8. Quest. How Gods prouidence and mans will may stand together.
Here are two errours to bee taken heed of in two extreames: Some doe so hold Gods prouidence, as that they exempt some thing•• from it: some on the contrarie do ascribe all things to the diuine prouidence, as th••t they impose a necessitie vpon the will of man, depriuing the same of the naturall libertie and freedome thereof.
1. Of the first opinion was Plato, affirming that there are many things in the world which God is no wayes the cause of, as of euill things; which is true, if he speake of the proper efficient cause of sinne: but yet euen in such things Gods prouidence slee∣peth not, directing, ordering, and disposing euill things vnto such ende, as seemeth best vnto himselfe.
2. Damascene also in some sort impugneth Gods prouidence, when hee saith, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that onely those things which are not within vs, not the things within vs, are subiect to Gods prouidence: whereas the Prophet Dauid saith directly, Psal. 139. thou vnderstandest my thoughts long before. He hath an other assertion as dange∣rous, That the election of things to be done is in vs, the perfection and consummation, of the concurring operation of God: whereas the Apostle saith, that God worketh in vs both the will and deede, of his good pleasure.
3. But that distinction of Damasus is not to bee misliked, whereby he diuideth Gods prouidence into 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, his good pleasure, & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, permission and con∣cession: for Gods prouidence is seene in willing and acting of good things, his per∣mission in suffering euil things to be done, not by a bare permission in leauing men to themselues to doe altogether what they list, but in vsing them and ouerruling them. This concession he further maketh of two sorts, diuiding it into 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, oecomi∣call or disciplinarie concession, in leauing his children sometime to themselues, for their further instruction: there is an other concession 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, absolute and finall, whereby he suffreth the wicked and inccorrigible finally to fall without recouerie.
2. In the other extreame are they which so hold the diuin•• prouidence, as that they bring in a fatall necessitie: But God constraineth no mans will: for if it be forced, it is not a will which willeth freely. But here there is a threefold libertie of the will to be considered: there is libertas à coactione, a libertie and freedome from coaction, in all men good and bad: libertas à peccato, a libertie from sinne, that is, from the domi∣nion thereof, when the will is regenerate: and libertas à miseri••, a liber••ie and immu∣nitie from misery, which shall be in the kingdome of God, when we are glorified. But a libertie à necessitate, from a kind of necessitie, man now hath not: he cannot choose but sinne. Adam before he fell had this libertie also: for it was in his power not to haue sinned, if he would: but now a necessitie of bondage and corruption is laid vp∣on his posteritie: but yet the mind of naturall men worke freely in respect of any vio∣lence, constraint, or coaction.