The third generall point proposed, concerning the Logicall deter∣mination of this proposition [whom hee will, hee hard∣neth]: or concerning the im∣mediate or proper object of the induration here spoken of.

PHaraoh, we grant,* was har∣dened by Gods absolute, irresistible will. Could Beza, can Piscator, or any other Ex∣positor living enforce any Page  157 more, out of the literall mea∣ning of those texts? whether granting thus much, wee must grant withall (what their fol∣lowers, to my apprehension, demand) that Pharaoh was an absolute Reprobate from the wombe; or, that hee was by Gods irresistible will ordained to this hardening, which by Gods irresistible will did take possession of his heart, is the question to be disputed. They (unlesse I mistake their mea∣ning) affirme: I must even to death, deny. I desire then that in this case I may enjoy the ancient pivilege of Priests, to be tried by my Peeres, which (God wot) need not be great Page  158 ones. I will except against no man, of what profession, place or condition soever, either for being my Judge, or of my Jury, so his braines be qualified with the speculative rules of syllogi∣zing, and his heart seasoned with the doctrine of the ninth Commandemen•, which is, Not to •eare false witnesse against his Neighbour, against his know∣ledge.

To avoid the Sophisticall chinkes of scattered proposi•i∣ons, wherein Truth often lyes hid in rhetoricall or popular dis∣course, wee will joyne issue in this syllogisme.

Whatsoever God from eternity decrees by his irresistible will, is Page  159 absolutely necessarie, and inevi∣table, or impossible to be avoided.

God from eternitie decreed to harden Pharaoh by his irresistible will.

Ergò, The hardning of Phara∣oh was absolutely necessarie, and impossible to be avoided.

And if his hardning were in∣evitable, or impossible to bee avoided, it will bee taken as granted that he was a reprobate from the wombe; Damnatus antequàm natus, the absolute childe of eternall death, before he was made partaker of mor∣tall life.*

The Major proposition is a Maxime not questioned by any Christian, Jew, or M•home∣tane. Page  160 And out of it wee may draw another Major as unque∣stionable, but more immediate in respect of the conclusion proposed; [Whomsoever God decrees to harden by his irresistible will, his hardning is absolutely in∣evitable, altogether impossible to be avoided. The Minor, [Pha∣raoh was hardned by Gods irresi∣stible will] is granted by us, and (as wee are perswaded) avou∣ched in termes equivalent by our Apostle. The difference is about the conclusion or connexion of the termes; which without better limitation than is ex∣pressed in the proposition or corollarie annexed, is loose and Sophisticall.

Page  161Would some braine which God hath blest with naturall perspicacitie, art and opportu∣nitie, vouchsafe to take but a little paines in moulding such 〈◊〉 cases for the Praedicates, as Aristo•le hath done for the Sub∣jects of Propositions, (though those wee often use not, or use amisse) those seeming Syllo∣gismes whose secret flawes clear sighted judgements can hardly discerne, by light of arts would crack so fonly in framing, that bleare eyes would espie their ruptures without spectacles. It shall suffice mee at this time to shew how grosly the Syllo∣gisme propo•ed failes in the fundamentall rule of all affir∣mative Page  162 Syllogismes. The Rule is, Quaecunque conveniunt cum a∣liquo tertio, inter se conveniunt. All other rules concerning the quantitie of propositions, or their disposition in certaine Mood and Figure, serve onely to this end, that the convenience or identitie of the Major and Minor with the Medium may be made apparent. This being made apparent by Rules of art, the light of Nature assures us that the connexion betweene the Extremes is true and indis∣soluble.

Now this Identitie or Vnitie (for that is the highest and su∣rest degree of convenience) is of three sorts, of Essence, of Qualitie, Page  163 of Quantitie or proportion, under which is comprehended the Identitie of Time. Whatsoever is truly called one and the same, is so called in one of these respects. And all those Identi∣ties may be either Specificall (or Common;) or Numericall, Mixt or Single. Most Fallacies arise from substitution of one Identitie for another. As hee that would admit that propo∣sition for true of Specificall Iden∣titie, which is most true of Nu∣mericall, might bee cheated by this Syllogisme;

I cannot owe you the same summe which I have paid you.

