The arte of logick Plainely taught in the English tongue, according to the best approued authors. Very necessary for all students in any profession, how to defend any argument against all subtill sophisters, and cauelling schismatikes, and how to confute their false syllogismes, and captious arguments. By M. Blundevile.

CHAP. VII.

Of Forepredicaments.

WHat meane you by forepredicaments?

Forepredicaments be certaine definitions, di∣uisions, and rules taught by Aristotle before the predicaments, for the better vnderstanding of the same, and therefore are called Antepredica∣menta, that is to say, For predicaments.

What, and how many things defineth he?

Three, that is, Equiuokes, Vniuokes, and Denominatiues.

What call you Equiuokes?

Equiuokes be such things as haue one self•…•… name, and yet bee diuers in substance or definition; as a naturall dogge, and a cer∣taine starre in the firmament, are both called by one name in La∣tine, Canis, yet they be nothing like in substance, kinde, or na∣ture. And note that the Schoolemen doe call the word or name it selfe Equiuocum Equiuocans, and the thing signified by the word Equiuocum Equiuocatum. They make also two kindes of Equiuokes, that is, Equiuokes by chance, and Equiuokes of pur∣pose. The first is, when one selfe name is giuen to many things by chance, and not for any likenesse that is betwixt them, as in English this word Hart signifieth as well the Hart of a man or beast, as a certaine beast called a Hart in the Forest. The second is, when one selfe name is giuen to diuers things of purpose, for some likenesse that is betwixt them, as a painted man is called man as well as the liuing man; for wee will commonly say, Here is King Henry the Eighth, when indeed it is but his pi∣cture. But ye must note, that all Equiuokes being generally pro∣nounced without addition, ought to be vnderstood according to their chiefe and most principall signification, as this word man being generally spoken, ought to be taken for a liuing man, and not for a painted man: but no Equiuokes ought to bee placed in any predicament, neither can it be defined, vnlesse it bee first

brought to one certaine signification; and therefore all Equi∣uokes are vtterly barred from all manner of Discipline.

What call you Vniuokes?

Vniuokes bee those things that haue one common name, which is spoken of them essentially, or really, as a man, a horse, a lion, whose common name is animal, or sensible body; for in asking what either of them is, it is rightly answered, to say, ani∣mal. And I say here really, because it is not enough for Vniuokes to haue a common name, vnlesse the same be also reall or essen∣tiall, whereby are excluded all common names or vnderstandings that be accidentall: for though white or blacke, swift or slow, or such like, is a common name, and is commonly applied both to man and beast, yet that is accidentally, and not really or substan∣tially. Moreouer, the Schoolemen doe call the common word it selfe Vniuocum Vniuocans, and the thing signified by the word Vni∣uocum Vniuocatum.

What call you Denominatiues?

Denominatiues are those accidents that be of like name, and differ only in case, or finall termination; as humble, humilitie; proud, proudnesse: for of humilitie, a man is said to be humble; and of pride, to be proud: and according to the Schoolemen, that word whereof the name doth spring, is called Denominator, and the name it selfe Denominatiue, and the thing or person so called, the Denominated; as if I should say of valiantnesse, Peter is said to be valiant; here valiantnesse is the Denominator, valiant the Denominatiue, and Peter the Denominated: for Peter is the sub∣iect whereunto the Denominator doth cleaue. The Grammari∣ans doe call the Denominator Abstractum, that is, a substantiue, and the Denominatiue Concretum, that is, an Adiectiue.

To what end doth Aristotle chiefly vse th•…•…se definitions?

To shew the differences of predications or kindes of speeches, which are to be allowed, and which not: againe, to know which be predications essentiall, and which be accidentall: for accor∣ding to the three definitions before rehear•…•…ed, there bee three Predications, that is to say, Predication Equiuocall, Vniuocall, and Denominatiue.

What is Predication Equiuocall?

Predication Equiuocall, is when the equiuoke is spoken of any of the things that it signifieth, as to say▪ His Letter was a Letter of the matter, meaning perhaps a hinderer of the matter: but such kinde of speeches ought to be reiected from all good discipline, as hath beene said before.

