The workes of Lucius Annæus Seneca, both morrall and naturall Containing, 1. His bookes of benefites. 2. His epistles. 3. His booke of prouidence. 4. Three bookes of anger. 5. Two bookes of clemencie. 6. His booke of a blessed life. 7. His booke of the tranquilitie of the minde. 8. His booke of the constancie of a wiseman. 9. His booke of the shortnesse of life. 10. Two bookes of consolation to Martia. 11. Three bookes of consolation to Heluia. 12. His booke of consolation to Polibius. 13. His seuen bookes of naturall questions. Translated by Tho. Lodge, D. in Physicke.

EPIST. CXXIIII.

Against the Epicures, that good consisteth in reason, not in sence. And therefore that infants are not as yet capable thereof: neither is it compleate, except it be where reason is compleate. How shall I vnderstand that it is in me, if I seeke nothing without my selfe?

I Can recount, if so thou list to heare, Full many precepts of the ancient wise, Except thou loath to lend thy listning eare, To know from whence the lesser cares arise.

But thou loathest not, neither doth any subtiltie disgust thee. Thy gentle spirit disdaineth not the smallest things, although it comprehend the greatest. I like∣wise approue this in thee also, because thou reducest all things to some vse, & ar•• only offended then, when with much subtiltie nothing is effected, which I will not now endeuour to do. The question is, whether good be comprehended by sence or vnderstanding. Hereunto it is annexed, that it is neither in brute beasts, nor in infants: they that hold voluptuousnesse for the chiefest good, doe iudge good to be sensible. We contrariwise considering it in the soule, maintaine that it is intelligible. If they did iudge of the good of sence, we should reiect no vo∣luptuousnesse, because all of them are both attractiue and pleasing, And con∣trariwise, we should willingly vndergoe no paine, because there is none but of∣fendeth the sence. Besides, they should not be worthy of reprehension, who are too much affected to voluptuousnes, and are too exceedingly afraid of pain. But wee mislike those that are addicted to their belly and lust, and contemne those, who for feare of paine dare attempt nothing couragiously. But wherein doe they offend, if they obey their sences, that are the iudges of good and euill. For to these Masters haue you giuen the power to desire and flie. But reason hath charge of this, and must order as well good and euill, as vertue and honesty. For by these the preheminence is giuen to the baser part, to iudge of the better, and their meaning is, that the sence which is a dimme and dull thing, and more slow in men then in other liuing creatures, should censure what the true good is.

What if a man would discerne the smallest things by sight, and not by touch, to discerne euill from good, a man cannot finde a more sharpe and better intended sight then that of the eye. Thou seest in what ignorance of truth he remai∣neth, and with what ignorance he hath trod••n those things vnder foote which are diuine, who will make the touch to be the iudge of good and euill•• Euen as, saith he, euery Science and Arte ought to haue something in it, which is mani∣fest, and comprehended vnder sence, from whence it may be deriued and en∣crease: euen so a blessed life hath for his foundation and beginning, something which is both apparant and sensible. But you say that a blessed life taketh her beginning from manifest things. Wee say that those things are blessed, which are according to nature, but what is according to nature appeareth cleerely and at the first sight, as that also which is entire. What is that which is according to nature? It is that which befalleth him who is newly borne, I say not good, but the beginning of good. Thou attributest pleasure vnto infancie, as if it were their chiefest good, that at his birth-day he should begin there, whither hee at∣taineth when he is become a man. Thus puttest thou the top of the tree into the place of the roote. If a man should say, that an infant lying in his mothers wombe, and scarce begun, tender, imperfect, and without forme, is alreadie in possession of any good, should he not seeme to erre manifestly? But what dif∣ference is there betwixt an infant, that doth begin to be, and one which is as yet but a hidden burthen in his mothers womb? Both these, in respect of the vnder∣standing of good & euill, haue equall maturitie: & no more is an infant capable of good as yet, then a tree, or any dumbe beast? But why is not good in a tree or dumbe beast? Because reason is not in them, and therefore is it not in an infant, by reason that he wanteth reason, whereunto when he hath attained, he shall approch more goodnesse. There is some creature which is not reasonable•• and some other which is not as yet endued with reason, if it be it is imperfectly. Goodnesse is neither in the one, nor in the other. Reason bringeth that good with himselfe. What difference then is there betwixt the things aboue men∣tioned? Neuer shall good be in a liuing creature which is depriued of reason, neither can it be in him that is not as yet endued with reason, as long as hee re∣maineth in that estate, she may be, but she is not ••s yet. So then I say (my Lu∣cilius) that good is not found in euery bodie, or in all ages, and is as farre estranged from the infant, as that which is last, is distant from that which is first, and the beginning of a thing, from the accomplishing and perfection of the same, and consequently, good is not in a bodie which doth but newly receiue forme in his mothers wombe: no more is there in the seede whence the bodie hath forme: as if thou makest mention of the good of any tree or plant, it is not in the first leafe that buddeth forth. The corne hath some good which is not in the tender blade, nor in the straw, but in the graine which is readie to be rea∣ped. Euen as all nature, except it be consummate, bringeth not forth his good, so the good of a man, is not in a man, except he be possessed of perfect reason. But what this good is, I will tell thee: It is a free and vpright minde, that sub∣iecteth all other things vnder him, and is himselfe subiect to nothing. Too far is infancie from pertaking this good, that the childish age hopeth it not, and youth doth weakely hope the same. Happie is old-age if it attaine thereunto by long and diligent studie, when this is both good and able to be vnderstood. Thou diddest say, sayest thou, that there is a certaine good of a tree, another of an herbe; therefore may an infant haue some good. The true good neither is in trees•• nor in dumbe creatures; that good which is in these is called but a bor∣rowed

