketh: neither is it enough to know the pla∣ces, vnlesse you can aptly applie them and vse them when oc∣casion shall serue, in disputations made either by mouth or pen, which requireth a continuall exerciso of such as will be perfect therein. And therefore to the intent you might the better learne how to exercise your selfe in the foresaid places, I haue thought good here to giue you at the least one example set downe by Hunneus in his Logicke: the Theame of which example is thus: Man ought to embrace vertue: which Theam hee doth not onely handle after the Logicall manner with short speach, but also after the Rhetoricall manner with co∣pious speach, vsing therein this threefold order: For first, hee bringeth in such proofes as are to be gathered in respect of the subiect of the Theame. Secondly, those that are to be gathe∣red in respect of the Predicate of the same: and thirdly, those that are to be had in respect of both.

The Theame or Proposition.

MAn ought to embrace vertue.

What arguments are to be gathered on the behalfe of the subiect of this Proposition?

These that follow, and first, from the definition thus: Sith of all sensible creatures man is the most noble and most worthy creature, for that he is endued with reason and coun∣sell, and was created like to the image of God: it is most meete therefore that such a creature should bee like his Creator, in life adorned with such vertue and goodnesse as is answerable to true iudgement, which the Logicians would briefly ex∣presse in this maner: it becommeth euery sensible body en∣dued with reason to loue vertue: Ergo, euery man ought to loue vertue.

From the Etymologie.

IT becommeth euery creature that is made of the slime of the earth, to be void of all arrogancie and pride, to bee lowly, humble, and obedient to his Creator, and to imbrace vertue in obseruing the Law of God deuoutly and religiously, where∣fore man called in Latine homo, of this word humo, (that is to say) earth, or rather slime of the earth, taking his original from so base and vile a thing, ought to bee humble and voyd of all pride and arrogancie, and to loue vertue aboue all things, be∣ing alwayes obedient to God his Creator, and ready to do his most holy precepts and commandements.

Logically thus:

Euery sensible creature that is created of the slime of earth, ought to bee obedient to his Creator and to imbrace vertue, therefore man ought to bee obedient to his Creator, and to imbrace vertue.

From the Matter.

MAn is made of the selfe same Matter of which all other vnliuing, dumbe & vnsen•…•…ble creatures are made, (that is to say) of the foure elements, whereby he is subiect to alte∣ration and corruption: wherefore man ought not to be proud or arrogant, but modest, humble, lowly, and obedient, shew∣ing in all the actions of his life, that he is not vnmindfull of his

base estate and condition, nor ignorant from whence he came, and what he is, euen no better then earth and dust.

Logically thus.

Man is made of a base matter, as all other things are, there∣fore Man ought not to be proud, but to loue the vertue of hu∣militie and obedience.

From the forme or shape of Man.

IT hath been alwaies most firmely, and with one whole con∣sent agreed and beleeued, euen from the beginning of the world, that the true shape of Man is a reasonable Soule, im∣mortall, and capable of euerlasting blessednesse, which Soule God of his goodnesse did breathe into man, to the intent that he should continually serue, honor, and obey him during this mortall life, and after death enioy eternall life: what great madnesse were it then to thinke, that Man hauing obtained at Gods hands so noble a shape, ought not to embrace all noble vertues, and to gouerne all his actions in such godly and vertu∣ous manner, as he may at length attaine to the euerlasting ioy whereunto he was first created and formed?

Logically thus:

Man consisteth of a Soule capable of eternall felicitie: Er∣go, Man ought to loue vertue, whereby he may attaine to that felicitie.

From the generall kinde.

SIth it is giuen by nature to euery sensible Body to seeke his owne safety, and to be best affected (that is) to haue his full perfection according to his Kind: the loue of vertue there∣fore, whereby Man is made not onely perfect in this life, but also attaineth thereby euerlasting ioy in the life to come, must needs be to him most naturall.

Logically thus:

Euery sensible body willingly desireth that which is agree∣able to his nature and kinde, therefore Man must needs loue vertue, as a thing most fit for his kinde.

From the speciall kinde.

BOth Men and Women, Rich and Poore, Yong and Old, of what state or calling soeuer they be, if they intend to leade a good and godly life, haue need of vertue: wherefore all Men that will liue well, ought to embrace vertue.

Logically thus:

Both Rich and Poore, Yong and Old ought to loue vertue: Ergo, euery Man ought to loue vertue.

From the common Accidents.

