The workes of Lucius Annæus Seneca, both morrall and naturall Containing, 1. His bookes of benefites. 2. His epistles. 3. His booke of prouidence. 4. Three bookes of anger. 5. Two bookes of clemencie. 6. His booke of a blessed life. 7. His booke of the tranquilitie of the minde. 8. His booke of the constancie of a wiseman. 9. His booke of the shortnesse of life. 10. Two bookes of consolation to Martia. 11. Three bookes of consolation to Heluia. 12. His booke of consolation to Polibius. 13. His seuen bookes of naturall questions. Translated by Tho. Lodge, D. in Physicke.

EPIST. CXVIII.

That he will write no vaine Epistles, but rather such as are full of profitable lessons. He perswadeth to handle our priuate not forraine businesses, to require nothing of for∣tune, neyther to depend vpon her. That the true good is to be sought, and the defini∣tion what it is: and likewise what it differeth from honestie. That euery good is ac∣cording to nature, neyther yet is euery thing good which is according to nature.

THou requirest me to write vnto thee oftentimes, if we enter into account thou canst not sufficiently satisfie me. It was agreed be∣tween vs that thou shouldest write first, and that I should answer thee, I will not be behinde hand with thee, I know that there is nothing lost that is lent thee. I will pay thee therfore before thy day: neyther will I doe that which eloquent Cicero was wont to counsell Atti∣cus to doe, that is, to write whatsoeuer came into his minde, although he had no matter whereupon to write. I can neuer want matter to write vnto thee, al∣though I omit all that discourse wherewith Cicero stuffeth his Epistles, to wit, who it is that laboreth for offices, who fighteth with his own or forraine forces, who laboureth for the Consulat, eyther vnder Caesars or Pompeis fauour, or of himselfe. How hard a vsurer Cicilius is, from whom his neighbours can∣not wrest a pennie, but a hundreth vpon a hundreth. It were better for a man to speake of his owne miseries then of another mans, to examine himselfe, and to consider how many things a man laboureth for, and obtaineth not one. This my Lucilius, is a worthy thing, this a secure and free thing, to demaund and pur∣chase nothing, and to let fortune possesse her estates, without ••ribing after any

of thē. How pleasant a thing is it, thinkest thou, when the people are assembl••d, when such as pretend offices giue court to their wel-wishers, & the one publike∣ly protesteth the mony he will giue, the other solliciteth by his sureties & priuat friends, when one man weareth and wasteth another mans hands with kisses. Where had he attained what he desireth, he would loath they should touch his, when all men are astonished, & expect the voice of the Crier, to stand idle & ••x∣pect those faires, neither buying nor selling any thing? How great ioy enioyeth this man, who beholdeth these assemblies, where choyce is made of Pretors and Consuls, but those great estates, where the one demaundeth yearely ho∣nours, others perpetuall power: the one happie successe in battels and tri∣umphes, the other riches: the one marriages and children, the other long and happie life for themselues and their parents. O how great a minde is it to de∣mand nothing, to make supplication to no man, and that saith vnto Fortune, I haue nothing to doe with thee, I am not at thy commandement. I know that with thee Catoes are repelled, and Vatinians aduanced. I demand nothing at thy hands. This is to reduce Fortune into order. Fot this cause therefore ought we to entertaine one another, and to entreat continually on this subiect in our let∣ters, beholding on euery side of vs so many thousands of men in trouble, who to cast themselues headlong into some mortall ruine, trauerse one mischiefe to finde out another, and seeke those things, which they incontinently flie as soone as they haue found them, or wherewith they should be likewise disgusted. For who is he that hath contented himselfe with that which was giuen him, or that supposed any thing ouer great, when he wished the same? Felicitie is not vn∣satiable, as men beleeue, but it is weake and small, and therefore satisfieth no man. Thou beleeuest that these things are great, because thou art estranged from them, but to him that hath gotten them they are but base: I lie if such a one seeke not to mount higher. That which thou accountest highest, is but a degree. But the ignorance of truth is the cause that men erre thus, and they runne vnto that which hath but the appearance of good, being deceiued by common opinion. Afterwards hauing by much trauell obtained that which they pretended, they see that those things are euill, vaine, and lesse then they expected, and the most part of them admireth at one time or another, these false lustre of such vanities. In briefe, the common sort esteeme those things for good, which are greatest. But lest wee fall into this error, let vs enquire that which is good. The interpretation thereof hath beene diuers: some haue de∣fined the same in one sort, othersome in another. Some define it thus. Good is that which inuiteth our mindes, and that calleth vs vnto him. H••reunto some pl••asantly obiect: But what if such a good inuite a man vnto his ruin••? Thou knowest how many euil•• there are that are attractiue. Truth, and that which seemeth true differ thus. That which is good is annexed vnto truth, for it is not good except it be true. But that which inciteth to it s••lf••, and attracteth by his appearance, hath a resemblance of truth: it insinuat••th, it solliciteth, it draweth. Some haue defined it thus. Good is that which moueth a desire of it selfe, or that inciteth the motion of the minde, that tendeth thereunto. And to this it is opposed in the same sort. For many things incite the motions of the mind••, which are desired to their confusion that desire them. Better haue they done who haue defined it thus. That is good which draweth vnto it selfe ac∣cording to nature, that motion of the soule, so that we ought to desire it then, when it is worthy to be desired. Let vs adde hereunto that this good is honest and vertuous, for we ought not to purchase an vnperfect good. This place ad∣monisheth