What is Predication Vniuocall?

It is when the generall kinde is spoken of his especiall kindes, or the especiall kinde of her inferiours, or the speciall difference of that speciall kinde which it maketh, or of the Indiuiduums contained vnder the same speciall kinde, as when wee say, Man is a sensible body, Man hath reason, or, Iohn is a man.

What is Predication Denominatiue?

It is when some accident is spoken of his subiect, as when wee say, Peter is proud, humble, or valiant.

What, and how many diuisions be there?

Two: The first diuision is touching words simple and com∣pound, whereof though wee haue said somewhat before, yet it shall not grieue vs, here againe to set it downe in such order as the Logicians vse.

Shew how.

Of words, some be simple, called in Latine, Incomplexa, and some be compound, called Complexa. Simple words bee distinct and seuerall words, not set together by any rule of Grammar, to make any perfect sentence, as, good, iust, a man a horse, to stand, to goe. Compound words be words significatiue, which are ioi∣ned together by rules of Grammar to make some perfect sen∣tence, as, Iohn is learned.

What is the second diuision?

The second diuision is fourefold, as followeth: First, of things that be, some be spoken of a subiect, and yet be in no subiect, as, man, horse, and such like vniuersall natures or substances: for they be no accidents. Secondly, some be in a subiect, and yet be not spoken of any subiect, as all particular accidents, as this or that colour, for these be Indiuiduums, and therefore not predi∣cable. Thirdly, some be in a subiect, and also be spoken of a sub∣iect, as all vniuersall accidents, as Science, Grammar, Logi ke, and such like: for of these some be generall, and some be speciall

kindes, and therfore are said to be predicable accidents. Fourthly, some be neither in a subiect, nor spoken of a subiect, as Iohn, Tho∣mas, this man, or that man, this horse, or that horse; for these be first natures or substances, and therefore are subiects themselues not predicable.

Whereto serueth this diuision?

By this diuision ye may learne the diuersitie of these two spee∣ches, to be spoken of a subiect, and to be in a subiect: for to be spoken of a subiect, is to be spoken really or essentially of some thing that is part thereof, as this word animal, or sensible body, is really spoken of man, horse, and of euery other thing that hath life and seeling; for they bee substantiall parts of that generall kinde: for if it be demanded what a man or horse is, it is rightly answered, that he is a sensible body. But to bee in a subiect, is to be spoken of another thing accidentally, and not essentially, as this word white or blacke is spoken accidentally of man, or of any other subiect, and not essentially; for neither is man any es∣sentiall part of white, nor white any essentiall part of man, and therefore cannot be in man, or in any other subiect, but acciden∣tally: and for that cause it is spoken of his subiect accidentally, and not really.

Now tell how many, and what those rules bee, whereof you spake before▪

There be two rules. The first is thus: When one thing is spo∣ken of another essentially, as of his subiect▪ then whatso•…•…uer may be spoken of that predicate, must needs bee also really spoken of the same subiect: for as this wo•…•…d sensible body is spoken of man or horse essentially, as when we say that man is a sensible body; so this word liuing body, being spoken essentially of a sensible body, as when we say that euery sensible body is a liuing body, is also as really spoken of the foresaid subiect, man, in saying that man is a liuing body; for this word, liuing body, is a more ge∣nerall kinde then sensible body is.

What is the second rule?

The second rule is thus: Diuers generall kindes not contained one of another, nor both of a third, haue diuers speciall differen∣ces, which doe make diuers speciall kindes, as a sensible body and

science: for the speciall differences of a sensible body are these, reasonable and vnreasonable, making both man and bruit beast: but the differences of science be these, contemplatiue and dispu∣tatiue, and such like, whereby are made speciall kindes of know∣ledge: for the difference contemplatiue maketh naturall Philo∣sophie, and the difference disputatiue maketh Logicke.

To what end serue these rules?

To the end it might be easily knowne what words are of affi∣nitie, and which be of one selfe predicament, and which not. Thus farre as touching forepredicaments. Now to the predica∣ments themselues. And first we will speake of substance.