EVery Man, after that hee hath ended this short course of life, must appeare at the last day before the terrible iudge∣ment seat of God, there to render account of all his deeds and words both good and bad, whereas euery man that hath done well, shal receiue for his good deedes a most glorious reward, euen life euerlasting: but the wicked for his euill deeds shall be condemned to hell fire, that neuer shall be quenched, a iust re∣ward for his deserts: wherefore all men ought in this life to fly vice, and to embrace vertue, from whence all good actions doe spring.

Logically thus:

Euery man shall render account at the last day, of all his deeds both good and bad, and shall receiue a iust reward ac∣cording to the same: Ergo, Euery man whilest he liueth in this world, ought to fly vice, and to embrace vertue.

From the cause efficient.

SIth Man was created by God the Creator of all things, and Author of all goodnesse, excellencie, and vertue, and was formed according to the very Image and likenesse of God: it behoueth man therefore to imitate his Creator, and by leading a godly and vertuous life, to shew that hee is somewhat like him, though not able in all things to attaine to the perfection of so perfect a patterne.

Logically thus:

God the cause efficient is good, therefore Man being the effect, ought to be good.

From the End.

THe Prophets and Apostles inspired with the Holy Ghost▪ Author of all Truth, by many their writings doe testifie, that the greatnesse and excellencie of that blessednesse wher∣unto Man is created, is such as no man is able to expresse with tongue, nor in his heart or minde to conceiue the same: wher∣fore sith Man is created to such exceeding great blessednesse, it behoueth him to embrace vertue, which is the very meane and way to bring him to that blessednesse.

Logically thus:

Sith most glorious blessednes is the end of Man, Man ther∣fore ought to embrace vertue, that he may attaine to that end.

What arguments are to be gathered on the behalfe of the Predi∣cate, and from what places?

These that follow, and such like, and first from the definiti∣on thus:

From the Definition of the Predicate.

SIth Vertue is a morall habite, whereby Mans will and all his actions are alwayes directed to God, and gouerned ac∣cording to true iudgement, and thereby are made most accep∣table both to God and Man: Man therefore ought to embrace Vertue, from whence such noble fruits doe spring.

Logically thus:

Man ought to loue that habite from whence all honest acti∣ons doe spring: therefore man ought to loue Vertue.

From the Description.

MAn ought with all endeuour to follow that thing wher∣by he may attaine not a vaine and transitorie glory, but a true and euerlasting glory, and thereby to be made accepta∣ble both to God and Man: Wherefore Man ought to embrace Vertue, from whence such glory springeth.

Logically thus:

That thing is worthy to be beloued of Man, which getteth him euerlasting glory: Therefore Vertue is worthy to be be∣loued.

From the Etymologie.

SIth Vertue, if you diligently consider and weigh the signi∣fication of the word, is none other thing but a Noble affe∣ction of the minde, of great excellencie, and most meete for Man: it is not to be doubted, but that those (which leauing so precious a thing, doe set their whole delight in seeking after worldly riches and bodily pleasure) are much deceiued, and doe greatly offend.

Logically thus:

Such excellencie as is most meet for Man, becommeth Man best: Therefore Vertue becommeth him best.

From the generall Kinde.

SIth it is well knowne that Man ought with all diligence to seeke after those habites, whereby humane nature is best adorned, and made most perfect: And that Vertue amongst such habites is the chiese: because that thereby the minde of Man is taught to know what truth is, and his will thereby is alwayes inclined to honest and laudable actions: Man there∣fore ought with al his power and endeuor to embrace Vertue.

Logically thus:

Man ought chiefely to loue those habites, whereby his na∣ture is made perfect: Therefore man ought to loue Vertue.

From the speciall Kinde.

IT is most meete, yea most necessarie for all men to loue for∣titude and temperance: for by temperance Mans wil is brid∣led, and kept from all euill lusts and affections, and by forti∣tude he is made free from feare of death: and as without tem∣perance mans life cannot be honest, so without fortitude his death cannot be commendable: wherefore it plainly appeareth how necessary a thing it is for a man to embrace Vertue, as that which chiefely maketh his life honest and laudable, and his death glorious and honorable.

Logically thus:

A man ought to loue fortitude and temperance: Ergo, He ought to loue Vertue.

From the corruption of the Subiect.

THe destruction of Vertue is the cause of most grieuous euils, for the light of Vertue being extinct, the minde is immediately wrapped in such darkenesse, as it cannot see nor discerne what is honest, what is profitable, or what is hurtfull, by meanes whereof man falleth into most filthie vices, which doe so infect and corrupt the life of man, as it becommeth most detestable both to God and Man: whereby it plainely appea∣reth how noble a thing Vertue is, and with what loue and dili∣gence it ought to be embraced of all men.

