Ten sermons preached I. Ad clerum. 3. II. Ad magistratum. 3. III. Ad populum. 4. By Robert Saunderson Bachellor in Diuinitie, sometimes fellow of Lincolne Colledge in Oxford.

THE SECOND SERMON.

ROM. 3.8.

And not rather, (as we be slanderously reported, and as some affirme that we say,) Let vs doe euill, that good may come: whose damnation is iust.

A Little before, at the fourth verse, Saint Paul had deliuered a Conclusion; sound and comfortable: and strengthened it from Dauids both experience, and testimony in a Psal. 51. A place preg∣nant, and full of sinewes to enforce it. The Con∣clusion in effect was; that Nothing in man can annull the Couenant of God. Neither the originall vnwor∣thinesse of Gods children, through the vniuersall corruption of nature, nor their actuall vnfaithful∣nesse bewrayed (through frailtie) in particular tryals; can alienate the free loue of God from them, or cut them off from the Couenant of Grace: but that still God will be glorified in the truth and faithfulnes of his promises, notwithstan∣ding any vnrighteousnes or vnfaithfulnes in man.

But neuer yet was any Truth so happily inno∣cent, as to maintaine it selfe free from Calumnie and Abuse. Malite on the one hand, and Fleshlinesse on the other; though with different aimes, yet doe the same worke. They both peruert the Truth, by drawing pestilent Corollaries from sound Conclusi∣ons, as the Spider sucketh poyson from medicina∣ble herbes. But with this difference; Malice slan∣dereth the Truth, to discountenance it: but Flesh∣linesse abuseth the Truth, to countenance it self by it. The cauilling Sophister, hee would faine bring the Apostles gracious Doctrine into discredit: The carnall Libertine, he would as faine bring his owne vngracious behauiour into credit. Both, by making false, yet colourable, Inferences from the former Conclusion. There are a three of those [ 1] Inferences: but neuer a good. The first; If so, then cannot God in reason and iustice take vengeance of our vnrighteousnesse. The Colour: for why should he punish vs for that, which so much mag∣nifieth and commendeth his righteousnesse? b But if our vnrighteousnes commend the righteousnesse of God, what shal we say? Is God vnrighteous that taketh vengeance? The second Inference: If so; then it is [ 2] iniust either in God or Man to condemne vs as sin∣ners, for breaking the Law. The Colour: for why should that action be censured of sinne, which so abundantly redoundeth to the glorie of God? c For if the Truth of God hath more abounded, through my lie, vnto his glorie, why yet am I also iud∣ged as a sinner? The third, and last, and worst Infe∣rence: [ 3]

If so, then it is a good and a wise resolution, Let vs sinne freely, and boldly commit euill. The Colour: for why should we feare to doe that, from which so much good may come? in this verse of my Text, And not rather, Let vs doe euill, that good may come.

This last cauilling Inference, the Apostle in this verse both bringeth in, and casteth out againe: bringeth in, as an obiection; and casteth out by his an∣swer. An answer which at once cutteth off both it, and the former inferences. And the Answer is double: Ad rem, ad hominem. That concerneth the force and matter of the obiection: this, the state and danger of the obiectors. Ad rem, in the former part of the verse; [And not rather (as we be slande∣rously reported, and as some affirme that we say,) Let vs do euill, that good may come.] Ad hominem, in the latter end; [Whose damnation is iust.] In the for∣mer part, there is an Obiection; and the Reiection of it. The Obiection, And not rather, Let vs doe euill that good may come. The Reiection thereof with a Non sequitur; implying not onely the bare in con∣sequence of it vpon the Apostles Conclusion, but withall, and especially the falsenes & vnsoundnes of it taken by it selfe; As we be slanderously reported, and as some affirme that we say, Let vs doe euill, &c.

My aime at this present is to insist especially vp∣on on a Principle of practike Diuinitie; which by ioynt consent of Writers old, and new; Orthodoxe, and Po∣pish; resulteth from the very body of this verse, and is of right good vse to direct vs in sundry difficul∣ties,

which daily arise in vitae communi, in point of Conscience. The Principle is this; We must not do any euill, that any good may come of it. Yet there are besides this, in the Text diuers other inferiour ob∣seruations not to bee neglected. With which I think it wil not be amisse to begin, and to dispatch them first briefly; that so I may fall the sooner, and stay the longer vpon that which I mainely intend.

Obserue first the Apostles Method, and substan∣tiall manner of proceeding: how he cleareth all as he goeth; how diligent he is and carefull, betimes to remoue such cauils, (though he a step a little out of his way for it) as might bring scandall to the Truth he had deliuered. When we preach and in∣struct others, we should not thinke it enough to de∣liuer positiue truths: but we should take good care also, as neere as we can, to leaue them cleare; and by preuention to stop the mouthes of such, as loue to picke quarrels at the Truth, and to barke against the light. It were good we would (so farre as our leisure and gifts will permit) wisely forecast, and preuent all offence that might be taken at any part of Gods truth: and be carefull, as not to broach any thing that is false, through rashnesse, errour, or intemperance; so not to betray any truth by igno∣rant handling, or by superficiall, flight, and vnsatis∣fying answers. But then especially concerneth it vs to bee most carefull herein; when wee haue to speake before such, as we haue some cause before∣hand to suspect to be, through ignorance, or weake∣nesse, or custome, or education, or preiudice, or partiall

affections, or otherwise contrary-minded vnto, or at leastwise not wel perswaded of those Truths we are to teach. If the wayes be rough and knotty, and the passengers feeble-ioynted and darke-sighted: it is but needfull the guides should remoue as ma∣ny blockes and stones out of the way, as may bee. When we haue gone as warily as we can to work, Cauillers (if they list) will take exceptions: it is our part to see wee giue them not the aduantage, lest wee helpe to iustifie the Principals, by making our selues Accessories. Those men are ill aduised, how euer zealous for the Truth, that stirre in con∣trouersed points, and leaue them worse than they found them.

b Stomake will not beare out a man without strength: and to encounter an ad∣uersary are required c Shoulders, as well as gall.

A good cause is neuer betrayed-more, than when it is prosecuted with much eagernesse, but little suf∣ficiencie. This from the method.

Obserue secondly the Apostles maner of speech, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Translators render it; As we are wrongfully blamed, As we are slandered, As we are slanderously reported. And the word indeede from the a Originall importeth no more: and so Writers both Prophane, and Sacred vse it. But yet in Scriptures by a Specialtie it most times signifieth the highest degree of Slander; when we open our mouthes against God, and speake ill, or amisse, or vnworthily of God: that is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and properly the sin wee call Blasphemy. And yet, that very word of Blasphemy, which for the most part referreth

immediately to God, the Apostle heere vseth, when he speaketh of himselfe and other Christian Ministers 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as we are slandered, nay as we are blasphemed. A slander or other wrong or con∣tempt done to a Minister, quà talis, is a sinne of a higher straine, than the same done to a common Christian. Not at all for his Persons sake: for so he is no more Gods good creature than the other; no more free b from sinnes, and infirmities and pas∣sions than the other. But for his Callings sake; for so hee is Gods c Embassadour, which the other is not: and for his workes sake; for that is Gods d message, which the others is not. Personall Slan∣ders and Contempts are to a Minister, but as to another man: because his person is but as another mans Person. But Slanders and Contempts done to him as a Minister, that is, with reference either to his Calling, or Doctrine, are much greater than to another man: as reaching vnto God himselfe; whose Person the Minister representeth in his Cal∣ling; and whose errand the Minister delivereth in his Doctrine. For Contempts, Saint Paul is expresse elsewhere; e He that despiseth, despiseth not Man, but God. And as for Slanders; the very choice of the word in my Text inferreth as much. The dig∣nitie of our Calling, enhaunceth the sinne: and euerie Slander against our regular Doctrines, is more than a bare Calumnie; if no more, at least petty f blasphemie 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, As wee are slandered, as wee are blasphemed. That from the word.

