The arte of logick Plainely taught in the English tongue, according to the best approued authors. Very necessary for all students in any profession, how to defend any argument against all subtill sophisters, and cauelling schismatikes, and how to confute their false syllogismes, and captious arguments. By M. Blundevile.
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- The arte of logick Plainely taught in the English tongue, according to the best approued authors. Very necessary for all students in any profession, how to defend any argument against all subtill sophisters, and cauelling schismatikes, and how to confute their false syllogismes, and captious arguments. By M. Blundevile.
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- Blundeville, Thomas, fl. 1561.
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- London :: Printed by William Stansby, and are to be sold by Matthew Lownes,
- 1617.
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- Logic -- Early works to 1800.
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"The arte of logick Plainely taught in the English tongue, according to the best approued authors. Very necessary for all students in any profession, how to defend any argument against all subtill sophisters, and cauelling schismatikes, and how to confute their false syllogismes, and captious arguments. By M. Blundevile." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A16218.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 15, 2024.
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Page 69
THE ART OF LOGICKE. THE THIRD BOOKE.
CHAP. I.
It is a perfect speech whereby some∣thing is manifestly declared to be true or false.
Of Noune and Verbe, which Noune would be of the Nominatiue case, and the Verbe of the Indicatiue Mood, as when I say, Man is a sensible body; for the Logicians do seldome allow any such speeches as are either of the Optatiue, Imperatiue, Interrogatiue, or Vocatiue Mood, as, I would to God I had a good horse: this speech is not accounted to be so true or certaine, as to say, I haue a good horse.
Of three, that is to say, the Subiect, Predicat, and Copulat.
It is the Verbe Substantiue, called in Latine, Sum, es, fui, that is, to be, which doth couple or ioine the Predicat with his Sub∣iect,
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as when we say, Man is a sensible body: here in this propo∣sition, the word man is the subiect, and the word sensible body is the predicat, and the Verbe is is the copulat: which copulat is not alwaies incident to euery proposition, and specially when the predicat is some other Verbe, and not the Verbe substantiue; as, Plato disputeth, Socrates walketh; which is as much to say, as Plato is disputing, Socrates is walking.
Three manner of waies, that is, according to substance, quali∣tie, and quantitie. According to substance thus: Of propositions, some are said to be categoricall, that is, simple, and some hypo∣theticall, that is, compound, of which compound propositions we minde not to speake, before we haue treated of all things be∣longing to a categoricall and simple proposition, which is two∣fold that is to say, absolute and modall.
It is a speech which affirmeth or denieth something absolute∣ly, without any respect; as when we say, God is true, or, Euery man is a lier: and this is otherwise called of the Logicians, Propo∣sitio categorica de inesse.
Into an affirmatiue and negatiue proposition.
It is said to be affirmatiue, when the predicat is affirmed of the subiect; as when I say, that Iohn is learned: and that is negatiue, when the predicat is denied of the subiect; as, Iohn is not learned. And note, that in such kinde of speech, the negatiue is alwaies ioined to the Verbo.
Foure manner of waies, that is to say, into an vniuersall, parti∣cular, indefinite, and singular proposition.
When some vniuersall signe is added to the subiect.
These: all, euery, whatsoeuer, whosoeuer, none, no body, not one, none at all, euery where, no where, and such like; as, Euery man is a lier, No man is true.
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When some particular signe is added to the subiect▪
These: some, any, many, few, and such like; as, Some man is wise, Few are wise.
When the subiect is a common word, hauing neither vniuer∣sall nor particular signe added vnto it; as when wee say, Men in these daies be giuen to great sollies.
When the subiect is some Indiuiduum, as when wee say, that Cicero is eloquent.
These three: that is, of what kinde? of what qualitie? of what quantitie? in Latine thus, quae? qualis? & quanta? for if it bee asked what kinde of proposition it is, then you must answere, that it is either categoricall, or hypotheticall, that is, simple or compound: and if it be demanded of what qualitie it be, then you must answere, that it is either affirmatiue, or negatiue: if it be asked of what quantitie, then you must answere, that it is ei∣ther vniuersall, particular, indefinite, or singular.
