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THey are made either by election or by lot, or by both together. The election or choice is referred to one alone who names and chooseth whom hee pleaseth, which is the ordinary manner in all prin∣cipallities; or else it is referred to many; and is done either by voice, or in lifting vp the hand and voice; or by billets or by beans. The Lot is cast, either vpon certaine
Citizens, out of which they will choose some one to im∣ploy in some charge; or vpon all those which are of the same age or the same condition, out of which they will likewise by Lot draw one or two to aduance them to some Office. The Lot and choyce concurres together di∣uersly. For either they choose a certaine number by voices, out of which afterwards they desire to draw one to bee an Officer; or hauing drawne many by Lot, they giue them power to choose one amongst them, which is held most capable.
In this difference it is to be obserued, that the discon∣tent of those which are not chosen is the lesse, when the Lot proceeds the choyce, then when the choyce goes be∣fore the Lot. Wherefore in places whereas hatred is ir∣reconcilliable, it were better to make vse of this last kind, then of the first.
Let vs now see what time Officers ought to remaine in the exercise of their charges. This is diuersly obserued. In some Estates they continue them during life: In others they are limmited to a certaine time. In some for a yeere; in others for two; and in others, although they were continued in their places during life, yet being many in the same charge, they made them serue alternatiuely one after another.
They which haue beene of opinion to make Officers temporary, and not to continue them during life, had for their principall consideration to abate the insolence and pride which a long command brought with it; as also to haue meanes to call Officers to an Accompt, hauing giuen ouer their charges, fearing they should not bee able to draw them so easily, being still in authority: In like man∣ner to preuent the impunity of those, which had transgres∣sed in their Offices. To make many pertakers of the E∣state, not onely to satisfie the ambitious, to cut off discont∣ments; but also to recompence many good men, & to make more capable of affairs, & to stir them vp to the care of the
publique. Some also haue beene of this opinion, to hin∣der that the gouernment might not bee vsurped by few men, who would make the rest subiect: hauing beene of∣ten seene by many examples, that the continuance of com∣mand hath made vsurpations easie, not onely vpon popular estates, but also in principalities and seignouries; the Offi∣ces and charges for life hauing beene made hereditary and patrimonicall in many estates.
They which would perpetuate them, haue had other consideration: For that making the Magistrates Annall, or for a short time they leaue their Offices before they are informed of their duties; so as the Estate falls alwayes in∣to the hands of vncapable men, and by these suddaine and frequent changes, most part of affaires remaine vndeci∣ded, Warrs begunne left vnperfit, Suits and differences laid by, and punishments and executions delayed. There is another consideration, which is, that the time being short, the Merchants study to doe their businesse speedily: and this change brings nothing, but new starued hors-lea∣ches, which must be filled; whereas they which are already full by their offices, might giue more ease vnto the people.
And as from new seruants growes the enuie of Families, so from new Magistrates proceeds the fall of Estates, which bring new Councells, new designes, new Lawes, new Customes, new Edicts, new kinds of liuing, and new Iudgements. Tiberius to withdraw the greate men of Rome from the knowledge of publique affaires, and to assure those the more whom he imployed in Offices, hee continued them during life. Wherefore to auoid the greatest part of the inconueniences which are found in either party; you must consider the forme of the Estate, and the humour of the subiects.
Popular Estates are maintained by the continuall change of Magistrates, to the end that euery one according to his qualitie may haue his part, as they haue in a soue∣raigntie, and that equallitie (the nurse of a popular
Estate) may be the better entertayned by the annual succes∣sion of Magistrates; least that the custome of commaun∣ding long, should cause some one to desire to seaze vpon the Soueraignty: the which is a consideration which they ought to haue in Seignouries, and Estates gouerned by few persons.
In Principallities it is not needfull to teach Subiects to Command, but to obay. And being necessary to retayne them in their duties, they cannot assure themselues but of few to maintayne the rest. Yet to preuent that the conti∣nuance of a great charge should not make some one dream of the vsurpation of the Estate, they may in continuing o∣ther Officers in their places, ballance the power of great men, in giuing them companions as great as themselues: or after the expiration of some time, to cause them to passe from one charge to another, which hath more honour but lesse power. Wherfore some haue held it fit, to distinguish the charges whereon the force depends, from those to whom they wil giue authority; and to make others aboue them, who shall haue more honour then authority or power.
This course is obserued by the Pope and the Seignoury of Venice. The gouernments depending on the Church, the authority is giuen to a Clergy-man for the gouernment, but the force is committed to another, who depends im∣mediatly on the Pope; yet hauing charge, in that which shal concerne the gouernment, to assist the resolutions of him that hath the authority. In gouernments depending on the Seignoury of Venice, a Gentleman of the Common∣weale commaunds: and for the Forces a Captayne of the Seignoury, who hath charge to assist him. But in neyther of these Estates, the Gouernour and he which commands the Forces, are not linckt together, as the one would fauour the vsurpation of his Companion. For as the Gouernour would not allow of his vsurpation that commaunds the Forces, for that it cannot be done but against his authority:
so he cannot expect and assistance from him, fearing that hauing made this ouerture, and the other making shew to yeeld vnto it, being Master of the forces, the authori∣ty of the Estate and gouernour being weakned by this en∣terprize, he would chase him away, and make him∣selfe Master of the gouernment. And these charges be∣ing not the most honourable in an Estate, but there be∣ing others more eminent, those which enioy them, ay∣ming at the honour of the others, study not to settle them∣selues there; but contrariwise some affect to be made Cardinals, and to be drawne from those places, and the others to attaine vnto the chiefe Offices of the Seignoury.