Obserue thirdly, the wrong done to the Apostle, and to his Doctrine. Hee was slanderously repor∣ted to haue taught that, which hee neuer so much as thought: and his Doctrine had many scandalous imputations fastened vpon it, whereof neither hee nor it were guilty, [As we are slanderously reported, and as some affirme that we say.] The best truths are subiect to mis-interpretation: and there is not that Doctrine, how firmely soeuer grounded, how warily soeuer deliuered; whereon Calumny wil not fasten, and stick slanderous imputations. Neither a Iohns mourning, nor Christs piping can passe the pikes: but the one hath a Diuell; the other is a glutton and a wine-bibber. Though b Christ come to fulfill the Law, yet there bee will accuse him as a destroyer of the Law, Matth. 5. And though he decide the que∣stion plainely for Caesar, and that in the case of Tri∣bute, Matth. 22. c Giue vnto Caesar the things that are Caesars: yet there be that charge him, as if hee d spake against Caesar, Ioh. 19. and that in the very case of Tribute, as if hee e forbade to giue Tribute vnto Caesar, Luke 23. Now if they f called the Master of the house Beelzebub; how much more them of his houshold? If Christs did not; thinke wee the doctrine of his Ministers and his Seruants could escape the stroke of mens tongues, and bee free from calumny and cauill? How the Apostles were slandered as Seducers, and Sectaries, and vaine babblers, and Heretiques, and broachers of new and false and pestilent doctrines; their Epistles, and the booke of their Acts witnesse abundantly to

vs. And for succeeding times, reade but the Apo∣logies of Athenagoras, and Tertullian, and others: and it will amaze you to see what blasphemous, and seditious, and odious, and horrible impieties, were fathered vpon the ancient Christian Doctors, and vpon their profession. But our owne experience goeth beyond all. The Doctors of our Church teach truely, and agreeably to vnanswerable eui∣dences of Scripture, the g effectual concurrence of Gods will and power, with subordinate Agents; in euery, and therefore euen in sinfull actions; Gods h free election of those whom hee purposeth to saue of his owne grace, without any motiues in, or from themselues; The immutabilitie of Gods i Loue & Grace towards the Saints, and their cer∣taine perseuerance therein vnto Saluation; The k Iu∣stification of sinners by the imputed righteousnesse of Christ, apprehended and applyed vnto them by a liuely faith; without the works of the Law. These are sound, and true, and comfortable, and profita∣ble, and necessary doctrines. And yet that impu∣dent Strumpet of Rome hath the forehead, I will not say to slander, my Text alloweth more, to blaspheme God, and his Truth, and the Ministers thereof for teaching them. Bellarmine, Gretser, Maldonate, & the Iesuites; but none more than our owne English Fugitiues, Bristow, Stapleton, Parsons, Kellison, and all the rabble of those Romish hell∣hounds, freely spend their mouthes in barking a∣gainst vs; as if we made God the author of sinne: as if wee would haue men sinne and be damned, by a

Stoicall fatall necessitie; sinne whether they will or no, and be damned whether they deserue it or no: as if wee opened a gappe to all licenciousnesse and prophanenesse; let men beleeue, it is no matter how they liue, heauen is their owne cock-sure: as if we cry∣ed downe good workes, & condemned charity. Slan∣ders loud, and false; yet easily blowne away with one single word, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. These imputations vp∣on vs and our doctrine are vniust: but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, let them that thus mis-report vs, know, that with∣out repentance their damnation will be iust.

It would be time not ill spent, to discouer the grounds of this obseruation, and to presse the vses of it something fully. But because my ayme lyeth another way; I can but point at them, and passe. If seldome Truth scape vnslandered, maruell not: the reasons are euident.

On Gods part, on Mans part, on the Diuels part. God suffereth, Man ray∣seth: & the Diuel furthereth these slanders against the Truth.

To begin ordine retrogrado, & to take [ 1] them backwards. First, on the Diuels part: a kinde of Contrariety and Antipathie betwixt him and it. Hee being the a Father of lies, and b Prince of darknesse, cannot away with the Truth, and with the Light: and therefore casteth vp slanders, as Fogs and Mists against the Truth to belie it, and [ 2] against the Light to darken it. Secondly, on mans [ 1] part: And that partly in the Vnderstanding; when the iudgement either of it selfe weake, or else wea∣kened through precipitancie, preiudice, or other∣wise, is deceiued with fallacies instead of sub∣stance,

and mistaketh seeming inferences, for ne∣cessary and naturall deductions. Partly in the Will; [ 2] when men of corrupt mindes set themselues pur∣posely against the knowne truth, and out of mali∣cious wilfulnesse (against the strong testimonie of their owne hearts) slander it, that so they may dis∣grace it, and them that professe it. Partly in the Affections; when men ouercome by carnall affecti∣ons, [ 3] are content to cheate their owne soules by gi∣uing such constructions to Gods Truth, as will for requital, giue largest allowance to their practices, and so rather chuse to crooken the Rule to their own bent, than to leuell themselues and their affections and liues according to the Rule. Thirdly, on Gods [ 3] part; who suffereth his owne Truth to be slande∣red and mistaken. Partly in his Iustice; as a fearefull [ 1] Iudgement c vpon wicked ones, whereby their hard hearts become yet more hardened, and their most iust condemnation yet more iust. Partly, in [ 2] his Goodnesse; as a powerfull fiery triall of true Do∣ctors, whose constancie and sinceritie is the more d approued with him, and the more eminent with men, if they e flie not when the Wolfe commeth, but keepe their standing, and stoutly maintaine Gods truth, when it is deepliest slandered, and hotliest opposed. And partly, in his Wisedome; as a rich oc∣casion [ 3] for those, whom hee hath gifted for it, f 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to awaken their zeale, to quicken vp their industrie, to muster vp their abilities, to scowre vp their spirituall armour, (which else through dis-vse might gather rust) for the defence,

and for the rescue of that g 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that pre∣cious truth whereof they are depositaries, & where∣with he hath entrusted them.

These are the Grounds. The Vses, for instruction briefly are, to teach and admonish euery one of vs: that wee be not either first, so wickedly malicious, [ 1] as without apparant cause, to rayse any slander; or [ 2] secondly, so foolishly credulous, as without seuere [ 3] examination, to beleeue any slander; or thirdly, so basely timorous, as to flinch from any part of Gods truth for any slander. But I must not insist. This from the slander.

Obserue fourthly, how peremptorie the Apostle is in his censure against the slanderers or abusers of holy truths: Whose damnation is iust. a Some vn∣derstand it with reference to the Slanderers; As we be slanderously reported, and as some affirme that wee say: Whose damnation is iust: that is, their damnati∣on is iust, who thus vniustly slander vs. b Others vnderstand it with reference to that vngodly reso∣solution: Let vs doe euill, that good may come; whose damnation is iust: that is, their damnation is iust for the euill they doe, who aduenture to doe any euill, vnder whatsoeuer pretence of good to come of it. Both expositions are good; and I rather embrace both, than preferre either. I euer held it a kinde of honest spirituall thrift; where there are two senses giuen of one place, both agreeable to the Analogie of Faith and Manners, both so indifferently appli∣able to the words and scope of the place, as that it is hard to say, which was rather intended; though

there was but one intended, yet to make vse of both. And so will we. Take it the first way: and the slanderer may reade his doome in it. Here is his wages, and his portion, and the meed and reward of his slander; Damnation. And it is a iust reward. He condemneth Gods truth vniustly: God condem∣neth him iustly for it; Whose damnation is iust. If we be countable (and wee are countable at the day of Iudgement) for c euery idle word we speake; though neither in it selfe false, nor yet hurtfull and preiudi∣ciall vnto others: what lesse than damnation can they expect, that with much falshood for the thing it selfe, and infinite preiudice in respect of others, blaspheme God and his holy Truth?

But if it be done of purpose, and in malice to de∣spight the Truth, and the Professors thereof: I scarce know whether there bee a greater sinne, or no. Maliciously to oppose the knowne Truth, is by most Diuines accounted a principall branch of that great vnpardonable sinne, the sinne against the holy Ghost: by some, the very sinne it selfe. I dare not say it is so; nor yet that it is vnpardonable, or hath finall impenitencie necessarily attending it: I would bee loth to interclude the hope of Repen∣tance from any sinner; or to confine Gods Mercy within any bounds. Yet thus much I thinke I may safely say; it commeth shrewdly neere the sinne a∣gainst the holy Ghost, and is a faire (or rather a foule) step towards it, and leaueth very little hope of pardon. That great sin against the holy Ghost, the Holy Ghost it selfe in the Scriptures chuseth, rather

than by any other to expresse by this name of a Blasphemie, Mat. 12. And whereas our Apostle, 1 Tim. 1. saith, That though he were a Blasphemer, yet b he obtained Mercy, because he did it ignorantly in vnbeliefe: he leaueth it questionable, but withall suspicious, whether there may bee any hope of Mercy for such as blaspheme maliciously, & against knowledge. If any mans be; certainly such a mans demnation is most iust.

But not all Slanders of Gods truth are of that deepe die: not all Slanderers, sinners in that high degree. God forbid they should. There are re∣spects, which much qualifie and lessen the sin. But yet allow it any in the least degree, and with the most fauourable circumstances; still the Apostles sentence standeth good: Without repentance their damnation is iust. Admit the Truth bee darke and difficult, and so easily to be mistaken: admit withall, the man be weake and ignorant, and so apt to mistake; his vnderstanding being neither distinct through in capacitie to apprehend and sort things aright, nor yet constant to it selfe through vnsettled∣nesse and leuitie of iudgement. Certainly his mis∣prision of the Truth is so much a lesser, than the others wilfull Calumnie; as it proceedeth lesse from the irregularitie of the Will to the Iudgement. And of such a man there is good hope, that both in time he may see his errour, and repent expresly and particularly for it; and that in the meane time he doth repent for it implicitè, & inclusiuely in his generall contrition for, and confession of the massie

lumpe of his hidden, and b secret, and vnknowne sinnes. This Charity bindeth vs both to hope for the future, and to thinke for the present: and Saint Pauls example and words in the c place but now alledged, are very comfortable to this purpose. But yet still thus much is certaine: He that through ignorance, or for want of apprehension or iudge∣ment, or by reason of whatsoeuer other defect or motiue, bringeth a slander vpon any diuine Truth; though neuer so perplexed with difficulties, or o∣pen to cauill: vnlesse he repent for it, either in the particular, (and that he must doe, if euer God open his eyes, and let him see his fault,) or at leastwise in the generall; it is still a damnable sinne in him; His damnation is iust. We haue the very case almost in terminis laid downe, and thus resolued in 2 Pet. 3. d In which are some things hard to be vnderstood, (obserue the condition of the things; hard to be vn∣derstood) which they that are vnlearned, and vnsta∣ble, (obserue also the condition of the persons; vn∣learned, and vnstable,) wrest, as they doe also the o∣ther Scriptures, to their owne destruction. Where we haue the matter of great difficultie, hard to bee vn∣derstood; the persons of small sufficiencie, vnlear∣ned, and vnstable, and yet if men, euen of that weak∣nesse, wrest and peruert truths, though of that hard∣nesse, they do it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to their own destruction, saith S. Peter there; to their owne iust damnation, saith S. Paul in my Text. This from the Censure in the first sense.