CHAP. II.
These: Opposition, Equiualencie, and Con∣uersion.
It is the repugnancie of two simple propositi∣ons, hauing one selfe subiect, and one selfe predicat.
Foure: Contrarie, Subcontrarie, Contradictorie, and Subal∣ternat.
An vniuersall affirmatiue, and an vniuersall negatiue; as, Euery man is iust, No man is iust.
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A particular affirmatiue, and a particular negatiue; as, Some man is iust, Some man is not iust.
Either an vniuersall affirmatiue, and a particular negatiue, or else an vniuersall negatiue, and a particular affirmatiue; as, Euery man is iust, and, Some man is not iust: or, No man is iust, Some man is iust.
Either an vniuersall affirmatiue, and a particular affirmatiue, or else an vniuersall negatiue, and a particular negatiue: as, Euery man is iust, and, Some man is iust: No man is iust, and, Some man is not iust.
All which kinde of opposites you may the better remember, by considering with what order they are placed in this Figure fol∣lowing.
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CHAP. III.
FOr the better vnderstanding of the lawes belon∣ging to the opposites, it shall bee necessarie to speake somewhat of the matter of a proposition, whereupon the said lawes doe partly depend.
Threefold, that is to say, naturall, casuall, and remote or vnnaturall.
When the predicat agreeth with his subiect essentially, or at the least necessarily: as when the generall kinde is spoken of his speciall kinde, and the speciall kinde of his Indiuiduums, or the difference of his speciall kinde, or the propertie of his subiect: as, Euery man is a sensible body, Iohn is a man, Euery man is rea∣sonable, Euery man is apt to speake.
When the predicat agreeth with his subiect accidentally, so as it may either be, or not be; as, Iohn is learned.
When the predicat agreeth no manner of way with the sub∣iect; as, A man is a horse, A man is a stone, &c.
Contrarie propositions can be true no way both together; as, Euery man is a sensible body, No man is a sensible body: but they may be both false, and specially consisting of matter contin∣gent; as when I say, Euery man is iust, No man is iust, which are both false.
Subcontrarie propositions, consisting of matter naturall, can∣not be both false at once; as, Some man is a sensible body, Some man is not a sensible body: but consisting of matter contingent▪ both may be sometime true; as, Some man is iust, Some man is not iust.
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Those can neither be true nor false b•…•…th at once: for if one bee true, the other must needs be false, whether the matter be natu∣rall, or contingent; as, Euery man is iust; Some m•…•…n is not iust: No man is iust; Some man is iust.
If the vniuersall be true, the particular must needs be true; as, Euery man is iust, Ergo some man is iust; but not contrarily. Againe, if the particular be false, the vniuersall also must needs be false; as, Some man is a stone, Euery man is a stone.
It teacheth to know what speeches be repugnant one to ano∣ther, and thereby to discerne truth from falshood.
CHAP. IIII.
It is the reconciling or agreeing of two pro∣positions, hauing one selfe subiect, and one selfe predicate, in such sort, that though they be di∣uers in words, yet they are made to bee all one in signification.
By the helpe of signes, either vniuersall or particular, that are of like value, and equall one to another, and thereby make the speeches equall.
As thus: Who knoweth not this to be true? Euery man know∣eth this to be true: There is none but that knoweth this to bee true. All these are of like value, and doe signifie one selfe thing. Againe, Some men are wise, Few men are wise, All men are not wise, Not many are wise, are also equiualent speeches. The Schoolemen doe giue diuers rules touching the equiualencie of speeches; but such as, in mine opinion, are neither necessarie, no•…•… profitable, for that they cause many times barbarous, vnusu∣all, and intricate speeches. And therefore I thinke good hereto passe them ouer with silence, wishing all men to iudge the equi∣ualencie of speeches, rather by the eare, and by custome of spea∣king,
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and by vsuall manner of taking the same in euery seuerall tongue or language, then by any rules, which perhaps will serue in one tongue, but not in another.
