The history of the world

§. VI. Of the Law of Nature.

OF the law of Nature as it is taken in generall, I finde no definition a∣mong the Schoolemen: only as it is considered in man, it is called the impression of diuine light, and a participation of the eternall law in the rea∣sonable creature. Lex naturalis est impressio diuini luminis in nobis, & par∣ticipatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura. VLPIAN defines the natu∣rall [unspec 40] law to be the same which nature hath taught all liuing creatures; Ius naturale est quod Natura omnia animalia docuit: and he afterward addeth, Ius ictud non humani gene∣ris proprium, sed omnium animalium quae terra mari{que} nascuntur, 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 commune est; The law of nature is not proper to man alone, but the same is common to all liuing crea∣tures, as well to birds, as to those which the Land and Sea produceth. But this definition is not generall, but of the naturall law in things of life.

The law of nature in generall, I take to be that disposition, instinct, and formall qualitie, which God in his eternall prouidence hath giuen & imprinted in the na∣ture of euery creature, animate, and inanimate. And as it is diuinum lumen in men, inlightning our formal reason; so is it more then sense in beasts; and more then ve∣getation [unspec 50] in plants. For it is not sense alone in beasts, which teacheth them at first sight, & without experience or instruction, to flie from the enemies of their liues: seeing that Bulls & Horses appeare vnto the sense more fearefull and terrible, then the least kinde of Dogs, and yet the Hare and Deere feedeth by the one, and flieth

from the other, yea though by them neuer seene before, and that as soone as they fall from their Dammes. Neither is it sense which hath taught other Beasts to prouide for Winter, Birds to build their nests, high or low, according to the tem∣pestuous or quiet seasons: or the Birds of India to make their nests on the smallest twigs which hang ouer Riuers, & not on any other part of the tree, or else where: to saue their egs and yong ones from the Monkies, and other beasts, whose weight such a twig will not beare: and which would feare to fall into the water. The in∣stances in this kind are exceeding many which may bee giuen. Neither is it out of the vegetable or growing 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of plants, that some trees, as the female of the Palmitto, will not beare any fruit except the male grow in sight. But this they doe [unspec 10] by that law, which the infinite and vnsearchable wisedome of God had in all eter∣nitie prouided for them, and for euery nature created. In man this law is double, corrupt, and incorrupt; corrupt, where the reason of man hath made it selfe sub∣iect, and a Vassal to passions, and affections brutall: and incorrupt, where time and custom hath bred in men a new nature, which also, as is aforesaid, is a kind of Law. For it was not by the law of Nature incorrupt, which S^t. Augustine calleth the law of reason, but by a nature blinded and corrupted, that the Germans did anciently allow of theft: and that other Nations were by law constrained to become Idola∣ters; that by the lawes of Lycurgus it was permitted to men to vse one anothers wife, and to the woman to choose them others besides their husbands, to beget [unspec 20] them with child: which law in those parts hath lasted long, and is not forgotten to this day.

The Scythians, and the people of both Indies, hold it lawfull to burie with them the best beloued wiues: as also they haue many other customes remem∣bred by G. Valentia, against nature and right reason.

And I know not from what authoritie it is that these lawes some men auow to be naturall: except it be of this corrupt nature, as (among others) to pay guile with guile: to become faithlesse among the faithlesse: to prouide for our selues by ano∣ther mans destruction: that iniurie is not done to him that is willing: to destroy those whom we feare, and the like. For taking the definition of naturall lawes, ci∣ther [unspec 30] out of S^t. Augustine or Aquinas, (the one calling it the impression of diuine light; the other, the dictate or sentence of practique reason) the same can teach vs, or incline vs to no other thing, then to the exercise of Iustice & vprightnesse: and not to of∣fer or performe any thing toward others, saue that which we would be content should be offered or performed toward our selues. For such is the law of nature to the mind, as the eie is to the bodie; and that which according to Dauid sheweth vs good, that is, the obseruation of those things which lead vs therby to our last end; which is eternall life: though of themselues not sufficient without faith and grace.

Now, that which is truly and properly the law of Nature, where the corruption is not taken for the law, is, as aforesaid, the impression of Gods diuine light in men, [unspec 40] and a participation of the law increated and eternall. For without any law written the right reason and vnderstanding, which God hath giuen vs, are abilities within our selues, sufficient to giue vs knowledge of the good and euill, which by our gra∣titude to God, and distribution of right to men, or by the contrarie, wee prepare and purchase for our selues. For when the Gentiles (saith S. PAVL) which haue not the Law, doe by nature those things contained in the law: they hauing not the law, are a law vnto themselues. Now, to loue God by whom we are, and to doe the same right to all men, which we desire should be done vnto vs, is an effect of the purest reason: in whose highest Turrets, the quiet of conscience hath made her resting place, and habitation. In arce altissima rationis quies habitat; Therefore, the Gentiles (saith [unspec 50] S. PAVL) which shew the effects of the law written in their hearts, haue their consciences for a witnesse of those effects: and the reprobate their thoughts to accuse them.