Kings who haue but one sort of people to imploy in gouernments, make vse of other meanes, some make gouernments triennall, and not onely the gouernments of Prouinces, but also of Cittadels and Forts, cau∣sing that these depend not on the others: but in certaine things, and accompany the Gouernour with forces; which are not particularly at their deuotion, but one∣ly ••o farre forth as the Gouernours shall contayne them∣selues in the Princes seruice. But if the Gouernours cannot be changed, they may change the forces which ought to assist them.
But forasmuch as the Prince ought to be Master, and dispose freely of great places, it seemes that hee might giue them for a certayne time; and the affaires so requiring it, they might continue them to the same persons, if he thought it fit; if not hee might take them into his hands, and deliuer them to others, with∣out any cause of discontentment to those from whom he had taken them. For this expresse limitation of time would worke two effects: The one that they which are aduanced to these places; entring into them, would resolue to leaue them: the other, that being certayne they must goe forth, they will neuer thinke
to become Masters, and settle themselues: whereas the time not being limmited, euery one will striue to continue in his place, and there to build his designes; but also will desire to bring in after him some one of his Children or Kinsmen. And if the Prince desires to retire him, he must buy his place of him, or cause it to be bought by some other; which is to bring in a venality, more shamefull and dangerous in an Estate, then any other abuse that can bee imagi∣ned. We will therefore conclude, that this change in the gouernment of Prouinces, and the command of great Troupes or Companies, be it of Souldiers or others which haue great authority in the Estate, is necessary for the safety of the Soueraigne, and the peace of the Subiect.
But for that in doing this altogether, they which would desire to continue in their charges, might plot together and trouble the Estate, to maintayne them∣selues; he must change them one after another, cau∣sing the time of their charges to expire at diuers termes.
There is another consideration which hath beene discreetly and wisely made in great Estates, not to giue great commands in a Prouince to those which are Natiues, not onely to auoyde the Iniu••tices which such persons may commit as well in fauour of their Kinsfolkes and Friends, as in hatred of their Ene∣mies; but also to auoyde the contempt of his Au∣thority which giues these charges, which proceeds commonly from the Iealousie of those of the Coun∣trey, who hold themselues equall, and sometimes greater then he that is aduanced. But if he that is made Gouernour bee so great, as they neede not feare this Iealousie, yet the Prince must make vse of this meanes, to auoyde the swelling authority which hee may get in the Prouince by his owne meanes, or by that
of his Kinsfolkes and Friends, to the preiudice of his Master. Our ancient Ordinances conformable there∣in to those of the Romans, had therein very well pro∣uided, especially in regard of Bayleifes and Seneshals, who were the ancient Gouernours: But they haue beene and are yet very ill gouerned and obserued.
It auayles not to say, that to facilitate the obe∣dience of Subiects, they haue beene forced to take this course; the Subiect obeying more willingly one of his Prouince, who hee thinkes would haue the same affection like himselfe for that which concernes the good thereof, the which a Stranger and vnknown vnto him would not doe, whom he imagines to be vnlike in humour and will. For this were to make the Prince subiect to his Officer, and to make the obe∣dience of the people depend more on the credit which the Officer hath, then of the Authority which the Prince ought to haue ouer his Subiects, who obey not the Prince, but so farre forth as it shall please the Officer; and the Officer losing his credit, the Prince shall be no more obeyed.
But if in a new Estate to settle himselfe, it is very fitting to make vse of those which haue most credit with his Subiects, the Princes authority hauing not yet taken roote in their minds; but I will not thereby inferre that he must continue it: but contrariwise this authority being acknowledged, to settle it absolutely, the obedience must immediately depend, and they must obey the Officer so farre forth as he hath authority from the Prince, and not for the particular credit he hath among the people.
Three kinds of creating and making Magi∣strates.
By election. By lott.
By lot and e∣lection toge∣ther.
The continu∣ance of Offi∣cers is either for life or a cer∣taine time.
Reasons and considerations to make Offi∣cers for a time.
Reasons and considerations to perpetuate Offices during life.
The change of Offices and Magistrates necessary in a popular E∣state,.
Meanes to pre¦uent the vsur∣pation of the Estate by the continuance of officers ingreat charges.
The practize of the Pope and Seignoury of Venice, in the disposition of great charges to preuent vsur¦pation.
The practise of Kings & Prin∣ces vpon the same subiect.
That the chāge of principall Officers & Ma∣gistrates is ne∣cessary for the safety of the Prince & peace of the people.
Prudence re∣quired in this change.
That you may not giue great commands in a Prouince to those that were borne there.