CHAP. V.
It is the changing or turning of the subiect and predicate, the one into the others place.
It is threefold, that is, simple, by accident, and by contraposition.
It is that whereby the termes are onely changed the one into the others place, the selfe same quantitie and qualitie being still reserued.
An vniuersall negatiue, and particular affirmatiue.
Of the first thus: No vertue is discommendable, Ergo no dis∣commendable thing is vertue. Of the second thus: Some man is a Philosopher, and some Philosopher is a man. And by this way sometime vniuersall affirmatiues may be also conuerted, as those whose termes are conuertible, as the speciall kinde and his diffe∣rence or propertie; as, Euery man is reasonable, and euery reaso∣nable thing is man: or, Euery man is apt to speake, and euery thing that is apt to speake, is man.
It is that whereby the termes are changed, and also the quan∣titie of the propositions, but not the qualitie.
An vniuersall affirmatiue into a particular affirmatiue, and an vniuersall negatiue into a particular negatiue.
Euery patience is fortitude: Ergo some fortitude is patience. Againe: No vertue is vice: Ergo some vice is not vertue.
It is that whereby neither quantitie nor qualitie is changed,
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but only termes finite into termes infinite, that is to say, termes limited into termes vnlimited.
All Nounes hauing a negatiue set before them, as, not man, not beast.
An vniuersall affirmatiue into an vniuersall affirmatiue, and a particular negatiue into a particular negatiue.
Of the first thus: Euery man is a sensible body, and euery thing that is not a sensible body, is not man. Of the second thus: Some vertue is not Iustice: Ergo, some thing that is not Iustice, is not vertue. These speeches in English haue some sauour; but to be spoken in Latine, after the Schoole manner, are very barbarous, or rather monstrous, as Ualerius termeth them, as to say, Quae∣dam non Iustitia non est non virtus.
CHAP. VI.
It is that which affirmeth or denieth some∣thing, not absolutely, but in a certaine respect, sort, or mood, which mood is commonly the predicat in this kinde of proposition, and all the rest of the subiect called of the Logicians, Dictum.
Mood is a word determining and limiting the signification of some other word whereunto it is ioined, as a wise man, a white horse: for here this word wise being added to man, doth limit and restraine the generall signification of the word man, which otherwise of it selfe comprehendeth both wise and foolish. And the like is to be said of any other generall word, whereunto any such addition is put: but of moods making modall propositions, there are but these foure, that is, Possible, Contingent, Impossi∣ble, and Necessarie.
Twofold, that is, Coniunct and Disiunct.
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When the mood is placed either in the beginning or ending of a proposition; as, It is impossible that Iohn is sicke: or thus; That Iohn is sicke it is possible.
When the mood is placed so, as it diuideth the one part of the subiect from the other; as, for Iohn it is possible to be sicke: and the Disiunct is said many times to be true, when the Coniunct is false, being both made of selfe termes: as for example, the Logi∣cians affirme this to be true, A white man it is possible to bee blacke: but this other, A white man to be blacke it is possible, they affirme to be false.
Because the mood is the Disiunct, which by parting and seue∣ring the Subiect, maketh the Proposition to seeme spoken in di∣uers respects, as man to be white in one respect, and blacke in another, and so the speech to be true.
CHAP. VII.
