The philosophie, commonlie called, the morals vvritten by the learned philosopher Plutarch of Chæronea. Translated out of Greeke into English, and conferred with the Latine translations and the French, by Philemon Holland of Coventrie, Doctor in Physicke. VVhereunto are annexed the summaries necessary to be read before every treatise

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The philosophie, commonlie called, the morals vvritten by the learned philosopher Plutarch of Chæronea. Translated out of Greeke into English, and conferred with the Latine translations and the French, by Philemon Holland of Coventrie, Doctor in Physicke. VVhereunto are annexed the summaries necessary to be read before every treatise
Author
Plutarch.
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At London :: Printed by Arnold Hatfield,
1603.
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"The philosophie, commonlie called, the morals vvritten by the learned philosopher Plutarch of Chæronea. Translated out of Greeke into English, and conferred with the Latine translations and the French, by Philemon Holland of Coventrie, Doctor in Physicke. VVhereunto are annexed the summaries necessary to be read before every treatise." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A09800.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 4, 2024.

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The Summarie.

THey who have so highly chanted the excellency of man, extolling the vigor of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 wit and understanding; whatsoever they doe alledge to that purpose, have 〈◊〉〈◊〉 forgot the principall, which is to shew that all the sufficiencie of his intelligence is a fu∣rious [ 20] guide; his will, a bottomlesse gulfe and pit of confusion; the light of his reason, a deepe darke night; his lusts and desires, so many enraged beasts to rent and teare him in peeces, if God by some especiall and singular grace, doe not illumine, regenerate and conduct him. A∣mong a million of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 for the proofe and confirmation hereof, that which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it selfe unto us in this dialogue is most sufficient: for is not this wonderfull, and a certaine signe of a marvellous blindenesse of mans wisdome, to see those, who all their life time do nothing els but seeke after the sove∣raigne good, maintaine vertue, detest vices, condemne Athists, Epicureans, and Libertines, yet to dread, feare, yea and adore the sworne enemie of their salvation and true life, to wit, satan the divell? Yes verily, and that which now we reade, agreeable to certaine discourses heereafter following, and namely, wherein a disputation is held, wherefore the oracles now doecease? as also what this word EI. [ 30] signifieth, sheweth not onely the opinion of Plutarch and some other Philosophers as touching these matters: but also the miserable state of all those who are abandoned to their owne sense, and void of the knowledge of the true God. And this ought to be remembred a second time, for feare lest in rea∣ding these discourses so eloquently penned, we be turned out of the right way: but rather contrariwise that we may perceive so much the better how vaine and detestable all the habit of man is, if it have for the ground and foundation, nothing but the conceits of his corrupt spirit. So then in this dialogue, we may behold the wisdome of the Greeks, running after Satan: and taking great paines for to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and set on foot one matter, which we ought to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and bury in perpetuall oblivion: or to touch withall their might and maine beside, that which the wisdome of the flesh cannot compasse. There be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 di∣vers personages who revive and set a worke the oracles of that priestresse or prophetesse at Delphos, [ 40] where was the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 temple of Apollo, the very cave and den of Satan, and wherein he exercised his trade and skill, with impostures and illusions incredible, during the space of many yeares. But to make this disposition of more force and validity, Plutarch after his accustomed fashion of broching and introducing his owne opinion by a third, following the stile and manner of the Academicks writing, bringeth to Delphos a stranger, who being together with Basilocles, Philinus, & other amused and occupied in beholding the statues which were there in great number, there began a discourse by way of disputation touching brasse and the propertie thereof. Which when it was well discussed and debated, Diogenianus demanded, why the ancient oracles were 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in homely verse & those in evill fa∣shion? whereto there were made divers answeres tending to this point, to make us beleeve, that where∣soever the words be most rusty, and worst couched, there we are to observe so much the more the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 [ 50] of the author. And this confirmeth fully, that which we have already spoken as touching the illusions of the divell, who is not content thus to abuse and deceive his slaves, but in this place hath to deale with a ridiculous & most apparent audaciousnesse, if the eyes of those whom he thus abuseth, had never so little 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to see the thousand part of his deceitfull guiles, as grosse and thicke as mountains-Continuing this discourse, they bandle afterwards the presages of these statues, and of others reared in divers places for the better authorising of the oracles; which when Boethus the Epicurean 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ,

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Plutarch replieth and reentreth into a common place, concerning the gravitie of these rude and ill fashioned oracles, conferring them with those of Sibylla, and mainteining the authoritie of them with his companions, through all the reasons they could devise. These be in summe, the contents of this Dialogue, which comprehendeth divers matters dependant thereof, and those noted in their order: the conclusion whereof is this, That as reprovable they be, who tax the simplicity and rudenesse of such ora∣cles, as those, who otherwise controll them for their ambiguity, obliquity and obscurity.

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