Take it in the other sense, with reference to this vngodly resolution, Let vs doe euill, that good may come: it teacheth vs, that no pretension of doing it in ordine ad Deum, for Gods glory, to a good end, or any other colour whatsoeuer, can excuse those that presume to doe euill; but that still the euill they doe is damnable, and it is but iust with God to render damnation to them for it; Whose damna∣tion is iust. And thus vnderstood, it openeth vs a way to the consideration of that maine Principle whereof I spake, and whereon by your patience I desire to spend the remainder of my time; namely this: We must not for any good, doe any euill. For the farther opening, and better vnderstanding where∣of, (since the rule is of infinite vse in the whole practice of our liues:) that wee may the better know when, and where, and how farre to apply it aright for the direction of our Consciences and Actions; we must of necessitie vnfold the extent of this word, euil, and consider the seuerall kinds and degrees of it distinctly and apart. Wee must not doe euill, that good may come.

First, euill is of two sorts. The euill of fault, and the euill of punishment. Malum delicti, and Malum supplicij; asaTertullian calleth them: or as the more receiued termes are, Malum Culpae, and Malum Paenae. The euill we commit against God, and the euill God inflicteth vpon vs. The euill we doe; vn∣iustly, but yet willingly: and the euill we suffer vn∣willingly, but yet iustly. In a word, the euill of sin, and the euill of paine. Touching euills of paine; if

the Case be put, when two such euils are propoun∣ded, and both cannot be auoided, whether we may not make choyce of the one, to auoide the other. The resolution is b common and good from the old Maxime, è malis minimum, we may incurre the lesser, to preuent the greater euill.

As wee may deliuer our purse to a Theefe, rather than fight vpon vnequall termes to saue it: and in a tempest cast our wares into the Sea, to lighten the Ship that it wracke not: and indure the launcing and ••earing of an old sore, to keepe it from festering and spreading.

And this Principle in my Text is not a rule for that Case: that being propounded concerning euils of Paine; whereas my Text is in∣tended onely of the euils of Sinne. Wee are here∣hence resolued, that we are not to do any euill, that good may come of it: for all which yet we may suffer some euill, that good may come of it. Al∣though (to note that by the way) the common an∣swer è malis minimum, euen in euils of Paine is to be vnderstood, (as most other practicall conclusi∣ons are) not as simply and vniuersally; but as com∣monly and ordinarily true. For (as c one saith well) perhaps there are Cases, wherin two euils of Paine being at once propounded, it may not bee safe for vs to be our owne caruers.

But I must let passe the Questions concerning e∣uils of Paine, as impertinencies. The euils of sin are of two sorts. Some are euill formally, simply, & per se; such as are directly against the scope & purpose of some of Gods Commandements: as Atheisme

against the first, Idolatry against the second, and so against the rest, Blasphemy, Prophanenesse, Disloyaltie, Crueltie, Adulterie, Iniustice, Calumny, Auarice, and the like; all which are euill in their owne nature, and can neuer (positis quibuscunque circumstantijs) be done well. Othersome are euill only respectiue∣ly, and by accident: but otherwise in their own na∣ture indifferent; and such as may be, and are done sometimes well, somtimes ill. To know the nature of which things the better, since they are of singu∣lar vse for the resolution of many Cases of Con∣science: wee must yet more distinctly inquire into the different kinds (or rather degrees) of indifferent things; and into the different meanes, whereby things otherwise in nature indifferent, become acci∣dentally euill for their vse.

Indifferent things are either equally, or vnequally such. We may call them for distinctions sake (and I thinke not altogether vnfitly) a indifferentia ad vt rumlibet; and b indifferentia ad vnum. Indiffe∣rentia ad vtrumlibet, or equally indifferent things are such, as (barely con••idered) are arbitrarie ei∣ther way, and hang in aequilibrio betweene good and euill, without turning the Scale either one way or other, as not hauing any notable inclinati∣on or propension vnto either rather than other: as to drinke fasting, to walke into the fields, or to life vp ones hand vnto his head, &c. Now concerning such things as these, if any man should bee so scru∣pulous, as to make a matter of conscience of them, and should desire to be resolued in point of Con∣science

whether they were good or euill; as namely, whether hee should do well or ill, to walke abroad into the fields a mile or two with his friend, the thing it selfe is so equally indifferent, that it were resolution enough to leaue it in medio, and to an∣swer him, there were neither good nor hurt in it: the Action of walking, barely considered, being not greatly either morally good, or morally euill.

I say, morally; for in matter of health or ciuilitie, or o∣therwise it may be good, or euill: but not c mo∣rally, and spiritually, and in matter of conscience.

And I say withall barely considered, for there may be circumstances, which may make it accidentally euill. As to walke abroad in the fields, when a man should be at Diuine Seruice in the Church, is by accident morally euill; through the circumstance of

Time: as on the contrary, not to walke, if we haue promised to meet a friend at such a time, and in such a place, who standeth need of our present helpe, is by accident morally euill, through the obligation of that former promise.

But yet still, these and other circumstances set aside; barely to walke, or barely not to walke, and the like, are Indif∣ferentia ad vtrumlibet, things in their owne nature (and that equally) indifferent.

Things vnequally indifferent are such, as though they be neither vniuersally good, nor absolutely e∣uill; yet euen barely considered, sway more or lesse rather the one way than the other. And that either vnto good, or vnto euill. Of the former sort are such outward actions, as being in Morall pre∣cepts

indefinitely commanded, are yet sometimes sinfully and ill done: as, giuing an Almes, hearing a Sermon, reprouing an offender; and the like. Which are in themselues good; and so to bee ac∣counted, rather than euill, though some vnhappy [ 2] circumstance or other may make them ill. Of the later sort are such outward actions, as beeing in Morall precepts indefinitely prohibited, are yet in some cases lawfull, and may be well done: as, swea∣ring an oath, trauelling on the Sabbath day, playing for money; and the like. Which are in themselues rather euill, than good, because they are euer euill, vnlesse all circumstances concurre to make them good. Now of these actions, though the former sort carry the face of good, the later of euill; yet in very truth both sorts are indifferent. Vnderstand mee aright: I do not meane indifferent indifferen∣tiâ contradictionis, such as may bee indifferently ei∣ther done, or not done; but indifferent onely in∣differentiâ contrarietatis, such as (suppose the do∣ing) may be indifferently either good or euill: be∣cause so they may bee done, as to be good, and so they may be done also, as to be euill. But yet with this difference, that those former, though indiffe∣rent, and in some cases euill, are yet of themselues notably & eminently inclined vnto good, rather than euill; and these later proportionably vnto euill ra∣ther than good. From which difference it com∣meth to passe, that to the Question barely proposed concerning the former actions, whether they bee good or euill; the answer is iust and warrantable,

to say indefinitely they are good: and contrarily con∣cerning the later actions, to say indefinitely, they are euill.

Which difference well weighed (to note that by the way) would serue to iustifie a common prac∣tice of most of vs in the exercise of our Ministerie, against such as distaste our doctrine for it, or vn∣iustly otherwise take offence at it. Ordinarily in our Sermons we indefinitiuely condemne as euill, swearing, and gaming for money, and dancing, and re∣creations vpon the Sabbath day, & going to Law, and retaliation of iniuries, and Monopolies, and raising of rents, and taking forfeitures of Bonds, &c. and in our owne coat Non-residency, and Pluralities, &c. Most of which yet, and many other of like nature, most of vs do, or should know to be in some cases lawful; and therefore in the number of those indifferent things which wee call Indifferentia ad vnum. You that are our hearers should bring so much charita∣ble discretion with you, when you heare vs in the Pulpits condemne things of this nature; as to vn∣derstand vs no otherwise, than wee either doe or should meane, and that is thus: that such and such things are euill, as now adaies, through the corrup∣tions of the times, most men vse them; and such as therefore should not be aduentured vpon with∣out mature & vnpartiall disquisition of the vpright∣nesse of our affections therein,

and a seuere triall of all circumstances, whether they carry weight enough with them to giue our consciences a suf∣ficient securitie, not onely of their lawfulnesse in

themselues, & at large, but of their particular law∣fulnesse too vnto vs, & then.