But I have paid you ten pounds in Gold.

Page  164Ergo, I doe not owe you ten pounds in Gold.

The Negative included in the Major is true of the same Individuall or Numericall sum; but not of the same Specificall. For suppose twenty pounds in gold were due; the one moytie might be paid, and the other yet owing. But men of com∣mon understanding are not so apt to be deceived in matters of money or commoditie with captious collections of this kinde, as unable to give them a punctuall solution. Every Creditor in his owne case would be ready to give this or the like sufficient practicall an∣swer: I doe not demand my ten Page  165 pounds which are already paid; but the other ten pounds which are yet behind: that is (as a Logician would say) The same sum specie, which hath beene paid, may yet be owing; not the same numero: Or, the same sum by equivalence; not the same individuall coynes.

But the Intrusion or admissi∣on of one Numericall Identitie for another of different kinde, is not so easily discerned in mat∣ters not dist•nguishable by common sense; especially if the Relative or Antecedent be in ordinary discourse promiseu∣ously matched with both, and that conjunctim or divisim. The Numericall Identitie inclused betwixt the Relatives, [Whatso∣ever Page  166 and whomsoever, quis, quic∣quid, quaecunque] and their An∣tecedents whether expressed or understood, is sometimes an Identitie of Essence or Nature onely, sometimes of Qualitie onely, sometimes of Quantitie or proportion onely: sometimes of Essence and Qualitie, but not of Quantitie; sometimes of Essence and Quantitie, but not of Qualitie; sometimes of Qua∣litie and Quantitie, but not of Essence. These Rules are uni∣versally true, [Wheresoever the Minor proposition is charged with an Identitie of Qualitie, Quantitie, Time or Essence, wherewith the Major is not charged: or è contra Page  167 wheresoever the Major is char∣ged with any one or moe of these Identities, from which the Minor is free: the Syllo∣gism:, if it be affirmative, must needs bee false, and tainted with the fallacie of Composition. Of the former rule, that vulgar example, be∣cause best knowne, is most •it.

The Identitie included be∣tweene the Relative and the Antecedent in the Major pro∣position, is an Identitie of Es∣sence Page  168 or Substance onely. The Minor includes another Identi∣tie, of Qualitie, which cannot be admitted in the Conclusion; because not charged in the Ma∣jor. Had the Assumption beene thus; At heri •misti carnes ovil∣las, the conclusion would rightly have followed; Ergo, Carnes ovillas hodie comedisti; For this is a part of Essentiall unity. The fallacie is the same backwards and forwards;

Examples of fallacies against the latter rule are more frequent in most mens writings, than Page  169 vulgarly knowne. This for one;

The same sound which once pleaseth a judicious Musicians constant eare, will please it still.

But this present voice or sound, which is now taken up (suppose a young Quirister were singing) doth please his Masters eare.

Ergò, It will please it still to the very fall.

The Major supposeth an ex∣act Identitie not of Essence or Qualitie onelv, but of Propor∣tion: otherwise it is false. For the articulate sound may bee Numerically the same, as being uttered with one and the same continued breath. The voice likewise may be for its qualitie, Page  170 sweet and pleasant: but so weake and unartificiall, that it may relish of flatnesse in the fall; and so lose the proportion and consonancie which in the beginning or middle it had with a judicious Musicians eare, or internall Harmonie.

The forme of this following fallacie is the same;*

Whatsoever the eternall and immutable rule of goodnesse once approves as just and good, it al∣wayes so approves. For in that it is immutable, it is still the same; and if the object remaine the same, the approbation must needs be the same.

But the eternall and immutable rule of justice once approved the Page  171 humane nature, or the corporall reasonable creature, as just and good.

•rgo, It alwayes approves at least the humane nature, or reaso∣nable creature, as just and good.