WE told you before, that of modall propositions, some were called coniunct, and some disiunct: and as for the modals disiunct, they differ but lit∣tle from absolute propositions before declared. And therefore we haue here chiefly to deale with opposition, equiualencie, and conuersion belonging to modall coniunct, the matter whereof being not altogether so necessarie as some men affirme, I minde to make no long speech thereof. But for the better vnderstanding of opposition, equiualencie▪ and conuersion thereof, it is needfull first to declare the quantitie and qualitie of a modall proposition: of both which things, though Aristotle maketh no mention, but only a little of qualitie; yet the latter Writers doe necessarily suppose modall propositions to bee indued with quantitie and qualitie: for they say that the mood necessarie is much like to a signe vniuersall affirmatiue; the mood impossible, to a signe vniuersall negatiue; the moods possible and contingent, which are both of one value, are like to signes particu∣lar
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affirmatiue. Now as touching the qualitie, which is to be ei∣ther affirmatiue or negatiue, like as the negatiue in absolute pro∣positions is wont to bee added to the verbe, euen so in modall propositions it is added to the mood, as by the examples set down in the figure of opposition hereafter following ye may easily per∣ceiue.
CHAP. VIII.
They are said to be opposite foure manner of waies, euen as absolute propositions are, tha is to say, contrarily, subcontrarily, contradictoriy, and subalternately, as you see in this figure fol∣lowing, wherin the mood is set before in the place of the subiect, the better to shew the quantitie & qualitie of euery proposition.
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CHAP. IX.
THe Schoolemen doe affirme, that modall propo∣sitions are easily made equiualent, by reason that they may be vttered foure manner of waies, that is to say, two manner of waies affirmatiuely, and two manner of waies negatiuely. The first way af∣firmatiuely, is, when no negatiue is added either to the subiect, or to the mood; as, for a man to be iust, it is pos∣sible, contingent, impossible, or necessarie. The second way af∣firmatiuely, is, when the negatiue is added to the verbe of the subiect, the mood remaining still affirmatiue; as, for a man not to be iust, it is possible, contingent, &c. The first way negatiuely, is, when the negatiue is only added to the mood; as, a man to be iust, it is not possible, contingent, &c. The second way negatiuely, is, when the negatiue is both added to the verbe of the subiect, and also to the mood; as, a man not to be iust, it is not possible, contingent, &c. which is all one and equiualent to this affirma∣tiue proposition, saying, that for a man to be iust, it is possible, contingent, &c. for two negatiues, as well in the Latine tongue, as in ours, do alwaies make an affirmatiue. Again, as touching the cōuersion of modal propositions, they say, that the disiunct being like to an absolute or simple proposition, may be conuerted both simply and per accidens; but the coniunct suffereth no conuersion: & though the Schoolemen do set down diuers & manifold rules, and haue inuented these 4. words of Art, that is, PURPUREA, ILIACE, AM ABIMUS, EDENTULI, attributing as wel to the vowels, as to the consonants thereof, certaine significations, for the better vnderstanding & bearing in memorie the equiua∣lencies & conuersions of the said modal propositions: yet because in mine opinion they are more meet to breed preposterous, intri∣cate & barbarous speeches, then to serue to any other good pur∣pose, I thinke it better to passe them ouer with silence, then to trouble your memorie therwith: wherfore leauing them as things superfluous, I minde now to treat of an hypotheticall or cōpound proposition, & of al the necessarie accidents therunto belonging.
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CHAP. X.
It is that which consisteth of two or more sim∣ple propositions, coupled together with some coniunction.
Threefold, Conditionall, Copulatiue, and Disiunctiue.
When the coniunction If is set before any simple proposition, as thus: If it be a man, it is a sensible body.
When two simple propositions are ioined together with a con∣iunction copulatiue, as, God is true, and man is a lier.
When two simple propositions are ioined together with a coniunction disiunctiue, as thus; Either it is day, or night.
Of two, that is, of the antecedent, and of the consequent?
That which followeth next after the coniunction, as thus: If it be iustice, it is a vertue: here this speech, If it be iustice, is the an∣tecedent, and the rest of the speech, that is to say, it is a vertue, is the consequent: and so it should be, though the words were con∣trarily placed, as thus: It is a vertue, if it be iustice.