But this by the way.

Now to proceed. There are diuers meanes wher∣by things not simply euill, but in themselues (either equally, or vnequally) indifferent, may yet become accidentally euill. Any defect or obliquity, any vn∣happy enteruening circumstance, is enough to poi∣son a right good action, & to make it stark naught. I may aswell hope to graspe the Sea, as to compre∣hend all those meanes. I make choyce therefore to remember but a few of the chiefest; such as hap∣pen oft, and are very considerable. Things not sim∣ply euill, may accidentally become such; as by sun∣dry other meanes, so especially by one of these [ 1] three: Conscience, Scandall, and Comparison. First, Conscience; in regard of the Agent. Though the thing be good, yet if the Agent doe it with a con∣demning, or but a doubting Conscience, the Acti∣on becommeth euill. a To him that esteemeth any thing to be vncleane, to him it is vncleane; andb hee that doubteth, is damned if he eate, because he eateth [ 2] not of Faith, Chap. 14. of this Epistle. Secondly, Scandall; in regard of other men. Though the thing be good, yet if a brother c stumble, or be offended, or be made Weake by it, the action becommeth euill. dAll things are pure; but it is euill for that man who [ 3] eateth with offence, vers. 20. there. Thirdly, Compa∣rison; in regard of other actions. Though the thing be good, yet if we preferre it before better things, and neglect or omit them for it, the action becom∣meth euill. e Goe, and learne what that is, I will haue

mercie and not sacrifice: Matth. 9.

The stuffe thus prepared, by differencing out those things, which vndistinguished, might breed confu∣sion: our next businesse must be, to lay the Rule, and to apply it to the seuerall kinds of Euill, as they haue bin differenced. I foresaw we should not haue time to goe thorow all that was intended: and therefore we will content our selues for this time, with the consideration of this Rule, applyed to things simply euill. In them the Rule holdeth per∣petually, and without exception: That which is sim∣ply euill, may not for any good be done. We know not any greater good (for there is not any greater good) than the glory of God: we scarce know a lesser sin (if any sin may be accounted little) than a harm∣lesse officious lye. Yet may notathis be done; no not for that. Will you speake wickedly for God, and talke deceitfully for him? Iob 13.7. If not for the glory of God; then certainly not for any other inferiour end: not for the sauing of a life; not for the b con∣uersion of a soule; not for the peace of a Church; and (if euen that were possible too) not for the redemp∣tion of a world. No c intention of any end can war∣rant the choice of sinfull meanes to compasse it.

The reasons are strong. One is; because sinne in its owne nature, is a de numero ineligibilium: and therefore as not eligible propter se, for it own sake, (there is neither forme nor beautie in it, that wee should desire it;) so neither propter aliud, with refe∣rence to any farther end. Actus peccati non est ordi∣nabilis in bonum finem; is the common resolution

of the Schooles. In ciuill and popular elections, if men make choice of such a person, to beare any of∣fice or place among them; as by the locall Char∣ters, Ordinances, Statutes, or other Customes which should rule them in their choice, is altogether ine∣ligible: the election is de iure nulla, naught and voide; the incapacitie of the person elected, making a nullitie in the act of election. No lesse is it in morall actions and elections: if for any intended end we make choice of such meanes, as by the Law of God (which is our rule, and must guide vs) are ine∣ligible; and such is euery sinne.

Another reason is grounded vpon that Princi∣ple, a Bonum ex causa integra, Malum ex partiali. Any partiall or particular defect, in Obiect, End, Maner, or other Circumstance, is inough to make the whole action bad; but to make it good, there must be an vniuersall b concurrence of all requi∣site conditions in euery of these respects:

As a dis∣figured eye, or nose, or lippe, maketh the face defor∣med; but to make it comely, there is required the due proportion of euery part. And any one short Clause, or Prouiso, not legall, is sufficient to abate the whole writ or instrument, though in euerie other part absolute, and without exception.

The Intention then, be it granted neuer so good, is vn∣sufficient to warrant an Action good; so long as it faileth either in the object, or maner, or any requi∣site circumstance whatsoeuer. c Saul pretended a good end, in sparing the fat things of Amalek; that he might therewith do sacrifice to the Lord: but God

reiected both it and him, 1 Sam. 15. We can thinke no other, but that d Vzzah intended the safetie of Gods Arke, when it tottered in the cart, and hee stretched out his hand to stay it from falling: but God interpreted it a presumption, and punished it, 2 Sam. 6. Doubtlesse e Peter meant no hurt to Christ, but rather good; when hee tooke him aside, and aduised him to bee good to himselfe, and to keepe him out of danger: yet Christ rebuked him for it, and set him packing in the Diuils name, Get thee behinde me, Sathan, Mat. 16.

But what will wee say (and let that stand for a third reason) if our pretended good intention proue indeed no good intention? And certainly, be it as faire and glorious, as we could be content to ima∣gine it, such it will proue to be, if it set vs vpon any sinfull or vnwarranted meanes; indeed no good in∣tention, but a bad. For granted it must be, that the Intention of any end doth virtually include the meanes: as in a Syllogisme, the Premises doe the Conclusion. No more then can the choice of ill meanes proceed from a good intention; than can a false Conclusion be inferred from true Premises:

and that is impossible. From which ground it is, that the a Fathers, and other Diuines doe oftentimes argue from the intention to the action, and from the goodnesse of the one, to the goodnesse of both: to that purpose applying those speeches of our Sauiour, in the twelfth, and in the sixth of Matthew, b Either make the tree good, and his fruit good: or else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit cor∣rupt:

And, c if thine eye be single, thy whole bo∣dy shall be full of light: but if thine eye be euill, thy whole body shall be full of darknesse.

The light of the body, is the eye; & of the worke, the intention. No maruell, when the eye is euill, if the whole body bee darke; and when the intention is euill, if the whole worke be naught. That which deceiueth most men in iudging of good or bad intentions, is, that they take the end, and the intention, for one and the same thing: betwixt which two there is a spacious diffe∣rence. For the end, is the thing propter quid, for which we work, that whereat we aime in working, and so hath rationem causae finalis: but the intention is the cause à qua, from which we worke, that which setteth vs on working; and so hath rationem causae efficientis.

Now betweene these two kindes of causes, the finall and the efficient, there is not on∣ly a great difference, but euen a repugnancie; in such sort, as that it is impossible they should at any time cöincidere, which some other kindes of causes may doe.

It is therefore an error to thinke, that if the end bee good, the intention of that end must needs be good: for there may as well be d a bad intention of a good end, as a bad desire of a good obiect. Whatsoeuer the end be we intend, it is certaine that intention cannot be good, which put∣teth vs vpon the choice of euill meanes.

Me thinkes the Church of Rome should blush, (if her forehead dyed red with the blood of Gods Saints, were capable of any tincture of shame,) at the discouery of her manifold impostures, in coun∣terfeiting

of Reliques, in coyning of Miracles, in compiling of Legends, in gelding of good Au∣thors by expurgatory Indexes; in iuggling with Ma∣gistrates by lewd Equiuocations, &c. Practices war∣rantable by no pretence. Yet in their account but a piae fraudes; for so they terme them, no lesse ri∣diculously, than falsly: for the one word contradi∣cteth the other. But what doe I speake of these, but petty things, in comparison of those her lowder impieties? breaking couenants of truce and peace; dissoluing of lawfull, and dispensing for vnlawfull marriages; assoyling Subiects from their Oaths and Allegiance; plotting Treasons, and practising Rebel∣lions; excommunicating and dethroning Kings; ar∣bitrary disposing of Kingdomes; stabbing and mur∣thering of Princes; warranting vniust inuasions; and blowing vp Parliament houses. For all which, and diuers other foule attempts, their Catholique de∣fence is the aduancement (forsooth) of the Catho∣lique Cause: Like his in the Poet, b Quocunque mo∣do rem, is their Resolution: by right, or wrong, c the State of the Papacie must be vpheld. That is their vnum necessarium: and if heauen fauour not; rather than faile, helpe must be had from hell, to keepe Antichrist in his throne.

But let them passe, and touch neerer home. There are (God knoweth) many Ignorants abroad in the world: some of them so vnreasonable, as to thinke they haue sufficiently non-plus't any repro∣uer; if being admonished of something ill done, they haue but returned this poore reply, Is it not

better to do so, than to do worse? But alasse, what ne∣cessitie of doing either so, or worse; when Gods law bindeth thee from both?

a He that said, Doe not commit adultery; said also, Do not kill: and he that said, Doe not steale; said also, Doe not lie. If then thou lie, or kill, or doe any other sinne; though thou thinkest thereby to auoide stealth, or adul∣tery, or some other sinne: yet thou art become a transgressour of the Law; and by offending in one point of it, guilty of all. It is but a poore choyce, when a man is desperately resolued to cast him∣selfe away; whether hee should rather hang, or drowne, or stab, or pine himselfe to death: there may be more horror, more paine, more lingring, in one than another; but they all come to one period, and determine in the same point; death is the issue of them all. And it can be but a slender comfort for a man, that will needes thrust him∣selfe into the mouth of hell by sinning wilfully, that he is damned rather for lying, than for stea∣ling, or whoring, or killing, or some greater crime: Damnation is the wages of them all. Murther can but hang a man; and (without fauour) Petty-Larceny will hang a man too. The greatest sinnes can but damne a man; and (without Gods mer∣cie) the smallest will damne a man too.