The conclusion is evidently false, albeit wee restraine it to the same individuall humane nature, or reasonable creature which immutable goodnesse did actually approve. What is the reason? or where is the fault? in the connexion. The Major includes an exact Identitie not of Essence or Substance onely: but of Qualitie, or rather of Con∣sonancie to the immutable rule of goodnesse. And whiles this Identitie of Qualitie or Conso∣nancie Page  172 lasts, the rule of good∣nesse cannot but approve the nature thus consonant: otherwise it should bee mutable in its judgement, or approbation. The minor proposition suppo∣seth the same identitie of quali∣tie or consonancie; but not the continuance of it. And therefore the conclusion is only true of that time, wherein the identitie of consonancy remained entire.* That is, in few words; Though the humane nature continue still the same; or though Adam were still the same man, yet hee was not still one and the same in re∣spect of divine approbation. For that supposeth an identitie of qualitie, of justice and good∣nesse. Page  173 As these alter; so it al∣ters.

The Syllogisme last mentio∣ned would bee unanswerable, were their doctrine not fallaci∣ous or rather altogether false, which would perswade that every entitie, nature, or creature, quaialis, as such, is good and approveable by the Creator. Was it then the humane nature? No, but the humane nature so qualified as he created it, which he approved. And whatsoever other nature is so qualified as Adams was, when he approved it, hath still the same approba∣tion from the immutable rule of goodnesse, which he had: Be∣cause the consonancie to the di∣vine Page  174 will may bee the selfe same in natures numerically distinct.

The Syllogisme in which wee stated the seeming endlesse con∣troversie last, hath all the faults which these two last fallacies had, and a great many more. The Syllogisme was this;

Whatsoever God from eternitie hath decreed by his irresistible will, is inevit•ble. Or thus;

Whomsoever God from eter∣nity reproves or decrees to har∣den by his irresistible will, that mans reprobation or indurati∣on is inevitable.

But God from eternity re∣proved Pharaoh, and decreed to harden him by his irresisti∣ble will.

Page  175Ergo, Pharaohs reprobation or induration was inevitable.

The Major supposeth an Iden∣titie not of person onely, but of qualitie: yea of degrees of qua∣litie. For as the immediate ob∣ject of divine approbation is justice, consonancie or confor∣mitie to the immutable rule of goodnesse: so the immediate ob∣ject of reprobation or indura∣tion, is not the abstract entitie or nature of man; but the nature mis-qualified, that is, unjust or dissonant from the rule of goodnesse. And according to the degrees of injustice or disso∣nancie, are the degrees of divine dislike, of divine reprobation or induration. The minor proposi∣tion Page  176 includes not onely an iden∣titie of Pharaohs person, but such a measure of injustice or dissonancie, as makes him lia∣ble to the eternall decree of re∣probation or induration by Gods irresistible will. But it supposeth not this identitie of such bad qualities; or this full measure of iniquitie to have be••e alwayes in him. Without alteration of his person or na∣ture, he was subject to great va∣riety of qualification: and each qualification capable of divers degrees and different dispro∣portion with the eternall and un∣changeable rule of goodnesse. And therefore the minor proposition, albeit eternally true, yet is eter∣nally Page  177 true onely with reference to those points of time, wherein Pharaoh was so qualified. No universalitie can infer any more particulars than are contained under it: and all those it neces∣sarily infers. An universalitie of time cannot inferre an uni∣versalitie of the subject: nor an universalitie of the subject in∣ferre an universalitie of time. This collection is false, God from eternitie foresaw that all men would be sinners. Ergo, Hee fore∣saw from eternitie, that Adam in his integritie should bee a sinner. The inference in the former Syl∣logisme is as bad; God decreed to •ard•n Pharaoh from eternitie. Ergo, Hee decreed to harden him Page  178 in every moment of his life. Or, Ergo, He was a reprobate from his cradle. This conclusion rightly scanned, includes an universa∣litie of the subject, that is, all the severall objects of divine justice, which are contained in Pharaohs life; not one particu∣lar onely. Whereas Pharaoh in the minor proposition, is but one particular or individuall object of induration, or of the divine decree concerning it.