Logically thus:

The destruction of Vertue is euill: therefore Vertue is good and worthy to be beloued.

From the vse of the Subiect.

THe vse of Vertue maketh mans life commendable, holy, glorious, and acceptable both to God and Man: then which nothing can bee in this world more to bee desired of man: wherefore it manifestly appeareth, that Vertue is so no∣ble a thing, as all men ought to bestow all their studie, labour and care in obtaining the same.

Logically thus:

The vse of Vertue is good: Therefore Vertue is good.

From common Accidents.

SIth all men doe greatly desire to haue their consciences quieted, and their mindes free from all euill lustes, affects, and passions, which with continuall strife doe molest the same: and thereby doe cause Man to lead a miserable life: Man ther∣fore ought to refuse no paine nor labour, so as he may attaine to Vertue, which is alwaies accompanied with that tranquilli∣tie of minde and conscience that is so much desired.

Logically thus:

The tranquillitie of the minde and conscience is to be desi∣red: Ergo, Vertue which is alwaies accompanied with that tranquillitie is to be desired.

From the cause Efficient.

SIth true Vertue is not to be gotten by any mans labour, ex∣ercise, or industrie, without the great grace of God, who is chiefe Authour and Giuer of all good gifts: it well ap∣peareth that Vertue is a most excellent thing, and most wor∣thie to be had in admiration, and therefore with feruent loue and diligence to be embraced of all men.

Logically thus:

God the chiefe Author of all good, is the cause Efficient of Vertue: therefore Vertue proceeding of so worthy a cause, must needs be an excellent thing, and worthy of all men to be embraced.

From the Effect.

TRue honor and glory hath beene alwaies had amongst all men in great admiration: because it seemeth not only by mans iudgement, but also by the diuine iudgement of God, to be alwaies attributed to vertue: wherefore sith Vertue doth yeeld such noble fruits and effects, Vertue must needs be a no∣ble thing it selfe, and worthy of all men to be embraced.

Logically thus:

The Effect of Vertue, which is true honor and glory, is good, and to be desired.

From the End.

SIth euerlasting blessednesse is of such excellencie, as neither tongue is able to expresse the ioyes thereof, nor minde to conceiue the same, and therefore ought to be desired aboue all things, as the iust reward of all goodnesse, and finall end of all euill, and that Vertue is the onely meane to bring man to that blessed End: who then will once thinke that Vertue is not to be esteemed aboue all things, and worthy of all men to bee embraced?

Logically thus:

The end of Vertue, which is euerlasting felicitie, is to bee desired: Ergo, Vertue is to be desired.

Hitherto you haue shewed how the aforesaid Theme is to be pro∣ued with Arguments fetched aswell from the Subiect as the Predi∣cate: now shew what Arguments are to be fetched from both ioyned together?

These that follow and such like, and first by Comparison, from the Lesse to the More.

From the Lesse to the More.

IF men will not let to bestow any paine, labour or cost to preserue their bodies from death, sickenesse, or any other hurt: how much more then ought they to endeuour themselues to obtaine Vertue, which will preserue their soules from all corrupt affections and euill vices, and thereby deliuer them from death euerlasting?

Logically thus:

Man ought to be carefull of his bodily health: Ergo, Much more of his soules health, which is chiefely preserued by Vertue.

From Similitude or Likenesse.

AS the beautie of the bodie is pleasant to mans eyes: euen so the beautie of the minde or soule is as acceptable to God: and therefore as man will be diligent and careful in dec∣king and adorning his body to please the eyes of men: euen so he ought to be most carefull to decke his soule and mind, with such Vertues, as doe make the same in Gods sight most accep∣table.

Logically thus:

As the decking of the bodie is pleasant to mens eyes: so the decking of the Soule is pleasing to God.

From Authoritie.

DAuid the Prophet in the 34. Psalme saith thus: Turne from euill, and doe that which is good. The Prophet Micheas also agreeth hereunto in saying thus: Deale iustly with all men, loue mercie, and walke diligently in the way of God. By which words these two godly Prophets doe teach no

other thing, then that Man forsaking all kinde of vice, should with all diligence embrace Vertue.

Logically thus:

God teacheth by his Prophet Dauid, and also by Micheas, that Man should fly Vice, and loue Vertue: Ergo, Man ought to loue Vertue. By daily exercising your selfe in such exam∣ples as this is, you shall in short time learne the right vse of the places, and bee able thereby readily to apply them to euery good purpose.

Heere endeth the fourth Booke of Logick.

Notes

• From the defini∣tion of the sub∣iect.