But what? wil some reply: In case two sinnes be propounded, may I not doe the lesser, to auoide the greater? O∣therwise must I not of necessitie doe the greater? The answer is short and easie: If two sinnes bee propounded, doe neither. Emalis minimum, hol∣deth

as you heard (and yet not alwayes neither) in euils of Paine: But that is no Rule for euils of sinne. Here the safer Rule is, è malis nollum. And the rea∣son is sound; from the Principle wee haue in hand. If wee may not doe any euill, to procure a positiue good; certainely b much lesse may wee doe one euill, to auoide or preuent another.

But what if both cannot bee auoyded, but that one must needes be done? In such a straite may I not chuse the lesser? To thee; I say againe, as be∣fore, Chuse neither. To the Case, I answer; It is no Case: because, as it is put, it is a case impossible. For Nemo angustiatur ad peecandum▪ the Case cannot be supposed, wherin a man should be so straitned, as he could not come off fairly without sinning. A man by rashnesse, or feare, or frailety may foulely entangle himselfe; and through the powerfull en∣gagements of sinne driue himselfe into very nar∣row straites, or be so driuen by the fault or iniury of others: yet there cannot be any such straits, as should enforce a necessitie of sinning; but that still there is one path or other out of them without sinne.

The Perplexity that seemeth to bee in the things, is rather in the a men; who puzzle and lose themselues in the Labyrinths of sinne, because they care not to heed the clue that would leade them out, if it were well followed.

Say, a man through heate of bloud make a wicked vow to kill

his brother: here hee hath by his owne rashnesse brought himselfe into a seeming strait, that either he must commit a murther, or breake a vow; either of which seemeth to bee a great sinne, the one a∣gainst the fifth, the other against the third com∣mandement. But here is in very deed no strait or perplexity at all: Here is a faire open course for him without sinne.

Hee may breake his vow; and there an end, Neither is this the choyce of the lesser sinne; but onely the b loosening of the lesser bond: the bond of charitie being greater, than the bond of a promise; and there being good reason that (in termes of inconsistencie, when both cannot stand,) the lesser bond should yeeld to the greater. But is it not a sinne for a man to breake a vow? Yes; where it may be kept saluis charitate & iustitiae, there the breach is a sinne: but in the case proposed, it is no sinne. As Christ saith in the point of swearing, so it may be said in the point of breach of vow, c 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Neuer was any breach of vow; but it was peccatum, or ex peccato: the breaking is either it selfe formally a sinne; or it argueth at least a for∣mer sinne, in the making.

So as the sinne, in the case alledged, was before in making such an vnlaw∣full vow; and for that sinne the party must repent: but the breaking of it now it is made, is no new sinne; (rather it is a necessarie duty, and a branch of that repentance which is due for the former rashnesse in making it,) because a hurtfull vow is, (and that virtute praecepti) rather to be broken than

kept.

The d Aegyptian Midwiues, not by their owne fault, but by Pharaohs tyrannous command, are driuen into a narrow strait, enforcing a seeming necessitie of sinne: for either they must destroy the Hebrew children, and so sinne by Murther; or else they must deuise some hansome shift to carry it cleanely from the Kings knowledge, and so sinne by lying. And so they did; they chose rather to lye, than to kill: as indeed in the comparison it is by much the lesser sinne. But the very truth is, they should haue done neither:

they should flatly haue refused the Kings commandement, though with hazzard of their liues; and haue resolued rather to suffer any euil, than to do any. And so e Lot should haue done: hee should rather haue aduentured his owne life, and theirs too, in protecting the chastitie of his Daughters, and the safetie of his ghests; than haue offered the exposall of his Daughters to the lusts of the beastly Sodomites, though it were to redeeme his ghests from the a∣buse of fouler and more abominable filthinesse.

Absolutely; there cannot be a case imagined, wher∣in it should be impossible to auoide one sin, vnlesse by the committing of another.

The case which of all other commeth neerest to a Perplexity, is that of an erroneous conscience: because of a double bond; the bond of Gods Law; which to f transgresse, is a sinne; and the bond of particular conscience, which also to g transgresse, is a sinne. Where∣upon there seemeth to follow an ineuitable ne∣cessitie of sinning; when Gods Law requireth

one thing, and particular conscience dictateth the flat contrary: For in such a case, a man must ei∣ther obey Gods Law, and so sinne against his owne conscience; or obey his owne conscience, and so sinne against Gods Law. But neither in this case is there any Perplexitie at all in the things themselues: that which there is, is through the default of the man onely, whose iudgement being erroneous mis-leadeth his conscience, and so casteth him vpon a necessitie of sinning. But yet the necessitie is no simple, and absolute, and vnauoidable, and perpetuall necessitie: for it is onely a necessitie ex hypothesi, and for a time, and continueth but stante tali errore.

And still there is a way out betwixt those sinnes, and that without a third: and that way is deponere erroncam conscienti∣am. He must rectifie his iudgement, and reforme the errour of his Conscience, and then all is well. There is no perplexitie, no necessitie, no obligati∣on, no expediencie; which should either enforce, or perswade vs to any sinne. The resolution is damna∣ble, Let vs doe euill, that good may come.

I must take leaue, before I passe from this point, to make two instances; and to measure out from the Rule of my Text an answer to them both. They are such, as I would desire you of this place to take due and speciall consideration of. I desire to deale plainely; and I hope it shall bee (by Gods blessing vpon it) effectually, for your good, and the Chur∣ches peace. One instance shall bee in a sinne of Commission; the other, in a sinne of Omission.

The sinne of Commission wherein I would in∣stance, is indeed a sinne beyond Commission: it is the vsurping of the Magistrates Office without a Commission. The Question is; whether the zealous intention of a good end may not warrant it good, or at least excuse it from being euill, and a sinne? I need not frame a Case for the illustration of this in∣stance: the inconsiderate forwardnes of some hath made it to my hand. You may reade it in the disfi∣gured windowes and wals of this Church: Pictures, and Statua's, and Images; and for their sakes the windowes and walles wherein they stood, haue been heretofore, and of late pulled downe, and broken in pieces and defaced: without the Command, or so much as leaue of those who haue power to reforme things amisse in that kind. Charitie bindeth vs to thinke the best of those that haue done it: that is, that they did it out of a forward (though mis-go∣uerned) zeale; intending therein Gods glory in the farther suppression of Idolatry, by taking away these (as they supposed) likely occasions of it. Now in such a case as this, the Question is, whether the intention of such an end, can iustifie such a deed? And the fact of a Phinehes, Numb. 25. (who for a much like end, for the staying of the people from Idolatrie, executed vengeance vpon Zimri & Cos∣bi, being but a priuate man, and no Magistrate;) seemeth to make for it.

But my Text ruleth it otherwise. If it be euill; it is not to bee done, no not for the preuenting of Idolatry. I passe by some considerations otherwise

[ 1] of good moment; as namely first, whether Sta∣tua's and Pictures may not be permitted in Chri∣stian Churches, for the adorning of Gods House, and for ciuill and historicall vses, not only lawfully and decently, but euen profitably?

I must confesse, I neuer yet heard substantiall reason giuen, why they might not: at the least, so long as there is [ 2] no apparant danger of superstition. And second∣ly, whether things either in their first erection, or by succeeding abuse superstitious, may not bee profitably continued, if the Superstition be abo∣lished? Otherwise, not Pictures only, and Cros∣ses, and Images; but most of our Hospitals, and Schooles, and Colledges, and Churches too must downe: and so the hatred of Idolatrie should but Vsher in licentious Sacriledge, contrary to that passage of our Apostle in the next Chapter be∣fore this, a Thou that abhorrest Idols, committest [ 3] thou Sacriledge? And thirdly, whether these for∣ward ones haue not bewrayed somewhat their owne selfe-guiltinesse in this Act, at least for the manner of it, in doing it secretly, and in the dark?

A man should not dare to do that, which he would not willingly either bee seene when it is a doing, or [ 4] owne, being done. To passe by these; consider no more but this one thing onely, into what dange∣rous and vnsufferable absurdities a man might run, if hee should but follow these mens grounds. Er∣ranti nullus terminus: Errour knoweth no stay, and a false Principle once receiued, multiplieth into a b thousand absurd conclusions. It is good for men to

goe vpon sure grounds, else they may runne and wander in infinitum.

A little errour at the first, if there bee way giuen to it, will increase be∣yond beliefe; as a small sparke may fire a large City, and a c cloud no bigger than a mans hand, in short space ouerspread the face of the whole Heauens.