These: First, whether they haue any quantitie, or qualitie: then, whether any opposition, equiualence, or conuersion doe belong to them, or not: thirdly, how to know the truth or fals∣hood of euery such proposition, be it conditionall, copulatiue, or disiunctiue. And first, as touching quantitie, they haue none at all: for quantitie is to be measured by signes vniuersall, or parti∣cular, which are only incident to the subiects of categoricall pro∣positions: but qualitie they haue, in that they affirme or denie some thing, by reason whereof there may be contradiction in
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hypotheticall propositions, but it cannot bee properly said, that they be either contrarie, subcontrarie, or subalternat, for that they are without quantitie; for want whereof they nei∣ther doe aptly admit opposition, equiualence, or conuersion, but onely contradiction.
By reason of affirmation, or negation; which, as in simple propositions is to be taken on the behalfe of the verbe copula∣tiue, and not of the subiect or predicate: so in compound propositions, it is to be taken on the behalfe of the coniuncti∣on, hauing a negatiue set before it; and yet not of euery con∣iunction, but onely of that coniunction conditionall, If: whereof I cannot aptly giue you any example in our natiue tongue, because it is contrarie to our naturall and vsuall speech, to put a negatiue before the coniunction, If; and therefore I leaue to speake thereof any further: and to say the truth, it ma∣keth but a strange kinde of speech in the Latine tongue, and I beleeue is seldome vsed in any disputation: as to say thus, Non si animal est, homo est: or, Non si lux est, dies est: both which are said to be negatiue speeches, according to the rule before giuen, because the negatiue is set before the coniuncti∣on si, and by vertue thereof (as the Schoolemen say) maketh the whole proposition to be negatiue.
CHAP. XI.
First, whether they be affirmatiue or nega∣tiue: for in the affirmatiues it sufficeth, that the one part doth necessarily follow of the o∣ther, as thus: If it be a man, it is a sensible body: and it ma∣keth no matter, though the parts seuerally taken, be both false, so as the Cousequent be good: as, If a tree be a man, a tree is a sensible bodie: for though both these parts be false, yet the
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Consequent conditionally is true: for a conditionall Proposi∣tion hath no regard to the truth of the parts, but onely that the Consequent may necessarily follow of the Antecedent.
By the Consequent: for if the Consequent bee not rightly inferred of the antecedent, then the negatiue is true, as thus: it followeth not that because a Lyon is a sensible body, that therefore a Lyon is a man.
It is said to be true, when both the parts bee true, as when I say, God is true, and man is a lyar: againe it is said to be false, when either one part or both parts be false: as when I say, man is a sensible bodie, and God is not a Spirit. Here be∣cause the first part is true, and the second part false, the whole Proposition is said to be false. It is said also to be false, when both parts are false, as thus; Man is true, and God is a lyar. Heere both parts be false.
Those which they call Temporall, Locall, by similitude and causall: as of time thus, When a penitent sinner pray∣eth, then God heareth him. Of place thus, Where two or three are gathered together in the Name of the Lord, he is in the midst of them. By similitude thus, As a man dealeth with his neighbour, so will God deale with him. Of the cause thus, Because the Sunne shineth, it is day. And therefore certaine Aduerbes as these, When, Where, Vntill, so long as, as, so as, for, therefore, because and such like, haue the signification sometime of the Coniunction (And) and sometime of the Con∣iunction (If).
To consist of repugnant parts, according to the
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signification of Coniunctions disiunctiue, such as these bee, vel or eyther, or else, and such like: as eyther it is day, or it is night, whereof the one destroyeth the other: for if the one be, the other can not be: and therefore they can not bee both true: but they may be both false, if there be any mean betwixt the two contraries: as when wee say, This woman is eyther white or blacke, both these are false, if she be browne, which is a meane colour betwixt white and blacke. But the later writers affirme the disiunctiue to bee true, if any one or both of the parts bee true, as thus, Eyther a man is a sensible body, or else a tree is a Substance: and to bee false when both parts bee false, as Eyther a man is true, or God is a lyar.