The rule of reason, conteinyng the arte of logique, set forth in Englishe, by Thomas Vuilson

About this Item

Title
The rule of reason, conteinyng the arte of logique, set forth in Englishe, by Thomas Vuilson
Author
Wilson, Thomas, 1525?-1581.
Publication
[Imprinted at London :: By Richard Grafton, printer to the Kynges Maiestie],
An. M.D.LI. [1551]
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Subject terms
Logic -- Early works to 1800.
Cite this Item
"The rule of reason, conteinyng the arte of logique, set forth in Englishe, by Thomas Vuilson." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A15542.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 1, 2024.

Pages

¶Of dedes done, or suffred to be done, called Actus.

THe maner of doyng, or suffe∣ryng is, when we are suppo∣sed to bee occupied, or affected any maner of waie, either in doyng, or in suffryng. There be so ma∣ny maner of doinges, as there be adia∣cētes, or wordes adioyned. And of the∣se adiacentes, feare, sorowe, trauaile, reste, heate, colde, are deriued these: to feare, to be sory, to trauaile, to rest, to be hotte, to be colde. And generally all those wordes that are referred vnto ye

Page [unnumbered]

two Predicamentes called the maner of doyng, and the sufferyng, are com∣passed with in this place, if the same woordes be considered as Accidentes which cleaue to the substaunce, & maie both be present, & also be a waie with∣out losse of the substaunce. For if thin∣ges done, be waied accordyng to their proper maner of doing, they are refer∣red to the two places aboue, called the differēce and the propretie. For where as we saie. Such a one speaketh, Ergo he is man (for nothyng els can speake naturally but man onely) although in this case (to speake) be a maner of do∣yng, yet it is not referred to this, but rather to the propretie, bicause it belō∣geth to man alone, & alwaies to man.

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