For grant, for the suppression of Ido∣latrie, in case the Magistrate will not doe his office, that it is lawfull for a priuate man to take vpon him to reforme what he thinketh amisse, and to doe the part and Office of a Magistrate (which must needs haue been their ground, if they had any, for this action:) there can be no sufficient cause giuen, why by the same reason, and vpon the same grounds, a priuate man may not take vpon him to establish Lawes, raise Powers, administer Iustice, execute Ma∣lefactors, or doe any other thing the Magistrate should doe; in case the Magistrate slacke to do his duty in any of the premises. Which if it were once granted (as granted it must bee, if these mens fact bee iustifiable;) euery wise man seeth, the end could bee no other but vast Anarchie and con∣fusion both in Church and Commonweale: where∣upon must vnauoidably follow the speedy sub∣uersion both of Religion and State. If things be a∣misse, and the Magistrate helpe it not; priuate men may lament it, and as occasion serueth, and their condition and calling permitteth, soberly and discreetly put the Magistrate in minde of it: But they may not make themselues Magistrates, to re∣forme it.

And as to the act of Phinehes: though I rather thinke he did; yet what if he did not well in so do∣ing? It is a thing we are not certaine of: and wee must haue certainer grounds for what we do, than [ 2] vncertaine examples. Secondly, what if Phinehes had the Magistrates authoritie to enable him to that attempt? It is not altogether improbable (to my apprehension) from the fifth verse of the chap∣ter, where the Story is laid downe, Numb. 25.5. e∣specially paralleld with another Story of much like circumstances, Exod. 32.27. that as there the Leuites, so here Phinehes drew the sword in execu∣tion [ 3] of the expresse command of Moses the su∣preme Magistrate. If neither thus, nor so: yet third∣ly, (which cutteth off all plea, and is the most com∣mon answere ordinarily giuen by Diuines to this and the like instances drawne from some singular actions of Gods Worthies;) Men of Heroicall spi∣rits and gifts, such as were Dauid, Samson, Ehud, Mo∣ses Elias, and some others, especially at such times as they were employed in some speciall seruice for the good of Gods Church, were exempt from the common rules of life: and did many things, (as we are to presume) not without the a secret motion and direction of Gods holy and powerful Spirit, which were therefore good in them (that secret direction being to them loco specialis mandati, like that to bAbraham for sacrificing his sonne) but not safe, or lawfull for vs to imitate. Opera liberi spiritus, c say Diuines, non sunt exigenda ad regulas commu∣nes, nec trahenda in exemplum vitae. The extraordi∣nary

Heroicall Acts of Gods Worthies are not to be measured by the common rules of life, nor to be∣come exemplary vnto others.

Of which nature was d Davids single combate with Goliah; and e Samsons pulling downe the house vpon himselfe and the Philistines; and f Moses slaying the E∣gyptian; and g Ehuds stabbing of King Eglon; and h Eliahs calling downe for fire from Heauen vpon the Captaines and their fifties, and diuers others recorded in Scripture.

Of which last fact we haue our blessed Sauiours iudgement, in Luk. 9. that it was done by the extraordinary and peculi∣ar instinct of Gods Spirit, but is not to be imitated by others, without iparticular certaine assurance of the like instinct. Where when the Disciples would haue called downe for fire from Heauen vpon the Samaritanes, and alleaged Elias for their precedent; k Lord, wilt thou that we command fire to come downe from Heauen and consume them, as Elias did? His answer was with a kinde of indignation (as both his lgesture and speeches shew) Nescitis cu∣ius spiritus estis; You know not what manner of spirit you are of. Elias was indued with an extraordinary spirit, in the freedome whereof he did what hee then did: but it is not for you or others to propose his example, vnlesse you can demonstrate his Spirit. And if Phinehes Act also was (as most m thinke it was) such as these:

it can no more iustifie the v∣surpation of Magistracie; than Dauids act can bloody Duels, or Samsons selfe-murther, or Moses's secret slaughter, or Ehuds King-killing, or

Eliahs priuate reuenge.

I haue stood the longer vpon the discouerie of this sinne, that men might take right iudgement of it; and not thinke it ei∣ther warrantable, or excusable by any pretension of zeale, or of whatsoeuer other good: and that both such as haue gone too farre this way in their prac∣tice already, for the time past, may acknowledge their own ouersight, and be sorry for it; and others seeing their errour, may for the time to come for∣beare such outrages; and keepe themselues within the due bounds of Christian sobrietie, and their particular Callings. And thus much of the former instance, in a matter of Commission. I am to giue you another, in a matter of Omission.

Euery omission of a necessary duty is simply euill, as a sinne. But affirmatiue duties, are but sometimes necessarie; because they doe not obligare ad sem∣per: as, being many, it is impossible they should. And many times duties otherwise necessarie; in case of Superiour reason and duties, cease to bee necessarie pro hîc & nunc: and then to omit them, is not to doe euill. Among other necessary duties this is one, for a Minister furnished with gifts and abilities for it; to acquaint Gods people with all ma∣teriall needfull truths, as hee can haue conuenient occasion thereunto. And (such conueniency sup∣posed) not to doe this, is asimply euill. Now then, to make the Case and the Question. The Case thus: A Minister hath iust opportunity to preach in a Congregation, not his owne: where he seeth or generally heareth some errour in iudgement, or

outragious sinne in practice to bee continued in with too publique allowance: Hee hath libertie to make choyce of his Text and theame, and leisure to prouide in some measure for it; and his consci∣ence telleth him, hee cannot pro hîc & nunc direct his speech with greater seruice to Gods Church, than against those errours or sinnes. Hee seeth on the other side some withdrawments: his discretion may perhaps bee called in question, for meddling where he needed not; hee shall possibly lose the good opinion of some, with whom he hath held faire correspondence hitherto; he shall preserue his own peace the better, if he turne his speech another way. This is the Case. The Question is, Whether these la∣ter considerations, and the good that may come thereby, bee sufficient to warrant vnto him the o∣mission of that necessary duty?

The rule of my Text resolueth it negatiuely: they are not sufficient. The Duty being necessarie, pro hic & nunc, it is simply euill to omit it; and there∣fore it may not be omitted for any other good. I deny not, but a Minister may with good discretion conceale many truths from his flocke; at least the opening and amplifying of them: if they bee not such, as are needfull for them to know, either for the stablishment of Faith, or practice of Life; as not onely many nice Schoole-points and Conclusi∣ons are, but also many Genealogies, and Leuiticall rites, and other things euen in the Scriptures themselues. Nay more, a Minister not onely in dis∣cretion may, but is euen in Conscience bound, at least

in the publike exercise of his Ministery, to conceale some particular truths from his Auditorie; yea though they be such as are needful for the practice of life, and for the settling of mens consciences: if they be such withall, as are not fit to bee publikely spoken of; as are many Resolutions of Cases apper∣taining to the seuenth Commandement (Thou shalt not commit adultery;) and some also appertaining to the eighth (Thou shalt not steale.) Our men a iust∣ly condemne the Popish Casuists, for their too much liberty in this kind in their Writings:

Whereby they reduce vices into an Art, vnder colour of re∣prouing them; and conuey into the mindes of b corrupt men, Notions of such prodigious fil∣thinesse, and artificial Leger-du-maine, as perhaps otherwise they would neuer haue dreamed on, or thirsted after. The loose writings of the vn∣chaste Poets are but c dull tutors of Lust, com∣pared with the authorized Tomes of our seuere Romish Votaries.

There be enourmous sinnes of this ranke, which a modest man would be ashamed so much as to name, especially in publike. Now of these, only the generalities would be touched in the publike; the specialties not vnfolded, but in the priuate exercise of our Ministery: nor yet that pro∣miscuously to euery one, that should out of curio∣sitie desire satisfaction in them; but onely to such men, (and that but onely so farre,) as they may con∣cerne

in point of conscience, and of practice. Be∣sides these, there are other Cases many, in which it may be more conuenient to conceale, than to teach some diuine truths at some times, and in some places.

But yet as the Case is here proposed, if it bee a truth questioned; about which Gods people are much distracted in their opinions; much mistaken by some through error in iudgement; much abused by sinfull, especially publike practice; occasioning Scandals and offences among brethren; likely to be ouerwhelmed with custome, or multitude of those that thinke or doe against it; and bee otherwise of materiall importance: I take it, the Omission of it vpon seasonable opportunitie, is a grieuous sinne, and not colourable by any pretence. Beloued, the Minister is not to come into the Pulpit, as a Fen∣cer vpon the stage, to play his prize, and to make a faire a flourish against sinne, (Here he could haue it, and there hee could haue it, but hath it no where:) but rather as a Captaine into the Field, to bend his forces especially against the strongest troupes of the enemy; and to squander, and breake thorow the thickest rankes; and to driue at the b fairest. It is not enough for a Prophet to c cry a∣loud, and to lift vp his voyce like a trumpet, and to tell Iudah and Israel of sinnes, and of transgressions at large: but if he would whet them vp to the battell, he must giue a more d certaine sound; he must tell Iudah of her sins, and Israel of her transgressions. If there be in Damascus, or Moab, or Ammon, or Ty∣rus,

or Iudah, or Israel; e three transgressions, or foure, more eminent than the rest: it is fit, they that are sent to Damascus, and Moab, and Ammon, and Tyrus, and Iudah, and Israel, should make them heare of those three or foure, more than all the rest. Sinnes and Errors, when they begin to get head and heart, must be handled roughly. Silence in such a case is a kinde of flattery: and it is f almost all one, when sinnes grow outragious; to hold our peace at them; and to cry Peace, Peace vnto them. Our Apostle in Act. 20. would not haue held himselfe sufficiently discharged from the guilt of other mens blood; if he had shunned (as occasion was of∣fered) to haue declared vnto them g 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, euen the whole counsell of God.

