The rule of reason, conteinyng the arte of logique, set forth in Englishe, by Thomas Vuilson

About this Item

Title
The rule of reason, conteinyng the arte of logique, set forth in Englishe, by Thomas Vuilson
Author
Wilson, Thomas, 1525?-1581.
Publication
[Imprinted at London :: By Richard Grafton, printer to the Kynges Maiestie],
An. M.D.LI. [1551]
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Subject terms
Logic -- Early works to 1800.
Cite this Item
"The rule of reason, conteinyng the arte of logique, set forth in Englishe, by Thomas Vuilson." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A15542.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed April 30, 2024.

Pages

¶The vse and commodite, which we hau by these fiue commune wordes cal∣led otherwise Predicables.

THere be .iiij. especiall commo∣dites. First they shew the lar∣genesse, and the narrownes of the most generall wordes, cal∣led otherwise Predicamentes, whiche hereafter folowe: so that here by, you may perceiue howe muche euery word comprehendeth in it selfe, and howe

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farre it may be applied. The second profite is, that euery thyng is defined by these fiue common woords, foras∣muche as al thynges the more narowe they be, are alwayes defined by wor∣des that are more large. As by the ge∣neral worde, by the difference, and the propretie. Thirdly, they are good to iudge the knitting of wordes, and to se what thing may truely be ioyned to o∣ther. for there is no Proposition, nor yet ioiing together of any sentēce (ac∣cordyng to the commō order of nature) but they alwayes agre to these aboue rehersed Predicables: so yt either the kynd is spokē of the singular or proper name (which is euer some one person, as thus Cicero est homo. Cicero is a mā) Or els the general worde, the dif∣ference, the propretie, or the accident, are all spoken either of the kynde, or of some one person as thus Homo, vel Ci¦cero est animal ratione praeditum, lo∣quendi facultatem habens, album, lō∣gum, latū. A man, or Cicero, is a liuing creature, endewed with reason, hauing aptnes by nature, to speake, beyng,

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white, long, and brode. So that no pro∣position can be, but the partes of the same are comprehēded with in these .v. cōmune wordes. Fourthlie, the general worde, the kynde, the difference, & pro∣prete are ioyned together necessarily, so that when yow name one, al thother folowe. Therfore when a propositiō is made from the kynde, to the general, to his difference, or propertie: it is euer∣more an vndoubted true proposition, as this. Homo est animal ratione prae∣ditū, loquendi facultatem habens. A man is a liuing creature endewed with reason, hauyng aptenesse by nature to speake. A man can not he except he be a liuyng creature, endewed with reason and hauing aptnes of nature to speake. The accident not withstandyng is not necessarely spokē of the subiect, but is there casually, & may be chaunged, as thus. Homo est albus. Somme man is white. This proposition may be af∣treward false, for he may be blacke, or alter his complexiō some other way, so that the accidēt is often altered, & an o∣ther succedeth in his ronme. Therfore

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it is good to be knowē, when you haue a Proposition, whether it be vndoub∣ted true, for euermore, or els maye be false at any tyme.

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