And it is most true, that whosoeuer is not a law vnto himselfe (while he hopeth to abuse the world by the aduantage of hypocrisie) worketh nothing else, but the

betraying of his owne soule, by craftie vnrighteousnesse, purchasing eternall per∣dition. For it helpeth vs not to hide our corrupt hearts from the worlds eie, seeing from him, who is an infinite eie, we cannot hide them: some Garlands wee may gather in this May-game of the world, Sed flos ille, dum loquimur, arescit; Those flowers wither while we discourse of their colours, or are in gathering them. That wee should therefore inhabit and dwell within our selues, and become fearefull wit∣nesses of our secretest euils, did that reuerend Philosopher Pythagor as teach in this golden precept: Nil turpe committ as, neque coram alijs, neque tecum, maximè omnium verere teipsum; Commit nothing foule or dishonest, saith he, neither to be knowne to o∣thers, nor to thine owne heart: but aboue all men reuerence thine owne conscience. And [unspec 10] this may be a precept of nature and right reason: by which law, men, and all crea∣tures, and bodies, are inclined to those operations, which are answerable to their owne forme; as fire to giue heate. Now, as the reasonable minde is the forme of man, so is he aptly moued to those things which his proper forme presenteth vn∣to him: to 〈◊〉〈◊〉, to that which right reason offereth; and the acts of right reason, are the acts of vertue: and in the breach of the rules of this reason, is man least excu∣sable: as being a reasonable creature. For all else, both sensitiue, growing, and in∣animate, obay the law which God imposed on them at their first creation.

The Earth performeth her office, according to the Law of God in nature: for it bringeth forth the bud of the hearbe which seedeth seede, &c. and the Beast, [unspec 20] which liueth thereon. He gaue a Law to the Seas, and commanded them to keepe their bounds: which they obay. He made a decree for the raine, and a way for the lightning of the thunders. He caused the Sunne to moue, and to giue light, and to serue for signes and for seasons. Were these as rebellious as man, for whose sake they were created, or did they once breake the law of their natures and formes, the whole world would then perish, and all returne to the first Chaos, darkenesse, and confusion.

By this naturall Law, or Law of humane reason, did Caine perceiue his owne wickednesse, and offence, in the murther of Abel: for he not onely feared the dis∣pleasure of God, but the reuenge of Men: it being written in his reason, that [unspec 30] whatsoeuer he performed towards others, the same by others might bee done vnto him againe. And that this iudgement of well and euill doing, was put into our natures by God, and his eternall law, before the law written: Moses in the person of God witnesseth, Gen. the fourth: If thou doe well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou doe not well, sinne lyeth at thy dore.

The Schoolemen are large also in this question of the naturall Law: the same being opened amply by Reinerius, Antoninus, and Valentia. But it is not my purpose to write a volume of this subiect.

But this law which Thomas Aquinas calleth an act of reason taken properly, and not a habite, as it is an euident naturall iudgemēt of practique reason: they diuide into [unspec 40] indemonstrable, or needing no demonstration (as that good is to be followed, and euill eschewed) and demonstrable, which is euidently proued, out of higher and more vniuersall propositions. Againe, as it answereth the naturall appetite, prescri∣bing things to be desired as good, or to be auoided as euill (as of the first, to desire to liue, and to satisfie hunger, &c. and of the second, to eschew paines, sorrow, and death) in this consideration they diuide it, according to the diuers kinds of appe∣tites that are in vs. For in euery man there are 3. sorts of appetites, which answere the three degrees of naturall Law. The first is, to be that which we are; in which is comprehended the desire, both to liue, and to preserue our being & life, also the desire of issue, with care to prouide for them: for the Father after his death liues in [unspec 50] his children; and therefore the desire of life comprehends the desire of children. And to these appetites are referred the first indemō strable lawes of nature, for the most part. For it needs no proofe, that all creatures should desire to be, to liue, and to be defended, and to liue in their issue, when they cannot in themselues. And as

man is a being, Ens or Res: so hee doth desire good, and shunne euill. For it is com∣mon to all things, to desire things agreeable to their owne natures, which is, to desire their owne good. And so is Good defined by Aristotle, to be that which all desire. Which definition Basil vpon the 44. Psalme approueth: Rectè quidem Bonum definierunt, Quod omnia expetunt; Rightly haue some men defined Good, or Goodnesse, to be that which all things desire.