In my Application of this Instance and Case, blame me not, if I do it with some reference to my selfe. Being heretofore by appointment, as now againe I was, to prouide my selfe for this place a∣gainst such a meeting as this is; as in my conscience I then thought it needfull for me, I deliuered my minde, (and I dare say, the Truth too, for substance) something freely, touching the Ceremonies and Constitutions of our Church. And I haue now also with like freedome, shewed the vnlawfulnesse of the late disorderly attempts in this towne; and that from the ground of my present Text. I was then blamed for that; I thinke vniustly; (for I do not yet see what I should retract of that I then deliuered:) and it is not vnlikely, I shall be blamed againe for this, vnlesse I preuent it. You haue heard now al∣ready,

both heretofore, that to iudge any mans heart; and at this time, that to slander any truth, are (without repentance) sinnes iustly damnable: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they that offend either in the one, or the o∣ther, their damnation is iust. To preserue therefore both you from the Sinne, and my selfe from the Blame; consider, I pray you, with Reason and Cha∣rity, what I shall say.

You that are our hearers, know not with what hearts we speake vnto you: that is onely knowne to our owne hearts; and to a God, who is greater than our hearts, and knoweth all things. That which you are to looke at, and to regard, is, with what b truth we speake vnto you. So long as what wee preach is true, and agreeable to Gods Word, and right reason: you are not, vpon I know not what light surmizes or suspicions, to iudge with what spirits, or with what dispositions of heart wee preach. Whether we c preach Christ of enuie, and strife, or of good will; whether sincerely, or of conten∣tion; whether in pretence, or in truth; it is our owne good, or hurt: we must answer for that; and at our perill be it, if we doe not looke to that. But what is that to you?

Notwithstanding euery way, so long as it is Christ, and his truth which are preached, it is your part therein to reioyce. If an d Angel from heauen should preach any vntruth vnto you, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Let him bee accursed: but if the very Diuell of hell should preach the truth, he must be heard, and beleeued, and obeyed. So long as e Scribes and Pharisees hold them to Moses's Text & Do∣ctrine,

let them bee as damned f Hypocrites, as Scribes and Phrisees can be: yet all whatsoeuer they bid you obserue, that you are to obserue & do.

Let mee then demand: Did I euer deliuer any vntruth? It had beene well done then to haue shewne it, that I might haue acknowledged, and re∣tracted it. Did I speake nothing but the truth? with what conscience then could any that heard me say, as yet I heare some did; That I preached factiously, That I came to cast bones among them, That I might haue chosen a fitter Text, That I might haue had as much thankes to haue kept away? For Fa∣ction; [ 1] I hate it: my desire and ayme, next after the good of your soules, was, aboue all, the Peace of the Church, and the Vnity of Brethren. [ 2] For casting bones (if that must needs be the phrase) they were cast in these parts long before my com∣ming by that great enemy to peace and vnity, and busie sower of discord, the Diuell: otherwise I should not haue found at my first comming such snarling about them, and such g biting and de∣uouring one another, as I did. My endeuour was ra∣ther to haue gathered vp the bones, and to haue taken away the matter of difference, (I meane, the errour in iudgement about, and inconformity in practice vnto, the lawful Ceremonies of the Church) that so if it had been possible all might haue beene quiet, without despising or iudging one another for [ 3] these things. For thankes; I hold not that worth the answering: alas, it is a poore ayme for Gods Minister, to preach for thankes.

For the choyce of my Text and Argument, both [ 4] then and now: how is it not vnequall, that men, who plead (so as none more) for liberty and plain¦nesse in reprouing sinne, should not allow those that come amongst them that liberty and plaine∣nesse against themselues and their owne sinnes? I dare appeale to your selues. Haue you neuer been taught, that it is the Ministers dutie, as to oppose against all errours and sinnes in the generall, so to bend himselfe (as neere as hee can) especially a∣gainst the apparant errours and sinnes of his pre∣sent auditorie? And doe you not beleeue it is so? Why then might I not; nay, how ought I not, bend my speech, both then against a common er∣rour of sundry in these parts in point of Ceremony; and now against the late petulancy, (or at least ouer∣sight) of some mis-guided ones?

The noise of these things abroad; and the scandall taken there∣at by such as heare of them; and the ill fruits of them at home in breeding iealousies, and che∣rishing contentions among neighbours: cannot but stirre vs vp, if wee be sensible (as euery good member should be) of the damage and losse the Church acquireth by them, to put you in minde and to admonish you (as opportunities inuite vs) both priuately and publiquely.

Is it not time, trow yee, to thrust in the sickle, when the fields look white vnto the Haruest? Is it not time our Pulpits should a little eccho of these things, when all the Countrie farre and neere ringeth of them?

For my owne part; how euer others censure me,

I am sure, my owne heart telleth mee, I could not haue discharged my Conscience; if being called to this place, I should haue balked what either then or now I haue deliuered. My conscience prompt∣ing mee, all circumstances considered, that these things were pro hîc & nunc necessary to be deliue∣red, rather than any other: if for any outward infe∣riour respect I should haue passed them ouer with silence; I thinke I should haue much swarued from the Rule of my Text, and haue done a great euill, that some small good might come of it. But many thousand times better were it for me, that all the world should censure mee for speaking what they thinke I should not; than that my owne heart should condemne mee for not speaking what it tel∣leth me I should. And thus much of things simply euill.

I should proceed to apply this Rule, Wee must not doe euill, that good may come; vnto euils, not sim∣ply, but accidentally such: and that both in the ge∣neral, and also in some few specials of greatest vse; namely, vnto euils which become such through Conscience, Scandall, or Comparison. In my choyce of the Scripture, I aymed at all this: and had gathered much of my prouision for it. But the Cases being many and weighty; I foresaw I could not goe on∣ward with my first proiect, without much wrong∣ing one of both: either the things themselues, if I should contract my speech to the scantling of time; or you, if I should lengthen it to the weight of the matter. And therefore I resolued here to make an

end; and to giue place (as fit it is) to the businesse whereabout we meet. The Totall of what I haue said, and should say; is in effect but this: No pre∣tension of a good end, of a good meaning, of a good euent, of any good whatsoeuer; either can suffici∣ently warrant any sinfull action to be done, or iu∣stifie it being done: or sufficiently excuse the Omis∣sion of any necessarie dutie, when it is necessarie. Consider what I say, and the Lord giue you vnderstanding in all things. Now to God the Father, Son, and holy Spirit, &c.

Notes

• At a Visitation at Boston Linc. 24. April. 1621.
• §. 1. The Occa∣sion.
• a

  That thou mightest be iu∣stified in thy sayings, and mightest ouer∣come when thou art iudged Psal. 51.4.
• §. 2. Coherence,
• a

  Triplex in∣conueniens, Ly∣ranus hîc.
• b

  Vers. 5.
• c

  Vers 7.
• §. 3. Diuision,
• §. 4. and Summe of the Text.
• §. 5. OBSER. I. Diuine truths must be clea∣red from cauill.
• a

  Propter hos arguendos, fecit Paulus hîc qua∣si digressionem tractando haec. Caietan hîc.
• b

  Aut animo demas, aut viri∣bus addas. Dic∣tum Archida∣mi ad filium.
• c

  As Zuinglius said of Carolo∣stadius (whom hee iudged too weake to vn∣dertake the defence of the Truth against Luther in the point of Con∣substantiation) Non satis hu∣merorum habet. Sleidan.
• §. 6. OBSERV. II. The Slander of the Mini∣sters regular doctrine, is more than an ordinary Slander.
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• b

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Act. 14.15. & Iam. 5.17.
• c

  2. Cor. 5.20.
• d

  1. Thes. 2.13
• e

  1. Thes. 4.8.
• f

  We haue heard him speake blas∣phemous words against Moses, and a∣gainst God, Acts 6.11.
• §. 7. OBSER. III. The best truths are subiect to Slander.
• a

  Matth. 11.17, 18, 19.
• b

  Matth. 5.17.
• c

  Mat. 22.21.
• d

  Ioh. 19.12.
• e

  Luke 23.2.
• f

  Mat. 10.25.
• g

  Act. 17.28. & Esay. 26.12.
• h

  Rom. 9.11.15.18, &c.
• i

  Ioh. 13.1. Rom. 11.29. & 5.9.10. & 8.35.38.39.
• k

  Rom. 3.28.
• §. 8. With the Causes;
• a

  Ioh. 8.44.
• b

  Eph. 6.12.
• c

  2 Thess. 2.10.11.12.
• d

  1 Cor. 11.19.
• e

  Ioh. 10.12.
• f

  2 Tim. 1.6.
• g

  1 Tim. 6.20. & 2 Tim. 1.14.
• §. 9. and Corolla∣ries thereof.
• §. 10. OBSER. IV. Euery slan∣der,
• a

  Ambrosius; Lyra; Piscator; Pareus, &c.
• b

  Chrysosto∣mus; Caieta∣nus; Erasmus, &c.
• c

  Math. 12.36.
• §. 11. Whether ma∣licious.
• a

  Math. 12.31.32.
• b

  1 Tim. 1.13.
• §. 12. or not, is damnable.
• a

  Inuoluntari∣um minuit de ratione peccati.
• b

  Psal. 19.
• c

  1 Tim. 1.13.
• d

  2 Pet. 3.18.
• §. 13. We must not doe any euill, for any good.
• §. 14. Touching e∣uils of paine.
• a

  Tertul. l. 2. adu. Marcion cap. 14.
• b

  Inter haec da∣tur electio; & minus damnum facere licet, vt euitetur maius, Pareus hîc.
• c