And thus at length we are ar∣rived at that point,* whence wee may descrie the occasions by which so many Writers of good note have missed the right streame or current of our Apostles discourse, and gravel∣led Page  179 themselves and their Audi∣tors upon by-shelves. All this hath beene for want of conside∣ration, That albeit Pharaoh from his birth unto his death, were but one and the same individuall man; yet was hee not all this while one and the same individuall object of Gods decree concerning mercie and induration.* The difference be∣twixt these wee may illustrate by many parallell resemblan∣ces. Suppose that Scepter (whose pedegree Homer so accurately describes) had in that long suc∣cession, lost any of his length; this had broken no square nor bred any quarrell, whether it had beene the same Scepter or not. Yet if the first and last owners Page  180 should have sold or bought scarlet by this one and the same Scepter; they should have found a great alteration in the measure. So then it is one thing to bee one and the self-same standard; and another thing, to bee one and the self-same staffe or scep∣ter. The least alteration in length or quantitie that can be, doth alter the identitie of any measure: but not the identitie of the materiall substance of that which is the measure. The same graines of barly which grow this yeare, may bee kept till se∣ven yeares hence. But hee that should lend gold according to their weight this yeare, and re∣ceive it according to their Page  181 weight at the seven yeares end, should finde great difference in the summes: though the grains bee for number and substance the same, yet their weight are divers. Or, suppose it to bee true which is related of the Great Magore, that hee weighs himselfe every yeare in gold, and distributes the summe thereof to the poore; and that he had continued this custome from the seventh yeare of his age: yet cannot there bee halfe the difference betwixt the weight of one and the same Prince in his child-hood and in his full age, after many heartie prayers to make him fat, as is betweene the different mea∣sures Page  182 of Pharaohs induration within the compasse of one yeare.

Therefore, this argument, [Pharaoh was hardned after the seventh plague by Gods irresistible will: Ergo, Hee was an irrecove∣rable reprobate from his child∣hood] is to a man of understan∣ding more grosse, than if wee should argue thus; [The Great Magore distributed to the poore five thousand pounds in gold in this fortieth yeare: •rgo, Hee distributed so much every yeare, since hee began this custome of weighing himselfe in gold.] For as he distributes unto the poore, not according to the identitie of his person, but according to the Page  183 identitie or diversitie of his weight: so doth the immuta∣ble rule of justice render unto every man, not according to the unitie of his person, but ac∣cording to the diversity of his worke. Unto the severall mea∣sures of one and the same mans iniquities, severall measures of induration, whether positive or privative, are allotted from eter∣nity. But finall induration by Gods irresistible will, or irre∣coverable reprobation, is the just recompence of the full measure of iniquity; or (as the Prophet speakes) To harden thus, is to •eale up iniquitie to de∣struction, without hope or pos∣sibility of pardon.

Page  184These two propositions are of like eternall truth; [God from eterniti• decreed by his irre∣sistible will to harden Pharaoh ha∣ving made up the full measure of his iniquitie:] and, [God from eternitie did not decree by his ir∣resistible will, that Pharaoh should make up such a measure of iniqui∣tie.] For hee doth not decree iniquity at all, much lesse full measures of iniquity. And yet, unlesse he so decree, not iniqui∣ty only, but the full measure of it; Pharaohs induration or re∣probation was not absolutely necessary, in respect of Gods eternall decree. For it was no more necessary, than was the full measure of iniquity unto Page  185 which it was due. And that (as hath beene said) was not neces∣sary, because not decreed by Gods irresistible will; without which, necessity it selfe hath no title of being.

From these deductions I may clear a debt for which I ingaged my selfe,* in my last publike me∣ditations. My promise was then, to make it evident that these two propositions [God from eternity decreed to harden Pharaoh by his irresistible will;] [God from eternitie did not decree to harden Pharaoh by his irresisti∣ble will,] might easily be made good friends, if their Abbe••ors would cease to urge them be∣yond their naturall dispositi∣ons. Page  186 From their natures, they are indefinites not singulars. Both, in a good sense, may bee made to tell the truth. But a wrangler may work them both to beare evidence for error. [God from eternitie did not decree to harden Pharaoh by his irresisti∣ble will,] is true of Pharaoh in his infancie or youth: but false of Pharaoh after his wilfull con∣tempt of Gods summons by signes and wonders.