me to teach thee the difference that there is betwixt that which is good, and that which is honest. Somethings they haue mixed, and inseparable betweene them: neither can that be good which hath not some hones••ie in it; neither that honest which is not good. What difference therefore is betwixt them both. Hon••stie is a perfect good, wherein a bl••ssed life is accomplished, by whose attouchment other things are made good also. That which I say is thus. There are some things which are neither good nor euill; as Warrefare, Embassage, and Iurisdiction. These things when they are honestly admini∣stred, begin to be good, and become so, whereas before time they were indiffe∣rent. Good by the societie of honestie is made good, and honestie by it selfe is good. Good floweth from honestie, honestie is of it selfe. That which is good might haue beene euill; that which is honest, could not be but good. Some haue proposed this definition. That is good, which is according to nature. Marke what I say. That which is good is according to nature, yet is not that forthwith good, that is according to nature. Many things consent vnto nature, yet so small are they, that they deserue not to be called good. For they are small and contemptible: no good, no not the least is to be contemned, for as long as it is little, it is not good; when it beginneth to be good, it is not little. Whence is any thin•• ••now•• to be good, if it be perfectly according to nature. Thou doest confe••••e, sayest thou, that this is good which is according to nature, this is his propertie. Thou confessest likewise that there are some things which are according to Nature, and yet not good. How therefore is that good, when these are not? How attaineth it another propertie, when as both of them haue this propertie, to be according to nature? That is to say, in as much as they are great. Neither is this a new thing, that some things are changed by encreasing. He was an infant; now become a yong man: he hath had at that time some other pro∣prietie. For the yong man is endowed with reason, the infant is depriued of it. Somethings become not only more great in their increase, but other things like∣wise. That, saith he, is not made another thing, which is made greater. It skilleth not whether thou fil a bottle with wine, or a tonn••, the property of wine remai∣n••th in both the vessels. A little waight of hony and a great differ not in sauour. Thou settest down different examples: for in these the same quality remaineth, and though they be encreased, they are alwayes hony and wine. Some things amplified in their kind, continue in their propertie: som•• things after many en∣creasings are changed by the last, which imprinteth in them a new qualitie, o∣ther thē that which they had before. One stone wil make an arch, that is to say, that bindeth in, and fastneth in the d••clining sides, and that tieth th••m together. Why hath this last stone, although it be little, so great a vse, because it maketh the worke compleat, although it giue it not any great encrease. There are some things, which in aduancing themselues, despoile themselues of their former forme, and inuest a new. After that our vnderstanding hath long time trauel∣led vpon any subiect, and that it is wearied in following the greatnesse thereof, he beginneth to esteeme it infinit, because it is become farre different from that it was befor••, when it seemed great, but not infinite. In like case we haue ima∣gined that a thing may not be cut, which is hardly cut: afterwards the difficulty growing to be greater, we finde that the thing can no more be cut. In like sort of a thing which is hardly moued, we come vnto a thing which is vnmoueable. According to the same reason, some thing hath beene according to nature, and afterwards the greatnesse of the same hath transported it into another proper∣tie, and hath made it good.