  Slater on this place.
• §. 15. Euils of sin simply such.
• §. 16. Things equal∣ly indifferent,
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• b

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• c

  Quia eorum obiectum non includit ali∣quid pertinens ad ordinem ra∣tionis. Aquin. 1.2. qu. 18. art. 8. in corp.
• §. 17. And things vnequally in∣different.
• §. 18. A profitable digression, oc∣casioned from the premises.
• a

  Let euery man be fully perswaded (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) in his owne mind, vers. 5.
• §. 19. How things become acci∣dentally euill.
• a

  Rom. 14.14
• b

  Ibid. vers. 23.
• c

  Ibid. vers. 21
• d

  Ibid. vers. 20
• e

  Matth. 9.13.
• §. 20. Nothing sim∣ply euill, may be done for any good to come there∣by.
• a

  Vide fusè Augustinum in lib. de Menda∣cio; & contra Mendacium; & alibi.
• b

  Ad sempiter∣nam salutē nul∣lus ducendus est opitulante men∣dacio. Aug de mendac. c. 19.
• c

  Ea quae con∣stat esse peccatae, nullo bonae cau∣sae obtentu, ••ullo quasi bono fine, nulla velut bo∣na intentione facionda sunt. Aug. contra Mendac. c 7.
• §. 21. The first Reas.
• a

  Suapte natu∣râ repugnat peccato, quòd sit eligibile: & propterea nec propter se, nec propter aliud bonum, est eligi∣bile. Caiet. in hunc locum.
• §. 22. The second reason.
• a

  Aquin. 1. secundae. qu. 18 art. 4. ad. 3. & qu. 19. art. 6. ad 1. ex Dionysio, cap. 4 de di∣uin. nomin.
• b

  Non est actio bona simplici∣ter, nisi omnes bonitates con∣currant: sed quilibet defe∣ctus singularis causat malum. Aquin. 1.2. qu. 18. art. 4. ad. 3.
• c

  1. Sam. 15.20. &c.
• d

  2 Sam. 6.6, 7.
• e

  Math. 16.22.23.
• §. 23. The third Reason.
• a

  Greg. lib. 28. Moral. cap. 13. Euseb. Emiss. hom. 26. and others.
• b

  Math. 12.33
• c

  Math. 6.22.23.
• d

  Sed videte ne fortè non sit verè oculus simplex, qui falletur. Ber∣nard. de prae∣cept. & dispen∣sat.
• §. 24. The first In∣ference a∣gainst the Church of Rome.
• a

  Sancta Hy∣pocrisis, was Dominicus his word.
• b

  Horat. lib. 1. Epist. 1.
• c

  Gaudeo, siue per veritatem, siue per occasi∣onem, Romanae Ecclesiae digni∣tatem extolli. Ioseph. Ste∣phanus de Osc. ped. in Epist. ad lect.
• §. 25. The second Inference a∣gainst a vul∣gar error▪
• a

  Iam. 2.10.11.
• b

  Eâdem doc∣trinâ quâ hor∣remus facere mala vt eueni∣ant bona, hor∣rere debemus facere mala vt euitemus peiora. Euitare enim peiora, multò minus bonum est; quàm euenire bonum, Cajetan. hic.
• §. 26. The obiection from the see∣ming case of perplexitie remoued.
• a

  Non enim da∣tur perplexio ex parte rerum: sed contingere po∣test ex parte ho∣minis nescientis euadere, nec vi∣dentis aditum euadendi absque ali quo peccato. Caiet hîc. See the glosse on dist. 13. item aduersus, where hee proueth against Grati∣an that there can be no per∣plexitie.
• b

  Non docet eligere minus peccatum, sed solutionem mi∣noris nexus. Caietanus hic. speaking of the Councell of Toledo. See c. 22. q. 4. per tot.
• c

  Math. 5.37.
• d

  Exod. 1.16, &c.
• e

  S. Augustin contra Men∣dac▪ c. 19.
• Gen. 19.8. Perturbatio a∣nimi fuit, non confilium. Hist. Scholast. in Gen. cap. 52.
• f

  Sinne is the transgression of the Law, 1 Ioh. 3.4.
• g

  Whatsoeuer is not of Faith, is sinne, Rom. 14.23.

  Omne quod fit contra conscien∣tiam, aedificat ad gehennam. c. 28. q. 1. Om∣nes. §. Ex his.
• §. 27. The Rule ap∣plyed in two instances.
• §. 28. The former instance.
• a

  Numb. 25.7, 8
• §. 29. Resolued from the rule of my Text.
• a

  Rom. 2.22.
• b

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Arist. li. 1 Phys. tec. 22.
• c

  3. King. 18.44, 45.
• §. 30. The example of Phinehes examined.
• a

  Nec Samson aliter excusa∣tur, quòd seip∣sum cum hosti∣bus ruinâ do∣mus oppressit, nisi quò laten∣ter Spiritus Sanctus hoc ius∣serat, qui per illum miracula faciebat. Aug. l. 1. de ciu. Dei ca. 21.

  Si defenditur non fuisse pec∣catum, priua∣tum habuisse Consilium in∣dubi••anter cre∣dendus est. Bern. de praec. & dispensat.
• b

  Gen. 22.2.
• c

  Chytr. in Gen. 14. & in Exod. 32.
• d

  1. Sam. 17.
• e

  Iudg. 16.30.
• f

  Exod. 2.12.
• g

  Iudg. 3.15, &c.
• h

  4. King. 1.10.12.
• i

  Imitand•• ab alijs exprimi nec possunt, ne•• debent, nisi eâ∣dem 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Spiritus ex∣citentur. Chytr. in Exod. 2.
• k

  Luk. 9.53.
• l

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Luk. 9.55.
• m

  De Phinees autem dicen∣dum est, quòd ex inspiratione diuina, zelo Dei commotus, hoc fecit. Aqui. 2.2. qu. 60. art. 6. ad 2. & Theo∣logi passim.
• §. 31. The later instance.
• a

  Sacerdos de∣bitor est, vt ve∣ritatem quam audiuit à Deo liberè praedicet. 11. qu. 3. noli timere. Ex Chrysost.
• §. 32. A Minister, in what Ca∣ses he may conceale some diuine truths from his au∣ditorie;
• a

  Moulin. Buckler of Faith, part. 2. sect. 4. and not onely ours, but some of their owne too: See Espenceus ad Tit. cap. 1.
• b

  In quibus plus proficit vi∣tiorum ignora∣tio, quàm cogni∣tio virtutis. Iustin. lib. 2. Hist. cap. 2.
• c

  Quis vete∣rum Poetarum plus obscoenita∣tis, impuritatis, flagitiorum, professus est, quàm docet Poenitentiale Burchardi? Quot sunt, qui ignorarent multa, quae ibi leguntur, nisi ex ipso didicissent? I.R. in confut. fab. Burdon. pag. 305. Quò Principum sacerdotum, negociatorum, ac praecipuè mulierum vitia in concionibus suis insectentur: quae saepiùs ita depingunt, vt obscoenitatem doceant. Erasm. in Adag. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• §. 33. and in what he may not.
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 1 Cor. 9.26.
• b

  Fight neither with small nor great, saue one∣ly with the King of Israel. 3 King. 22.31.
• c

  Esay 58.1.
• d

  If the trum∣pet giue an vn∣certaine sound, who shall pre∣pare himselfe to the battell? 1 Cor. 14.8.
• e

  Amos 1. & 2.
• f

  Penè idem est fidem nolle asserere, & ne∣gare. Fulgent. lib. 1. ad Thra∣sim. cap. 1. Si¦cut incauta lo∣cutio in erro∣rem pertrahit, ita indiscretum filentium in er∣rore relinquit. Greg. in Mo∣ral.
• g

  Act. 20.26, 27.
• §. 34. A more par∣ticular Ap∣plication, in defence of the former Sermon.
• a

  1 Ioh, 3.20.
• b

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Act. 17.11. Non requiritur quis, vel qualis praedicet; sed quid praedicet. Distinct. 19. Secundùm. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Plat. in Charmide.
• c

  Phil. 1.15 16.17.18.
• d

  Gal. 1.8.9.
• e

  Math. 23.2.3
• f

  Woe vnto you Scribes and Pharisees, Hypo∣crites, Math. 23.13, 14, &c.
• g

  Gal. 5.15.
• §. 35. The conclu∣sion.