Beza's collection upon this place,* is grounded upon the in∣definite truth of this affirmative, [God from eternity decreed to har∣den Pharaoh.] But hee extends this indefinite truth beyond its compasse. For hee makes it an Page  187 universall, in that hee termi∣nates the irresistible decree to every moment of Pharaohs life, without distinction of qualifi∣cation. And it may be, hee was of opinion, that as well each severall qualification, as each different measure of Pharaohs hardening or impenitency, did come to passe by Gods irresisti∣ble will. His error, into which the greatest Clerk living (espe∣cially if hee be not an accurate Philosopher) might easily slide, was in confounding eternitie with successive duration; and not distinguishing succession it selfe, from things durable or successive. Hee and many o∣thers in this argument speake• Page  188 as if they conceived that the necessarie coexistence of eterni∣tie with time did necessarily draw every mans whole course of life, motu quodam raptus, after such a manner as Astronomers suppose that the highest Spheare doth move the lower, whereas, if wee speake of the course, not of Pharaoh's naturall, but mo∣rall life; it was rather an incon∣dite heape or confused multi∣tude of durables, than one en∣tire uniforme duration. And each durable hath its distinct reference to the eternall decree. That which was eternally true of one, was not of all; much lesse eternally true of another. Eternitie it selfe, though im∣mutable, Page  189 though necessarily, though indivisibly co-existent to all, was not so indissolubly linked with any, but that Pha∣raoh might have altered or stay∣ed his course of life before that moment, wherein the measure of iniquitie was accomplished. But in that moment hee became so exorbitant, that the irresisti∣ble decree of induration did fasten upon him. His irregular motions have ever since be∣come irrevocable; not his acti∣ons onely, but his person, are carried headlong by the ever∣lasting revolution of the un∣changeable decree, everlasting unavoydable destruction.

The proposition or conclu∣sion Page  190 proposed, [Pharaoh was hardened by Gods irresistible will,] is true from all eternitie, throughout all eternitie; and therefore true from Pharaohs birth unto his death: but not therefore true of Pharaoh how∣soever qualified, or of all Phara∣oh's qualifications throughout the whole course of his life. For so the proposition becomes an universall, not onely in re∣spect of the time, but of the sub∣ject; that is, of all Pharaohs seve∣rall qualifications. The sense is, as if hee had said, [God from e∣ternitie decreed to harden Phara∣oh, howsoever qualified, as well in his infancie as in his full age, by his irresistible will: and thus ta∣ken Page  191 it is false. The inference is the same with the fore-mentio∣ned, [Adam in Gods foreknow∣ledge was a sinne• from eternitie; Ergo, Adam was alwayes a sin∣ner; a sinner before hee sinned, du∣ring the time of his innocencie:] or with this, God from all eternitie did decree by his irresistible will, that Adam should die the death; Ergo, Hee did decree by his irre∣sistible will, that Adam should die as soone as hee was created, or be a sinner all his life long.

To reconcile these two pro∣positions aright, [God from e∣ternitie decreed by his irresistible will that Adam should die,] [God from eternitie did not decree by his irresistible will, that Adam should Page  192 die,] otherwise than wee have reconciled the two former, [God from eternitie decreed to harden Pharaoh by his irresisti∣ble will;] [God from eternitie did not decree to harden Pharaoh by his irresistible will,] no Wri∣ter, I presume, will undertake. The onely reconciliation pos∣sible, is this, [God did decree by his irresistible will, that Adam 〈◊〉 s•o•ld die:] [God did not decree by his irresistible will, that 〈◊〉 not sinning, should die] nor did hee decree by his irresisti∣ble will, that Ad•m should sin, that hee might die. For (as wee said before) God did neither decree his fall, nor his perseve∣rance by his irresistible will. Page  193 And his death was no more in∣evitable than his fall. Nor was Pharaohs small induration more inevitable, than the mea∣sure of iniquitie to which such induration was from eternitie awarded by Gods irresistible will. Of Pharaoh thus conside∣red, the conclusion was true from eternitie; true in respect of every moment of Pharaohs life, wherein the measure of his iniquitie was, or might have beene accomplished; though it had beene accomplished within three yeares after his birth. And this accomplishment presup∣posed, the induration was most inevitable, his finall reprobati∣on as irrecoverable, as Gods Page  194 absolute will (taking absolute as it is opposed to disjunct) is irre∣sistible:

The same proposition in re∣spect of reprobation is univer∣sally true Vniversalitate subje∣cti,* that is, of every other per∣son so ill qualified as Pharaoh was, when God did harden him. Whosoever shall, at any time, become such a man as Pharaoh was then, is a repro∣bate from eternitie by Gods ir∣resistible will. And seeing no man is exempted from his juris∣diction, hee may harden whom hee will, after the same manner that hee hardened Pharaoh: al∣though de facto hee doth not so harden all the reprobates; that Page  195 is, hee reserves them not alive for examples to others, after the ordinary time appointed for their dissolution. Nor doth he tender ordinary meanes of re∣pentance to them, after the doore of repentance is shut up∣on them. God in his in•inite wisdome hath many secret pur∣poses incomprehensible to man; as, Why, of such as are equall offenders, one is more rigorously dealt with all than another: Why, of such as are equally disposed to goodnesse morall, one is called before another. That thus to dispense of mercy and justice in this life, doth argue no par∣tialitie or respect of persons with God, is an argument Page  196 elsewhere to be insisted upon.

The point whereupon wee are now to pitch, is this indefi∣nite, [Men are not reprobated or hardened by Gods irresistible will, before they come to such a pitch or hight of iniquity.* No man living shall ever bee able to make this inference good: Pharaoh was absolutely reproba∣ted from eternitie, that is, His re∣probation was immutable from e∣ternitie; Ergo, Pharaoh in his youth or infancie was a reprobate. To infer the consequence pro∣posed, no Medium more pro∣bable than this can possibly be brought; Pharaoh from his infan∣cy to his full age, was alwayes one and the selfe same man; Et de eo∣dem Page  197 impossibile est idem affirmari & negari. The consequence not∣withstanding is no better than this following: The Eclipse of the Moone was necessarie from the beginning; Ergo, The Moone was necessarily eclipsed in the first quarter, or in the prime; Because the Moone being of an incorruptible substance, hath continued one and the same since the creation. But unto this consequence every Ar∣tist could make replie, that the proper and immediate subject of the Eclipse is not the Nature or Substance of the Moone how∣soever considered; but in cer∣taine opposition to the Sunne. So that albeit this proposition, [The Moone shall be eclipsed] 〈◊〉 Page  198 true necessarily and from ever∣lasting: yet it is necessarie, yet it is true onely of the Moone in such Diame•rall opposition to the Sunne, that the Earth may cover it with her shadow as with a mantle. Whensoever it is in such opposition, it is necessarily Eclipsed. Whensoever it is not in such opposition to the Sunne, it cannot possibly by course of nature be Eclipsed. It is in like manner true which wee have often said, that the proper and immediate object of the eternall decree, concerning induration or reprobation, was not Phara∣ohs individuall Entitie or essence: but Pharaoh charged with a cer∣taine measure of iniquitie, or Page  199 separation from his God. Granting then that Pharaohs substance was one and the same, as incorruptible as the Moone: yet the degrees of his declination from the unchange∣able rule of justice, or of his op∣position to the fountaine of mercy and goodnesse, might be more than are the degrees of the Moones aberration or elongation from the Sunne. Now the All∣seeing providence did more ac∣curately calcul•te each word, each worke, each thought of Pharaoh, and their opposition to his goodnesse, than Astrono∣mers can doe the motions of the Moone or Planets. And will he not make his payment accor∣ding Page  200 to his calculation? So that in one and the selfe same Phara∣oh there might be more severall objects of the eternall decree, than are minutes or scruples in forty yeares motion of the Moone. Not the least varietie or alteration in his course of life, but had a proportionate conse∣quent of reward or punishment allotted to it from all eternitie, by the irresistible decree. Unto Pharaoh then having made up the full measure of his iniquitie, the irresistible induration and unrecoverable reprobation was, by the virtue of this eternall de∣cree, altogether necessarie and inevitable. But unto Pharaoh, before this measure of iniquity Page  201 was made up, neither indurati∣on nor irrecoverable reprobati∣on was so necessarie or inevita∣ble. To thinke the unchange∣able rule of justice should a∣ward the same measure of indu∣ration or reprobation unto farre different measures of ini∣quitie, is deeper than the dregges of Heathenisme: it is a doctrine which may not be vented where any Christian care is present.