good: and what is that, sayest thou? That which is according to the na∣ture of euery thing. There is not one brute beast that may in any sort partici∣pate good, which belongeth to a better and more happy nature: there is no good but there where reason hath place. These foure natures are distinct; that of a Tree, that of a Beast, that of a Man, and that of a God. These two which are without reason are of the same nature, the other two are diuers, the one immortall, the other mortall. Of these the one maketh his owne god ac∣complished, and that is God, & a mans diligence addresseth the other. The rest are perfect in their nature, but not truely perfect if reason be absent from them. For that is finally perfect which is perfect according to cōmon nature, but com∣mon nature is reasonable, the rest may be perfect in their kinde. That wherein happie life cannot be, cannot haue that thing which causeth happie life, but a blessed life is made by good things, and in a dumbe beast that is not that where∣by blessed life is effected, and therefore good cannot be in a dumbe beast. A dumbe beast comprehendeth things that are present, by sense he remembreth those things that are past at such time as that which awakeneth the sense, awa∣keneth it selfe, as a horse remembreth himselfe of his way when he is set into the beginning of it: whilst he standeth in the Stable he hath no remembrance thereof, although he hath trode it ouer many times. But the third time, that is to say, that which is to come appertaineth not to dumbe beasts: how then can their nature seeme to be perfect who haue no vse of perfect time? For time consisteth of three parts, of that which is past, of that which is present, of that which is to come. That which is onely present and shortest, and passeth soonest is giuen to beasts: as touching that which is past, they haue eyther none or little remembrance thereof neyther, but casually thinke they on things that are pre∣sent; thus the good of a perfect nature cannot be in an imperfect nature. Or if by nature she hath it, she hath it as hearbes haue; neither doe I denie but that brute beasts haue their motions very rude and violent towards those things which seeme to be according to nature, but such motions are confused and dis∣ordered, but there cannot be any confusion or disorder in good. Why then sayest thou doe brute beasts moue themselues confusedly and disorderly? I would say that they moued. ••••mselues confusedly and disorderly, if their na∣ture were capable of order: but they haue a motion according to nature. For we call that thing confused, which sometimes may not be confused, and that carefull which may be assured; vice is in nothing wherein vertue may not be; dumbe beasts haue by nature that motion which they haue. But ••est I detaine thee ouer-long, there shall be some good in a dumbe beast, some vertue, some perfection; but what shall it be, but what good? Neyther absolutely good, nei∣ther vertue, neyther perfect; for these priuiledges doe onely appertaine vnto those that are endowed with reason, who haue the knowledge giuen them why, how farre, and how. Thus good is not in any thing, except it be ended with reason. Doost thou aske me whereunto this disputation tendeth, and what profite it shall yeeld vnto thy minde? I will tell thee, it exerciseth it, it whetteth it, and detaineth the same in some honest meditation, since he must employ and occupie himselfe. But that which restraineth the minde that run∣neth after vice, is profitable. But this I say, that the greatest good I can do thee, is to teach thee thy good, to seperate thee from brute beasts, and to lodge thee with God. Why doost thou entertaine and nourish the forces of thy bodie? Nature hath granted brute and sauage beasts greater th••n these? Why doost thou so carefully maintaine thy beautie, when as thou hast done thy vttermost

thou shalt be ouercome by many brute beasts in comelinesse? Why doest thou trim thy haire with so great diligence, when thou hast eyther scattered it after•• the Parthian manner, or tied it vp in knots after the Germane fashion, or let it grow long as the Scithians are wont; in euery horse thou shalt finde a thicker crest, in euery Lion a goodlier. When thou shalt addresse thy selfe to runne, the Hare will outstrip thee, wilt thou leaue these forraine aduantages in pursuit, whereof thou hast alwayes the worst, and returne vnto thy good? And what is this? vndoubtedly it is a reformed minde, pure and imitating good, ex∣tolling himselfe aboue humane things, placing nothing of himselfe without himselfe. Thou art a reasonable creature: what good is there therefore in thy selfe? Perfect reason. Summon thou that to his chiefest perfection, and let it increase as much as it may. Then suppose thy selfe to be blessed when all thy ioy shall proceed from thy selfe, when in th••se things which men long after, wish and desire thou findest nothing I say, not that thou wouldest rather haue, but that thou wouldst haue. I will giue thee a short lesson, wherby thou mayest measure thy selfe, wherby thou mayest perceiue that thou art perfect. Thou shalt possesse thy true good, when thou shalt know that those are most vnhappy who are happy.