The second kinde of appetite is of those things which appertaine to vs, as wee haue sense. Whence, by the law of Nature, wee desire the delights of euery sense; but with such moderation, as may neither glut vs with satietie, nor hurt vs with excesse. For as Sense it selfe is for the preseruation of life and being: so is it meete, [unspec 10] euen by the law of nature, that the sensitiue appetite should not carrie vs to the destruction, either of our life or being. And although (seeing both these kinds of appetites are in beasts) we may well say, that Nature hath giuen diuers lawes vnto them: In which sense the Ciuilians define Naturallright, or Ius naturale, to bee the same which Nature hath taught all liuing creatures; Yet the Schoolemen admit not, that the instincts of beasts can be properly called a Law, but onely a 〈◊〉〈◊〉, or Right, which is the matter, & aime of euery Law. For so they distinguish it; where Vlpian affirmeth, that Ius naturale is that, which Nature hath taught all liuing creatures. In this place (saith Valentia) Ius is not to be taken for a Law, but for the matter of the Law. And yet where Vlpian also distinguisheth the right belonging [unspec 20] to liuing creatures in generall, from the right belonging to men; calling the one Ius naturae, the other Ius gentium: the Diuines vnderstand the law of nature more largely, that is, for all euident dictates, precepts, or biddings of diuine reason: both in beasts and men; and restraine the law of Nations to a kinde of humane right.

The third appetite is of those things which appertaine properly to man, as he is a liuing creature reasonable: as well with relation to God, and to our Neigh∣bour, as for our selues: and the lawes of this appetite are the Commandements of our religion.

Now although there are many other branches and diuisions of this law of na∣ture answering the diuision of matter, which it prescribeth, and as manifold, as the [unspec 30] morall actions are which it commandeth or forbiddeth: yet is the law of nature but one law, according to Aquinas: first, because it hath one fountaine or roote in the naturall or motiue facultie, which is but one, stirring vp to good, and declining the contrarie: secondly, because all is contained in that generall naturall precept, That good is to be followed, and ill auoided: and thirdly, because all the parts are reduced to one and the same last end.

That this law of nature bindeth all creatures, it is manifest: and chiefly man; because he is indued with reason; in whom as reason groweth, so this band of obseruing the law of nature increaseth, Postquam ratio ad perfectum venit, tunc fit quod scriptum est, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 mandato, peccatum reuixit; When reason grew to perfection, [unspec 40] then it came to passe, which was written by S. PAVL, When the Commandement came, sinne reuiued. Neither is it a small warrant for this law of nature, when those which breake the same, are said by S. PAVL, To be deliuered ouer into a reprobate sense (or minde) to doe those things which are not conuenient: and againe, that their consciences beare witnesse, and their thoughts accuse them. For, though this law of nature stretch not to euery particular: as to command fasting and the like: yet, it commandeth in generall all good, and whatsoeuer is agreeable to right reason. And therefore, said DAMASCENE; homines facti sunt mali, declinando in id quod contra naturam est; Men (saith he) are made euill, by declining vnto that which is contrarie to nature: and S. AVGVSTINE, Omne vitium naturae nocet, ac per hoc contra naturam est; Euery vice [unspec 50] doth wrong to nature, and is therefore contrarie vnto it.

Neither yet are the rules of this law of nature so streight, but that they suffer ex∣ceptions in some particulars. For whereas by this law all men are borne Lords of the earth, yet it well alloweth inequalitie of portions, according to vnequal merit:

by taking from the euill, and giuing to the good: and by permitting and comman∣ding that all men shall enioy the fruits of their labours to themselues: according to the rules of justice and equitie.

And though the law of nature command, that all things bee restored which are left in trust, yet in some causes this her law she suffereth to be broken: as to denie a mad man his weapons, and the like, which he left in keeping while hee was sober. But the vniuersall principles can no more be changed, than the decrees of God are alterable: who according to S^t. PAVL, abideth faithfull, and cannot denie himselfe.

Notes

• Aug. in Epist. ad Hil. 89. & in 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. tract. 49.
• Vlp. de Iustitia & Iure. l. 1. tit. 1
• Supra §. 4. ex loco ad Rom. 7. 23.
• Theod. l. 9. de cu∣randis affect: 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Acosta.
• Nemo iure na∣turae cum alteri∣us 〈◊〉〈◊〉 locupletior 〈◊〉〈◊〉 debct.
• Psalm. 4.
• Rom. 2. ver. 14.
• Rom. 2. ver. 15.
• Gen. 1.
• Iob. c. 28.
• Tho. q. 94. art. 2.
• Ethic. l. 1. c. 1.
• Basil.
• Rom. 1. 28.
• Rom. 2. 15.
• L. 2. Fid. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. c. 30.
• 2. Tim. 2.