The former resemblance is fully parallell to our resolution in all other points, save onely in this, that the eternall decree did not so necessary direct or impell Pharaoh to make up the full measure of his iniquitie, as it doth direct and guide the Page  202 course of the Moone, till it come in full and Diametrall opposition to the Sunne. Therefore this Si∣militude will not follow, The Moone, though not at this time Eclipsed; yet holds that course by the unchangeable decree, which in time will bring it to be in Dia∣metrall opposition to the Sunne, and by consequence to be Eclipsed: So though Pharaoh in his infanci• was not reprobated or hardened by Gods irresistible will; yet was hee by the eternall decree ordained to such reprobation or induration, without possibilitie of altering his course, or avoiding that oppositi∣on which his full age had unto divine goodnesse.

As every true convert or re∣generate Page  203 person may say with Saint Augustine, Ego non sum ego; I am become another man: so might it be truly said, in a con∣trarie sense, Pharaoh sometimes was not Pharaoh. When he was a childe, he spake as a childe, hee thought as a childe. His mouth was not opened against God: his minde was not set on mur∣ther. To have seene the Israeli∣tish infants strangled and expo∣sed to the mercilesse •louds, would more have affected his heart, being young and tender, than afterwards it did his daughters. Nor was that cruel∣tie, which in his full age hee practised, so contained in his infancie, as poison in the ser∣pents Page  204 egge. It did not grow up by kinde or necessitie of his na∣turall temper; much lesse was it infused by Gods irresistible will: but acquired by custome. The seeds of it were sowne by his owne selfe will: ambitious pride was the root: politick jelousie was the bud: tyrannie and oppression, the fruit. Nei∣ther was it necessary by the eter∣nall decree, that this corrupt seed should be sowne: or being sowne, that it should prosper and bud; or that after the bud∣ding, it should ripen in malig∣nity. During all this progresse from bad to worse, the imme∣diate object of Gods immuta∣ble and unresistible will was Page  205 mutabilitie in Pharaoh. But this progresse which was not neces∣sarie by any eternall decree or law, being de facto once accom∣plished; his destruction was in∣evitable, his induration unresi∣stible, his reprobation irreco∣verable, by the eternall and un∣controulable decree.

That Pharaoh in his youth or infancie was not such an object of Gods irresistible will for indura∣tion,* as in his full age hee be∣came, may be thus demonstra∣ted:

No man whose salvation as yet is truly possible, is utterly exclu∣ded by Gods irresistible will from salvation.

But the salvation of Pharaoh Page  206 in his youth or infancie was truly possible.

Ergo, Pharaoh in his youth or infancie, was not excluded by Gods irresistible will from salva∣tion.

Therefore, He was not then the object of Gods irresistible will for induration.

The Major is evident from the exposition of the termes. For God is said to will that on∣ly by his irresistible will, which hath no possibility of the con∣trary. The necessity of it like∣wise may bee made evident by the rules of conversion; No mans salvation that stands excluded by Gods irresistible will from salva∣tion, is truly possible: Ergo, No Page  207 man, whiles his salvation is possi∣ble, is utterly excluded by Gods irresistible will from salvation; or, which is all one; No man whiles his salvation is possible is either hardned or reprobated by Gods ir∣resistible will: or in Latine more perspicuously thus, Nullus per irresistibilem Dei voluntatem sa∣lute exclusus, est servabilis: Er∣go, Nullus servabilis (id est, quamdiu servari potest) est à sa∣lute exclusus per irresistibilem Dei voluntatem. No argument can be of such force or perspi∣cuitie as is this primary rule of argumentation:

The Minor, [Pharaohs salva∣tion Page  208 in his youth or infancie was truly possible,] is as evident from another Maxime in Divinitie; Quicquid non implicat contradi∣ctionem, est possibile; sive obje∣ctum Divinae potentiae. Now what contradiction could it imply, to save this childe, sup∣posing Pharaoh, more than it did to save another; for exam∣ple, Moses? Unlesse wee will say, that Pharaoh was made of another mould, or a creature of another Creator, than Moses or other children are. To save Pha∣raoh, as a sonne of Adam, could imply no contradiction: other∣wise, no flesh could possibly be saved. If to save Pharaoh after he had committed many actu∣all Page  209 sinnes and follies of youth, did imply any contradiction, what man of yeares, in this age especially, can hope for par∣don?

It will be replied, that albeit to save Pharaoh in his youth or infancie did imply no contra∣diction in the object; and there∣fore his salvation was not abso∣lutely it selfe impossible: yet it being supposed, that God from eternity decreed to harden him and destroy him by his irresi∣•ible will; it must needs im∣ply a contradiction in Gods de∣cree or will to save him; and by consequent, his salvation was impossible ex Hypothesi.

This answer is like a medi∣cine Page  210 which drives the malady from the outward parts where∣to it is applied, unto the heart. It removes the difficultie into a more dangerous point. For wee may with safetie inferre, That God did not decree by his irresisti∣ble will to exclude Pharaoh in his youth or infancie from possibilitie of salvation: because, to have sa∣ved Pharaoh in his youth or infan∣cie was in it selfe not impossible, as implying no contradiction.

In bodies naturall, so long as the passive disposition or capa∣citie continueth, the same effect will necessarily follow; unlesse the efficacie or the application of the agent alter. I dem secundum idem, semper natum est producere Page  211 idem: He which is alwayes the same without possibility of al∣teration in himselfe, is at all times equally able to doe all things that in themselves are not impossible. And no man, I thinke, will say that Pharaohs election in his infancie was in it selfe more impossible, than his owne reprobation was. And hee that thinketh his owne re∣probation was in it selfe impos∣sible, cannot thinke himselfe so much bound to God, as he ma∣keth shew of, for his infallible election.

If from the former proposi∣tion, Whatsoever is absolutely possible to God, is alwayes possible to him, a man should thus as∣sume; Page  212 To have shewed mercie to Pharaoh was absolutely possible to God, and hence conclude; Er∣go, It is possible to God, to shew mercie on him at this instant: the illation, whatsoever the asserti∣on be, includes the same fallacie of composition, which was before discovered in the Syllogisme, Quas emisti carnes, casdem come∣disti; Sed crudas emisti, &c. For Pharaoh, though unto this day, one and the same reasonable soule; yet is he not one and the same object of Gods eternall decree for hardning or shewing mercie. To save any man of Gods making, implies no con∣tradiction unto that in•inite power by which he was made. Page  213 To save any man that hath not made up the full measure of his iniquitie, implies no contradi∣ction to his infinite goodnesse, no impeachment to his Maje∣stie: it is agreeable to his good∣nesse. To save such as have made up the full measure of their iniquitie, alwayes implies a contradiction to his immuta∣ble justice. And all such, and (for ought we know) only such, are the immediate objects of his eternall, absolute and irresi∣stible will or purpose of repro∣bation. But when the measure of any mans iniquitie is made up, or how farre it is made up, is onely knowne to the all-see∣ing Judge. This is the secret Page  214 wherewith flesh and bloud may not meddle; as being es∣sentially annexed to the prero∣gative of eternall Majestie, b∣longing only to the cognizance of infinite wisdome.